Cedar Mundi (Holding) Sal v Bassel Attieh & Ors [2026] EWHC 1820 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1820 (Comm)Claim Nos: CL-2023-000767CL-2024-000488
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 17/07/2026The Hon. Mr Justice Bryan
CEDAR MUNDI (HOLDING) SALClaimant(1) MR BASSEL ATTIEHDefendants(2) MR TALAL AL BAHARDefendant(3) IFA CAPITAL LTDDefendant(4) MED AL BAHAR INTERNATIONAL LTDDefendant(5) CEDAR II FUND LPDefendant
Ian Wilson KC and William Day(instructed by Dechert LLP) for ClaimantTom Montagu-Smith KC and Matthew Watson(instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 23, 24, 25 and 26 February 2026, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 23 March 2026, 15, 16, 20, 21 and 22 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 09.00am on 17 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]The claimant Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL (hereafter, “Cedar Mundi”/the “Claimant”) is a Lebanese joint stock company formed on 17 April 2015 as a joint initiative between Mundi Ventures SL (a Spanish limited company) and the “IFA” group of companies (“IFA Group”). At all relevant times, Cedar Mundi operated a venture capital fund to invest in early-stage portfolio companies, utilising funds raised pursuant to a private placement in 2016. From May 2016 until around 7 September 2021, Cedar Mundi appointed another Lebanese company, Cedar Mundi Capital Holding Sal (“CMCH”) to act as “Management Agent” pursuant to a management agency agreement executed on or around 18 May 2016 (“Management Agency Agreement”).[2]The First Defendant, Mr Bassel Attieh(i) was a director of Cedar Mundi from its incorporation until 6 September 2021;(ii) was, from 18 February 2021 to 5 March 2021, a director of Fastnet Partners GP Limited (“Fastnet”), an exempted Cayman Islands company wholly owned by Kuwait Holding Company KSCC (“KHCK”) and general partner of the Fifth Defendant;(iii) was, at all material times, appointed Vice Chairman and General Manager of the board of directors of Cedar Mundi (“Cedar Mundi BoD”); and(iv) is, since its incorporation, a director of CMCH.[3]The Second Defendant, Mr Talal Al Bahar, is and was at all material times(i) a director of the Third Defendant;(ii) a director and shareholder of the Fourth Defendant;(iii) a director of Fastnet;(iv) a director of KHCK; and(v) a director of Med Al Bahar Holding Company KSC (“MAB”). Mr Al Bahar was also, at all material times, a director of International Financial Advisors KPSC (“IFAK”) (a listed Kuwaiti investment company and the sole owner of the Third Defendant).[4]The Third Defendant is a British Virgin Islands company incorporated in July 2009.[5]The Fourth Defendant, Med Al Bahar International Limited (“MABIL”) is a Cayman Islands company and shareholder in Cedar Mundi. Since 31 July 2021, MABIL has also been a limited partner of the Fifth Defendant, holding 25.76% of its share capital.[6]The Fifth Defendant, Cedar II Fund LP (“Cedar II”) is a Cayman Islands exempt partnership formed on 22 February 2021.[7]The Al Bahar family is a prominent and very wealthy family in Kuwait. They are the ultimate beneficial owners of the “Med Al Bahar” group of companies, which includes KHCK, MABIL, MAB, and Fastnet (the “Med Al Bahar Group” or “Al Bahar Group”). The Med Al Bahar Group is associated with the IFA Group. The IFA Group includes (or did include) at least IFAK, IFAC, and IFA Investments (Switzerland) SA. Mr Attieh was at all material times employed as, in effect, manager of the Med Al Bahar Group family assets and investments, as he acknowledged in Attieh 1 at para 16. A2. OVERVIEW[8]The detailed facts are addressed in Section B below. What follows here is a brief overview to place the issues that arise for determination in context, and to introduce associated defined terms.[9]The Central Bank of Lebanon (the Banque du Liban, or “BdL”) set up an initiative, by what is known as Intermediate Circular No. 331 (“Circular 331”), to increase equity investment, either directly or via venture capital or similar vehicles, in Lebanese start-up companies by which the BdL would provide interest free funding to Lebanese banks for such investment.[10]Mr Attieh set up Cedar Mundi because of this initiative. He saw this as a good opportunity for the Med Al Bahar Group. He persuaded Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) and other Lebanese banks to become shareholders in Cedar Mundi and to commit capital backed by BdL funding. In practice the vast majority of the funding came from a consortium of eleven Lebanese banks and financial institutions (referred to as the “C-331 Shareholders”) with money coming from the BdL, so, from a Lebanese perspective, it was regarded as “public money” or “public funds” (see Saghbini 1 para 19 and Attieh 1 para 68.2).[11]The other shareholder was MABIL, which was part of the Al Bahar Group, and was not funded by the BdL. By December 2019 MABIL owned 23.625% of Cedar Mundi’s shares and the C-331 Shareholders owned the remaining 76.375%. The C-331 Shareholders were accordingly the majority shareholders of Cedar Mundi, whilst MABIL was a minority shareholder. By agreement of the C-331 Shareholders, SGBL (the largest C-331 Shareholder) and its deputy general manager Mr Georges Saghbini, became non-executive directors of Cedar Mundi.[12]In addition to subscribing for shares in Cedar Mundi, each of the C-331 Shareholders and MABIL entered into a subordinated facility agreement with Cedar Mundi enabling Cedar Mundi to draw down (by way of capital calls) amounts to be used primarily to fund Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio. Cedar Mundi made three capital calls in mid-2016, mid-to-late 2017 and March 2019 (the “Capital Calls”).[13]Notwithstanding that ownership and governance structure, the Claimant’s case is that the events at the heart of this case were driven by Mr Attieh acting in what he regarded to be the interests of his “true” employer, the Med Al Bahar Group, to the detriment of Cedar Mundi, the C-331 Shareholders and the BdL.[14]The backdrop, and the Claimant says the catalyst, for Mr Attieh’s actions, was the onset of a serious financial crisis in Lebanon in 2019. The BdL’s foreign currency reserves collapsed, and de facto capital controls were introduced to prevent a run on Lebanese banks, leaving US Dollars “trapped” within the Lebanese financial system (known as “Lollars” or “L$”). The BdL restricted further investment into Cedar Mundi (and required any such investment to be paid in Lebanese Lira).[15]The Claimant says that what Mr Attieh should have done in such circumstances was agree a course of action with the rest of the Cedar Mundi BoD, such as placing Cedar Mundi into a divestment period, seeking and obtaining investor approval, and then implementing an agreed strategy for the fund openly and transparently. What Mr Attieh actually did (the Claimant says in breach of fiduciary duty) was enter into two transactions on behalf of Cedar Mundi, each of which, says the Claimant, was unauthorised.