Cometsambre SA v Lloyd's Insurance Company SA HIG 5321 [2026] EWHC 1837 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1837 (Comm)Case No CL-2024-000661
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21/07/2026MR JUSTICE BUTCHER
COMETSAMBRE SAClaimantLLOYD’S INSURANCE COMPANY SA HIG 5321Defendant
Guy Blackwood KC and Jamie Hamblen (instructed by Birketts) for ClaimantTimothy Hill KC and Alex Carless (instructed by HFW) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 11, 14, 15, 18, 19 May 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 21 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE BUTCHER
[1]This case concerns a Charterers’ Liability (or ‘C/L’) and Freight Demurrage and Defence (or ‘FDD’) insurance. The Claimant (‘Cometsambre’) was the insured, and the Defendant (‘Lloyd’s’) was the insurer.[2]The insurance arrangements provided cover for Cometsambre’s potential liability as charterers of vessels to carry cargoes of scrap metal from Ghent, Belgium. Cover was first put in place in 2008, but this dispute relates to the renewal for the 2022 year. In June 2022, a cargo of Cometsambre’s scrap metal was loaded onto the chartered vessel LOWLANDS MIMOSA, and was involved in a fire on board, which gave rise to a substantial claim against Cometsambre under the charterparty.[3]Cometsambre’s claim is for a declaration that Lloyd’s is liable to indemnify it in respect of the charterparty claim, and in respect of its legal costs associated with the fire and the charterparty arbitration. Lloyd’s has contended that it was entitled to, and has, avoided the relevant policy and has denied liability, on the basis that Cometsambre breached its duty of fair presentation of the risk. Specifically, Lloyd’s contends that Cometsambre should have disclosed, but failed to disclose, certain fires that had previously occurred in its scrap metal. Cometsambre denies that Lloyd’s was or is entitled to avoid the policy.

Factual Background and History of the Insurance Cover

[4]The following description of the facts is almost entirely uncontroversial. To the extent that there was any relevant dispute, it involves my findings on the relevant issue.[5]Cometsambre is a scrap metal dealer based in Belgium and is part of the wider COMET group. Lloyd’s is the company which writes all European risks for Lloyd’s syndicates. In this case, the relevant syndicate was ‘HIG 5321’, which signifies Hartford’s Syndicate 1221, formerly known as ‘Navigators’, and it was that syndicate which assumed the risk under the relevant insurance contract.[6]In early 2008, Cometsambre was contemplating starting to charter vessels to ship cargoes of scrap metal from Ghent. It approached Antwerp Insurance Claims Associates NV (‘AMICA’), an insurance coverholder, through Cometsambre’s retail broker, Concordia NV (‘Concordia’) in order to obtain C/L and cargo insurance. In an initial email of 7 February 2008, it was said that it was anticipated that some 600,000 MT scrap would be shipped per year, on a fixed route between Ghent and Istanbul or Izmir, that there would be approximately 30,000 MT per shipment, and that the value of the goods would be US$ 450 per MT.[7]Concordia provided a ‘Charterers Liability Questionnaire’ which it had completed. This stated, inter alia: Type of cargoes Scrap (schredded steel scrap HMS 1 + HMS 1-2 or ISRI specs. 210/211, min. density 65 LBS/F3) in bulk Delivery CFR/FO Abt. 35 000 MT per vessel Contract with owners T/C or V/C V/C C/P forms Gencon C/P Expected no. of vessels per annum … 15 vessels Claims record Unexisting – 1st trade as voyage charterer[8]On 28 February 2008, Concordia sent to AMICA a copy of Cometsambre’s proposed first voyage charterparty, which would be with Lalemant NV as Disponent Owners and on the Gencon form. That charterparty contained the following, amongst other, provisions:
‘12. Cargo … 30,000 MT 10% more or less Owners’ option steel scrap non oily, non radioactive/excluding motor blocks/turnings/boring and cuttings HMS 1/HMS 1+2/ shredded SF … … Additional Clause 51 The scrap mentioned herein only limited to hms 1+2 and/or shredded scrap specifically non-oily/non-radioactive/non-dangerous excluding motor blocks and turnings and also metal borings, shavings and cuttings. …’

Additional Clause 51

[9]On 10 March 2008, Concordia wrote to Mr Hoek of AMICA stating that ‘Cometsambre’s first declaration concerns the “Ali Ekinci”. On 12 March 2008 Mr Hoek made comments on a draft ‘Covernote’ which had been supplied to AMICA by Concordia. He wrote, inter alia:
‘In addition to the excluded cargoes you mention, DRI, NBI and HBI Fines are also excluded’
. He also wrote that AMICA had already received a copy of the charterparty, ‘but would appreciate receiving a copy of the b(s)/l in due course.’’[10]On 12 March 2008, Mr Hoek wrote to Concordia:
‘One more question: In the C/P for the Mv ‘Ali Enciki’ … the cargo is listed as “…steel scrap non oil…” I assume that scrap is always made oil-free before shipping.’
I assume that scrap is always made oil-free before shipping.’[11]Later on 12 March 2008, Mr Hoek wrote to Concordia:
‘… would you please ask Cometsambre the more general question of what the exact description of the cargo is? Ann [Dely of Concordia] previously stated the following in this regard: “shredded steel scrap HMS 1 + HMS 1-2 or ISRI specs. 210/211, min Density 65 LBS/F3 in bulk.” Is that still correct? I ask this specifically because a standard exclusion for scrap is “excluding oily scrap, engine blocks and borings and turnings”, which should also be included in the final policy for the sake of clarity.’
On 13 March 2008, Concordia confirmed that the description of the goods given earlier was correct.[12]On 17 March 2008, Mr Hoek wrote to Concordia confirming cover both under the C/L insurance, and under a cargo insurance which had also been being negotiated. The security on the C/L cover was Axa Corporate Solutions and the Raetsclub, not, at this juncture, Lloyd’s.[13]The C/L coverage came to be contained or evidenced by what was called a ‘Covernote’, dated 20 March 2008, signed on behalf of AMICA and Cometsambre. This Covernote employed Concordia’s standard terms. Under this contract, it was agreed that insurers would provide both C/L and Marine Defence insurance for a period of 12 months from 10 March 2008 in respect of ‘All vessels chartered by the Assured to be declared, not exceeding 25 years of age or held covered at rates, terms and conditions to be agreed prior to attachment’. The Maximum Insured Amount in relation to C/L was specified as US$ 25 million. Excluded cargoes as regards the C/L cover were specified as:
‘Ammonium nitrate, Grain in tankers, Liquid sulphur, Methane and similar liquid gas, Explosives, Livestock, Asbestos, Acids, Calcium Carbide, Naphta, Motor Spirit, Tar, Pitch in bulk, Wet hides, Cement in bulk, Fishmeal, DRI, HBI, HBI Fines.’
[14]In parallel, AMICA also agreed to take a 100% share on a cargo policy (Subscription Policy P.A. 5339), which was to insure Cometsambre, on the general conditions of the Antwerp Marine Policy of 2004, in respect of ‘Primarily, but not exclusively, bulk scrap metal except for engines, scrap metal containing oil waste, lathe shavings and drilling shavings’. This cargo insurance, for which the security was led by Axa France, was against all risks, including risks of heating, sweating and spontaneous combustion, and was to cover ‘goods belonging to the Insured during transport and/or transported on their behalf and/or under their management or in which they have any interest as owner, agent, carrier, depositary and/or in any other capacity…’.[15]During the course of 2008, AMICA and Syndicate 1221 reached agreement on the basis on which AMICA would underwrite C/L on behalf of Navigators Syndicate. The ‘Types of Cargo’ in respect of which AMICA were authorised to underwrite C/L risks included ‘Non-oily scrap’. The document further stated ‘All other cargoes are subject to referral to Navigators as per the attached list of non-approved cargoes.’ Mr Hoek’s evidence was that the ‘attached list of non-approved cargoes’ was the same as that attached to the underwriting guidelines/authority document for 2013, to which I refer below.[16]In 2009, Cometsambre did not renew with AMICA either the C/L / Marine Defence cover or the cargo policy. In 2010, however, Cometsambre renewed the C/L and marine defence cover, now on AMICA’s new standard terms, and with Navigators as the security. The cargo insurance was now written by AMICA on behalf of insurers led by Axa Paris.[17]The new Cover Note for C/L and FDD insurance which was drawn up in 2010 specified that it was an ‘Open cover, to insure all vessels chartered by the Assured during the period of 12 calendar months, commencing on 10 February 2010…’ It was further provided:
‘6. Vessels & Declarations All vessels (whether on time or voyage charter) chartered by the Assured are to be declared to Underwriters prior to inception of risk. Vessels which meet the following criteria are automatically accepted: IACS classification Entry with an International Group P&I club … Vessels of maximum 40 years of age. 7. Limit of Insurance a. Charterers’
Liability: In respect of Charterers’ Liability claims: USD 25.000.000,00 any one accident or occurrence. … 8. Premium a. Charterers’ Liability: - For cover including liability for damage to cargo: USD 1,15 per GT per vessel per annum, pro-rata per day… - For cover excluding liability for damage to cargo: USD 0,75 per GT per vessel per annum, pro-rata per day… … 9. Deductibles a. Charterers’ Liability In respect of damage to hull claims: USD 10.000,00 any one accident or occurrence. In respect of damage to cargo claims: USD 10.000,00 any one cargo carrying voyage. In respect of all other claims: USD 3.500,00 any one accident or occurrence. … AMICA Conditions Charterers’ Liability Liability for Damage to Hull This insurance indemnifies the Assured for their liability for physical loss of, or damage to, the chartered vessel arising from the Charter Party. To include liability for hire, demurrage or loss of use (including detention) as a direct consequence of such physical loss of, or damage to, the chartered vessel. … 5.8 Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Clause This insurance shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, English Law and Practice. Any dispute between the parties arising out of this insurance is to be submitted to the High Court in London. …’ Vessels which meet the following criteria are automatically accepted: IACS classification Entry with an International Group P&I club … AMICA Conditions Charterers’ Liability

