“FII is a spectrum of disorders, rather than a single entity. At one end less extreme behaviours include a genuine belief that a child is ill. At the other the behaviour of carers includes them deliberately inducing symptoms by administering drugs, intentional suffocation, overdosing, tampering with medical equipment and falsifying test results and observational charts. [If] the court accepts that AG was administered alcohol and chlorpheniramine, unknown to the medical staff responsible for his care, then this case would fall at the severe end of the spectrum, given that AG suffered from life-threatening episodes requiring repeated resuscitation.”
“To these matters I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death, the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record keeping or recollection of the person hearing or relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as “story-creep” may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith.” ix) As to the issue of lies, the court must always bear in mind that a witness may tell lies in the course of an investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress. The fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied above everything (R v Lucas[1982] QB 720 ). Within this context, it is important to note that, in line with the principles outlined in the R v Lucas, in seeking to determine whether a person is a perpetrator, or should be included within the pool of possible perpetrators, it is essential that the court weighs any lies told by that person against any evidence that points away from them having been responsible (H v City and Council of Swansea and Others[2011] EWCA Civ 195 ). x) It is also important when considering its decision as to the findings sought that the Court take into account of the presence or absence of any risk factors and any protective factors which are apparent on the evidence. In Re BR[2015] EWFC 41 Peter Jackson J sets out a useful summary of those factors drawn from information from the NSPCC, the Common Assessment Framework and the Patient UK Guidance for Health Professionals. xi) It is in the public interest that those who cause injury to children be identified (Re K (Non-accidental Injuries: Perpetrator: New Evidence)[2005] 1 FLR 285 ). The court should accordingly endeavour to identify on the simple balance of probabilities the person or persons responsible for inflicting the injuries in question where it is possible to do so. xii) The Court should not, however, ‘strain’ the evidence before it in order to identify on the simple balance of probabilities the individual or individuals who inflicted the injuries. If it is clear that it is not possible on the evidence before the court for the court to conclude on the balance of probabilities who the perpetrator of the injuries is, or perpetrators of the injuries are and the court remains genuinely uncertain, then the court should reach that conclusion (Re D (Care Proceedings: Preliminary Hearing)[2009] 2 FLR 668 ). xiii) The threshold pursuant tos 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 may still be satisfied where the court finds that significant harm was caused by one or other or both of the parents but is unable to identify which parent is the perpetrator or that they both are. In in Lancashire CC v B[2000] 1 FLR 583 at 588 Lord Nicholls observed as follows: “In the present case the child is proved to have sustained significant harm at the hands of one or both of her parents or at the hands of a daytime carer. But, according to this argument, if the court is unable to identify which of the child's carers was responsible for inflicting the injuries, the child remains outside the threshold prescribed by Parliament as the threshold which must be crossed before the court can proceed to consider whether it is in the best interests of the child to make a care order or supervision order. The child must, for the time being, remain unprotected, sinces 31 of the Children Act 1989 and its associated emergency and interim provisions now provide the only court mechanism available to a local authority to protect a child from risk of further harm. I cannot believe Parliament intended that the attributable condition in s 31(2)(b) should operate in this way. Such an interpretation would mean that the child's future health, or even her life, would have to be hazarded on the chance that, after all, the non-parental carer rather than one of the parents inflicted the injuries. Self-evidently, to proceed in such a way when a child is proved to have suffered serious injury on more than one occasion could be dangerously irresponsible.” xiv) Where the court cannot identify a perpetrator or perpetrators on the simple balance of probabilities, it is still important to identify the pool of possible perpetrators by asking whether the evidence establishes that there is a ‘likelihood or real possibility’ that a given person perpetrated the injuries in question (North Yorkshire CC v SA[2003] 2 FLR 849 ). In North Yorkshire CC v SA Butler-Sloss LJ stated: “In these difficult and worrying cases where the court has, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead has said, to recognise and have regard to the differing interests of the adults and the child, Parliament has provided a two-limb threshold which requires to be satisfied before the court has the right to consider the welfare of the child. The first is met in this appeal since the child was injured and suffered significant harm. In relation to the second limb, the attributable condition, it seems to me that the two most likely outcomes in ‘uncertain perpetrator' cases are as follows. The first is that there is sufficient evidence for the court positively to identify the perpetrator or perpetrators. Secondly, if there is not sufficient evidence to make such a finding, the court has to apply the test set out by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead as to whether there is a real possibility or likelihood that one or more of a number of people with access to the child might have caused the injury to the child. For this purpose, real possibility and likelihood can be treated as the same test. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead pointed out in Re O and N; Re B[2003] UKHL 18 ,[2003] 1 FLR 1169 the views and indications that the judge at the first part of a split trial may be able to set out may be of great assistance at the later stage of assessment and the provision of the protection package for the injured child. I would therefore formulate the test set out by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead as, ‘Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?'. There may perhaps also be the third possibility that there is no indicator to help the court decide from whom the risk to the child may come, in which eventuality it would be very difficult for the local authority and for the court to assess where the child might be at most risk.”
“If the evidence is not such as to establish responsibility on the balance of probabilities it should nevertheless be such as to establish whether there is a real possibility that a particular person was involved. When looking at how best to protect the child and provide for his future, the judge will have to consider the strength of that possibility as part of the overall circumstances of the case.”