[16]First, Mr Attieh purported to transfer the material part of Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio to IFAC (the Third Defendant), a company within the Med Al Bahar Group. In exchange, Cedar Mundi was to receive 84% of the share capital of IFAC (the “2020 Transaction”). This was the PPC Agreement (which the C-331 Shareholders did not know about or see until it was disclosed in this litigation). It was finally accepted by the Defendants, at the outset of the trial, that Mr Attieh did not have authority to enter into the 2020 Transaction.[17]Second, Mr Attieh subsequently purported to sell the overwhelming majority of Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio—comprising both the assets already transferred to IFAC and most of the other portfolio investments—to Cedar II, another company within the Med Al Bahar Group, by an SPA signed by Mr Attieh (the execution of which was concealed from the Claimant, and which the Claimant only subsequently learned about by accident).[18]The Defendants allege that the 2021 Transaction was authorised at a board meeting on 13 April 2021 (the “13 April 2021 Board Meeting”) which allowed Mr Attieh to enter into the SPA. In contrast the Claimant says that (as a matter of fact) any authorisation at the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting, on the proper construction of the board minutes, was subject to approval at a general assembly of Cedar Mundi shareholders (which it is common ground never occurred), and also, and in any event (as a matter of Lebanese law), the Transactions were not valid absent both board approval and general assembly approval because the transfer of the substantial majority of the company’s assets was outside the ordinary course of its business, and hence beyond the board’s authority under Article 157 of the Lebanese Commercial Code (“LCC”), and in any event these were related party transactions that were subject to statutory preconditions including general assembly approval as required by Article 158 of the LCC (and the Claimant says that the good faith and/or benefit exceptions that the Defendants seek to rely upon do not apply).[19]The net result was that the Med Al Bahar Group obtained almost all of Cedar Mundi’s investments, which it still retains, at what the Claimant says was a substantial undervalue (which is also in issue in this trial). For his part, Mr Attieh received a “bonus” of approximately US$1.6 million from Mr Al Bahar, which the Claimant says was for his work in protecting the Med Al Bahar Group interests and furthering the Transactions on behalf of, and in the best interests of, the Al Bahar group, and which the Claimant alleges is a secret profit obtained by Mr Attieh in breach of his fiduciary duties and which the Claimant alleges it is entitled to recover from Mr Attieh.[20]On 25 October 2023, after Cedar Mundi wrote to portfolio companies to assert the invalidity of the Transactions, Cedar II commenced a claim (CL-2023-000767) against Cedar Mundi, seeking declarations that(1) the SPA was valid and(2) it had acquired title to the assets purchased thereunder. Cedar Mundi responded with a counterclaim, and also a separate claim seeking relief against all the Defendants (CL-2024-000488). On 24 October 2024, the proceedings were consolidated, with Cedar Mundi as the Claimant. The investment portfolio now under Cedar II’s control is subject to an interim notification injunction pending the outcome of this trial. A3. THE AGREED LIST OF KEY ISSUES[21]During the course of the parties’ oral Opening Submissions, I invited the parties to agree a List of Key Issues for determination at the trial, which could then be addressed by the parties in their Closing Submissions, and determined by the Court, as appropriate, in this judgment (the “Judgment”). The parties were thereafter able to do so (the “Agreed List of Issues”). The Agreed List of Issues was agreed without prejudice to any party’s position as to whether another party’s answer to that issue was properly pleaded and so open to them.[22]By the time of oral closing submissions certain issues no longer arose for determination (as identified below in strikethrough), whilst the parties also constructively agreed that a number of the issues (as identified below in italics) would be deferred to be addressed subsequently, as applicable, following the handing down of the Judgment.[23]The final Agreed List of Issues is as follows: Core Validity/Authority Issues on the 2021 Transaction 1. Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 157 of the LCC or Cedar Mundi’s Articles of Association? 2. Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 158 of the LCC? 3. If the answer to issue 2 , was the 2021 Transaction nonetheless authorised for the purpose of Article 158 because:(1) It was entered into by Cedar II in good faith; and/or(2) It was beneficial to Cedar Mundi. 4. On the true construction of the minutes of the board meeting on 13 April 2021, was the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification? 5. At the board meeting on 13 April 2021: (1) Was Mr Attieh prohibited from voting by Article 158 by reason of the circumstances of his resignation from Fastnet (applying the Lebanese doctrine of fraudulent acts in its strict sense)? (2) If Mr Attieh was not entitled to vote at the meeting (or is to be treated as not having been entitled to vote) was the effect of Article 158 that the board meeting was invalidly constituted? 6. Was the 2021 Transaction unauthorised because it was a fraudulent act (in its broad sense)? Further Validity/Authority Issues on both Transactions 7. As to ratification: (1) Was the 2020 Transaction ratified by the 13 April 2021 board meeting? (2) Was the 2021 Transaction ratified by the board meeting on 25 October 2021 and/or by Cedar Mundi accepting receipt of the cash consideration pursuant to the SPA, retaining that cash consideration and/or using some of those funds for its own purposes? 8. Did either Transaction engage the doctrine of illegality? If so, what is the effect of illegality on the Transactions? Issues that turn on the validity/authorisation of the Transactions 9. If the 2021 Transaction is valid: (1) Does that extinguish any claims Cedar Mundi has against IFAC for the return of the assets transferred to it under the 2020 Transaction? (2) Is Cedar II liable to Cedar Mundi for any outstanding part of the consideration? (deferred issue) 10. If the Transactions are invalid: (1) Are Cedar II / IFAC entitled (whether as trustees or in unjust enrichment from Cedar Mundi) to the sums expended in maintaining the investment portfolio and should any order for the transfer of assets by them be conditional upon payment of the same? (deferred issue) (2) Is Cedar Mundi liable to MABIL in respect of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment? other claims 11. Did Mr Attieh act in breach of fiduciary duty and what law governs that claim? 