“I am, of course, well aware that, until now, the courts have not granted injunctions in the circumstances which arise in this case. It is equally true that the claimants are uniquely notorious. On the basis of the evidence presented to me, their case is exceptional.”
“The level of animosity felt towards, and the risks faced by JV can be seen in the public attitude towards Mr. [XX] who was mistaken for JV. Mr. XX was first mistaken for JV 5 years ago and he and his family have moved on a number of occasions, having been ‘forced to flee for our lives’. On a night out in a pub he was warned by a friend that he must leave immediately as he was going to be stabbed in the toilets. Police concern for his safety led to the installation of a panic button in his home. Since the claimants returned to prison more than 2000 people have joined a Facebook group claiming that Mr. XX is JV. The group’s members have vowed to track him down and wreak revenge for “the murder of James Bolger”
“23. There is understandable and legitimate public interest in the fact that one of James Bulger’s killers has now been convicted of child pornography offences. That fact and the details of those offences can now be (and have been since last Friday) freely reported. But there is no legitimate public interest in knowing his appearance, his location in custody; or the exact location at which he was arrested and to which he might return in the event of being released; or, if there is, it is of marginal significance when set against the compelling evidence of a clear and present danger to his physical safety and indeed his life if these facts are made public. 24. As for his new name, my original view was that if he were to be tried and convicted by a jury in that name, it would then inevitably become a matter of public record, and the claimant would have brought that on himself. But now that he has been convicted on his own pleas of guilty entered in the name of JV, there is no reason why his new name should be made public. The effect of doing so would simply be to assist those who seek to track him down. The fact of public interest, as I have already said, is that the man formally known as JV has been convicted. His new name is entirely immaterial. 25. I do not think it makes any difference whether the case is put on the basis of JV’s right to life underArticle 2 of the ECHR or on the basis of domestic law. Even if theHuman Rights Act 1998 had never been enacted I would reach the same conclusion as a matter of domestic law. It is a fundamental duty of the State to ensure that suspects, defendants and prisoners are protected from violence and not subjected to retribution or punishment except in accordance with the sentence of a court. That principle applies just as much to unpopular defendants as to anyone else.”
“The commission of these offences and the possession of the manual suggest that you have a compulsive interest in serious sexual crime against small children. The possession of the manual also suggests that you were at least contemplating the possibility of moving on to what are called “contact offences”, that is actual sexual crime against children. This is against a background where you know the very substantial penalties you face if you are caught. The incentive for you to live a quiet [and] law-abiding life out of the public eye does not just come from penalties imposed by the criminal justice system, which is why there is an injunction in place to protect your life. You took a very great risk when you committed these offences and this suggests to me a compulsive desire which you could not control. You did this on a day when you were undergoing assessment in the [context] of your life licence. This shows how manipulative and dishonest you are. There is no evidence that you have ever actually embarked on the commission of any contact offence. There is no evidence of grooming or, in this set of material, of you having been in contact with other men with a view to gaining access to children.”
“In the present case the reason for advancing that special quality is that, if the information was published, the publication would be likely to lead to grave and possibly fatal consequences. In my judgment, the court does have the jurisdiction, in exceptional cases, to extend the protection of confidentiality of information, even to impose restrictions on the press, when not to do so would be likely to lead to serious physical injury, or to the death, of the person seeking that confidentiality, and there is no other way to protect the Applicants other than by seeking relief from the court.”
“The Attorney General and the Official Solicitor both submitted that there is a high risk of serious physical harm and the real possibility that a claimant might be killed if identified. Moreland J and Pill LJ felt it necessary to grant injunctions to protect the children during their detention in secure accommodation. In 1993 Moreland J considered that there was a real risk of revenge attacks upon them from others. Lord Woolf CJ in his statement on the tariff in October 2000 confirmed, from the information presented to him on the tariff, that that remained the situation. I heard evidence, in chambers, which supported the conclusion to which Lord Woolf CJ came, that there are solid grounds for concern that, if their identities were revealed on release, there might well be an attack or attacks on the claimants, and that such an attack or attacks might well be murderous.”
