Bains v Arsalan - Funeral Arrangements [2026] EWHC 1597 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1597 (Fam)Case No FD26P00329
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF S116 OF THE SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981
IN THE MATTER OF THE INHERENT JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
IN THE MATTER OF HARLEEN BAINS (DOB 25.05.2020) DECEASED
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/06/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE PEEL
Between
MANJIT BAINSApplicant(1) ZARA ARSALAN1 st Respondent(2) IQBAL AND SONS BEREAVEMENT SERVICES2nd Respondent
Cleo Perry KC and Jay Banerji (instructed by Goodman Ray LLP) for ApplicantThe First Respondent in person for in person for The Second Respondent did not attend and was not representedHearing Hearing dates: 22 and 23 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 23 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.Peel J:
[1]This is an unspeakably tragic case. It concerns a burial dispute in respect of a little girl, Harleen (also known as Bambi), who died in 2020 aged 2 months. The dispute is between her mother and her paternal family in circumstances where her father is deceased.[2]Harleen was born into the Sikh faith on 25 May 2020. Both her parents were Sikh. They were unmarried; her mother had parental responsibility, but her father did not. At the time of Harleen’s death, they had been in a relationship for about two years.[3]On 23 July 2020, Harleen suffered catastrophic injuries at home, comprising(i) multiple blunt blows to the head causing skull fractures and irreversible brain damage, and(ii) very severe spinal injuries, rib fractures, a broken collarbone and left leg fracture consistent with violent shaking. The following day, she died in hospital. At the time of sustaining the injuries, the only other persons present in the home were her mother and father. Harleen’s mother gave what she subsequently accepted was a false account to the police, alleging that the injuries had been sustained accidentally after Harleen wriggled out of her arms.[4]In August 2022, Harleen’s father took his own life.[5]In November 2022, Harleen’s mother was arrested for murder, whereupon she changed her account to allege that Harleen’s father had assaulted both her and Harleen, knocked her unconscious and killed Harleen. By the time of trial, the key question for the jury was whether it was Harleen’s mother and father who had inflicted the injuries. There was no suggestion of a joint enterprise.[6]On 20 February 2026, Harleen’s mother was convicted of murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 19 years. In his sentencing remarks on 12 March 2026, Cavanagh J said that the killing was not premeditated, but was carried out in a sudden fit of rage.[7]Harleen’s mother told me that shortly after Harleen’s death, she converted to Islam. She changed her name from Sharandeep Kaur Talwandi to Zara Arsalan.[8]Throughout this period, Harleen’s body remained in a mortuary, under the responsibility of the Coroner’s Office.[9]It appears that a charitable bereavement service, Iqbal and Sons, was contacted on 8 May 2026 by the Coroner’s Office and on 11 May 2026 received formal written instructions from Harleen’s mother to carry out the funeral arrangements in accordance with her wishes, which were for an Islamic burial.[10]On 12 May 2026, the Coroner’s Office issued a Burial Order authorising release of the body. I note that the burial application form refers incorrectly to Harleen’s religion as Islam in circumstances where she had been born into the Sikh faith and remained so at her death.[11]On or about 12 May 2026, Harleen’s paternal family became aware of the impending release of Harleen’s body from the mortuary for an Islamic burial to take place. Some communication took place between the bereavement service and the paternal family, which is not necessary for me to set out.[12]On 20 May 2026, the body was collected by Iqbal and Sons from the mortuary in advance of the intended burial on 22 May 2026 in the Muslim baby section of the designated cemetery. They were instructed by Harleen’s mother to conduct the burial in accordance with Islamic rites and procedures, including an Islamic funeral prayer at a local mosque.[13]On 21 May 2026, Harleen’s paternal grandmother, with the support of the wider paternal family, applied for injunctive relief to prevent the burial from taking place, on the basis that it was their wish for Harleen to receive a Sikh funeral.[14]On 21 May 2026, interim injunctive relief was granted (on a without notice basis to Harleen’s mother, and short informal notice to the bereavement service) by Harrison J. He joined the bereavement service as a party. As a result, the intended burial was cancelled and the body was returned to the mortuary.[15]At the next hearing, on 12 June 2026 before Victoria Buler-Cole KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, Harleen’s mother joined the hearing remotely, but was unrepresented. The judge: i) Recorded that Harleen’s mother was to be provided with a list of Children Panel solicitors. ii) Continued the injunction against both Harleen’s mother and the bereavement service. iii) Gave directions for further evidence. iv) Listed for a final hearing before me on 22 June 2026.

