A Local Authority v M & Ors [2025] EWHC 1132 (Fam)

[2025] EWHC 1132 (Fam)Case No FD24P00853
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 04/04/2025
The Child: D (a boy born 10/2024)
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CUSWORTH
Between
A LOCAL AUTHORITYApplicantM1st RespondentF2 nd RespondentThe Child (by their children’s guardian)3 rd Respondent
Mrs Hayes (instructed by the applicant) for ApplicantThe 1 st and 2 nd Respondents appeared in person for in personMs O’Connor (solicitor of David Wilson solicitors) for 3 rd RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 03 April 2025
JUDGMENT

Cusworth J :

[1]This is an application by A County Council (‘the local authority’) for permission to contact the extended family members of D (born October 2024), to notify them of his birth with a view to exploring whether the option of one of them caring for D is possible and in his best interests. This is because his parents, who are unmarried but share parental responsibility for him, and are in a stable and committed relationship, have been clear since his birth that they wish to relinquish him for adoption. The day after D’s birth, his mother [M] signed an agreement for his voluntary accommodation by the local authority. D was discharged from hospital to the care of a couple offering a “foster to adopt” (early permanence) placement. He has remained in their care ever since. The parents have been equally clear that, with the exception of the maternal grandmother who knows of D, they do not wish their extended families to be informed of his birth. The local authority’s application was filed on 30 December 2024.[2]Although they are clear that they do not seek to care for D, his parents have retained an active interest in his health and wellbeing. They have filed two joint statements explaining the reasons for their position, and both the mother and the father [F] gave oral evidence to me. I have also heard from Ds guardian and have heard from submissions from counsel for the local authority, the solicitor for the guardian and from each of the parents, over about half a day. The guardian supports the parents’ position in her assessment.[3]The parents have expressed their strong sense of responsibility to do what is right for D. M did not discover her unexpected pregnancy until very late, such that a termination was no longer possible for her. They explain that having children was ‘not part of their plan as a couple’, and are clear that they have made the right decision for D to place him for adoption. They speak very positively of his foster parents, whom they have met, and say that they are certain that adoption by his current carers offers D the best opportunity for a successful life. They say in their first statement that they had never considered involving their wider family, because they ‘know better than anyone that none of them would be suitable for many reasons…’. They continue by asking that their rights as parents are respected, and stating that they have a right to a private life and that they feel that ‘attempting to inform our wider family would be a huge breach of that right.’[4]In their second statement the parents also express concern at the passing of time, and the fact that D will have already created a strong bond with his foster carers. They speak positively of his progress, and of their involvement with child in care reviews. They then set out their reasons for not wanting there to be any notification of their wider family prior to the adoption. Firstly, they say that there has not been any contact with the paternal family ‘in recent months’. This on enquiry however only extended back to Christmas, when they relate a row about the paternal grandparents permitting F’s two older sons, who I will deal with later in this judgment, to play on unsuitable video games, and, they recount, the grandparents then encouraged them to lie about this; and they complain about an Umbrella Cockatoo owned by the grandparents that is let out of its cage when they and F’s sons are in the house, contrary to their wishes. Whilst they then say that to involve the paternal grandparents in D’s life ‘would do nothing short of ruin his chance of a good fulfilling happy childhood’, there is no more direct evidence offered to justify this.[5]Later, F told the guardian of a ‘massive fallout’ with his father some two years ago, but not one which had prevented his sons having regular contact with their grandparents since. They both say that they believe that none of their respective siblings are at a stage in their lives where they would wish to care for a baby, and they have both reported a strained relationship with those siblings. Given that the application was made by the local authority only on 30 December 2024, it is clear that the family rift whereby F has not seen his parents has only lasted for as long as this application has been before the court.[6]Further, and of significant concern, is the position of J (aged 10) and T (aged 8) who are F’s sons by a previous relationship. They spend half of their time with their father under a shared care arrangement, but the fact of D’s birth has so far been kept a secret from them. In their second statement, the parents say this of the boys’ likely reaction to receiving the information:
‘They will be shocked to learn of D's existence, and we worry that they will not cope with such news. We are also concerned that should they discover the birth of D at their current ages, they will have difficulty in processing why we did not inform them and it could cause resentment, and in turn have a detrimental effect on their relationship with us both.’
