G (A Child) (Habitual Residence), Re [2026] EWHC 1427 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1427 (Fam)Case No FD26P00016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 11/05/2026
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE STEPHEN SMITH(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
Re G (A Child) (Habitual Residence)ApplicantRe G (A Child) (Habitual Residence)
Mr J. Green (instructed by Abbey Solicitors) for ApplicantThe Respondent appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 29 and 30 April 2026
Approved Judgment.............................HIS HONOUR JUDGE STEPHEN SMITH
[1]The principal controversial issue addressed in this judgment is whether the child at the heart of these proceedings, G, a girl born in early 2023, was habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales on 8 January 2026. That was the date on which the father issued proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of this court for the return of G from the United Arab Emirates to where, on his case, she had been unlawfully removed by the mother, following her earlier unlawful retention in Pakistan, in (on the father’s case), March 2024.[2]For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that on 8 January 2026, G was not habitually resident in England and Wales. Accordingly, this court does not have the jurisdiction to hear this application, and it is dismissed on that basis.

Factual background

[3]The father is a joint British/Pakistani citizen. The mother is a citizen of Pakistan. They were married in Pakistan in early 2021. Shortly after their marriage, they lived in Pakistan at a property rented by the father’s company, and from there spent time in the United Kingdom and the UAE, rotating between all three countries.[4]In September 2021 the mother was granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom as the spouse of the father and became pregnant a short time later. The mother and father continued to rotate their time between England, Pakistan and the UAE.[5]While the mother was pregnant with G, the parents agreed that their child would be born in England, and that the family would live in this jurisdiction. Against that background, the mother returned to England from Pakistan in November 2022, and the father followed shortly afterwards. Both before and after G’s birth, the mother and father lived in the father’s family home with his parents and members of his extended family.[6]In April 2023, there was what has been described as a “serious marital dispute” resulting in the police being called. The father alleged that the mother and her mother had threatened to remove G from the United Kingdom. He issued proceedings in the Family Court to obtain a prohibited steps order and a port alert to prevent the mother from removing G from the jurisdiction. Those orders were issued on 2 May 2023 by a district judge sitting in the Family Court, but the proceedings were eventually settled by consent, and the final order in those proceedings withdrawing those orders was dated 21 June 2023. It is common ground that the Family Court accepted that G was habitually resident in this jurisdiction for the purposes of those proceedings. The parents sought to restore their relationship, in consultation with their families.[7]The parents continued to travel internationally, with G, rotating their time between England, Pakistan and the UAE.

The precipitating event

[8]On 22 February 2024, the family travelled from England to Pakistan for a family wedding on the mother’s side. That date was the last time that G was in the jurisdiction of England and Wales.[9]What took place in Pakistan is a matter of dispute between the parties, but it is common ground that on 10 March 2024, the father left Pakistan while the mother and G remained in the country. It is also accepted by the father that when he left the country, he had with him a Pakistani birth registration document in relation to G which would have been essential for the mother to present in order to take G out of the country, unless replaced on application to National Database and Registration Authority in Pakistan (“NADRA”).[10]It is the mother’s case that she was “abandoned” by the father in Pakistan on 10 March 2024, and that by leaving her there without a NADRA registration document, he effectively stranded her there. She returned to her family home in the same city, and later moved to the UAE, to live with her mother and stepfather.[11]The father’s case is that he and the mother were staying in separate properties for the wedding celebrations in March 2024. The mother knew when the flight was, since it was the same flight they always took when travelling back to England from that city, something they had done many times. They were to make their own way to the airport and meet there. Return tickets had been purchased for the whole family. The mother and G did not attend the airport, and the father flew back alone. He says that he had forgotten that he had G’s NADRA document in his wallet, and that he did not intend to leave the mother and G stranded in Pakistan.[12]Thereafter, G continued to reside with the mother, with the mother splitting her time between Pakistan and the UAE, the mother having obtained a replacement NADRA document. The father attempted to apply to the courts in the UAE for a travel ban in respect of G, but his application appears to have been refused on eligibility grounds because, on his case, G did not have residency in the UAE. There is no documentary evidence about any UAE family proceedings.[13]Later in 2024, reunification discussions between the mother and the father recommenced, but to no avail. The mother would go on to travel between Pakistan and the UAE with G on a number of occasions from late 2024 until around March 2026. The father occasionally travelled to the UAE to meet with the daughter there, facilitated by the mother.[14]It is the mother’s case that in July 2025 she and G permanently relocated from Pakistan to the UAE. She secured work there and lived with her mother and stepfather. G has been registered at a nursery there.[15]The mother and G returned to Pakistan in October 2025, during which time she and the father each proposed rival co-parenting agreements, the contents of which I shall return to in due course.[16]The mother and G returned to the UAE on 14 November 2025. On 17 November 2025, pursuant to an application made by the father to the family court in Pakistan, a port alert equivalent order was implemented in relation to G. That order permits G to travel into, but not out of, Pakistan. It remains in force.[17]The mother and G remained in the UAE until the recent conflict in Iran started, at which point they returned to Pakistan. The mother says that she felt that the security situation was too dangerous for her and G to remain in the UAE. She now wants to return. Things have settled down in the region, and it is now safe for her to resume life in the UAE, she says. However, she contends that she cannot travel with G due to the Pakistani travel banning order obtained by the father with effect from 17 November 2025.