The hearing before me

[16]I heard the case in open court. I see no reason to impose reporting restrictions as the tragic circumstances of this case are already firmly in the public domain.[17]The applicant was represented by leading and junior counsel. Harleen’s mother joined remotely. She was not represented. She told me that she had had details of solicitors for a number of days but had not been able to make contact with any. I asked her whether she would like the opportunity to try and locate lawyers, or to continue without representation. She said clearly, “I would prefer to represent myself”. The bereavement service did not attend; I had indicated by email beforehand that there was no obvious need for them to do so.[18]Counsel for the applicant relied on a helpful and thorough skeleton argument, which leading counsel enlarged upon briefly in respect of certain matters. They argue two points: i) That by reason of the Forfeiture Act 1982, Harleen’s mother has no locus to apply for a grant of administration, and therefore no right to determine burial arrangements. ii) As a fallback, and if they are wrong about that, applying s116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 so far as it relates to Rule 22 of the Non Contentious Probate Rules 1987 (“NCPR), Harleen’s mother should in any event be displaced from the order of priority of those to whom grant of administration can be made, and the paternal grandmother should instead be granted letters of administration, which would enable her to carry out the funeral arrangements.[19]Harleen’s mother spoke in forcible terms about what she perceives to be the injustice of her conviction. She spoke negatively of Harleen’s father and his family. She told me that she intends to appeal, although I note that she is already several months out of time, and nothing has yet been lodged and issued. She did not request an adjournment. She believes that Harleen should be buried in a cemetery, which she would then be able to visit, rather than have her ashes dispersed in flowing water. In short, she says that she should have the right to determine the funeral arrangements.

The Law

[20]The application is for letters of administration to be granted to Harleen’s paternal grandmother so as to enable her to make the funeral arrangements. The application is brought by reference to Rule 22 of the NCPR and s116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. These provisions only enable the court to determine who is entitled to take the grant of administration, not how.[21]It is long established that “the law recognises no property in a corpse”: R v Sharpe (18 57) 21 JP 86.[22]Hale J (as she then was) said in Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844 at 845H: “There is no right of ownership in a dead body. However, there is a duty at common law to arrange for its proper disposal. This duty falls primarily upon the personal representatives of the deceased (see Williams v. Williams (1881) 20 Ch. 659; Rees v. Hughes [1946] K.B. 517). An executor appointed by will is entitled to obtain possession of the body for that purpose (see Sharp v. Lush (1879) 10 Ch. 468 at 472; Dobson v. North Tyneside Health Authority [1997] 1 WLR 596 at 600 obiter), even before there has been a grant of Probate. Where there is no executor that same duty falls upon the administrators of the estate, but they may not be able to obtain an injunction for delivery of the body before the grant of letters of administration (see Dobson).[23]Counsel on behalf of the paternal grandmother, in support of their first argument, drew to my attention the Forfeiture Act 1982. The Act provides as follows: “1. The “forfeiture rule”.(1) In this Act, the “forfeiture rule” means the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing.(2) References in this Act to a person who has unlawfully killed another include a reference to a person who has unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death of that other and references in this Act to unlawful killing shall be interpreted accordingly. 2. Power to modify the rule (1) Where a court determines that the forfeiture rule has precluded a person (in this section referred to as “the offender”) who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring any interest in property mentioned in subsection (4) below, the court may make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of that rule. (2) The court shall not make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of the forfeiture rule in any case unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified or excluded in that case.(3) In any case where a person stands convicted of an offence of which unlawful killing is an element, the court shall not make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of the forfeiture rule in that case unless proceedings for the purpose are brought before the expiry of the period of three months beginning with his conviction relevant period. (3A) In subsection (3) above, the “relevant period” is the period of 6 months beginning with— (a) the end of the period allowed for bringing an appeal against the conviction, or (b) if such an appeal is brought, the conclusion of proceedings on the appeal.