12. Are any of the other Defendants liable in dishonest assistance? (deferred issue) 13. Are any of the other Defendants liable in knowing receipt? (deferred issue) 14. Are any of the Defendants liable in unlawful means conspiracy? (deferred issue) 15. What, if any, loss has Cedar Mundi suffered? (deferred issue) Remedies 16. In light of the Court’s findings on the above issues, what remedies should the Court grant (deferred issue) A4. THE AGREED DECISION TREE[24]In the context of the Agreed List of Issues for determination, and at the suggestion of the Court, the parties agreed a “decision tree” which addresses the consequences of the respective answers to the various issues in relation to the 2020 Transaction and the 2021 Transaction, (the “Agreed Decision Tree”), which is set out below, and at Annex A hereto: A5. THE AGREED STRUCTURE AND HEADINGS FOR CLOSING SUBMISSIONS[25]I directed the parties to agree the structure and headings for Closing Submissions to ensure that each party addressed the issues arising in the same part of their written closing submissions, and the parties reached agreement on the same (the “Agreed Structure”). The parties followed such Agreed Structure in their respective Closing Submissions (albeit, in some instances, with their own specific sub-sections).[26]I largely follow the Agreed Structure in this Judgment, but by reference to the following sections and sub-sections:a. A. INTRODUCTION A1. THE PARTIES A2. OVERVIEW A3. THE AGREED LIST OF KEY ISSUES A4. THE AGREED DECISION TREE A5. AGREED STRUCTURE AND HEADINGS FOR CLOSING SUBMISSIONSb. B. THE FACTS B1. THE CLAIMANT’S WITNESSES B1.1 Mr Georges Saghbini B1.2 Mr Jimmy El Azar B1.3 Mr Farid Dahdah B2. THE DEFENDANTS’ WITNESSES B2.1 Mr Bassel El Koussa B2.2 Mr Talal Al Bahar B2.3 Mr Bassel Attieh B3. ESTABLISHMENT OF CEDAR MUNDI, CAPITAL CALLS AND THE LEBANESE FINANCIAL CRISIS B3.1 Establishment of Cedar Mundi B3.2 Directors and shareholders B3.3 Contractual and regulatory framework B3.4 Investment portfolio B3.5 The Capital Calls B3.6 The Lebanese financial crisis B3.7 Alleged MABIL Overpayment B4. THE 2020 TRANSACTION B4.1 Portfolio Preservation and Continuity Agreement B4.2 Mr Attieh’s justifications for the 2020 Transaction B5. THE ORIGINS OF THE 2021 TRANSACTION B5.1 Engagement of BSEC B5.2 Meeting at the Al Mandoloun Café (September 2020) B5.3 Mr Attieh and BSEC’s work on an LP-led secondary transaction (Autumn 2020) B5.4 Mr Attieh proposes a GP-led secondary transaction (December 2020) B5.5 The period prior to the 16 March 2021 board meeting B5.6 Board meeting on 16 March 2021 B6. NEGOTIATION OF THE 13 APRIL BOARD RESOLUTIONS B6.1 Agreement that there should be a general assembly meeting B6.2 Mr Attieh’s analyse juridique B6.3 Negotiation of the text of the resolutions B6.4 The Board resolutions B7. CONSTRUCTION OF THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MINUTES (ISSUE 4) B7.1 Relevant principles in relation to construction B7.2 The construction of the board minutes on their face B7.3 The construction of the board minutes having regard to the surrounding circumstances B7.4 Conclusion on Issue 4 B8. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MEETING B8.1 Convening of the general assembly B8.2 Discovery of the 2020 Transaction B8.3 Discovery of the Proximie Fundraise B8.4 The BdL Letters B8.5 Mr Attieh implements the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval B8.6 Resignations B8.7 Discovery of the implementation of the 2021 Transaction B8.8 Mr Attieh’s bonus and the new board’s resolutionsc. C. THE EXPERT EVIDENCE C1. LEBANESE LAW C1.1 Areas of agreement and areas no longer in issue or relevant C1.2 The Lebanese law experts and their respective expertise and evidence C2. LOLLARS C2.1 Applicable principles C2.2 Dr Nahas C2.3 Mr Hatem C3. VALUATION C3.1 Secondary discount: market trends in 2020 and 2021 and sanctions C3.2 Secondary discount: country risk C3.3 Secondary discount: alleged distress C3.4 Adjustment/secondary discount: capital commitments C3.5 White Lab C3.6 Conclusions on valuationd. D. CORE VALIDITY ISSUES ON THE 2021 TRANSACTION D0. THE LEGAL BACKDROP D0.1 The proper approach to foreign law D0.2 Sources of Lebanese law D0.3 Lebanese law principles of statutory interpretation D1. ARTICLE 157 OF THE LCC (ISSUE 1) D1.1 Introduction D1.2 The respective positions of the experts D1.3 The distinct powers of the corporate organs D1.4 Lebanese scholarship D1.5 Case law relied upon by Mr Sakr and the Defendants D1.6 Article 19 of the Articles of Association D1.7 Conclusion on Article 157 and application to the facts D1.8 Was an extraordinary general assembly required? D1.9 Conclusion on Issue 1 D2. ARTICLE 158 OF THE LCC (ISSUE 2) D2.1 The text, structure and meaning of Article 158 D2.2 Legislative intention D2.3 The provisions of the French Code of Commerce D2.4 Case law D2.5 Doctrinal writings D2.6 Conclusion on Article 158 and its application to the facts D2.7 Conclusion on Issue 2 D3. GOOD FAITH/BENEFIT EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE 158 OF THE LCC (ISSUE 3) D3.1 The good faith exception (Issue 3(1)) D3.1.1 The doctrine only applies to étrangers D3.1.2 The meaning of good faith D3.1.3 The legal consequences of a finding of good faith D3.1.4 Application of the good faith exception to the facts D3.1.5 Conclusion on Issue 3(1) D3.2 The benefit exception (Issue 3(2)) D3.2.1 The nature of the exception D3.2.2 The legal consequences of a finding of benefit D3.2.3 The application of the benefit exception D3.2.4 Conclusion on Issue 3(2) D4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MINUTES (ISSUE 4) D5. VOTING AT THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MEETING (ISSUE 5) D5.1 The proper interpretation of the relevant parts of Article 158 D5.2 Fraud in the narrow sense in Lebanese law D5.3 Application to the facts D5.4 Conclusion on Issue 5 D6. WAS THE 2021 TRANSACTION A FRAUDULENT ACT (IN ITS BROAD SENSE) (ISSUE 6) D6.1 Fraud in the broad sense in Lebanese law D6.2 Application to the facts D6.3 Conclusion on Issue 6e. E. FURTHER VALIDITY ISSUES ON BOTH TRANSACTIONS E1. INTRODUCTION E2. RATIFICATION (ISSUE 7(2)) E2.1 Introduction E2.2 Applicable principles E2.3 Ratification and the 2021 Transaction E2.4 Conclusion on Issue 7(2)f. F. CONSEQUENTIAL VALIDITY ISSUES F1. CONSEQUENCES OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 2021 TRANSACTION (ISSUE 9) F2. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS (ISSUE 10) F2.1 Liability for the Alleged MABIL Overpayment (Issue 10(2))g. G. OTHER CLAIMS (ISSUES 11 TO 15) G1. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (ISSUE 11) G1.1 Introduction G1.2 Applicable law G1.3 The scope of the duties G1.4 Breach of fiduciary duty G1.4.1 In relation to the 2020 Transaction G1.4.2 In relation to the 2021 Transaction G1.4.3 Mr Attieh’s remunerationh. H. REMEDIES (ISSUE 16)

