Jessica Bradley v CM & Ors [2026] EWHC 125 (Fam)

“Dr Downs…. has concluded that [C] should live with her father and have contact with her mother, on the basis of her conclusions that the mother is parentally alienating [C] from the applicant father. The Guardian supports that being the applicant father’s position and says if the residence is to be transferred there should be a short suspension of contact, effectively to allow [C] to be in with the father, and, then, contact resume on a supervised basis.”

“The plan as envisaged by the Guardian, Dr Downes [sic.] and Judge Trotter Jackson has inevitably only been partially successful to the extent that the process of alienation has been interrupted, the father and daughter relationship appears to have been reestablished and there is a more solid foundation on which to build for the future through regular family time. It has however failed in the sense that as far as I am concerned it has not and will not address C's ongoing emotional and psychological needs. The transition back to the mother should be facilitated as smoothly as possible as soon as practicable and ideally with minimal acrimony. If there is a gap between C leaving one school and starting another steps should be taken to have work sent home with her so that she does not fall behind.”

“2.1 …Results suggest [the children] are both struggling with acknowledging their feelings, especially in relation to their family. Results also suggest the use of splitting which is a psychological defence used to manage internal tension. Splitting is known to feature in a number of personality disorders and, should the current situation continue, it is likely to have a significant impact on their psychological, emotional and social development and their ability to form and sustain healthy relationships in the future. Should the present situation continue, the children will be at increased risk for developing mental health/psychiatric problems in the future. 2.2. In my opinion the children are being alienated in relation to their father. It is likely that they are picking up on the emotional reactions of their mother and they will be aware of there being consequences on their mother of their having contact with their father.”

“The evidence is suggestive of the children’s expressed wishes and feelings not being representative of their true wishes and feelings due to their having been placed under pressure to align with their mother and devalue/reject their father. There is also evidence of both children using the psychological defence of splitting in order to manage the tension of being drawn into the dysfunctional dynamics of their parents relationship.”

“There is no evidence to suggest that her mother has intentionally negatively influenced [DD] in relation to her father but she may have picked up on emotional reactions of her mother or may have overheard conversations in relation to her father.”

“The mother is devoted to [DD] and her care for her daughter is compromised only by her unwillingness to accept that she should have a father in her life.”

“[1] This appeal is about access to the Court file under the principle of open justice as identified in Dring(on behalf of the Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum UK) v Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd (Media Lawyers Association intervening) [2019] UKSC 38; [2020] AC 629 (“Dring”). The purpose of this short judgment is to address a matter of general importance, namely to emphasise the limits of the open justice principle, specifically in the context of care proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (“the CA”). [2] Open justice is a fundamental constitutional principle. The underlying rationale is the need to allow the media and the public access to information about the work done in Courts and tribunals so that not only individual decisions but also the operation of the Courts and tribunals more generally can be subjected to appropriate scrutiny. Allowing such scrutiny serves the public interest by keeping a check on the way in which judges behave, enabling the public to understand how cases are decided, and ensuring public confidence in the system of public justice. To serve these ends, procedural rules, in particular CPR Part 5.4C and FPR r.12.73 PD12G, make provision for non-party access to Court documents or communications between the Court and a party or another person. The open justice principle may also require that media or public access be given to a wider range of documents than those prescribed by the rules (unless prohibited by the rules).”

“(1) Except as provided by this rule or by any other rule or Practice Direction, no document or copy of a document filed or lodged in the Court office shall be open to inspection by any person without the permission of the Court, and no copy of any such document or copy shall be taken by, or issued to, any person without such permission. (2) A copy of an order made in open Court will be issued to any person who requests it. (3) Subject to rules 14.24 and 29.1(2) and to any direction given by the Court, a party to any family proceedings, or the legal representative, children’s guardian or litigation friend for a party in any family proceedings, may have a search made for, and may inspect, and obtain a copy of, any document or copy of a document filed or lodged in the Court office in those proceedings.”

“The High Court has jurisdiction under its inherent jurisdiction to grant permission. Whether or not to do so will be a balancing exercise weighing factors in favour against those against (see In re X (Disclosure of Information) [2001] 2 FLR 440, para 23).”

