London Borough of Haringey v Musa [2014] EWHC 2883 (Fam)

[2014] EWHC 2883 (Fam)

Case No FD14P00069

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date Thursday, 3 rd July 2014

Before

MR. JUSTICE NEWTON

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B E T W E E N:

Between

LONDON BOROUGH OF HARINGEYApplicants

MUSARespondents

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Rex Howling QC (instructed by Legal Services of Haringey Council) for Applicant

Kate Grieve (instructed by Corper Solicitors) for Respondent Mother

for The Respondent Father did not attend and was not represented.

Will Tyler QC (instructed by CAFCASS Legal Services) for Guardian for the Older children.

David Boyd (instructed by Creighton & Partners Solics) for Guardian for the Younger children.

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J U D G M E N T

(Transcript prepared from a poor quality recording)

[1]Doing the course of submissions in this difficult case, a document has been brought to my attention by counsel representing the mother. A second was lodged at the Clerk of the Rules’ office which has just been brought to me by my clerk, it is in similar terms. The document is not from a party or witness in the case, and is a perfect example of the problems which have beset this enquiry, ill tempered, ungoverned, ill informed and inaccurate comment by third parties. The document deals with a number of issues which have been raised in the proceedings, reaching back as far as 2010 when the care proceedings were instituted. But the point of interest, especially when it is the mother who apparently asserts that she wishes those supporters to stop, is that it was handed to the Court by the mother’s counsel as a document of some significance. The letter reads as follows:

“Dear Lord Munby and Judge Roderick Newton, Conflict of interest: recusal from the case I am sending this fax as a matter of urgency related to the above case. I am calling for the recusal of Judge Roderick Newton from the Musa case due to a ‘conflict of interest’ according to Judicial guidelines as follows: 1a. Where there is any possible conflict of interest (including family members) a Judge is to disclose this. I understand nothing has been disclosed. 1b Judge Lesley Newton (whom I believe to be the wife of Judge Roderick Newton) has been a member of the Family Justice Committee. 1c The Family Justice Council consisted of Dr. Adesida (alleged independent Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist - acting for Haringey). Therefore, a conflict of interest by ‘association’ and as it was between 2008 - 2009 and Judge R. Newton would be aware of this.”

The document (along with many others sent to Holman J) has been brought to my attention. For the record, so that those in court hear me say it, I am not, nor ever have been married to Judge Lesley Newton. Of course, I know Judge Lesley Newton as an eminent and highly respected circuit judge, but we have no personal connection. I am married to somebody else and, so far as I am aware, so is she. Even a cursory examination of “Whos Who” would confirm what I state. I have no connection with the Family Justice Council, either through Judge Lesley Newton or indeed anybody else. There is, and could be no conflict of interest. I can say, without fear of contradiction that I was completely unaware of the Musa case until I began the hearing this week. Conflict of interest: recusal from the case LATER:

Conflict of interest: recusal from the case

[2]This is an ex tempore oral judgment concerning two of seven children. They are, in fact, the two youngest of a sibling group. Neither of the parents appears before the court, they are both serving terms each of seven years’ imprisonment for child cruelty. Both the children with whom I am concerned are placed together with prospective adopters. Child A was placed on 13th January 2014 and Child B on 24th June 2014.

[3]The local authority make three applications: the first that I should authorise the change of their surnames pursuant to sections 28(2) and (3) of the 2002 Act; the second, that I should authorise the change of their forenames pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction; and the third, that I should amend the order made by Charles J in May 2012, providing for reasonable direct contact between the children themselves, to indirect contact (his judgment is reported at

2002 EWHC 1330

); and finally the fourth, as to the restricted terms of the order made by Holman J. in relation to reporting on 11th April 2014. I will deal with that issue first.

[4]I have heard this case in public. I was invited to do so and I give this judgment in public. My pressing and overriding concern is the welfare of these two vulnerable and innocent children not publicity, but this is the latest chapter in a long catalogue of events which has provoked considerable public interest. I have already referred to the judgment of Charles J, which is reported. There have been subsequent orders made by Judges of this division in relation to publicity. In the early part of this year there were three judgments of Holman J, each of which appears on BAILII and each identifying the family by way of surname. In all other respects, the judgments are anonymised in that the children are not identified and there indeed is no other identification as to their or anybody else’s whereabouts. Of course, I have in mind the order made by Holman J, on 11th April 2014. The underlying purpose, the point of, the applications made by the local authority is to give the children anonymity. Moreover, it is to give the children a new identity, that has come about in unusual circumstances, almost unique circumstances, because of the very considerable public interest that there has been in their circumstances and in this case. A limited Google search simply putting in the surname of the family and the local authority produces a whole raft of vigorous and continuing activity on the internet.