B. THE FACTS

[27]The core issues largely either turn on the proper construction of the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting (Issue 4) or issues of Lebanese law (including Issues 1 to 3, 5, 6 and 7(2)), as opposed to contested matters of fact. Indeed, there is much agreement as to the facts, as is also reflected in the Case Memorandum, the Agreed List of Issues and the Chronology.[28]In relation to factual matters, and as is well established, the Court’s starting point is to rely on the documentary evidence, objective facts proved independently of witness testimony, and overall or inherent probabilities, since witness recollections can fade or be fallible (see Gestmin SGPS v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), [2020] 1 CLC 428 at [15]-[22] (Leggatt J)).[29]In cases which raise issues of fraud (as the present does), and as I said in JSC BM Bank v Kekhman [2018] EWHC 791 (Comm), it is often necessary to have regard to the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, and test whether that (taken as a whole) establishes the allegations of fraud (see at [46]-[50], [67]-[69] and [78]-[79]).[30]Each of the parties called factual witnesses to give factual evidence in the present case. To the extent that their evidence is of relevance, I address such evidence in the context of the facts and the issues arising and when making findings of fact, indicating whether I accept or reject such evidence and my reasons for the same. However, I introduce the witnesses below, and make certain general observations about such witnesses at this point. B1. THE CLAIMANTS’ WITNESSES

B1.1 Mr Georges Saghbini

[31]Mr Saghbini was the general manager of SGBL, and as such a senior banking executive. I consider that he was doing his best to assist the Court. However, it is clear that he was not involved in the detail of the relevant events, focussing on the “macro” rather than the “micro” (as he put it in Saghbini 1 paras 12 to 13). It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that as both parties rightly point out in their closing submissions, and as he was perfectly candid about in his oral evidence (see Day 3 page 9 lines 15 to 24), he had a limited recollection of events. He was nevertheless able to give evidence as to “big picture issues” such as his stance on the 2021 Transaction, both in his written evidence (see, for example, Saghbini 1 para 22), and in his oral evidence (see, for example, Day 3 page 76 lines 10 to 16).

