G (A Child) (Abduction: Poland), Re [2025] EWHC 2752 (Fam)

[2025] EWHC 2752 (Fam)

Case No FD25P00492

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND CUSTODY ACT 1985

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981

AND IN THE MATTER OF G (A BOY)

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 24 October 2025

Before

MR DAVID REES KC

(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

(In Private)

Between

FKApplicant

PKRespondent

Mr Sam Wallace (instructed by Gillian Radford & Co) for Applicant

Ms Emily Rayner (instructed by Waldrons Solicitors) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing date: 23 October 2025

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

Mr David Rees KC:

Introduction

[1]I am concerned with an application under the 1980 Hague Convention for the summary return of a four-year old boy, G, to Poland.

[2]I will begin by announcing my decision which is that I will order G’s return to Poland. I will now explain my reasons for that decision.

[3]G and both his parentsare Ukrainian. In March 2022 Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine and a week after the start of that invasion, G, his mother, his maternal grandmother and members of his extended paternal family left Ukraine and moved to Poland. The father initially remained in Ukraine, but he joined G and the mother in Poland in September 2022.

[4]The parents separated in late 2023 or early 2024. At that time G was in the primary care of his mother with assistance provided by the maternal grandmother.

[5]In 2024, following the diagnosis of issues with his back, the father travelled to the UK where his mother and sister (G’s paternal grandmother and aunt) are living for treatment. The father asked the mother if G could come with him to the UK. She agreed on the understanding that the trip would be for up to three months. G and the father travelled to the UK on 28 October 2024, initially returning to Poland on 18 November. A week later, on 25 November, they travelled back to England and have remained here ever since.

[6]The mother attempted to persuade the father to return G to Poland. In March 2025 she obtained a visa entitling her to travel to the UK and she came to England in May for a fortnight. G stayed with her during this period, but the father retained his passport and refused to permit G to return to Poland with the mother. The mother subsequently issued proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention seeking G’s summary return to Poland on 11 August 2025 and that application comes before me today for final determination.

[7]The mother is represented by Mr Sam Wallace of counsel; the father by Ms Emily Rayner of counsel. I am grateful to both counsel for their submissions and assistance in this matter.

[8]At the commencement of the hearing yesterday, Ms Rayner, on behalf of the father, made an application for an adjournment The basis of the application was that the father wished to instruct new solicitors as he considered that his existing solicitors had failed to put across the seriousness of his concerns about the conditions that G would face if a return was ordered. I refused the application which was made without any notice or formal application and at far too late a stage. These are summary proceedings and I was not prepared to permit their delay, given the father has had plenty of opportunity to file evidence in defence to the application.

[9]Turning then to the nature of the dispute between the parties. It is common ground between the parties that for the purposes of the 1980 Convention:a. G has been retained in England and Wales by the father;

b. That retention was wrongful and in breach of rights of custody being exercised by the mother; and

c. G was habitually resident in Poland immediately prior to his retention in England and Wales.

[10]This is therefore a case where I am required by the 1980 Convention to order G’s summary return to Poland unless I am satisfied that the father has made out one of the exceptions to the obligation to return that are found under

Art 13 of the Convention

[11]Here, the father relies on Art 13(b) of the Convention. This provides as follows:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution, or other body which opposes its return establishes that: (b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation."

[12]It is important that the limited nature of an application for summary return under the 1980 Convention is properly understood. The father’s case at times appeared to focus on wider questions of welfare and where, and with whom, G should live. I made clear to the parties in the course of the hearing, and do so again now, that the application before me is not to decide where G should ultimately live. As Mostyn J made clear in B v B

[2014] EWHC 1804 (Fam)

“2. The Hague Convention of 1980 is arguably the most successful ever international treaty and it has over 90 subscribers to it, over half the countries in the world. The underlying and central foundation of the Convention is that, where a child has been unilaterally removed from the land of her habitual residence in breach of someone's rights of custody, then she should be swiftly returned to that country for the courts of that country to decide on her long-term future. 3. There are very few exceptions to this and the exceptions that do exist have to be interpreted very narrowly in order that the central premise of the Convention is not fatally undermined. It is important to understand what the Convention does not do. The Convention does not order a child who has been removed in the circumstances I have described to live with anybody. The Convention does not provide that the parent who is left behind should, on the return of the child, have contact or access in any particular way. The Convention does not provide that, when an order for return to the child's homeland is made, the child should stay there indefinitely. All the Convention provides is that the child should be returned for the specific purpose and limited period to enable the court of her homeland to decide on her long-term future. That is all it decides.”

