A & B (Summary return: Inherent jurisdiction: Nigeria), Re [2026] EWHC 1274 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 1274 (Fam)

Case No FD25P00602

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

The Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

The Senior Courts Act 1981

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 13 May 2026

Before

CATHERINE COWTON KC

(SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE)

Between

MApplicant

FRespondent

Re A & B (Summary return: Inherent jurisdiction: Nigeria)

The Applicant mother was acting in person for in person

The Respondent father was acting in person for in person

Hearing Hearing dates: 24 April and 1 May 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely on 13 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and then for release to the National Archives.

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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Introduction

[1]This is the final hearing of the mother’s application for the summary return to England of her son A (age 6) and her daughter B (age 5). The application is dated 23.9.25, and was issued by the court on 25.9.25. The application is made under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The children’s father is the respondent. The parents were married when the children were born and so as a matter of English law they both have parental responsibility for both children.

[2]The father flew with the children from England to Nigeria on 24.7.25 (arriving on 25.7.25), and has since retained them in that country. The mother says that this was without her consent, and that she was their primary carer for all their lives until that day. The mother has not seen either child since.

[3]The final hearing was listed with a time estimate of 1 day on 24.4.26. The mother attended in person, representing herself. The father attended by video-link from Nigeria; he was also representing himself. Technical problems for the father in Nigeria, led to delays in progressing the hearing. Neither party had provided the court with a final hearing bundle, so time was also taken during the hearing to ensure the court and both parties had all evidence provided by each of them since the application was issued.

[4]Because this was an application for summary return, neither party gave oral evidence. Their cases were set out in writing in various statements and position statements, and each had provided supporting documentary evidence. After reading all the documents lodged, and hearing oral submissions from both parties, there was insufficient time for the court to give a decision on 24.4.26, and so the case was adjourned for one week.

[5]On 1.5.26, the court received further oral submissions from each party (the father, in particular, wishing to emphasise various points about why the English court should not make the orders sought by the mother), and then explained the final decision to the parties and the reasons for it, and that a full written Judgment would follow. As the parties are litigants in person, the court has provided a written Judgment so that the decision, and reasons for it, are clear to them both, and can also be made available to future Judges in both jurisdictions, insofar as relevant.

Overview

[6]The key issues I am asked to resolve are: 6.1. Whether the English court has jurisdiction to make orders in respect of the children; and if so 6.2. Whether I should order the father to return the children to England from Nigeria, so that the mother can resume her role as primary carer, or share the children’s care.

[7]The mother’s position is that the court should order that both children be returned to England immediately. She has not seen the children since 23.7.25, and indirect contact has been sporadic. At the date of the hearing on 24.4.26 she had not been permitted to speak to either child since 16.2.26, including not being allowed to speak to A on his birthday or B on her birthday. There was also a lengthy period from 24 July until 2 November 2025 when she was not permitted to speak to either child. She has asked the English court to deal with these important issues because she lives here, and the children also lived here until the father removed them to Nigeria.

[8]The father’s position is that the family is Nigerian, and that it is in the children’s best interests to live with him in Nigeria, where they are now settled in a family home and attending school. He challenges the role of the English court in making decisions about the children’s future. He encourages the mother to move back to Nigeria and spend time with the children there. He does not agree to return the children to England, where he no longer wishes to live.

Written evidence

[9]I was not provided with a final hearing bundle, as both parties were acting in person and neither party had prepared one. Instead I received multiple statements and exhibits, and other documents, from each party which I read carefully. These included: 9.1. The mother’s C66 application dated 23.9.25 (issued 25.9.25); 9.2. High Court orders dated 30.10.25, 18.11.25 and 6.3.26 (the latter, a disclosure request to the Home Office, directed on 18.11.25); 9.3. The court’s EX660 request to the Home Office dated 3.3.26, and the Home Office response letter dated 9.4.26; 9.4. The mother’s witness statements dated 10.11.25, 30.3.26, and 20.4.26 (with exhibits, including a video recording and an audio recording); 9.5. The mother’s position statement dated 20.4.26; 9.6. Prior to the adjourned hearing on 1.5.26, the mother provided a further witness statement dated 30.4.26 and more exhibits; 9.7. The father’s witness statements dated 17.11.25 and 8.4.26 (with exhibits); 9.8. A further statement emailed during the hearing on 24.4.26 (prepared by him over the lunchtime adjournment, in response to the mother’s 20.4.26 statement); 9.9. A copy of one of B’s school reports displaying the name of the children’s school in Nigeria (which I asked the father to send during the hearing on 24.4.26, to verify the name of the school); 9.10. An email showing the flight ticket booking for the father and children (dated 16.6.25) which he provided to the court following the 24.4.26 hearing. Background

[10]The father is aged in his late 30s, and the mother is in her late 20s. They met in Nigeria in 2018 and started a relationship. They married in 2019 in Nigeria. A was born in 2020, and B in 2021. Both children were born in Nigeria. Both parents and both children only have Nigerian nationality and passports.

[11]In September 2022, the father travelled to England. He came on a student visa, having obtained a place to study for a Masters degree at university in England. In October 2022, the mother and children travelled to England to join the father. Their immigration status was as dependents on his student visa. The family lived in rented accommodation. In November 2022 the mother obtained a job working night shifts so that she could be home as the children woke up in the morning, and able to look after them in the daytime. In 2023 she obtained work as a support worker, again working night shifts, to fit around the children’s needs.

[12]The mother explained that obtaining the job as a support worker was part of a shared plan of herself and the father, so that she could obtain a work visa in England before his student visa expired. The father and children could then be dependents on her visa, and the family would be able to remain living and working in this country. The father did not dispute this shared plan. The mother’s employers supported the mother’s visa application. On in 2023 she was granted leave to remain in this country as a skilled worker, until August 2028. The father and children have immigration status in this country as her dependents, also until August 2028. After finishing his Masters degree in September 2023, the father also obtained paid work. They continued to live in rented accommodation. Both parents helped to look after the children when they were not at work, but the mother’s case is that she was their primary carer from birth, taking the lead role in their day-to-day care, arranging all their medical appointments, and making arrangements for nursery and schooling.

