London Borough of X v Mrs Z & Anor [2025] EWHC 2040 (Fam)

[2025] EWHC 2040 (Fam)Case No FD25P00127/ZC25C50084
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 31/07/2025
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MCKENDRICK
Between
LONDON BOROUGH OF XApplicantMrs ZRespondentMr ERespondent
Max Lansman (instructed by local authority solicitor) for ApplicantKate Hudson (instructed by Amphlett Lissimore) for First RespondentEmma Hudson (instructed by Philcox Grey) for Second RespondentRebekah Wilson (instructed by Cartwright King) for Third RespondentThe Guardian appeared in person for in personHearing Hearing dates: 21-23 July 2025
Approved Judgment.............................
[1]This is an application issued pursuant to the High Court’s wardship jurisdiction to determine where a seventeen year old child should live. He is anonymised in the judgment as ZE. The applicant is the relevant local authority which exercises safeguarding and other statutory duties to ZE. The first respondent is his mother. The second respondent is his father. He has litigation capacity and instructs his own solicitors. The Guardian, who was appointed, has helpfully remained and appeared in person. Ancillary issues regarding contact with his mother also arise.[2]I heard the pre-trial review in this matter on 15 July 2025 and the final hearing took place over three days on 21 to 23 July 2025. I heard evidence from one single joint expert (a clinical psychologist); an educational psychologist; a social work manager; the respondent mother and the respondent father. I received submissions of a very high quality from counsel and reserved my decision.[3]I have decided that it is in ZE’s best interests to continue to live with his father. He will continue to have contact with his mother but there will be restrictions on this which will be reduced and which will then cease before a short hearing in October when I can review contact. Wardship will continue until then, at which point I hope it will be able to end. I set out my reasons for arriving at these decisions.

Background

[4]ZE was born in March 2008. He is the only child of the short lived relationship between Mrs Z and Mr E, his parents. He has lived nearly all his life with his mother and his older half-brothers. His mother lives in a cramped council flat.[5]Public law proceedings were issued by the applicant on 18 February 2025 seeking an interim supervision order. ZE was then sixteen. The application pointed out ZE would turn seventeen in March. The applicant sought for him to reside with his father under a child arrangements order and for there to be twice weekly supervised contact with his mother. Whilst the application notice sought an interim supervision order, in the applicant’s witness evidence, its social worker sought the immediate removal of ZE from his mother’s care. The applicant – through the social worker – stated they recognised it was unusual to seek public law orders in respect of an older child but this was an exceptional case and was “so concerning” that the removal was urgent.[6]The social work evidence charted the background of the applicant’s involvement. It noted ZE has a diagnosis of sinus tachycardia. That he was removed from school by his mother in 2017. That his mother had not provided him with any proper home education and had not engaged with the applicant’s Elective Home Education Team (“EHE Team”). It stated she had failed to engage him in education or socially. The evidence was that he was subjected to chronic neglect. He had missed many medical appointments and the cardiology team had discharged him in 2022 because of his mother’s non-engagement. It noted the history. ZE came to the attention of children’s services in July 2019 under the category of neglect. The referral had been made by the EHE Team. In August 2023 a Police Merlin report raised concerns about ZE in the light of his mother’s mental health. She had made delusional allegations against her neighbours. A section 47 Children Act 1989 Act (hereafter “the 1989 Act”) assessment began which led to a Child Protection Plan for neglect in October 2023. It noted the case was then closed in June 2024. In August 2024 the Fire Brigade made a referral because of severe hoarding in the family home and noted significant black mould on the walls. It noted a Community Mental Health Team jointly visited with the police in August 2024. The witness statement states Mrs Z was sectioned and ZE was placed with his father. It notes the ‘section’ was overturned at a ‘tribunal’ and ZE returned home, apparently without children’s services being informed. A further child and family assessment took place in October 2024 which led to a Child Protection Plan in January 2025. No mention is made in the evidence of the failure to consider the Public Law Outline.