‘Whilst not directly relevant to the court’s determination of the issues as they now stand, it is a feature of this case that, in being dependent upon the surrogate’s consent to the making of an order that fully and properly recognises W and X as Z’s parents, they are dependent upon the consent of Y. In that regard, whilst the Guardian does not seek a declaration of incompatibility, it not being considered in Z’s best interests to prolong proceedings, and in the absence of the other parties making an application for the same, the following points are noted: (a) Surrogacy provides a means by which two individuals whose assigned genders are male can create a family which has a genetic link to one parent. (b) By direct analogy, the means by which two individuals whose assigned genders are female can create a family which has a genetic link to one parent is by assisted conception (either IVF or artificial insemination). (c) In relation to (b) (i) section 42 of the HFEA 2008 provides for the recognition of the second parent as the legal parent from the point of the embryo, sperm and eggs or sperm being inseminated, irrespective of where the assisted conception took place, unless it can be shown that the second person did not consent to the procedure. This applies irrespective of whether the procedure took place in this jurisdiction. (ii) The same applies under section 43 in relation to (b) where the two individuals are not married or in a civil partnership but the treatment occurs in an HFEA licenced clinic within the UK and where under section 44 the agreed female parenthood conditions are met demonstrating that second parent consents to being treated as such. (iii) In either (i) or (ii) an individual whose assigned gender is female is able to be recognised as the second parent from the point of conception and conferred the status of second parent at birth automatically as long as the above provisions are met. (d) In the case (a), an individual whose acquired gender is male is unable to be recognised as the legal parent until either a parental order is granted or an adoption order. The requirement under section 54 of the HFEA for the surrogate’s consent and the absence of any ability for this to be dispensed results in a situation in which, by virtue of the assigned genders of the intended parents, a child born of surrogacy commissioned by two individuals whose assigned genders are male, is not afforded the same rights to have both intended parents recognised as their legal parents as child who is born of assisted conception commissioned by two individuals whose assigned genders are female.’
“W and I would like to continue with the joint parental order application as we think this will be in the best interest of Z so I would really appreciate it if you could think about giving your consent to the application…If you want to talk on the phone please let me know.”