Tecnimont SpA & Anor v LLC Eurochem North-West-2 (Russia) [2026] EWHC 255 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 255 (Comm)

Case No CL-2025-000593

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS

COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date 9 February 2026

Before

Dame Clare Moulder DBE

Between

Tecnimont S.P.AClaimants

MT Russia LLCClaimant

LLC Eurochem North-West-2 (Russia)Defendant

Alan Maclean KC and Tom Leary (instructed by McDermott Will & Schulte (UK) LLP) for Claimants

Hearing Hearing date: 9 February 2026

JUDGMENT

Monday, 9 February 2026

[1]This is the Court's judgment on the application by the claimants, Tecnimont SPA and MT~Russia LLC, for anti-enforcement relief pursuant to section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981(“section 37”) and/or section 42 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“section 42” and the “Arbitration Act” respectively).

[2]It is supported by two witness statements from Mr Milo Molfa, a partner in the London office of McDermott Will & Schulte (UK) LLP instructed on behalf of the claimants dated 28 December 2025 and 14 January 2026.

[3]The defendant, LLC EuroChem North-West-2, (“NW-2” or the “defendant”), is a Russian company which was held by Bright J after a trial to be controlled by a person designated for sanctions purposes by both the UK and the EU, namely Mr Andrey Melnichenko. The immediate parent of the defendant is believed by the claimants now to be Mineral Fertiliser Production EuroChem LLC which is believed to be ultimately owned by Mr Melnichenko.

[4]The relief which is sought by this application follows an earlier hearing before this Court in November 2025 at which an order was made by Butcher J in support of arbitration proceedings between the claimants and the defendant to restrain the defendant from pursuing proceedings in Russia in breach of arbitration agreements. Those orders have, on the evidence before the Court as to the orders and applications which had been made in Russia following that hearing, been ignored by the defendant. In particular, on the evidence the defendant has now commenced enforcement proceedings, in India and Malaysia, seeking to enforce the orders obtained in the Russian courts.

[5]I am told by counsel for the claimants that a hearing will take place in India tomorrow, and as a result the application made today is urgent. I am also told by counsel that no hearing is expected in the Malaysian proceedings for approximately two months. However, as I observed to counsel during submissions, I note that no update on the position in the foreign proceedings was before the Court in the form of evidence.

[6]NW-2 has not appeared at this hearing. Counsel for NW-2 did appear at the start of the morning, seeking a hearing on its late application made only yesterday evening (Sunday) to set aside the earlier order of Bright J made on 16 January of this year, which order gave permission for the claimants to serve NW-2 with the claim form by alternative means, namely email, which I understand they did on 16 January 2026.

[7]As the Court determined when counsel for NW-2 was before the Court, given the lateness of the application, this Court was not prepared to hear that set aside application this morning, and the Court has proceeded to consider the substantive application.

[8]This substantive hearing is not an ex parte hearing. NW-2 was on notice of the hearing and has chosen not to appear. NW-2’s representatives informed the claimants and the Court by a letter dated 27 January 2026 that it was not instructed to appear on the substantive application, although in that letter it referred the Court to certain evidence previously submitted to the Court.

Background

[9]The history of this matter was set out in the judgment of Butcher J in November 2025 (

[2025] EWHC 3151

Comm) and in the judgment of the Court of Appeal referred to below.

[10]In brief, arbitration proceedings were commenced by the claimants in London in August 2022 under three contracts to build a urea and ammonia plant in Russia. The contracts provided for any disputes to be referred to London arbitration under the ICC Rules. The claimants say they were unable to perform the contract due to the imposition of sanctions. The defendants counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract.

[11]The defendants also brought proceedings in the Commercial Court against the banks who had issued performance bonds in support of the contracts. In July 2025 judgment was handed down at first instance, holding that the bonds were unenforceable by reason of the EU sanctions regime.

