“(1) The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.”
“[38] It has to be borne in mind that the choice for the court is not confined to either ordering or refusing to order disclosure. The court has power to impose appropriate conditions where that is necessary to hold the balance fairly and in a Convention-compliant manner. [39] Sometimes (as in Re Z (Children) (Disclosure: Criminal Proceedings)) it will be quite clear what document(s) need to be disclosed and there will be no need for the family court to impose any limitations or conditions upon their subsequent use. Sometimes there may be uncertainty as to precisely which documents should be disclosed. (After all, the person seeking disclosure, if not a party to the proceedings in the family court, may not know what documents there are which might appropriately be disclosed and the family court may have a less than perfect understanding of the other proceedings.) In such a case a ‘step by step' approach may be appropriate, the family court directing the disclosure of the documents which seem to be most immediately relevant but on the basis that the applicant can always make a supplementary application for the disclosure of further documents. Sometimes (as in A Health Authority v X (Discovery: Medical Conduct)[2001] 2 FLR 673 ) it may be appropriate – indeed essential, if rights protected by the Convention are not to be breached – to impose more or less stringent limitations or conditions upon the use of the documents. In particular, it may be appropriate for the family court to retain control over any further dissemination of the documents (or of the information contained in the documents) especially if there is a prospect of the documents (or the information) entering the public domain. Sometimes it may be appropriate to disclose only parts of certain documents or to disclose documents in an edited or redacted form.”
“2. The Director-General. (1) The operations of the Service shall continue to be under the control of a Director-General appointed by the Secretary of State. (2) The Director-General shall be responsible for the efficiency of the Service and it shall be his duty to ensure— (a) that there are arrangements for securing that no information is obtained by the Service except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its functions or disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose or for the purpose of the prevention or detection of serious crime or for the purpose of any criminal proceedings; and (b) that the Service does not take any action to further the interests of any political party; and (c) that there are arrangements, agreed with the Director General of the National Crime Agency, for co-ordinating the activities of the Service in pursuance of section 1(4) of this Act with the activities of police forces, the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies.” (a) that there are arrangements for securing that no information is obtained by the Service except so far as necessary for the proper discharge of its functions or disclosed by it except so far as necessary for that purpose or for the purpose of the prevention or detection of serious crime or for the purpose of any criminal proceedings; and (b) that the Service does not take any action to further the interests of any political party; and (c) that there are arrangements, agreed with the Director General of the National Crime Agency, for co-ordinating the activities of the Service in pursuance of section 1(4) of this Act with the activities of police forces, the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies.”
“[156] In the course of this judgment we have made detailed reference to the various statutory and other safeguards and oversights which govern the receipt of intercepted material in the UK. Save in one possible (and to date hypothetical respect) we have ruled that the current regime…when conducted in accordance with the requirements we have considered, is lawful and human rights compliant… [157] The legislation in force and the safeguards to which we have referred are intended to recognise the importance of, and the need to maintain, an acceptable balance between (a) the interests of the state to acquire information for the vital purpose of national security and the protection of its citizens from terrorism and other serious crime; and (b) the vital interests of all citizens to know that the law makes effective provision to safeguard their rights to privacy and freedom of expression, together with appropriate and effective limits upon what the state does with that information.”
“The disclosure is to responsible professionals who will use the material for the purpose for which it is shared, namely criminal investigation and possible prosecution. The criminal justice system has its own responsibility and powers to protect the vulnerable.”
“The importance of coordinated strategy, predicated on open and respectful cooperation between all the safeguarding agencies involved should be recognised, as should the need for open dialogue, appropriate sharing of information, mutual respect for the differing roles involved and inter-agency co-operation”
“The need to preserve the secrecy of information relating to intelligence and military operations in order to counter terrorism, criminal activity, hostile activity and subversion has been recognised by the European Commission and the court in relation to complaints made under article 10 and other articles under the Convention: see Engel v The Netherlands (No 1)(1976) 1 EHRR 647 , paras 100–103; Klass v Federal Republic of Germany(1978) 2 EHRR 214 , para 48; Leander v Sweden(1987) 9 EHRR 433 , para 59; Hadjianastassiou v Greece(1992) 16 EHRR 219 , paras 45–47; Esbester v United Kingdom (1993) 18 EHRR CD 72, 74; Brind v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR CD 76, 83–84; Murray v United Kingdom(1994) 19 EHRR 193 , para 58; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v The Netherlands(1995) 20 EHRR 189 , paras 35, 40. The thrust of these decisions and judgments has not been to discount or disparage the need for strict and enforceable rules but to insist on adequate safeguards to ensure that the restriction does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the end in question. The acid test is whether, in all the circumstances, the interference with the individual's Convention right prescribed by national law is greater than is required to meet the legitimate object which the state seeks to achieve. The OSA 1989, as it applies to the appellant, must be considered in that context.”