[13]The mother describes incidents of domestic abuse (including physical violence and attempted strangulation) and financial control / coercive and controlling behaviour, during the marriage. Her supporting evidence includes: 13.1. An email from her employers in February 2023 asking her to provide details of a bank account in her sole name for receipt of her income, rather than the father’s sole bank account details (which she says he had insisted on her providing to her employer); 13.2. Bank statements showing her salary being paid into her account, and then almost all the money being removed by the father; 13.3. An audio recording (she says, from June 2024), in which the mother says “you want to strangle me”, the father shouts at her, you can hear what sounds like a hit/slap, and the mother says “I am not interested in you beating me again… leave me and my family alone… you want to strangle me”; 13.4. A video recording (she says, from 24.1.25, just after the father returned from a short trip to Nigeria). The mother describes this incident as having arisen when she asked about some food the father had bought, and he lost his temper, threw the food on the floor, pressed her neck and she almost passed out. She says B walked into the kitchen while the incident was happening. The video does not clearly show what happened, but you can hear the father’s voice, the phone camera twists around and then points at the floor, and you can see a young girl walking in.

[14]The father denies her allegations of abuse. I did not hear oral evidence during this summary return hearing, and I do not make any findings of fact in this Judgment, but note that the allegations are serious.

[15]On 5.1.25, the father went to Nigeria for a short visit, until 22.1.25. He says that he was looking for a job, but did not find one. He returned to England and the family continued living here. The mother explains that, after the 24.1.25 alleged violent incident, she decided that she and the father must separate for the safety of her and the children. She made arrangements for alternative rented accommodation.

[16]In March 2025, the mother moved out of the family’s rented property with the children, into a 4-bedroom house which she had rented with a friend. Initially she and the children were sharing a bedroom, but as she was able to afford to pay more of the rent, later she could provide two bedrooms for them. The father complains that for the first three weeks after they left, he did not know where the mother and children were living. However, the mother did then tell him, and he accepts had regular direct contact (for 2-3 days/nights each time) with the children over the following months.

[17]A attended primary school in England for Reception year (2024-25). B attended a nursery nearby, and had a place to start in Reception at the same primary school as A in September 2025. The school was near to the mother’s rented accommodation. The mother had a stable job, and secure immigration status.

[18]The father complains that, after they separated, the children were looked after by strangers while the mother was at work. The mother disputes this, saying that her friend would be with the children overnight while she was at work and that she would look after them during the daytime, when they were not at school/nursery. Her grandmother also came over from Nigeria in July 2025 to assist.

[19]After the mother and children moved out, the father continued living in the family’s previous rental property until May/June 2023, and then moved to live with friends elsewhere. He did not tell the mother where he was living. He did not arrange to terminate the tenancy or pay the final sums due, and the mother says that she was left to pay £875 and then another £635 from her income, to end the rental contract.

Removal from England

[20]On 23.7.25, the father took the children for what the mother says was intended to be a week’s contact with him in England, during the school holidays. He then took the children to Nigeria, leaving England on 24.7.25 (arriving in Nigeria on 25.7.25, having flown via a third country). However the circumstances of this remained unclear until this final hearing. It was only following the hearing on 24.4.26, that the father emailed to the court the flight tickets he had booked for himself and the children, which were inconsistent with other evidence he had given.

[21]The father asserted repeatedly that the mother knew that he was taking the children to Nigeria, and agreed to it, such that she had packed all their clothes for him to take. He said that he was “not of the message type, I prefer calling”, as an explanation for why there was no evidence of any communication with the mother before 24.7.25 about him taking the children to Nigeria, or confirming her agreement to this. The mother disputed that she knew about any plan to take the children to Nigeria, or that there was any agreement, and so this is a factual issue. However I did not need to hear oral evidence about it because the written evidence (and in particular, messages between the parents) provides a clear picture about what really happened.

[22]I set out below the messages between the father and mother leading up to and after the children were taken to Nigeria by him: 22.1. 15.7.25 (Father): “Is it that you never loved me from the beginning? Please answer me so I can have peace” 22.2. 16.7.25 (Mother): “Will you be picking them upon the 28th of July to spend the week with you? Since you said you can’t pick them up this Friday” 22.3. 16.7.25 (Father): “I will be coming to pick them up may be Tuesday or wenesday [sic] next week I am still trying to get approval from work will let you know the exact day before the end of the week, regards to your grandma, if you don’t mind can I talk to her?” 22.4. 16.7.25 (Father): “I am calling to speak to your grandmother can I? If you don’t mind” 22.5. 18.7.25 (Father): “Please I want to talk to the kids” 22.6. 19.7.25 (Father): “What have I done to you? You left me for another man? Your friend is connecting you and..” [rest of message not legible] 22.7. 25.7.25 (Father) [my emphasis]: “I was so scared of been vulnerable to you that was why I never showed my love to you, but when you left I became very vulnerable to you as expected you showed me what I was scared of, I begged for complete 5months but you refused because of money and another man, I had other plans before but when I found out that your grandma is around everything became very clear to me that everything that happened you and your family planned it, that is the reason why even after my mum traveled to see your family still nothing changed, when this whole matter was happening I did not talk or spoke to my dad for 3 months after yelling at him that day at your house,… I did not talk to her for more than 3months we just started talking 2 weeks ago, my mum it got to a point that I did not talk to her for sometime, you know why because I feel that day are all supporting you but same family that took your like their own you blocked all of them and insulted my mum…, I see you as someone that is very smart but I never knew that you can be easily manipulated, anyway long story short I have taken my kids back to Nigeria spent more than £6,800 for me to be able to fly with the kids from Uk one thing you don’t know is that Uk is just advance Nigeria, I wish you all the best in life, I hope the money that you are pursuing left right center you make it, it got to a point I became like homeless, frustrated, all the money I kept for mortgage £10,100 wasted just in space of 5months, you brought me down to nothing humiliated me, you turned me to a laughing stock among your friends and family, you are trying to do everything to put me in jail in Uk so you can be free for life, the message you sent to agent that you left the house because of violence and sign the house paper under duress I have it, you don’t know the implications of what you did, to the extent that you now know lawyers in Uk I just took my time to state a few here because it will be the last time you will hear from me and the kids again for life, let me save you the stress of how I did it, I started everything a week ago when I heard your grandmother is around was when I bought my ticket, please look for a way to send me the kids clothes if you don’t mind, may GOD ALMIGHTY REWARD YOU AND YOUR FAMILY FOR ALL YOU GUYS DID TO ME, you can now go and marry the Igbo guy now since I am all of a sudden Urhobo now. Thanks” 22.8. With the above message, the father sent the mother a photograph of himself and the children at an airport; the father is smiling at the camera, but the children are not smiling, and look confused and anxious.

