JPMB, Re [2026] EWHC 1361 (Fam)

Case No FD26P00275
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
NCN: [2026] EWHC 1361 (Fam)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
23 April 2026
SIR JONATHAN COHENRE: JPMBApplicantRE: JPMBMS M STANLEY (Solicitor Advocate) appeared for Applicant TrustMR ACHONU (Solicitor Advocate) appeared for Second RespondentThe First Respondent appeared in person for in personJUDGMENT(Approved)Digital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JEWeb: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.Date 2026-04-23

SIR JONATHAN COHEN: I am giving this ex tempore judgment immediately after the end of an application brought by the Health Authority in relation to a young man, JPMB (whom I shall refer to as JP), who was born on 9 February 2010 and is now aged 16 years and 2 months. Urgency does not permit any other course.

[2]The application is brought by the Health Trust pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court seeking a declaration that it is lawful and in JP's best interests to receive a transfusion of blood or blood products in the event that it is the clinical view of the surgical team that this becomes necessary during his surgery for appendicitis. The first respondent is JP’s mother and JP was joined by me as the second respondent.[3]JP was brought into hospital late on the evening of 21 April, so about 36 hours ago, and was provisionally diagnosed with acute appendicitis, which was confirmed by scan. He was seen by the relevant consultant, Dr M, first thing on the morning of the 22nd, yesterday, and again later in the day and again this morning.[4]The options that were available were put to JP. He could have conservative management or an operation. Conservative management would mean the administration of antibiotics and keeping a close eye on JP to see how he reacts. Indeed, over the last 24 hours since he has been receiving such treatment, he has shown signs of improvement. But there is no means of knowing whether that improvement would last or whether the problem would simply come back again and he has, perfectly reasonably, taken the view that he would like an appendectomy to remove his appendix.[5]The doctor has provided a helpful witness statement, the contents of which he amplified in oral evidence. The appendix needs treatment one way or another because, without an improvement either by conservative management or surgery, it risks rupturing leading to sepsis, peritonitis and death. If surgery is going to be performed, it should be performed no later than during the course of today, preferably in the first half of today. So, this is a matter of very considerable urgency. The longer that it is delayed, the much greater the chances of sepsis and death.[6]All operations of course carry risks. There are the risks that are attached to anaesthetics; there are the risks of bleeding. The risk of bleeding is described by Dr M, as being 1 to 3 per cent and the likelihood of a blood transfusion being required is put by the doctor as "less than .5 per cent".[7]In his evidence to me, he described that as being, as of course mathematically it would be, 1 in 200, but I think that rather overstates the likelihood, both because he says that it is less than .5 per cent but also by reference to his own clinical experience of having conducted more than 1,000 appendectomies over the course of 14 years, and only once has he found it necessary to administer a blood transfusion. So the need for a blood transfusion is extremely unlikely.[8]It is not an all or nothing situation so far as a blood transfusion is concerned. I should have said earlier, although it is obvious, that the reason why this debate is taking place is that JP is a Jehovah's Witness, as is his mother, and that is the faith which they follow devotedly. Of course, Jehovah's Witnesses are strongly opposed to any form of foreign blood coming in to their bloodstream.[9]When I said it was not an all or nothing situation, what I meant by that is that there are two lesser forms of assistance that can be provided, stopping short of a foreign blood transfusion. One is the use of cell saver. Cell saver uses the patient's own blood, extracting and purifying it and then replacing it in the patient's bloodstream so that there is no question of contamination by any other form of blood. The second is the use of a clotting factor without it containing blood products. That is available in the hospital in which JP is a patient. Both of those are acceptable to JP and plainly, if required, could be of considerable assistance. It does not mean, of course, that they, in extreme circumstances, would adequately replace a blood transfusion using the blood of another person.[10]JP has made his position very clear. He was seen by Ms Odze, instructed by Cafcass, during the course of yesterday afternoon. He made it quite clear that he would not accept anything with blood, unless it was his own blood. He explained that he has his faith in God and he must follow what he is taught by God. There is not an option whereby he can accept other peoples' blood and, if death is the consequence, then he will be with God and he will follow God's law. So, even if I were to make an order that he should accept blood, he would not agree with me doing so. He does not want to die, but he must follow the bible and if the bible says, "Do not accept blood", then that must be the law which he follows.[11]There is general agreement that these views are strongly held and are the views of JP and not of anybody else. There is no suggestion that they have been forced upon him.