[12]Following the judgment in the proceedings relating to the performance bonds, the defendant brought proceedings in Russia as follows:a. in August 2025 NW-2’s then parent, MCC brought proceedings against the claimants for breach of contract. I understand these proceedings have now been withdrawn, but in September NW-2 brought proceedings initially against the second claimant, and then in October joining Tecnimont, for breach of contract to recover the amount counterclaimed in the arbitration. The Russian court gave judgment for the defendant in the amount of approximately US$2.19 billion on 27 November 2025.

b. NW-2 has also bought two sets of proceedings in Russia seeking injunctive relief to stop the arbitration proceedings (the “anti-arbitration proceedings”). These applications were granted by the Russian court on 10 December 2025.

c. Finally, interim measures have been ordered by the Russian court on 30 October 2025 comprising the seizure of moveable funds and property to a value of approximately €103 million referred to as the "interim measures orders".

Orders of the arbitral tribunal and the order of Butcher J

[13]Various orders have been made by the arbitral tribunal ordering the defendants to withdraw the Russian proceedings. In particular, Procedural Order 18 contained a peremptory order that NW-2 should withdraw the second Russian proceedings and the anti-arbitration proceedings. Procedural Order 22 contained a peremptory order to take all steps necessary or appropriate for the discharge of the interim measures order. Procedural Order 23 contained a further peremptory order to withdraw the second Russian proceedings.

[14]The claimants applied to the Court for an order to support the peremptory orders and this was the order granted by Butcher J under section 42 (the “Butcher J order”). An appeal to the Court of Appeal was rejected: LLC EuroChem North-West-2 v Tecnimont

[2026] EWCA Civ 5

Events following the Butcher J order

[15]The defendant has not complied with those orders of the Tribunal or the Butcher J order and following the judgment of Butcher J on 21 November 2025 and despite the orders made by the Tribunal and the Court, the proceedings in Russia have been progressed and orders have been made by the Russian courts in both the second Russian proceedings and the anti-arbitration proceedings as referred to above.

[16]On 9 December 2025 the Tribunal, by Procedural Order 25 (“PO 25”), granted an application to restrain the defendant from seeking to enforce the November Russian court judgment and any other judgments or orders that it might obtain in breach of the parties' arbitration agreements. Paragraph 37 read:

“The Tribunal directs and orders that: a. Eurochem LLC be restrained from taking any steps to enforce any judgment and/or order rendered by the Russian Courts in respect of the Unlawful Russian Court Actions 5 or any other proceedings commenced in breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement, whether in Russia or elsewhere; b. Eurochem LLC and Eurochem AG be restrained from commencing, pursuing, participating in, or allowing to continue, any other proceedings in Russia or elsewhere that are commenced in breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement; and c. Eurochem AG shall take all steps necessary or appropriate to cause Eurochem LLC not to enforce any judgment and/or order rendered by the Russian Courts in respect of the Unlawful Russian Court Actions or any similar proceedings commenced in breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement, whether in Russia or elsewhere.”

[17]In December 2025 the claimants learnt that steps were being taken by NW-2 in India to enforce the Russian judgments. On 22 December 2025 the defendant issued proceedings in India, both to enforce the November Russian judgment and seeking to freeze assets pending enforcement of that judgment. Those Indian proceedings were purportedly served on the claimants on 23 December 2025.

[18]Also on 22 December 2025, the defendant applied for a writ of execution to enforce the penalties ordered in the Russian anti-arbitration order. The Russian court granted that relief on 26 December 2025 which the claimants learned of, according to the evidence of Mr Molfa, on 29 December 2025.

[19]On 8 January 2025 the claimants were purportedly served with proceedings in Malaysia seeking interim mareva relief pending enforcement of the November Russian judgment.

[20]The claimants issued this application on 28 December 2025 to obtain anti-enforcement relief relying on section 37. The application was then amended on 14 January 2026, before service on the defendant, to seek relief under section 42 in the alternative.

Procedural Order 28

[21]On 8 January 2026 the claimants sought and obtained from the Tribunal permission to seek section 42 relief from the Court and peremptory orders in a further procedural order, PO 28, ordering the defendant, amongst other things, to withdraw the enforcement proceedings.