[23]The mother then sent messages to third parties, which are consistent with her not knowing about or agreeing to the father taking the children to Nigeria: 23.1. Message from the mother to the father’s sister on 25.7.25: “Sis..good morning. I am calling to inform you that your brother took the children to Nigeria without my consent”; 23.2. Message from the mother to a family friend. The mother forwarded to the friend the father’s long message on 25.7.25 (quoted above), and the photo of the father and children at the airport, and the friend replied: “Jesus Christ. What is wrong with this man. Why is he joking with these kids future and thier wellbeing. Let me call my husband”; the mother replies “Okay ma. Thank you ma”; the friend then messages “Please don’t worry your self too much stay strong. My husband is trying to reach him. He is yet to pick”, and then (after a 2 minute voice call) the friend messages:“He is really in Nigeria. My husband had spoken with him”.

[24]The mother says she reported the abduction to the English police on 25.7.25.

[25]When the father provided screenshots of the flight tickets to the court, between the hearings on 24 April and 1 May, it was clear that he had not been honest with the mother in his long message on 25.7.25, where he told her that he had only booked the tickets “a week ago”. In fact, the tickets were booked on 16.6.25. In the email with which he sent screenshots of the tickets to the court, he said:

“I have attached evidence of the purchase of my flight ticket dated 16 June 2025 for me and the children like i sited before the it was suppose to be a 3weeks holiday but then i got the job,kindly look for my return ticket in there as well.”

[26]The return tickets which he had booked were to leave Lagos at 6:50am on 19.8.25, flying via Casablanca in Morocco (the airline was Royal Air Maroc, as on the outward journey), and arriving in London at 16:50 on the same day.

[27]On travelling to Nigeria on 24/25 July 2025, the father says that he and the children stayed in a hotel. He described this as a holiday, and that at that stage he planned to travel back to England with them, using the return tickets. He seeks to excuse the lack of contact with the mother as being because he did not have a phone, and had to get a SIM card. At some point he says he obtained a job, and decided to stay longer, moving with the children into a property in Nigeria which he owns (a different property to the family home they had lived in before moving to England, which he says had been demolished). By the time of her court application on 23.9.25, the mother still did not know their whereabouts. The father provided their address only after the court ordered him to do so.

[28]From 23.7.25 until 2.11.25, the father did not permit the mother to speak to the children. She sent many messages asking to speak to them (the court has been provided with numerous screenshots of messages), but was not allowed to.

[29]After the first court hearing on 30.10.25, and the father being served with these proceedings, he permitted some phone contact, from November 2025 onwards, but this stopped on 16.2.26. The mother was not allowed to speak to either child on their birthdays this year, and the father did not agree to the children receiving presents which she had arranged to be bought for them in Nigeria. At the hearing on 24.4.26, I made clear to the father that it was not acceptable for the children not to be able to speak to their mother, and some phone contact took place during the week between 24 April and 1 May, but not the full extent of contact that had been agreed and ordered.

[30]The children were not in school in Nigeria from July 2025 until January 2026. The father said that he arranged some home lessons for them, but he did not enrol them in schools because he was still thinking that he might come back to England with them.

[31]I was told about a family meeting on 25.12.25 involving various extended family members, when the mother was asked to agree to the father returning with the children to England, but on the basis that he would live in the same rented property as the mother and children. The mother did not agree that this was safe or appropriate, as their marriage had ended, and given her allegations of domestic abuse. She suggested alternative places that the father could live in England, and offered to provide some money towards this. No agreement was reached, and the father and children remained in Nigeria.

[32]The mother also says that a member of the father’s extended family has said that if she does not now return to Nigeria, she should forget about her children for life. The mother’s position is that she does not feel safe in Nigeria, and that the children should be returned to her care in England.

[33]The father says that since he has been in Nigeria, he has obtained a job for a foreign tech company, which he does remotely from home in Nigeria.

[34]Since January 2026, the children have attended school in Nigeria. The father did not want the mother to know the identity of their school, and provided with one of his statements a copy of their school reports but with the name of the school hidden. When asked by the court on 24.4.26 to identify the school, he said it was the “X School” in X area. I note that there is no school with this name, in X city. I therefore asked him to provide a school report with the name of the school on it, noting that both children are Wards of English High Court, and therefore the Court needs to know where the children are at school. He provided a school report showing the name of the school over lunch on 24 April. The school is actually called the Y School and is located in Y area. It is troubling that the father did not initially give the correct name of the children’s school to the High Court, and wishes to conceal this from their mother.

[35]I consider that it is clear from all the written evidence the court has received, that the father made arrangements to take the children to Nigeria without the mother’s knowledge or consent, and has retained them there ever since without her agreement.

[36]There are no court proceedings in Nigeria. The father has taken no steps to engage the Nigerian courts. I have been provided with no expert evidence about Nigerian law, or the Nigerian courts’ likely approach to this case, were there to be court proceedings there. The mother has trusted the English court to deal with these issues, given that this is where she and the father had chosen to make their home with the children, and had lived for nearly 3 years, before the father removed them without her consent, and where she continues to live. Procedural

Background

[37]The mother’s C66 application under the inherent jurisdiction is dated 23.9.25 and was issued on 25.9.25. The application was prepared by her as a litigant in person, and seeks: 37.1. “An order for the children to be returned back to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom”; and 37.2. “An order preventing the removal of the children from the United Kingdom in the future without my written consent”. It is clear from the written evidence which the mother has provided to the court, that she seeks for the children to be returned to her care, in England.

[38]The first hearing took place before Julia Cheetham KC (Deputy High Court Judge) on 30.10.25. The mother represented herself, assisted by Support Through Court. The father did not attend but had been sent the application by email. The court order records that: 38.1. The court is satisfied on a provisional basis that the children were on the date of removal and remained on the date of institution of the proceedings habitually resident in England and Wales; 38.2. The children were wrongfully removed from England on/around 30.7.25; 38.3. The courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility over the children (pursuant to Articles 5 and 7, 1996 Hague Convention); 38.4. The children were ordered to be Wards of the High Court during their minority; 38.5. The parties were ordered to file witness statements; 38.6. A further hearing was listed on 18.11.25.