[7]In her assessment, the guardian explains that the parents have by their choice had no direct contact with D since his birth. However, she sets out that:
‘D’s parents have provided the foster carers with photographs of F’s older children and of themselves and, as mentioned before, the foster carers have a photograph with D’s parents which is displayed in the bedroom that D will use when he will be a bit older’
. Importantly, the guardian also records that:
‘There is also no evidence to suggest that M has been under any pressure from F, and this is something that she confirmed when I spoke with her without F present. F has also been very clear that this is a decision that they have both discussed and agreed upon and they present as keen to respect each other’s views and opinions and, when observed together, there was nothing to suggest an imbalance of power in their relationship.’
I accept that the parent’s position is entirely mutually held.[8]The guardian continues that:
‘The concerns raised by F about his parents may not necessarily pose immediate safeguarding concerns to D and could be further assessed/explored by the Local Authority when completing further assessments and it could be argued that adequate safeguarding measures could be put in place to ensure D would be safe. As D’s Children’s Guardian, I am very concerned about how life would look for D if he was to be cared for by his paternal grandparents. I refer mainly to the paternal grandparents as they do seem to be the most realistic option from the extended family.’
Later she adds:
‘In addition, the fact that D’s parents have not only felt unable to share the news about their baby with the paternal grandparents but have actively opposed the prospect of them caring for D, would likely further negatively impact the family dynamics… F’s children spend regular time with their paternal grandparents and D will also know that their father sees his older siblings and that neither his mother nor his father want to see him. For D, this is likely to have a significant detrimental emotional impact, and it could also impact negatively on F’s relationship with his own children.’
With respect to her, these comments seem to address the question of whether the paternal grandparents should be successful if they were to make an application to become D’s carers, rather than whether they should receive any notification of his existence and position.[9]The guardian then goes on to consider the negative impact of a delay, if further assessments and court hearings are required. However, she adds that D’s foster carers ‘also fully understand that this process, if allowed by the Court, could be lengthy and they have both re-assured me that they will care for D no matter what the outcome will be so in that sense, the impact on D of extending the proceedings could be mitigated.’ She then concludes that:
‘As D’s Guardian, I believe that D’s right to family life needs to be balanced against the risk of significant emotional harm for D which could have long lasting implications for him, for the reasons outlined above, if notification were permitted. I consider that the risks attached to notification also outweigh the potential interference with the rights to a family life of the extended family members as well as those of D.’
[10]That, then, was the written evidence before me. I have clearly neither read nor heard any evidence from the wider family, and must proceed on the basis of the evidence before me, including the oral evidence from the parents and the guardian which I have heard, and the parties’ submissions. I must do that in light of the law that I must apply to any application of this kind. That law was comprehensively reviewed in Cases A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41, in the judgment of Peter Jackson LJ, where he firstly confirmed at [84] that:
‘while child welfare, prompt decision-making and a comprehensive review of every relevant factor, including those mentioned in the checklists, are all central to the notification decision, the decision is not one that is formally governed by the provisions of s.1 of the CA 1989 or of the ACA 2002 and the welfare of the child is not the paramount consideration of the local authority and the court in this context.’