[22]The peremptory orders in PO 28 read:

“The Tribunal directs that Eurochem LLC must, forthwith and in any event by 4pm (London) on 9 January 2026: i. confirm that it will comply with PO25 by stating that it will not take any steps to enforce any judgment and/or order rendered by the Russian Courts in respect of the Unlawful Russian Court Actions (including, but not limited to, pursuing the Bombay Enforcement Action and/or enforcing the Writs of Execution) or any other proceedings commenced in breach of the parties’ arbitration agreement, whether in Russia or elsewhere; and ii. where Eurochem LLC has already initiated proceedings in breach of paragraphs 37 of PO25 (including, but not limited to, the Bombay Enforcement Action and the applications for the Writs of Execution), not allow such actions to continue, including by withdrawing such actions and/or discharging any resulting judgment and/or order resulting therefrom, and produce written evidence of such withdrawal(s) and/or discharge(s), (the “Peremptory Orders”).”

Relief sought

[23]As to the relief sought by this application, the draft order before the Court has three operative paragraphs. The first paragraph largely follows the peremptory orders in PO 28 and thus is seeking an order under section 42. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft order, go beyond the peremptory orders in PO 28 but track the orders made in paragraph 37 of PO 25 and the claimant relies on section 37 in order to obtain that relief.

The relevant law

[24]Section 42 gives the Court power to grant relief in support of peremptory orders of the arbitral tribunal. Section 37 is the general discretionary power of the Court to grant injunctive relief if it is just and convenient to do so.

[25]Section 42 reads (in material part):

“42 Enforcement of peremptory orders of tribunal or emergency arbitrator. (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may make an order requiring a party to comply with a peremptory order made by the tribunal or (as the case may be) the emergency arbitrator. (2) An application for an order under this section may be made— (a) by the tribunal or the emergency arbitrator (upon notice to the parties), (b) by a party to the arbitral proceedings with the permission of the tribunal or the emergency arbitrator (and upon notice to the other parties), or (c) where the parties have agreed that the powers of the court under this section shall be available. (3) The court shall not act unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of failure to comply with the peremptory order. (4) No order shall be made under this section unless the court is satisfied that the person to whom the peremptory order was directed has failed to comply with it within the time prescribed in the order or, if no time was prescribed, within a reasonable time. …” “82 Minor Definitions (1) In this Part “peremptory order” means an order under s. 41(5) or made in exercise of any corresponding power conferred by the parties”

[26]The scope of section 42 was considered by Butcher J in the earlier proceedings in November 2025 and upheld by the decision of the Court of Appeal as to which the judgment was handed down in early January 2026.

[27]The issue considered by the Court of Appeal (see the judgment at [1]), was whether section 42(5) of the Arbitration Act permits the Court as a matter of law to make an order enforcing a peremptory order of an arbitral tribunal granting anti-suit relief.

[28]At [45] of the judgment, the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make a peremptory order only if the failure to comply is a failure to do something which is necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. It also rejected the proposition that compliance with orders for antisuit relief are not capable of being something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. The Court of Appeal held that an antisuit injunction was in furtherance of the arbitration, and as such within the scope of section 42.

[29]It follows in my view that an anti-enforcement injunction to enjoin proceedings to enforce an order obtained in breach of an anti-suit injunction would also be within the scope of section 42.

[30]Having established that the Court has power to make the order under section 42, the Court must be satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the relief. The factors applicable in this case to the exercise of the discretion under section 42 were considered by Butcher J at [59] onwards of the judgment. I note in particular the concern raised by the defendants which was rejected by Butcher J as to whether the directors could be liable for civil or criminal sanctions in Russia, and I note his conclusion at [68] and [69] of the judgment that the need for the injunction outweighed the countervailing concerns:

“In any event, even if there were a real risk of the criminal prosecution of NW2's directors, I do not accept that that constitutes a factor in the exercise of my discretion which comes anywhere near outweighing the factors in favour of the grant of an order. In particular, it does not outweigh the concern of the court to support the arbitration and to ensure compliance by NW2 with the arbitration agreements and the Tribunal's orders. In circumstances where the Russian proceedings are being pursued in breach of the English arbitration agreements and pursuant to Russian laws, which are, at least in large part, aimed at frustrating EU and UK sanctions against Russia, I do not consider that a risk of liability for NW2's directors in Russia or comity concerns can outweigh the court's concern to support the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration.”