“[69] The information sought by Ms Newman is as an investigative journalist. Her request for access to the documents has been put in a number of different ways but is aimed at obtaining access to the source material which informed the decision-making process that led to the events which culminated in the making of a placement order. That source material contains the most sensitive and personal material in relation to a child who suffered a number of developmental and other difficulties even before the trauma of her removal from her mother’s care for three years. The judge, in considering that aspect of the application which was in relation to M’s medical records, properly said (at para 136): “In considering where the balance lies, it seems to me that the overarching factor which I have to weigh in the balance is whether it is in M’s overall best interests to release to a journalist the most intimate details of her own and her mother’s medical records even if the dissemination goes no further than that. Such a step would represent a clear Court-directed intrusion of this child’s most basic and fundamental rights to a private family life. If those rights are to be the subject of Court-sanctioned interference, there has to be a proper justification.” [70] In my judgment the judge was entitled to conclude at para 129 that the information now available through the various judgments is significant in terms of background detail and content, but that that is the case does not, without more, necessarily justify giving further access to the child’s private information to a journalist “albeit that she is an individual who is entitled to this Court’s respect for her professional endeavours”. “In considering where the balance lies, it seems to me that the overarching factor which I have to weigh in the balance is whether it is in M’s overall best interests to release to a journalist the most intimate details of her own and her mother’s medical records even if the dissemination goes no further than that. Such a step would represent a clear Court-directed intrusion of this child’s most basic and fundamental rights to a private family life. If those rights are to be the subject of Court-sanctioned interference, there has to be a proper justification.”

"For the purposes of the law relating to contempt of Court, information relating to proceedings held in private (whether or not contained in a document filed with the Court) may be communicated – … (b) where the Court gives permission, including as provided for under rule 12.73A."

“2.3 The provisions of the rules permitting the attendance of media representatives or duly authorised lawyers and the disclosure to third parties of information relating to the proceedings do not entitle a media representative to receive or peruse Court documents referred to in the course of evidence, submissions or judgment without the permission of the Court or otherwise in accordance with Part 12, Chapter 7 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and Practice Direction 12G (rules relating to disclosure to third parties). (This is in contrast to the position in civil proceedings, where the Court sits in public and where members of the public are entitled to seek copies of certain documents). 2.4 The question of attendance of media representatives or duly authorised lawyers at hearings in family proceedings to which rule 27.11 and this guidance apply must be distinguished from statutory restrictions on publication and disclosure of information relating to proceedings, which continue to apply and are unaffected by the rule and this guidance. 2.4A Practice Direction 12R and Practice Direction 14G make provision in relation to the making of transparency orders, detailing what may or may not be published from the proceedings to the public at large, or a section of the public, when a media representative or duly accredited lawyer attends a hearing as provided for in rule 27.11. 2.5 The prohibition in section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989, on publishing material intended to or likely to identify a child as being involved in proceedings or the address or school of any such child, is limited to the duration of the proceedings. However, the limitations imposed by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 on publication of information relating to certain proceedings in private apply during and after the proceedings. In addition, in proceedings to which s.97(2) of the Children Act 1989 applies the Court should continue to consider at the conclusion of the proceedings whether there are any outstanding welfare issues which require a continuation of the protection afforded during the course of the proceedings by that provision.”