B1.2 Mr Jimmy El Azar

[32]Mr El Azar was Head of International Finance at SGBL, and he was SGBL’s project lead for Cedar Mundi reporting directly to Mr Saghbini. He was in a position to, and did, give evidence in relation to the Capital Calls, the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting, the 2021 Transaction and the discovery of the 2020 Transaction and other matters after the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting.[33]Whilst I consider that at times Mr El Azar was “buying time” before answering questions by asking for questions to be asked again, in circumstances in which I was satisfied he generally had a good command of English, which is often an adverse consequence of witness training (which Mr El Azar may or may not have had), ultimately his evidence was consistent with the documentary record, and I do not consider that his evidence was undermined, in any material respect, in cross-examination.[34]In particular he gave evidence as to the “consensus requirements” that had been agreed with Mr Attieh by the time of the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting (El Azar 1 at para 99), with his evidence being that the understanding reached with Mr Attieh and “broadly reflected” in the 13 April 2021 board resolutions involved the following pre-conditions (Day 5 page 119 lines 6 to 16):
“Broadly, my Lord, an independent valuation, non-objection stance of the BdL, general assembly ratification of the proposed transaction, and obviously providing full specifics of the proposed transaction to the BdL for obtainment of the non-objection stance, a post-closing adjustment provision, and the completion of all preparatory actions leading up to the execution of a definitive agreement, amongst which our understanding would have been that a draft -- a final draft definitive agreement would have been finalised and in a form that would be acceptable to SGBL.”

B1.3 Mr Farid Dahdah

[35]Mr Dahdah had been SGBL’s lawyer for some 18 years and, indeed it appears he has been Cedar Mundi’s lawyer for a number of years, and as such he, perhaps inevitably, demonstrated an awareness of Cedar Mundi’s case, which I have borne well in mind when considering his evidence. Nevertheless, his evidence is consistent with the documentary record, and I do not consider his evidence to have been undermined, in any material respect, in cross-examination. His evidence (and his cross-examination) was focussed upon what SGBL had agreed with Mr Attieh by the time of the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting, with his evidence in cross-examination being that “the board meeting, the SPA, general assembly ratification and the BdL non objection stance” were “indivisible” (Day 3 page 188 lines 16 to 21). B2. THE DEFENDANTS’ WITNESSES

B2.1 Mr Bassel El Koussa

[36]Mr El Koussa was a founding member of Quiqup in which Cedar Mundi was an investor. He was briefly cross-examined about the affairs of Quiqup. He was clearly an honest independent witness doing his best to answer questions asked of him.

B2.2 Mr Talal Al Bahar

[37]Mr Al Bahar is the head of, and his family are the ultimate beneficial owners of, the Med Al Bahar Group. He is also the Second Defendant. In his evidence he had a tendency to distance himself from the Transactions, which was inconsistent with the documentary evidence, and indeed the evidence of Mr Attieh whose evidence was that he consulted Mr Al Bahar on every material decision and had been following Mr Al Bahar’s instructions throughout which, in this respect at least, has the ring of truth about it. Mr Al Bahar’s actual involvement is clearly evidenced by the contemporary documentation. Subject to that tendency, I am satisfied that he answered questions asked of him in a straightforward manner, albeit with a weather eye on the issues in the case so far as they related to him, his companies, and his relationship with Mr Attieh.

