P & Anor v S & Anor [2025] EWHC 944 (Fam)

Case No FA-2024-000319

[2025] EWHC 944 (Fam)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

On appeal from The Family Court, sitting at Worcester

His Honour Judge Cole

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 10/04/2025

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CUSWORTH

Between

PAppellant

LAppellant

SAppellant

TAppellant

P- and -L- and –S- and –T 1 st Appellant 2 nd Appellant 1 st Respondent 2 nd Respondent

Ms Joy Brereton KC and Mr Mani Singh Basi (instructed by Cartwright King)

for appellant child, ‘P’

Mr Stefano Nuvoloni KC and Mr Baldip Singh (instructed by Nelsons Law)

for second appellant mother, ‘L’

The first respondent father in-person, ‘S’

Mr Basharat Hussain for second respondent children, ‘P’ and ‘T’, via their guardian (instructed by Childcare LLP).

Hearing Hearing dates: 9-10 April 2025

APPROVED JUDGMENT

……………..

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CUSWORTH

[1]This is an appeal hearing following two appeals against the order of HHJ Cole made in the Worcester Family Court on 5th November 2024, made by the 1st appellant mother (‘the mother’) and the 2nd appellant child, ‘P’, who is aged 14 ½, having been born in September 2010. The judge’s order appealed against directs that P should immediately return to this jurisdiction from Slovakia, where he has been, without either parent, since the summer of 2024, in the circumstances described below. The return order was made under the Children Act 1989. There has as yet been no application made for such an order under the auspices of the Hague Convention 1980.

[2]P is separately represented by leading counsel, Ms Brereton KC, for the purposes of this appeal. I have also heard submissions from leading counsel for the mother, Mr Nuvoloni KC, and from counsel of the r.16.4 Guardian, Mr Hussain. The guardian was appointed by the court at the hearing when the order now under appeal was made. The father, who is the respondent to the appeal but the applicant in the proceedings before the Family Court, was present at the hearing of the appeal but not represented, and made oral submissions to me at the hearing.

[3]I also have before me an application made by the mother to permit P’s sister T (born in 2013, and so now aged nearly 12), to travel to Slovakia with her over the current Easter holiday, to enable her and her brother P to spend time together in that country. I determined that I would hear that application together with this appeal, given that the mother’s application is to be allowed to travel on 12 April 2025, just two days hence.

[4]The history. The mother and the father were married in 2009 and separated in 2019. The Decree Absolute was granted in 2021. In January 2021, court proceedings took place which resulted in a "Lives With" Order for both children being made in favour of the mother. The mother’s position is that father did not actively engage in the court process. He informed the court that his work as a lorry driver prevented him from adhering to a regular schedule with the children. Consequently, a general contact order was issued without specific arrangements. The court order stipulated that the parents were responsible for agreeing on the contact schedule between themselves. The mother says that the father has not spent regular time with the children since 2022. It is understood that he saw T briefly in July 2023. After the last Court proceedings in 2021, agreements were made for contact to take place every other weekend, but this then reduced to every other Sunday only, as the mother had enrolled the children in a Slovak school on Saturdays. The father has not now had contact with the children since July 2023 other than on one occasion when he went to visit P in Slovakia on 24 September 2024, in the circumstances explained below.

[5]The mother travelled to Slovakia with both children for a holiday on 21 July 2024. P had told his mother that he was being bullied in school in the UK and, once in Slovakia, told her that he did not want to return. He then stayed in Slovakia, the mother says with his maternal grandmother, and the mother enrolled him for school in Slovakia. The mother returned to the UK with T, on 31 August 2024. P’s English school wanted to speak with him, and on 13th September 2024, they set up a Facetime conversation. The mother and T had travelled back to Slovakia on 12 September so, the mother says, she could support P to make a call to his school. She also says that she wanted to see if P would agree to return to the UK. During the call, P explained that he had enrolled in a Slovakian school and was much happier. He told them that he had been bullied in the UK and expressed that he wanted to continue attending school in Slovakia. P maintained his refusal to return, and on 16 September 2024, four days later, the mother and T again returned to the UK, so that T could start the new school year in the UK.

[6]The father then visited P in Slovakia on 24 September 2024, where P informed his father he did not want to return to the UK. The Father subsequently made an application for a child arrangements order, a prohibited steps order and a specific issue order in relation to schooling under the Children Act 1989. However, no formal application for a return order under the Hague Convention 1980 was made, and at the hearing on 1 October 2024 at the Worcester Family Court, HHJ Cole made an order directing the mother to return P to the UK under the Children Act 1989. A return date was directed before the same judge on 5 November 2024.