The parties’ positions

[18]The father’s case is that G remains habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. At the time of her birth, it was the parties’ settled intention that England was to be the family home. They reconciled, in England, after the father obtained a port alert order from the Family Court in this jurisdiction in June 2023, and continued to live predominantly in England until G was unlawfully retained in Pakistan by the mother on 10 March 2024. Since then, G’s living arrangements have been peripatetic, chaotic and unsettled. Mr Green submits that the court enjoys jurisdiction to consider the father’s substantive application, and that I should make a declaration accordingly.[19]The mother’s case is that G was no longer habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales upon the commencement of these proceedings on 8 January 2026. On the mother’s case, G was habitually resident in the UAE on that date, and remained habitually resident there at the date of the hearing before me on 29 April 2026, notwithstanding her temporary relocation to Pakistan for security reasons at the outset of the conflict in Iran. That being so, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this application, and it should be dismissed.

The hearing

[20]The father attended the hearing in person, represented by Mr Green, and the mother participated remotely, from Pakistan, as a litigant in person. The mother was assisted by a McKenzie Friend. I heard evidence from both parties, and submissions from Mr Green on behalf of the father, and from the mother in person over a remote link. The mother was cross-examined by Mr Green, and the father was cross-examined by the mother.[21]There had been no direction for a qualified legal representative in relation to the mother putting questions directly to the father, and Mr Green submitted that there was no basis to prevent the mother from doing so herself as a litigant in person. Indeed, the mother confirmed to me that she was happy to do so. Nevertheless, I directed the mother to avoid putting questions to the father about allegations of domestic abuse (which is an undercurrent of the mother’s case in these proceedings), and to focus her questions on matters pertaining to G’s habitual residence.[22]In relation to the mother giving evidence from Pakistan, I considered the guidance given by Poole J in Newcastle CC v JK and Ors (Care Proceedings: International Abduction: Evidence from Abroad) [2025] EWHC 1767 (Fam) at para. 110 and following. I was satisfied that there was no impediment to the court receiving her evidence in this way, largely for the reasons given by Poole J in his judgment, and in light of the well-established practice of doing so in cases of this nature in this court.[23]I will not set out the entirety of the parties’ evidence in this judgment, but will do so to the extent necessary to reach and give reasons for my findings, below.

The law

[24]Neither Pakistan nor the UAE are signatories to the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (“the 1996 Convention”).[25]The provisions of the 1996 Convention apply when determining the issue of jurisdiction in relation to a state that is not a party to the convention. See paras 57 to 59 of Re A (A Child) (Habitual Residence: 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 659. That being so, the question of whether this court regards a child as habitually resident in this jurisdiction or in a rival non-contracting jurisdiction is to be determined by reference to the domestic authorities addressing that issue, including by reference to any applicable incorporated international law.[26]In Re B (Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) [2016] UKSC 4, Lord Wilson described “habitual residence” in the following terms, at para. 27:
“A child’s habitual residence in a state is the internationally recognised threshold to the vesting in the courts of that state of jurisdiction to determine issues in relation to him (or her).”
[27]In Re London Borough of Hackney v P and Others (Jurisdiction: 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 1213, Moylan LJ addressed the relevant date(s) in relation to which habitual residence must be determined. Relevant for present purposes are the following principles, at para. 125 (sub-paragraph numbering taken from the original): “(ii) the court must determine the issue of jurisdiction at the outset of proceedings by reference to the date on which the proceedings were commenced; (iii) jurisdiction under the 1996 Convention can be lost during the course of proceedings, if it was based on habitual residence and the child has ceased to be habitually resident in England and Wales. Accordingly, the court must be satisfied that it retains jurisdiction at the final hearing…”.[28]There are many authorities addressing the concept of habitual residence, many of which Mr Green summarised in his skeleton argument, as did the mother. Moylan LJ conducted a comprehensive review of the authorities in Re F (A Child) (Habitual Residence) [2025] EWCA Civ 911. At para. 58, Moylan LJ said:
“The determination of habitual residence is not a formulaic exercise because it requires a broad consideration of the child's and the family's circumstances and because different factors will be present in different cases with the same factor being more significant in one case than another. Accordingly, as was said in the case of HR Proceedings brought by HR (With the participation of KO and another) (Case C-512/17)[2018] Fam 385. , at [54], "guidance provided in the context of one case may be transposed to another case only with caution".”
[29]Against the background of the above cautionary note (and emphasising the non-exhaustive nature of the guidance reviewed in his judgment), Moylan LJ proceeded in the remainder of para. 58 to summarise the key principles derived from the authorities he examined. I will address those principles where relevant in the course of my analysis, below; it is not necessary to set them out here.[30]See also the guidance given by Lord Wilson in Re B (Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) about the loss and subsequent acquisition of habitual residence, at para. 46:
“The identification of a child’s habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact. In making the following three suggestions about the point at which habitual residence might be lost and gained, I offer not sub-rules but expectations which the fact-finder may well find to be unfulfilled in the case before him: (a) the deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state; (b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and (c) were all the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it.” (a) the deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state; (b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and (c) were all the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it.”
[31]There is no burden of proof in relation to the issue of habitual residence. See the guidance given by Moylan LJ in Re F at paras 39 and 40.[32]In relation to witness evidence, I direct myself that people lie for a variety of reasons. Telling a lie in the witness box or in some other related context does not necessarily conceal or indicate guilt or demonstrate a wholesale lack of credibility on the part of the witness concerned. The classic Lucas formulation was given by Lord Lane CJ in [1981] QB 720 in the following terms:
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”
[33]See also the summary of the law concerning Lucas directions given in Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 at paras 97 to 105, per McFarlane LJ (as he then was). The Court held that the principle in Lucas is not limited to accomplices, as was the case in the original Lucas case (para. 98). A Lucas direction applies to the analysis of a witness’s credibility in the family courts as much as it does in the criminal courts (para. 99). At para. 100, McFarlane LJ endorsed and applied the approach taken by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Middleton [2001] Crim.L.R. 251:
“In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion that an individual has lied on a material issue as direct proof of guilt.”
[34]The demeanour of a witness in the witness box must be approached with caution, but it may, when considered in the round with the remaining evidence in the case, be a factor of some relevance. See Re B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371 at para. 25, per Peter Jackson LJ:
“No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness's credibility based solely on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by the witness, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities. However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence. Indeed in family cases, where the question is not only 'what happened in the past?' but also 'what may happen in the future?', a witness's demeanour may offer important information to the court about what sort of a person the witness truly is, and consequently whether an account of past events or future intentions is likely to be reliable.”