Art 13(b)

[13]Counsel have referred me to a number of authorities on the operation of Art 13(b), although I do not understand there to be any significant difference between them on the applicable law. The following is a summary of the relevant principles identified from the cases that have been drawn to my attention:a. There is no need for Art 13(b) to be narrowly construed. By its very terms it is of restricted application. The words of Art 13 are quite plain and need no further elaboration or gloss (Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal)

[2012] 1 AC 144

[54]).

b. It has a high threshold demonstrated by the use of the words “grave” and “intolerable”. (Re A (Children) (Abduction: Article 13(b))

[2021] EWCA Civ 939

;

[2021] 4 WLR 99

at [84]).

c. The focus of Art 13(b) is on the risk to the child in the event of his or her return (Re A at [85]).

d. The burden lies on the person (or institution or other body) opposing return. It is for them to produce evidence to substantiate one of the exceptions. The standard of proof is the ordinary balance of probabilities but in evaluating the evidence the court will be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Convention process (Re E at [32]).

e. The risk to the child must be ‘grave’. It is not enough for the risk to be ‘real’. It must have reached such a level of seriousness that it can be characterised as ‘grave’. Although ‘grave’ characterises the risk rather than the harm, there is in ordinary language a link between the two (Re E at [33]).

f. Both physical and emotional abuse can establish the existence of a grave risk within Art 13(b). (Re A at [87]).

g. The words ‘physical or psychological harm’ are not qualified but do gain colour from the alternative ‘or otherwise’ placed ‘in an intolerable situation’. ‘Intolerable’ is a strong word, but when applied to a child must mean ‘a situation which this particular child in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate’ (Re E at [34]).

h. The effect of the separation of a child from the taking parent can establish the required grave risk but the court must be careful because as a rule the parent should not be allowed to create a situation that is potentially harmful to the child, and then rely on it to establish the existence of a grave risk (Re A at [88-90]).

i. Art 13(b) looks to the future: the situation as it would be if the child were returned forthwith to his or her home country. The situation which the child will face on return depends crucially on the protective measures which can be put in place to ensure that the child will not be called upon to face an intolerable situation when he or she gets home. Where the risk is serious enough the court will be concerned not only with the child’s immediate future because the need for protection may persist (Re E at [35]). In relation to this point the 1980 Hague Convention Guide to Good Practice provides further guidance at paras [36] and [37] as follows:

“[36] Therefore, whilst the examination of the grave risk exception will usually require an analysis of the information/evidence relied upon by the person, institution or other body which opposes the child’s return (in most cases, the taking parent), it should not be confined to an analysis of the circumstances that existed prior to or at the time of the wrongful removal or retention. It instead requires a look to the future, i.e., at the circumstances as they would be if the child were to be returned forthwith. The examination of the grave risk exception should then also include, if considered necessary and appropriate, consideration of the availability of adequate and effective measures of protection in the State of habitual residence. [37] However, forward-looking does not mean that past behaviours and incidents cannot be relevant to the assessment of a grave risk upon the return of the child to the State of habitual residence. For example, past incidents of domestic or family violence may, depending on the particular circumstances, be probative on the issue of whether such a grave risk exists. That said, past behaviours and incidents are not per se determinative of the fact that effective protective measures are not available to protect the child from the grave risk.” [37] However, forward-looking does not mean that past behaviours and incidents cannot be relevant to the assessment of a grave risk upon the return of the child to the State of habitual residence. For example, past incidents of domestic or family violence may, depending on the particular circumstances, be probative on the issue of whether such a grave risk exists. That said, past behaviours and incidents are not per se determinative of the fact that effective protective measures are not available to protect the child from the grave risk.”

