“Both parties should be mindful of the minor child’s needs and should act in a fashion that minimises the impact of their disagreements on Y. They should attempt to work together to lessen the child’s stress and anxiety. The court finds however, that the petition fails to set forth an adequate basis to restrict parenting time and it is denied.”
“The Court finds that the minor child, Y, is a habitual resident of the United States in that she has been residing in Colorado since March 2016 with the permission of [the Family Court], and pursuant to his order regarding Child Arrangements issued on January 11, 2016 and filed in this court on January 22, 2016. This Court has taken jurisdiction over matters concerning the minor child.”
“When father failed to appear as ordered at the February 2019 hearing, the court entered a bench warrant for his arrest and entered a temporary custody order to remain in place pending resolution of the warrant. The bench warrant required father to return to court within fourteen days, at which time the court would presumably enter further orders. The temporary custody order appears to have been entered without reference to any applicable standard, which is troubling. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), (b)(I), CRS 2021 (providing that the court may make or modify an order granting or denying parenting time whenever such an order would serve the best interests of the child, except that the court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting tie rights unless it applies the endangerment standard). Nevertheless, neither of these orders completely determined the rights and liabilities of the parties therefore are not final for appellate purposes. We dismiss this portion of father’s appeal. See State ex rel. Suthers, 252 P.3d at 10.”
“[13] Father’s third recusal motion alleged that the judge had (1) improperly commented on his mental health outside of his presence; (2) commented that father was ‘difficult’; (3) complained about the burdensome and voluminous record; (4) entered a bench warrant against him without reason; (5) entered orders that deprived him of court-ordered parenting time; (6) failed to extend timeliness deadlines under the rule of civil procedure to account for postal delays between Colorado and England; (7) denied his fee waiver requests; and (8) denied or dismissed motions without explanation.”
“On February 11, 2019, the Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Respondent, [C], for his failure to appear at a hearing after having been ordered by the Court to do so. The Court further ordered that, until the warrant is resolved, it is in the best interests of the child not to be with Respondent in unsupervised parenting time lest he be arrested on the outstanding warrant. Since that time, the Court therefore has suspended all unsupervised parenting time of the child with Respondent. For the foregoing reasons, the attached motion is DENIED. The Court reiterates its prior orders: Respondent may have only supervised parenting time with the child. Such supervision must be with a professional supervisor at the Respondent’s expense. Such supervision must be in [X] County, Colorado.”
“[17] Finally, the court’s discussion with mother about father’s mental health was improper, but it does not require disqualification. We have read this exchange and disagree that the comments reflected a “bent of mind” that would have prevented the judge from dealing fairly with father.”
“[22] The court should have suspended the proceedings or assigned another judicial officer to review the enforcement motion while the recusal motion was pending. Even so, the court’s erroneous decision to rule on the enforcement order whilst the third recusal motion was pending did not affect father’s substantial right or affect the outcome of the case, and any error is harmless as the court ultimately denied the recusal motion on its merits. See od.; CAR 35(c). [23] We do not consider, however, whether the court erred in denying the enforcement motion. A motions division of this court ordered that father may not appeal from that order because it is based on the terms of a temporary custody order and is not final for appeal purposes. See In re Marriage of Rappe, 650 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Colo. App. 1982) (holding that a temporary custody order is not final for purposes of appeal). Whilst we are not bound by those divisions’ determination of finality, see Allison v Engle, 2017 COA 43, 22, we agree with and following that division’s rationale and dismiss this portion of father’s appeal. [24] We also decline to accept father’s urging that the enforcement order is a final, appealable order because its reliance on the resolution of the bench warrant means it has the effect of being indefinite. The resolution of the bench warrant is squarely in father’s control, as the court ordered him to return to the court within fourteen days of its execution. This we dismiss the portion of the father’s appeal seeking substantive review of the enforcement order and bench warrant.”
“[30 The record unmistakably supports the court’s finding that father has abused the judicial process by submitting ‘prolix, repetitive, [and], redundant’ filings. The overwhelming majority of the filings in the nearly 5,000 page court record came from the father, which refutes his claim that his is merely responding to mother’s filings. As just one example, father’s three CRPC 97 recusal motions totalled more than 350 pages, with most of the content consisting of arguments already raised and resolved by other orders in the courts for both Colorado and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, apparent from the record that the father’s ‘repeated filings are designed to thwart the [c]ourt’s orders, to intimidate the [c]ourt, and to intimidate and exhaust [mother].’ We note that at least one United Kingdom court reached a similar conclusion, surmising from the ‘significant amount of litigation’ father ‘has an agenda to make these divorce proceedings as drawn-out as possible.’ Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in entering the injunction. [31] We further conclude that the order is narrowly tailored to achieve its intended results: ‘protect [mother] from having to respond to meritless and vexatious filings’; ‘eliminate the need for court staff to spend unwarranted time collecting, collating, organising, and scanning [father’s] voluminous filings’; and ‘conserve judicial resources by reducing the need for the [c]ourt to issue orders on redundant, meritless, and/ or vexatious motions.’ [32] But father's claim of indigency raises a question of whether the court's injunction, while narrowly tailored to address father's vexatious and lengthy filings, is not narrowly tailored enough to retain his constitutional right to access to the courts. The court reasoned that an attorney is necessary to ensure that father's future filings are consistent with all court rules, are well grounded in fact, are warranted by existing law, and are not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay. See C.R.C.P. 1 l(a). [33] But the requirement that father may proceed only through counsel might, as he asserts, completely foreclose his constitutional right of access to the court if he cannot afford to obtain an attorney. See Karr, 50 P.3d at 914 (considering whether order preventing indigent prose litigant from appearing without counsel would effectively prevent him from appearing at all); see also Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (expressing concern that an attorney who knows a litigant's "track record" might well be unwilling to devote the time and effort necessary to sift through the litigant's generally frivolous claims to see if there is one of sufficient merit to undertake legal representation). Mother conceded at oral argument, and we agree, that the existing injunction is problematic for this reason. We additionally agree with mother's statements from oral argument that the injunction unfairly prevents father from filing responses to her motions and that both parties need to comply with C.R.C.P. 10. [34] Therefore, we reverse the injunction and remand for the court to amend its language consistent with mother's concessions that (1) both parties' submissions must comply with C.R.C.P. 10; (2) father should be allowed file responses to mother's motions; and (3) father must obtain leave of the court before submitting any prose filings, regardless of whether the document is in response to mother's filings or otherwise. See Karr, 50 P.3d at 915-16 (listing procedures for litigant's permission to file and considerations for the court before approving or disapproving the petition).”