[7]The applicant served an interim threshold which alleged inter alia that whilst ZE had a heart condition he had not been seen by any medical professional since 2019. The interim threshold alleged he “has been out of education since 2017……[the mother] has since refused to engage with the Elective Home Educations Team or provide [ZE] with a formal education”. The applicant’s pleading further alleged ZE was socially isolated, shared a bedroom with his mother and she, Mrs Z, has a history of “delusional paranoia” and, in 2024, was “sectioned under S3 of the Mental Health Act” admitted to hospital and ZE was placed under police protection. This application was served on Mrs Z.[8]A hearing took place before District Judge Hudd on 3 March 2025. Mrs Z did not attend nor was she represented. The court made an interim care order. The social worker attended the family home to explain the court order on 4 March 2025 in the morning. Nobody answered. The matter returned to court that day and the applicant sought, and obtained, a recovery order pursuant to section 50 of the 1989 Act.[9]On 7 March 2025, eight police officers arrived at the family home, with two social workers. They used force to enter the home. I have seen the police body camera video footage. The flat was dirty and cramped. Mrs Z was present with ZE and his older brother. A number of police officers entered the hallway. Mrs Z was visibly upset and angry. She was shouting at the police officers and demanding to see a signed warrant. The police saw a hammer and a knife on furniture in the hallway and they removed them from the flat. She was shown the recovery order and she pointed out it was not signed and contained the wrong date of birth. ZE was taken away by the police. His mother can be seen to ensure he has clothes, a hot water bottle and his heart medication before he leaves. ZE was placed with his father. The social work evidence filed following the removal states:
“the removal was challenging, requiring the presence of eight police officers. Upon arrival, the police found [ZE]’s mother was armed with a meat cleaver and a hammer, which were taken from her and secured by officers.”
It states she “became physical” and “had to be restrained” in order for the police to gain access to ZE. The statement continues:
“his mother has significant mental health challenges, including delusional thinking and paranoia, and has previously demonstrated violent behaviour.”
[10]Mr E filed a witness statement dated 11 March 2025. He agreed with the applicant’s interim threshold. He pointed out that Mrs Z stymied his attempts to develop a relationship with ZE and she failed to comply with various private law orders made for him to spend time with his son. He says he has seen ZE two or three times a year over the last few years. He has not been in her home since ZE was a baby and he was not aware she had taken him out of school. He notes ZE was upset over being removed from the family home. He notes ZE has become calmer and settled in the days after his removal. He gets on well with him.[11]On 17 March 2025, the applicant issued an application to make ZE a ward of court. It noted that it could not obtain a care order before ZE turned seventeen and therefore sought wardship to permit the court to exercise parental responsibility over ZE. Poole J made ZE a ward of court on 24 March 2025. The order noted the applicant is committed to reviewing contact with a view to arranging supervised telephone contact between ZE and his mother. Disclosure orders were made against the Metropolitan Police. At a further hearing, various case management directions were then made and a final hearing was listed with a pre-trial review, as directed by Mr. David Rees KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge.[12]At the pre-trial review all parties submitted the final hearing should be adjourned because the local authority had not filed all their evidence, disclosure was missing from ZE’s medical records and the Metropolitan Police had not complied with the previous disclosure orders made. I refused to discharge the trial. A further hearing before a High Court Judge would likely not have taken place prior to December 2025. This would have led to the interim position, based upon untested evidence, enduring from March 2025 to December 2025. Furthermore, it did not seem proportionate to list a five day trial at the end of the year for an order that would only endure until ZE turns eighteen in March 2026. I made directions for the urgent disclosure of GP records, for the Metropolitan police to comply with the earlier disclosure orders made and directed a final witness statement from the applicant and a response to the “threshold” from Mrs Z.