Returning to my summary of the law: j. When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk (Re IG (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence; Art 13(b))

[2021] EWCA Civ 1123

at [47(4)]). k. In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination (Re IG at [47(5)]). l. That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do. (Re IG at [47(6)]). m. If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk. (Re IG at [47(7)]). n. In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there. (Re IG at [47[(8)]). o. In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance. (Re IG at [47(9)]) p. The clearer the need for protection, the more effective the measures will have to be. (Re E at [52]).

The Father’s Case

[14]The father’s position is that if I order G’s return to Poland there is a grave risk that such a return will expose him to physical or psychological harm or place him in an intolerable situation. In summary, the father relies upon the following matters:a. The living arrangements that G previously experienced while living with his mother in Poland were such that they presented a risk to him;

b. G’s needs were neglected when he was living in Poland;

c. G’s development was delayed during his life in Poland;

d. G would struggle to assimilate back into life in Poland if an order for his return were made.

[15]The specific concerns raised by the father are as follows:a. He does not consider the maternal grandmother to be a suitable person to assist in providing care for G. He describes her as an alcoholic who drinks strong beer and 2-3 bottles of brandy each week. In support of this allegation, he refers to an incident that took place in Ukraine before G was born when he says that Police had to attend the maternal grandmother’s house as she was not answering the door. The father’s case is that the maternal grandmother had been drinking and had fallen asleep. He complains that the mother and maternal grandmother have also left bottles of alcohol accessible to G.

b. The father alleges that G’s needs were neglected when he was living in Poland and that he seemed to have no routine, being allowed to stay up until 11pm. He accuses the mother of not providing stimulation for G and leaving him to be cared for by the maternal grandmother.

c. He claims that G’s needs were not prioritised and that the mother would spend money on alcohol so that G had to make do with second hand clothes and toys. He considers that the mother is more concerned about her own needs and career, and fears that G’s needs will be pushed to the side if a return is ordered.

d. He alleges that the mother has neglected the family dog in Poland and that this is indicative that the mother will fail to care for G if he is returned there.

e. He draws the court’s attention to the fact that the mother lives in a one-bedroom apartment and that G spent too long sleeping in a pushchair rather than a bed; he alleges that that G would spend long periods in the pushchair and would not get the exercise that a child of his age requires.

f. G has delayed development of language and speech, and did not start to speak until he was around three and half years old. The father alleges that the mother did not care about this. Eventually, the father says that he insisted G saw a speech therapist and he paid for this service. He says that the advice from the therapist was that G was not being spoken to at home.

g. He claims that G has been fed an unhealthy diet in Poland.

h. He considers that in Poland G will get little in the way of support and help and that as the mother is not working for a Polish company she will not qualify for assistance from the Polish government.

i. The father also points to a text exchange with the mother in early 2024 during which the mother told the father that she would “lash out” at G more often in circumstances where she does not have enough money for everything that she needs. The father fears that there will be times when the mother is stressed and G will be living in an environment where he is shouted at or worse.

[16]He also alleges that the mother does not plan to stay in Poland. He refers to a conversation that he says took place when the mother was visiting England in May of this year, in which she is said to have told him that her longer-term plan was to move to Portugal where she would get a nanny to look after G.

[17]Ms Rayner does not seek to contend that each of these factors, viewed individually would necessarily give rise to an Art 13(b) defence. However, she invites me to view them cumulatively and argues that when they are seen in that way, they are sufficient to ground the father’s Art 13(b) defence.

[18]More generally the father is concerned that a return to Poland would be disruptive for G. The father points out that G is currently being provided with speech and language therapy in the UK, is registered with a GP, is on a waiting list for a psychologist and has just started school. The father considers that G will not obtain such wide-ranging support in Poland. Ultimately, the father argues that G has now been in England for a year. He is settled here. He would struggle to assimilate in Poland. It is not his “home” country, and if a return were ordered and it would cause him harm. In making this argument Ms Rayner recognises both(1) that an Art 12 settlement defence is not open to the father on the facts of this case, and

(2) that this court is required to act through the framework of the 1980 Hague Convention. This is not a welfare decision to which section 1(1) Children Act 1989 applies. Instead, Ms Rayner’s argument is a broader one; that the overall impact of a return on G is itself a further factor to be taken into account, alongside the other points that she has made, and which should lead the court to the conclusion that the father’s Art 13(b) defence has been made out in this case.

