FG (A Child: Return Order to Lithuania, Re [2026] EWHC 1050 (Fam)

IMPORTANT NOTICEThis judgment was delivered in private. Any published version of the judgment must strictly preserve the anonymity of the child and members of their family. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.[2026] EWHC 1050 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Between
The FatherApplicantThe MotherRespondentNaomi Wiseman (counsel) for Applicant Father,instructed by Venters SolicitorsMichael Bailey (counsel) for Respondent Motherinstructed by LJ Collins Solicitors
THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND CUSTODY ACT 1985
(INCORPORATING THE 1980 HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION)
THE CHILD: FG (aged 6)
Re FG (A Child: Return Order to Lithuania)JUDGMENTNicholas Stonor KC sitting as a Deputy High Court JudgeHearing Hearing dates: 30 April and 01 May 2026Judgment handed down: 01 May 2026
[1]By an application date 16 January 2026, the applicant father (F) seeks a return order to Lithuania in relation to his son, FG, who is aged 6. F’s application is brought under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 incorporating the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the Convention’). The application is opposed by FG’s mother (M).[2]M, F and FG are all Lithuanian nationals. M and FG each have Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK which was granted under the EU Settlement Scheme in 2020 and 2021 respectively. FG currently lives with M in the UK.[3]F’s case is that FG was habitually resident in Lithuania throughout his life. He says that in early June 2025, at a time when he was in prison in France but having direct and indirect contact with FG, his mother (PGM) discovered that M and FG had left their home in Lithuania. F subsequently learned that they had relocated to the UK. Following his release from prison in France in September 2025, F took steps which led to these proceedings being issued.[4]M’s case is that, whilst she and FG visited Lithuania regularly, FG remained habitually resident in the UK at all times. Looking at the period leading up to May 2025, M says that she and FG were in the UK from 20 February to 17 March; then in Lithuania from 17 March to 26 March; then in the UK from 26 March to 02 April; then in France from 02 April to 04 April (during which she took FG to see F in prison on three consecutive days); then in the UK from 04 April to 18 May; then in Lithuania from 18 May to 28 May. M says that she and FG last spent time in Lithuania on 28 May 2025.[5]M opposes F’s application on the following alternative bases: (1) FG has been habitually resident in the UK throughout his life and so there has been no wrongful removal under Art 3 of the Convention.a. FG is settled in the UK within the meaning of Art 12 of the Convention; and/or,b. F was not actually exercising custody rights at the time of the removal (Arts 3 and 13(a)); and/or,c. F had subsequently acquiesced in the removal (Art 13 (a)); and/or,d. There is a grave risk that FG’s return would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation (Art 13(b)).[6]M’s Art 13(b) defence is based on her allegations of domestic abuse. Whilst denying those allegations, F offers a range of protective undertakings. Whilst these undertakings are not enforceable in Lithuania, F’s case is that M can issue proceedings in Lithuania and obtain orders which mirror these undertakings.[7]I emphasise, for the avoidance of any doubt, that I am not deciding the long-term care arrangements for FG. The Proceedings[8]The application had been case managed through to a two-day final hearing commencing 30 April 2026, with an earlier one-hour hearing on 01 April 2026 for summary resolution or, in the alternative, directions / Pre-Trial Review.[9]At the hearing on 01 April 2026:(1) I refused M’s application, which had been made orally at the hearing, for FG to be joined as a party. Having regard to the test in rule 16.2 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, and the guidance contained in paras 2.11(i) and 3.6 of the Practice Guidance ‘Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings’ (issued by Sir Andrew McFarlane PFD on 01 March 2023), I was not satisfied that it was in FG’s best interests for him to be joined as a party given his age and degree of maturity. Joining FG would also have necessitated the adjournment of the final hearing.(2) It was clarified on behalf of M that she would be asserting that FG had been habitually resident in the UK throughout his life.

