"In assessing the wife's income needs...the analysis, as has been said on many occasions, is a broad one as the court is considering what income it would be fair for the wife to have available to her, in this case, for the next 30 or so years.....in my judgment the court's task when addressing this factor is not to arrive at a mathematically exact calculation of what constitutes an applicant's future income needs. It is to determine the notional annual income which in the circumstances of the case it would be fair for the wife to receive. Further in a case such as the present, in my judgment the wife is entitled to have sufficient resources to enable her to spend money on additional, discretionary items which will vary from year to year and which are not reflected in her annual budget" f). The Estate was inherited and that must be reflected in the award. It is accepted that: (1) The mansion house was the matrimonial home for almost the entirety of the marriage. The children were brought up there. It was the heart of the parties' relationship and family life; (2) The Estate income was used to support the family lifestyle. The capital value of the Estate was also deployed in funding the family via increased indebtedness secured on the Estate; (3) This was a long marriage to which the Wife made a full contribution. g). Per Lord Nicholls in Miller/McFarlane (supra) at [22]: "the parties' matrimonial home, even if this was bought into the marriage at the outset by one of the parties, usually has a central place in any marriage. So it should normally be treated as matrimonial property...". 36. "
"To what property does the sharing principle apply? The answer might well have been that it applies only to matrimonial property, namely the property of the parties generated during the marriage otherwise than by external donation; and the consequence would have been that non-matrimonial property would have fallen for redistribution by reference only to one of the two other principles of need and compensation to which we refer in para [68], below. Such an answer might better have reflected the origins of the principle in the parties' contributions to the welfare of the family; and it would have been more consonant with the references of Baroness Hale of Richmond in Miller at paras [141] and [143] to 'sharing … the fruits of the matrimonial partnership' and to 'the approach of roughly equal sharing of partnership assets'. We consider, however, the answer to be that, subject to the exceptions identified in Miller to which we turn in paras [83]–[86], below, the principle applies to all the parties' property but, to the extent that their property is non-matrimonial, there is likely to be better reason for departure from equality. It is clear that both in White, at 605F–G and 989 respectively, and in Miller, at paras [24] and [26], Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead approached the matter in that way; and there was no express suggestion in Miller, even on the part of Baroness Hale of Richmond, that in White the House had set too widely the general application of what was then a yardstick." i). The subsequent jurisprudence, while acknowledging the potential application of the sharing principle to inherited wealth, has tended towards a needs-based determination. Plainly, as Mr Marks QC puts it, "there is a graduated scale or spectrum of kinds of inherited wealth and circumstances relevant to the question of sharing. Factors relevant to likelihood of sharing might include:- i) the nature of the assets (e.g. land/property, art, antiques, jewellery on the one hand, and cash or realisable securities on the other); ii) whether the inherited assets have been preserved in specie or converted into different assets, realised or even spent; iii) how long they have been 'in the family'; iv) the established or accepted intentions of both the previous holders of the assets and the spouse who has inherited them; v) whether they have been 'mingled' (for example by being put into joint names of the spouses, or by being mixed with assets generated during the marriage); vi) the length of the marriage and therefore the period over which they have been 'enjoyed' by the other spouse; vii) whether the other spouse has directly contributed to the improvement or preservation of the inherited wealth."
"How then does the court approach the 'big money' case where the wealth is inherited? At the risk of over-simplification, I would proffer this guidance: (1) Concentrate ons 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as amended because this imposes a duty on the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of 18; and then requires that regard must be had to the specific matters listed in s 25(2). Confusion will be avoided if resort is had to the precise language of the statute, not any judicial gloss placed upon the words, for example by the introduction of 'reasonable requirements' nor, dare I say it, upon need always having to be 'generously interpreted'. (2) The statute does not list those factors in any hierarchical order or in order of importance. The weight to be given to each factor depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, but where it is relevant that factor (or circumstance of the case) must be placed in the scales and given its due weight. (3) In that way flexibility is built into the exercise of discretion and flexibility is necessary to find the right answer to suit the circumstances of the case. (4) Like every exercise of judicial discretion, the objective must be to reach a just result and justice is attained when the result is fair as between the parties. (5) Need, compensation and sharing will always inform and will usually guide the search for fairness. (6) Since inherited wealth forms part of the property and financial resources which a party has, it must be taken into account pursuant to subs 2(a). (7) But so must the other relevant factors. The fact that wealth is inherited and not earned justifies it being treated differently from wealth accruing as the so-called 'marital acquest' from the joint efforts (often by one in the work place and the other at home). It is not only the source of the wealth which is relevant but the nature of the inheritance. Thus the ancestral castle may (note that I say 'may' not 'must') deserve different treatment from a farm inherited from the party's father who had acquired it in his lifetime, just as a valuable heirloom intended to be retained in specie is of a different character from an inherited portfolio of stocks and shares. The nature and source of the asset may well be a good reason for departing from equality within the sharing principle. (8) The duration of the marriage and the duration of the time the wealth had been enjoyed by the parties will also be relevant. So too their standard of living and the extent to which it has been afforded by and enhanced by drawing down on the added wealth. The way the property was preserved, enhanced or depleted are factors to take into account. Where property is acquired before the marriage or when inherited property is acquired during the marriage, thus coming from a source external to the marriage, then it may be said that the spouse to whom it is given should in fairness be allowed to keep it. On the other hand, the more and the longer that wealth has been enjoyed, the less fair it is that it should be ringfenced and excluded from distribution in such a way as to render it unavailable to meet the claimant's financial needs generated by the relationship. (9) It does not add much to exhort judges to be 'cautious' and not to invade the inherited property 'unnecessarily' for the circumstances of the case may often starkly call for such an approach. The fact is that no formula and no resort to percentages will provide the right answer. Weighing the various factors and striking the balance of fairness is, after all, an art not a science.And at [76]: "