[31]I see no reason to reach a contrary decision in the circumstances where the defendant continues to pursue proceedings in breach of English arbitration agreements and court orders. In my view, the need to support the arbitration outweighs any such concerns as were raised by the defendant hitherto.

[32]As to section 37, the position on anti-enforcement relief under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act was considered by Henshaw J in Google LLC v NAO Tsargrad Media

[2025] EWHC 94

Comm. The claimants relied on the general principles set out at [82] of his judgment which counsel submitted were applicable to anti-enforcement applications.

Discussion

[33]Counsel for the claimants submitted in his written skeleton that the decision in Google "bears a striking resemblance to the facts of the present case". The facts of that case are set out in brief at [2] of the judgment. The remedy sought was anti-enforcement injunctive relief in order to prevent the recognition or enforcement of a series of judgments of the Russian court in jurisdictions outside Russia. The Russian proceedings in that case were alleged to have been commenced and pursued in breach of London arbitration or exclusive English jurisdiction agreements. The judgments had led to the seizure in Russia of assets belonging to a subsidiary and the defendants had also embarked on a series of attempts to enforce the Russian judgment in various other jurisdictions around the world.

[34]However, the potential key difference between that case and the circumstances which are before this Court is that in that case the arbitral tribunal had not been constituted, no peremptory orders had been issued, and Henshaw J was, therefore, only concerned with the exercise of his discretion under section 37.

[35]This Court, therefore, needs to consider the relationship between section 42 of the Arbitration Act and section 37 of the Senior Courts Act. Counsel for the claimants accepted in the course of oral submissions that there is no authority on this point. Butcher J decided the application before him under section 42, and it was not necessary therefore for him to consider whether to also grant relief under section 37.

[36]The Court of Appeal in its judgment noted at [33] that sections 40 - 42 of the Arbitration Act envisaged three steps: a non-peremptory order, a peremptory order to the same effect under section 41 (5) and a Court order requiring a party to comply with the peremptory order under section 42.

[37]Sections 40 and 41 read as follows (so far as material): “40. General duty of parties.(1) The parties shall do all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitral proceedings.

(2) This includes— (a) complying without delay with any determination of the tribunal as to procedural or evidential matters, or with any order or directions of the tribunal, and (b) where appropriate, taking without delay any necessary steps to obtain a decision of the court on a preliminary question of jurisdiction or law (see sections 32 and 45). 41 Powers of tribunal in case of party’s default. (1) The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal in case of a party’s failure to do something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. (2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the following provisions apply. … (5) If without showing sufficient cause a party fails to comply with any order or directions of the tribunal, the tribunal may make a peremptory order to the same effect, prescribing such time for compliance with it as the tribunal considers appropriate.

[38]As set out above, Section 42 (3) provides that “the Court shall not act unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of the failure to comply with the peremptory order.”

[39]The general powers of the Court, and the exercise of its powers under s37, have to be considered in light of the general principles set out in Section 1of the Arbitration Act:

“1. General principles. The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be construed accordingly— (a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; (b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest; (c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.”

[emphasis added]

[40]I also have regard to the freedom of parties to determine the powers of the tribunal under Section 38:

“38. General powers exercisable by the tribunal. (1) The parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal for the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings…”

[41]As referred to above, PO 25 had, in summary, three limbs. It ordered NW-2 to refrain from taking enforcement steps in Russia and elsewhere. It ordered the defendants to restrain from commencing or continuing proceedings in breach of the arbitration agreement, and it ordered EuroChem AG to cause NW-2 not to enforce the agreements.

[42]However, the peremptory orders sought by the claimants and made by the tribunal in PO 28, by its terms, was not as broad as the terms of PO 25. As set out above the relevant peremptory orders directed NW-2(i) to confirm that it would not take steps to enforce, and

(ii) where proceedings had been initiated in breach of the relevant paragraph of PO 25, it should not allow such actions to continue.