[19]In support of his case the father has exhibited a number of letters evidencing the medical and other support that G is receiving in England. These letters themselves raise a number of questions about the information that the father has provided to the professionals providing support to G, as they appear to suggest that he witnessed specific traumatic incidents during his time in Ukraine. Thus, a letter from G’s GP practice dated 14 January 2025 states “Unfortunately during his early life he has been witness to many unspeakable traumas and losses”. A further letter dated 4 March 2025 from the same writer claims “Before he moved to England he witnessed severe trauma during the war in Ukraine”. A letter from G’s head teacher dated 16 July 2025 refers to G continuing “to suffer trauma resulting from his experiences in Ukraine”. A letter from a Health Visitor dated 20 July 2025 states “G and his father have come here from war torn Ukraine, his mother was still in Ukraine but his parents have now separated and his mother is living in a different country. G has already had so much trauma and disruption in his young life, witnessing the war, his parents separating and coming to a different country.” A report of an initial assessment of G from CAMHS dated 27 February 2025 refers to G having being referred to that service by his GP with (among other things) “presenting issues PTSD related trauma and loss symptoms (flashbacks, nightmares and trauma-induced phobias based on experience of the war in Ukraine) separation and social anxiety” A letter of support dated 22 April 2025 from a local charity which assists Ukrainian refugees refers to what is said in the CAMHS letter set out above.

[20]The difficulty with these letters is that G was not exposed to the Ukraine war in the manner that has been suggested. He and his mother left Ukraine within a week of the Russian invasion. She did not remain there as the Health Visitor was apparently told. Whilst I do not discount the effects on G of the anxiety that was doubtless felt by his parents in the opening days of the war, or of the disruption that he will have experienced as a result of his family being displaced to Poland, these events took place when he was just over a year old. Moreover, and importantly, it is not suggested by either parent in their evidence that G was at any time exposed directly to the war or to any violent or traumatic incident, let alone to the “many unspeakable traumas and losses” and “severe trauma” referred to by his GP, which appears to have formed the basis for the later assessments of G. The only source for this information to the GP must have been the father, and I am left with the conclusion that the father has deliberately sought to exaggerate G’s experiences of the war in Ukraine in his dealings with professionals in this country. I note further that although the professionals also make reference to G experiencing separation anxiety, they do not appear to have been told by the father that he had retained G in England without the mother’s consent.

[21]There are other elements of what is reported in these letters that are, simply, untrue. For example, the letter from the local charity dated 22 April 2025 which appears to have been written in support of an application for housing for the father and G states that G and his father need to avoid public places such as parks etc, and that G, as a consequence of a postnatal injury and recent concussion cannot use a bus, car or other kinds of public transport. The mother in her evidence has provided a number of videos which I have watched. These show G with his father on bicycles in public spaces and playing in a playground. She has also provided other videos of G catching a bus and travelling on a train.

[22]Notwithstanding these points, Ms Rayner urges me to accept the conclusions about G’s condition within these reports as accurate. I cannot go that far. Although I am willing to accept that these reports accurately describe what the professionals were told and observed about G, I do not consider that I can, with any certainty, rely on their conclusions as to the cause of any conditions that they observed. For example, although the CAMHS letter refers to G having separation and social anxiety, I cannot have any confidence as to the cause of this; given that CAMHS have been presented with a false narrative of G’s life to date and do not appear to have been told about the circumstances under which G came to live with his father and was separated from his mother.

[23]The father’s own position is that he is unable to return to Poland with G. He is currently waiting for medical treatment for his back in England and he has his mother and sister living here who can provide him with support. His case is that in Poland he would have no support network and would not be able to work or to afford anywhere to live. He seeks the following undertakings from the mother as protective measures if a return is ordered:a. That she will not pursue any prosecution of the father in Poland;

b. That she will permit the father to see G in both England and Poland;

c. That she will not leave G in the care of the maternal grandmother unsupervised;

d. That she will not physically chastise G;

e. That she will not verbally abuse G; and

f. That she will not leave G in the maternal grandmother’s care if she has been drinking alcohol.

[24]However, it is the father’s position that even if the mother were willing to agree to all the protective measures he has proposed, he would still contend that a return should be refused under Art 13(b).