[5]On the first day of this hearing, there was a somewhat agitated throng of people outside the court. I made it clear that I would hear firstly the application to sit in open court made by the local authority. Having granted that application, I then moved into open court and, as I say, I heard this case throughout in open court. But the interest and activity of those involved in the injustices and issues of the case as they see it, have continued. Yesterday leaflets were being distributed outside the court, identifying the family and the campaigns which they seek to garner. This morning, I received a document endeavoring to persuade me that I should recuse myself from the case, maintaining erroneously that I was married to another judge who had a direct or tangible, in fact a really remote connection, with this case. It has caused considerable interest wider afield. Representatives of the Nigeria High Commission, who are not in court now, have been present through much of this and previous hearings

[6]Previous judgments, which appear on the internet and are available, identify the family and the local authority and have been placed there because of the debate, indeed notoriety, which this case, very sadly, has attracted. Whilst it could be thought, at the start of this case, that my discretion in relation to whether I sit in open court or private was to a degree fettered, my clear view is that it is always much better to proceed in public, so that the public can see and hear the issues so carefully debated and considered by the court. Secrecy breeds suspicion, and can lead to the most extraordinary and, almost always, ill-informed conclusions and results, as can be seen from the various documents that are associated with these papers. As I say, the very recent extraordinary example only this morning connecting my surname with another Judge simply because we share the same surname and the pyramid that was built upon it as it was firmly asserted, demonstrates just how very ill advised and misguided that can be.

[7]During the course of the hearing reference has been made to the various judgments made by Holman J, Charles J and others. Ordinarily, such proceedings, proceedings such as these, are held in private. They are held in private for the benefit of the children, because it is their welfare which should be everybody’s but in any event is my paramount concern. Not infrequently and indeed now almost always, if a judgment is of likely interest it is published on a public website BAILII. Here, the facts are now well within the public arena. Although I cannot be sure, it appears that the details of the children, indeed photographs, appear, as far as I can see, on the internet. It would not be difficult with little application to marry what has taken place within these proceedings with the previous ones. It is because of that, that despite my considerable and overriding anxieties about these innocent children, this judgment is given in public. I make no order about publicity. It seems to me that the judgment can be described by the family’s name, Musa, which appears on the other judgments as they have already been identified. It seems to me, as I have already said, that it is rather like shutting the stable door well after the horse has bolted. This is a situation which very regrettably demonstrates how very careful the court must be in making sure that the pieces of the jigsaw, particularly where there is intense public scrutiny in a case, are not such that their own security, that of the children, is placed in danger. Very sadly in this case, that is exactly what appears to have happened or may happen.

[8]The local authority, represented by Mr. Howling QC, set their application in stark terms, here are children whose very security and future is endangered by those who would seek to portray their position as an injustice. They make the unusual applications not just in relation to the surname, which after all could, in fact, change, or would change, if an adoption order is subsequently approved, but also in relation to their forenames. The relationship between those two issues and that of contact is not necessarily apparent but is pressing because it is clear, as a result of what the prospective adopters fear, in my judgment reasonably, that it is necessary for there to be an amendment of the arrangements set out by the judge two years ago. Otherwise their identification may be accomplished by other means, and notwithstanding the quite extraordinary management of this case by the local authority, that decision was probably inevitable.

[9]The mother is not before the court. She is now represented by Ms. Grieve, but on the first day, no one appeared on her behalf at all, until her solicitor, who was on the court file, attended a quarter of an hour after the case started. There have been difficulties with representation. Indeed, there have been difficulties in the past about representation, the mother successfully changing her solicitors shortly before a previous hearing resulting in delay or subsequent adjournment. The mother, it is clear from the documents, was very anxious about her own, and indeed continuing, ill health brought about, at least in part she says, from the birth of child B, now over two years ago. On a previous occasion when she was brought to court, but was either not able, or refused, to be produced, into the court safely and had to be taken back to Holloway Prison. She was represented. On the first day, it became apparent from the solicitor recently instructed that the solicitor was(a) on the record, and

(b) had had difficulties with the Legal Aid Agency, which may or may not have anything to do with her conduct inasmuch as there appears to have been some significant difficulty arising from the previous certificate, that is to say, whether it was continuing, whether it was an emergency, whether the certificate had been significantly exceeded by way of limit. The circumstances were very less than clear. The difficulties were not improved by the solicitor now instructed also requesting approval for the instruction of Queen’s Counsel, which an experienced solicitor would understand may of itself delay determination for many weeks. The solicitor had been told that she was covered, but shortly before the hearing she seemed to apprehend that she was not, and that legal aid had been withdrawn.