“The evidence establishes that there has been no abduction or wrongful removal of the parties’ child. [D] brought [Y] to the US in 2016 with the express permission and order of the family court in Manchester, England. The child’s habitual residence has been in the US, and in particular in Colorado, since that time. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act have no application in this case. The problem here is that the parents have been unable or unwilling to comply with the parenting time orders that were originally issued by the Manchester court, and that have been registered in, and to some extent modified by, the [District Court], Colorado. As a former Colorado state district judge who presided over literally thousands of parenting time disputes in that capacity, I am concerned that the best interests of the child are not being served, due largely to the behaviours of the two parents. Generally speaking, it is in the best interest of children to spend quality time with both parents. That plainly was the desire of both the [English] court and the [US] County District Court. However, this Court cannot sit as a court of appeal from either of those courts in the guise of exercising its authority under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. It appears to this Court that R has one, and possibly two, options. His best option appears to be to turn himself in on the outstanding warrant in [the US County District Court]. After addressing the warrant, he can presumably either move to reopen the [District Court] case or file a new action … The [District Court] would then address parenting time, decision making and child support issues. C is a student nurse, and there is some indication in the record that he might have pursued this new career in contemplation of relocation to the US. If he were to relocate to Colorado, then presumably the parenting time issues would be quite different. If he remains in the UK, then the distance will continue to pose logistical and financial barriers. However, Colorado courts are well equipped to address those issues, difficult as they might be.”
“The record in appeal in this case indicates that all three requirements [of the Younger abstention convention] are met. First, it is undisputed that the parties have, for the past give years, been litigating access issues in the state court civil proceeding and that [C] attempted to assert in state court the same access issues that he now seeks to assert in this federal action, i.e. enforcement of certain provisions of the [English] family court’s January 11, 2106 custody order. To be sure, the state court most recently dismissed the action without prejudice. But it is undisputed that the state court did so, in pertinent part, because of [C]’s failure to comply with a court order, and that [C]’s failure to comply was undoubtedly due to the fact that the state court had previously issued a bench warrant for his arrest due to his failure to appear at a scheduled hearing on child support and allocation of travel costs. In other words, it is apparent from the record that [C] chose to initiate these federal proceedings because his efforts at enforcing the [English] family court’s January 11, 2016 order in the state court were stymied by his own failure to comply with the state court’s orders and the state court’s resulting issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest. Second, the record makes clear that the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the access claims raised by [C] in this federal action. And third, we conclude that the state court proceedings involve two important state interests: family relations and the interest in enforcing arrest warrants that have been issued by a state court.”
“… the county-specific nature of the US State child custody jurisdiction, and the power of individual generic judges in rural counties, can conspire to create a situation where, as here, access to justice for particular children and/or parents can be completely curtailed.”
“completely transgressed the boundaries of judicial discretion into the realm of assertion or outright falsehoods due to clear bias against [the father] and in favour of [the mother] with whom [the District Court judge] shares numerous attributes”
“…a single district judge controlling a generic court who shows a predisposition to receive, accept and believe from [the mother] (who, like himself, is a wealthy lawyer resident in southern suburbs of [X]) voluminous non-sworn oral and written submissions without subjecting any of these, as required by Colorado and US laws to any evidentiary hearings conducted under due process.”
“(3) A court in England and Wales cannot make a section 1(1)(d) order unless- (a) it has jurisdiction under the Hague Convention, or (b) the Hague Convention does not apply but – (i) the condition in s 3 of this Act is satisfied, or (ii) the child concerned is present in England and Wales on the relevant date and the court considers that the immediate exercise of its powers is necessary for his protection.” (a) it has jurisdiction under the Hague Convention, or (b) the Hague Convention does not apply but – (i) the condition in s 3 of this Act is satisfied, or (ii) the child concerned is present in England and Wales on the relevant date and the court considers that the immediate exercise of its powers is necessary for his protection.”
“It is clear from the authorities that the English court has, by delegation from the Sovereign, jurisdiction to make a wardship order whenever the Sovereign as parens patriae has a quasi-parental relationship towards the infant. The infant owes a duty of allegiance and has a corresponding right to protection and therefore may be made a ward of court: Hope v Hope. Subsequent cases confirm that that is the basis of the jurisdiction… An infant of British nationality, whether he is in or outside this country, owes a duty of allegiance to the Sovereign and so is entitled to protection, and the English court has jurisdiction to make him a ward of court.”