The Mother’s case

[25]The mother denies or downplays the allegations that the father has made against her.a. She denies that the maternal grandmother is an alcoholic. Referring to the incident that took place prior to G’s birth, when the grandmother did not answer her door, the mother informs me that the maternal grandmother has significant hearing loss in one ear and that she had fallen asleep on her good ear. She states that the grandmother drinks only at weekends and does not drink to excess and has previously held senior positions in large companies in Ukraine. She does not consider G to be at any risk from the grandmother.

b. She would, if G’s return to Poland is ordered, continue to rely on the grandmother for some assistance with G, as G’s kindergarten would finish at 5pm and the mother would be at work until 6pm. The mother therefore does not wish to provide the undertaking sought by the father that G should not be left in the sole care of the maternal grandmother at any time, although when I invited Mr Wallace to take instructions on this point, she indicated that she would be willing to provide an undertaking in these terms until the first hearing of a welfare application in the Polish court, if I required her to do so. She is, in any event, willing

(a) to do everything possible to minimise the amount of time G spends with his grandmother without her; and

(b) give undertakings not to physically chastise G, not to verbally abuse him and not to leave G in the care of the maternal grandmother if she has been drinking (although as I have explained, the mother denies that this is an issue in any event).

c. She denies that G was neglected when in Poland. Although he would spend his days with the maternal grandmother who would take him out to parks and play groups, the mother was working remotely from home and could assist when required. She states that G did have a routine, although because he had a daytime sleep, he would often then not go to sleep again until later in the evening. She accepts that these lunchtime naps took place in his pushchair rather than in a bed.

d. She denies the father’s allegations about money, claiming that after their separation the father took the money that had been in their joint account and refused to contribute to G’s living costs. Following their separation the only financial support that she received from the father was for some specific matters such as kindergarten meals and G’s speech therapy and neuropsychologist sessions.

e. She denies the father’s allegation that she cares more about herself than G, and to the extent that she has had to progress her career this has been to provide for herself and G.

f. Her case is that she has not been neglecting the family dog, and I have been presented with copies of recent and substantial vet bills that the mother has had to meet for this animal. I do not consider the issue of the dog to be a point of any relevance to these proceedings.

g. She agrees that G has delayed speech and language, although she is upset by the father’s suggestion that this has been caused by her. She took G to a speech and language therapist in Poland, but he initially struggled with this therapy, so he was also seen by a neuropsychologist, which assisted in settling his behaviour. She describes G as having made very good progress with his speech and language and states that he was engaged with these services when he left Poland. She has provided reports from both the speech and language therapist and the neuropsychologist confirming his attendance at these sessions between July and October 2024 and indicating the progress that he was making. The mother makes the point that the parents speak Russian, G learning Polish in kindergarten and is now required to learn English in the UK and these changes will not have assisted his speech and language.

h. The mother denies the father’s allegations about G’s diet in Poland.

[26]The mother also denies that G will not get appropriate support in Poland. The mother is paying Polish social security contributions (and has exhibited documents in support of this) and G will have access to the healthcare system in that country if I order his return. She makes the point that he was receiving speech and language therapy and assistance from a neuropsychologist in Poland before he was taken to England and through Mr Wallace the mother confirmed to me that she would be happy to undertake that these sessions should resume if G was returned to Poland.

[27]She also denies that she would ever lash out at G. She accepts that she sent the text message relied upon by the father but explains that this was sent in the context of an argument over money (the father was refusing to give the mother her half share of the proceeds of the family car). She also denies that the message was ever intended to suggest that she might inflict physical violence on G, rather she was trying to say that she would be tired and might not speak to G in a nice way.

[28]Although the father has complained that the mother has taken foreign holidays rather than visited G in England, the mother points out that of the holidays that she has had, one took place during the initial three month period when G was in England with her agreement, whilst she asked the father to let G accompany her on a second holiday which he refused. She visited G in England in May 2025 once she was able to get a visa to enter the UK. She accepts that she has had a discussion with the father about relocating with G to Portugal but argues that this was an alternative option that she proposed in an attempt to meet the father’s objections to G living in Poland and learning Polish. She is committed to living in Poland; has a good job and has recently extended the lease on her apartment.