[10]So it was that a letter was written to the court by her informing the court that, as, effectively, she was without legal aid and had only the briefest of instructions from the mother who she had seen in prison about two weeks previously that the case could not be effective and may have to be removed from the list. She was not able to argue the mother’s case properly. The mother had, of course, already signed and filed a statement on 9th April. The solicitor wrote to the court indicating that she respectfully suggested the court should adjourn the case, no disrespect was intended, and importantly that she would not be appearing either. That extraordinary state of affairs which is at best highly discourteous and in fact in breach of the solicitor’s professional obligations could have had the effect of scuttling this hearing. In fact, as I was making arrangements for the solicitor to be at court, she unexpectedly appeared. Much of the first day was spent almost entirely regularising the mother’s position. It was unimpressive.

[11]With not inconsiderable difficulty, I spoke to the duty governor of the prison where the mother is held and enquired whether or not they would facilitate a legal visit that day. He could not have been more helpful, being prepared to facilitate any sensible arrangement (as had been the case since the solicitors instruction), the prison were however anxious about whether the mother herself was prepared to cooperate and see her legal advisors, and in particular leave her cell. I note that the mother had been prepared to do so to have a social visit just a few days ago on Saturday. That was an issue which appeared to cause unrest and a vociferous outburst by some in the public gallery (alleging further conspiracy), but I have no reason to doubt the bona fides of the prison authorities. In any event, the mother was able during recreation time, which extends for some hours in the late afternoon/early evening, to speak to her instructing solicitors if she wished to do so. She chose not to, indeed set out through counsel how she was prepared to conduct the hearing. I was, however, able also to persuade the High Court legal aid team that it was desirable that the mother should be represented, and later on Tuesday legal aid was extended. I am very grateful to the Agency having dealt with the matter so quickly. As a result of that, Ms. Grieve was instructed, although she herself, I think, was unclear whether or not she was instructed pursuant to a legal aid certificate or not. Thus finally the hearing was able to start and the mother, importantly – who has very strong views about this matter - was able to be represented before the court, albeit that Ms. Grieve’s instructions were very limited and limited to the statement, which was already filed before the court, the mother refusing to elaborate further, and continuing to seek delay.

[12]I paint this background because it seems to me that there were a number of impediments placed in the way of the court in what was an urgent application, although it has taken several weeks, indeed months, to be heard, and because, although I express no particular view about it, it is easy to see how submissions could be made that, at the very best, the system was being manipulated by her. I am very grateful to Ms. Grieve for stepping into the breach and at short notice and representing the mother’s interests at a late stage. It seems to me most unfortunate that the circumstances were as I have described them. I am not at all sure that the mother’s solicitors should not bear some considerable financial responsibility, but for now I make no further comment about it. I am confident that it is unlikely to happen again.

[13]The guardian for the older children was represented by Mr. Tyler QC. She has been principally concerned about the contact that ought to have occurred. The children, the five older children, have a different path ahead of them to the two younger children. The guardian for A and B, Trudy Jordan, has been represented by Mr. Boyd. She supports the applications made by the local authority. She invites the court to consider the issue of publicity - I have to say I am very sympathetic to the way in which the application is put, but I have determined it in the way I have simply because it seems to me in this case it makes, in fact, I am sad to say, no difference - she is anxious that nothing further should be done to disrupt the children’s security during their minority and beyond.

[14]The genesis of these applications arises quite evidently in the extraordinary and unusual circumstances of the attention that has been paid to this case on the internet and, to a lesser extent, in the media. It has attracted a great deal of publicity in this country and I am told, hence the attendance of members of the Nigeria High Commission, that it has even been raised in the Nigerian Assembly. The considerable public focus led to Holman J dealing with the matters in open court in March and April of this year. It is clear that there has been considerable interest, as I have already described, from people outside court and within. There has been a high-profile publicity campaign and by way of example financial rewards have been offered leading to information identifying the whereabouts of at least one of the children.

