“Convictions as evidence in civil proceedings. (1)In any civil proceedings the fact that a person has been convicted of an offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or [of a service offence (anywhere)] shall (subject to subsection (3) below) be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any issue in those proceedings, that he committed that offence, whether he was so convicted upon a plea of guilty or otherwise and whether or not he is a party to the civil proceedings; but no conviction other than a subsisting one shall be admissible in evidence by virtue of this section. (2)In any civil proceedings in which by virtue of this section a person is proved to have been convicted of an offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or [of a service offence]— (a)he shall be taken to have committed that offence unless the contrary is proved; and (b)without prejudice to the reception of any other admissible evidence for the purpose of identifying the facts on which the conviction was based, the contents of any document which is admissible as evidence of the conviction, and the contents of the information, complaint, indictment or charge-sheet on which the person in question was convicted, shall be admissible in evidence for that purpose. (3)Nothing in this section shall prejudice the operation of Section 13 of this Act or any other enactment whereby a conviction or a finding of fact in any criminal proceedings is for the purposes of any other proceedings made conclusive evidence of any fact….”
“It suffices to say that, where the case against a father or stepfather is that he has perpetrated acts of abuse on children of a former family, and where the issue as to his perpetration of those acts has been directly relevant in earlier proceedings relating to that family to which he was a party, has been fully investigated and has been the subject of an express finding, in accordance with the appropriate standard of proof, that he did so perpetrate them, I would hold that he could not challenge the finding in the later proceedings. It seems overwhelmingly convenient that the issue should be taken to have been adjudicated nearer the relevant time, i.e. in the earlier proceedings, in proceedings in which the children themselves and their mother were almost certainly active participants and in which the central focus was upon those children. To that limited extent I would import the doctrine of issue estoppel into children cases. Indeed, emboldened by the words of Butler-Sloss LJ which I have already quoted, and the observation of Balcombe LJ in the Ealing case (above) at p 793H to the effect that: ‘this is not ordinary civil litigation: it concerns children’, I would thereby necessarily be extending the doctrine of issue estoppel in its application that the parties in both proceedings should be the same.”
“It seems to me that the weight of Court of Appeal authority is against the existence of any strict rule of issue estoppel which is binding upon any of the parties in children's cases. At the same time, the court undoubtedly has a discretion as to how the inquiry before it is to be conducted. This means that it may on occasions decline to allow a full hearing of the evidence on certain matters even if the strict rules of issue estoppel would not cover them. Although some might consider this approach to be a typical example of the lack of rigour which some critics discern in the family jurisdiction, it seems to me to encompass both the flexibility which is essential in children's cases and the increased control exercised by the court rather than the parties which is already a feature of the court's more inquisitorial role in children's cases (and beginning to gain ground in other litigation as shown in the Woolf Report on Access to Justice)”
“The judgement of Coleridge J in R v Hartington Middle Quarter Inhabitants contains the classic statement of principle. ‘The judgement’ relied upon a res judicata ‘concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide, and which was actually decided, as the groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point in issue.’ It is ‘conclusive evidence, not merely of the fact directly decided, but of those facts also which are… necessary steps to the decision, … [and] so cardinal to it that without them it cannot stand. Unless they are necessary steps, the rule fails and they are collateral facts only. He rejected the proposition that ‘the judgement can only be evidence of the very fact actually decided. Where the decision necessarily involves a judicial determination of some issue of law or fact, because it could not have been legitimately or rationally pronounced without determining or assuming a particular answer, that determination, though not expressed, is an integral part of the decision. There is otherwise no such thing as an issue estoppel by implication.”
“It’s Emma here. I think it’s really important to say that we were really impressed with MGM and similarly felt that she was able to work with professionals, that she was open to advice, that she was open and honest. It’s none of those reasons why we’re preferencing the placement with PA and her husband over with her. There are other reasons that we’ve not spoken about yet, I suppose, and I think we’re not in dispute or anything. I think MGM has so many strengths. She’s got a lot to offer the children. She’s very thoughtful. She presented as open and honest in many ways. So, I don’t think we’re in dispute about any of those things at all.”