[43]In oral submissions, counsel for the claimants submitted that the peremptory orders were necessarily retrospective dealing with breaches that had already occurred, and submitted that the Court should grant relief on this application in a broader form under section 37 in order to prohibit any future proceedings that may be initiated in breach of PO 25.

[44]Counsel for the claimants submitted that to require the claimants to go back to the arbitral tribunal to obtain peremptory orders each time would be to introduce delay in preventing future enforcement proceedings, which would run counter to the principle that an applicant seeking anti-enforcement relief should do so promptly and without delay before the proceedings are too far advanced.

[45]Counsel for the claimants also submitted that the grant of the order under section 37 would support the Butcher order which had not been complied with.

[46]The general principles as referred to above under the Arbitration Act are that the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest, and the Arbitration Act expressly states that the Court should not intervene except as provided.

[47]The Arbitration Act sets out a framework (which the parties may vary by agreement) within which the Tribunal may make orders and if a party fails to comply with an order, the Tribunal may make a peremptory order. If, for whatever reason, the terms of that peremptory order are not as extensive as the original order, in my view that is a matter between the parties seeking the order and the Tribunal. The power of the Court provided for in the Arbitration Act is to enforce peremptory orders. The mandatory provision in section 42(3) that the Court “shall not act” unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of any failure to comply indicates, in my view, that the primary recourse is intended to be to the Tribunal.

[48]It would be open to the claimants to seek further peremptory orders and the evidence does not support a conclusion that recourse to the arbitral tribunal in this case would involve a delay such that the Court needs to intervene and exercise its powers under section 37 in addition to the powers under section 42. The speed with which the Tribunal can act in this case is demonstrated by the fact that when a peremptory order was sought by the claimants on 5 January 2026, the tribunal responded by issuing PO28 on 8 January 2026, granting permission for the claimants to bring the application as well as granting the peremptory order in the terms sought.

[49]I do not accept the submission that an order under section 37 should be granted in order to support the Butcher order. There is a remedy before the courts for breach of that order which is open to the claimants, namely proceedings for contempt. An order from this Court under section 37 to enjoin enforcement is not, in my view, the appropriate mechanism by which to enforce the Butcher order.

[50]It was submitted for the claimants that the order sought does not go further than PO 25, and “justice” requires an order under section 37 which tracks PO 25 and is thus complementary to the peremptory order PO 28. Mr Maclean submitted orally:

“…we know that the Tribunal has made orders in exactly the terms of paragraphs 2 and 3, so why not, I ask rhetorically, should the court not be just as keen to do something in relation to paragraph 37, Procedural Order 25, as it is to do something in relation to paragraph 19 of the Procedural Order 28? And if that's right, and in my submission it is right, then the next question is: am I, the court, troubled by the procedural mechanisms by which I do this obvious justice which I, the court, can see that on the one term I'm enforcing a preemptory order, whereas on the other hand I'm using the courts, as your Ladyship pointed out earlier, broad discretion to do what is just and convenient, and in my submission the answer to that question is no.”

[51]I proceed for present purposes on the assumption (without having to decide the point) that the Court retains its discretion under s37 notwithstanding the language of the Arbitration Act. However in my view in deciding whether it is just and convenient to exercise that discretion to issue orders which go beyond the scope of the peremptory orders made by the Tribunal, the Court should have regard to the arbitration regime and the structure created by the Arbitration Act (as amended by the parties). In my view, as referred to above, the Arbitration Act is clear as to its mechanism for enforcing orders of the Tribunal, and the appropriate role of the Court. I am not persuaded that there is a detriment to the claimants in the circumstances of this case which justifies the exercise of the Court’s discretion under section 37 in a way which in my view would cut across the clear language and structure of the Arbitration Act. I therefore decline to exercise the Court’s discretion under section 37 on the basis that it is not, in my view, just and convenient to grant the relief sought under section 37.

Conclusion

[52]As indicated above, I am satisfied that the Court should exercise its powers under section 42 to order the defendant to comply with the peremptory orders in PO 28. I therefore grant the order sought in paragraph 1 of the draft order, subject to a small amendment to change the word "including" in the second line to "such that". For the reasons set out above, I decline to make the orders as sought in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft order under section 37. ______________