(b) in her statement dated 24 March 2026, M had said:

“I have not abducted my child; I escaped to protect my son and myself from domestic abuse”; and “I have consistently expressed my intention to live permanently in the United Kingdom. In March 2025, I relocated here with [FG] on a permanent basis.”
I gave permission to M to file a statement setting out the evidence she relied on to support her case as to habitual residence, focusing on the period after May 2022 (when the Lithuanian Court last exercised its jurisdiction). This Hearing[10]The core bundle ran to 387 pages and included three statements from F, two statements from M, a statement from FG’s paternal grandmother (PGM), information relating to F’s criminal record and M’s complaints about F to Police in Lithuania and in the UK, and information from the Lithuanian Central Authority which had been communicated via the UK Central Authority (ICACU). I was also provided with a helpful bundle of authorities which ran to 800 pages, and some additional authorities were furnished during the course of the hearing.[11]F attended remotely from Lithuania. M attended in person. Both parents had the benefit of a Lithuanian interpreter.[12]F was represented by Ms Wiseman, counsel. M was represented by Mr Bailey, counsel. They had both prepared detailed skeleton arguments which were helpfully supplemented by focused oral submissions. I am grateful to them both and to their respective instructing solicitors.[13]On M’s account, she has lived in the UK, where her parents live, since 2008, but has travelled regularly to visit Lithuania. M bought a flat in Lithuania in 2015.[14]In early 2019, M and F met and they began an ‘on/off’ relationship during which FG was conceived. M gave birth to FG in the UK in early 2020. FG’s birth was registered in the UK, with the father’s details left blank.[15]On F’s account, M and F resumed cohabitation in Lithuania in around June 2020. M says that she and FG continued living in the UK but visited Lithuania regularly.[16]FG’s birth was registered in Lithuania in July 2020, naming both M and F as his parents. On F’s account, supported by PGM, FG spent regular time with PGM including overnight stays at her property in Lithuania.[17]On 10 August 2020, M was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK under the EU Settlement Scheme.[18]On 05 July 2021, M started renting the flat in the UK where she currently lives. M has produced a letter from her landlord which states that M “has been residing at the above-mentioned property as a tenant since 5th July 2021 and continues to reside there to the present date.” M has produced some tenancy agreements. The current monthly rent is £1500.[19]On 01 September 2021, FG began attending a local nursery in Lithuania. There is a letter form the nursery which states that FG “has been attending the [nursery] since 1 September 2021 and is listed among kindergartners of our nursery-school”. M says that the nursery in Lithuania “was simply for him to spend time during holidays there when I would engage in activities without him”.[20]On 21 December 2021, FG was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK under the EU Settlement Scheme. M says that FG attended nursery in the UK from 2022. She has produced no evidence in support of this.[21]On 15 April 2022, M reported to the Lithuanian Police that, on 07 April 2022, F had perpetrated a serious assault against her involving her being kicked in the head and arms, dragged by the hair and punched in the stomach. M said that F subsequently sent her threatening messages. On 19 April 2022, M was medically examined and was found to have injuries consistent with her having suffered at least three to four blunt traumatic impacts, possibly on 07 April 2022. M told Police at the time that she, F and FG were living together at her flat in Lithuania. F denied assaulting M or sending her threatening messages. He told Police at the time that M and FG were living at the address in Lithuania and he visited regularly, sometimes staying overnight, but was not living there permanently. M subsequently informed the Police that she did not wish to pursue her complaint.[22]M says that there were multiple incidents of physical abuse and that F’s behaviour towards her was often threatening, intimidating, harassing and denigrating.[23]On 05 May 2022, the District Court in Lithuania made an order which approved a settlement agreement reached by M and F. The agreement included provision that(1) FG’s “place of residence” was determined to be with M;(2) F would pay monthly child maintenance at a stipulated amount;(3) F would “participate in the upbring and contact” of FG as follows: every Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday from 1730 to 1930; every second weekend from Saturday 1600 to Sunday 1300; other contact arrangements “provided they agree on this in writing, by email, or via SMS messages”.[24]In June 2023 F, who has an extensive criminal record which includes offending in multiple European countries, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in France for offences of burglary and attempted burglary. FG continued to have contact with F by means of telephone calls facilitated by PGM.[25]Around the time of F’s imprisonment, according to F and PGM, M and FG moved into F’s apartment in Lithuania and remained living there until they moved to the UK in 2025.