[39]The hearing on 18.11.25 took place before Mr Justice Poole. The mother attended court as a litigant in person; the father attended remotely, also as a litigant in person. The Judge made an order which recorded that: 39.1. The children were taken to Nigeria by the father on 24.7.25, and are living there with him; 39.2. The father does not object to the children having contact with the mother, including in person; 39.3. The father objects to the return of the children, as being adverse to their welfare; 39.4. The court remained satisfied on a provisional basis of the jurisdictional matters recited in the 30.10.25 order (set out in §38.1-38.3 above); 39.5. The children remained Wards of the High Court; 39.6. A final hearing was listed on 24.4.26; 39.7. Permission was given for both parties to file further witness statements; 39.8. The court was to make an EX660 request to the Home Office.

[40]At the conclusion of the 24.4.26 hearing, I made an

[41]At the adjourned hearing on 1.5.26, the mother explained to the court (and provided evidence of her whatsapp screenshots) that she had not had all the ordered indirect contact in the week between the hearings: 41.1. Saturday: the mother attempted a video call (6 times) but the calls did not connect or ring. She sent a message which was not responded to (“Good morning sir. Please it’s 10am. Can I talk with my children”) but no return call was received by her. She did not speak to the children at all that day; 41.2. Sunday: she spoke to the children for 4 minutes and then they told her they were going to church. She said that she would call back later to complete the 20 minute call but when she tried, later that day, the calls were not answered (1 call at 12:53, 2 calls at 14:43-14:44) and no return call was received; 41.3. Tuesday: the mother tried a video call, but the camera was turned off after the call began. She could hear the children and they could hear her, but she could not see them until the end of the call. In total she spoke to the children for over 20 minutes; 41.4. Thursday: the video call began with the camera switched on, but was turned off after a few minutes. The audio remained active, but she could not see the children until the end of the call. She spoke to them for 22 minutes.

[42]The father in oral submissions on 1.5.26 sought to excuse the various breaches of the order on the basis of technical difficulties in Nigeria, but his explanations were not persuasive.

Immigration position

[43]The EX660 response from the Home Office dated 9.4.26 records that: 43.1. In October 2023 the mother was granted Leave to Remain as a Skilled Worker, valid until August 2028. She is restricted to working for her named sponsor only, and has no recourse to public funds; 43.2. In November 2023 the father was granted Leave to Remain as a Dependent Partner, valid until August 2028. The next sentence is unclear and seems erroneous (it says “they are restricted to work as a sports person”),but both parents understand that the father is able to work in the UK under the terms of this visa (as he did, after finishing his Masters degree). He has no recourse to public funds; 43.3. In November 2023 both children were granted Leave to Remain as Dependent Joiners of a Skilled Worker (the mother), valid until August 2028.

[44]The Home Office letter confirms that the immigration status of the parents and children “will not be affected by the children remaining outside the United Kingdom. However, if the children continue to remain outside the United Kingdom for an extended period, this may affect their visas, and they may be required to apply for entry clearance before returning. All individuals hold valid leave in the United Kingdom and therefore retain the right to travel in and out of the country”.

[45]There is therefore no current problem with the father and children returning to live in England, but if the father retains the children abroad for an extended period going forward, immigration difficulties are likely to arise. As their mother lives in this country, this would be a serious problem for the children’s welfare.

Legal framework: Jurisdiction

[46]Nigeria is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, or the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. However, the English High Court has power under its inherent jurisdiction to order the summary return of children to England from Nigeria, in appropriate cases, and to make children Wards of the High Court (as has happened in this case).

[47]To consider whether the English High Court has jurisdiction to make orders in this case, I need to consider the children’s connections with England. They are not British nationals. They were also not present in this country when the mother made her application to the High Court, as the father had removed them from England two months earlier. I therefore need to consider: 47.1. Whether the children were habitually resident in England when the mother’s application was issued on 25.9.25; and 47.2. Whether, the English court retains jurisdiction to make orders relating to the children now.

[48]Both parties are litigants in person, and so did not address me on the Law. The father emphasised repeatedly that the children are Nigerian by nationality, and that this is a Nigerian family. He described himself and the children having lived in Nigeria since July 2025, that they have a home there, are now at school there, he has a job, and they have many family members in Nigeria. Although – as a litigant in person - he did not refer specifically to the concept of habitual residence, it is fair to assume from his submissions that he is asserting that the children are now habitually resident in Nigeria, and thus that the English court should not make any orders relating to them.

[49]I note that the key test for habitual residence is a simple one:

“the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment”

. Habitual residence is a question of fact, to be established on the evidence before the court, on the balance of probabilities. There are multiple aspects to a full consideration of what constitutes habitual residence, as summarised by Mr

Justice Hayden in Re B (a minor) (habitual residence) [2016] EWHC 2174 (Fam):

“i) The habitual residence of a child corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment (A v A, adopting the European test). ii) The test is essentially a factual one which should not be overlaid with legal sub-rules or glosses. It must be emphasised that the factual enquiry must be centred throughout on the circumstances of the child's life that is most likely to illuminate his habitual residence (A v A, Re KL). iii) In common with the other rules of jurisdiction in Brussels IIR its meaning is 'shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity'. Proximity in this context means 'the practical connection between the child and the country concerned': A v A (para 80(ii)); Re B (para 42) applying Mercredi v Chaffe at para 46); iv) It is possible for a parent unilaterally to cause a child to change habitual residence by removing the child to another jurisdiction without the consent of the other parent (Re R); v) A child will usually but not necessarily have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for him or her (Re LC). The younger the child the more likely the proposition, however, this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused. It is the child's habitual residence which is in question and, it follows the child's integration which is under consideration; vi) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative (Re KL, Re R and Re B); vii) It will be highly unusual for a child to have no habitual residence. Usually a child lose a pre-existing habitual residence at the same time as gaining a new one (Re B); (emphasis added);… Subparagraph (viii) was removed from the list of considerations following the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re M (Children) [2020] EWCA Civ 1105 ix) It is the stability of a child's residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant, though this is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there (Re R and earlier in Re KL and Mercredi); x) The relevant question is whether a child has achieved some degree of integration in social and family environment; it is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated before becoming habitually resident (Re R)(emphasis added); xi) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly (Art 9 of BIIR envisages within 3 months). It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day (A v A; Re B). In the latter case Lord Wilson referred (para 45) those 'first roots' which represent the requisite degree of integration and which a child will 'probably' put down 'quite quickly' following a move; xii) Habitual residence was a question of fact focused upon the situation of the child, with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely among the relevant factors. It was the stability of the residence that was important, not whether it was of a permanent character. There was no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time, let alone that there should be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside there permanently or indefinitely (Re R)…”

[50]I note that both of the previous court orders (30.10.25 and 18.11.25) considered on a provisional basis that the children were habitually resident in England on the date of removal (24.7.25) and remained so on the date of institution of proceedings (25.9.25), that the children were wrongfully removed from England in July 2025, and that the English courts have jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 5 and 7 of the 1996 Hague Convention.