[7]That initial order was unsuccessfully appealed by the mother, in circumstances described by me in my judgment in the permission application for this appeal, which has been reported at

[2025] EWHC 468 (Fam)

. Subsequently, and no doubt with the mother’s encouragement, a solicitor was instructed on P’s behalf, who met remotely with him on 22 October 2024. She noted that P was articulate, and able to tell her his perception of the situation and what his wishes were. She consequently assessed him to be competent to instruct her, and moved forward on his instructions to intervene in the case. On this basis, an application was lodged with the Court on P’s behalf on 24 October 2024, to be made a party to these proceedings. The case put for him was that he opposed the Order that was made for his return, and had expressed clearly that he does not wish to return to the UK. He says that he feels that he has settled in Slovakia and enjoys his life there. In addition to this, P wrote a letter to the Court expressing his wishes and feelings with regards to the current application, and his desire to remain where he was.

[8]P’s application to be joined as a party was granted by HHJ Cole on 5 November 2024. However, the court went on to refuse his application to discharge the Specific Issue Order (‘SIO’) directing his return. That new order was again not complied with, and was again appealed, this time by both P and the mother. The application for permission to appeal was refused by HHJ Cole, but a 7-day stay was granted. P and the mother filed grounds for permission to appeal and the matter was returned to me. I listed an oral hearing to deal with the application for permission to appeal on 19February 2025, and gave permission in the above referred to judgment to both Appellants to appeal on only two of the various grounds that they were each advancing, essentially complaining of what was described as an ‘Improper Application of the Children Act in Place of the Hague Convention’, and a ‘Failure to Consider Practicalities of Enforcing the Return Order’. As a consequence of these appeal proceedings, the anticipated return date before HHJ Cole on 10 January 2025 was vacated, and I understand has yet to be re-listed.

[9]In my judgment granting permission I said this: 4. …Counsel for the mother, and for P, both argued in effect that rather than continuing with the Children Act 1989 proceedings whilst P remained in Slovakia, the ‘better course’ (to use the words of Moylan LJ in Re: S (Abduction: Hague Convention or BIIa)

[2018] EWCA Civ 1226

at [47], would have been for Hague Convention 1980 proceedings to be commenced in Slovakia to seek to secure a return order. 5. I am of course very aware that the reason why that course was urged on HHJ Cole, and is being urged on me now as the primary ground of appeal, is that both prospective appellants hope that the ‘child’s objection’ defence available under Art.13 of the 1980 Convention can be deployed to persuade the Slovakian court to decline to make a return order in P’s case. I do not know whether that might be the outcome of such proceedings. I can see, having now latterly had sight of the guardian’s position statement for this hearing, that there are genuine concerns in this case about whether the children’s voices are ‘currently their own’, and about ‘possible elements of alienating behaviour’. T is also expressing reasons for wishing to leave the UK which do not appear to tally with her school’s report, and about which the guardian is not yet convinced. It is also the case that the father’s relationship with the children appears to have been significantly interrupted now for over 2 years. This is not, therefore, on any view a straightforward case. 6. However, as Moylan LJ accurately observed in Re S (above) at [48]:

‘The making of a summary return order does not necessarily lead to the expeditious return of a child’

. That has not happened in this case. When the matter was before HHJ Cole in October, the retention in Slovakia was very recent, a return date in England imminent, and both parents before him in court. Had the mother complied with his summary order, welfare decisions could have been taken calmly in light of the status quo, and I am clear that the judge had good reason to make the order which he did, under the 1989 Act. 7. Later however, and particularly now some 4 months later, the most expeditious basis for seeking a return order would appear to be the route offered by the Hague Convention 1980. Again, as Moylan LJ made clear of the Convention in Re S at [48]: ‘Apart from this being the “expected” route, it has certain real advantages. First, a higher degree of direct assistance is likely to be provided by the authorities in the requested state to a party bringing an application under the 1980 Convention than in respect of an application for the enforcement of an order. Secondly, there is a specific obligation on states to determine applications under the 1980 Convention within 6 weeks. There is no such specific requirement in respect of the enforcement of parental responsibility orders. Thirdly, Article 11 provides what is to happen if a non-return order is made. There is, therefore, a tailor-made procedure through which the courts of the respective Member States engage with the case and engage with each other. Additionally, any subsequent return order has an expedited enforcement procedure under Chapter III, Section 4 and, to repeat, “without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with” Article 42(2).’ 8. Consequently, in the circumstances which obtained before HHJ Cole on 5 November 2024, there were significant grounds for the court to reconsider whether the order for a summary return made in October should be repeated: a. The previous order had not been complied with, and the most effective method compliance would likely be through some form of Slovakian proceedings; and b. P was now separately represented and, albeit subject to the caveat that the just appointed guardian had not yet had the opportunity to report, was certainly voicing objections through his counsel which indicated that his return without an application under the Hague Convention 1980 would be difficult to achieve.