[26]M says that she and FG remained living in the UK. She says that she worked on a flexible part-time basis at a company in the UK from February 2017 to March 2024. M says that from April 2023 to September 2025, she worked for another UK company in an administrative capacity. In respect of both companies, M has produced tax information confirming only the start and end dates of her employment. In respect of the first job, her taxable income (February 2017 to March 2024) is zero. In respect of the second job, her taxable income (April 2023 to September 2025) is less than £8,000.[27]PGM has produced screenshots of messages which appear to show that M was working at a company in Lithuania in January 2024. PGM says that M’s work sometimes involved travel and she would leave FG in PGM’s care. PGM says that M and FG sometimes left Lithuania, to visit family in the UK or a cousin in Sweden, but this was never for more than “a few weeks or a month”.[28]F says that, because of M’s alcohol misuse issues, which M denies, PGM became more involved in FG’s life. PGM has produced photos which, she says, show FG to be in her care in Lithuania on occasions during the following months: July – December 2023; every month in 2024 except February and April; January to May 2025 except April 2025. M says that some of these photos were taken in the UK by M and then sent to PGM.[29]On 31 March 2025, M started making payments to a childminder in the UK. She says that FG had previously attended childcare provision in the UK but has not produced any supporting evidence.[30]As I have already described, M took FG to see F in prison in France on three consecutive days starting 02 April 2025. PGM says that FG stayed with her between 23 and 27 May 2025. M says that she and FG travelled from Lithuania to the UK and that FG has not returned to Lithuania since then.[31]PGM says that in early June 2025, after trying without success to speak to M, she grew worried and let herself into F’s flat. PGM says that she discovered that all of M and FG’s belongings had been removed. Her suspicions that M had taken FG to live in the UK were confirmed, she says, when she spoke to one of the other mothers at FG’s nursery. PGM told F.[32]In September 2025, FG started attending primary school in the UK. A letter from the school dated 10 February 2026 states that FG “presents as a settled, secure and well-supported child” and reports favourably in respect of M’s parenting.[33]Following F’s release from prison, he contacted the authorities in Lithuania which led to this application being issued. M has produced some screenshots of messages which she says show F behaving in an intimidating and abusive manner towards her.[34]On 06 February 2026, after being served that day with a Location Order made within these proceedings, M reported her complaints about F’s behaviour to the UK Police. M was referred to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC). At a MARAC meeting on 18 February 2026, M and her family were assessed as being “at high risk of harm”.[35]PGM says that, on 06 March 2026, she received a video call from M late at night and was able to speak to FG. This was the first contact that she had had with FG since May 2025.[36]M is currently working in a role within the UK justice system. Legal Framework 5.1. Habitual Residence[37]In Re F (A Child) (Habitual Residence) [2025] EWCA Civ 911, it was clarified by Moylan LJ (at [38-42], that there is no burden of proof in relation to habitual residence. After reviewing the authorities, Moylan LJ said: “57. In conclusion, I start by reiterating part of what Black LJ said in Re J Re J (A Child) (Finland) (Habitual Residence) [2017] 2 FCR 542 , namely first that there is no “prescribed route” and not “only one way in which to approach the making of a finding of fact about habitual residence” and secondly that “the scope of the enquiry depends entirely on the particular facts of the case” with the nature and extent of the analysis depending on the circumstances of the particular case. As with any judgment, what is important it that there is a sufficient analysis and explanation of the court’s determination.[58]The determination of habitual residence is not a formulaic exercise because it requires a broad consideration of the child’s and the family’s circumstances and because different factors will be present in different cases with the same factor being more significant in one case than another. Accordingly, as was said in the case of HR Proceedings brought by HR (With the participation of KO and another) (Case C-512/17) [2018] Fam 385 , at [54], “guidance provided in the context of one case may be transposed to another case only with caution”. With those caveats, I set out the following elements (which are not intended to be exclusive) drawn from the cases:(a) “The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact”: Re B In Re B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 , at [46]. It is “focussed on the situation of the child”: Re A In Re A (A Child) [2024] 4 WLR 49 , at 54(v) and Re R In re R (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2016] AC 76 , at [17]. It is an issue of fact which requires the court to undertake a sufficient global analysis of all the relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors;(b) As set out, for example, in Proceedings brought byHR, at [41]:
“In addition to the physical presence of the child in the territory of a [member] state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent”; (c) Factors of relevance, as set out in Proceedings brought byHR, at [43], and reflected in many other domestic cases, include: “the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay in the territory of the different [member] states concerned, the place and conditions of the child’s attendance at school, and the family and social relationships of the child in those member states”; (d) The intentions of the parents are also a relevant factor and there is no “rule” that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child: Re R, at [17]; (e) As set out in Re R, at [16], it is “the stability of the residence that is important, not whether it is of a permanent character” but there “is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time” because habitual residence can be acquired quickly: e.g. A v A A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2014] AC 1 , at [44]; (f) The “degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question” is relevant, Re R, at [17]. It is clear that “full integration” is not required, “Re B (SC)”, at [39], but only a degree sufficient to support the conclusion, when added to the other relevant factors, that the child is habitually resident in the relevant state; (g) The relevant factors will reflect the age of the child (see Mercredi v Chaffe [2012] Fam 22, at [53]-[55]; A v A, at [54(vi], and Re LC In re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] AC 1038 , at [35]). Accordingly, “The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned”: Re A, at 54(vi); (h) The court is considering the connections between the child and the country or countries concerned: A v A, at [80(ii)]; Re B (SC), at [42]; and Proceedings brought by HR, at [43]. This is a comparative analysis as referred to, for example, in Re M Re M (Children) (Habitual Residence: 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) [2021] 2 FLR 60 , at [60]; Re B (EWCA) In re B (A Child) (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice intervening) [2020] 4 WLR 149 , at [86]; and Re A, at [46]. As observed by Black LJ in Re J, I repeat: “What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence.”
An example of this is seen in Re B (SC) in which Lord Wilson, at [49]-[50], referred to the factors which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment” and those which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of integration in the environment in Pakistan”.” (a) “The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact”: Re B In Re B (A Child) [2016] UKSC 4 , at [46]. It is “focussed on the situation of the child”: Re A In Re A (A Child) [2024] 4 WLR 49 , at 54(v) and Re R In re R (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2016] AC 76 , at [17]. It is an issue of fact which requires the court to undertake a sufficient global analysis of all the relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors; (b) As set out, for example, in Proceedings brought byHR, at [41]:
“In addition to the physical presence of the child in the territory of a [member] state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent”; (c) Factors of relevance, as set out in Proceedings brought byHR, at [43], and reflected in many other domestic cases, include: “the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay in the territory of the different [member] states concerned, the place and conditions of the child’s attendance at school, and the family and social relationships of the child in those member states”; (d) The intentions of the parents are also a relevant factor and there is no “rule” that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child: Re R, at [17]; (e) As set out in Re R, at [16], it is “the stability of the residence that is important, not whether it is of a permanent character” but there “is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time” because habitual residence can be acquired quickly: e.g. A v A A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2014] AC 1 , at [44]; (f) The “degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question” is relevant, Re R, at [17]. It is clear that “full integration” is not required, “Re B (SC)”, at [39], but only a degree sufficient to support the conclusion, when added to the other relevant factors, that the child is habitually resident in the relevant state; (g) The relevant factors will reflect the age of the child (see Mercredi v Chaffe [2012] Fam 22, at [53]-[55]; A v A, at [54(vi], and Re LC In re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] AC 1038 , at [35]). Accordingly, “The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned”: Re A, at 54(vi); (h) The court is considering the connections between the child and the country or countries concerned: A v A, at [80(ii)]; Re B (SC), at [42]; and Proceedings brought by HR, at [43]. This is a comparative analysis as referred to, for example, in Re M Re M (Children) (Habitual Residence: 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) [2021] 2 FLR 60 , at [60]; Re B (EWCA) In re B (A Child) (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice intervening) [2020] 4 WLR 149 , at [86]; and Re A, at [46]. As observed by Black LJ in Re J, I repeat: “What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence.”
An example of this is seen in Re B (SC) in which Lord Wilson, at [49]-[50], referred to the factors which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment” and those which pointed to the child having “achieved the requisite degree of integration in the environment in Pakistan”.” 5.2. Wrongful Removal[38]The relevant parts of the Convention are as follows:

Article 3

[46]The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where - a). it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; andb) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.[48]The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

Article 5

[49]For the purposes of this Convention - a). "rights of custody" shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence;b) "rights of access" shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence.[39]Pursuant to Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Direction 12F – International Child Abduction, para 2.2:
“rights of custody” are ‘interpreted very widely (see paragraph 2.16 below)’. Para 2.16 provides (emphasis added): “‘Rights of custody’ includes rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence. Rights of custody may arise by operation of law (that is, they are conferred on someone automatically by the legal system in which they are living) or by a judicial or administrative decision or as a result of an agreement having legal effect. The rights of a person, an institution or any other body are a matter for the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence, but it is for the State which is being asked to return the child to decide: if those rights amount to rights of custody for the purposes of the 1980 Hague Convention; whether at the time of the removal or retention those rights were actually being exercised; and whether there has been a breach of those rights.”
[40]The burden of proving a wrongful removal rests with the applicant (here, F). 5.3. Relevant Date for Determining Wrongful Removal[41]The relevant date for assessing whether a removal or retention is in fact wrongful is the date of the alleged removal or retention (Re M (Children) (Habitual Residence: 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention) [2020] EWCA Civ 1105, per Moylan LJ at para 68).[42]In Re S (Child Abduction: Delay) [1998] 1 FLR 651, Wall J (as he then was) confirmed (at 655-657) that:(1) “removal is an issue of fact and depends critically upon the particular facts of each case” and that(2) (referencing the House of Lords decision in Re H; Re S (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] 2 FLR 262) a wrongful removal is not a continuing state of affairs but is an event that occurs on a specific occasion. On the facts of that case, which involved a removal to the UK from Germany in May 1996, and then a three-day return to Germany in September 1996 during which the child saw the father before the child was brought back to the UK, Wall J found that there had been two wrongful removals and that the father was entitled to rely on the latter removal (in September 1996) as being the wrongful removal for the purposes of the Convention. 5.4. Articles 12 and 13[43]The relevant parts read as follows:

Article 12

[58]Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith[59]The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. . . .

Article 13

[61]Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that - a). the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; orb) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.[64]In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence. 5.5. Acquiescence[44]As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Re B (1980 Hague Convention: Article 13(a)/(b)) [2025] EWCA Civ 1603 (per Cobb LJ as he then was at [23]), Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech in Re H and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1997] 1 FLR 872 remains “the seminal reference point on this issue”. In Re H, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said (at page 884): “(1) For the purposes of Art 13 of the Convention, the question whether the wronged parent has "acquiesced" in the removal or retention of the child depends upon his actual state of mind. As Neill LJ said in [Re S (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1994] 1 FLR 819 at 838]: "the court is primarily concerned, not with the question of the other parent's perception of the applicant's conduct, but with the question whether the applicant acquiesced in fact". (2) The subjective intention of the wronged parent is a question of fact for the trial judge to determine in all the circumstances of the case, the burden of proof being on the abducting parent. (3) The trial judge, in reaching his decision on that question of fact, will no doubt be inclined to attach more weight to the contemporaneous words and actions of the wronged parent than to his bare assertions in evidence of his intention. But that is a question of the weight to be attached to evidence and is not a question of law. (4) There is only one exception. Where the words or actions of the wronged parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to believe that the wronged parent clearly is not asserting or going to assert his right to the summary return of the child and are inconsistent with such return, justice requires that the wronged parent be held to have acquiesced.” 5.6.

(b) : Grave Risk/Intolerable Situation

[45]The leading authorities are the Supreme Court decisions in Re E (children) (international abduction) [2011] UKSC 27 and Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10.