B2.3 Mr Bassel Attieh

[38]Mr Attieh is clearly an articulate, and highly experienced banker, who has a high opinion of himself and believes himself to be cleverer than those around him including his cross-examiner, indulging himself as an advocate in his own cause throughout his evidence. He is also an inveterate liar, who lied unashamedly in his evidence. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given his approach to business which involved him entering into the 2020 Transaction in an underhand manner, without authority, without revealing what he had done, and indeed, concealing the same when Heads of Terms were drafted in advance of the 13 April 2021 Board Meeting, and then proceeding to enter into the SPA without a general assembly and concealing from the C-331 Shareholders that he had even done so. He was quick to acknowledge his duties as a director of Cedar Mundi but equally quick to disregard such duties in his conduct of Cedar Mundi’s affairs, acting throughout in the best interests of the Med Al Bahar Group.[39]Ultimately, over the course of an extended cross-examination, he revealed himself to be not quite as clever as he undoubtedly thought he was, as is exemplified by the fact that he transparently descended into false evidence made up “on the hoof”.[40]In this regard (and in a true low point in his evidence), Mr Attieh went so far as to invent a factual narrative, that was contrary to the terms of the 13 April board resolution itself, and is clearly untrue (Day 8 page 50 lines 1 to 8):
“I told [Mr Najjar] it’s very long basically to actually have a formal general assembly meeting and we are time-sensitive -- under time pressure because of the mounting losses and the raising of Cedar II. So Nadi basically answered me that he actually spoke to Farid Dahdah and Jimmy and they all agreed that all the decisions will be made at the board and there is no need basically to wait for a general assembly meeting.”
[41]This was a wholly new, and transparently false, allegation. It did not appear in any of Mr Attieh’s witness statements, it is not pleaded, and it was not put to Mr El Azar or Mr Dahdah. This is hardly surprising as it was a clear invention by Mr Attieh during the course of his evidence of which his lawyers were no doubt wholly unaware until the lie came out of his mouth. Unsurprisingly, it does not feature in the Defendants’ closing submissions. If it had been true (which it clearly is not) it would, of course, have been important evidence given the central relevance of whether it had been agreed that any board resolution was subject to general assembly approval. It is notable that on this occasion, as on other occasions (as will become readily apparent) Mr Attieh conveniently recounted what Nadi Najjar had allegedly told (or advised) him. Conveniently, because Mr Attieh was well aware that the Defendants had not called Mr Najjar and so was not available to contradict whatever Mr Attieh might choose to say.[42]This was not an isolated example of a lie made up “on the hoof”. Indeed, very soon thereafter Mr Attieh made up another lie, adopting the very same modus operandi and an alleged conversation with Nadi Najjar. When it was put to him that at no point during the negotiations did SGBL agree that the transaction could be entered into without the prior approval of the general assembly, Mr Attieh stated as follows (Day 8 page 55 lines 16 to 23):
“basically my understanding, based basically on the discussion that I had with Nadi, who relayed basically what he discussed with Jimmy and Dahdah, is that this general assembly that we were calling forward was just for the pure form because SGBL was already liaising to get the approval of all the Circular 331 shareholders on the conditions on which basically that board has resolved to enter into the transaction.”
[43]Mr Attieh repeated this allegation, that the general assembly was simply for “pure form” later on the same day, denying that it was understood between the parties that the general assembly was a necessary precursor to the transaction, and stating that the point of it was “[p]our la forme … For pure form.” (Day 8 page 65 lines 3 to 11).[44]Such allegations did not appear in any of Mr Attieh’s witness statements and, yet again, and tellingly, they were not put to Mr El Azar or Mr Dahdah (as they would have been had that been the Defendants’ understanding of Mr Attieh’s evidence (or indeed their case)). They were not, of course, corroborated by Mr Najjar either, as the Defendants did not call him. This is another example of Mr Attieh making matters up “on the hoof”, and in a way that is plainly inconsistent with the wording of the board resolutions, which are addressed in due course below.[45]In closing, in something of an understatement, the Defendants stated that “Cedar Mundi may identify areas where [Mr Attieh’s] testimony does not accord with the documents precisely”. They then made the brave submission, “the overriding impression [Mr Attieh] gave was that he was giving an honest and candid account of what he did and why”. I respectfully disagree. Whilst his account may occasionally have been candid, there were only fleeting glimpses of the truth. One of those was when, in a candid moment, Mr Attieh acknowledged the following (Day 8 page 64 line 23 to page 65 line 2):
“Q. -- you must have understood the intention and outcome of the 13 April 2021 meeting to mean that there did indeed now need to be a general assembly meeting to deal with the matters set out in the agenda; yes? A. Yes, that was the agreement, yes.”
[46]More prevalent, however, were the numerous untruths that Mr Attieh told in the course of his written and oral evidence. To give but one further example, Mr Attieh falsely claimed that the 2020 Transaction had been entered into in March 2020 only after he had sought advice from Cedar Mundi’s lawyers, Nadi Najjar and Yasmine Safa Tfaili (Attieh 1 paras 149 to 151), yet another example of bringing Mr Najjar into it, whereas in fact the PPC Agreement had first been signed by him and Mr Al Bahar in January 2020. Mr Attieh claimed that he had omitted to mention the signed January version of the PPC Agreement in his statement because “a closing condition of transferring the IFAC structure into Kuwait Holding” was not satisfied (Day 6 page 78 lines 23 to 24) but that is hardly a plausible explanation given that he repeatedly claimed that the March version of the PPC Agreement never completed either.[47]Mr Attieh’s evidence was also overlaid with obvious, and transparent, hostility towards Cedar Mundi (of whom he was a director, albeit one acting in the best interest of his paymasters the Al Bahar Group, who he repeatedly referred to as “our group”) as exemplified by his parroting unpleaded allegations of collusion between the C-331 Shareholders and the BdL which clearly coloured his own evidence and removed any semblance of objectivity to such evidence, alleging (variously) that the C-331 Shareholders were, “defrauding the company” (Day 8 page 24 line 24), in “collu[sion] with the BdL and their accomplices” (Day 8 page 25 line 3) and had “objectives” that were “essentially basically black mail” of MABIL (Day 9 page 20 line 10 to page 21 line 5) – once again showing, in the process where his true colours lay. When it was put to him that he was “treating the banks as if they’re the opposing party in litigation. They’re not. They’re a central part of this company” he doubled-down on his expressed views replying, “again, as I said, my Lord, I considered the banks to have basically colluded with the Central Bank since December 2019 to organise their default and cover themselves. So, yes, they were acting against the interest of the company” (Day 7 page 182 lines 5 to 13). They were, of course, the majority shareholders of the company, and it was the minority shareholder (MABIL) whose interests he favoured.[48]Ultimately Mr Attieh’s lies, dissemination, deflection and open hostility to the C-331 Shareholders were legion. I address his evidence in due course below. He is not a witness of truth, and I can place little, if any, weight on his evidence save where it is against his interest or is supported by contemporary documentary evidence. B3. ESTABLISHMENT OF CEDAR MUNDI, CAPITAL CALLS AND THE LEBANESE FINANCIAL CRISIS

B3.1 Establishment of Cedar Mundi

[49]In 2015, Mr Attieh was searching for investment opportunities for the Al Bahar group to invest in venture capital funds in the Middle East and he came across Circular 331 which, as already noted, is an initiative by the BdL to increase equity investment, either directly or via venture capital or similar vehicles, in Lebanese start-up companies.[50]During 2015, Mr Attieh travelled to Lebanon to begin investigating this opportunity, during which time he met with representatives of the BdL and learned that the BdL was offering to provide Lebanese commercial banks with interest-free funding for a maximum of seven years of up to 75% of eligible investments, with the banks covering the remaining 25%. By Circular 331, those financial institutions would benefit from interest-free lending for their participation in the capital of Lebanese start-up companies, and companies whose objects were restricted to investing venture capital in Lebanese start-ups.[51]It was in this meeting with representatives of the BdL that Mr Attieh was referred to SGBL as a potential lead investor who “subsequently played a central role in liaising with the BdL throughout the lifecycle of the investment fund” (per Attieh 1 para 38).[52]Around the same time, on 18 March 2015, Mr Al Bahar as Vice-Chairman of IFAK, wrote to the BdL to inform it of IFAK’s wish to form Cedar Mundi, which would operate within the structure of Circular 331.[53]Soon after, on 16 April 2015, Cedar Mundi’s constitutive general assembly took place, and Cedar Mundi was established as a Lebanese joint stock company. The board of the general assembly comprised Mr Attieh and Cedar Mundi Associates (BVI) Limited (“CMA”), a British Virgin Islands company in which each of Mundi Ventures SL and the IFA Group held 50% of the voting rights. On establishment, Cedar Mundi’s entire issued share capital was owned by CMA.[54]The general assembly resolved to ratify Cedar Mundi’s Articles of Incorporation and to elect the Cedar Mundi BoD, which comprised: CMA (acting by Mr Javier Santiso, CEO and general partner of Mundi Ventures SL), Mr Attieh (who was also a director of CMA), and Mr Nadi Najjar (external legal counsel for Cedar Mundi and CMCH). Mr Attieh was at the same time elected as Chairman of the Cedar Mundi BoD.[55]On the following day, Cedar Mundi was incorporated and as from 2016, it operated as a venture capital fund within the Circular 331 framework.

