“6. Every person in this jurisdiction has the inalienable right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: the freedom to believe whatever one wishes, to be able to express those beliefs, to manifest them in every aspect of life, including to associate with others who hold similar beliefs; additionally, self-evidently, the right to bring up their children within those beliefs and the right not to be treated less favourably than others because of those beliefs. Those rights have long been recognised in our society and are enshrined in our law (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights and enacted in the Human Rights Act of 1998). This case, in common with other similar ones, confronts not just behaviours but, as I recorded earlier, whether and in what circumstances the religiously motivated views of parents are so harmful to their children that the state should intervene to protect the child. All families are free to bring up their children as they see fit, provided of course, that within a wide ambit they do not cause them harm. But the question in this and in other cases is under what circumstances might the parents’ religious views and activities result in harm to the children’s physical and emotional health and well-being. 7. The Government’s Prevent Strategy and the radicalisation of some parents and of their children has brought this issue very much to the fore; it challenges the tolerance and neutrality between different religions and perspectives, in particular denying the opportunity to individuals to prevent hatred (and thus extremism). It goes to the very roots of democratic and jealously guarded freedoms. Self-evidently the State cannot place limitations on beliefs that are held by a private individual. It can, however, place limitations on the manifestation of those beliefs if that limitation is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, which in these circumstances would be protecting public order, health, morals, freedoms or rights of others, generally or individually.”
“Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Dawlat al - 'Iraq al - Islamiyya, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al Sham (DAISh) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham - Proscribed June 2014. ISIL is a brutal Sunni Islamist terrorist group active in Iraq and Syria. The group adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. ISIL aims to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law in the region and impose their rule on people using violence and extortion. ISIL was previously proscribed as part of Al Qa’ida (AQ). However on2 February 2014 , AQ senior leadership issued a statement officially severing ties with ISIL. This prompted consideration of the case to proscribe ISIL in its own right. ISIL not only poses a threat from within Syria but has made significant advances in Iraq. The threat from ISIL in Iraq and Syria is very serious and shows clearly the importance of taking a strong stand against the extremists. We are aware that a number of British nationals have travelled to Syria and some of these will inevitably be fighting with ISIL. It appears that ISIL is treating Iraq and Syria as one theatre of conflict and its potential ability to operate across the border must be a cause of concern for the whole international community. In April 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting a Shia election rally in Baghdad. These attacks are reported to have killed at least 31 people. Thousands of Iraqi civilians lost their lives to sectarian violence in 2013, and attacks carried out by ISIL will have accounted for a large proportion of these deaths. ISIL has reportedly detained dozens of foreign journalists and aid workers. In September 2013, members of the group kidnapped and killed the commander of Ahrarash - Sham after he intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity. In January 2014, ISIL captured the Al-Anbar cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, and is engaged in ongoing fighting with the Iraqi security forces. The group also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik. ISIL has a strong presence in northern and eastern Syria where it has instituted strict Sharia law in the towns under its control. The group is responsible for numerous attacks and a vast number of deaths. The group is believed to attract foreign fighters, including Westerners, to the region. The group has maintained control of various towns on the Syrian/Turkish border allowing the group to control who crosses and ISIL’s presence there has interfered with the free flow of humanitarian aid. Note: The Government laid an Order in August 2014 which provides that “Islamic State (Dawlat al Islamiya)” should be treated as another name for the organisation which is already proscribed as ISIL. The UK does not recognise ISIL’s claims of a ‘restored’ Caliphate or a new Islamic State.”
“[The mother] approached me via a phone call in relation to her ongoing issues with Social Services. She explained that she had returned from Syria and had had her daughter removed from her care. She said that Social Services had implied during the course of their interactions that she was radicalised and that this is one of the reasons for the removal. She expressed her concern around this and asked for support with how to manage and communicate with Social Services as she felt victimised. I would like to make clear that at no point during this phone conversation did she say she was radicalised and there was no indication that she is in fact radicalised. I have never met [the mother] and contact has only been over the phone.”