[11]In a comprehensive review of previous authority in his judgment, Peter Jackson LJ traced the development of the test, including by reference to two decisions of Cobb J, the first of which was Re A (Relinquished baby: Risk of domestic abuse) [2018] EWHC 1981 (Fam), where that judge had dispensed with service upon a father with whom the mother had had a very brief relationship characterised by abuse and harassment. He was satisfied that there was no realistic prospect of a placement with any family member. At [19] Cobb J set out a series of ‘cardinal principles’ in cases of this kind: “i) Each case is fact-sensitive (Re RA at [31]); ii) The outcome contended for here is "exceptional" (A Local Authority v the mother at [1]/[7]) iii)… iv) The court must have regard to the welfare checklist in section 1(4) ACA 2002; v) It is a further requirement of statute (section 1(4)(f)(iii) ACA 2002) that the court has regard to the wishes and feelings of the child's relatives; vi) Respect can and indeed must be afforded to the mother's wish for a confidential and discreet arrangement for the adoption of her child, although the mother's wishes must be critically examined and not just accepted at face value; overall the mother's wishes carry "significant weight" albeit that they are not decisive (Re JL and AO at [47], [48] and [50], and see also Re RA at [43(vi)]); vii) Article 8 rights are engaged in this decision; however, in a case where a natural parent wishes to relinquish a baby, the degree of interference with the Article 8 rights is likely to be less than where the parent/child relationship is to be severed against the will of the parent (Re TJ at [26]]; viii) Adoption of any kind still represents a significant interference with family life, and can only be ordered by the court if it is necessary and proportionate (Re RA at [32]); ix) A high level of justification is still required before the court can sanction adoption as the outcome, and a thorough 'analysis' of the options is necessary (Re JL & AO at [32]); 'analysis' is different from 'assessment' – a sufficient 'analysis' may be performed even though the natural family are unaware of the process (Re RA at [34]). As I said in Re RA at [38]: "in order to weigh up all of the relevant considerations in determining a relinquished baby case it may be possible (it may in some cases be necessary) and/or proportionate to perform the analysis without full assessment of third parties, or even their knowledge of the existence of the baby. The court will consider the available information in relation to the individual child and make a judgment about whether, and if so what, further information is needed".”

iii)…

[12]The second case of Cobb J’s cited in Cases A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) is Re H (Care and Adoption: Assessment of Wider Family) [2019] EWFC 10, which was also a case where parents wished to keep the birth of a child from the father’s family. In concluding that the paternal family should be informed of the child’s existence, he made these observations:
“45. … none of the provisions of statute, regulations or rules to which I have referred, impose any absolute duty on either the local authority or the Children’s Guardian, or indeed the court, to inform or consult members of the extended family about the existence of a child or the plans for the child’s adoption in circumstances such as arise here. However, the ethos of the CA 1989 is plainly supportive of wider family involvement in the child’s life, save where that outcome is not consistent with their welfare.” … 49. In exercising that broad discretion, I would suggest that the following be borne in mind… There will be further cases where the mental health or well-being of the parent or parents may be imperilled if disclosure were to be ordered, and this may weigh heavy in the evaluation. But in exercising judgment – whether that be by the local authority, adoption agency or court – I am clear that the wider family should not simply be ignored on the say-so of a parent. Generally, the ability and/or willingness of the wider family to provide the child with a secure environment in which to grow ( section 1(4)(f)(ii) ACA 2002 ) should be carefully scrutinised, and the option itself should be “fully explored” (see [28]). The approach taken by Sumner J in the Birmingham case more than a decade ago, to the effect that “cogent and compelling” grounds should exist before the court could endorse an arrangement for the despatch of public law proceedings while the wider family remained ignorant of the existence of the child (see [29] above), remains, in my judgment, sound. This approach is in keeping with the key principles of the CA 1989 and the ACA 2002 that children are generally best looked after within their own family, save where that outcome is not consistent with their welfare, and that a care order on a plan for adoption is appropriate only where no other course is possible in the child’s interests (see Re B (A child) and Re B-S ).”