[15]The proceedings themselves started long ago in 2010. In June 2011, while subject to an interim care order and placed at home, child A became profoundly ill. It is a matter which has led to continuing debate in some of the documents which I have seen, and upon which it is unnecessary to comment. The parents were arrested and in due course stood trial. As I have made plain in the earlier part of this judgment, subsequently, the parents, charged with child cruelty, were convicted and each sentenced to a term of seven years’ imprisonment.

[16]Within these proceedings, there were significant difficulties. The local authority had to seek injunctions on 22nd September against the parents and a Mr. Kirk. There had been threats to abduct the children. A fact finding hearing took place just a few weeks later on 7th November 2011 before the then President. Two days later, on 9th November, two of the older children had to be moved because their whereabouts had become known to the parents and supporters. Child B was, born to the mother in 2012 whilst she was in Holloway Prison, seemingly without any forewarning that the mother was, in fact, pregnant. Mr. Justice Charles dealt with matters in May 2012, care and placement orders were made and a contact order, about which there has been a great deal of debate in this case. As I say, in August the parents were convicted and sentenced.

[17]During 2013 there are recordings of the local authority having difficulty in identifying prospective adoptive homes for the children. That is perhaps not entirely surprising not least because(a) unusually they sought homes that would welcome sibling contact and

(b) because inevitably any prospective adopter would have to be made aware of the continuing campaign and which would be sufficient, and indeed appeared to be sufficient, to drive anybody who could provide these children with a loving home, away from the idea of adoption. Thus, in effect, the children have patiently waited in foster care through no fault of their own and certainly through no fault, as far as I can see it, of the local authority. The issue of contact at least appeared an impediment to placement. The local authority were very anxious that the home which these children deserved to have, a secure permanent, a loving and predictable home, was one which escaped their grasp for so many months, indeed years.

[18]During 2013 prospective adopters were identified. It is very difficult for the court to unpick precisely what happened as far as subsequent events in the local authority are concerned. The local authority were anxious about the significant media attention, and it is ironic that the unbridled campaign led on behalf of the parents and ostensibly the children, has been almost entirely causative to the application, and the situation that the children and the prospective adopters now face today. As I say, even as recently as yesterday, there were flyers being distributed outside court and causing media attention. It is evident that the adopters have, understandably, genuine concerns. They cannot, for example, register child A using their real name and their anxieties are fuelled, having regard to their own situation, because an acquaintance who is aware of the family and who knows some of their support network, read an article on the internet, and approached the family asking questions directly about these children, thus demonstrating to the adopters no doubt to an alarming degree just how easy it is to identify the children and therefore, where they are. It is not assisted either by the fact that the children have distinctive names. So it is the three taken together, the names, the internet and the media attention, all of which create it is said an immediate, tangible and real risk as far as the children are concerned, but also an underlying and ongoing risk as far as the adopters are concerned. They worry what might be around any corner they turn.

[19]The hearing has taken two days. The first of three was lost in the circumstances which I have already described. I have been referred to a number of cases, Re D in 2002, P in 2013 and M-F in 2014, and I bear in mind the evaluative, as opposed to the discretionary, process, described in Re B (A Child), a case which I do bear in mind since this case is one which is likely to lead ultimately to a final adoption order if it is granted. I have heard evidence from the independent reviewing officer, the deputy head of service, the allocated social worker and a member of the family finding team of the local authority. Almost the entirety of the evidence has been directed, to the very troubling conduct of the local authority in regard to the contact order made by Charles J in 2012, he securing by order the inter-sibling relationship. It appears that a unilateral decision was taken, to use the colloquialism, to sling the court order into the long grass. It might be described, at best, as global incompetence, but more accurately reflects very worrying, widespread and engrained failings of this local authority. It seems to me there is a need for the parties to reflect further, I shall give a further public judgment, on my analysis of what has taken place once the dust of this part has settled.