Determining the factual matrix

[35]Determining the jurisdiction of a child’s habitual residence is, at its core, a question of fact. To determine that issue, it will first be necessary to establish the factual matrix upon which that assessment must be based. I have considered all evidence and submissions, in the round, to the balance of probabilities standard.[36]I commence with a number of preliminary observations about the factual matrix.[37]First, this is a case where there is a broader dispute between the parents, much of which relates to events which took place in either Pakistan or the UAE. For example, the father makes safeguarding allegations against the mother in relation to her mental health and care of G in Pakistan and the UAE. To give another example, the mother contends that she was turned away from the father’s family home in Pakistan by the father’s armed guards. These allegations, while in principle serious, do not shed much light on the comparative analysis that is required to determine the issue of habitual residence. The parents approached their evidence on the issue of jurisdiction through the lens of the broader dispute between them (and possibly between their families). In my judgment, the animus between the parties sometimes clouded their evidence on the core issues relevant to my analysis of G’s habitual residence. I have sought to restrict my findings to issues of relevance to the issue of habitual residence, rather than irrelevant aspects of the broader dispute between the mother and the father.[38]Secondly, this is not a case where there are many significant disputes about the underlying factual matrix insofar as it relates to the issue of habitual residence. Both parents gave evidence that, insofar as the overall chronology was concerned, was broadly consistent. There were some points of disagreement that were largely inconsequential from the perspective of the issue of habitual residence. One example of this was who was first to call the police during the “serious marital dispute” in April 2023; whether it was the mother or the father adds little, if anything, to the overall evidential landscape.[39]The primary issues for my analysis relate to the character and categorisation of G’s living arrangements, and her integration and other matters pertaining to the location of her habitual residence at the relevant dates. That said, there are some disputed matters of fact on which it is necessary for me to reach findings, in particular whether there was a settled agreement or understanding between the parents that G would be raised in the jurisdiction of England and Wales; the father says that there was, whereas the mother says that there was not.[40]Thirdly, I must bear in mind the need not to impose my own cultural assumptions about the family arrangements of the mother and father, and their own family and cultural experiences and expectations. The mother and father’s relationship did not exist in a vacuum; they involved their families, whether through living in homes owned by the family (such as the father’s family’s home in England), and they involved their families in reconciliation discussions. They each have extended family in Pakistan and the UAE, with lifestyles and cultural expectations that reflect the cultural and religious context of their Pakistani heritage. I take those factors into account.