[13]Finally, in Cases A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives)[above], Peter Jackson LJ at [89] provided a comprehensive summary of ‘the principles governing decisions (by local authorities as adoption agencies or by the court) as to whether a putative father or a relative should be informed of the existence of a child who might be adopted’. These he set out as follows: ‘1. The law allows for ‘fast-track’ adoption with the consent of all those with parental responsibility, so in some cases the mother alone. Where she opposes notification being given to the child’s father or relatives her right to respect for her private life is engaged and can only be infringed where it is necessary to do so to protect the interests of others. 2. The profound importance of the adoption decision for the child and potentially for other family members is clearly capable of supplying a justification for overriding the mother’s request. Whether it does so will depend upon the individual circumstances of the case. 3. The decision should be prioritised and the process characterised by urgency and thoroughness. 4. The decision-maker’s first task is to establish the facts as clearly as possible, mindful of the often limited and one-sided nature of the information available. The confidential relinquishment of a child for adoption is an unusual event and the reasons for it must be respectfully scrutinised so that the interests of others are protected. In fairness to those other individuals, the account that is given by the person seeking confidentiality cannot be taken at face value. All information that can be discovered without compromising confidentiality should therefore be gathered and a first-hand account from the person seeking confidentiality will normally be sought. The investigation should enable broad conclusions to be drawn about the relative weight to be given to the factors that must inform the decision. 5. Once the facts have been investigated the task is to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved. The welfare of the child is an important factor but it is not the paramount consideration. 6. There is no single test for distinguishing between cases in which notification should and should not be given but the case law shows that these factors will be relevant when reaching a decision:(1) Parental responsibility. The fact that a father has parental responsibility by marriage or otherwise entitles him to give or withhold consent to adoption and gives him automatic party status in any proceedings that might lead to adoption. Compelling reasons are therefore required before the withholding of notification can be justified.(2) Article 8 rights. Whether the father, married or unmarried, or the relative have an established or potential family life with the mother or the child, the right to a fair hearing is engaged and strong reasons are required before the withholding of notification can be justified.(3) The substance of the relationships. Aside from the presence or absence of parental responsibility and of family life rights, an assessment must be made of the substance of the relationship between the parents, the circumstances of the conception, and the significance of relatives. The purpose is to ensure that those who are necessarily silent are given a notional voice so as to identify the possible strengths and weaknesses of any argument that they might make. Put another way, with what degree of objective justification might such a person complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision? The answer will differ as between a father with whom the mother has had a fleeting encounter and one with whom she has had a substantial relationship, and as between members of the extended family who are close to the parents and those who are more distant.(4) The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. This is of particular importance to the child’s lifelong welfare as it may determine whether or not adoption is necessary. An objective view, going beyond the say-so of the person seeking confidentiality, should be taken about whether a family member may or may not be a potential carer. Where a family placement is unlikely to be worth investigating or where notification may cause significant harm to those notified, this factor will speak in favour of maintaining confidentiality; anything less than that and it will point the other way.(5) The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given. Where this would be severe, for example because of fear arising from rape or violence, or because of possible consequences such as ostracism or family breakdown, or because of significant mental health vulnerability, these must weigh heavily in the balancing exercise. On the other hand, excessive weight should not be given to short term difficulties and to less serious situations involving embarrassment or social unpleasantness, otherwise the mother’s wish would always prevail at the expense of other interests.(6) Cultural and religious factors. The conception and concealed pregnancy may give rise to particular difficulties in some cultural and religious contexts. These may enhance the risks of notification, but they may also mean that the possibility of maintaining the birth tie through a family placement is of particular importance for the child.(7) The availability and durability of the confidential information. Notification can only take place if there is someone to notify. In cases where a mother declines to identify a father she may face persuasion, if that is thought appropriate, but she cannot be coerced. In some cases the available information may mean that the father is identifiable, and maternal relatives may also be identifiable. The extent to which identifying information is pursued is a matter of judgement. Conversely, there will be cases where it is necessary to consider whether any confidentiality is likely to endure. In the modern world secrets are increasingly difficult to keep and the consequences, particularly for the child and any prospective adopters, of the child’s existence being concealed but becoming known to family members later on, sometimes as a result of disclosure by the person seeking confidentiality, should be borne in mind.