[51]However at this final hearing, I need to consider the jurisdictional position carefully, and based on all the evidence now available. I also need to be careful to identify the children’s habitual residence on the correct date, i.e. to determine whether this should be the date of the application (25.9.25), or the date of the hearing (24.4.26/1.5.26).

[52]The legal position for considering jurisdiction in applications relating to non-1996 Convention States is helpfully set out in the Judgment of Mr Justice Peel in H v R

[2022] EWHC 1073 (Fam)

. In that case, the Court was dealing with the alleged wrongful removal of two children to Libya by their father, where they had since been retained by paternal family members. Both parents were Libyan by nationality, but had lived in England for many years, where the children were born. The children only had Libyan nationality. The mother made a C66 application under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction for orders that the children should be returned to England (with the intention that they be returned to her care), rather than an application for a specific issue order under section 8 Children Act 1989. The legal position on jurisdiction is dealt with from paragraphs 28-49, which includes the following excerpts (and my emphasis): Jurisdiction: habitual residence28. The starting point is the Family Law Act 1986 which at s1 includes within the definition of a "Part I order": a) a section 8 order made by a court in England and Wales under the Children Act 1989; d) an order made by a court in England and Wales under the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to children – (i) so far as it gives care of a child to any person or provides for contact with, or the education of, a child;

29. As I have indicated, in my view the nature of M's application, being for the children to be committed to her care, brings it within s1(1)(d).

30. That being so, one travels to s2(3) of the Act which provides that a s1(1)(d) order shall not be made by the court unless: a) it has jurisdiction under the Hague Convention, or b) the Hague Convention does not apply but – (i) the condition in section 3 of this Act is satisfied.

31. The condition in s3 is, so far as relevant for these purposes, that "on the relevant date" the child concerned was habitually resident in England and Wales. And by the interpretation at s7(c), "relevant date" is "the date of the application".

32. As the statute says, M's application is governed first by the 1996 Hague Convention. This is described by Baroness Hale at para 20 of A v A as the "first port of call"…

33. I turn to the 1996 Hague Convention. By article 5(1):

"The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child's person or property". 34. The first question for me to decide is the date at which habitual residence falls to be considered. Is it, as M submits, the date of her application (2 June 2021) or, as F submits, the date of hearing (April 2022)? If the latter, there is an obvious concern in cases like these that it is in the interests of an alleged abductor to prolong proceedings in order to establish a greater degree of settlement or integration of the children in the country to which they have been removed; in other words, to improve a habitual residence defence. It strikes me as unsatisfactory if that is indeed the case. However, I must consider the relevant jurisprudence, as the point has apparently not been completely decided. 36. The Explanatory Report of Paul Lagarde (1997) at para 42 says as follows: "

Where the change of habitual residence of the child from one State to another occurs at a time when the authorities of the first habitual residence are seised of a request for a measure of protection, the question arises as to whether these authorities retain their competence to take this measure (perpetuatio fori) or whether the change of habitual residence deprives them ipso facto of this jurisdiction and obliges them to decline its exercise. The Commission rejected by a strong majority 27 a proposal by the Australian, Irish, British and United States delegations favourable to the perpetuatio fori….” 37. A plain reading of this passage suggests that a change of habitual residence during proceedings leads to a change of jurisdiction from the outgoing Contracting State to the receiving Contracting State. The principle of perpetuatio fori is excluded. On the face of it, therefore, the court looks at habitual residence at the date of trial (in this case April 2022) for if, by then, habitual residence lies in the recipient Contracting State, jurisdiction will also have moved to the recipient Contracting State. 38. I confess to having some misgivings about the state of the law if this is indeed the case. I have already remarked upon the opportunity for unscrupulous abductors to take advantage of delay, or indeed to manufacture delay, so as to engineer a change of habitual residence. An innocent party may act promptly and properly, yet find themselves in a habitual residence race against time, powerless as the court proceedings take their course. 39. However, in this case, different principles may apply because Libya is not a Contracting State under the 1996 Hague Convention. The Lagarde report goes on as follows:

"On the other hand, in the case of a change of habitual residence from a Contracting State to a non-Contracting State, Article 5 ceases to be applicable from the time of the change of residence and nothing stands in the way of retention of jurisdiction, under the national law of procedure, by the authority of the Contracting State of the first habitual residence which has been seised of the matter, although the other Contracting States are not bound by the Convention to recognise the measures which may be taken by this authority." 40. Again, on a plain reading, this suggests to me that the position is different where the other state is a non Contracting State. If at the date of the final hearing, habitual residence lies in the country of origin, then so does jurisdiction. If, however, between issue and final hearing habitual residence moves to the non Contracting State, jurisdiction does not travel with it, but nor does it remain with the Contracting State under the Convention. Therefore, as the report says, Article 5 ceases to apply and national law takes over. I accept that there is no specific Article to this effect, but the report is clear, and, in my view, it is logical that jurisdiction should not transfer to a non Contracting State. After all, why should a non Contracting State be fixed with jurisdiction pursuant to a Convention which it has not signed? It is equally logical that if perpetuatio fori does not apply, then the 1996 Convention gives no answer to the issue of jurisdiction if habitual residence is lost from the country of origin, and, as the Lagarde report says, the position then reverts to domestic law. This outcome avoids the unsatisfactory situation where children are in a non Contracting State, and lengthy proceedings play into the hands of a party who seeks to dispute the jurisdiction of England and Wales, including, as here, raising a challenge to jurisdiction very late in the day, so as to fix habitual residence and jurisdiction in a State with which this country has no reciprocal Treaty arrangements. 44. I do not propose to opine on the appropriate date as between two Contracting States; to do so would be obiter as that is not the situation here… 45. However, it seems to me that where the other country (in this case Libya) is a non Contracting State, the second part of the Lagarde report accurately reflects the position. If habitual residence lies in England at the date of trial before me, Article 5 is operative and on any view, England retains jurisdiction. If, however, between issue in June 2021 and hearing in April 2022, habitual residence transferred to Libya, then Article 5 ceased to apply, and national law became operative. 46. It follows that, on that second scenario (i.e at the date of hearing habitual residence lay in Libya), jurisdiction is then governed by domestic law i.e the Family Law Act 1986 ss1, 2 3 and 7 which cumulatively provide that the court has jurisdiction under English law if: i) The order sought is a s1(1)(d) order under the inherent jurisdiction giving care of the children to any person which, for reasons already given is, in my judgment, the case here; and ii) The children were habitually resident in England and Wales at the relevant date, which is defined as the date of application. 47. As Moylan LJ put it in Re M [2020] EWCA Civ 922 when considering exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction): "the scheme of the 1986 Act is to give jurisdiction to make one of the substantive orders listed in s.1 only when the child is either habitually resident or is present in England and Wales"