[29]On behalf of the mother, Mr Wallace made a number of points about the father’s credibility. In addition to drawing my attention to the letters from the various medical professionals relied on by the father which I have already mentioned, Mr Wallace also points out that there is no contemporaneous evidence of any complaint by the father to the police or social services in Poland in relation to the care that G was receiving by the mother. No specific incident of the maternal grandmother’s alleged alcoholism is identified other than one which took place prior to G’s birth (although there is a mention of alcoholism in the GP’s letter of 4 March 2025 which appears to conflate the father’s allegations against the mother and the maternal grandmother into complaints against a single individual). Mr Wallace notes that prior to the parties’ separation the father was willing to leave G in the mother’s sole care for long periods of time, as he was a lorry driver who would be away for six weeks in every eight, and even after their separation he left G in the mother’s care for nearly a year until he took him to England in October and November 2024.

[30]Mr Wallace also identified evidence that G has been actively cared for by the mother. I have seen videos of the mother playing with G in Poland. Mr Wallace also relies on reports from the neuropsychologist and speech and language therapist that G had been seeing in Poland. These documents were disclosed late, as a result of an error by the mother’s solicitors. However, I permitted their inclusion in the bundle as they seemed to me to be relevant third party evidence as to G’s position whilst in Poland. Ms Rayner urges me to be cautious about these documents, arguing that they (and a psychotherapist’s report in relation to the mother) have all been produced since the commencement of these proceedings. Whilst Ms Rayner is correct about the dates upon which these reports have been prepared, these are reports prepared by professionals and (as with the letters relied upon by the father), I consider that I can rely upon them as accurately recording what the professional was told and observed.

[31]G’s speech and language therapist describes G as attending sessions between 12 Julya and 21 October 2024. She states:

“At the beginning of our work, the boy showed significant emotional attachment to his mother: he would often approach and hug her during sessions. His father also attended some of the sessions, he supported the process, and participated by observing the child’s progress.”

She describes G as highly interested in the work that was being done and demonstrating positive emotional dynamics and sufficient intellectual capabilities. The neuropsychologist says similar things. Her report states “His parents and grandmother were actively involved in raising the child. A strong emotional attachment to his mother should be especially noted, she clearly played an important role in forming his sense of security and trust. Overall, G demonstrated positive dynamics of development, he was friendly, open to interaction, adapted well to new conditions, and actively developed his cognitive skills.”

[32]The mother’s psychotherapist had been consulted by the mother who was described as having:

“…recurring difficulties in building and maintaining personal boundaries. She reports a high sense of responsibility for others, a tendency to neglect her own needs, difficulty refusing requests, and fear of causing negative reactions from others.”

The mother’s psychotherapist observed the mother interacting with G and records:

“When her child entered the therapeutic space, the client immediately redirected her attention to him, recognised his needs and responded appropriately. The child demonstrated a sense of safety. In interactions with his mother, he first positioned himself on her lap and only thereafter articulated his desires and needs. His speech was age appropriate and his requests were clearly expressed… A healthy attachment between mother and child was observed.”

Discussion

[33]My conclusions are based on the totality of the evidence that has been presented to me and upon the written arguments and oral submissions made by both counsel.

[34]Ms Rayner accepts, and I agree, that the points raised by the father in his evidence would not, when considered individually, give rise to an Art 13(b) defence. However, she invites me to consider them cumulatively and argues that when I do so there is a sufficient picture of neglect, of developmental delay and of the difficulties that G would face in seeking to assimilate back in Poland, so as to satisfy the court that there is a grave risk that G’s return to Poland would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.

[35]In considering the father’s case, I am required first to analyse whether his allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk required under Art 13(b) and this requires me to consider whether the overall evidence enables me confidently to discount the possibility that they do.

[36]Here I am not satisfied that the evidence provided by the father in support of his allegations is of either sufficient detail or substance to give rise to the grave risks required by Art 13(b). Although the father makes the general allegation that the maternal grandmother abuses alcohol, the only incident which he has sought to link to this alleged misuse took place before G was born. He has not identified a single occasion when G is alleged to have been left in the sole care of the maternal grandmother whilst she was unfit to care for him. There is no evidence of contemporaneous complaint to the mother, to the police, or to Polish social services about the alleged risk to G, and no evidence that G has been placed at risk by the maternal grandmother, let alone come to any harm in her care.