Position of the Parties

[13]At the hearing, the parties’ positions were as follows. The applicant submitted I should make findings of fact based upon the document that began as the interim threshold but had been amended and renamed Schedule of Findings. The applicant submitted that it was in ZE’s best interests to remain in his father’s care and to live with him until eighteen. They submitted there should be only supervised contact between ZE and Mrs Z. I was invited to maintain wardship. The respondent father, supported this position. Mrs Z sought the return of ZE to her care and the conclusion of the proceedings. In the alternative she sought unsupervised contact. She invited me to make findings to correct the false position put forward by the applicant. Counsel for ZE submitted he wanted to go home to his mother. The Guardian’s final analysis supported ZE remaining living with his father. After having heard the evidence, the Guardian supported unsupervised contact between ZE and Mrs Z to avoid ZE “falling off a cliff” when he turns eighteen.

Legal Position

[14]It is important to briefly chart the legal position. Section 31 (2) of the 1989 Act sets out the well-known ‘threshold’ for the making of a care or supervision order. Section 31 (3) prohibits the making of a care or supervision order in respect of a child who has turned seventeen. In theory, at least, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to make a welfare decision in wardship. The court may conduct a welfare analysis with ZE’s welfare as my paramount consideration. The disputed issues in these proceedings are, namely:(i) should ZE live with his mother or his father; and(ii) should he live with his father should he spend unsupervised time with his mother.[15]It is a curiosity of wardship, that a child is immediately warded upon the court issuing a C66 application for wardship – see section 41 (2) Senior Courts Act 1981, unless the child is in care. This counterintuitive position is confirmed by Ormrod LJ (with the agreement of Dunn LJ) in Re R (Minors (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1981) 2 FLR 416 at paragraph 6.[16]Poole J continued ZE’s wardship when the matter came before him. Wardship is the parental jurisdiction of the High Court. Ultimate responsibility for the child rests with the court. The court remains in control of the child and no major steps can be taken in the life of the child without order of the court. Wardship and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court are now for all practical purposes synonymous.[17]Practice Direction 12 D summarises the Inherent Jurisdiction at paragraphs 1.1 to 1.3:
“It is the duty of the court under its inherent jurisdiction to ensure that a child who is the subject of proceedings is protected and properly taken care of. The court may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a child unless limited by case law or statute. Case law establishes that such proceedings should only be commenced exceptionally where it is clear that the issues concerning the child should not be resolved under the Children Act 1989, for example, for reasons of urgency, of complexity or of the need for particular judicial expertise in the determination of a cross-border issue. For a review of the relevant case law and principles, see In the matter of NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49. The court may under its inherent jurisdiction, in addition to all of the orders which can be made in family proceedings, make a wide range of injunctions for the child’s protection of which the following are the most common – (a) orders to restrain publicity; (b) orders to prevent an undesirable association; (c) orders relating to medical treatment; (d) orders to protect abducted children, or children where the case has another substantial foreign element; and (e) orders for the return of children to and from another state. The court’s wardship jurisdiction is part of and not separate from the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The distinguishing characteristics of wardship are that – (a) custody of a child who is a ward is vested in the court; and (b) although day to day care and control of the ward is given to an individual or to a local authority, no important step can be taken in the child’s life without the court’s consent.”
[18]A Practice Direction contains guidance. If it contains an incorrect statement of law, then this is not authoritative, see Brooke LJ in U v Liverpool City Council (Practice Note) [2005] 1 WLR 2657 at paragraph 48.[19]I have received no submissions on the legal background because it has been assumed I can make a residence decision for ZE. I have a little hesitation in proceeding given that it could be said (although it has not been submitted in these proceedings) that I am, in effect, undermining the prohibition set out in section 31 (3) by resorting to wardship to make orders. And that I am doing so without having to cross threshold. I remind myself, as is well known, that if Parliament has set out a statutory scheme this must be followed without recourse to the court’s Inherent Jurisdiction. Lord Hailsham LC in Richards v Richards [1984] AC 174 at 199 held:
“… where, as here, Parliament has spelt out in considerable detail what must be done in a particular class of case it is not open to litigants to bypass the special Act, nor to the courts to disregard its provisions by resorting to the earlier procedure, and thus choose to apply a different jurisprudence from that which the Act prescribes.”
