“the hearing on9th December 2013 shall be utilized to enquire into: (i) The circumstances under which the China Tiger trusts were set up; (ii) The purpose of those trusts; (iii) Whether those trusts are nuptial settlements; (iv) The availability of funds within those trusts to the parties; (v) Whether the funds within those trusts can only be utilized for tiger conservation”
“[the wife] will no doubt seek to suggest that she has always been ignorant of such matters and has been dependent upon H to explain the true position. The evidence filed in these proceedings demonstrates that this stance by her is completely contrived. The evidence shows that – as she has been aware throughout: (a) The trust was created solely for the purpose of furthering the Chinese Tiger Project; (b) Suggestions at the time of creation of the trust that she or H might be beneficiaries were specifically rejected; (c) It was created in a great haste in order to take the place of two individuals (the Varty brothers) as a party to a tripartite agreement (the Framework Agreement) involving the Chinese Government and SCT (UK) in furtherance of the Chinese Tiger Project. (d) The need for haste has been explained in detail by H in his evidence (and indeed by W in her South African evidence) but was in essence caused by the Varty brothers reneging on the deal at the last minute such that the entire Framework Agreement which lies at the heart of the Chinese Tiger Project was in grave danger of falling apart. (e) Mauritius was chosen as a forum for the trust because South Africa would have presented exchange control problems. All of this has always been well known to W and her failure to be upfront about it is a serious breach of her duty of full and frank disclosure and has led to enormous costs being expended on behalf of SCT (UK) in obtaining the evidence to establish matters that should never have been put in issue.”
“He has never told me that, nor has Li, and in fact they have told me the opposite on, again, more occasions than I can recall. I want to reiterate that I have never seen a single document which contradicts the fact that it was a single-purpose trust; namely, for the benefit of, ultimately, the tigers but the project in general. I would certainly never have involved myself, at my own expense and put my reputation at risk and signed agreements with the Chinese government, if I had had any inkling at any stage in that process that this was a trust out of which Stuart and Li were entitled to benefit in a personal capacity.”
“The starting point for any consideration today of s 24(1)(c) must be the speech of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead (with whom Lords Keith of Kinkel, Ackner, Lloyd of Berwick and Steyn all agreed) in Brooks v Brooks[1996] AC 375 ,[1995] 3 WLR 141 ,[1995] 2 FLR 13 . At 391, 147 and 19 respectively Lord Nicholls said this: 'The section is concerned with a settlement “made on the parties to the marriage”
'Beyond this the authorities have consistently given a wide meaning to settlement in this context, and they have spelled out no precise limitations. This seems right, because this approach accords with the purpose of the statutory provision. Financial provision that is appropriate so long as the parties are married will often cease to be appropriate when the marriage ends. In order to promote the best interests of the parties and their children in the fundamentally changed situation, it is desirable that the court should have power to alter the terms of the settlement. The purpose of the section is to give the court this power. This object does not dictate that settlement should be given a narrow meaning. On the contrary, the purpose of the section would be impeded, rather than advanced, by confining its scope. The continuing use of the archaic expressions 'ante-nuptial' and 'post-nuptial' does not point in the opposite direction. These expressions are apt to embrace all settlements in respect of the particular marriage, whether made before or after the marriage. In this connection, it should be noted in passing that a settlement may be made in respect of a particular marriage even though in certain circumstances the wife or husband by a subsequent marriage might be the person to take. Lort-Williams v Lort-Williams[1951] P 395 affords an illustration of this.'
'Those words are extremely wide, and I am anxious that they should not, by any construction the Court may put upon them, be narrowed in any way. To narrow them would be undesirable for this reason: the various circumstances which come before the Court, and for which this section is brought into operation, are so diverse that it is to my mind extremely important that, so far as possible, the Court should have power to deal with all the cases that come before it, and, in dealing with them, to meet the justice of the case. I, therefore, do not desire to see any narrow interpretation placed upon the words of the section.'