[10]Having dealt with the other grounds advanced by both appellants, I concluded that:12. …I am satisfied that there are significant questions about the utility and propriety of ongoing Children Act 1989 proceedings in this jurisdiction whilst any application for a summary return order is made in Slovakia. I am clear that any application for such a return order is very likely to be better and more effectively pursued under the Hague Convention 1980, rather than by an attempt at reciprocal enforcement of a specific issue order in the Slovakian Courts. I am, therefore, persuaded that the appeal under Grounds 1 and 3 of the mother’s appeal, that are headlined ‘Improper Application of the Children Act in Place of the Hague Convention’ and ‘Failure to Consider Practicalities of Enforcing the Return Order’, do have a real prospect of success, and I will give permission for the appeal under those grounds to proceed. These grounds are also essentially comprised within Grounds 1 and 2 of P’s appeal. I do not grant permission under any of the other grounds advanced.

13. Finally, as I indicated in court during the hearing, and to the father who was listening but not represented, it seems to me now very clear that an application under the Hague Convention 1980 in Slovakia for the return of P does need to be made with some urgency. That would seem to be the best route to enable the short-term issues in relation to his circumstances to be determined, regardless of the court’s previous orders in this jurisdiction. If that process is now begun, then a full hearing of this appeal may become unnecessary.

[11]I consequently stayed the return order made by HHJ Cole. I make it clear that the rest of his order, especially those parts relating to T, which were not the subject of the appeal, were not intended to be stayed by my order, and should be treated as still current. Unfortunately, however, and despite what had been made clear, the father has not taken the step of initiating proceedings under the Hague Convention 1980, even though I am assured that it was explained to him by Mr Singh, junior counsel for the mother, that legal aid would be available for him to do so. At the hearing of this appeal, he told me that, having initially given up a previous attempt without the benefit of representation, he would try again to make such an application. He further indicated that he has now been in touch with a suitably qualified lawyer to start that process. Clearly, whilst he is not out of time to do so, the delay caused by his failure to act so far has made the prospect of an order for summary return now being made by the Slovakian Courts significantly less likely.

[12]The current position. Although the father is not currently willing to concede that P should be left residing permanently in Slovakia, he did however acknowledge that it was not in P’s interests to be unable to travel to this jurisdiction while the proceedings continued and so maintain his relationship with his sister, T, or with either of his parents. This is compounded by the fact that HHJ Cole’s current order, for understandable reasons, as it stands prevents T from travelling to Slovakia. Mr Nuvoloni KC for the mother on the first day of this hearing informed me that the mother would be issuing an application to relocate to Slovakia with T within the next 24 hours, which she duly did overnight, and which application will now need to be listed alongside the other Children Act proceedings before HHJ Cole in the Worcester Family Court.

[13]As indicated, I do have before me today, in addition to the appeal, an application by the mother for permission to take T to visit P in Slovakia over the upcoming Easter school holiday. The mother overnight filed without leave a further statement in support of her application, including new information not put before me during Mr Nuvoloni’s submissions yesterday. In fact, Mr Nuvoloni has today placed very little emphasis on the content of that statement, only referring to the mother’s job in the UK as a reason to be confident that she would be returning here. The guardian has spoken to T, who confirmed that she wanted to go to Slovakia with the mother, and in due course wants to be able to live there with her brother P, returning to the UK for holidays with her father. She said that she misses P and had not seen him for a while.