[20]The text of the last sentence of paragraph 1.1 of PD12D came about following Lord Wilson’s review of the earlier text of the Practice Direction, which he held had incorrectly stated that Inherent Jurisdiction proceedings should only be commenced if the issue cannot be resolved under the 1989 Act – see NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49 at paragraph 44. The current iteration of the Practice Direction provides, therefore, for a wider role of the Inherent Jurisdiction. The parties in these proceedings agree that the court cannot make a care order and thereby permit the applicant to exercise parental responsibility to require ZE to reside with his father. No party has submitted that I cannot determine ZE’s residence under wardship because the court cannot make ZE the subject of a care order as he is seventeen. No party has sought to appeal the confirmation of ZE’s wardship on the issuing of the C66 application on 17 March 2025. Therefore I shall accept the agreed position that I can make a decision in respect of ZE’s residence exercising my powers in wardship. For good reasons the courts are slow to place limits on the Inherent Jurisdiction and the court’s role in wardship is clear and established.[21]All parties are agreed that the test is welfare. Ms Kate Hudson submits with force that given ZE’s age and his clear wishes, factual findings are required to justify the interference in her client’s and ZE’s Article 8 ECHR right to respect of a family life. I cannot agree with that submission. Given ZE’s age and his capacity, his mother’s rights are limited and as such, any interference in her Article 8 right to respect for a family life, would need limited justification for any such interference to be lawful. I have in mind what was said by Lady Hale in Re D [2019] UKSC 49; at paragraphs 23-23 (emphasis added): The earlier “age of discretion” cases had established the principle that children could achieve the capacity to make their own decisions before the age of majority. It was no longer, if it ever had been, correct to fix that at any particular age, rather than by reference to the capacity of the child in question: it had already been established that a child below the age of 16 could consent to sexual intercourse so that it was not rape (R v Howard [1966] 1 WLR 13) or to being taken away so that it was not kidnapping (R v D [1984] AC 778). Parental rights and authority existed for the sake of the child, to enable the parent to discharge his responsibilities towards the child, and not for the sake of the parent. Lord Scarman put it thus (p 185):
“The principle is that parental right or power of control of the person and property of his child exists primarily to enable the parent to discharge his duty of maintenance, protection, and education until he [the child] reaches such an age as to be able to look after himself and make his own decisions.”
The consequence was that (p 188): “… as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed.” 24. As Lady Black explains in paras 69 to 72 of her judgment, the Gillick case is not directly relevant to the issue before us now. It had to do with medical treatment and not with deprivation of liberty. It was concerned with whether a child might acquire the capacity, and the right, to make such decisions for herself before she reached the common law age of discretion, not with whether parental authority endured beyond that age if the child lacked the capacity to decide for herself. And as Lady Black has shown, it is, to say the least, highly arguable that such authority did not extend to depriving such a child of her liberty once she had reached the age of discretion.[22]This point is further illustrated by the fact Article 8 does not necessarily protect the relationship between an adult child and his parent - see Kugathas v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31 where Sedley LJ (with the agreement of Simon Brown and Arden LJJ (as they were)) at paragraph 14 accepts a relationship between an adult child and his parents does not necessarily acquire Article 8 ECHR protection. See also Arden LJ at paragraph 25:
“Because there is no presumption of family life, in my judgment a family life is not established between an adult child and his surviving parent or other siblings unless something more exists than normal emotional ties: see S v United Kingdom (1984) 40 DR 196 and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom [1985] 7 EHRR 471. Such ties might exist if the appellant were dependent on his family or vice versa.”