(b) ) [2021] EWCA Civ 1123 (at [47]):

“(1) The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words “grave” and “intolerable”. (2) The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return. (3) The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk. (4) When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk. (5) In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination. (6) That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do. (7) If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk. (8) In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there. (9) In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance. (10) As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on “Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings” issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018 Updated 01 March 2023. , the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks.”
[46]In G v D (Article 13(b) Absence of Protective Measures [2020] EWHC 1476 at para 39 (quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in Re C (A Child) (Abduction: Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1354 at para 60), MacDonald J noted “. . . it is well established that courts should accept that, unless the contrary is proved, the administrative, judicial and social service authorities of the requesting State are equally as adept in protecting children as they are in the requested State (see for example Re H (Abduction: Grave Risk) [2003] EWCA Civ 355, [2003] 2 FLR 141, Re M (Abduction: Intolerable Situation) [2000] 1 FLR 930 and Re L (Abduction: Pending Criminal Proceedings) [1999] 1 FLR 433).” Discussion 6.1. Relevant Date[47]Mindful of the guidance provided by Wall J in Re S (above), I am satisfied that the relevant date when considering whether there has been a wrongful removal is 28 May 2025. I note that, on M’s account, she and FG had returned to Lithuania for a ten-day stay between 18 May and 28 May. They were not “in transit”. Whilst FG did not see F during this time, he did spend three days with PGM. 6.2. Habitual Residence[48]When considering FG’s habitual residence as at 28 May 2025, neither parent bears the burden of proof.[49]Mr Bailey urged me to view the issue of habitual residence through the prism of parental intention and emphasised the factors which related most directly to M, in particular: her connections with the UK; her determination that she (and FG) should not lose their settled status. I have approached the issue of habitual residence, which is of course a question of fact, not through any particular prism but neutrally and with an open mind. In doing so, along with all other relevant considerations, I have of course taken into account Mr Bailey’s submissions.[50]In favour of FG being habitually resident in the UK:(1) M has strong connections with the UK given that she has family here and she spent a considerable amount of time here before she met F.(2) M has produced evidence showing that, since July 2021, she has rented a flat in the UK and has been responsible for paying a significant monthly rent. M has not produced any photos or other evidence to show the extent to which she and FG actually lived at this property.(3) FG was born in the UK; his birth was first registered here; he spent the first five months or so of his life here.(4) Whilst it is accepted that M and FG spent periods of time in the UK, M has produced no evidence (such as plane tickets) to show that she and FG spent considerably more time in the UK than in Lithuania.(5) M has produced evidence showing that she has had some level of employment with two UK companies since 2017, though that evidence does not provide any detail as to the extent of work done by M and the income figures suggest that it was relatively modest.(6) M asserts that FG attended nursery in the UK from 2022 but has produced no evidence in support.(7) M has produced evidence showing that she had started paying a childminder in the UK from 31 March 2025. There is no evidence as to the extent to which FG was in fact cared for by the childminder. On M’s own account, between 01 March 2025 and 28 May 2025, she and FG had two lengthy trips to Lithuania and a shorter but still multi-day trip to France. Given FG’s age as at March/May 2025, if he were settled in the UK he ought to have been attending primary school by then in any event.(8) M asserts that she values the settled status which she and FG enjoy in the UK and would not want to jeopardise that. However, it was accepted that this status would only be lost if M and FG were to leave the UK and not return, even briefly, for five years.[51]In favour of FG being habitually resident in Lithuania:(1) FG, M and F are all Lithuanian nationals.(2) M has owned a property in Lithuania since 2015.(3) FG’s birth was also registered in Lithuania.(4) There is a letter confirming that FG has attended nursery in Lithuania since September 2021 and was still registered there as at 11 November 2025, though it does not include a record of attendance.(5) In May 2022, the Lithuanian District Court made an order approving a settlement agreement which had been reached by the parents. M has never suggested that she was in any way pressurised into accepting the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian court.(6) The order made by the Lithuanian court included provision for FG to have contact with F three evenings each week with alternate weekend staying contact. Such an agreed arrangement is not at all consistent with FG being habitually resident in the UK at that time.(7) There is evidence showing that M was working in Lithuania in January 2024.(8) The photos and accompanying calendar produced by PGM show that, from July 2023 to May 2025, FG spent time with her in Lithuania on at least one occasion each month (and usually multiple occasions each month) for every month except February 2024, April 2024 and April 2025. Even if M is right and that some of these photos were taken in the UK, this evidence from PGM, who was heavily involved in FG’s life but was not FG’s primary carer, is difficult to reconcile with FG being habitually resident in the UK.(9) In her first statement, as already referenced, M said:
“I have not abducted my child; I escaped to protect my son and myself from domestic abuse”; and “I have consistently expressed my intention to live permanently in the United Kingdom. In March 2025, I relocated here with [FG] on a permanent basis.”
These assertions are also difficult to reconcile with FG being habitually resident in the UK.[52]In my view, standing back from the competing factors set out above, the evidence in support of a finding that FG was habitually resident in Lithuania as at 28 May 2025 (or indeed March 2025) is far more cogent and compelling than the evidence, such as it is, which points towards FG having been habitually resident in the UK. I find that FG was indeed habitually resident in Lithuania as at 28 May 2025. 6.3. Custody Rights and Wrongful Removal[53]The burden is on F to show that the removal was wrongful.[54]Pursuant to Article 3.156 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania:[1]The father and the mother shall have equal rights and duties in respect of their children.[2]Parents shall have equal rights and duties by their children irrespective of whether the child was born to be a married or unmarried couple, after divorce of judicial nullity of the marriage or separation.[55]F’s actual involvement in FG’s life was reflected in the order made by the Lithuanian District Court in May 2022.[56]Whilst F was incarcerated, he maintained involvement with FG through telephone contact and, at least on those three days commencing 02 April 2025, direct contact.[57]Taking these matters into account, I am satisfied that F had custody rights and that he was exercising those rights as at 28 May 2025.[58]M accepts that, when she took FG to visit F in prison, she did not speak to F about her intentions to live in the UK and not to return to Lithuania. Her case is that she did not need to do so because she and FG were already living in the UK. Given my finding in respect of habitual residence, I reject that explanation.[59]I am satisfied that, on 28 May 2025, M wrongfully removed FG from Lithuania. 6.4. Settlement[60]The burden of proof is on M. The wrongful removal was 28 May 2025. The proceedings were commenced on 16 January 2026, less than one year after the wrongful removal. Accordingly, M’s defence of settlement under Art 12 does not get off the ground. 6.5. Acquiescence[61]I can also deal with this shortly. M bears the burden of proof. She has produced no evidence to support, or evidence from which inference can be drawn to support, her assertion that F acquiesced to the removal. 6.6.

