N v N (Appeal: Setting Aside of Decree Nisi) [2026] EWHC 1593 (Fam)
[1]On 25 March 2026 I heard the Applicant wife’s application for permission to appeal, with appeal to follow. Although the application was heard in public, at the start of the hearing I made an order imposing restrictions on the publication of the identity of the parties and their children and prohibited the publication of any information which may lead to any such person being identified. I did so to protect the identity of the parties’ minor children having balanced their Article 8 rights against the Article 10 right to freedom of expression. Within this judgment I have referred to the Applicant wife as the Applicant. The Respondent is her husband. I have referred to them in that manner for convenience when writing this judgment. No discourtesy is intended to either party nor should either party read into the way I have referred to them any finding as to their marital status. Both parties represented themselves before me.[2]By Appeal Notice filed on 5 November 2025 the Applicant sought to appeal the order of HHJ Reardon dated 6 October 2025 which stated: Further to the conditional order granted on 1st August 2025 no reason has been shown as to why the conditional order should not be made final. Therefore the conditional order is made final. The conditional order is made final on 6th October 2025.This certifies that the marriage solemnised on 12th March 2009 at Mushin Local Government Marriage Registry Lagos in Nigeria between [the Respondent] and [the Applicant] has legally ended.[3]The Grounds of Appeal relied upon by the Applicant can be summarised as follows:(1) The order was subject to a serious procedural or other irregularity in that the Applicant had sought to challenge the validity of the conditional order.(2) The marriage which the order dissolved was not valid as the Respondent (petitioner) was already married, having been married previously to the Applicant (in 2000) and then bigamously to a third party (in 2007).(3) The 2009 marriage was a ‘sham’ marriage contracted to enable the husband to secure a visa to come to the UK.(4) The marriage was not made according to Nigerian customary Igbo law.(5) The conditional order was made without a hearing and without the applicant being able to object.[4]On 8 December 2025 I granted the Applicant permission to bring this application out of time for the reasons I have set out below.[5]On the face of her FP161 the Applicant states that HHJ Reardon granted her permission to appeal on 3 November 2025. Having read the papers placed before me by the Applicant, it appears that HHJ Reardon did not grant the Applicant permission to appeal nor did she transfer the case to the High Court; rather, HHJ Reardon assisted the Court of Appeal by providing the case papers to them upon their request so that they might consider whether the case should be heard in this court or the Court of Appeal. Having considered the papers, the Court of Appeal directed the Applicant to this court. At no stage has the Applicant been granted permission to appeal by HHJ Reardon or the Court of Appeal.[6]The Applicant seeks to appeal the order of HHJ Reardon because she says that the order was made final by HHJ Reardon when a conditional order made on 1 August 2025 was already subject to an appeal or there was an application to set aside or rescind the conditional order still outstanding. It is the Applicant’s case that the conditional order was made in relation to a void marriage in Nigeria on 12 March 2009 between her and the Respondent. She says the second customary marriage was void for three reasons. First, it was entered into by the parties whilst their first customary marriage in Nigeria in 2000 was still in existence. It was, she says, a sham for immigration purposes. Secondly, the Applicant contends that by 12 March 2009 the Respondent had not ended his marriage to another woman and thus the second customary marriage is, she asserts, bigamous. Thirdly, the marriage on 12 March 2009 was a marriage in the Nigeria Igbo customary court and only that court, she says, has jurisdiction to end the marriage.Relevant Chronology
[7]On 29 April 2000 the parties married at a Registry in Lagos (Marriage Certificate produced).[8]On 12 March 2009 the parties married again at Mushin Local Government Registry in Lagos (Marriage Certificate produced). The Applicant now contends that this marriage is not valid in Nigeria.[9]On 7 February 2022 the Respondent filed for divorce, case no ZZ22D05226.[10]On 30 April 2023 the Respondent made a sworn statement in which he stated that he married the Applicant on 29 April 2000. He stated it was a customary traditional marriage. The Respondent contended that their marriage on 12 March 2009 was a legal marriage.[11]On 31 October 2023, there was a hearing before District Judge Cridge of the Applicant’s application to set aside the decree nisi in case ZZ22D05226. At its conclusion, District Judge Cridge found on the balance of probabilities that the 29 April 2000 certificate was not a valid certificate of marriage. The Applicant’s case at that hearing was recited as being that the March 2009 marriage certificate which was issued by the marriage registry at Mushin in Nigeria following a court ceremony on that date was the only valid certificate of marriage but noted that the Applicant alleged the Respondent had married another in Nigeria in 2007 and that the 2009 marriage was, according to her, voidable for bigamy.[12]On 7 November 2023 the Respondent husband applied for a divorce in relation to the marriage dated 12 March 2009, case no. 1698-7609-6205-7984.[13]On 18 November 2023 the Applicant submitted her answer.[14]On 3 January 2024 DDJ Pearce ordered that the disputed case was to be listed for a case management conference at Bromley.