Liability for Damage to Hull

[18]The C/L and FDD cover was renewed on almost identical terms between 2010 and 2022, ‘as expiring’, with very little correspondence and few amendments. During this period:(1) Each year AMICA produced a document calculating Cometsambre’s claims ratio, listing the total premiums paid, claims paid, value of claims outstanding, claims total and a loss ratio for previous years.(2) In or about December 2012, AMICA and Syndicate 1221 produced revised Underwriting Guidelines for 2013. This included a list of cargoes which were ‘not approved’. There were two columns, one headed ‘Hull, P&I, Cargo’, and the other ‘Hull and P and I ex Cargo’. In the first column were a number of printed items, some of which were crossed out in manuscript. Thus, the printed text included:
‘Turnings or battlefield scrap Manufactured steel goods (Rods, Wire, Sheets etc) inc. Scrap’
Manufactured steel goods (Rods, Wire, Sheets etc) inc. Scrap’ The words ‘Turnings or battlefield’ in the first, and the entirety of the second of those lines were crossed out, and the word ‘oily’ was written in manuscript before ‘scrap’. The second column had the same two printed items, and no manuscript changes were made to them, or to any items in that column. (3) The two columns represent, as Mr Hill KC said, whether the insurance is in respect of liability for damage to hull and cargo, as well as P&I cover, or only for liability for damage to hull and P&I cover, but not for liability for damage to cargo. (4) I accept the evidence given by Mr Hoek that the amendments to the first column were made by him in order to match the list of approved cargoes, but that the list was of no real significance as he had no intention of writing, and never did write, non-approved cargoes. (5) During this 11-year active period (ie excluding 2009), Cometsambre paid an average premium of US$5,267.86 per year on the C/L policy (namely US$62,954.09 less US$5,007.66 in continuity bonuses, over 11 years). (6) There was a claim on the policy in 2012 in respect of stevedore damage on m/v CHYRA for US$8,426 (later adjusted to US$9,133.68). (7) In April 2021 Cometsambre informed Concordia that a chartered vessel had grounded at Alexandria, Egypt, and that the disponent owners had threatened a claim. (8) There was no disclosure in these years of the occurrence of any fires affecting Cometsambre’s scrap cargoes.

The Undisclosed Fires

[19]Lloyd’s case is that Cometsambre should have disclosed but failed to disclose a number of fires which had occurred in its scrap. It is necessary to identify what those fires were.[20]On 25 May 2020, there was a fire in a stockpile of Cometsambre’s scrap on the quayside at Ghent. The fire department attended, and several pieces of scrap were removed with a crane. The fire department reported:
‘… a scrap heap caught fire. The burning part was removed with a crane and placed next to the heap. The situation was considered under control, but a final inspection was requested … no smoke or flames visible. Small burnt residues were present among the removed scrap. Thermal camera inspection was carried out and temperatures were acceptable. As a precaution, additional scrap was removed by crane. Further thermal inspection showed no issues. No further action by the fire brigade was required.’
[21]On 3 September 2020 a fire occurred during the loading of the Cometsambre-chartered m/v ORIENT DYNASTY at Ghent. An internal report prepared by Cometsambre after the fire includes this description:
‘At around 9.45 am, the foreman of Sea Invest noticed a release of smoke in hold number 1 (they were loading). Immediately afterwards, flames appeared. It was there that the crew intervened and extinguished the fire in the hold. As a precautionary measure, the Foreman and the Sea Invest crane operator took out the equivalent of 20-25 tons of HMS and placed them on the quay (the fire was out). A Sea Invest truck arrived and sprayed the pile with a lot of water. The pile remained on the quay for more or less 5 hours and 30 minutes and was then reloaded into the hold. The Foreman and the Sea Invest crane operator believe that the product that started burning came from a truck they had just dumped.’
[22]On 23 October 2020 there was a fire on board the Cometsambre-chartered m/v COMMON SPIRIT during discharge of a cargo of scrap at Alexandria, Egypt. A discharge survey prepared by Bureau Veritas records that:
‘During discharging operation supervision, our inspector noted a heavy smoke rising from Hold No. 2. Immediately our inspector headed straight to the mentioned Hold on board MV COMMON SPIRIT to observe that some steel scrap cargo was on fire…’
The surveyor recorded that ‘The fire was put out by Vessel crew using fire hoses and Alexandria port authority firefighting team as well.’[23]Hadia Helmy of the receiver, EZZ Steel, stated that she was ‘Very much upset by this’, and a message was sent to Cometsambre, stating that ‘You are strongly requested to take all necessary countermeasures to avoid existence of any hazard/explosive/foreign materials in our shipments which is possible cause of this fire.’ On 4 November 2020, EZZ Steel made a further complaint about what it said was ‘poor quality’ of the scrap in the COMMON SPIRIT shipment, stating that it included ‘not only very high level of impurities but more important is the large number of explosive material that was imbedded in the scrap which for us is really a very serious issue’. EZZ Steel also provided a PowerPoint presentation which included: a complaint that ‘[t]his Shipment is characterised by large content of Remnants of war, projectiles cannons, shell gun and many other harmful materials’; photos of ‘Explosives’; a complaint about the ‘large content [of] closed vessels [ie gas cylinders]’; complaints about the ‘large amount of Non ferrous materials, Wastes, Rubber, wood, tires and synthetic spongy beside considerable amount of Dust’, estimated at 5% of total quality; and a description of the cargo as being ‘very bad scrap quality’.[24]Cometsambre did not accept these complaints. The Bureau Veritas discharge survey had recorded the level of impurities in the scrap as between 0.08% and 0.35%, but had noted that some wood parts, rubber, fibres, plastic etc had been observed, and also that ‘Due to the inhomogeneous nature of the cargo and lack of access during inspection the presence of other material being not in conformity with above description cannot be excluded.’ Cometsambre’s position was that ‘we loaded good-quality material’, and ‘the level of impurities is low and remains within the contractual terms. Therefore there is nothing to be criticised.’[25]On 28 January 2021 there was a fire in a stockpile of Cometsambre’s scrap at the quayside in Ghent. An internal report prepared by Cometsambre after the fire records that at about 21.15 the Sea Invest crane operator noticed smoke at the top of the stockpile and decided to call the fire brigade. The fire was around 20m high in the pile. Fire fighters worked on the fire until around 02.15. About 20m³ was affected. The report refers to the fire as having been brought quickly under control.[26]On 14 October 2021 there was the start of a fire on board the Cometsambre-chartered mv SAKURA during loading at Ghent. There is little information about this incident, but the Master’s Letter of Protest stated:
‘During loading operation (Cargo Scrap) on 14 October 2021 / 0015 LT in cargo hold No. 2 ‘Found caught fire due to inherent vice of cargo’ immediately informed the stevedores to take out the fire cargo. The stevedores remove the Cargo from cargo hold and Crew monitoring the Cargo no smoke.’
The stevedores remove the Cargo from cargo hold and Crew monitoring the Cargo no smoke.’[27]In addition to these fires, there were a number of fires in scrap due to be or being processed at Cometsambre’s processing plants at Obourg and Châtelet. Given the different circumstances which gave rise to those fires from those relevant to the C/L policy at issue here, these fires assumed, in my view correctly, a very limited significance during the trial, and it is not necessary to say more about them.

The 2022 Renewal

[28]On 14 December 2021 AMICA contacted Concordia about renewing the C/L cover for 2022. Following the claim for hull damage as a result of the grounding earlier in the year, AMICA proposed an increase in the premium and excess. Cometsambre resisted both. On 27 December 2021 AMICA agreed to a two-week extension to the existing cover whilst instructions were taken on renewal. On 13 January 2022 Concordia sent an email to AMICA confirming, as discussed on the telephone, that the C/L cover could be renewed for 2022. AMICA had not persisted in its suggestion of increased premium rate or excesses.