B3.2 Directors and shareholders

[56]The Cedar Mundi BoD from 2016 comprised three executive directors and two non-executive directors. The executive directors included:(1) Mr Attieh, who was also vice president or vice chairman of the board of directors, and sometime assistant general manager. Mr Attieh resigned with effect from 6 September 2021. Mr Attieh was also a director of Cedar Mundi’s fund manager, CMCH, a director of Fastnet Capital Ltd, and for a short period before the 2021 Transaction, a director of Fastnet Capital GP Ltd (the general partner of Cedar II), all as part of his remit as an executive for the Al Bahar Group.(2) Mrs Wafa Al Qatami, who was also chairman general manager, and who also resigned with effect from 6 September 2021. Mrs Al Qatami is part of the Al Bahar family, indeed she is Mr Al Bahar’s aunt, and like Mr Attieh, she held various positions within the Al Bahar Group. Per Mr Attieh, he did not consult Mrs Al Qatami on the 2021 Transaction until shortly before the board meeting of 16 March 2021 (Attieh 1 at para 226), which was months after Mr Attieh had begun planning it.(3) Mr Javier Santiso, who also resigned with effect from 6 September 2021. Mr Attieh’s written evidence is that Mr Santiso was the founder of Mundi Ventures (Spain SL), and that “Javier had started distancing himself from Cedar Mundi” by the beginning of 2020 (Attieh 1 at paras 133 and 219), with Mrs Al Qatami exercising a power of attorney on his behalf at board meetings thereafter, and that he was not consulted on either Transaction. Mr Attieh confirmed during his cross-examination that Mr Santiso had “taken a step back” from being “an active participant in Cedar Mundi” (Day 5 page 157 line 4 to Day 5 page 158 line 6).[57]The two non-executive directors included Mr Saghbini, who resigned with effect from 23 March 2021; and SGBL, as a corporate non-executive director, usually represented by Mr El Azar at board meetings, which resigned with effect from 6 September 2021. After the 2021 Transaction had been discovered in September 2021, shortly after on 25 October 2021, SGBL was re-elected to the board along with other C-331 Shareholders (Bank of Beirut, Bank Audi, BLOM, and Fransabank) and Mr Saghbini personally.[58]As to Cedar Mundi’s shareholders, SGBL acted as placing agent, sponsor, and lead shareholder for all of the C-331 Shareholders. These included 11 Lebanese banks and financial institutions (in addition to SGBL, these were Jammal, IBL, BLOM, Fransa Invest, Fransa Bank, Banque Libano-Francaise, FNB, Bank Audi, Bank of Beirut, and Fenicia), alongside MABIL and minimal holdings by the four individual directors. The C-331 Shareholders were treated as “limited partners” and MABIL/CMCH/the Al Bahar Group were treated as the “general partner”.[59]The exact proportions of the capital contributions made by each shareholder fluctuated over time with the three capital calls, but the C-331 Shareholders were always collectively the majority shareholders and capital contributors, and SGBL was ultimately the largest of the C-331 Shareholders.

B3.3 Contractual and regulatory framework

[60]There are five key documents which set out the framework in which Cedar Mundi operated:(i) Circular 331 dated 22 August 2013;(ii) the Private Placement Memorandum dated January 2016 (the “PPM”);(iii) the Subordinated Credit Facility Agreements between Cedar Mundi and each shareholder entered into on various dates between May and September 2016 (the “SCFA”);(iv) the Management Agency Agreement dated 18 May 2016; and(v) the Articles of Incorporation, amended on 15 February 2016 (the “AoA”).