Witness evidence

[41]I will address matters arising from the evidence of each party; I stress that I have conducted the entirety of my analysis in the round and did so before reaching my findings of fact.[42]The father’s evidence was clear and articulate. I formed the impression that he sought to assist the court with some aspects of his evidence, particularly those parts of the narrative which he perceived as being helpful to his case (perhaps understandably), but that in other respects he sought to minimise steps that he had taken which – he now must realise – were inconsistent with the case he now advances.[43]One example of this is as follows. The father’s evidence was striking for its failure to engage with the role he played in G remaining in Pakistan in March 2024 and subsequently. I accept the mother’s evidence that the father left the country on 10 March 2024, on his own, without making any provision or arrangements for the mother or for G in his absence. The father accepts that he had G’s NADRA certificate with him when he left the country; he knew that that would have meant that the mother was unable to travel with G. While the father said that that was a simple mistake, I find that it was not. He did not mention this mistake in either of his witness statements, and it was only when pressed by the mother under cross-examination that he said that he had forgotten that he had the NADRA certificate in his wallet. There appears to have been a dispute between the father and the mother during that visit to Pakistan, leading to the father travelling back to the United Kingdom alone. He was, of course, not forced to board the flight, and he had access to a comfortable home, with security guards, drivers and staff, in Pakistan. He could have remained in the country quite easily, yet he chose to leave Pakistan, knowing that his wife and daughter remained there. His actions were consistent with leaving the country in the midst of an argument, knowingly leaving his wife and daughter behind, and doing so in a way which would prevent them from making onward travel arrangements without his consent or involvement, until a replacement card could be secured.[44]Whether this is categorised as abandonment, stranding or in some other way is of less significance than the actual actions of the father: he left the mother and G in Pakistan, and did so in a way which he knew would have prevented them from returning to England. Those are not, I find, the actions of someone who considered his daughter to have been habitually resident in England at the time. The father was reluctant to accept the clear implications of his actions under cross-examination. He sought to minimise his responsibility for creating the circumstances which led to G remaining in Pakistan with her mother. This is by no means a decisive factor, but it is a relevant part of the overall context and evidential landscape.[45]Another example of the father’s state of mind at the relevant times is the timing of the application to this court. G was last in the jurisdiction of England and Wales on 22 February 2024, and the alleged wrongful retention by the mother took place on 10 March 2024. Under cross-examination from the mother, the father explained that he did not commence these proceedings until as late as January 2026 because he had previously instructed solicitors in this jurisdiction in 2024 (the implication being that he was not advised about the correct process), and that in any event he thought that he had reconciled with the mother, from August 2024 onwards. That answer contrasted with para. 29 of his statement dated 8 April 2026, which stated that he commenced proceedings in Pakistan and the UAE in relation to the wrongful removal and abduction of G “in February 2024”, but that he now understood that the correct procedure would have been to issue proceedings in this jurisdiction initially.[46]I find that the father was reluctant to accept that there had, in reality, been a significant delay in bringing these proceedings. Indeed, in the witness box he was reluctant even to articulate the date that his application in this court had been issued. I had the strong impression that he was reluctant to accept that the time he took to bring the application suggests that, for most of 2024 and 2025, he took the view that G had ‘moved on’ from the United Kingdom, and by implication that she had moved on from the jurisdiction of England and Wales.[47]The father also sought to distance himself from the manner in which he conducted legal proceedings in Pakistan. In his oral evidence, he insisted that he had only sought to obtain a port alert order in Pakistan for the purposes of securing G’s whereabouts, to enable her to be returned to the jurisdiction of England and Wales, for welfare proceedings to take place here. However, that contrasted with the “prayer” in a petition presented by the father to the family court in Pakistan in which he sought the return of G to his care “in the interest of justice, fair play and for the welfare of minor [sic]”, as well as seeking an interim order for her custody – with no mention of a return to England.[48]Under cross-examination from the mother, the father claimed that this petition had been entered without his express authority by his Pakistani lawyer acting under a power of attorney. I note that there were no documents which demonstrated that the father’s Pakistani lawyer had acted beyond the father’s instructions in this respect, nor demonstrating the claimed power of attorney. The position, I find, was that the father considered the court in Pakistan to be the primary forum for the resolution of this dispute with the mother, in the context of her unilateral and repeated decisions to travel to the UAE with G. Of course, the father is not a lawyer, and it has taken a hearing in the Family Division of the High Court to determine the issue of jurisdiction in England and Wales, so I must exercise caution before ascribing too much significance to the father’s views about this issue. But the fact remains that he applied to the family court (or its equivalent) in Pakistan for orders to place G into his care, and in doing so made no mention of what he now contends was his desire all along for G to be returned to the jurisdiction of England and Wales, the location of her claimed habitual residence.[49]Other aspects of the father’s conduct prior to commencing these proceedings gave the strong impression that, at the time, he did not consider England and Wales to be G’s habitual residence. In October 2025, the father proposed a draft “co-parenting” agreement to the mother. The relevant paragraphs in the father’s draft stated [sic throughout]:
“And whereas… The Mother has relocated to [UAE], G was temporarily residing in [UAE] with no clear visa status and without consent of the father. Father primarily resides in the United Kingdom.” “The father is clear on his preference that the minor be raised in the UK, however this seems unrealistic for Mother, as she has no family based in the UK. Therefore until the Minors parents cannot come to an agreement on the Minor living in the UK, the father proposes that Minor lives temporarily in [Pakistan], with the intention that Minor lives temporarily in Lahore Pakistan, with the intention that minors parents will further negotiate in the near future on the minor living in the UK.” “Father will provide a residence for the exclusive use of Mother and Minor, in a location in [Pakistan] that the father finds to be reasonable. The residence will be furnished by the father to a standard deemed to be reasonable according to the Father. Father will pay rent directly to landlord. Electric, Gas and water bill will be paid by Father directly to relevant institution.” (Emphasis added)