Fires in 2022

[29]Fires were experienced in 2022. These are, of course, not themselves the subject of Lloyd’s allegations of non-disclosure. They were, nevertheless, the subject of some evidence and argument at the trial.[30]On 24 March 2022 there was a fire in a Cometsambre stockpile in Ghent. A report states that:
‘As soon as we observed a more significant development of smoke, we immediately contacted the fire brigade.’
[31]On 4 May 2022, there was a fire at Ghent quayside in Cometsambre’s scrap. It was reported that: ‘Smoke and then flames appeared in the HMS 1/2 stockpile’.[32]On 18 May 2022, there was a fire in EZZ Steel’s warehouse in Alexandria, Egypt, after discharge of Cometsambre scrap from m/v ERTEA. In a Report of Inspection dated 25 May 2022, Alfred H Knight Holland B.V. reported that the receivers had had to call for help from outside, and fire trucks had put the fire out after 3 hours. The Report added:
‘The most important note during the cargo inspection is the impurities found in the cargo such as sponge, foam, plastics, tires and closed drums. Handling of the cargo in open areas with high temperature is perhaps the main cause for fire.’
[33]On 21 May 2022, there was a fire on board the Cometsambre-chartered m/v TONY SMITH during loading at Ghent. Smoke was observed in scrap loaded into Hold No. 2. Loading stopped and the burnt cargo was removed and water applied to it. The incident appears to have been swiftly dealt with.[34]On 22/23 June 2022 there were two fires on board the Cometsambre-chartered vessel LOWLANDS MIMOSA whilst loading scrap at Ghent, for another sale to EZZ Steel. The first fire on 22 June was extinguished, after which loading was resumed. On 23 June there was another fire on board, which is said to have caused significant damage to the vessel and is the subject of a large claim against Cometsambre.[35]Cometsambre’s internal incident report refers to the likely cause as a lithium battery catching fire, and refers to lithium batteries and gas cylinders in the scrap. At Cometsambre’s request the Belgian court appointed a surveyor to produce a report on the incident. That surveyor noted that the level of impurities permitted for the HMS scrap was 1%, and that the jointly appointed cargo surveyor for the loading operations had confirmed that the scrap loaded complied with contractual specifications. The cause of the fire was considered to have been the ignition of a flammable impurity, but the precise cause was not determined.[36]Lalemant has commenced arbitration proceedings against Cometsambre in respect of the damage to the LOWLANDS MIMOSA. Lalemant has alleged breach of charterparty by Cometsambre in shipping dangerous cargo, and in particular:(1) Breach of the cargo description in Box 12 and Rider Clause 51;(2) Breach, by reason of its impurities, of the requirement to ship a reasonable cargo of scrap;(3) Failure to give notice of the dangerous nature of the cargo, contrary to the IMSBC Code;(4) Failure to load the cargo in accordance with the IMSBC Code; and(5) A claim for an indemnity under Article IV, rule 6 of the Hague Rules for shipping dangerous goods.[37]On 28 September 2022, there was a fire on board the Cometsambre-chartered m/v STELLAR EAGLE during loading in Ghent. Cometsambre’s internal report stated that:
‘At around 17.10 hours, the bulldozer that was trimming in hold number 5 noticed that a fire had broken out…. As the fire hoses had already been connected before loading, the pump only had to be switched on and the fire could be extinguished immediately. After 3 minutes the fire was out….’
The report indicates that it was suspected that the fire had been caused by a battery.

AMICA’s stance after the LOWLANDS MIMOSA fire

[38]By 20 July 2022, AMICA had been informed of some previous fires in scrap belonging to Cometsambre. On that date, AMICA wrote to Cometsambre, stating, in part:
‘We can now but remind Cometsambre that it has not given full and frank disclosure to the insurers from the outset of this matter; … -while walking in the yard numerous canisters were observed which were not empty as well as oily rags, motor parts … The cargo that was actually loaded on board is still under investigation. -insurers have not been informed on multiple incidents one of which was considered to be a major fire for which EZZ STEEL put Cometsambre on notice and which was not disclosed to insurers; … AMICA has informed Cometsambre from the outset, at the meeting with Concordia as well as during exchanges afterwards that it is fully free to ship a new cargo to EZZ STEEL under a new contract if that is how Cometsambre wishes to proceed and that such shipment will be covered provided it is within the specifications of the policy. Given the current incident and the previously undisclosed incidents, a pre-loading meeting (viz. between Ship-Owners/master, Cometsambre, Stevedores, EZZ and the respective surveyors) incorporating a risk-assessment of the dedicated cargo with acceptable risk.’
[39]On 23 December 2023, HFW, on behalf of AMICA, wrote to Cometsambre giving notice that AMICA had grounds to decline the claim intimated by Cometsambre in respect of LOWLANDS MIMOSA on the basis that Cometsambre had breached its duty of fair presentation, on the basis that, contrary to representations made to AMICA, the goods carried were not recyclable, non-hazardous, clean scrap, and that between 2014 and 2022 there had been ten fires involving scrap metal shipments belonging to Cometsambre, either on the quayside or when loaded onto vessels, of which AMICA had not been notified.

BST Fires

[40]It is necessary to refer to a further aspect of the factual evidence in this case at this juncture, though it does not relate to Cometsambre. It relates instead to a different scrap metal exporter which Lloyd’s insured, via AMICA, namely Belgian Scrap Terminal (‘BST’).[41]A fire occurred on 23-24 March 2018 on board the m/v LMZ PLUTO, having departed from Antwerp after loading a cargo of BST’s scrap, consisting of HMS 1/2, HMS 1/P&S, shredded steel and new cuttings. The fire was described as an emission of smoke. The fire led to inspections by a P&I Surveyor and a Port State Control officer. The vessel was detained at Flushing by Port State Control.[42]AMICA appointed BMT to conduct a survey. The BMT surveyor recorded that he observed debris such as a rag, pieces of wood and small pieces of plastic, but in minimal quantities. The source of the fire was not found. The BMT surveyor accepted that the source could have been the debris, but stated in an addendum that he preferred the view that the source was hot work done by the crew.[43]The survey refers to the vessel’s owners having particularised a claim for EUR 628,510 against BST.[44]This fire was disclosed to AMICA but did not lead to AMICA’s declining cover.[45]A second fire occurred in a cargo of BST scrap on 10 July 2018. This fire occurred during the loading of cargo onto the m/v SOFIA R whilst at Antwerp. Again, AMICA appointed BMT to conduct a survey. The survey records that, after trimming in Hold no. 4, smoke developed into flames over an area of approximately 1m x 1m. The fire was extinguished in about 1 hour 40 minutes. The possible cause identified was a spark initiated by the trimming, which could have ignited non-steel elements of the cargo, but it was not possible to identify the material which had first ignited.[46]The SOFIA R fire did not lead to AMICA declining cover. Instead, in February 2019 AMICA offered to renew the BST policy.