Absent the jurisdictional basis of habitual residence, the court may not make a s1(1)(d) order under the inherent jurisdiction. The alternative route of making an order under the parents patriae jurisdiction, which does not depend on habitual residence, is only available to British citizens which is not the case here. 48. I therefore take the view that the relevant date for habitual residence is the date of the application (2 June 2021) in accordance with the 1986 Act. 49. Had the application been for a s8 specific issue return order, beyond doubt the test would have been habitual residence at the date of the application, it being an application for a s1(1)(a) order. It is somewhat odd, to my mind, that a bare application for inward return under the inherent jurisdiction (with no element of care or contact sought) would lack jurisdiction under the 1986 Act even though the relief sought is identical; that, however, is the conclusion of Baroness Hale in A v A. The difficulty for applicants is that these problematic cases involving alleged wrongful abduction/ retention overseas in a non 1980 Hague Convention country are brought via wardship so as to invoke the full powers of the High Court. If the application is to be made by s8 of the Children Act 1989 so as to ensure that the date of habitual residence is fixed at date of issue, rather than risk the date being fixed at date of trial, the ability to seek appropriate orders may be diminished. It may be that applications under the inherent jurisdiction should include relief by way of care and/or contact so as to come within s1(1)(d).

[53]H v R was approved by the Court of Appeal in L.B. Hackney v P)

[2023] EWCA Civ 1213

(Lord Justice Moylan at §78), and Re A

[2023] EWCA Civ 659

. I note that in the latter case, Moylan LJ stated at §61-62:61. The same issue, namely whether a case was within the scope of the FLA 1986, was considered by Peel J in H v R. In that case, as in the present appeal, an application had been made in Form C66. An order was sought "under the inherent jurisdiction for wardship and an inward return order". Peel J noted, at [26], that in A v A Lady Hale had "described the bare inward return order made under the inherent jurisdiction in that case as not encompassing care or contact and therefore not falling within s 1(1)(d) of the" FLA 1986. He then, by analysing the applicant mother's statement and the content of an order which had been made, concluded, rightly in my view, that the case was within the scope of the FLA 1986. As he said, at [27], the mother "did not seek solely an inward return order; she sought substantive child arrangements orders and secured such orders from the court on 17 June 2021".

62. The above cases demonstrate that, in each case, it will be necessary for the court to decide on which side of the line the application and/or the orders made by the court fall. Are they within the scope of either sub-section 1(1)(a) or sub-section 1(1)(d) or not? In my view this should be more a matter of substance than form and will include, as Peel J did in H v R, consideration of the applicant's statement.

[54]I note that the mother in this case, who is a litigant in person, did not make an application under s.8 of the Children Act 1989 for a specific issue order for the children to be returned to this jurisdiction (relying on their habitual residence at the date of the application). Instead she made an application to the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction for a Return Order. However, just as in H v R, it is in my judgment clear from the evidence filed by the mother in this case, that she seeks the return of the children to her care, and so this case falls within s.1(1)(d) of the Family Law Act 1986, and is not a “bare return order”. Thus, the date at which the court needs to be satisfied that the children were habitually resident in England, is the date of her application (25 September 2025).

[55]Even if the children’s habitual residence may have changed to Nigeria in the several months since these proceedings started, because Nigeria is not a 1996 Hague Convention State, the English court retains jurisdiction to make substantive orders in respect of the children under domestic law, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Family Law Act 1986.

Legal framework: summary return orders (inherent jurisdiction)

[56]If I do have jurisdiction to make a return order under the inherent jurisdiction, based on the children’s habitual residence at the date of the mother’s application, I need to consider carefully whether this is an appropriate case for me to make such an order, in circumstances where the children have been living in Nigeria since 25.7.25, and are nationals of that country. The English High Court is respectful of other jurisdictions, and should not misuse its inherent jurisdiction.

[57]In the House of Lords decision in Re J (A Child) (Custody Rights: Jurisdiction)

[2005] 3 WLR 14

, Baroness Hale of Richmond stated at §32-40 (selected passages below):32. The most one can say…is that the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there…

33. One important variable…is the degree of connection of the child with each country. … to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his “home” country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture and his education will all come into this.

34. Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests… 38. … our law does not start from any a priori assumptions about what is best for any individual child. It looks at the child and weighs a number of factors in the balance, now set out in the well-known “check-list” in section 1(3) of the Children Act… 39. … If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned… 40. The effect of the decision upon the child’s primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive…

[58]I also note the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re O (Summary Return: Non-Convention Country)

[2025] EWCA Civ 660

, including §54-56 of the Judgment of Mr Justice Cobb: 54. An application for a summary return of a child to a non-Hague Convention country under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is to be determined simply and straightforwardly by what is in the child's best interests (Re J at [18], [25], [28], [29] and [32]). On an application of this kind, a

judge must undertake:

"…a swift, realistic and unsentimental assessment of the best interests of the child, leading, in proper cases, to the prompt return of the child to his or her own country, but not the sacrifice of the child's welfare to some other principle of law"

. Ormrod LJ in Re R (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction)

(1981) 2 FLR 416

, at 425. The requirement for the Judge to undertake this "swift and unsentimental decision", rooted firmly in welfare, was reinforced by Baroness Hale in her speech in Re J at [31] and [41]. 55. In determining a non-Convention summary return application, there is no 'warrant' to apply the principles of the 1980 Hague Convention, either directly or by analogy (Re J at [22], [31] and [33])… 56. Re J provides the definitive statement of the law in this area…

[59]The court can, if appropriate, attach “conditions” to return orders under the inherent jurisdiction (see e.g. Re A & B (Children: Return

[60]I note that the same essential principles apply, whether the application is for a Return Order to or from another country. This court has to consider whether the order is the children’s best interests. The decision should be made on a summary basis, and must focus on the children’s welfare. Although the welfare checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 does not have to be used in exercising the inherent jurisdiction, it is a helpful framework for consideration of factors relevant to welfare and the children’s best interests.