[12]JP has been onscreen throughout the two hours or so that this hearing has taken, and he has spoken to the court. I shall say plainly I thought he was a most impressive young man. I thought he was intelligent, sensitive and with a full understanding of the issues that the court is confronted with.[13]He is doing seven GCSEs. He has applied for college for when his course ends in the summer. He attends school regularly. He is close to friends and family and has a range of interests and activities.[14]I have heard from his mother. I am grateful for her attendance. She spoke through an interpreter, a friend, who has very kindly come to the rescue of the court when it was ascertained yesterday afternoon when this case should have been heard, that the mother needed the assistance of an interpreter and I am very grateful to her for putting aside her own professional commitments yesterday afternoon late and this morning to be able to assist the court.[15]JP's mother has described him as a responsible young man. He demonstrates maturity. He causes no problems in his life and makes good choices and he wants actively to participate in his treatment and not to compromise his wellbeing, which to him means not take blood products. She supports his stance.[16]Ms Odze was represented by Mr Niven-Phillips of Cafcass, but Mr Niven-Phillips came out of the case yesterday afternoon, another reason why there could not be an effective hearing yesterday, when JP indicated that he wished to instruct his own lawyer. No-one doubted that he had the capacity to do so and Mr Achonu has come in at very short notice, accepting instructions late yesterday, to represent JP today, and I am grateful for his help given over a very short period of instruction.[17]Ms Odze confirmed to Mr Achonu when questioned that his views were as set out in her attendance note. She described him as a lovely young lad who expressed his views clearly and that his conscience could be troubled if the order was made.[18]This case is very much on the cusp. I have to balance the preservation of life against the right to autonomy and I do so not in a vacuum but against all the circumstances of the case. I give weight to the potentially fatal consequence of the very unlikely event that requires a blood transfusion and I give weight to the maturity of JP’s views whilst not overlooking his still young age. I take into consideration the distress that he may well feel if his views are not followed. I bear in mind that the treating team are ready and willing to undertake the operation even if the use of donated blood is not authorised by the court.[19]Cobb J (as he then was) was faced with a very similar situation in 2024 with a 17 year old Jehovah's Witness and the reasoning that he sets out in his judgment in Re: J (Blood Transfusion: Older Child: Jehovah's Witness) [2024] EWHC 1034 (Fam) is one which I adopt. I draw particular help from paragraphs 35, 38-39 and 43-47 which read: I do not interpret the remarks in Re E & F set out in the foregoing paragraphs (§33/34) to mean that where proposed medical intervention carries with it any risk of loss of life, the court is obliged to authorise treatment so as to preserve the young person’s life. That would be to negate the lodestar of welfare in the widest sense. Nor do I believe that those remarks are intended to contradict the earlier remarks about the two transcendent factors in play when considering the welfare of a mature young person (see [50] Re E & F, and §31 above). When considering authorising medical treatment which is opposed by a competent young person (using ‘competent’ in the context of Gillick above), it is crucial that the court should consider, among other factors, the chronological age and level of maturity of the individual young person, their intelligence and understanding of the issues and risks, the nature of the specific decision to be made, objectively the full set of risks involved both ways (of having or not having the treatment and its consequences), the reasons given by the young person for their decision, and the prospective quality of the life to be lived should the unwanted treatment be successful in preserving the minor’s life. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Re E & F it is important that the court identifies:
“… the factors that really matter in the case before it, gives each of them proper weight, and balances them out to make the choice that is right for the individual at the heart of the decision” ([52]). I am conscious that the risk of intra-operative or post-operative serious haemorrhage in this case is said to be “very small”; this is of obvious comfort to J and his family, and to me, but it nonetheless is a risk. J is aware, his parents are aware, as indeed I am aware, that there are irreparable and disproportionate consequences for J in the event that he suffers a severe haemorrhage in the operation or in the post-operative period, and blood products are not administered. I also bear much in mind the description which Mr R gave about his own distress as a surgeon if he found himself powerless to save J’s life if he began to bleed severely on the operating table. But I remind myself that if this operation were to be taking place in six months’ time or thereafter, this court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with this patient’s choice, and nor would the doctors. J has articulated clearly his opposition to this type of treatment, and has done so from a place of understanding and maturity. While the inherent jurisdiction offers “protective