The Legal Framework

[47]There was little dispute as to the relevant legal framework. It was common ground between the parties that it was governed by the provisions of the Insurance Act 2015 (‘IA’).[48]Section 3 of IA provides as follows:
‘The duty of fair presentation (1) Before a contract of insurance is entered into, the insured must make to the insurer a fair presentation of the risk. (2) The duty imposed by subsection (1) is referred to in this Act as “the duty of fair presentation”. (3) A fair presentation of the risk is one— (a) which makes the disclosure required by subsection (4), (b) which makes that disclosure in a manner which would be reasonably clear and accessible to a prudent insurer, and (c) in which every material representation as to a matter of fact is substantially correct, and every material representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is made in good faith. (4) The disclosure required is as follows, except as provided in subsection (5)— (a) disclosure of every material circumstance which the insured knows or ought to know, or (b) failing that, disclosure which gives the insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material circumstances. (5) In the absence of enquiry, subsection (4) does not require the insured to disclose a circumstance if— (a) it diminishes the risk, (b) the insurer knows it, (c) the insurer ought to know it, (d) the insurer is presumed to know it, or (e) it is something as to which the insurer waives information. (6) Sections 4 to 6 make further provision about the knowledge of the insured and of the insurer, and section 7 contains supplementary provision.’
[49]Section 4 IA makes provision as to what constitutes knowledge of the insured, including the following:
‘Knowledge of insured … (3) An insured who is not an individual knows only what is known to one or more of the individuals who are— (a)part of the insured's senior management, or (b)responsible for the insured's insurance. … (6) Whether an individual or not, an insured ought to know what should reasonably have been revealed by a reasonable search of information available to the insured (whether the search is conducted by making enquiries or by any other means). (7) In subsection (6) “information” includes information held within the insured's organisation or by any other person (such as the insured's agent or a person for whom cover is provided by the contract of insurance). (8) For the purposes of this section— … (c) “senior management” means those individuals who play significant roles in the making of decisions about how the insured's activities are to be managed or organised.’
[50]Section 5 IA makes the following provision as to knowledge of the insurer. ‘Knowledge of insurer (1)For the purposes of section 3(5)(b), an insurer knows something only if it is known to one or more of the individuals who participate on behalf of the insurer in the decision whether to take the risk, and if so on what terms (whether the individual does so as the insurer's employee or agent, as an employee of the insurer's agent or in any other capacity). (2) For the purposes of section 3(5)(c), an insurer ought to know something only if— (a)an employee or agent of the insurer knows it, and ought reasonably to have passed on the relevant information to an individual mentioned in subsection (1), or (b)the relevant information is held by the insurer and is readily available to an individual mentioned in subsection (1). (3) For the purposes of section 3(5)(d), an insurer is presumed to know—(a) things which are common knowledge, and(b) things which an insurer offering insurance of the class in question to insureds in the field of activity in question would reasonably be expected to know in the ordinary course of business.’[51]Section 7 IA contains important ‘Supplementary’ provisions, as follows:
‘Supplementary (1) A fair presentation need not be contained in only one document or oral presentation. (2) The term “circumstance” includes any communication made to, or information received by, the insured. (3) A circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms. (4) Examples of things which may be material circumstances are— (a)special or unusual facts relating to the risk, (b)any particular concerns which led the insured to seek insurance cover for the risk, (c)anything which those concerned with the class of insurance and field of activity in question would generally understand as being something that should be dealt with in a fair presentation of risks of the type in question. (5)A material representation is substantially correct if a prudent insurer would not consider the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct to be material. (6)A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract of insurance is entered into.’
[52]Under s. 7(3), materiality is judged by whether it would ‘influence the judgement of a prudent insurer’. In Delos Shipholding SA v Allianz Global [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm), Dias J said in relation to this test:
‘[220] The test of materiality under the 2015 Act is substantively the same as under the previous law. It was therefore common ground that Insurers did not need to show that the undisclosed circumstances would have had a decisive effect on the judgment of the hypothetical prudent underwriter, or even that he would probably have regarded them as increasing the risk. It is sufficient that he or she would have wanted to take them into account.’
[53]At [242] of Delos v Allianz, Dias J indicated, in my judgment correctly, how the test might have applied in that case. She said:
‘[242] Had it been necessary to decide, I would have held that the charges were material on the basis that a prudent underwriter would have wanted to consider imposing a condition, for example, that Mr Bairactaris should be replaced as a nominee director. Whether or not the prudent underwriter would actually have done so is, of course, irrelevant; I find that he or she would at least have wanted to consider the matter. Accordingly, had I concluded that the Claimants had the requisite knowledge, I find that they should have disclosed the circumstances relied on by Insurers.’
[54]Section 8 IA makes provision for remedies for breach of the duty of fair presentation. It provides in part:
‘Remedies for breach (1) The insurer has a remedy against the insured for a breach of the duty of fair presentation only if the insurer shows that, but for the breach, the insurer— (a)would not have entered into the contract of insurance at all, or (b)would have done so only on different terms. (2)The remedies are set out in Schedule 1. (3)A breach for which the insurer has a remedy against the insured is referred to in this Act as a “qualifying breach”. (4)A qualifying breach is either— (a)deliberate or reckless, or (b)neither deliberate nor reckless. (5)A qualifying breach is deliberate or reckless if the insured — (a)knew that it was in breach of the duty of fair presentation, or (b)did not care whether or not it was in breach of that duty. (6)It is for the insurer to show that a qualifying breach was deliberate or reckless.’
[55]No case was pursued by Lloyd’s that any breach of the duty of fair presentation by Cometsambre was deliberate or reckless. Accordingly the potentially relevant provisions of Schedule 1 of IA are as follows: ‘Other breaches 3Paragraphs 4 to 6 apply if a qualifying breach was neither deliberate nor reckless. 4If, in the absence of the qualifying breach, the insurer would not have entered into the contract on any terms, the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, but must in that event return the premiums paid. 5If the insurer would have entered into the contract, but on different terms (other than terms relating to the premium), the contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those different terms if the insurer so requires. 6(1)In addition, if the insurer would have entered into the contract (whether the terms relating to matters other than the premium would have been the same or different), but would have charged a higher premium, the insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim. (2)In sub-paragraph (1), “reduce proportionately” means that the insurer need pay on the claim only X% of what it would otherwise have been under an obligation to pay under the terms of the contract (or, if applicable, under the different terms provided for by virtue of paragraph 5), where—[56]The test for inducement in s. 8 IA concerns the effect of a breach of the duty of fair presentation in relation to the relevant contract of insurance. Each renewal of an insurance contract is a new insurance contract: see Dalecroft Properties Ltd v Underwriters Subscribing to Certificate No. 755/BA004/2008/IOS/00000282/2008/005 [2017] EWHC 1263 (Comm) at [85]; Tynefield Care Ltd v The New India Assurance Co Ltd [2025] Lloyd’s Rep IR 621 at [130]. The relevant contract of insurance here is the 2022 renewal. The duty of fair presentation required the disclosure of material circumstances, even if they ought to have been disclosed, but were not disclosed, at inception or at an earlier renewal, provided that such circumstances were still relevant to the new contract of insurance and remained unknown to the insurer. Inducement is assessed at the time that the relevant contract of insurance becomes binding: see Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (14th ed) at 7-180 – 7-181.[57]In a number of cases, judges have warned of the risk that in evidence insurers may engage in post-claim underwriting. In Bate v Aviva Insurance UK Ltd [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 492, at [25], HHJ Mackie KC warned of the risk that the evidence of insurers will be a ‘defensive post-mortem response to the risk in the particular case’. In North Star Shipping Ltd v Drake Insurance Plc [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76 at [254] Colman J said that hypothetical evidence in relation to inducement ‘by its very nature lends itself to exaggeration and embellishment in the interests of the party on whose behalf it is given’. Males J in AXA Versicherung AG v ARAB Insurance Group (BSC) [2016] Lloyd’s Rep IR 1, at [121] said:
‘the witness will generally have convinced himself that he would not have written the risk and will generally be […] an honest man, his assertion that he would not have done so if a fair presentation had been made will often be made with conviction and will appear plausible. A healthy scepticism is therefore appropriate in evaluating such evidence, together with a proper regard for the burden of proof and an appreciation of where on the wide spectrum of materiality the particular non-disclosure which is relied upon falls.’
[58]These statements cannot be said to amount to legal principles, but they are valuable reminders that the nature of the question being asked has a tendency to produce evidence which advantages the underwriter and which, though honestly given, is unreliable.

The Key Issues

[59]Lloyd’s case is that:(1) Cometsambre breached its duty of fair presentation by failing to disclose the earlier fires.(2) As a result, it is entitled to avoid the policy.[60]Cometsambre denies this case. There is no dispute that the fires were not disclosed. But Cometsambre:(1) Denies that any relevant person at Cometsambre had knowledge of the quayside fire of 25 May 2020.(2) Denies that there was any failure by it to make a fair presentation, because: (a) The fires were not material; or (b) Cometsambre gave sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needed to make further enquiries; or (c) The insurers are presumed to have known that fires of this nature in scrap metal belonging to it would probably have occurred; or (d) Insurers had waived information as to the fires.(3) Had there been disclosure of the fires it would not have impacted the decision of AMICA to write the risk or the terms on which it would have done so.[61]The principal issues to be decided are thus as follows. In the first place, the limited issue as to knowledge of the 25 May 2020 fire.[62]Secondly, in relation to the issue of fair presentation, there are 4 main sub-issues which require resolution:(1) Whether any of the fires were material circumstances within the meaning of s. 7(3) IA?(2) Whether Cometsambre gave to AMICA sufficient information to put insurers on notice that they needed to make further enquiries for the purposes of s. 3(4)(b) of IA?(3) Whether AMICA is presumed to know of the fires for the purposes of s. 3(5)(d) of IA?(4) Whether AMICA waived information in relation to the fires for the purposes of s. 3(5)(e) of IA?[63]Third, in relation to avoidance, it is necessary to determine whether, but for any breach by Cometsambre, AMICA would have refused to enter into the relevant policy, either on the same or any terms.