[20]The salient point is that, in circumstances which are opaque at best, contact between the siblings was suspended, a final contact visit having occurred. It is unclear why a perfectly straightforward contact order was entirely disregarded by the local authority. It is unclear what the adopters themselves were told. The evidence is contradictory. It is unclear in what circumstances and why (at best, it seems to me extraordinarily incompetent that) the director of children’s services, consequent upon the judgment of Holman J, went to apologise to the children personally. It is difficult to see how that could ever have occurred, particularly because predictably, the discussion clearly gave rise to the hope, on behalf of the children, that they would be able to see each other - it is difficult to see how they would think anything else (especially as their request appeared to be considered) - and then again to be told later, they having been given further information by someone who was not known to them but a complete stranger, that that would not be possible. It is difficult to understand such well meaning incompetence. I do not understand either how the authority see the role of the independent reviewing officer, let alone the guardian, who never seems to have been consulted at all as to what has occurred. The independent reviewing officer, who, after all, had been involved in the case for some time, and the guardian who had been involved in the case for some time, appear to have been kept ignorant of some or even all of these vital decisions that had been taken. Additionally, one of the children is already known by a derivative of a new name. How has that situation arisen? Surely it is understood, even at the most basic level, that in regards to a forename, having regard to the judgment of Butler-Sloss LJ, now over 10 years ago, and well recognised law and practice, what is surely known by every professional, that this practice is high handed and misconceived, it is unlawful. How has that situation arisen? It appears that the adopters were given very little or scant information, possibly no information at all. I am not even confident that the ‘match’ would have gone ahead had they, in fact, been told what the real situation was.

[21]It is so easy to understand how all this is volatile fuel to those who believe that there is some secret agenda, some conspiracy, that there really is some basis to believe that that is what has occurred, even though I find that there is not. The whole point of having public authorities subject to remedy and public account is that an open process should be just that, procedure and process should be conducted properly, fairly and openly, that there should be confidence in a system which makes such far reaching decisions in relation to children. A decision which can withstand proper scrutiny. It is only after the court has exposed the deficiencies, as seem here manifest, that the real import comes to the fore in its full glaring and unedifying detail. At best, there has been no regard to a proper process, no regard to the detail and no compliance with an important court order. There has been no continuing assessment or analysis. There has been no “joined up thinking”. Indeed, I am not sure that any rational realistic thought has been applied at all. It seems to me that the situation as far as the children are concerned, even if the intentions of the authority have been entirely laudable, has been lost in the melee of what has taken place. As I made clear during the course of argument, I do not underestimate the corrosive and debilitating pressure that professional workers may experience from the unrelenting and intimidating campaign of others. But there is here such a strong influence from outside, that surely careful thoughtful and analysis from senior responsible personnel should have managed each decision? It has meant when decisions have apparently been taken, with the best will in the world, it has not been possible to properly follow through the decision making process. Even now the authority is unable to identify the decision or decision maker or makers. I am satisfied that a decision was taken, contrary to the court order, contrary to proper process and more worrying unidentified by the IRO.

[22]Bearing all that in mind however, it is blindingly obvious that those enjoined through the statutory authorities, to support and maintain the best possible welfare outcome and to find the best possible home for these children, have done so with no agenda, other than a desire to protect and support them. Nonetheless there can be no avoiding that there has been a lack of any real consultation, a lack of any robust process, fuelling at least an anxiety, particularly one can understand from the parents’ perspective, that there is some hidden covert agenda. As it happens, the mother has chosen not to appear and the father, in fact, has chosen not to engage in the process at all. But there still needs to be a proper process, a process by which the actions of the local public authority can be scrutinised, sanitised, if you like, by the light of day that has only happened, in fact, through this process.

[23]I can determine the issues quite straightforwardly. The children are placed for adoption. The plan has been supported by the court. There is no plan for rehabilitation. The parents are, after all, serving significant periods of imprisonment, and are in no position to provide care for their children, leaving aside any other issues about their criminal conduct. The children are known and have distinctive names. They are easily identifiable. There is an understandable and proper concern about contact between the younger children and the older children leading to identification, so that their future lives could be inadvertently or deliberately subverted. It is particularly unfortunate that had the matter not been dealt with by the local authority unilaterally, some sort of discussion could have taken place, some semblance of a helpful exploratory process could have taken place, for each of the children so that they would have a better understanding of why contact was to stop. There could have been some exploration, perhaps even resolution, which would have been more helpful to them now and in the future, but that, sadly, has been denied by the combination of the actions of the family supporters and the consequent reaction of the authority.