“67. The fact that this case involves alleged risk of harm to a child consequent upon alleged risk of radicalisation, alleged extremist beliefs or alleged risk of removal to Syria does not change the fundamental legal principles that must be applied when determining the applications before the court. Those principles can be summarised as follows: i) The burden of proving the facts pleaded rests with the local authority. In cases of alleged extremist beliefs or ideology, alleged risk of radicalisation and alleged risk of removal to a war zone, it is for the local authority to establish these on the balance of probabilities. There is no requirement on a parent to prove the contrary. Where a respondent parent seeks to prove an alternative explanation for a given course of conduct but does not prove that alternative explanation, that failure does not, of itself, establish the local authority’s case, which must still be proved to the requisite standard (see The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 948 ). ii) The standard to which the local authority must satisfy the court is the simple balance of probabilities. The inherent probability or improbability of an event remains a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred (Re B[2008] UKHL 35 at [15]). Within this context, there is no room for a finding by the court that something might have happened. The court may decide that it did or that it did not (Re B[2008] UKHL 35 at [2]). The legal concept of proof on the balance ofprobabilities must be applied with “common sense” (The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 948 ). iii) Findings of fact must be based on evidence not on speculation. The decision on whether the facts in issue have been proved to the requisite standard must be based on all of the available evidence and should have regard to the wide context of social, emotional, ethical and moral factors (A County Council v A Mother, A Father and X,Y and Z[2005] EWHC 31 (Fam) ). iv) In determining whether the local authority has discharged the burden upon it the court looks at what has been described as “the broad canvas” of the evidence before it. The court takes account of a wide range of matters including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and inferences that can be properly drawn from the evidence. The role of the court is to consider the evidence in its totality and to make findings on the balance of probabilities accordingly. Within this context, the court must consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the other evidence (Re T[2004] 2 FLR 838 at [33]). v) The evidence of the parents and carers is of utmost importance and it is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. The court is likely to place considerable reliability and weight on the evidence and impression it forms of them (see Gestamin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd v Anor[2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) at [15] to [21] and Lancashire County Council v M and F[2014] EWHC 3 (Fam) ). vi) As to the issue of lies, the court must always bear in mind that a witness may tell lies in the course of an investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress. The fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (R v Lucas[1982] QB 720 ). vii) With respect to the welfare decision that is before the court, in the proceedings underPart IV of the Children Act 1989 before making a final order the court must be satisfied that the threshold criteria set out insection 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 are made out and must have regard to the matters set out insection 1 of the 1989 Act , which matters include the stipulation that the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration. In the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, before making a final order the court must be satisfied that the order sought is in the child’s best interests having regard to the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration. 68. Whilst, as I have noted, the fact that this case involves alleged risk of harm to a child consequent upon alleged risk of radicalisation, alleged extremist beliefs or alleged risk of removal to Syria does not change the foregoing fundamental legal principles, it is important in cases of this nature to further emphasise the following matters. 69. Suspicion is not enough. In these difficult and emotive cases, suspicion perhaps finds an easier foothold than in other cases concerning harm to children. In the context of cases of this type, in Re X & Y (No 3)[2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) the President observed at [110] that “There are many matters on which I am suspicious, but suspicion is not enough, nor is surmise, speculation or assertion”
“1 Terrorism: Interpretation. (1) In this Act “terrorism means the use or threat of action where – (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it -- (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. (4) In this section – (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. (5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.” 72. With respect to the concepts of “radicalisation” and “extremism”, the Revised ‘Prevent’ Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for Specified Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in theCounter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 defines ‘radicalisation’ as follows: “Radicalisation’ refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.”
“… vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.” 73. The Revised ‘Prevent’ Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for Specific Authorities in England and Wales on the Duty in theCounter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 states as follows in respect of Islamist extremism: “Islamist extremists regard Western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a ‘war with Islam’, creating a narrative of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Their ideology includes the uncompromising belief that people cannot be both Muslim and British, and that Muslims living here should not participate in our democracy. Islamist extremists specifically attack the principles of civic participation and social cohesion. These extremists purport to identify grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.” 74. In this context, it is also useful to consider the analysis (undertaken within the context of a plea of justification in a libel action) of Haddon-Cave J in thecase of Begg v BBC[2016] EWHC 2688 (QB) at [117] to [128] of positions that may be considered “extremist Islamic positions” in the context of Islam and Islamic doctrinal positions. In that case, Haddon-Cave J drew the following conclusions (footnotes excluded): “[117] What is ‘extreme’ is, by definition, something which is not ‘moderate’. Thus, ‘extremist’ Islamic positions can be seen in contradistinction to ‘moderate’ or ‘mainstream’ Islamic positions. Dr Wilkinson usefully defines moderate Islam as essentially those ideas, doctrines and worldviews consensually agreed by Sunni and Shia Islamic Law Muslim scholars, mainstream Salafi scholars and Muslims, generally to constitute the essential doctrines, teachings and spirit of Islam, according to Qur’an and Sunna, applied in such a way as to be suitable for the context of contemporary Britain. I agree with this as a general working definition. Extremist Islamic positions [118] In my view, the following constitute “extremist”
“The second fundamentally important point is the need to link the facts relied upon by the local authority with its case on threshold, the need to demonstrate why, as the local authority asserts, facts A+B+C justify the conclusion that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, significant harm of types X, Y or Z. Sometimes the linkage will be obvious, as where the facts proved establish physical harm. But the linkage may be very much less obvious where the allegation is only that the child is at risk of suffering emotional harm or, as in the present case, at risk of suffering neglect. In the present case, as we shall see, an important element of the local authority’s case was that the father “lacks honesty with professionals”, “minimises matters of importance” and “is immature and lacks insight of issues of importance”
“fam – my sheikh was showin me vids of life over in the state – its not what u think fam – bruv – u can go over there – n still whip a merc – n a bmw – n live a calm life … the fightings more on the borders now … plus over there … u will have more rights than over here – nobody will get away … with injustice against u – even if ur a fighter”