[50]The significance of the above emphasised text is that it demonstrates that, as recently as October 2025, the father viewed the circumstances of G and the mother in the following terms: first, that the mother had “relocated” to the UAE; secondly, that it would be “unrealistic” for the mother and G to return to the United Kingdom, as the mother had no family based here; thirdly, that the father proposed that G should reside in Pakistan (rather than the UAE); and fourthly, that the father was content to provide G and the mother with accommodation, and to meet many of the living expenses they would incur in doing so. Those are all factors consistent with G having lost her previous habitual residence in this jurisdiction.[51]The father’s evidence was that there had been a joint agreement between him and the mother that G would be raised in the United Kingdom. I do not accept that there was a joint parental agreement for G to be raised in the UK throughout her childhood. That was the father’s expectation, but it was not a view that the mother shared. At most, there was a joint understanding that the family would spend considerable periods of time in England and Wales, albeit while rotating between Pakistan and the UAE. Had the events of March 2024 unfolded differently, the lifestyle of this globally mobile family may in time have coalesced around England and Wales; but there was no express agreement to which the mother voluntarily subscribed in favour of England and Wales being G’s habitual residence throughout her childhood. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.[52]First, the mother and father’s life together in England was limited in depth and breadth. I accept that the parties arranged for G to be born in the United Kingdom, and she remained in England until 27 May 2023, the point at which regular international travel oscillating between Pakistan and the UAE for lengthy periods of time commenced. I also accept that the mother secured limited leave to remain as the father’s spouse. However, the mother and father never lived apart from the father’s family when they were in England and Wales. There were no steps taken to secure their own home of the sort that would be consistent with a settled joint intention to remain habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. By contrast, the father had the use of a well-appointed property in Pakistan with maids and a driver. While the father’s evidence was that that was a property rented by his company for the use of visiting shareholders, the fact remains that the father had, I find, exclusive use of the property when he needed it. The father and the mother are both citizens of Pakistan, and neither are subject to immigration restrictions in the country – in contrast to the position of the mother, who is subject to immigration control in this jurisdiction (and presently does not hold leave to enter or remain). The father performs a significant leadership role in the family business in Pakistan and there is no suggestion that he would not have been able to continue to use the property at will. The mother has family of her own in the same city in Pakistan.[53]Secondly, I accept the mother’s evidence that when she lived in this country, she did not have an independent existence outside the father’s extended family home, which itself was not a home of which they had exclusive use. There was a short period when they relocated to another property while building work took place on the father’s extended family’s home, but there is no suggestion that that was because the mother and father were establishing their own separate life together. The mother did not work and was not in any form of study. There is no evidence that the mother had a social life in England, or was otherwise integrated in her own capacity, despite the fluency and ease with which she speaks (very good) English. Nothing in the father’s evidence suggests he did anything to facilitate the integration of his then wife in England.[54]I also accept the mother’s evidence that she perceived that she did not have the freedom to live an independent life while in England. I stress that I am not making findings of fact relating to the mother’s allegations of controlling and coercive behaviour on the part of the father. I do find, however, that the cultural and familial expectations to which the mother felt that she was subject while living in the father’s family home in England meant that she did not feel that she was able to establish any roots or integration of her own with any sense of ease. In this respect, the mother emphasised in her evidence the dependence and reliance that she was required to place on the father when she moved to the United Kingdom; she married the father when she was 21 years old, and when he would have been 27. She had just turned 22 when she first came to the United Kingdom from Pakistan and had no independent existence of her own in this country. The mother’s evidence was that she was unhappy with this arrangement. It would be surprising if, against that background, she was party to a decision permanently to remain in the United Kingdom, away from her own family in Pakistan and the UAE. Indeed, the father went so far in his proposed co-parenting agreement in October 2025 (see above) to concede that it was “unrealistic” for the mother to raise G in the United Kingdom “as she has no family based in the UK.”[55]Thirdly, the evidence does not support a finding that the father valued the mother’s opinion. While post-March 2024 and throughout 2025 he sought to negotiate with the mother for the return of, or living arrangements relating to, G, I regret to find that there is nothing to suggest that the father valued the mother’s opinion when it came to making significant family decisions. The father was the head of the family and decided on the direction it would take, albeit taking counsel from his extended family, and negotiating with the mother’s family as required. To the extent the father considered there was any form of joint agreement it would, at most, have been a reflection of his own views and aspirations about G’s living arrangements.[56]For those reasons, I do not accept the father’s evidence that there had been a joint agreement that G would be raised in the United Kingdom.[57]The mother’s evidence was, on the whole, credible. I reject Mr Green’s submissions to the contrary. There were some occasions when she could not recall dates or precise details, but when that was so, she said so. For example, Mr Green’s opening question in cross-examination was whether the mother accepted that, on 2 May 2023, G was habitually resident in England and Wales. The mother initially seemed confused by the question and could not recall the significance of that date. Mr Green intimated that the mother was looking to her McKenzie Friend for assistance. I find that she was not seeking any form of coaching on the point; she simply could not remember that that was the date on which the father had attended court in this jurisdiction in relation to the father’s application for port alerts at that stage. When she realised what Mr Green was asking by reference to the event in question (namely, family court proceedings in this jurisdiction), rather than the date he gave in the abstract in the course of asking his first question in cross-examination, the mother was able to provide an answer. She was not trying to conceal matters from the court in such circumstances.