[37]The same can be said about the father’s allegations of the mother’s neglect. Some of the smaller points that he has made, such as the fact that G was left to sleep at lunchtime in his pushchair rather than his bed are admitted by the mother, but in my view fall well short of establishing anything like the grave risk of harm required by Art 13(b). The more serious allegations are denied by the mother and again, there is nothing beyond the father’s bare assertions to support his case. There are no contemporaneous complaints which would provide corroboration of his allegations. Further, the evidence that has been provided by the mother from the Polish professionals is supportive of there having been a close bond between the mother and G before he was wrongly retained in England.

[38]I accept, because this is common ground, that G has a delay in his speech and language. However, this was being addressed in Poland before he was brought to England, and the mother has indicated that she will restart this therapy in Poland if I order a return. I do not consider that his return would present a grave risk of harm on this ground either. I also accept the mother’s evidence (which the father has not sought to contradict) that she is paying social security contributions in Poland and that G will be entitled to healthcare there if he returns.

[39]Nor do I consider that the mere fact of a return would be a source of a grave risk of harm or intolerability. I accept that there would be some disruption to G as he got used to life in Poland again. He would need to start at a new kindergarten and having been living with his father, he would need to get used to living with his mother again. However, I do not consider that any of this goes beyond the rough and tumble that is inevitable when a return order is made. He would be returning to live with his mother who had been his primary carer for the first three years of his life, and he would be returning to the same apartment in a country where he had previously lived for 2 and half years. He has already experienced the Polish kindergarten system. None of this will be new or unfamiliar to him.

[40]In my judgment, the lack of detail to the father’s allegations and the complete absence of any corroborative evidence means that I can confidently discount the possibility that there is substance to the father’s allegations as to the risks posed to G by the mother and maternal grandmother. Overall, I am not satisfied that the father’s arguments, either individually or cumulatively satisfy the high threshold of Art 13(b) and I therefore find that the defence has not been made out.

[41]In any event, I understand that the mother remains willing to undertake:a. Not to pursue any prosecution of the father in Poland;

b. Not to physically chastise G;

c. Not to verbally abuse G;

d. Not to leave G in the maternal grandmother’s care if she has been drinking alcohol; and

e. That G will restart work with a speech and language therapist and neuropsychologist in Poland (the same ones as if before if they are still available).

[42]Whilst not being a matter which is capable of forming a binding undertaking (given the difficulty of determining whether it has been broken), the mother is also willing to provide an assurance to the court that she will minimise the time that G spends in the maternal grandmother’s sole care. Given(1) that the mother primarily wishes to rely on the grandmother to provide care for G for the hour between the end of the school day and her finishing work, and

(2) the terms of the undertaking that she is providing not to leave G in the maternal grandmother’s care if she has been drinking alcohol, I do not consider that it is also necessary for me to insist on a further undertaking from the mother not to leave G in the maternal grandmother’s sole care at any time.

[43]In my judgment, even if I am wrong and the father’s arguments, taken cumulatively, are capable of presenting a grave risk of harm or intolerability to G, I consider that these undertakings would be sufficient to ameliorate any risk to him. I am also entitled to take into account that the authorities in Poland have child protection measures available to them, should any issues arise in that jurisdiction.

[44]Taking all matters into account, I am not satisfied that the father has made out his Art 13(b) defence. Accordingly, under the 1980 Hague Convention I am required to make an order for G’s return to Poland and will hear counsel in a moment on the precise terms of that order.

[45]I make clear, as I have already mentioned, that this decision is not a final determination on matters of G’s welfare, and if there remain issues in dispute, these will now be matters for the Polish courts.

[46]Finally, I should record that this judgment, although delivered orally, has been read from a prepared draft judgment that requires only typographical correction. I will perfect that draft and circulate it to the parties later today. I therefore direct that there is no need for a separate transcript of this judgment to be prepared. The approved judgment, when circulated, should be translated into Russian for the benefit of the parents.

[47]That is my judgment. ************