(4) The interests in property referred to in subsection (1) above are— (a) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired— (i) under the deceased’s will (including, as respects Scotland, any writing having testamentary effect) or the law relating to intestacy or by way of ius relicti, ius relictae or legitim; (ii) on the nomination of the deceased in accordance with the provisions of any enactment; (iii) as a donatio mortis causa made by the deceased; or (iv) under a special destination (whether relating to heritable or moveable property); or (b) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired in consequence of the death of the deceased, being property which, before the death, was held on trust for any person.(5) An order under this section may modify or exclude the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property to which the determination referred to in subsection (1) above relates and may do so in either or both of the following ways, that is— (a) where there is more than one such interest, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of any (but not all) or all of those interests; and (b) in the case of any such interest in property, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of all or any part of the property.(6) On the making of an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule, the forfeiture rule shall have effect for all purposes (including purposes relating to anything done before the order is made) subject to the modifications made by the order.(7) The court shall not make an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property which, in consequence of the rule, has been acquired before the coming into force of this section by a person other than the offender or a person claiming through him.(8) In this section—• “property” includes any chose in action or incorporeal moveable property; and• “will” includes codicil. (1) In this Act, the “forfeiture rule” means the rule of public policy which in certain circumstances precludes a person who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring a benefit in consequence of the killing. (2) References in this Act to a person who has unlawfully killed another include a reference to a person who has unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled or procured the death of that other and references in this Act to unlawful killing shall be interpreted accordingly. (1) Where a court determines that the forfeiture rule has precluded a person (in this section referred to as “the offender”) who has unlawfully killed another from acquiring any interest in property mentioned in subsection (4) below, the court may make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of that rule. (2) The court shall not make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of the forfeiture rule in any case unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the conduct of the offender and of the deceased and to such other circumstances as appear to the court to be material, the justice of the case requires the effect of the rule to be so modified or excluded in that case. (3) In any case where a person stands convicted of an offence of which unlawful killing is an element, the court shall not make an order under this section modifying or excluding the effect of the forfeiture rule in that case unless proceedings for the purpose are brought before the expiry of the period of three months beginning with his conviction relevant period. (3A) In subsection (3) above, the “relevant period” is the period of 6 months beginning with— (a) the end of the period allowed for bringing an appeal against the conviction, or (a) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired— (i) under the deceased’s will (including, as respects Scotland, any writing having testamentary effect) or the law relating to intestacy or by way of ius relicti, ius relictae or legitim; (ii) on the nomination of the deceased in accordance with the provisions of any enactment; (iv) under a special destination (whether relating to heritable or moveable property); or (b) any beneficial interest in property which (apart from the forfeiture rule) the offender would have acquired in consequence of the death of the deceased, being property which, before the death, was held on trust for any person. (5) An order under this section may modify or exclude the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property to which the determination referred to in subsection (1) above relates and may do so in either or both of the following ways, that is— (a) where there is more than one such interest, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of any (but not all) or all of those interests; and (b) in the case of any such interest in property, by excluding the application of the rule in respect of all or any part of the property. (6) On the making of an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule, the forfeiture rule shall have effect for all purposes (including purposes relating to anything done before the order is made) subject to the modifications made by the order. (7) The court shall not make an order under this section modifying the effect of the forfeiture rule in respect of any interest in property which, in consequence of the rule, has been acquired before the coming into force of this section by a person other than the offender or a person claiming through him.