The Key Personnel and the Evidence

[64]Before considering these issues, it is helpful to identify the individuals concerned at Cometsambre and at AMICA, and the witnesses that gave evidence.[65]AMICA had been set up in 1984 by Gilbert Simons. Mr Adrianus Hoek had joined in December 2006. Mr Simons died in 2011. After that Mr Hoek went on to become Managing Director of AMICA. The AMICA team came to consist of Mr Hoek, Mr Mark Rietdijk, who assisted Mr Hoek in particular on the underwriting side, and Mr Ronald Oortgiesen, who assisted in particular in an administrative and support role. Mr Hoek gave evidence and was cross-examined.[66]Mr Hoek was, in my assessment, a plainly honest witness who gave his evidence carefully and thoughtfully.[67]At Cometsambre, Mr Didier Duchesne was the person responsible for its C/L insurance, and for liaising with Concordia in relation to the covers with AMICA.[68]Francois Renardy joined Cometsambre in April 2022, and has been Head of Strategic Risk since 2025. Mr Renardy was thus not at the company at the time that the relevant undisclosed fires occurred or when the relevant insurance cover was placed.[69]Cometsambre served a witness statement only from Mr Renardy. In it, Mr Renardy produced a spreadsheet which summarised the fires which had occurred. Mr Renardy was not cross-examined.[70]No witness statement was put in from Mr Duchesne, and he was not called. This was the subject of criticism by Lloyd’s.[71]Expert evidence was given on behalf of Cometsambre by Alan Jervis, and on behalf of Lloyd’s by John Howe.[72]Alan Jervis worked for Norwich Union in various capacities for nearly 20 years, including as President and Chief Agent of Norwich Union Group Canada between 1989 and 1996. He was President/Owner of Coastal, Marine Claims and Recoveries between 1996 and 2002, President/Owner of Eagle Underwriting Group Inc between 1996 and 2010, Commercial Underwriting Manager / Senior Underwriter at Coast Underwriters in the RSA between 2010 and 2022. Since 2019 he has been President of Jervis ICI Ltd which provides expert witness and consultancy services.[73]John Howe was a senior underwriter at North of England P&I Club between 1989 and 2016, and between 2016 and 2019 was Senior VP for Business Development at Skuld P&I Club.[74]Mr Howe has a great deal more experience than Mr Jervis of writing the relevant types of risk. He wrote or renewed many fixed premium C/L policies, including policies for scrap metal cargoes, at North of England and at Skuld. At North of England, he was underwriting several hundreds of C/L policies per year. Mr Jervis’s relevant experience was much more limited. Much of his career was spent primarily in claims handling. His underwriting experience involved very limited numbers of C/L policies.[75]I also considered that Mr Howe’s evidence was given with conviction and confidence. I did not consider that the same could be said of Mr Jervis’s evidence in relation to important issues in the case.[76]Accordingly, where they differed, I considered that Mr Howe’s evidence was, in general, more reliable and to be preferred. Analysis Was there relevant knowledge of the 25 May 2020 fire?

Analysis

[77]Cometsambre points to the fact that the 25 May 2020 fire is not referred to in any documents disclosed by it. It is referred to only in a document provided by the Ghent fire department in September 2024, which describes the fire as ‘small’. There is no basis, Cometsambre contends, on which to conclude that Cometsambre’s senior management or employee in charge of insurance knew of the fire or ought to have known of it.[78]Lloyd’s argues that this was a fire at Cometsambre’s premises in Ghent which required attendance by the fire brigade and harbour police. It is to be inferred that Mr Duchesne would have been told of it. In any event, the Court should draw an adverse inference against Cometsambre as(i) it is inconceivable that there was no internal report and(ii) Cometsambre failed to adduce evidence from Mr Duchesne or anyone else responsible for its insurance.[79]I find it very difficult to accept that the occurrence of a fire at Ghent which required the attendance of and steps to be taken by the fire brigade was not reported to the commercial manager with responsibility for C/L insurance. Even if Mr Duchesne, or a member of Cometsambre’s senior management, was not actually aware of the occurrence of the fire, I consider that it was information which the insured ought to have known, because it would have been revealed by a reasonable search of information available to the insured (including by making enquiries of staff and/or of the fire brigade if there were really a possibility that the fire brigade knew of matters which were not known to the manager in charge of C/L insurance arrangements).[80]Thus I conclude that Cometsambre knew or ought to have known of the 25 May 2020 fire.[81]With that said, I should add that I do not consider that whether Cometsambre knew or ought to have known of that fire makes any significant difference to the issues of whether a fair presentation of the risk was made and whether Lloyd’s is entitled to avoid the cover.