Jurisdiction: habitual residence: analysis and reasoning

[61]These children had had no other home than England since October 2022. They were settled here, A was in school here, B in nursery (and shortly due to start school), they had settled immigration status and were cared for by their primary carer mother, who lives and works here, with time spent with their father who had also lived in this country since September 2022. They were registered with doctors, and had formed friendships with other children through the parents’ friends and school/nursery. The children had not visited Nigeria since October 2022, and had thus spent most of their lives here, until their removal in July 2025. There is therefore no question but that the children were habitually resident in England and Wales, when the father flew to Nigeria with them on 24.7.25.

[62]There was no significant delay by the mother in issuing her application for summary return after she learned that the father had taken the children to Nigeria without her consent. She contacted the police immediately, on 25.7.25, and after attempts to persuade the father to return the children had failed, she made this application on 23.9.25 (issued on 25.9.25). There are various reasons why I consider that the children were still habitually resident in England on 25.9.25: 62.1. The children were not familiar with Nigeria, having not visited the country since October 2022, when they were aged 2½ and 1½ respectively; 62.2. According to the father, they spent some weeks when they first moved to Nigeria in a hotel, not a home; 62.3. The father booked return flights for them on 19.8.25; it is clear from this, and his email to the court (§28 above: it was suppose to be a 3weeks holiday but then i got the job), that he did not at that stage intend to stay long-term in Nigeria; 62.4. The father has not provided the date when he and the children moved to the property he owns, but this was not the same property that the family had lived in before moving to Nigeria; 62.5. The children had no contact at all (even by telephone) with their primary carer mother until 2.11.25; 62.6. As at 25.12.25, the father was still open to returning with the children to England, if the mother would agree to him moving into the same property as her; 62.7. The children were not enrolled at schools until January 2026, after the attempted negotiations for the terms on which they would return to England failed to reach agreement.

[63]For all of these reasons, I do not believe that the children’s habitual residence had changed to Nigeria by the date of the mother’s application to the court.

[64]The father was keen to emphasise in his evidence and oral submissions the extent of the children’s integration in their lives in Nigeria now, including: 64.1. They live in a settled home in Lagos, which he owns; 64.2. He works from home, and is able to look after them day-to-day; he is now their primary carer; 64.3. They have attended Nigerian schools since January 2026; 64.4. They have made friends through their schools; 64.5. They have many extended family members who live in Nigeria.

[65]I recognise that, despite the father not having the mother’s consent to take the children to and retain them in Nigeria, these points made by the father would support an argument that the children’s habitual residence may now have changed to Nigeria. However, as explained above, the date for establishing habitual residence is the date of the mother’s application, not the date of the final hearing. Otherwise, the father would be able to take advantage of precisely the issue about which Mr

Justice Peel was concerned in H v R:

“the unsatisfactory situation where children are in a non Contracting State, and lengthy proceedings play into the hands of a party who seeks to dispute the jurisdiction of England and Wales… so as to fix habitual residence and jurisdiction in a State with which this country has no reciprocal Treaty arrangements.”

[66]I am therefore satisfied that the English court has jurisdiction to make an order for the children to be returned to England, to the care of their mother, if it is in the children’s best interests to do so. Return

Return order: analysis and reasoning

[67]The first aspect to consider is whether England was the children’s “home country” when the father removed them on 24.7.25, and thus whether it would be appropriate to order the father to return the children here. There are arguments which go both ways: 67.1. These are Nigerian children, who were born in Nigerian, to Nigerian parents; most of their extended families live in Nigeria; 67.2. The children’s first language is English, which they speak in both countries; 67.3. The family is religious; the children have attended churches in both countries, and with both parents; 67.4. Importantly, until the date the father removed the children without the mother’s consent, their home had been England for the majority of their lives. B had not been to Nigeria since she was 1½ years, and A since he was 2½ years old; 67.5. They had settled in England for nearly 3 years with the agreement of both parents; 67.6. Although the father said that he did not intend to stay in England long-term, the mother obtained a work visa with his encouragement so that the family could remain for 5 years after his student visa expired; 67.7. I have not been provided with evidence of any discussion, let alone agreement, for the family to move back to live in Nigeria; 67.8. The children were at school(a) (A) and nursery

(b) (B) in England; 67.9. Their primary carer mother (until their removal) lives in England.

[68]On balance, I am satisfied that England had become the children’s “home country” prior to their removal in July 2025. I next need to consider carefully whether it is the children’s best interests to be returned to England, taking their welfare as my paramount consideration. I will use the welfare checklist in s.1(3) Children Act 1989 as a helpful framework.

[69]I also note the provisions of PD12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The mother in this case makes serious allegations of domestic abuse against the father. He denies these allegations, and I am unable to resolve the factual disputes. I note that the father does not make any allegations against the mother, save his concerns about her having delegated the children’s care to strangers, when they were living separately in England, which the mother denies. Clearly there will need to be careful consideration of any allegations which the parties make, in substantive welfare proceedings, but this is not something which I can resolve in these summary proceedings. However there is nothing in what the father has said which in my view would weigh in the balance against returning the children to England, and their mother again being involved in their day-to-day care.

[70]

(a) The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding) The children are only aged 5 and 6 years old. No CAFCASS report was directed in this summary application, and so I have no independent evidence of their wishes and feelings. As the children are living in Nigeria, CAFCASS would only have been able to speak to them on the phone, not meet them, so any enquiries would have been superficial given their young ages. I note that the father recognises that the children have a close relationship with their mother. He was clear during this hearing that he would agree to the mother being involved in their care, if she moved to Nigeria. The children remain happy to talk to their mother, when this is permitted by the father. From the evidence I have read, I have no reason to doubt that they would wish their mother to be involved in their day-to-day lives. However, I have no direct evidence about their wishes and feelings about living in Nigeria, or being returned to live in England, and so cannot factor this into my overall analysis.