(8) The impact of delay. A decision to apply to court and thereafter any decision to notify will inevitably postpone to some extent the time when the child’s permanent placement can be confirmed. In most cases, the importance of the issues means that the delay cannot be a predominant factor. There may however be circumstances where delay would have particularly damaging consequences for the mother or for the child; for example, it would undoubtedly need to be taken into account if it would lead to the withdrawal of the child’s established carers or to the loss of an especially suitable adoptive placement.(9) Any other relevant matters. The list of relevant factors is not closed. Mothers may have many reasons for wishing to maintain confidentiality and there may be a wide range of implications for the child, the father and for other relatives. All relevant matters must be considered. 7. It has rightly been said that the maintenance of confidentiality is exceptional, and highly exceptional where a father has parental responsibility or where there is family life under Article 8. However, exceptionality is not in itself a test or a short cut; rather it is a reflection of the fact that the profound significance of adoption for the child and considerations of fairness to others means that the balance will often fall in favour of notification. But the decision on whether confidentiality should be maintained can only be made by striking a fair balance between the factors that are present in the individual case.[14]I will therefore apply those principles to the facts of D’s case as I find them to be. Firstly, I acknowledge that both parents here have parental responsibility, and both together would wish to prevent notification of their wider families. This undoubtedly does engage their right to respect for their private life, and can only be infringed where it is necessary to do so to protect the interests of others. Although this is not determinative, it is relevant that both of those with parental responsibility for D would wish to prevent any wider notification, and I do afford their view significant weight. However, in light of the profound importance and consequences of the adoption decision for D, and potentially for other family members, including J and T, I must consider whether the circumstances here are capable of supplying a justification for overriding the parent’s request. And in undertaking that task, I should not take the parent’s unopposed case at face value, but investigate sufficiently to ‘enable broad conclusions to be drawn about the relative weight to be given to the factors that must inform the decision’.[15]I am not in any doubt, having heard from both parents, that they both feel strongly that they believe that they have Ds best interests at heart. It is clear that F does have a difficult relationship of some sort with his parents, and on his account is not especially close to either of his sisters – albeit that I was told that one did send him a text to acknowledge his birthday recently. I am not however satisfied that the rift described with his family is either longstanding or as irreparable as he maintains, and note that it remains the position that both of his older sons, whose care he shares with their mother, continue to have regular contact with their paternal grandparents, even if I am told that since Christmas this has been only when they are with their mother rather than with their father. It may be that the paternal grandparents are now a little old in their mid-fifties to care for a baby born only last October, and of course there could be complications in the different inter-family relationships if that were to become the case, not least given the position of J and T. There may be good reasons why they should not be preferred as carers to the foster parents with whom D has now been since his birth, and with whom he will I accept have formed a strong bond. One of the most significant reasons might of course be the opposition of D’s parents to that course. But that does not necessarily mean that the adoption process should be completed without their being notified and their position considered if they decide that they want it to be.[16]I have not been given a full picture of the situation of either of Ds paternal aunts, save that neither have children of their own. It may be that neither would wish to offer themselves to care for D, as the parents say, and that they have sided with the paternal grandparents when there have been family rows, for example over the Cockatoo, but my sense is not of a serious estrangement for reasons which would preclude either being considered as a potential kinship carer, rather it is that for their own reasons, the parents would not wish them to be considered.[17]The position of F’s older sons, J and T, is obviously a very difficult one in the circumstances. Whilst they spend 50% of their time with their father, they have currently no idea that D exists, being told that M was recovering from a minor operation in hospital for the period whilst he was being born. Both parents described J to me as ‘delicate’, and it was their apparent intention that neither boy should be told of D’s existence until they were much older, perhaps until they had reached adulthood. It was apparent that neither parent had given very much thought to the possible consequences of this, or to the prospect that D might himself as he grows up engage in life story work by which he would learn that he had two brothers, whom he might well wish to have some sort of relationship with. If J and T find out only when they are adults that they have had a brother, whose existence their father has kept from them for many years, that might have a profound impact on their relationship with him, and M. If D seeks his brothers out, before they have been told of his existence, that could have profound consequences for all three. In the meantime, they are all three being deprived of a sibling relationship.