[58]That said, the mother was reluctant to accept that, even in the past, G had been habitually resident in the United Kingdom. Nothing turns on this for the purposes of my analysis, but it demonstrates the extent to which the mother (like the father) was only able to see matters from her perspective.[59]Other aspects of the mother’s evidence revealed a defensiveness which suggested that she was seeking to gloss over matters which she perceived as being harmful to her case. One example of this is whether she was aware of the return flights booked by the father for 10 March 2024; when it was put to her by Mr Green that she must have known about that booking, her response was to ask for an email or other documentary evidence demonstrating that she knew about the flights. That, I find, was a defensive mechanism to gloss over the fact she knew that the family were due to return to the United Kingdom on that date, and that she and G should have attended the airport to meet the father in time for the departure. Similarly, it was put to the mother that her stepfather does not agree with her living with him and her mother in his apartment in the UAE. The mother’s response to that question was to ask for documentary evidence demonstrating that that was the case. Again, that was a defensive response which did not engage with the question that was put to her, by virtue of which the mother did not avail herself of the opportunity to explain whether her stepfather was, in fact, happy for her and G to live with them at his flat in the UAE.[60]Overall, though, the mother’s evidence was clear and consistent. She was able to explain how she had been able to travel to the UAE without the NADRA certificate which the father had taken with him when he returned to England on 10 March 2024, namely by obtaining a replacement. There was an understandable sense of exasperation in aspects of the mother’s evidence, in particular in relation to being questioned by Mr Green about this issue. I remind myself that the demeanour of a witness is an unreliable guide to credibility and reliability; this aspect of my analysis does not relate to the mother’s demeanour as such. Rather, the mother reacted to the irony which underpinned Mr Green’s questions, and by extension, the father’s application to this court: Mr Green challenged the mother as to how she had been able to leave Pakistan given the father’s unilateral actions which, on Mr Green’s case, should have been effective to prevent the mother from leaving Pakistan. It follows that, on the one hand, the father brought this application on the footing that the mother unlawfully and unilaterally retained G in Pakistan. Yet on the other, the father, through his counsel, contends that the mother should never have been able to leave Pakistan in the first place. This is despite it being the father’s case that the mother should have returned G to the United Kingdom. Put another way, the father contends that the mother failed to do something which he accepts his actions prevented her from doing.[61]The mother focussed much of her evidence on her case that she and G are habitually resident in the UAE, rather than in Pakistan. Mr Green challenged that aspect of her case. In my judgment, whether G is habitually resident in the UAE or Pakistan is of less significance to the question of whether she remains habitually resident in England and Wales. Of course, as part of determining the principal controversial issue I identified in the opening paragraph of this judgment, I must address the degree of G’s integration in her present state of residence, in order to conduct the required comparative evaluation against the position that obtains in relation to England and Wales.[62]Upon the commencement of these proceedings, the mother and G were living in the UAE. They had spent January to July 2025 in Pakistan, followed by three months in the UAE, until October 2025. From October to 14 November 2025, they returned to Pakistan. The mother contends that she returned to the UAE on 14 November 2025, and has been habitually resident there since that date. The mother has obtained employment in the UAE. In early January 2026, the mother registered G at a nursery in the UAE; G’s first day appears to have been 28 January 2026[63]Both the mother and G were resident under time-limited tourist visas in the UAE; the mother says that she was not in a position to obtain the necessary documentation from the Pakistani authorities to secure longer visas because of the port-alert in force in Pakistan at the behest of the father. There is no documentary evidence about the entitlement of the mother and G to be issued with longer visas, or the extent to which the port alert in Pakistan has made obtaining a more secure form of immigration status in the UAE more difficult. However, bearing in mind the summary nature of these proceedings, and the need to approach matters proportionately, I consider that I may make findings on this issue without further evidence. There is a plausibility to this aspect of the mother’s case. Certainly, the father has – on his own case – taken steps to make the mother’s international travel more difficult, whether by retaining G’s NADRA card, or obtaining port alerts in Pakistan. He tried, but failed, to obtain a similar order from the courts in the UAE. The mother has secured employment in the UAE and has provided a letter from her employer confirming the same. I accept that it is likely that her employer would be able to sponsor a more secure form of visa for her, with G as her dependent, but that she has been prevented from doing so by the restrictions imposed in Pakistan, which will have prevented the mother from obtaining the necessary documentation from the Pakistani authorities.[64]The mother does not have her own accommodation in the UAE. She and G stay with her mother and her stepfather when she is in the country. I accept the father’s evidence that there are tensions between the mother and her stepfather, meaning that there is a precarious quality to her accommodation in the UAE. By contrast, the mother’s status in Pakistan is less precarious; she is a citizen of the country, and has access to her mother’s home, in relation to which there is no suggestion by the father of the sort of tensions that apparently exist with the stepfather in the UAE.[65]G’s longest uninterrupted period of residence in the UAE was therefore from 14 November 2025 until shortly after the recent conflict commenced in Iran, in early March 2026. I accept the mother’s evidence that she only left the UAE because of the security situation and that, at the date of the hearing before me, she considered that it was safe to return but that she had been unable to do so due to the extant port alert in Pakistan. She continues to work remotely for her UAE-based employer, and seeks to return to the UAE if and when the port alert has been lifted. There is an inconsistency in the mother’s position that she both seeks to remain in the UAE, and yet is unable to regularise her status and that of G due to not being able to obtain the correct documentation or certification from the authorities in Pakistan. It appears that the mother’s plan to reconcile that inconsistency is through being prepared to pay the administrative fines necessary for overstaying her tourist visa, and that of G, as she confirmed under cross-examination. While it may be said that that is not a long-term solution, it nevertheless reflects the mother’s intentions in relation to remaining in the UAE. There is a copy of a fine for G dated 31 March 2026 annexed to the mother’s skeleton argument.