[14]Whilst regular sibling contact is plainly very much in the interests of both children while the proceedings about their future continue, both I and the guardian, as expressed in her position statement for this hearing drafted by counsel Mr Hussain, has a concern as to whether if T were to be taken to Slovakia, she would in fact return. This is compounded by P’s decision not to return, and the fact of the anticipated application for T to join him, which does align with her wishes as relayed to the guardian. On balance, the guardian (not then aware of the promised relocation application, but concerned that that was the mother’s ambition) did conclude that the desirability of the children spending time together soon would point to permitting such a trip, if sufficiently robust undertakings or other strictures securing T’s return could be put in place. She did not confirm whether what the mother was offering, which I will consider below, would suffice.

[15]On the day before this hearing, however, having been able to speak by video link to P, the guardian was able to record that:

‘He did however say that if Mum and Sister cannot come over to Slovakia, he would be happy to come over to the UK for the week and expressed he would wish to return to Slovakia.’

Mr Hussain made clear to me today, when I asked whether the guardian would still recommend a trip to Slovakia for T this Easter if it became possible for P to return here to see her for a limited period instead, that she felt that, given the risks of the Slovakian trip, a temporary return to the UK for P would be preferable. Ms Brereton KC, for P, indicated that she would wish to have the opportunity to take instructions from P about his willingness to return, on the basis that the order currently in place which would preclude his later return to Slovakia without a further court order would be removed, and he could therefore be assured that he would be back for the next school term in Slovakia after Easter. Regrettably, I am told by Mr Nuvoloni KC that there is no prolonged Easter break for the schools in that country, and P would only be able to travel between 17 April and 22 April. Further, there is then no further holiday until the end of June. I therefore at the close of submissions yesterday adjourned for P’s lawyers to discuss the matter with him.

[16]Whilst Mr Nuvoloni for the mother suggested that P may be unwilling to return given the father’s newly relayed intention to make an application for a return order under the 1980 Hague Convention, Mr Hussain for the guardian was clear that P’s expression of opinion to her should be taken at face value. Whilst I note that the mother in her first statement cites other benefits to T from a holiday in Slovakia, a country she has visited many times and knows well, not least spending time with her grandmother and a possible skiing trip, these are less important benefits for her than seeing her brother, and for P to see both T and their mother. In her new statement drafted overnight, the mother added for the first time the information that the maternal grandfather is apparently scheduled to have an operation to remove his gallbladder after Easter, and urging that the trip for T would allow her to spend time with him before then. As indicated, this point was not made by Mr Nuvoloni in his submissions in support of the application on either day of the hearing, and therefore I have concerns about the appropriate weight that it should receive. The guardian notes that there has been no medical evidence filed in support.

[17]The Appeal. FPR 2010 Rule 30.12(3) provides that this appeal will only be allowed if the decision of the court below was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. Junior counsel Mr Basi in his skeleton for P accurately summarises that the appellate court may conclude that a decision is wrong or procedurally unjust where(i) there has been an error of law;

(ii) the judge has clearly failed to give due weight to some very significant matter or, by contrast, has clearly given undue weight to some matter not deserving of it;

(iii) that a conclusion has been reached on the facts before the court which was not open to the judge reaching them on the evidence;

(iv) that a process has been adopted at the court below which is procedurally irregular and unfair to such an extent that it renders the decision made unjust; or

(v) that a discretion has been exercised which is outside the parameters within which it is possible to have reasonable disagreement.

[18]I have to bear in mind that despite the question of the desirability of Hague Convention 1980 proceedings being raised before HHJ Cole, certainly by the mother’s counsel, in November 2024, and further and very clearly by me in court at the hearing in February 2025, as well as in my subsequent judgment following that hearing as set out above, no such application has ever been made. Although the father today again indicates that he intends to make one, and is now seeking legal assistance to start such a process, I cannot be certain that such an application will be made, and with every month that passes it must be the case that the strength of the defences available in the Slovakian courts to resist such a summary order being made would only increase. It is also significant that, in the absence of any such application having been made when the matter was before HHJ Cole, he was not in a position to defer the domestic application, which I am satisfied was quite properly before him, to await the outcome of any such proceedings. Indeed, as at the date of this hearing, there are still no other applications before any court relating to P.

[19]In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that the judge’s decision to repeat the return order in relation to P was outside the wide ambit of his discretion, or that it was a course that was not properly open to him. The judge clearly took into account P’s clearly expressed wishes as related by his own counsel, and cannot have been bound to await a report from the guardian, or from CAFCASS, in those circumstances. In the absence of Hague proceedings, to have rescinded the return order would have been to send a definite message that he was entitled to consider inadvisable. The judge was also entitled to expect that steps would then be taken by the father to implement such a return, either by initiating proceedings under the Hague Convention, or otherwise seeking some enforcement of his order in Slovakia. He anticipated a return date on 10 January 2025, when he could have assessed the progress of any such proceedings and considered any appropriate further steps. He had before him an application by the father for enforcement of his October order, which he adjourned to that next hearing.