[23]See also Baker LJ’s analysis (with the agreement of Peter Jackson and Warby LJJ) in Re P (Discharge of Party) [2021] EWCA Civ 512 [2021] 1 WLR 3098 at paragraphs 34-36.[24]I set out this learning because very soon ZE will be an adult. I quite accept Parliament has determined a person under eighteen remains a child. The Article 8 rights of both Mrs Z and ZE remain in play and may well endure beyond his majority. However, importantly, at his age, less justification is required to lawfully interfere in Mrs Z’s rights. The Article 8 ECHR adult to adult relationship case law helps to demonstrate that.[25]When determining ZE’s residence in wardship, I am more concerned with his rights, than his mother’s. But it is another facet of this litigation that I am not being asked to make any form of deprivation of liberty order. I am not being asked to make any coercive orders. It appears clear from the evidence that none have been required. ZE has never attempted to leave his father’s home to return to reside with his mother, even though her home is close to where he now lives and there are no restrictions on his liberty.[26]Therefore, I approach my task as follows:a. ZE has capacity pursuant to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to decide where to reside;b. Mrs Z’s rights fall to be considered, but any interference in her Article 8 ECHR rights to respect for a family life, to determine where ZE should live and for him to live with her, requires only limited justification to avoid a violation of her rights;c. ZE retains his liberty to decide where to live; I am not asked to restrict or deprive him of his liberty;d. in deciding where it is in his best interests to live, ZE’s welfare is my paramount consideration, paying considerable regard to his ascertainable wishes and feelings;e. it is not necessary for me to make findings of fact to decide where it is in ZE’s best interests to live as I am neither depriving him of his liberty nor cutting across his mother’s ‘right’ to decide where and with whom he should live, given his age and capacity;f. I will, however, determine the facts, so that the background of what has happened is clear to ZE, and also so the facts are clear to the applicant local authority.[27]It follows from what I have said above, that I recognise my role in these proceedings is limited. To a large extent I consider I am providing guidance to ZE. The court is at the outer reaches of its powers. All parties have accepted wardship since March 2025. Certainly, there has been no appeal that the test of exceptionality as set out in PD 12D, has not been made out. I have some doubts about the exceptionality of the circumstances I am presented with, however, recognising this is not a case about deprivation of liberty and recognising the limits to the mother’s rights given her capacitous son can choose where he lives, I am persuaded that ZE welcomes the decision making of this court. Furthermore, I note that the decisions made in wardship for him to live with his father and see his mother are not decisions he has sought to undermine or otherwise go against.

Fact Finding

[28]Turning then to the disputed facts. Much of the hearing was taken up with the factual disputes between the applicant and Mrs Z. Normally I summarise the written and oral evidence of the witnesses, but having reflected it is not necessary to do so, as the facts were clear by the end of the hearing and there was no real dispute between the parties.[29]The applicant’s schedule of facts and the mother’s responses are set out below. Mrs Z’s responses on factual matters are straightforward and largely true. She has, however, failed to realise the impact on her son of her neglect. At the time care proceedings were issued on 18 February 2025 (all facts averred below are averred to be true to that date, unless otherwise stated), for the following reasons, [ZE] was suffering, and was likely to suffer, significant harm and that harm was attributable to the care given to him or likely to be given to him, if an order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give, and would likely do so were ZE to return to his mother’s care. Response The mother does not accept that ZE has suffered or was likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care she was able to give him. The mother does not in any event accept that this is the appropriate test to be applied as the case is now within wardship and as such the threshold test within the Children Act 1989 is not determinative. Failure to meet ZE’s medical needsa. ZE has a heart condition, Sinus Tachycardia. Ms Z failed to engage with the cardiology team or take ZE for a medical review since 2019. Due to Ms Z failure to take ZE to his appointment, ZE was discharged from cardiology in 2022.b. ZE was not been seen by any health professional including his GP since 2019 despite his know heart condition. Response The mother denies that she has failed to engage with the cardiology team or other mental health professionals. It is evident from the documents filed by the local authority that this assertion is not true. Neglect and emotional harm due to Ms Z Mental Healthc. ZE was out of education since 2017 when Ms Z removed ZE from school. Ms Z since refused to engage with the Elective Home Educations Team or provide ZE with a formal education. Response The mother denies that ZE was out of education since 2017. She accepts that he was out of formal education since that time but that she was home schooling him.d. The home environment was in very poor condition. In August 2024 a referral was received from the Fire Bridge reporting severe hoarding and significant black mould on all the walls. Response The mother accepts that the home environment was in a very poor condition. The mother was trying to secure alternative accommodation for herself and her sons.e. ZE was socially isolated and spent most of his time sleeping or playing games consoles. Ms Z provided ZE with no social opportunities and or supported/encouraged activities, services and experiences