“A risk of a breach of the unqualified rights in Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR is a risk as to events in the future rather than a present breach of that unqualified right. Accordingly, I do not think that even such a potential breach can automatically trump the Article 10 right to freedom of expression. A broadly similar approach as the Supreme Court adopted in PJS v News Group Newspapers Limited[2016] AC 1081 is required. There must be an intense focus on the nature and extent of the risks under Articles 2 and 3, and on the comparative gravity of those risks and of the rights under Article 8 and 10 of the ECHR in the individual case. The justification for interfering with Articles 8 and 10 or for restricting each of those rights must be taken into account, and a proportionality test must be applied.”
“57. If PJS’s case was simply based on confidentiality (or secrecy), then, while I would not characterise his claim for a permanent injunction as hopeless, it would have substantial difficulties. The publication of the story in newspapers in the United States, Canada, and even in Scotland would not, I think, be sufficient of itself to undermine the claim for a permanent injunction on the ground of privacy. However, the consequential publication of the story on websites, in tweets and other forms of social network, coupled with consequential oral communications, has clearly resulted in many people in England and Wales knowing at least some details of the story, including the identity of PJS, and many others knowing how to get access to the story. There are claims that between 20% and 25% of the population know who PJS is, which, it is fair to say, suggests that at least 75% of the population do not know the identity of PJS, and presumably more than 75% do not know much if anything about the details of the story. However, there comes a point where it is simply unrealistic for a court to stop a story being published in a national paper on the ground to confidentiality, and, on the current state of the evidence, I would, I think, accept that, if one was solely concerned with confidentiality, that point had indeed been passed in this case.”
“Confidentiality in a meaningful sense can survive a certain amount of leakage, and every case must be decided on its, but in this case I have reached a clear view that the story’s confidentiality has become so porous that the idea of it still remaining secret in a meaningful sense is illusory. Once it has become readily available to anyone who wants to know it, it is lost the essence of confidentiality. The court must live in the world as it is and not as it would like it to be. I would echo Jackson LJ’s words that “it is in my view inappropriate (some may use a stronger term) for the court to ban people from saying that which is common knowledge”
“It is known, from social media monitoring, that there are large sections of society with remaining strong feelings of anger and hatred towards the subject, some appearing to be of an obsessive nature. It is assessed that there is a high likelihood of these emotions manifesting as targeted or opportunistic violence towards the subject were his identity widely available. Whilst there have been no targeted threats of violence towards the subject, owing to the preservation of his identity, open source research has revealed social media posts of a violent nature from perceivably unconnected members of the public. The open source research has been limited to open profiles, and it is believed that private profiles or groups exist with the explicit purpose of sharing views about the subject in a private forum. The content of these groups or the intent of the members is not known but it is likely that some exist for the discussion and escalation of vigilante behaviour. The existence of the injunction has been and remains a critical element in protecting against Article 2 risks presented to the subject. Whilst the amended injunction proposal does not seek to directly reveal current details of the case and is limited to information not including images, it is highly likely, if not inevitable, that triangulation of geographical and biographical information would reveal his current identity beyond doubt to previous associates and lead to the revelation of recent images and information confirming the identity of the subject on social media. This is at least as wide reaching as the mainstream media but with little scope for censorship or control. Such is the nature of social media, any successful identification of the subject online is highly likely to reach individuals with whom he associates [who] were unaware of his identity and may react adversely when presented with this revelation. This could lead to confirmation of his current or future location and lead to targeted or opportunistic vigilante violence or demonstrations. A full compromise of the subject’s identity would make the application of covert protection measures untenable due to his notoriety and high profile nature. It would be impractical to consider relocating the subject in a new identity without significant changes to his appearance which would not be considered reasonable and proportionate balanced against maintaining the injunction and preserving his identity in a less intrusive manner.”