‘12. The Second Respondent father (as would have been expected of a reasonable parent) failed to seek timely medical attention for Z despite being aware of swelling to her leg and a bruise to her back. 13. Further, the Second Respondent father, as a parent whom had care of Z from time to time, failed to recognise, appropriately respond to or enquire about her ongoing discomfort and/or pain as would have been evidence to him and expected of a reasonable parent.’
‘I am of the opinion that the relatives in the Punjab are unable to offer a viable and permanent home to Z. Due to the injuries that Z has sustained and the impact of these, Z currently requires a significant amount of care from her foster carer, medical staff and community-based health professionals. Based on the current assessment of Z’s physical and cognitive disabilities, it is likely that she will require this significant level of care throughout her life and I am concerned about the facilities in the Punjab region where both sets of grandparents live. I have discussed this issue with Shila (sic) Foster in the kinship team who has personal experience of the region in the Punjab where the grandparents live. She has indicated that there would be limited healthcare and educational facilities for a child with Z’s difficulties. Furthermore, she has raised reservations about how a child with Z’s difficulties may be viewed culturally.’
“evidence of the lack of alternative options for the children and an analysis of the evidence that is accepted by the court sufficient to drive it to the conclusion that nothing short of adoption is appropriate for the children.”
“An assessment of the benefits and detriments of each option for placement and in particular the nature and extent of the risk of harm involved in each of the options”
“the need to take into account the negatives, as well as the positives, of any plan to place a child away from her natural family”
“However, research indicates that the outcomes for children that have been…adopted are generally more favourable as they have a sense of ‘belonging’ and a life-long commitment from the adoptive family. Problems and/or issues in relation to identity can to a degree, be addressed via letterbox contact with birth parents. The Local Authority have identified Z’s current carer wishes to adopt her; clearly this will provide continuity in the specialist care that Z needs and her attachments and bond with her carer will be maintained and indeed, will continue to grow and develop.”
‘the impact which giving permission would be likely to have on the timetable, duration and conduct of the proceedings’
‘22. The language used in Re B is striking. Different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear. Orders contemplating non-consensual adoption – care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders – are "a very extreme thing, a last resort", only to be made where "nothing else will do", where "no other course [is] possible in [the child's] interests", they are "the most extreme option", a "last resort – when all else fails", to be made "only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do": see Re B paras 74, 76, 77, 82, 104, 130, 135, 145, 198, 215. 23. Behind all this there lies the well-established principle, derived from s 1(5) of the 1989 Act, read in conjunction with s 1(3)(g), and now similarly embodied in s 1(6) of the 2002 Act, that the court should adopt the 'least interventionist' approach. As Hale J, as she then was, said in Re O (Care or Supervision Order)[1996] 2 FLR 755 , 760: “the court should begin with a preference for the less interventionist rather than the more interventionist approach. This should be considered to be in the better interests of the children … unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary.”… 25. Implicit in all this are three important points emphasised by Lord Neuberger in Re B. 26. First (Re B paras 77, 104), although the child's interests in an adoption case are paramount, the court must never lose sight of the fact that those interests include being brought up by the natural family, ideally by the natural parents, or at least one of them, unless the overriding requirements of the child's welfare make that not possible. 27. Second (Re B para 77), as required by section 1(3)(g) of the 1989 Act and section 1(6) of the 2002 Act, the court "must" consider all the options before coming to a decision. As Lady Hale said (para 198) it is "necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions". What are these options? That will depend upon the circumstances of the particular cases. They range, in principle, from the making of no order at one end of the spectrum to the making of an adoption order at the other. In between, there may be orders providing for the return of the child to the parent's care with the support of a family assistance order or subject to a supervision order or a care order; or the child may be placed with relatives under a residence order or a special guardianship order or in a foster placement under a care order; or the child may be placed with someone else, again under a residence order or a special guardianship order or in a foster placement under a care order. This is not an exhaustive list of the possibilities; wardship for example is another, as are placements in specialist residential or healthcare settings. Yet it can be seen that the possible list of options is long. We return to the implications of this below. 28. Third (Re B para 105), the court's assessment of the parents' ability to discharge their responsibilities towards the child must take into account the assistance and support which the authorities would offer. So "before making an adoption order … the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support”…’