which would benefit ZE. Response The mother denies that ZE was socially isolated, he had many on-line friends and he also went out with his two brothers. He also had contact with his father and with him met up with his paternal family members.f. The home was (and remains) overcrowded. ZE shared a bedroom with Ms Z which was locked at night. Ms Z was offered alternative accommodation, but this was refused by Ms Z. Response The mother accepts that the home was overcrowded and as already stated the mother was trying to secure larger and more suitable accommodation. Alternative accommodation was offered but was not suitable. The mother accepts that she did from time to time share a bedroom with ZE. The mother accepts that there were locks (bolts) on the internal rooms. This was because the front door was insecure after an intruder tried to gain access. The bolts would not prevent anyone leaving a room, rather they provided protection from intruders.g. Ms Z has a history of delusional paranoia. Ms Z continues not to accept that she has mental health difficulties and continues to refuse to engage with CMHT or court assessments of her mental health. Response The mother does not accept that she has a history of delusional paranoia or other mental health difficulties and so does not consider it necessary or appropriate to engage with the CMHT.h. On 22.08.24, Ms Z was sectioned under S3 of the Mental Health Act and admitted to the [M] Unit. ZE was placed under police protection. Response The mother denies being sectioned under section 3 of the Mental Health Act as alleged. The mother was sectioned under section 2 of that act for assessment and successfully appealed to the First Tier tribunal against her section. She was discharged on 06.09.24, 15 days after the original section was made.i. Ms Z failure to address her mental health issues continues to impact on her ability to parent ZE. Response The mother engaged fully with the [M] Unit as is evident from the Tribunal decision. She denies that she has mental health issues and so does not have anything to address. She denies that there is anything to prevent her from being able to parent ZE. Removal of ZE from the Motherj. On 07.03.25, when ZE was removed from Ms Z’s care, upon arrival Ms Z was armed with a meat cleaver and hammer which were taken from her by police officers. Police officers had to restrain Ms Z in order to gain access to ZE. Response The mother was not ‘armed’ with a meat cleaver and hammer as alleged. There were those items within the home close to the door but at no time did she pick up or attempt to pick up the items and the police report records that there were no threats during the incident. The mother does accept that a police officer did hold her by her arm for a few moments but this was not because the mother had threatened or assaulted any of those attending the home. Mother’s Non engagement with professionalsk. Despite extensive efforts Ms Z failed to work with CMHT, children social services or the child protection process, and has failed to fully engage with these proceedings. Response The mother denies that she has failed to engage in these proceedings. She has attended every hearing since ZE was removed and has instructed solicitors. The mother accepts that she has not worked with the CMHT, this is because there is no need for her to work with that team. In relation to children’s social service and the child protection process, the mother has found the local authority’s involvement as being extremely unhelpful as they continuously focus on her mental health when this is not justified.[30]As I have said, Mrs Z was a straightforward and honest witness. The documentation which has now been produced, but was not available to the applicant earlier (although it plainly should have been) fills in further blanks. The following facts are derived from, the evidence:a. Mrs Z removed ZE from school in 2017. He never returned to formal education. Given the opportunity, ZE has now, with his father’s help, enrolled himself in college and will commence formal education once more in September 2025.b. His mother tried to home educate him. She engaged on and off with the EHE Team. She has produced evidence of Key Stage Three education in the home setting but nothing further.c. Whilst in his mother’s care, ZE had no friends other than on-line friends.d. ZE lived with his mother in a cramped and mouldy flat.e. ZE shared a bedroom and a bed with his mother until the age of sixteen.f. ZE was taken to medical appointments sporadically over the years. His cardiology team discharged him in 2022 after he repeatedly missed appointments.g. Mrs Z has wondered whether her neighbours have practised witchcraft on her. She was detained under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for two weeks for assessment but was released by the First-tier Tribunal on her own application. She was not found to be suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warranted detention for assessment.h. Mrs Z’s response to professionals has been variable.i. The applicant’s response to ZE’s neglect has been variable.j. Mrs Z was not armed with a meat cleaver and a hammer when the police entered her home.k. The applicant placed incorrect and incomplete information before DJ Hudd in March 2025 which led to the recovery order being made.l. The applicant continued to ask this court to make findings which were obviously wrong up to the final hearing in this matter.[31]These conclusions are clear from the evidence. They are not really disputed. No further reasons are required as the parties know why these are my findings. Given the long history of neglect, it is hard to understand both the sudden ‘urgency’ and the requirement for eight police officers being required to use force to enter the home and remove ZE in March 2025. I did not find the applicant’s case clear on this issue. It was harmful for ZE. Mrs Z accepted she made the situation worse and was right to apologise in the witness box. The applicant’s team also need to reflect on its role.