(b) )

[62]M has made serious allegations of domestic abuse which are disputed by F. I take these allegations at their highest. My focus is on the risk to FG if he were to return to Lithuania. I note that, even after the most serious alleged incident took place in April 2022, M and FG were nonetheless able to remain living in Lithuania, and FG was able to continue to enjoy positive relationships with both F and PGM, for the following three years.[63]In those circumstances, and without in any way diminishing the significance of M’s allegations, I am sceptical as to whether the high threshold of grave risk / intolerability for FG is met.[64]However, proceeding on the basis that M’s allegations might potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, I must carefully consider whether and how the risk to FG can be addressed. I am satisfied that the protective measures proposed by F, which can be mirrored in a court order in Lithuania, are sufficient to address the risk. In reaching that conclusion, I am mindful of MacDonald J’s guidance in G v D (Article 13(b) Absence of Protective Measures [2020] EWHC 1476 (see para 46 above). I have no reason to doubt that the Lithuanian authorities are equally as adept in protecting children as are the authorities in the UK.[65]I am not satisfied that the Article 13(b) defence has been established.[66]For the reasons set out above, I make a return order to Lithuania. I will hear counsel in relation to the precise date and any other consequential directions.[67]It will be for the court in Lithuania to determine any issues relating to FG’s future care arrangements. I permit disclosure of this judgment and of the case papers to the Lithuanian courts and any Lithuanian authorities who may be concerned for the FG ’s welfare.