The level of fire risk to be expected in Cometsambre’s scrap metal cargoes

[82]Before answering the specific issues as to fair presentation and inducement identified above, it is helpful to address this question, which was the subject of much debate at the trial, and which informs the analysis in relation to those issues.[83]There was a significant difference between the parties. Cometsambre contended that the prudent underwriter would have known: of ‘the usual fire risks posed by HMS/shredded metal steel scrap’; that HMS / shredded steel scrap will inevitably contain impurities; that the ‘generally accepted tolerance for impurities is 1% of the total weight for HMS 1/2 scrap and 0.5% for shredded steel scrap’; that the impurities found in HMS / shredded steel scrap ‘will often pose fire risks’; and that ‘fires in HMS / shredded steel scrap occur with some frequency and are an appreciable risk’.[84]Lloyd’s case was that an underwriter would not be expecting fires in Cometsambre’s ‘clean, non-dangerous scrap metal cargoes’. Therefore ‘any cargo fires that did take place (let alone a new pattern of five cargo fires in quick succession after about 12 years without any fires) should have been disclosed’. Lloyd’s relies in support of this case on the terms of the presentation of the risk by Cometsambre, the terms of applicable industry standards (ISRI and the IMSBC Code) and on Mr Howe’s expert evidence. The initial presentation[85]The starting point as to what would have been expected by an actual underwriter, and by a prudent underwriter, in relation to Cometsambre’s cargoes is the information supplied by the insured at the initial presentation. This included that the scrap would be shredded steel scrap HMS 1 and/or HMS 2, or ISRI specification 210 or 211. HMS 1 is no. 1 Heavy Melting Steel of ISRI (the acronym of the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries) scrap specifications 200-202. HMS 2 is no. 2 Heavy Melting Steel of ISRI specifications 203-206. ISRI specifications 210 and 211 are categories of ‘shredded scrap’.[86]The relevant ISRI specifications were the Ferrous Scrap Specifications: FS-2007 at the time of initial presentation of the risk and FS-2021 at the time of the 2022 renewal. Those specifications remained in essentially the same terms. Both the 2007 and 2021 FS specifications included, as ‘General Information’:
‘a. Cleanness. All grades shall be free of dirt, nonferrous metals, or foreign material of any kind, and excessive rust and corrosion. However, the terms “free of dirt, nonferrous metals, or foreign material of any kind” are not intended to preclude the accidental inclusion of negligible amounts where it can be shown that this amount is unavoidable in the customary preparation and handling of the particular grade involved.’
[87]In addition, the proposed form of charterparty supplied at the initial placement included Box 12 and Additional Clause 51 in the terms quoted above.[88]The initial presentation therefore indicated that the scrap which would be shipped by Cometsambre would be ‘clean’, in the sense indicated in the ‘Cleanness’ provision in the ISRI specifications, and ‘non-oily / non-radioactive / non-dangerous’. The IMSBC Code[89]A further matter which would have been relevant to the perceived fire risk of Cometsambre’s scrap metal cargoes was the IMSBC (International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes) Code made under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. Mr Howe’s evidence, which I accept, was that an underwriter would draw a distinction between what are Group B cargoes for the purposes of the IMSBC Code, which are broadly cargoes that possess chemical hazards which could create dangerous situations on board ship, and Group C cargoes, which are ones which are neither liable to liquefy nor possess chemical hazards.[90]There are two entries in the IMSBC Code covering scrap metal. The first is for ‘SCRAP METAL’. The description is ‘“Scrap” iron or steel covers an enormous range of ferrous metals, principally intended for recycling.’ It is a Group C cargo, and is said to have ‘No special hazards’, and to be ‘… non-combustible or has a low fire risk except when cargo contains swarf (fine metal turnings liable to spontaneous combustion)…’ For swarf there is a cross reference to the second entry.[91]That second entry is ‘FERROUS METAL BORINGS, SHAVINGS, TURNINGS OR CUTTINGS UN 2793 in a form liable to self-heating.’ The description is ‘Metal drillings usually wet or contaminated with such materials as unsaturated cutting oil, oily rags and other combustible material.’ This category of cargo is in Group B, and is said to be ‘liable to self-heat and ignite spontaneously, particularly when in a finely divided form, wet or contaminated with such materials as unsaturated cutting oil, oily rags and other combustible material.’[92]Given the initial presentation, which indicated that Cometsambre’s cargoes would be non-oily, non-dangerous, and would exclude oily scrap, borings and turnings, I consider, in line with Mr Howe’s evidence, that an underwriter would understand that its scrap would constitute Group C cargoes. Consistently with this, Cometsambre appears, when it made declarations of the IMSBC Code of its cargoes, to have declared them as Category C. Would a greater fire risk have been expected?[93]Cometsambre made the case that a prudent underwriter (and Mr Hoek) would have expected that cargoes of scrap metals would experience a significant incidence of fires, by reference to a number of matters.[94]Specifically, Cometsambre referred to the fact that a cargo of scrap metal would inevitably contain, and it would be known that it would contain, impurities. It further contended that the ‘generally accepted tolerance for impurities’ is 1% of total weight for HMS 1 /2 scrap and 0.5% for shredded steel scrap. In support of that case, Cometsambre relied on the fact that this was the tolerance which BST worked to, as recorded in the BMT survey report in relation to the fire on the LMZ PLUTO; and that this figure appears in at least some of Cometsambre’s sales contracts, including in relation to the LOWLANDS MIMOSA.[95]These impurities, Cometsambre contended, will ‘often pose fire risks’. This was said to be supported by a circular from MS Amlin of August 2019, entitled ‘Scrap metal cargoes: an underestimated risk’, which stated that it was intended to ‘promote[ ] further awareness of the dangers and risks associated with the loading and carriage of scrap metal cargoes’ and provided ‘some recommendations to carry such cargoes in a safe manner.’ That circular referred to dangers of spontaneous combustion, and of fire because ‘mixed scrap cargoes may be polluted with paper, car tyres, rags and all different kinds of flammable material’ and that if seawater and salt crystals are present in the cargo hold this can lead to rapid oxidation resulting in rising temperatures and setting the contaminants on fire.[96]Cometsambre also pointed in this context to the Belgian court surveyor’s report on the LOWLANDS MIMOSA which had referred to the fact that, even though the cargo had been recorded in the documents accompanying the cargo as clean and free from fire hazard, ‘in practice, however, there are indeed flammable substances present in HMS 1-2 and a real fire hazard emanates from the maritime transport offered cargo.’ Reference was also made to the BMT survey reports in respect of the LMZ PLUTO and the SOFIA R which had referred to the presence of impurities.[97]Cometsambre also drew attention to certain statements made to the Belgian Nautical Commission in the context of the investigation of the LOWLANDS MIMOSA. The foreman of the Ghent stevedores for that loading operation, Yves Doubels, is recorded as having stated (as translated):
‘If I say that we experience this more often, it may be in one or two out of ten transshipment operations. While we are loading or unloading, we sometimes see a small smoke development, and then immediately remove it. I think we experience this maybe once a month, that something like this happens. Keep in mind that a lot of scrap is handled. … Fire incidents in the handling of scrap metal, that has always been the case, but now in recent years I think it is a bit more common in my opinion. Small incidents I mean, what happened on board was extreme. Sometimes there are also incidents in the stocks, where we are not present. I notice that especially the HMS is fire sensitive, more than for example shredded scrap. I suspect that this is now being dealt with in a different way, but it remains a difficult issue. The traffic of HMS has increased sharply…’
[98]The Safety Instruction Card provided to stevedores at the Port of Ghent (dated 26 September 2016) stated (in a machine translation) that ‘scrap metal is highly flammable because it contains an enormous amount of combustible residues’, such as rubber, oil and grease residues, plastic, cloths and rags, dust and paint on scrap.[99]My assessment of this material is as follows. I accept that it will have been broadly appreciated, within the scrap metal industry, and by a prudent underwriter, that scrap metal cargoes would contain a level of impurities. I do not accept that Cometsambre established that there was an ‘accepted tolerance’ of 1% of impurities in HMS. There was no expert evidence from anyone active in the scrap metal industry. The statements in survey reports to which Cometsambre referred were made for different purposes and in different circumstances. Furthermore, even if parties to contracts for the sale and purchase of scrap metal may have been prepared to agree to such a tolerance in their sale contract, that is not necessarily an indication that they expected that the cargo would actually contain that level of impurities. In the BMT report on the LMZ PLUTO, whilst reference was made to BST having mentioned a tolerance of 1%, the amount of foreign material in the LMZ PLUTO hold was estimated as less than 0.01% by weight. Further, BMT considered that that scrap was ‘standard/normal scrap’. Moreover, as Mr Howe said in his evidence, the tolerances agreed by the parties to a sale contract were not a matter with which a prudent underwriter would be concerned.[100]Furthermore, it was not established that there was any ‘accepted tolerance’ (whether of 1% or anything like it) for flammable impurities as opposed to impurities in general (such as dirt or non-ferrous metals). It would not be expected that there would be any significant quantity of flammable materials where the cargo was being shipped as a Group C cargo, and where the sale contract provided, as in fact Cometsambre’s contracts with EZZ Steel regularly did, that the cargo should be ‘free from dangerous materials, inflammable or explosive’.[101]There clearly is, and would be understood to be, some risk of fire in cargoes of HMS 1 / 2 scrap metal. The Amlin circular suggests that this was a risk which it was thought was underestimated. There is no reliable evidence, however, as to the actual incidence of fires in cargoes of such scrap metal. The Amlin circular does not refer to any statistics. The statement of the foreman of the stevedores in Ghent at the time of the LOWLANDS MIMOSA to the Court-appointed surveyor as to a fire in 1 or 2 of every 10 shipments, following an increase in recent years, is in my judgment unreliable evidence as to the actual incidence of fires, even within the port of Ghent. No evidence was called in this trial from a witness who could speak to such matters; the statement of the foreman was not backed up by any documentary records; and does not appear to have been the subject of any detailed interrogation. The conclusion of the Court-appointed surveyor in relation to the LOWLANDS MIMOSA fire in relation to general levels of the incidence of fires was:
‘No systematic investigation has been conducted into previous incidents, and the evidence available is therefore purely anecdotal. In general, it is very difficult to gain an accurate picture of the extent of the overall problem of fires occurring during the storage and/or handling of scrap metal. There is a subjective feeling among the companies involved, as well as among the fire brigade and other services, that the number of fire incidents is increasing, but there are no objective figures to verify this…’
[102]The Safety Instruction card referred to above has the hallmarks of being cautionary and of overstating the risk in order to have the desired safety and prophylactic effects. The description of scrap metal cargoes does not resemble the description of Group C cargo ‘Scrap Metal’ in the IMSBC Code. Overview as to perceived fire risk[103]Thus, in overview, I consider that what would be expected by a prudent underwriter as to the fire risk of Cometsambre’s scrap metal cargoes would be influenced by the nature of the original presentation, and by what was implied, by reason of the terms of ISRI specifications and the IMSBC Code, as to what such cargoes would consist of and as to their being ‘non-hazardous’. This would have meant that an underwriter would be expecting a low risk of fire. It would not have meant that an underwriter would consider there to be no risk of fire. It has not been shown, however, that there was (or is) any reliable statistical or systematic evidence as to what the incidence of such fires would be. Whether there would be fires would be understood to depend in part on what was in fact the composition of the scrap cargo involved, including as to the level of impurities it contained. A prudent underwriter would also probably have been aware of a perception that the incidence of fires in scrap metal cargoes had increased in recent years.[104]I turn now to consider the issues which arise as to fair presentation, which I have already summarised.