• “property” includes any chose in action or incorporeal moveable property; and• “will” includes codicil.[24]Rule 22(1)(c) of the NCPR sets the order of priority for persons with “a beneficial interest in the estate”. Thus, submits counsel, by reason of the Forfeiture Act 1982, Harleen’s mother is barred from acquiring any interest in Harleen’s property. She can therefore have no beneficial interest in the estate. Accordingly, it is submitted, Harleen’s mother has no locus to apply for, or receive a grant of letters of administration under s22 of the NCPR. Support for this proposition can be found in the decision of Patten J (as he then was) in Scotching v Birch [2008] EWHC 844. In that case, the mother of a young child had killed the child and attempted unsuccessfully to kill herself. The child’s father applied for a grant administration so as to have the child buried near where he lived, whereas the mother wanted the burial to take place where she and the child had lived. By the time of the hearing, she had pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility, but the Crown had not accepted the plea and intended to proceed with a charge of murder. The judge referred to the common law rule of public policy which prohibits a person who unlawfully kills another from taking a benefit under his estate and which applied whether the benefit arises under a will or intestacy; Paul v Knight and Baxter [1914] P1. The judge concluded that by reason of the public policy rule, the mother had no locus to apply for a grant of administration.[25]Curiously, there is no reference in the judgment to the Forfeiture Act 1982, which had come into force 16 years before, and which incorporated on a statutory basis the common law rule. In the circumstances, the judge did not consider it necessary to go on and engage with s116. Further, Patten J did not directly address whether the estate of the deceased must in fact hold any assets so as to engage the common law forfeiture rule, and by extension remove from the mother the right to apply for grant of administration. However, there is no suggestion that the child’s estate in that case did hold any assets, and I therefore infer from Patten J’s judgment that the mother was disentitled from applying for grant of administration by reason of Rule 22 whether the estate held assets or not.[26]The second argument of counsel for the paternal grandmother is made by reference to Rule 22 of the NCPR and s116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. It is expressly submitted as an alternative in the event that the court concludes Harleen’s mother does have entitlement or locus to apply for grant of administration, contrary to their submissions under the Forfeiture Act 1982.[27]Harleen died intestate and there are no personal representatives. The resolution of the question of who is entitled to a grant of letters of administration for the deceased’s estate in the first instance follows the order of priority set out in Rule 22 of the NCPR: 22. —(1) Where the deceased died on or after 1 January 1926, wholly intestate, the person or persons having a beneficial interest in the estate shall be entitled to a grant of administration in the following classes in order of priority, namely—(a) the surviving spouse or civil partner;(b) the children of the deceased and the issue of any deceased child who died before the deceased;(c) the father and mother of the deceased;(d) brothers and sisters of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of the whole blood who died before the deceased;(e) brothers and sisters of the half blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of the half blood who died before the deceased;(f) grandparents;(g) uncles and aunts of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the whole blood who died before the deceased;(h) uncles and aunts of the half blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the half who died before the deceased.[28]Thus, the starting point under rule 22(1((c) is that Harleen’s mother is entitled to a grant of administration which in turn enables her to authorise arrangements for the body.[29]This order of priority can be displaced if there are special circumstances which make it necessary or expedient to do so. S116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides as follows:
“Power of the court to pass over prior claims to grant (1) If by reason of any special circumstances it appears to the High Court to be necessary or expedient to appoint as administrator some person other than the person who, but for this section, would in accordance with probate rules have been entitled to the grant, the court may in its discretion appoint as administrator such person as it thinks expedient. (2) Any grant of administration under this section may be limited in any way the court thinks fit.”