Welfare

[32]ZE has lived with his father since March 2025. He is settled. He has been able to “vote with his feet” and contact his mother or return to her home. The evidence is that he has never done so.[33]The Guardian’s insightful assessment of his wishes and feelings is her report is as follows: [ZE]’s verbalised wishes are that he wants to return to the care of his mother. He has maintained that wish on both occasions I have met with him, and his reasoning for this is always that this is where he considers his home because that’s where his mother and brothers are, and that’s where he grew up. [ZE] referred to his mother’s home as “where the fondness is at”. [ZE] feels that things would be better at mum’s house if they were given a bigger property. [ZE] reports that he feels ok with his father, but his overall preference is to return to his mother. It’s clear to me however, that [ZE] visualises his future in his father’s house, because when talking about college, he reflected that there were space limitations at dad’s house which may hinder his studies, and he talked me through how he planned to get to college from his father’s house. This is an important observation in my view, because it suggests that [ZE]’s verbalised wishes and feelings aren’t in keeping with his subconscious processing.[34]In his report, the single joint expert, Dr Corr, clinical psychologist, notes that “when considering future care arrangements, [ZE] did not express a strong preference between living with his mother or father and indicated that he would be happy to live with either, although at points during the assessment [ZE] did state that he wished to live with his mother. [ZE] stated that if he was to live with his mother, this would need to be in a larger property with four bedrooms.”[35]ZE’s counsel told me he wanted to go home to his mother. ZE did not want to meet the judge and believed I would make the right decision for him. I was told if he does go home he would like to see more of his mum.[36]Considering all the written and oral evidence, in my judgment, ZE most clearly wants to go to College in September and succeed and obtain an education. Both expert witnesses assess him to be at least of average or above intelligence. Despite his mother’s inadequate home schooling, he is attaining fairly well albeit with a few deficits. I think he wants to be settled. He knows it is unlikely his mother will obtain a four bedroom house. I find the Guardian’s analysis of the disparity between what he says he wants to her and how he visualises his future at College to be very helpful. It might also be the case that if ZE wanted the judge to know he really wanted to go home to Mrs Z, he would have told me that in writing or at a meeting.[37]ZE is now enjoying some socialisation. He enjoys he visits to the seaside to see his father’s family and his cousins. His medical care is more consistent. He lives in a cleaner, less cluttered environment. He has his own bed and bedroom. His father is a kind and caring man.[38]His Guardian’s evidence is: I support the Local Authority plan for [ZE] to remain in the care of Mr [E]. My view is that should [ZE] return to the care of Ms [X], he would suffer significant harm by way of neglect. This is an exceptional case, because in the face of overwhelming indication that [ZE] was suffering harm, he was failed by agencies who should have protected him. In addition to closing [ZE]’s child protection plan in 2024; in the absence of evidence that concerns had resolved or lessened in my view, the Local Authority failed to act accordingly when [ZE] returned home to the care of Ms [X] when Ms [X] returned home from hospital in September 2024, proposing another child protection plan despite evidence available to them that such a plan would unlikely afford [ZE] any protection. The Local Authority continued to be refused entry into the home after this event, and it was known that a month before that the conditions were unsafe. It is difficult to comprehend that it took some months before the Local Authority made their application, and that the application made was for a interim supervision order, which would not have afforded [ZE] the protection that he needed. In my view, this inaction from the Local Authority has contributed towards the neglect that [ZE] has experienced in his childhood”.[39]The welfare analysis is quite straightforward. I think Mrs Z recognised this but did not want to be seen to be giving up on ZE. For the reasons set out above, ZE’s welfare dictates that residing with his father is in his best interests.