Materiality

[105]I accept the evidence of Mr Howe that a prudent underwriter would want to take the fires on board ORIENT DYNASTY, COMMON SPIRIT, and SAKURA into account in deciding whether to write the risk. His view was expressed as being that:
‘A fire on board is a paradigm example of an incident which can give rise to liability to the shipowner. A prudent underwriter would want to know about every fire on board any chartered vessel before writing a charterers’ liability policy, regardless of whether it gave rise to any loss or claim. Put simply, the existence of previous fires on board vessels would affect the judgment of a prudent insurer because fires on vessels are likely to result in claims by the vessel owner and the insurer is taking the risk of those claims. Any previous fires on board chartered vessels are also relevant because of what they suggest about the nature of the cargo being shipped by the charterer…’
[106]I also accept Mr Howe’s evidence that a prudent underwriter would treat the quayside fires of May 2020 and January 2021 in much the same way as the vessel fires. As he put it:
‘Where a fire happens in scrap metal at the port waiting to be loaded, a prudent underwriter would see it as a fire that could just as well have happened on board the ship than on the quayside.’
[107]Furthermore, I accept Mr Howe’s evidence that the pattern of fires experienced by Cometsambre made it particularly clear that they ought to have been disclosed. His evidence was:
‘… it is useful to look at the experience of Cometsambre between 2008 and 2020. During this 12-year period Cometsambre did not have any vessel fires and only one/two isolated quayside fires in 2013. … However, between May 2020 and October 2021 (a period of about 18 months), Cometsambre experienced five fires – three on board vessels and two on the quayside in cargoes being loaded or waiting to be loaded. That would suggest to me and a prudent [C/L] underwriter a significant change in the risk profile.’
[108]The fact that Cometsambre may not have identified any particular reason why there had been an increase in the incidence of fires did not mean that they were not material to be disclosed. On the contrary, as Mr Howe said in oral evidence:
‘I think he [ie the insured] should be very concerned as to why you can’t identify the cause. He’s put various protocols in place to avoid such incidents, but they’re still having them. Why?’
[109]It appears to me to be both credible and reasonable that the judgment of a prudent underwriter would be affected by knowledge of the fact and pattern of the fires experienced by Cometsambre, when account is taken of what I have found, above, would have been expected of Cometsambre’s cargoes. As I have set out, the risk of fires should have been low, but there remained a risk, the extent of which was difficult to quantify precisely, and which would depend in part on the exact nature of the cargoes being shipped by Cometsambre. In that state of affairs, an underwriter would want to know of the incidence of fires because it would help the underwriter assess what was the extent of the fire risk, and whether it had changed, and because the record of fires might indicate something about Cometsambre’s cargoes and / or procedures.[110]I should refer to two specific arguments put forward by Cometsambre as to why the fire record was not material. The first was that none of the fires had given rise to a claim. Specifically, none of the fires on board vessels had led to any claim by vessel owners / disponent owners and therefore they were not material to a C/L underwriter.[111]Mr Howe’s response to this was, I considered, persuasive. He said:
‘Fires are something that a prudent underwriter would want and expect to be told about, being a paradigm example of an incident capable of giving rise to a claim – and a very large one at that. It is not credible to say that underwriters should wait for a fire claim before the issue of fires becomes material. This seriously risks prejudicing underwriters. … I do not know of any “[C/L] industry practice” that fires are immaterial and not material circumstances. In my view, there is no such [C/L] industry practice at all. On the contrary, the industry practice in marine underwriting generally, and therefore [C/L] underwriting specifically, is that incidents that could have given rise to claims or losses should be disclosed to an underwriter, whether or not such claims or losses in fact materialised. It is the risk that matters and if an insured keeps having incidents which show such risks exist and repeatedly materialise then a prudent underwriter would want to know about the incidents.’
[112]The other argument was to the effect that the fires in stockpiles on the quayside before loading were not material to be disclosed to a C/L underwriter because, if the fire gave rise to any claim at all, it would be a claim not on the C/L policy, but on Cometsambre’s property policy, which was taken out with a different insurer (and which it appears did not pay out in respect of the relevant incidents).[113]Once again, Mr Howe’s evidence was convincing. In his oral evidence he said:
‘… what I find alarming is that there were fires in stockpiles that were destined to be loaded on board a ship and they were catching fire. That, to me, intimates more of a spontaneous combustion situation. Again, I’m no fire expert either, but because it’s on the quayside waiting to be loaded it’s only fortuitous it happens there and not on board the vessel. But it does give me an indication that there’s something in that stockpile that’s not quite right.’
Further, there occurred the following exchange during Mr Howe’s cross-examination:
‘Q. Well, I suggest to you that, on this, Mr Jervis is right, isn’t he, that as a general market practice it is simply not the case that a prudent underwriter would regard different risks insured by different insurers to be material to a charterers’ liability underwriter? That’s correct, isn’t it? A.Totally disagree. If it gives me an overall picture of the risk I’m being asked to cover it’s material.’

Insurers put on notice: s. 3(4)(b) IA?

[114]Cometsambre’s argument here is that underwriters were informed that it would be shipping HMS 1 /2 and shredded steel scrap, that they should have known the general risks of such a business, that they were informed at the outset that there was at that stage no claims history, and they had not asked Cometsambre to fill in an updated questionnaire in subsequent years or asked for any further information about risk management, losses, incidents, claims or fires. Given these matters, Cometsambre argues, insurers were on notice that they needed to make further enquiries if they wished to know of fires not giving rise to claims.[115]In my judgment, this argument amounts to an attempt improperly to reverse the burden of ensuring a fair presentation of the risk in circumstances such as this. That obligation is primarily on the insured.[116]More specifically, I do not consider that what AMICA was told can be said to have put insurers on notice of the need to make further enquiries as to whether there had been a change in the incidence of fires as compared to previous years. Yet, that is what in fact had happened. After many years in which there were no fires, there were five fires on vessels or in quayside scrap piles in the 20 months before the 2022 renewal. The underwriters had not been put on notice of the need to enquire as to such a change in incidence.[117]A suggestion was made by Mr Jervis that AMICA should have commissioned a risk survey to review risk management controls and procedures, at the outset (as I understood it, in 2008) because of the fact that there were ‘inexperienced charterers’. I do not accept this. Mr Howe’s evidence appeared to me to be preferable:
‘This was a simpl[e] risk to write given the manner in which the cargo was presented. I can see no reason why an underwriter would commission a risk survey to review all risk management controls and procedures – presumably at the sorting plant – when presented with a non-hazardous cargo.’
[118]A further suggestion made by Mr Jervis was that a prudent underwriter should have asked at the outset (in 2008) whether there was going to be a loading survey in respect of each shipment and would not have underwritten the risk unless there was going to be one, although he was not suggesting that the underwriters should see them all. As I understood it, this was a point relied on, at least in part, in the context of underwriters being put on notice to ask for further information, in that, given that they had not been told that there would always be a loading survey, they would have to ask if they wanted more information as to what might have been revealed if there had been.[119]I accept Mr Howe’s evidence in his second report, however, that there was no reason why AMICA should have insisted on receiving either the first loading survey after inception of the original policy, ‘let alone any subsequent loading surveys’. Further, I do not see that a failure by underwriters to stipulate at the outset that loading surveys should always be performed, even though the underwriter would not see them, can excuse Cometsambre from disclosing the occurrence of fires of which it actually knew.

Were insurers presumed to know the relevant circumstances: s. 3(5)(d) IA?

[120]I have already considered in some detail what insurers could be expected to know as to the risk of fire in Cometsambre’s cargoes from the way in which the insurance was originally presented, taken with the industry standards, and other sources of information as to the risk.[121]It suffices here to say that it is not established that AMICA is presumed to have knowledge of the incidence of any of the relevant fires, or the fact that such fires must have been experienced by Cometsambre; and still less of the occurrence, after a significant period in which there were no fires at all, of 5 fires in a period of some 18 months.

Was disclosure of the relevant information waived by insurers: s. 3(5)(e) IA?

[122]Cometsambre’s case is that the facts that it notified underwriters at the outset that it was shipping HMS 1 / 2 and shredded steel scrap, that Cometsambre was only asked at inception to provide its claims history, and that Cometsambre was not asked to fill in an updated questionnaire in subsequent years, nor provide any further information about risk management, losses, incidents, claims or fires or as to the charterparties involved, and made reference to Cometsambre’s claims ratio in renewal correspondence, ‘would have communicated to a reasonable insured that the Underwriters were only concerned with Cometsambre’s claim history and were indifferent about fires not giving rise to claim’. There was thus a waiver of disclosure for the purposes of s. 3(5)(e) IA.[123]The relevant test is, as I understand it, whether a reasonable reader or observer of the communications would have understood underwriters to have shown that they had only limited concerns which did not extend to the undisclosed information: see McGillivray on Insurance Law (16th ed) 16-086, and Young v Royal and Sun Alliance Plc 2019 SLT 622 and [2020] CSIH 25, 2020 SLT 597.[124]In my judgment, a reasonable reader / observer would not have had any such understanding from the communications (or absence of communications) from the underwriters. At the outset, AMICA had made enquiries designed to ensure that fire-risky cargo was not being covered.[125]The fact that the questionnaire provided by Concordia had a question only about ‘Claims record’ could not reasonably be understood to indicate that underwriters were not interested in any instances of fire which had not given rise to a claim. The questionnaire was one prepared by Cometsambre’s own broker: the information contained in it was thus that proffered by Cometsambre, not that specifically requested by AMICA. In addition, the terms of the questionnaire itself were not sufficiently clear as to indicate that the only concern was with matters which had given rise to claims. The absence of any further enquiries by AMICA about the questionnaire would not have been understood to have any great significance given that what the questionnaire revealed was that voyage chartering was a new venture for Cometsambre.[126]That the insured was not asked to fill in an updated questionnaire in subsequent years was, according to Mr Howe, not unusual. The absence of a renewal questionnaire could not reasonably be understood to be a waiver of disclosure of material circumstances. The fact that AMICA made reference to Cometsambre’s claims ratio, which was part of what AMICA had been made aware of, did not indicate that underwriters were uninterested in other information. As to the fact that AMICA did not ask for sight of further charterparties, it was Mr Howe’s evidence, which I accept, that AMICA was entitled to assume that Cometsambre’s charterparties would remain materially the same as that originally shown to it, and that it would be for Cometsambre to tell AMICA if the terms had materially changed. In fact it appears that they did not.[127]More generally, looking at the dealings between the parties in the round, I cannot accept that the conduct or communications of AMICA could reasonably have been understood as showing that it was not interested in the incidence of the fires which occurred in 2020/2021, after a significant period in which there had been no quayside or vessel fires.