[20]As Moylan LJ made clear in Re S (Abduction: Hague Convention or BIIa)

[2018] EWCA Civ 1226

, the ‘better course’ in most situations where a child has been abducted to or retained in a contracting state is to proceed under the 1980 Hague Convention, but that does not mean that for the court to consider making or to make Children Act 1989 orders in the absence of such proceedings amounts to an error of law. The judge plainly had jurisdiction to make the orders which he did – see for exampleRe D (A minor) (Child: Removal from Jurisdiction)

[1992] 1 FLR 637

(CA). Further, I am as explained satisfied that the judge did give due weight to P’s wishes and feelings at the hearing, having heard full submissions from counsel instructed on his behalf. There was no procedural irregularity or unfairness here to either of the appellants, and the course which the judge took was well within the ambit of his discretion. Consequently, I am satisfied that the appeals before me against the order made on 5 November 2024 should be dismissed.

[21]The variation application. However, I am aware that order under appeal was made five months ago. The father has not chosen to take advantage of the scheme of the convention, the benefits of which were fully described by Moylan LJ in Re S (above), and repeated by me not least for the father’s benefit in my permission judgment. Further, and crucially, P has not returned from Slovakia. In those circumstances, the benefits of the return order continuing now, three months beyond its originally anticipated return date in January 2025, are much reduced. The father has not yet taken the further steps that he knew were required of him to make the prospect of an actual return more likely. The mother, by her appeal against the order, has in effect frozen the position here, such that any further progress in the substantive proceedings in Worcester, such as a variation or suspension of the SIO, has not been possible. In the meantime, the children have not seen each other, and P has not seen either of his parents. T has been unable to travel to Slovakia where her maternal family live.

[22]Further, alongside the return order when it was re-made on 5 November 2024, HHJ Cole made an order which would preclude P from leaving the UK again if he were to return, without a further court order. As it stands, this would preclude his visiting to see T over the Easter holiday, even though such a trip would be greatly in the interests of both of them. Whilst the reasons for that provision at the time that the order was made are readily understandable, I consider that the situation has changed significantly in the time that has elapsed since. I have before me as explained the mother’s application for a variation to the judge’s order to permit T to travel with her to visit her brother P in Slovakia. In the context of that application I must consider the welfare of both children, the risks in the event of such a trip that T may not return, and the importance of P and T having the opportunity of spending some time together in the immediate future.

[23]In the mother’s newly filed statement, as a reason why she can be expected to return to this country, she also urges the fact of her jobs in this country (as the director and teacher at a Slovak School, and head of the education department of a broader association of such schools). It may be that it will take some time for her to disengage from her activities here, but I bear in mind that she felt able to leave P, she says in the care of his maternal grandmother, when she and T returned to this jurisdiction in September 2024. It is not beyond the bounds of imagination that she could do the same with T, who is now expressing the clear view that she wishes to join her brother, before herself relocating at the end of the school year in a few months’ time, whatever the outcome of the proceedings before HHJ Cole. In those circumstances, I have to consider carefully the assurances and undertakings which the mother is offering.

[24]In her original statement in support of her application dated 25 March 2025, the mother offered only to provide the court with an itinerary, to surrender hers and T’s passports only on their return to the UK at the end of the trip, and not to apply to the Slovakian Court to change T’s habitual residence. I do not consider that such undertakings offer any effective safeguards at all. Simply, if the mother returned without T at the conclusion of the trip, the only remedies open to the father would be a further opportunity to instigate Hague Convention 1980 proceedings, or to seek further orders from HHJ Cole. T’s habitual residence in any event is a matter of fact, regardless of any applications made to the court.

[25]I asked Mr Nuvoloni whether the mother owned any real property in this jurisdiction that could be offered as a surety, but was told that she did not. Save for the information about her employment, no further measures were proposed. Whilst the guardian was prepared to offer reluctant support for the trip in the absence of any proffered alternative in her position statement, she made it clear through Mr Hussain, including in the light of the new evidence in her second statement, that she supported as her preferred option an opportunity for P to return here to visit his family, even if only briefly, over the Easter weekend.