[15]On 25 March 2024 District Judge Cridge gave directions in the disputed divorce and listed the matter for hearing. The Recital to District Judge Cridge’s order includes the following: The court had reminded itself of its findings in case number ZZ22D05226 on 31st October 2023 as set out in the recitals to that final order which dismissed the applicant’s petition for divorce which had relied upon a false marriage certificate dated 29th April 2000. The respondent accepted that the marriage certificate relied upon by the applicant was genuine and signed by them both at the date, time and location shown on the certificate. Her position, however, was that the applicant was already married at the time of the parties’ wedding in 2009. Further, that the name he had given to the respondent and used on the wedding certificate was not his true name. The respondent therefore maintained that, according to the relevant law in Nigeria, their marriage was unlawful and void. The applicant denied both these assertions. The court decided that directions to trial were needed. [note in the above passage the Applicant is the husband][16]There was a hearing before District Judge Cridge on 18 September 2024. I have a transcript of that hearing. The Applicant did not attend that hearing. I do not have a copy of the order made on that day but it appears from other documents I have read that on that occasion the Applicant was asserting through her written case that the certificate of marriage in March 2009 related to another couple and that the Respondent was not the person named on certificate .Accordingly the Respondent gave evidence to explain the difference between the name on the certificate and the name he now used which the District Judge accepted. District Judge Cridge remarked that the Applicant had not attended to prove her case that the Respondent was already married to another in March 2009, and that the Applicant relied on the March 2009 proceedings to bring a claim for financial remedy against the Respondent. The judge concluded that on the balance of probabilities, the marriage between the Respondent and Applicant at Emmution local government or the marriage registry at Lagos, Nigeria on 12 March 2009 was a lawful and valid marriage.[17]On 20 March 2025 HHJ Simmonds refused the Applicant’s application for permission to appeal the order of District Judge Cridge and certified the application as being totally without merit. The finding of District Judge Cridge thus stands.[18]On 17 April 2025, District Judge Rich sitting at the Family Courts at the Court and Tribunal Service Centre recorded that the "wife" attended the pronouncement of the Conditional Order hearing to allege that the marriage concerned was bigamous and so invalid. In consequence, she submits a decree or order of divorce is inappropriate and the marriage should be declared invalid throughout.The court transferred the case to be heard at the Respondent husband’s local court.[19]On 1 August 2025, HHJ Reardon set aside the order of 17 April 2025 and granted a conditional order on the papers. HHJ Reardon held that the marriage solemnised on 12 March 2009 at Mushin Local Government Registry in Lagos Nigeria had broken down irretrievably and granted a conditional divorce order. The order stated that the court can cancel or rescind the conditional order at any time before the order is made final. The Applicant states that: The divorce application was made for a second marriage that was contracted in court without ending the first marriage. And the conditional order was made for a different non- existing marriage that was contracted in the local government and that none of the parties in this case is part of that marriage. But our names were included in a conditional order that is made for the marriage that does not exist[20]On 14 August 2025 the applicant applied to set aside or rescind the conditional order, The Applicant supported her application with a sworn witness statement. Within that statement the Applicant alleges that the person named on the March 2009 marriage certificate is not the Respondent. She alleges that the April 2000 marriage and that in March 2009 were customary marriages and that neither are valid as they do not meet the requirements of a Nigerian Igbo Customary Law. The Applicant states that, in any event, the second marriage was not valid because the first had not been dissolved at the time it was celebrated and because in 2007 the Respondent married another. There is email correspondence to the no reply divorce email address on 28 August 2025 which acknowledges receipt and suggests she might need to file a D11.[21]On 24 September 2025 HHJ Simmonds by email acknowledged receipt of the application to rescind the conditional order which was returned without issue. The email stated that a conditional order had been made and the correct application is an appeal to the order made in East London (that is a reference to the order of 1 August 2025). The Applicant says she made that appeal the same day. Having read all the papers presented by the Applicant to this court, I can find no appeal against the conditional order made on 1 August 2025. However, on 25 September2025 the Applicant did write an email to East London Family Court in which she quoted the conditional order, stated that she still wished to rescind or set aside the conditional order and set out the grounds upon which she relied.[22]On 6 October 2025 HHJ Reardon granted a final order when the Applicant says her application to set aside the conditional order was still pending. The Applicant contends that the order HHJ Reardon made was in relation to a marriage to which neither she nor the Respondent were a party. The order of 6 October 2025 says that further to the conditional order of 1 August 2025 no reason has been shown why a conditional order should not be made final, Therefore the conditional order was made final. The order of 6 October 2025 certifies that the marriage solemnised on 12 March 2009 at Mushin Local Government Marriage registry Lagos Nigeria between the parties was legally ended.[23]The Applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 3 November 2025, the Court of Appeal by email redirected the Applicant to this court. The appeal notice was filed in this court on 5 November 2025 and issued on 11 November 2025. The reason for delay in applying for permission to appeal was that the Applicant, litigant in person, applied to the Court of Appeal initially and within time.[24]In the circumstances, on 8 December 2025 I permitted the Applicant to make an application out of time and stayed the order of 6 October 2025 pending consideration of the application for permission to appeal with an appeal to follow thereafter if permission was granted.The Hearing Before Me