[18]It was also apparent that the guardian, in coming to her recommendation that there be no notification of the extended family, had not in her report given very much thought to this dynamic. She seemed to have been considering the position principally from the perspective of whether D remained best placed with his current foster-carers. She was clear, having considered the position, that telling J and T of D’s existence was something that should happen soon, and should not be delayed for a matter of years, as the parents were proposing. She agreed that it would be sensible if the parents sought help to enable them to pass on the information in an appropriate and positive way. However, she remained of the view that notification of the wider family in advance of the adoption decision for D was not required. There might of course be significant consequences for family relations, if the extended family do come to know of D’s existence only after an adoption order has been recently made, about which they had not been notified. I must bear all of these unresolved elements in mind.[19]Turning to the maternal family, the maternal grandparents are separated. It is the case that the maternal grandmother is fully aware of the situation, and as I understand it, she is accepting of the parents’ decision that D should be adopted by his current foster-carers. I am told by the mother that her father, the maternal grandfather, is recently separated from a subsequent partner, and not in a frame of mind where he might be considered as a carer for D. He is in his 60s. Whilst it may well be the case that he would not present a viable alternative carer for D, that is also not a complete answer to the question of whether his notification should be prevented, although it is relevant that he will not likely offer such a prospect. I understand that M herself has an older sister, who she tells me would not be interested in caring for D, if she knew of him, and a brother who was himself adopted before her birth, and about whom she only discovered relatively late into her teenage years. She does not have any ongoing contact with him. Whilst there are no related children on the mother’s side of the family, and the maternal grandmother has been informed, there is no other clearly identified reason why the mother’s sister or father should not be notified.[20]I am satisfied that the news of M’s advanced pregnancy must have come as a significant shock to the parents, and that the decisions which they have since had to make must have been both difficult for them, and also left them in a state of emotional turmoil. I can well see that they did not want the swift implementation of their decision to relinquish D for adoption, hard as that must have been for both of them, to be held up by objections or intervention from their extended family. I also entirely acknowledge that the decision will inevitably lead to the need for extremely difficult and complicated conversations with J and T, which F would far rather avoid for the time being, if he could. I can also see that the parents would both benefit from counselling and advice as to the way in which they should deal with the complicated dynamics which their decision has created. It may also be easier for them in some ways to have those conversations only after D has been adopted, so that they have certainty that their wishes cannot be countermanded or reconsidered as might be the case if, albeit I accept that they consider it unlikely, a family member were to put themselves forward as a potential kinship carer. It is clear that they have reached a decision together, about what they believe to be in the best interests of their child, which they both feel strongly should preclude the notification of family members whose input they very much do not wish to receive.[21]These are the circumstances in which I have to strike ‘a fair balance between the various interests involved’. And, whilst the welfare of D is an important factor, I accept that it is not the paramount consideration. I will consider the circumstances in light of the factors identified by Peter Jackson LJ at [89] (6) of Cases A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [above]:a. Parental responsibility. In this case, both of the parents have parental responsibility, and resist notification. There is therefore no reason to support the local authority’s application of the basis that anyone who would otherwise have the opportunity to give or withhold consent to adoption is being prevented from so doing.b. Article 8 rights. Here, although not potential carers for D, J and T are his half-brothers, who spend 50% of their time living with their father. By the decision not to consider kinship care, these close relatives of D are being deprived substantially of a potential family life with him, even if, as I understand, the foster carers are open to some level of ongoing contact with the birth family. In circumstances where the parents have currently got no clear plan to even inform the boys of D’s existence, it is clear that for the present at least they are not at the point of being willing to foster that relationship going forward. Indeed F’s initial oral evidence was to the effect that he had not intended to tell them at all for the next ten years or so. Although I note that D’s carers have been provided with a photograph of J and T, there has been no thought given to how any future relationship between the three might be pursued.c. Further, whilst it may be the case that none of the parent’s siblings would want to consider offering themselves as a carer for D, as the parents tell me, there is no evidence as to why that should be the case. It may be that both of F’s sisters have decided they do not wish to have a family, as he says, but in circumstances where I am not satisfied that relations within his family are as broken down as he has told me, at least from their perspective, I cannot be confident that that is the case. It is noticeable that the absolute estrangement on which he relies has come about only since these proceedings were initiated, and seemingly at the instance of F. I bear in mind that if in fact the evidence that he has given about his belief in sisters’ unwillingness to offer assistance proved unsubstantiated, then the right to a fair hearing for F’s siblings would have been engaged, and strong reasons would be required before the withholding of notification to them could be justified. I only have his bare assertion to rely on. The same situation applies with M’s sister and father.d. The substance of the relationships. As Peter Jackson LJ put it in the alternative, ‘with what degree of objective justification might (the relative) complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision?’ Again here I am dependent upon the evidence of the parents to assess the relationships with the wider family; and whilst I do accept that in circumstances where the parents wish for there to be no notification of the families at all, that might be said of itself to be evidence of a strain, I do not feel that I have been presented with as full and comprehensive explanation for any difficulties as I might have been. In particular, the lack of thought apparently given to the future engagement with J and T hints at a potentially much more complicated family dynamic which the parents have chosen not to reveal. If ‘those who are necessarily silent’ are to be ‘given a notional voice so as to identify the possible strengths and weaknesses of any argument that they might make’, then the circumstances for D have to be looked at from as neutral a point of view as possible, taking into account what is known, rather than what is asserted by the parents who are seeking to prevent notification.e. What is certain is that F has parents in their mid-50s, and two childless adult sisters. He has two children by a former relationship (J and T) who spend half of their time with him and the rest with their mother. Before Christmas, both those children saw their paternal grandparents regularly, both when they were with their father, and also when they were with their mother. That suggests fairly close familial relationships, without more. Then, unexpectedly, M discovered last year that she was in the late stages of pregnancy, too late for a termination, and she and F made what must have been the extremely hard decision to give their baby up for adoption. In taking that decision, they may well have considered how that news might be received in F’s family, and indeed how they would feel if D, although their child by birth, were being brought up elsewhere in the extended family. That could be a difficult thing for either F or M to contemplate, although they have not chosen to cite their own feelings as amongst their reasons to resist the local authority’s application. It may also be complicated for D, especially when compared with what sounds to be an excellent early permanence placement. I must decide how that weighs against what would otherwise appear to be the availability of a significant extended family, not in terms of eventual outcome for D, but in terms of notification of the fact that he exists and that there is a question about his best interests.f. The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. As above, ‘An objective view, going beyond the say-so of the person seeking confidentiality, should be taken about whether a family member may or may not be a potential carer’. As explained the evidence here is incomplete and partial, and the fact of D’s settled place with by all accounts excellent early permanence foster carers means that any eventual alternative placement may be seen as unlikely – but not necessarily unrealistic. It cannot be said with confidence that ‘a family placement is unlikely to be worth investigating’ or that ‘notification may cause significant harm to those notified’, even if difficult discussions might follow within the family, not least because they have not up until now been made aware of D’s birth. In those circumstances, this factor would appear to point in favour of notification, notwithstanding that D’s current placement will remain his very likely eventual destination.g. The physical, psychological or social impact on the parents of notification being given. For the reasons given at (e) above, I acknowledge that there may be underlying concerns that the parents have, that they have not felt able to share fully about their reaction to any family involvement. However, I must bear in mind, given the fact of J and T’s close relationship to D, that the fact of his birth is unlikely to be kept a secret indefinitely. Familial relationships are going to have to re-adjust around the fact of his existence, however that information is introduced. In those circumstances, notification may bring forward the need for frank conversations to be had, but its impact over and above the fact that the news will eventually be shared within the two families must be limited. As Peter Jackson LJ made clear, ‘excessive weight should not be given to short term difficulties and to less serious situations involving embarrassment or social unpleasantness, otherwise the mother’s wish would always prevail at the expense of other interests’.h. Cultural and religious factors. I am not told of any that may be relevant in this case.i. The availability and durability of the confidential information. Under this head, Peter Jackson LJ explained that, ‘there will be cases where it is necessary to consider whether any confidentiality is likely to endure. In the modern world secrets are increasingly difficult to keep and the consequences, particularly for the child and any prospective adopters, of the child’s existence being concealed but becoming known to family members later on, sometimes as a result of disclosure by the person seeking confidentiality, should be borne in mind’. As I have made clear above, it is at least highly likely that the information about Ds birth and adoption will soon become known within the extended family. As the guardian agreed, J and T should be told of him sooner rather than later. In those circumstances, enduring confidentiality is simply not an option here. All of this points firmly toward notification, once the parents have had the opportunity to manage the passing of the information to the boys, and so also to the adults around them.j. The impact of delay. Peter Jackson LJ confirmed that ‘In most cases, the importance of the issues means that the delay cannot be a predominant factor.’ This is especially so when the early permanence carers have confirmed that they will continue to care for D in the event that the conclusion of the adoption proceedings are held up by the notification process. D’s excellent current placement is not therefore under threat from the process. I do accept that notification will inevitably mean that the time when D’s permanent placement can be confirmed will be delayed, but that should have any serious impact on him given his young age and the continuity of care that he will receive. If the evidence of the parents as to their families’ likely lack of interest in offering themselves as potential carers proves to be accurate, then any delay will in any event be limited.k. Any other relevant matters. All the matters canvassed before me, and which additionally appear to be of relevance, have been fully canvassed above.[22]Finally, I bear in mind Peter Jackson LJ’s reminder that ‘the profound significance of adoption for the child and considerations of fairness to others means that the balance will often fall in favour of notification. But the decision on whether confidentiality should be maintained can only be made by striking a fair balance between the factors that are present in the individual case’. Here, I am very well aware of the parents’ clear and shared view that they do not wish for their wider family to be notified. Although I do not feel that they have allowed me to get to the bottom of their relations with F’s family, I understand that they very much wish that the question of adoption by D’s current carers is settled before any disclosure is made; and before this hearing, I am clear that it was not there intention to inform anyone if they felt that they could get away with it for many years. Sadly, I fear that such an approach is entirely unrealistic in the modern world.[23]I am not satisfied that I have been given any compelling reasons why any of the extended family members identified on either side should not individually be notified, even if it is unclear whether any of them will wish to put themselves forward. Further, given the desirability for J and T to be told of their sibling’s existence before very long, and the likelihood of life story work for D in due course giving him information about his brothers, it is inconceivable that this information would remain hidden indefinitely. In those circumstances, is there a balance in favour of allowing the adoption to proceed ahead of any notification, to ensure certainty for D, and ensure peace of mind for his parents? I consider that such a course is only likely to generate more acrimony within the family, and not serve any family member’s interests in the long term. Even if that question were finely balanced, there is no obvious justification that I have been given why D’s grand-parents, aunts and half-brothers should not be made aware of him, and for the adults to be given the opportunity to put themselves forward as potential carers for him. That is so, even though the early permanence placement in which D has already been since birth appears to be very likely the best option for his future care. If D discovers that, although he was adopted out of his birth family, family members came forward to offer themselves unsuccessfully at the time, he may be comforted by that, although his parents do not feel able to care for him.[24]I confirm that I have fully considered the factors in s.1 of the CA 1989 and of the ACA 2002.There no striking factor in this case which weighs decisively in favour of confidentiality being maintained, notwithstanding the parents’ firm views, and a number of factors identified above which I consider clearly tip the balance in the other direction. I emphasise that this goes only to notification, and not to the most important questions of where and how D’s best interests will dictate that he is brought up. However, having considered all of the different elements in this case, and contrary to the conclusion expressed by the guardian, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the local authority’s application, and give them permission to notify the extended family of the birth of D, to allow those notified to consider their position with regards to whether they would want to seek to be explored as potential carers.[25]As I made clear during the hearing, I entirely accept that, in the event that that was the conclusion that I reached following this hearing, the parents would wish to have an opportunity to inform their family, and especially J and T, themselves, rather than the news being conveyed by receipt of letters by the family from the local authority. It is entirely appropriate that they should be given the opportunity to do this.[26]M in particular was keen to have some help in understanding how best to approach that process, especially with the two boys. Whilst I am sympathetic to that aim, any time granted must be limited as it will of necessity hold up the very progress of the adoption proceedings that the parents understandably are keen to complete. I also balance that by reminding myself that delay in this case, if limited, will not be of significant prejudice for D in the circumstances which I considered at [21](j) above. The local authority suggested that any delay to allow information to be passed should be no longer than 28 days, before they could begin the notification process. I can see that this will be a difficult undertaking for the parents, but one on which they must embark as soon as possible. I am satisfied that on any view, they should have been able to receive some advice, and tell those who would need to be informed, within 6 weeks - 42 days - and that is the time that I will permit them.[27]That is my judgment.