[30]The authorities (for example, Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387 (QB)) suggest that there is a two stage process: i) First, to identify any special circumstances that might displace the r22 order; and ii) To decide whether, in the light of such special circumstances weighing in favour of varying the order of priority, it is necessary or expedient for the court to vary the order.[31]The court has the power to appoint as administrator a person lower down the priority list, such as in Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston (supra) where an uncle replaced the mother. The court may appoint a person not on the list, and with no familial connection, as in Oldham MBC v Makin[2017] EWHC 2543 (Ch).[32]Special circumstances are not limited to circumstances in connection with the estate itself or its administration, but can extend to any other circumstances which the court thinks relevant: Re Clore [1982] Fam 113, per Ewbank J. at p.117. This was adopted by Hale J in Buchanan v Milton (supra), who took what she described at 855C as a “broad view of special circumstances”. Examples of factors relevant in this balancing exercise include the wishes of the deceased, the place with which the deceased had the closest connection and the reasonable wishes and requirements of the deceased’s family and friends.: Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] 2 FLR 1681. Ultimately, as Hale J said in Buchanan v Milton (supra) at 854G:
“This must in the end be a question of fact depending upon the nature of the alleged circumstances and the context in which they are raised.”
[33]In Re H (A Child) [2023] EWCA Civ 995, the burial issue lay between two parents where their child had died of natural causes. The Court of Appeal described the test at paragraph 32 as a balancing exercise, specific to the deceased’s circumstances during life. They referred to the mother’s parental responsibility and biological link, but made clear that these were not determinative factors. The child had, for some years, been in the care of her father, and then paternal grandparents. The court, when upholding the first instance judge’s order which found in favour of the paternal family, held that “ This court must address the balance of interests which is fact specific to H's circumstances during her life…”. On the facts of that case, the “predominant force” was the “well-articulated and genuinely held devout religious views of those with the real closest relationship” to the child, and their wish to support what they believed to be her afterlife, indicating the importance of family and religion.[34]Closest to this case on its facts, is Re E (A Child: Burial Arrangements)[2019] EWHC 3639 (Fam), in which the mother had been convicted for culpability in connection with her child's death which had been perpetrated by her then partner. The judge decided to grant the child’s father letters of administration under s.116 to arrange the funeral over the mother's objection. Other cases on burial disputes, all of course specific to their facts, include Re JS [2017] 4 WLR 1, Re K [2018] 1 FLR 96 and ND v LD [2019] EWHC 3639.[35]This survey of the jurisprudence demonstrates to my satisfaction the breadth ofcircumstances to which the court may have regard where no one factor automatically takes precedence over another. The test is not one of welfare under the Children Act 1989 as the child is no longer alive. Biological connection and parental responsibility are factors (in the right case, powerful factors), but they do not confer automatic priority. The court must undertake an evaluation of all relevant circumstances by reference to s116.[36]It also appears from the authorities that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in cases of this nature (see, for example, the dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he was) in Re JS ( supra) andHayden J in Re K (supra)), although it seems to me that the court should normally first reach to s116 and only invoke the inherent jurisdiction if s116, or other applicable legislative and procedural rules, are not available. In this case, it seems to me that s116 governs my approach because of the direct issue by reference to the rules and s116 as to whether Harleen’s mother or paternal grandmother (both of whom are listed in rule 22 off the NCPR 1987) should be granted letters of administration. By contrast, for example, in Re JS (supra) the issue before the court was whether an order should be made fora local authority (which does not feature in rule 22) to be authorised to make the funeral arrangements any event. Inevitably, whether the inherent jurisdiction should be invoked will depend on the facts of each case.[37]The court has the power to determine or direct who has the power to make the arrangements, but does not have the power to direct where or how it should take place: Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 10173 (Ch), although the court inevitably must have regard to how and where it is proposed by competing parties to take place in order to determine who should have the power to make the arrangements.