Inducement

[128]Mr Hoek gave evidence that he was the person who was responsible for the renewal of the cover for the 2022 year. His evidence was that if the earlier fires on board vessels and on the quayside had been disclosed he would not have renewed the policy. This was for at least two reasons. As he expressed it:
‘The first reason is simply the fact of the fires themselves. The premium earned on charterers’ liability insurance is low. For example, in the previous policy year of 2021, we earned only USD10,271.68 in premia from the Claimant. It is not commercially viable to write this business if there is a real risk of a fire on board a vessel potentially resulting in a large claim. The rates we were charging for these shipments was just too low to justify such risks. That is why we only insured ‘clean’, non-oily scrap. … I would never have renewed the policy if I had been told by the Claimant that it had so many previous fires. Unlike simple stevedore damage claims, fire claims can result in a vessel being an actual or constructive total loss. The exposure is immense and incomparable to the limited premium we receive. … I can say with absolute certainty that I would not have renewed the policy in January 2022 had I known of the previous fires set out above. It is not a question of me requiring an increase in the premium. Even doubling or tripling the premium would not have persuaded me to do so. I simply would not have been interested in the business at all. The second reason I would have refused to renew the policy relates to the likely cause of the fires (as opposed to the simple fact that they occurred). Had any single fire been previously declared, I would have appointed surveyors to attend and assess the quality of the cargoes shipped by the Claimant and the cause of the fire. … We were unable to carry out contemporaneous investigations, because the previous fires were not declared. However, it is evident that there was a recurring pattern of fires in the scrap metal being shipped by the Claimant, increasing in frequency. It is clear to me that these fires were attributable to the poor quality of scrap cargo being loaded and transported and this was probably due to a failure properly to sort the material before shipment. … The earlier fires would have clearly indicated to me a change in the risk profile, and I would not have been prepared to write the Policy at all. It is not a question of the level of the premium or the deductible. I simply would not have declined the renewal.’
[129]I am very conscious of the warnings which have been given in previous cases, some of which I have referred to above, as to the risk that honest underwriters may convince themselves that had an ex hypothesi undisclosed matter been disclosed it would have led them to decline the risk; and thus that their evidence may be truthful but incorrect. Having considered this risk carefully and having reviewed his evidence with a healthy degree of scepticism, I am, nevertheless, satisfied that Mr Hoek’s evidence is reliable, and should be accepted.[130]I have, in particular, considered the cross-examination of Mr Hoek, and his responses to it. That cross-examination avoided squarely putting to Mr Hoek what I considered to be the correct counterfactual, namely what his response would have been if, as was the case, there had been no disclosure of the 2020 fires before the 2021 renewal, and there had then been disclosure of the five 2020 and 2021 fires in the context of the renewal for the 2022 year.[131]The counterfactual which was repeatedly put to Mr Hoek was that each fire had been disclosed at the time it occurred, and AMICA had sent its own surveyor or expert to inspect the cargo, and that surveyor had not reported any adverse findings about the cargo. This does not appear to me to be the correct counterfactual question to ask, in circumstances where the failure to report the occurrence of any of the fires had meant that the prompt appointment of a surveyor by AMICA was not a possibility.[132]Furthermore, Cometsambre has not, in my judgment, shown that, had the fires been promptly notified to insurers and a surveyor promptly appointed, that surveyor would have made no adverse findings as to the quality of the cargo. On the contrary, material available to the court suggests that that would not have been the case. Thus:(1) The stevedores described the fire on ORIENT DYNASTY as likely to be ‘spontaneous heating from stock’;(2) the EZZ Steel PowerPoint presentation in relation to the COMMON SPIRIT suggests poor quality cargo;(3) the Letter of Protest in relation to SAKURA referred to ‘inherent vice of cargo’;(4) the 25 May 2020 quayside fire was in a stockpile and there was no evidence of external factors at play, and thus spontaneous combustion was a decided possibility as the cause;(5) and the 28 January 2021 quayside fire also appears to have started in a part of the scrap heap in which there was no activity, and thus again spontaneous combustion was a strong possibility as the cause.[133]In any event, Mr Hoek’s evidence, in relation to this cross-examination remained that the disclosure of the fires would have caused him to decline to renew. His evidence included that:(1) ‘If one fire had been reported to me by Cometsambre, my expert would have said the cargo is okay, and it was a small incident, I would probably also have renewed. But if you have five incidents, five, even sending an expert to those five incidents means five times 3,000 / 4,000 in survey costs against the policy that pays 7,000 or 8,000 premium. I mean, it’s a risk.’(2) ‘… for my commission of a few hundred dollars, I’m simply not even going to consider underwriting. Five fires is too much.’ And:
‘… for a few hundred dollars per year I cannot have my claims people deal with five claims. It’s simply uneconomical….’ (3) ‘Aside from that, after 10 or 12 years, it suggests a change in the risk profile. You don’t have 12 years without problems and then have five fires in 20 months.’ (4) ‘Five fires is an accident waiting to happen and I was not going to be there for the future.’
[134]Mr Hoek was pressed as to why his position in relation to Cometsambre would have been different from his stance in relation to BST, where he had renewed, notwithstanding the fires on the LMZ PLUTO and on the SOFIA R. Cometsambre pointed out that the fire on LMZ PLUTO had given rise to a claim which was initially valued at €628,510. A loss record dated 14 May 2026, which was produced during the trial, showed total premiums for BST of US$750,570.45 over the period 2003-2019, with total claims in that period of US$587,967.50, of which US$ 476,134 related to the 2018-2019 year, and almost all of that was referable to the fire on board LMZ PLUTO. That meant that there had been a loss ratio of 78.34% over the whole period, and of 950.33% for the 2018-19 year.[135]Mr Hoek’s response was that the position of BST was different from Cometsambre’s. BST had notified AMICA of the fire on LMZ PLUTO and AMICA had instructed BMT to undertake a survey, which had, as Mr Hoek put it, advised that the fire had probably been started by hot work being performed, with a hot piece of metal being thrown into the hold. BST had also notified AMICA of the suspected fire on the SOFIA R and Mr Hoek had again instructed BMT, who had concluded that the cargo contained a ‘minimum quantity of debris’. He also said that:
‘BST paid six times more premium than Cometsambre, they pay about 65,000 a year, so their statistic can bear more costs, particularly survey costs.’
He stated his overall position in relation to the two insureds as follows:
‘If there’s one fire, because again for me BST was one fire incident [viz LMZ PLUTO], the other one [viz SOFIA R] I don’t see as a fire incident. BST had one fire incident … That is, for me, the fortuitous incidents for which you insure. Because my surveyor, I will make it specific, did not say the cargo was dangerous, so for that reason also in light of the Pluto where the same conclusion had been drawn, I decided to renew. In this case you are talking about five fires after 12 years of no fires. So not only does that suggest there is a fire risk, which for me is something exceptional and dangerous, it’s not something you except [sic in transcript]. … I only renewed BST because my surveyor said the cargo is okay….’
[136]There was a suggestion by Cometsambre that Mr Hoek’s evidence in relation to inducement was inconsistent with AMICA’s stance after the LOWLANDS MIMOSA fire, as expressed in an email of 20 July 2022, referred to above.[137]I considered it to be apparent from its terms that the email of 20 July 2022 was an attempt at finding a temporary solution to the continuing difficulties and dangers created by the LOWLANDS MIMOSA fire, at a point when investigations as to that fire, and as to the limited disclosure of previous fires were under way and had not been concluded. Mr Hoek said in his oral evidence that he would not have been ‘happy’ to insure a proposed shipment to EZZ Steel and stated that he had done what he could to avoid Cometsambre’s shipping further cargo. This email and episode did not appear to me to bear in any meaningful way on Mr Hoek’s evidence as to inducement.[138]The issue of inducement is one to be judged primarily on the basis of factual, not expert, evidence: the question to be addressed here is whether, had there been a fair presentation, AMICA would have refused to enter into the relevant policy, either on the same or any terms. Mr Hoek’s evidence that AMICA would not have done so is, nevertheless, lent some enhanced credibility by the evidence of Mr Howe to the effect that a hypothetical prudent underwriter would not have written the 2022 renewal on the same or any terms. His view was that such an underwriter would not wish to be around for the ‘sixth bullet’, as he put it, having ‘dodged’ the first five; would consider that the potential for a very significant claim was very high compared to the premium; and would be concerned that the incidence of fires indicated that the scrap recently being shipped by Cometsambre was other than that which had been initially described or at least that there was sufficient uncertainty about the quality of the cargo that s/he did not wish to take the risk.[139]Thus, despite the challenge made to it by Cometsambre, I found Mr Hoek’s evidence that, had the five vessel and quayside fires been disclosed AMICA would not have renewed the insurance for the 2022 year on the same or any terms, to be reliable and I accept it.

Conclusion

[140]It follows from the findings above that Lloyd’s was entitled to avoid the contract and tender a return of the premium, as it has.[141]Cometsambre’s claim is therefore dismissed.