[26]Mr Nuvoloni advanced a number of further considerations, including the additional cost of travel for P, around £170, in circumstances where his client had already purchased non-refundable tickets for herself and T to travel the other way. In circumstances where P’s return ticket was not used in September, and where any such purchase this time has been made by the mother in the knowledge that the outcome of her application had not been determined and was by no means certain to succeed, that was a calculated risk which she has taken, and not a reason to risk T’s continuing presence in this country, if provision can otherwise be made for her to see P.

[27]Ms Brereton expressed to me that P himself would prefer it if his family visited him, for a number of articulated reasons. These included that he had been arranging a party for T’s birthday on 22 April, and that he had not yet travelled alone by aeroplane, and was not sure about doing so. In relation to the former, again given that this application is only now before a court, if he has been encouraged to plan a party in Slovakia for his sister, this should not have happened before the application has been determined. It cannot now justify by itself allowing the application. As to a solo flight, P will be 15 later this year, and the flight from Bratislava is only some 2 hours and 20 minutes. It is not therefore unrealistic to expect that he will be able to manage such a direct flight as an unaccompanied minor.

[28]I have also considered the fact that P’s holiday appears to cover only the period of the extended Easter weekend, whereas the English school Easter holidays are for a longer period. It is therefore true for much of any longer trip by her to Slovakia, T would only see her brother at the start and end of his school day, she would have the time to see other members of her family. That consideration does not, in my opinion outweigh the significant risk that she would not return if such a holiday were now to happen.

[29]Whilst any trip in this direction by P would be of much shorter duration, unless it bit into the very beginning or end of the school term in Slovakia, it would achieve the most important objective of the application, which is to enable the siblings to see each other and spend time together without being prevented from doing so by any orders of this court, provided at the same time that P was assured that he would be able to return to his school and to his current life in Slovakia at its conclusion. It would need to be the case that such a trip was expressed to be entirely without prejudice to the contentions that either parent may make in any ongoing proceedings, whether before HHJ Cole, or, if Hague proceedings are now instituted by the father, in Slovakia, whether as to acquiescence or settlement. This would be a purely practical expedient to allow P and T to spend some time together for the short period that their holidays overlap, whilst the court proceedings otherwise continue. As such it is manifestly in both of their interests. I have of course considered all of the factors in the checklist at s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 in relation to both children.

[30]In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that at this time, as opposed to the time when the order was made by the judge in November 2024, it is appropriate by way of variation to now suspend the return order which has been stayed by my February order, to allow P to return to this country for such period as he is able over the Easter period to see and spend time with T, and with his mother. The order should include an express recital which sets out that intention. I have not made reference to any arrangements for P to spend time with the father, given the likely short duration of the trip, and the strained history of such arrangements, but I do not intend to preclude a meeting between them if it can be agreed. Further, whilst I have suspended the operation of the return order, I have not discharged it, and I leave to HHJ Cole the question of whether or not in the current circumstances it is appropriate to reimpose the order.

[31]I adopt this course as the one preferred by the guardian, and whilst not the course which P through his counsel would prefer, it is nevertheless one which he earlier this week made clear to the guardian that he would be happy to adopt, even if he did not then appreciate the shortness of the Slovakian school Easter break. The suspension of the return order should be seen as an entirely neutral step, to reflect the passage of time, and not one that should be interpreted in favour of either party in any other applications relating to the children’s welfare in any court, and especially in the event that 1980 Hague Convention proceedings are finally commenced by the father. The matter, including the mother’s new application, should now be listed for further consideration at the earliest opportunity before HHJ Cole.

[32]Finally, I have been invited in a document provided by counsel at the start of the hearing to give ‘guidance’ on a number of questions which I described to Mr Nuvoloni, and he acknowledged, as somewhat ‘loaded’. These related to the circumstances in which the court should make a return order under the Children Act 1989, in the absence of Hague Convention proceedings; how the courts should approach the interplay between the two schemes; for how long orders should continue under the Children Act in the absence of Hague proceedings; and whether there might be some risk of jurisdictional overreach in some circumstances. All of these cases are quintessentially fact specific, and I do not consider that I can or should usefully add to the full and careful observations in the judgment of Moylan LJ in Re S (Abduction: Hague Convention or BIIa)

[2018] EWCA Civ 1226

, especially in circumstances where I have determined that the appeals in this case should be dismissed. 10 April 2025