Analysis

[38]I am satisfied that by reason of the Forfeiture Act, and accepting as I do the submissions of counsel for the paternal grandmother, Harleen’s mother is not entitled to benefit from the estate of Harleen and, accordingly, is not entitled to apply for, or receive, a grant of administration under Rule 22 of the NCPR. I base this on the decision of Scotching v Birch (supra) with some hesitation as I did not hear argument from Harleen’s mother (acting in person) on the legal points raised. The next in line under Rule 22 is the grandparents of whom only the paternal grandmother has sought letters of administration. If I am correct on this, it determines the application as there is no reason for the grandmother herself to be displaced under s116.[39]If, however, I am wrong about this, and Harleen’s mother is entitled to apply for grant of administration, I go on to consider the alternative submission by reference to Rule 22 of the NCPR and s116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.[40]I acknowledge that Harleen’s mother is the closest biological relative to Harleen and was the only person with parental responsibility during Harleen’s lifetime. I have no reason to doubt her acceptance of Islamic faith and her wish for Harleen to be buried in accordance with Islamic tradition. I accept that she would prefer to have Harleen buried in a cemetery which she can at some point (but not for very many years to come in the light of her sentence) visit and remember her.[41]However, these factors are, in my judgment, comfortably outweighed by countervailing considerations which lead clearly to the conclusion that the paternal grandmother’s application should be granted: i) First, and most powerfully, the terrible reality of this case is that it was Harleen’s mother who brutally murdered her. She took the life of an innocent, vulnerable, tiny child who needed and deserved the love and protection of her mother. Instead, she was subjected to a ferocious and frenzied assault, as described by Cavanagh J in his sentencing remarks. She falsely claimed it was an accident and then changed her story to attempt to incriminate Harleen’s father, who by then had taken his own life and was entirely blameless. As Cavanagh J put it, “she tarnished [F’s] memory with a false accusation of murder”. It would offend common sense, reason and justice to enable Harleen’s mother, on the facts of this case, to be entrusted with the funeral arrangements. In my judgment, Harleen’s mother abdicated her parental responsibility in the most extreme way, and abdicated the right to exercise responsibility over the funeral arrangements in circumstances where those funeral arrangements only arise because of her actions. ii) Second, Harleen was born into a Sikh family and was herself a Sikh during her very short life. She had no connection with the Muslim faith. She was named at a Gurdwara Sahib, a sacred place of assembly and worship for Sikhs. During her lifetime, her mother was a Sikh. Her father was a Sikh for the whole of his life and on his death received a Sikh cremation. Extended family on both sides were and are Sikhs. iii) Third, it is the wish of the paternal family to honour Harleen’s afterlife in a way consistent with her welfare and religious upbringing whilst alive. The Sikh funeral would likely involve a cremation, followed by dispersal of the ashes in flowing water. It is noteworthy that it was (on the evidence I have read) Harleen’s father’s wish before he died that Harleen should be buried in accordance with the Sikh tradition. His suicide note makes express reference to wishing his family to make the arrangements. Given that Harleen’s mother took Harleen’s life, and took her away from her father for ever, considerable weight, in my judgment, should be afforded to those views. It also seems relevant to me that the paternal family gave impact statements at the criminal trial. iv) By contrast, none of the wider family on the maternal side have expressed any wish to be involved, having disassociated themselves from Harleen’s mother. The paternal family have made contact with them, but they do not wish to participate in, or express any view on, funeral arrangements.[42]I conclude that: i) By reason of the interplay of the Forfeiture Act 1982 and Rule 22 of the NCPR, Harleen’s mother is disentitled from applying for grant of administration. ii) If I am wrong about that, then, applying Rule 22 of the NCPR and the Forfeiture Act 1982, I am satisfied that(a) there are special circumstances which weigh in favour of varying the order of priority, namely the conduct of Harleen’s mother in unlawfully killing Harleen in horrific circumstances, and(b) it is necessary and expedient to grant letters of administration to the paternal grandmother to enable her to make the funeral arrangements in accordance with the Sikh faith, culture and tradition. iii) Although not necessary for me to do so, I would reach the same conclusion under the inherent jurisdiction.