Habitual residence

[66]Against the background of those findings of fact, I now turn to the issue of habitual residence. This is a question of fact that must be focussed on G’s situation as at the date proceedings were commenced. The primary question for my consideration is whether G was habitually resident in England and Wales on 8 January 2026, but to determine that question I must address her comparative integration in her state of residence at that date. If G was habitually resident in England and Wales on that date, she must have remained so by the date of the hearing before me in order for this court to retain jurisdiction.[67]The fact that both parties accepted that G was habitually resident in England and Wales in June 2023 is nothing to the point. The position that applied nearly three years ago is of little relevance to the contemporary analysis I must now perform. It demonstrates the depth of G’s past integration in England and Wales; her mother arrived in November 2022 with a valid visa, and gave birth in January 2023. By the time the family court accepted jurisdiction in relation to G in June 2023, she had lived for most of her life in the United Kingdom, with only a single, four-week, absence from the jurisdiction of England and Wales (27 May to 24 June 2023, Pakistan). It is hardly surprising that G was habitually resident in England and Wales in those circumstances.[68]Moving ahead to 8 January 2026, on that date G’s father was (I accept for the purposes of this analysis) habitually resident in England and Wales, as were his parents and members of his wider family. G’s father is, of course, a hugely significant figure in her life, and his habitual residence in this jurisdiction represents a significant link to England and Wales. The father’s intention was for G to be brought up in England and Wales, and the mother had at least agreed that the family would spend significant periods of time here. G is a British citizen and enjoys the right of abode in the United Kingdom without restriction. Those are significant factors linking G to this jurisdiction.[69]However, by 8 January 2026, G had not resided in, or even visited, England and Wales (or anywhere in the United Kingdom) for 22 months. On that date, she had no friends in England and Wales, was not registered in any pre-school or nursery, and had not received any healthcare in the jurisdiction. Her mother had not set foot in the jurisdiction for the same length of time, and no longer had a visa permitting her to reside here lawfully.[70]The circumstances which led to G remaining out of the jurisdiction of England and Wales were triggered by the father leaving Pakistan without the mother or G. It was the father who left the mother, with no means of travelling without him due to his retention of the NADRA document. The mother knew that she was expected to board the flight with G, but she did not. There is nothing to suggest that the mother thought that the father would go without her, leaving his wife and daughter in Pakistan. It would have been open to the father to remain in Pakistan to make arrangements for the mother and G to board a later flight; he did not. Significantly, the father subsequently took additional steps to prevent the mother and G from leaving the jurisdiction, namely by obtaining a port alert. The mother, at this time, is likely to have had enough of the father, and will have wanted to stay in Pakistan. She was deeply unhappy in the father’s family home in England and much preferred life in Pakistan (or the UAE).[71]On 8 January 2026, G had been continuously resident in the UAE since 14 November 2025; but for a four-week break from 16 October to 14 November 2025, G had resided in the UAE since 7 July 2025. From April 2024 to July 2025, G spent most of her time (14 months) in Pakistan, the country of her joint nationality, where her mother has family and accommodation. In the UAE, G’s residence was precarious; she was living in accommodation belonging to the mother’s stepfather, in relation to which there had been tensions. She and the mother were present at that time on tourist visas. G overstayed her tourist visa, resulting in a fine being payable by the mother. I accept that the mother’s own mother was residing in the UAE at that time, which provided family links and integration for the mother.[72]Drawing this analysis together, I consider that it would be fanciful to conclude that G, by then still under three, remained habitually resident in England and Wales some 22 months after she had last set foot in the jurisdiction. While I accept that her previous links would have been significant, the passage of 22 months was amply sufficient to disengage the links she formed as a small baby in England and Wales, and forge new links elsewhere. I would reach this conclusion even on the footing that it was the mother’s unilateral decision to retain G in Pakistan which had the effect of causing this change. There is, of course, no rule that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child; and in any event, the father bears some responsibility for triggering the chain of events which led to G not returning to this jurisdiction.