“The determination of habitual residence is not a formulaic exercise because it requires a broad consideration of the child's and the family's circumstances and because different factors will be present in different cases with the same factor being more significant in one case than another. Accordingly, as was said in the case of HR, at [54], "guidance provided in the context of one case may be transposed to another case only with caution". With those caveats, I set out the following elements (which are not intended to be exclusive) drawn from the cases: (a) "The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact": Re B, at [46]. It is "focussed on the situation of the child": Re A, at 54(v) and Re R, at [17]. It is an issue of fact which requires the court to undertake a sufficient global analysis of all the relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors; (b) As set out, for example, in Proceedings brought by HR, at [41]: "In addition to the physical presence of the child in the territory of a [member] state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent"; (c) Factors of relevance, as set out in Proceedings brought by HR, at [43], and reflected in many other domestic cases, include: "the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child's stay in the territory of the different [member] states concerned, the place and conditions of the child's attendance at school, and the family and social relationships of the child in those member states"; (d) The intentions of the parents are also a relevant factor and there is no "rule" that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child: Re R, at [17]; (e) As set out in Re R, at [16], it is "the stability of the residence that is important, not whether it is of a permanent character" but there "is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time" because habitual residence can be acquired quickly: e.g. A v A, at [44]; (f) The "degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question" is relevant, Re R, at [17]. It is clear that "full integration" is not required, "Re B (SC)", at [39], but only a degree sufficient to support the conclusion, when added to the other relevant factors, that the child is habitually resident in the relevant state; (g) The relevant factors will reflect the age of the child (see Mercredi v Chaffe[2012] Fam 22 , at [53]-[55]; A v A, at [54(vi], and Re LC, at [35]). Accordingly, "The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned": Re A, at 54(vi); (h) The court is considering the connections between the child and the country or countries concerned: A v A, at [80(ii)]; Re B (SC), at [42]; and Proceedings brought by HR, at [43]. This is a comparative analysis as referred to, for example, in Re M, at [60]; Re B (EWCA), at [86]; and Re A, at [46]. As observed by Black LJ in Re J, I repeat: "What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence." An example of this is seen in Re B (SC) in which Lord Wilson, at [49]-[50], referred to the factors which pointed to the child having "achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment" and those which pointed to the child having "achieved the requisite degree of integration in the environment in Pakistan".”
“47. Thus, according to the Court’s case-law, the intention of the parents cannot as a general rule by itself be crucial to the determination of the habitual residence of a child, within the meaning of Regulation No 2201/2003, but constitutes an ‘indicator’ capable of complementing a body of other consistent evidence. 48. Admittedly, the weight to be given to that factor, for the purposes of determining where a child is habitually resident, depends on the circumstances specific to each individual case (see, to that effect, judgment of22 December 2010 , Mercredi, C-497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraphs 50 and 51).”
“It’s super simple. I told you from the beginning. London is non-negotiable. [MP’s] schooling has to be the best schooling. You used to say you have a value around education. Well why don’t you live that value? You used to say you have a value around integrity. Then live with integrity” “It was always obvious we lived in London. It was always obvious that [MP] was going to school at [name of schooll], everything was always obvious.”
“In circumstances where MP is not habitually resident in England, the court here does not have jurisdiction to, and would not make an order, even by consent in the proposed terms. It is, however, accepted that if it were agreed that [MP] attends [the agreed school] from September 2026, the English court could then seize jurisdiction, and final order could be made. [The mother] has been clear that she cannot agree to a permanent relocation to London unless and until there is a clear path in terms of the pattern of [MP’s] care ie until final terms are agreed.”