“41. The constitutional principle of open justice applies to all Courts and tribunals exercising the judicial power of the state. It follows that, unless inconsistent with statute or the rules of Court, all Courts and tribunals have an inherent jurisdiction to determine what that principle requires in terms of access to documents or other information placed before the Court or tribunal in question. The extent of any access permitted by the Court’s rules is not determinative (save to the extent that they may contain a valid prohibition). It is not correct to talk in terms of limits to the Court’s jurisdiction when what is in fact in question is how that jurisdiction should be exercised in the particular case. 42. The principal purposes of the open justice principle are twofold and there may well be others. The first is to enable public scrutiny of the way in which Courts decide cases - to hold the judges to account for the decisions they make and to enable the public to have confidence that they are doing their job properly. In A vBritish Broadcasting Corpn, Lord Reed reminded us of the comment of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 475, that the two Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed in 1693 requiring that both civil and criminal cases be heard “with open doors”, “bore testimony to a determination to secure civil liberties against the judges as well as against the Crown” (para 24). 43. But the second goes beyond the policing of individual Courts and judges. It is to enable the public to understand how the justice system works and why decisions are taken. For this they have to be in a position to understand the issues and the evidence adduced in support of the parties’ cases. In the olden days, as has often been said, the general practice was that all the argument and the evidence was placed before the Court orally. Documents would be read out. The modern practice is quite different. Much more of the argument and evidence is reduced into writing before the hearing takes place. Often, documents are not read out. It is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases, especially complicated civil cases, to know what is going on unless you have access to the written material.”

“[21] The Court in Dring thus identified two main purposes of the open justice principle, namely: (i) to enable public scrutiny of the way in which the Courts decide cases so as to provide public accountability and secure public confidence; and (ii) to enable public understanding of the justice system. Whilst the Court recognised that its identification of these purposes might not be exhaustive, the core aim is to ensure appropriate transparency for the work of the Courts and tribunals and the judges who sit in them. [22] As is apparent from decisions such as Newman v Southampton City Council [2021] EWCA Civ 437; [2021] 1 WLR 2900 (at [48] and [49]), it is important to understand and respect the limits of the open justice principle in this context. Court files may contain a great deal of information that is commercially sensitive or confidential or (as in this case) personal and private. The open justice principle does not extend to affording third parties access to such information for reasons unconnected with examining the work of the Courts and tribunals and the judges who sit in them. [23] The Supreme Court in Dring made clear that a non-party has no right of access to the Court file; the Court’s permission is required. It is incumbent on the person seeking access to documents under the open justice principle to explain (i) why he seeks access and (ii) “how granting him access would advance the open justice principle”: see [45]. [24] In this case, the BBC’s amended explanation explained why it wanted access to the file but said nothing about how this would advance open justice. The limits that we have identified were overlooked, and the judge’s approach to the application of the open justice principle was wrong in law. The objective of the BBC, whilst undoubtedly part of a legitimate journalistic investigation, was neither to scrutinise the way in which Courts decide cases, nor to enable the public to understand how the justice system works and decisions are made. It was not in any way designed to throw light on the workings of the family Courts and their judges. [25]The central error into which the judge fell was to define the (family) justice system as encompassing not only the work of the Courts but also (independently of the Courts) the operations of local authorities and other state agencies working with children, and then to apply the principles identified in Dring to the entire (family) justice system as so defined. [26] That is not what Dring is about. The application of open justice principles is confined to the system of justice in the narrow sense. Disclosure for one of the purposes identified in Dring may incidentally facilitate scrutiny of decision-making by local authorities and other public bodies. But enabling such scrutiny is not itself a purpose which requires or justifies disclosure under the open justice principle.”

"s12 Publication of information relating to proceedings in private. (1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any Court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of Court except in the following cases, that is to say— (a) where the proceedings— (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; (ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or … (2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a Court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of Court except where the Court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication. … (4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any publication is punishable as contempt of Court which would not be so punishable apart from this section (and in particular where the publication is not so punishable by reason of being authorised by rules of Court)."