[73]This conclusion is reinforced when viewed through the lens of Lord Wilson’s judgment in Re B (Habitual Residence: Inherent Jurisdiction) at para. 46. The guidance in this paragraph goes to the timing of disintegration and reintegration, rather than forming standalone criteria to determine habitual residence. Taking the points in turn: i) G was deeply integrated in England and Wales at the point of her removal, meaning that a significant period of time would be required to achieve integration elsewhere (para. 46(a)). In my judgment, 22 months is amply sufficient to achieve that objective. ii) There is no suggestion that there was any significant pre-planning of G’s move (para 46(b)). The mother and father had experienced marital difficulties in June 2023. The mother was unhappy. She packed 40KG, her full baggage allowance; but aside from that, there is no evidence that she had planned a significant international move. She was not to know that the father would leave the country with G’s NADRA certificate, nor that he would later impose Pakistani port alerts on her. Even if there was no pre-planning, the elapsed time of 22 months has been more than sufficient to enable G to disintegrate from this jurisdiction, and integrate elsewhere. iii) Not all central members of G’s family moved with her (para. 46(c)). Her father remained habitually resident in this jurisdiction. This means that G has retained some links to England and Wales, and will have required more time to disintegrate from this jurisdiction. Again, 22 months is a very lengthy period when viewed in this respect.[74]The father’s strongest submission that militates in favour of G remaining habitually resident in England and Wales relates to the temporary and precarious nature of her residence in the UAE. It is, I accept, precarious. Residence which encompasses a real risk of repeated immigration violations of UAE immigration law is, without more, an unsound basis to conclude that a child is habitually resident, especially when considered alongside G’s precarious accommodation, and the equally precarious immigration status of the mother in the UAE. Moreover, G has spent far less time in the UAE than in Pakistan since March 2024. Her nursery registration is recent, and appears to post-date these proceedings being issued.[75]It is necessary, however, to view G’s residence in the UAE in the round with her residence in Pakistan. G has spent most of her time, by a significant margin, in Pakistan. That is the country of her nationality, and that of her mother. It is the country to which she fled the conflict in Iran. While it is not for this court to adjudicate on any rival claims G may have to habitual residence in the UAE or Pakistan, in order to perform the comparative exercise inherent to this assessment of habitual residence, it is necessary to examine the quality of G’s residence in each jurisdiction.[76]Properly understood, most of Mr Green’s submissions which contended that G was not habitually resident in the UAE were, in fact, submissions that she was habitually resident in Pakistan. In my judgment, it is not necessary to get sidetracked into adjudicating between the competing claims that G may have to be habitually resident in Pakistan or the UAE, given the length of G’s absence from England and Wales. What is clear, in my judgment, is that G was not habitually resident in England and Wales on 8 January 2026. The overall length of her absence – 22 months – was more than sufficient to disengage the previous links she enjoyed in this jurisdiction.[77]As I conclude, I must address a submission advanced by Mr Green. In his skeleton argument and in oral submissions, Mr Green emphasised the “some degree of integration” test which is derived from A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2014] AC 1. However, at para. 49 of Re F, Moylan LJ explained that the concept is not to be elevated above all other criteria, and said:
“‘some degree of integration’ is not the test and is not the relevant question. Nor does habitual residence necessarily correspond to the place in which a child has some degree of integration. It is not a bar which, once surmounted, determines the issue of habitual residence. Social and family integration is an element which needs to be considered when determining habitual residence and, indeed, the conclusion that a child is not integrated is likely to lead to a conclusion that they are not habitually resident in that country, but ‘some degree of integration’ is not the test and its existence does not determine habitual residence.” (Emphasis supplied)
[78]Even if I were to apply a test of “some degree of integration”, G has so fully disintegrated from her previous residence in England and Wales that the application of that test would only admit of one conclusion: that G was not habitually resident in England and Wales on 8 January 2026. Aside from having a British father, on that date G retained virtually no integrative links with the jurisdiction of England and Wales.[79]Returning to the question posed at the outset of this judgment, I therefore find that on 8 January 2026, G was not habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to determine this issue, and the father’s application must be dismissed.[80]I will invite the parties to draw a suitable order.[81]That is the judgment of the court.