[24]There are obvious and significant risks in this case, not just the specific nature of the case but of the very widespread internet and media attention, generating significant public interest and enquiry. It is the basic right of any child to have a secure, loving and stable home. The court has already decided that that cannot be provided by the parents or the family. It has to be identified elsewhere, that is, most likely by permanence through adoption. If that home is to be stable and enduring, away from the glare of publicity, as any child would wish and deserve, it has to be done. In most cases no further orders are required, but in this case, it seems to me, such orders are required, necessary and proportionate. There is strong evidence of determined efforts to identify the whereabouts of the children. The children in the past have already had to be moved because of it. There is strong evidence that they are easily identifiable, and there is strong evidence, (as telephone calls as recently as January of this year have made clear) that the focus is on identifying the children and of the location of the children. In those circumstances, it seems to me that, unusually in this case, the court is driven to consider changing the children’s names.

[25]Changing a forename of a child is fundamental. It alters their very real identity It is not just a part of their living embodiment; it is part of their background, their history, their culture, their heritage; past, present and future. It is part of their make-up, their matrix. The mother herself maintains that it is ‘inhumane’ to consider changing a child’s forename. But the court has sometimes to weigh the reconcilable. It is hardly the children’s fault that this situation has arisen; it is the responsibility of adults. Those adults have created a situation and in such a way that these children are at risk, a real risk of disruption, upset and disturbance, so therefore the court is driven to contemplate a radical and wholesale change, and balance the harm which there will be to them if that change is approved, to the harm which is or is likely to occur if it does not. Can the children be settled, undisturbed, in a permanent home with a reasonable degree of predictability if I do not make the order? Can the risks which flow from the glare of focused publicity as has happened here in some other way be protected? Can they be somehow shielded from that? In my judgment, whilst the court can go to significant lengths to protect them, having regard to the span of this hearing, an evaluation of the best evidence, having regard to the factors including the reasons here for open court, it seems to me that, very sadly, these children urgently require a new identity, and that protection is necessary, justified and proportionate, not just in the sense of their surname, which inevitably will change if subsequently an adoption order is approved, but in relation to their forename too. The activities that have taken place in this case over many years are such that my paramount consideration being the welfare of the children, the court should endeavour to enable the children to come to a position where they have a normal life, a life which every child should be able to expect. It is for those reasons that it seems to me the evidence is all strongly one way and that the court has now absolutely no alternative but to both change their surnames and forenames with immediate effect. Acknowledging the possible or likely effects upon them, I am, of course, troubled, as I have made clear, that one of the children is already known apparently by a derivative of the newly proposed name, yet another pre-emptive decision seems to have occurred, but that is no doubt something upon which the conduct of the authority does not on the facts alter the substance of my decision. However lest it be thought that this depressing catalogue of failures is in some way to be forgotten, I shall give a separate judgment in relation to those issues in due course having received further written submissions. The behaviour and approach of this authority needs to completely change, its conduct has been amateur, unprofessional and incompetent.

[26]The remaining issue is contact. The court made an order that there should be reasonable contact between the siblings. That was brought to an end by the local authority last year. It is self-evident that each of the children is likely to be subject to significant internal and external pressure as a result of what they know or sense may have taken place within the court arena but, much more importantly, outside of it.

[27]The belated issue is that of security. It seems to me more likely than not that there will at some stage be some problem or difficulty that confidentiality will be breached. I cannot but fail to acknowledge that increasingly the life of each person is able to be traced through the social media and through the internet. Considering how much this aspect of life has changed, even within the last decade, and what may happen over the next decade, it is almost certain that there will be some problem in the future.

[28]The third issue is that of the adopters themselves. They do not support it. Whilst I strongly deprecate the way in which this situation has arisen, it may well have been that the outcome would, in fact, have been the same. The relationship that the children had with each other, that is, the sibling group of five and that of two, whilst small comfort, is of a different quality. Contact could restart but here, because of all the circumstances and pressures, would not be sustainable. Whilst I have absolutely no reason to think that the children would not get on with each other, and indeed would not gain a very considerable benefit from their relationship with each other, indeed were keen when they were spoken to very recently to restart contact, balancing those advantages with the disadvantages, that is, of the pressure, the likelihood of an incident way beyond speculation and of the lack of support from the prospective adopters, means that I am constrained to say, that the order that I must make is that of reasonable indirect contact only.

[29]In relation to the issues of the local authority’s conduct, I suggest Mr. Howling submits his submissions in writing within, I would say, 14 days, if that is convenient. MR. HOWLING: My Lord, if it assists the court, we have actually reached an agreement on this point outside ---- MR. JUSTICE NEWTON: Good MR. HOWLING: -- that we exchange by 4 o’clock on 17th July. We have problems with us sequentially being at other jurisdictions. MR. JUSTICE NEWTON: Thank you. __________