[25]I heard the application for permission to appeal with appeal to follow if permission were granted on 25 March 2026. Both parties represented themselves.[26]On 8 December 2025 I had given directions for the preparation of a bundle to be used at the hearing. Instead on 15 December 2025, the Applicant sent to the appeals’ office an email with 45 separate attachments. Some were whole documents; other documents were divided into separate attachments. In addition, the Respondent submitted a response document seeking to uphold the orders of 1 August 2025 and 6 October 2025. At the hearing before me neither party had their documents in any sort of order and accordingly time was taken as they located documents that they wished to refer me to, sent them to me through the court associate and checks were undertaken to ensure both parties and the court were referring to the same documents. By this method both parties were able to advance their cases orally through submissions. I then adjourned to re-read all the documents that had been submitted to the court in advance of the hearing and at the hearing itself. Whilst this process was adopted to ensure that self-representing parties had a fair hearing, the court and both parties would have been greatly assisted if this court’s previous direction in relation to the filing of a court bundle and PD30A paragraphs 5.10A-5.10C had been observed. Had a bundle been prepared as it ought to have been, a more efficient hearing would have been possible, and both parties would have been better able to marshal their arguments.[27]At the conclusion of the case I took time to re-read all the documents that had been sent to me.My Decision with My Reasons
[28]On 18 September 2024 District Judge Cridge concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, the marriage between the Respondent and Applicant at Emmution local government or the marriage registry at Lagos, Nigeria on 12 March 2009 was a lawful and valid marriage. The transcript of the hearing on 18 September 2024 shows that prior to making the order, District Judge Cridge clarified with the Respondent the difference between the name he now uses and his name as it appears on the marriage certificate. It is implicit in the finding that he made as to the validity of the 12 March 2009 marriage that he accepted the Respondent’s evidence. On 20 March 2025 HHJ Simmonds refused the Applicant permission to appeal that order and certified her application for permission to appeal as being totally without merit. The order of 17 April 2025 was made by District Judge Rich on the Applicant’s oral submissions and without being taken to all the relevant orders and papers. On that basis, it was set aside by HHJ Reardon on 1 August 2025. HHJ Reardon, who had all the relevant papers and orders before her, then proceeded to make a conditional order. The order she made on that occasion was within her discretion and was lawful. The Applicant did not appeal the order of 1 August 2025 rather she sought to have it set aside or rescinded.[30]Turning then to the Grounds of Appeal upon which the Applicant relies before me, I consider that the issue of the validity of the marriage made subject to the final order was determined by District Judge Cridge on 18 September 2024. The Applicant attempted to appeal his determination but in March 2025 HHJ Simmonds refused her permission to appeal and certified her application as totally without merit. District Judge Cridge’s finding thus remains in place. Based on those findings HHJ Reardon was entitled to make the conditional order she did on 11 August 2025. Despite her assertions to the contrary, the Applicant did not appeal that conditional order. Instead, she made an application to rescind or set aside the conditional order. The only ground upon which the appeal before me has any real prospect of success is procedural irregularity in that the application to rescind or set aside the conditional order was not considered by HHJ Reardon.[29]Any application to prevent a conditional order being made final should be made in accordance with Part 18 of the Family Procedure Rules. FPR 2010 7.18 states that a Form D11 should be used.[30]FPR 2010 7.19(4) states, in so far as is relevant, that (1) Unless rule 7.20 applies – (a) a party in whose favour a conditional order has been made may give notice to the court that they wish the conditional order to be made final; (b) both parties in whose favour a conditional order has been made may jointly give notice to the court that they wish the conditional order to be made final; or (c) subject to paragraph (2) below, where the conditional order is in favour of both parties, but the application is to proceed as a notice by one party only, that party may give notice to the court that they wish the conditional order to be made final. […] (4) Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), where the court receives a notice under paragraph (1) it will make the conditional order final if it is satisfied that – (a) no application for rescission of the conditional order is pending; (b) no appeal against the making of the conditional order is pending; (c) no order has been made by the court extending the time for bringing an appeal of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), or if such an order has been made, that the time so extended has expired; (d) no application for an order of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (c) is pending; (e) no application to prevent the conditional order being made final is pending; FPR 2010 7.20 does not apply to this case nor does FPR 2010 7.19(5) and (6). Not withstanding the terms of FPR 7.19(4) the court retains a discretion to make or refuse to make a conditional order final – Smith V Smith [1990] 1 FLR 438.[31]On 14 August 2025 the Applicant made an application using D11 to set aside or rescind the conditional order. From my reading of the papers, HHJ Reardon appears not to have had the Applicant’s application before her when she made the conditional order final. That may be explained by the Applicant initially sending her documentation to a different court centre rather than an error on the part of HHJ Reardon. In the circumstances, HHJ Reardon cannot be criticised for not taking the application into account when she made the conditional order final. However, the fact that she did not have the application before her means that the requirements of FPR 2010 7.19(4) appear not to have been met. I have therefore had to considered how I should treat this appeal and what remedy should I grant, if I allow it. I have decided that the proper approach is to allow the appeal and remit it to HHJ Reardon for re-consideration initially on the papers.[32]That is my judgment.