'Is it upon the husband in the character of husband or in the wife in the character of wife, or upon both in the character of husband and wife? If it is, it is a settlement on the parties within the meaning of the section. The particular form of it does not matter. It may be a settlement in the strictest sense of the term, it may be a covenant to pay by one spouse to the other, or by a third person to a spouse. What does matter is that it should provide for the financial benefit of one or other or both of the spouses as spouses and with reference to their married state.'
'But whether a settlement is within s 192 does not depend on who is the settlor. In many ante-nuptial settlements, neither the husband nor the wife are themselves the settlors … But whether a settlement is within s 192 must depend on what it effects. If, in fact, it is a settlement on either husband or wife, or both in the character of husband or wife, it is wholly immaterial that it is prompted and stated to be prompted by affection only for one of them. On the question whether a settlement is a settlement within s 192, the motive of the settlor seems to me immaterial, except so far as it is given effect to by the terms of the deed.' [236] In N v N and F Trust Coleridge J conducted a careful survey of the authorities. The case concerned a property which was owned, via a Bahamian company, by a Jersey based trust of which the husband was a beneficiary. It was common ground that the Jersey settlement was not per se a nuptial settlement which could be varied by the court under s 24(1)(c) of the 1973 Act. However the Jersey Trust had made available a property to the husband and wife which they used as their family home. The wife argued, and Coleridge J agreed, that the property was subject to an ante-nuptial settlement which could accordingly be varied. Referring to Brooks v Brooks, he said (para [30]) that '
'My task is to consider what the real substance of the arrangement was which governed this property. The authorities make it clear that I should consider the question broadly and ask myself whether or not it was an arrangement which made ongoing provision for the husband, wife and/or child in those capacities. Motive is irrelevant.'
'This property was bought by the trust during the parties' engagement and prior to their marriage. I think there can be no doubt it was nuptial. In terms of the question of ongoing provision for them during their marriage, it is hard to think of any arrangement that is more ongoing than the provision of a matrimonial home.'
“The Husband created the CTSAT to benefit the tigers, his wife and himself. It has continued to benefit them by, for example, providing a home and paying for expenses (examples are in Annexe 1). In the not too distant future it will also provide capital. H can easily access CTSAT – he can become the Protector and thereafter dismiss the professional trustees. If he chooses not to take up residence and qualify as a professional trustee he can simply change the proper law of the trust. A man thus motivated will have no difficulty in getting round his self-imposed exclusion (he will use a separate corporate vehicle or simply charge ongoing commissions etc). The trust was settled for these parties. It provides ongoing benefit. It is a nuptial settlement. In addition it can provide real benefit.”
“I have spoken to Stuart and it does seem that there has been some confusion over how the trust should work. The key point is that Stuart should not be a beneficiary; the sole beneficiary should be the Save China’s Tigers charity Stuart would like to ensure that the proposed structure: Would entitle him to a US tax deduction should the trust never be in a position to repay his loan; Would not result in Stuart being taxed on any of the trusts income; Would be accepatbel [sic] to US and UK Charity commissions. The Mauritian lawyers have indicated various provisions of the trust deed which cause them problems under Mauritian law and I would like to determine whether the current form of the trust deed can achieve Stuart’s objectives if these provisions are deleted. The problem provisions are as follows: Clause 4 (g) ‘The Settlor shall have the unrestricted overriding power to remove a protector and to appoint new or additional Protectors…’ to be deleted. Clause 19 ‘RETAINED RIGHTS OF SETTLOR’ delete in its entirety. Clause 34(b), delete the added words entitling Stuart to the Trust Property on termination of the trust. Schedule 2, the sole beneficiary should be the Save China’s Tigers charity” … “As you are aware we are under considerable time pressure so I would like to have a conference call involving Bryan Cave and Mitch Barret (Mauritian trust attorney) as soon as possible. The object of the call is to agree a form of trust deed that is acceptable to all side[s] even if it is not perfect by the close of business today, so that we have [a] properly constituted and registered trust for the signing date of the Framework Agreement.”