power” over children and young people (Re E & F at [46]), I am conscious that I should not exercise an overly protective or paternalistic authority over this responsible young man, when I am satisfied that he knows clearly and convincingly what he wishes in respect of the upcoming operation, can clearly articulate his choices, and can explain his reasoning. Welfare: Every decision concerning medical treatment for children and young people must turn upon its own facts; “[t]he court needs to focus on the factors that really matter in the case before it” (Re E & F at [71]). In all cases, the paramount concern of the court is to make a decision in the best interests of the individual subject young person, looked at in its widest sense. I have found this to be an extremely finely balanced decision which directly and poignantly engages the “two transcendent factors” referred to in Re E & F, namely the preservation of life and personal autonomy. It is plain that the subject young people in Re E & F felt “aggrieved” ([5]) that their views were overridden, and I am satisfied that J would feel the same. Even though the body of case law to which I have been referred has generally concluded with a decision in favour of treatment, I am conscious that “that is not the invariable outcome” (per Re E & F at [65]). To be faithful to the rich seam of pronouncements in this area I wish to emphasise that judicial ‘respect’ for the ‘views of the mature child’ is not a tokenistic mantra; it must be given true meaning, and where appropriate, full effect. To some degree this is demonstrated by the decisions of Moor J in A South East Trust v AGK [2019] EWFC 86 and to the decision of Cohen J in A Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v DV (A Child) [2021] EWHC 1037 (Fam), where the objections of young people to the administration of blood products held sway. However, the distinguishing feature between those cases and this is that in AGK and DVno significant opposition was offered by the medical profession to the minor’s objections. J is only a matter of weeks away from being an adult as a matter of law. He has limited – but nonetheless evolving – experience of mature decision-making; he has first-hand experience of the death of someone of whom he was fond. He already shows many attributes of adulthood. I found him to be an impressive young man with clear thoughts and expression. I am satisfied that he knows his own mind, and is aware of the risks to which he is exposing himself in declining blood products in the unlikely event that they would be needed in this operation. J’s clear and unequivocal decision in this regard, and his reasoning, are rooted in his faith; I respect his well-recognised right under Article 9 of the ECHR to manifest and observe his religion. The Applicants recognise that J’s beliefs about blood products are “long held and considered”
. I accept that if I were to accede to this application and blood products were therefore administered intra-operatively or post-operatively, this would be likely to affect J’s sense of self-determination, his fidelity to the tenets of his religion, and the quality of his life going forward. I am satisfied that while blood products may save his life, their administration against his wishes would lead to him experiencing a much reduced quality and enjoyment of that saved life, and he would be ‘tormented’ by having other blood in his veins. Having weighed all of the matters outlined above, I have concluded that in this case it is in J’s best interests for his own decision to refuse the administration of blood or blood products in surgery to prevail, and I propose therefore to refuse the application for the court’s authorisation to administer blood products in the event of emergency in the upcoming operation. The order must reflect my conclusions about J’s competence to participate in this litigation without a guardian, and to make decisions about the planned medical treatment. I shall declare that it is lawful, being J’s decision and in accordance with his best interests, for his treating clinicians not to administer whole blood or primary blood products, even if in the opinion of the treating clinicians the transfusion of blood or blood products may preserve J’s life, or prevent severe permanent injury or irreversible physical or mental harm. I shall further provide that if prior to the procedure J consents to having such blood or blood products, such treatment will be provided as long as his clinicians consider this to be clinically indicated.[20]In Re J, the young person was within 6 months of being an adult, whilst JP is still some 21 months away. But a chronological comparison is not an entirely accurate way of approaching this. JP is entitled to have his views taken with gravity and, as I say, he has impressed me and everybody else with his maturity and clarity.[21]I consider in all the circumstances of this case, in particular what seems to me the very small nature of the risk, catastrophic though it might be if things were to turn out badly, as one that can be taken, bearing in mind, as I say, not only the rarity of such treatment being required, but also the options that are available by way of, if not alternative, certainly mitigation of bleeding, if that were to take place.[22]So, in the circumstances, I shall make an order that it is lawful in JP's best interests not to receive blood products against his wish.[23]Postscript: the operation was undertaken without complications arising. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk This transcript has been approved by the Judge