(b) Their physical, emotional and educational needs The children’s physical needs were met in England, and are being met in Nigeria. They have had homes in both countries, and both parents work and can pay for their day-to-day care. A was educated at primary school in England, and B was about to start at the same school. For several months after they moved to Nigeria, they were not in school, but they started school in Nigeria in January 2026. The children have an emotional need to have a relationship with both parents, and I am significantly concerned about the emotional harm that has likely been done to both children, by the father’s unilateral decision to take them to Nigeria, and keep them away from their mother, who has only been allowed to speak to them sporadically since July 2025, and who they have not seen at all since. Were I to order the children’s return, the mother currently has accommodation where she could look after them. Their English school places have been lost because of the time since they left, but the mother can apply for school places for them both at local primary schools on their return. The father was concerned about where he would live in England, but as he currently works remotely from home for a US tech company, he should be able to continue to do this job in England, at least in the short-term. He would not tell the court or the mother how much he earns, but he has been able in Nigeria to fund all the children’s day-to-day costs and private school fees. He should therefore be able to fund rented accommodation in England, on a return here.

(c) The likely effect on them of any change in their circumstances The effect of me making an order for the children to return to this country, would create a change in their current circumstances, living in Lagos with their father, and attending new schools there. However, they would be returning to England, where they have spent the majority of their young lives, to an English culture which is very familiar to them, and would be able to spend time/live with their mother, who had been their primary carer for all their lives until July 2025. I believe that the change in their circumstances which would be brought about by making an order for them to return would be positive in terms of the children’s emotional wellbeing, not negative or detrimental, particularly because they can then again be cared for by their mother, as well as their father.

(d) Their age, sex, background and any characteristics of theirs which the court considers relevant A is a 6-year old boy, B is a 5-year old girl. They are Nigerian by birth and nationality, and have many extended Nigerian family members. However the children had lived in England with the agreement of both parents from ages 2½ and 1½ (respectively).

(e) Any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering The children were removed from their mother’s primary care, for the first time since birth, by the father without warning in July 2025. They were flown to Nigeria with the father, where they had not lived or visited for most of their lives. They have not seen their mother in person since. They were not permitted any contact with their mother at all, until November 2025, and indirect contact (phone/video call) since then has been sporadic and unsatisfactory. Even the phone calls stopped in February 2026, until the court ordered them to restart after the 24.4.26 hearing. It is not clear what the children have been told about why they left England, or why they are not being cared for by their mother. All of this is likely to have caused the children emotional harm.

(f) How capable each of their parents is of meeting their needs Although both parents are capable of meeting the children’s physical and educational needs, I do not believe that the father is currently capable of meeting their emotional needs. It seems from the evidence before the court that he has sought to use the children as a “bargaining chip” to encourage the mother to return to the marriage. He has not permitted the children to spend time with their mother for 9 months, and rarely to speak to her. For several months he did not tell the mother where the children were living, and even during this final hearing would not tell her which school the children are attending in Nigeria (giving a false name for it in his oral submissions). He does not appear to value the children’s relationship with their mother, despite this being fundamental to their current and future emotional stability.

[76]Overall, and taking into account the children’s welfare in the broadest sense, I am satisfied that it is their best interests for the court to make an order that the children be returned to England immediately. The English court is best placed to make longer-term decisions about the children’s future care, once the children have been returned, including whether they should live with the mother and spend time with the father, or the reverse, or there should be a shared care arrangement. On a very interim basis, I will be ordering that immediately on their return they are in the shared care of both parents (equal time, alternating weeks). However the English court will need to consider carefully the longer-term child arrangements, and the mother’s allegations of domestic abuse will need to be investigated as part of this process.

[77]If the father wishes to take the children to live permanently in Nigeria, I explained to him that he can make an application to the English court for permission to remove them to live there, which can be considered on its merits by the English court, which in my judgment is the court best placed to consider the future arrangements for these children.

Conclusion

[78]I explained to the parties at the hearing on 1.5.26 that I would be making the following orders: 78.1. The father must bring the children back to England not later than 23:59 (English time) on 22 May 2026; 78.2. The father shall book and pay for flights for himself and the children, and provide flight details and copies of the purchased flight tickets to the mother and to the High Court by email by 16:00 (English time) on 15 May 2026; 78.3. On the father’s return, the children’s Nigerian passports must be lodged with the Tipstaff of the High Court; 78.4. After returning the children to England, neither parent shall remove them from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without the written permission of the other parent, or an order of the English Court; 78.5. Penal notices will be attached to all of the above provisions. The father would be in contempt of the English High Court if he does not comply with the court’s orders; 78.6. The mother agrees not to contact UKVI or create any difficulties in respect of the father’s immigration status in this country; 78.7. Until the children are returned to England, the father shall ensure that the mother has indirect contact by video call if possible (and if not possible, by telephone call) with both children, for not less than 20 minutes on each occasion, at 10am on each Saturday and 18:00 on each Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday, starting immediately; 78.8. Without prejudice to both parties’ arguments about the future care of the children, and consideration by the English court of the mother’s allegations of domestic abuse, on their return to England the parties shall share the children’s care equally (alternating weeks); arrangements must be made for the mother to spend time with the children immediately that they return to this country and for this shared care arrangement then to commence; 78.9. The court has listed a hearing with on 4 June 2026 at 10:30am before a High Court Judge (time estimate 1 hour), shortly after the father’s return with the children, to consider next steps, including whether the children should remain Wards of the High Court and consideration of making child arrangements orders for the time they should spend with each parent (and appropriate judicial allocation, if there are to be contested child arrangements proceedings).

[79]The father indicated at the end of the hearing on 1 May 2026 that he was very dissatisfied with the court’s decision, and intended to issue proceedings in the Nigerian court. If there are in the future any court proceedings in Nigeria initiated by either party, I give permission to both parties to provide to their Nigerian lawyers and to the Nigerian court all of the papers filed by them both in these proceedings, all English court orders in these proceedings, and this written Judgment. 13 May 2026

order

40.1. Adjourning this hearing until 1.5.26; permitting both parties to attend remotely; 40.2. Recording that the mother had not spoken to the children at all since 16.2.26; 40.3. Requiring the father to ensure that the mother had indirect contact by video call if possible (and if not, by telephone) with both children for not less than 20 minutes each time, on Saturday, Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday at 10:00am each day, in the week before the 1 May hearing. Order: UAE)

[2022] EWHC 2120 (Fam)

, a decision of Mr Justice Poole, particularly §30). order: analysis and reasoning