"Of crucial importance in the present case is Wilson J's decision in X v Dempster. Analysing the previous authorities, he summarised matters at p 898 (this has now, of course, to be read subject to section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989): "[E]vents in the lives of the children in the present case which are already in the public domain or which do not relate to the proceedings can be the subject of publication. Furthermore certain material which might well qualify in a loose sense as information relating to the proceedings can be published because the prohibition is to be construed not loosely but strictly and by direct reference to the mischief at which it is directed. Thus, in the absence of a specific injunction, the following can be published: (a) the fact, if it be the case, that a child is a ward of Court and is the subject of wardship proceedings or that a child is the subject of residence or other proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or of proceedings relating wholly or mainly to his maintenance or upbringing … ; (b) the name, address or photograph of such a child as is mentioned in (a) … ; (c) the name, address or photograph of the parties (or, if the child is a party, the other parties) to such proceedings as are mentioned in (a) … ; (d) the date, time or place of a past or future hearing of such proceedings … ; (e) the nature of the dispute in such proceedings … ; (f) anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the Court in which the hearing in private is taking place … ; and (g) the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings … So much for what can be published notwithstanding section 12. What is it that cannot be published? In the first place it is quite clear that the effect of section 12 is to prohibit the publication of accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private, as also the publication of documents such as affidavits, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes of the judgment. (I emphasise that this list is not necessarily exhaustive.) Section 12 likewise prohibits the publication of extracts or quotations from such documents: Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers; also the publication of summaries: X v Dempster at p 898. It is also quite clear in my judgment that the prohibition in section 12 applies equally whether or not the information or the document being published has been anonymised."

" I am in no doubt that the Court does have the power to order the disclosure of part or all of what takes place in private proceedings (including any judgment made by the Court during the course of or at end of the proceedings). In my view the Court has that power under its inherent jurisdiction. It had that power before the incorporation of the Convention by the Human Rights Act 1998: see Kent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam) at paras 83 to 86 where Munby J summarised the relevant jurisprudence. The Court continues to have that jurisdiction following the incorporation of the Convention. The domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence is reflected in the Practice Guidance (Family Courts: Transparency) [2014] 1 WLR 230 ("the Practice Guidance") issued by Sir James Munby P in relation to the publication of judgments in family Courts and the Court of Protection. See also per McFarlane LJ in In Re W (Children) (Care Proceedings: Publicity) [2016] 4 WLR 39 at paras 32 to 40."

"Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

"Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

" Freedom of expression. (1) This section applies if a Court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. (4) The Court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appear to the Court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material) to (a) the extent to which (i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public, or (ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published, [and] (b) any relevant privacy code."

“The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2AC 457. For present purposes the decision of the House on the facts of Campbell and the differences between the majority and the minority are not material. What does, however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.”

“This principle is applicable as much in family proceedings as in any other proceedings. The statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the AJA 1960 and section 97 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate “shielded justice” environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms. Munby J explained at [83]-[86] in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 142 (Re B) the Court’s jurisdiction to relax and increase the statutory restrictions on reporting, and the reasons for those restrictions.”

“I would record and approve what Nicklin J said in PMC [PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg UHB [2025] EWHC 2969 (KB)], where he refused an application for the anonymity of a child claimant to a clinical negligence claim. I have already mentioned that the judge said he disagreed with a part of the dictum. Nicklin J said this at [41]: “Whilst, in a very broad sense, in assessing the engaged convention rights on any application for a derogation from open justice, the Court is carrying out a ‘balance’ between them, the scales do not start evenly balanced. The Court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. Any balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. That is not to give a presumptive priority to Article 10 (or open justice), it is simply a recognition of the context in which the Re S ‘balance’ is being carried out.”

"The Court has power both to relax and to add to the "automatic restraints"

“… any presumption or principle in favour of open justice which applies generally to Court proceedings does not apply to proceedings that are held in private and which relate to children. The default position in such cases is to the contrary and is, as I have described, as a matter of statute and the rules, one which prohibits the publication of any information relating to the proceedings. That default position, which is designed to protect children, can, where appropriate, be modified by a judge upon the application of a party or the media. It has in any event been tempered by the President's transparency initiative, the purpose of which is to allow greater public access to, and understanding of, the work of the family Courts.”

“[37] As I set out at the beginning of this judgment, all the parties to the wardship proceedings agreed that the Court bundles in this case could be provided to the three journalists who have attended these hearings. All agreed that the journalists could quote and report from those documents including the Cafcass reports subject to the names of the parties, or any members of the family being kept anonymous. [38] This was not contentious, nor was a provision that the journalists should not disclose copies of the bundle to anyone else, save any lawyer instructed by them or, in the case of Ms Summers and Mr Israel, their editors.”