[40]The applicant and Mr E are concerned that Mrs Z will undermine ZE’s confidence and security living with his father. They are particularly concerned around the time he begins college in September. There is that risk. However, when I asked the social work manager if there was evidence Mrs Z had tried to undermine the placement with Mr E, she did not identify any. The applicant complains that Mrs Z has raised ‘adult’ themes with ZE. He is nearly an adult and it is hard to police their conversations. ZE has capacity to decide who to spend time with. It would be overly protective to police all his contact with his mother by the requirement for it to be supervised. I feel that ZE is awaiting my decision on where he should reside and he will stand behind it. I also detect that Mrs ZE has contested issues because she has been unfairly characterised by the applicant in these proceedings. She has failed ZE because of her neglect of his education, the cleanliness of the home and her only sporadic interactions with medics and other professionals. That being said, she has brought up her son to be a polite young man. He has reasonable educational attainments and the potential to do much more. She was not assisted by bringing up three boys alone in inner London in a cramped flat. There are obvious risks for any boy growing up in inner London. I was told the risks likely increase because of ZE’s Caribbean heritage. I accept there are risks of involvement in crime or being a victim of crime, of violence and gang related issues. ZE’s counsel was correct to reference ZE’s protected characteristics and the Lammy Review in her submissions. ZE knows nothing or little of this world. His mother has protected him from that albeit she has failed him with her neglect. She is not, however, the seriously mentally unwell, machete wielding, violent woman she has been made out to be by the applicant. She may feel some small level of vindication. She has been well represented by Ms Hudson who has demonstrated through her effective cross-examination and her submissions the errors in the applicant’s case. I say this because I hope, that Mrs Z will also accept my welfare findings for her son. I hope she will, therefore, not undermine his security living with his father.[41]ZE currently sees his mother in person twice a week for supervised contact. He also enjoys supervised telephone contact.[42]I am of the view ZE should be able to see his mother for a couple of hours every week in the community (not in her home). This can start from August. This should be the subject of light touch support but not close supervision. This can replace one of the supervised weekly contact sessions. There has to be a balance of building up unsupervised time between ZE and Mrs Z. Supervised video contact can take place as offered from now. Two weeks after he has settled into college, I can see no real reason why he cannot call his mother unsupervised. The applicant must carry out a review of the necessity of support or supervision every 14 days between now and the next hearing, document the same and provide it to the parties. If supervision or support cannot be reduced, justification should be provided. I am providing permission for support/supervision, but the applicant must consider whether it remains necessary. All supervision and support will come to an end by 30 September 2025. That will permit me to assess the situation at the review hearing in mid-October.[43]If Mrs Z seeks to undermine his home with his father or his college placement, there are measures that can be taken and I am unlikely to hesitate to step in to protect ZE, assuming I have jurisdiction to do so. The applicant will have liberty to apply to cease contact or provide for supervision if this is needed. I hope that will not be necessary.[44]I agree ZE should have a passport. If he wishes to travel abroad before March 2026, I will consider that issue.[45]I shall continue ZE’s wardship until a one hour review hearing in October 2025. I would hope at that stage proceedings can come to end. ZE will be informed about my decisions through his solicitor. I would want two key message to me relayed to him from me:(i) his college placement is a wonderful opportunity and I hope he is able to embrace it; and(ii) I have decided where I think it is best for him to live but I have also recognised the importance of his relationship with his mum, who he will continue to see her regularly.[46]I thank all counsel for their assistance and ask they draft an order to give effect to this judgment.