“Most family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the Court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the Court’s focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied. “ The Family Justice Council published “Guidance on responding to a child’s unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour” in December 2024 in which it said: A child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent is often alleged to be a result of ‘parental alienation’. Despite the lack of research evidence, and international condemnation, reference is still made to the discredited concept of ‘parental alienation syndrome’. For the avoidance of doubt, the Family Justice Council (FJC) recognises that ‘parental alienation syndrome’ has no evidential basis and is considered a harmful pseudo-science. Concepts of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and ‘parental alienation’ are increasingly exploited within family litigation. … there are concerns that its use as a term, or any associated terms such as ‘alienating behaviours’, accords it misplaced legitimacy. Whilst this is a concern, it remains an allegation which the family Courts in England and Wales are increasingly asked to consider and act upon. The purpose of this guidance is to assist with navigation of the existing system, drawing together best practice in relation to the law as it stands against a backdrop of an increasing number of cases in which these allegations are raised. In producing this guidance, the Family Justice Council does not seek to add legitimacy to the concept of ‘parental alienation’. It has carefully weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of referencing the issue and has responded to the overwhelming call for clarity and guidance as to how these complex cases are best approached. This guidance will therefore refer to a child’s unexplained ‘reluctance, resistance and refusal’ to spend time with a parent (RRR – see Glossary above) wherever possible. However, because it addresses calls from across the sector for practical guidance on how allegations of Alienating Behaviours are responded to, this term will also be used for necessary clarity where psychological manipulation by a parent has resulted in RRR. “This guidance acknowledges that where found the harm of Alienating Behaviours to a child can be significant and enduring, akin to other forms of emotional/psychological child abuse. Alienating Behaviours range in intensity and their impact on children, but these harms can be far reaching. They can affect a child’s emotional, social and psychological development. Severed relationships and growing up with a false narrative can also have a harmful impact on a child’s identity, self-worth and sense of safety in the world. Whilst the focus here is on the welfare outcomes for children, it is also important to recognise the very significant emotional impact on parents of the loss of a relationship with a child.”

“(i) the child is reluctant, resisting or refusing to engage in a relationship with a parent or carer. (ii) The reluctance, resistance or refusal is not consequent on the actions of that parent towards the child, or the other parent, which may therefore be an appropriate justified reaction by the child, or is not caused by any other factor, such as the child alignment, affinity, or attachment. (iii) The other parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to engage in a relationship with that parent.”

“I believe my access to these documents is strongly in the public interest, particularly transparency, to promote understanding of what the family Court process entails, ensuring justice and fair treatment for all, and securing the best use of public resources. It is particularly of public interest due to the recent attention on parental alienation syndrome, and the Family Justice Council recently recognising that ‘parental alienation syndrome’ has no evidential basis and is considered a harmful pseudo-science.”

“Leave me in peace.”

“Disclosure carries real risks of harm and identification. The mother says that the children are “visibly distressed” at even the prospect of meeting with the Guardian. If children of these ages exhibit such high levels of distress at the prospect of discussing Court applications, then the Guardian cannot see how the sharing of documents related to those proceedings would do anything other than cause significantly high levels of further distress and anxiety. In such circumstances [the Guardian] submits that Article 10 does not outweigh Article 8.”

“As HHJ Hale noted, [C] probably cannot remember a time when she was not the subject of litigation. This has already been harmful to her. The long-term effect of that litigation, and its impact upon her identity and her emotional wellbeing, is yet to be fully seen. The Court has made significant efforts to try to limit future litigation regarding [C] but has struggled to do so. Notwithstanding the Section 91 (14) order made in March 2025, [C] was subject to another set of proceedings within months of that order being made. This present application, supported by [C]’s mother, perpetuates the situation. Granting Ms Bradley’s application is likely to lead to a further article, permanently available online, which continues to centre on [C] as the subject of litigation, in perpetuity.”

“3.1. The starting point is the principle of open justice. It is generally in the public interest for judgments to be published, even where they arise from private proceedings, and even where there is no particular public interest in the individual case / judgment - subject to any countervailing Article 8 issues, which may justify some anonymisation but do not necessarily preclude publication entirely.”