(i) Circular 331

[61]The BdL is authorised by the Lebanese Code of Money and Credit to issue decisions with legal force as part of its regulation of the banking and financial sector. One such decision is Basic Decision 6116. Circular 331 published and circulated Intermediate Decision 11512 on 22 August 2013, which amended Basic Decision 6116 by adding a new Article 8 (Bis). Article 8 (Bis) was subsequently amended by Intermediate Decision 12463 (Circular 452) dated 22 February 2017 and Intermediate Decision 12715 (Circular 477) dated 7 November 2017. This version of Article 8 (i.e. “Circular 331”) was in force at the time of the incorporation of Cedar Mundi. A slightly different version was in force at the time of the Transactions.[62]Circular 331 set out the basis on which the BdL would fund the Lebanese banks to invest in start-ups under the initiative (see Article 1(i)). The approval of any funds by the BdL was contingent on an application which included, amongst other things, information about the start-up’s past and projected financial performance (Article 1(IV)); and controls were placed on how Lebanese banks could then exit from any such investments, in order to protect the public money invested by the BdL (Article 1(III)). The Banking Control Commission of Lebanon (the “BCCL”) ensured the proper implementation of Circular 331 (Article 1(V)). (ii). The PPM[63]In or around January 2016, by a draft private placement memorandum Cedar Mundi offered the private placement of its shares to eligible investors under Circular 331 and set out the terms upon which shareholders were to participate. The PPM stated, in particular:(1) The key investment strategy “focuses on sourcing investment opportunities for its Portfolio in Lebanon as well as internationally” aimed to “help grow [Lebanese] startups internationally” and to invest in “overseas-incubated startups … restricted to startups headquartered in Lebanon or which commit to position in Lebanon a sizable part of their operations”.(2) Cedar Mundi would raise approximately between US$44,982,000 and US$62,982,000 in capital through subordinated loans provided by eligible shareholders under Circular 331, to be drawn down upon notice from Cedar Mundi. It was contemplated that these subordinated loans would be drawn down in three tranches upon completion (30%), in the first year (40%), and in the second year (30%).(3) The “Investment Period”, i.e. “the period during which the Company will execute its investments and build up its Portfolio”, was “3 years as of the date of Completion”, but which could be subject to annual extensions by Cedar Mundi’s general assembly upon the recommendation of its board of investors. The overall “Fund Term” was “7 years, with possible annual extensions subject to BdL approval”.(4) CMCH was appointed as fund manager for Cedar Mundi and an investment committee of two representatives of CMCH and five independent members would be established by the board of directors.(5) Cedar Mundi was “organized as a closed-end fund and its activities are regulated by the Central Bank of Lebanon”.[64]The PPM was later amended to extend the closing date to 1 May 2016 to permit capital calls after the Investment Period, but only for payment of management fees under the Management Agency Agreement, and to extend the Investment Period to 30 April 2020. The BdL approved this amendment on 16 January 2020. The BdL approved a second amendment on 10 August 2020, further extending the Investment Period by another year to 30 April 2021. The expiry of the Fund Term, by which Cedar Mundi was required to have exited its investments, was on or around 28 April 2023.[65]In February 2016, SGBL as placement agent for Cedar Mundi, sent private placing letters to the C-331 Shareholders. At various times between February and April, the C-331 Shareholders each returned to Cedar Mundi a completed “Form of Confirmation”, by which each shareholder confirmed an undertaking(i) to purchase a number of private placing shares; and(ii) to grant a subordinated credit facility agreement. On 28 April 2016, the Cedar Mundi BoD resolved to accept the C-331 Shareholders’ applications under the PPM, set the effective date of the first closing as 1 May 2016, and confirmed an aggregate committed investment received and accepted up to that date of US$40,000,000. (iii). SCFAs[66]The Subordinated Credit Facility Agreements (the “SCFAs”) were in a standard form for each shareholder and incorporated certain terms of the PPM. They were entered into at various dates between May and September 2016. They provided in particular that Cedar Mundi could make capital calls for subordinated loans, up to the limit stated in the recitals for the relevant shareholder, during the Investment Period (clause 2).[67]The loans under the SCFAs were “wholly subordinated to the claims of all other non-subordinated creditors” and, subject to contrary consent, ranked pari passu with “all other debt which is subordinated” (clause 8). Moreover, Cedar Mundi was not entitled to repay any of the C-331 Shareholders (or MABIL) without the prior consent of the BdL (clause 4), or if it would result in Cedar Mundi ceasing to be a going concern (clause 5) and no C-331 Shareholder (nor MABIL) was entitled to sue for the same (clause 7). Cedar Mundi was also entitled to enter into other “short-term … bridge loans and credit facilities to be used for investments in Portfolio Companies or other financial commitments” where there was a liquidity need (clause 9).[68]In the event that a shareholder did not advance the full amount called upon, the SCFAs provided a procedure under clause 13 (the “Default Mechanism”), whereby(i) the company, which had to be Cedar Mundi itself, would issue a notice of default which had to make clear that Cedar Mundi intended to exercise its rights under clause 13;(ii) the shareholder had a rectification period of 30 days from receipt of the default notice; following which(iii) Cedar Mundi was entitled, without obligation, to issue a further notice requiring the shareholder to transfer its shares and credit facility in accordance with a stipulated valuation procedure to a new shareholder. Clause 13 specifically provided that any transfer under that provision was subject to the “prior written approval” of the BdL. (iv). The Management Agency Agreement[69]Cedar Mundi entered into the Management Agency Agreement with CMCH on 18 May 2016, the recitals to which recorded that CMCH, as manager, was engaged in “selecting investment opportunities and creating shareholders value by actively growing the investees operations”. CMCH was entitled to charge an annual management fee and earn “carry interest” in the investment portfolio (clause 4). The term of the Management Agency Agreement was seven years, consistent with the framework of Circular 331, and subject to up to three annual extensions (clause 6).

(v) The AoA

[70]Cedar Mundi’s (amended) AoA were published on or around 15 February 2016. The AoA set out the constitutional provisions of Cedar Mundi. In particular, Cedar Mundi was to be governed by the LCC and Circular 331, and subject to the supervision of the BdL and the BCCL (Article 1). Its objects were limited to the activities of a holding company, including: the acquisition of stocks or shares in Lebanese and other companies; the management of those companies; and the granting of loans to those companies (Article 3).[71]Part IV of the AoA is entitled “Management of the Company” and included provisions as to the authority of Cedar Mundi’s BoD, including Articles 17, 19, and 20 which provide:
“ARTICLE 17 : BOARD OF DIRECTORS The Company shall be managed by a Board of Directors, composed of three members at least and seven members at most, as determined by the General Assembly. When elected by the General Assembly, the mandate of the Board of Directors shall be for a period of three years maximum. … ARTICLE 19 : POWERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS The Board of Directors is vested with the widest powers to represent the Company vis-à-vis any and all third parties, to execute the resolutions of the General Assembly and to carry out any and all acts and operations relating to its object, with no limitation or reserve whatsoever except those laid by the Law and the present Articles of Incorporation. ARTICLE 20 : DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS The duties of the Board of Directors shall include but not be limited to : … 4. to submit any proposal or suggestion to the General Assembly regarding any amendment(s) it believes necessary to introduce to the Articles of Incorporation 5. to call for the meetings of the General Assemblies of shareholders and prepare the agenda of such meetings ; 6. to implement the resolutions of the General Assemblies. 7. Inform the Central Bank of any transfer of the shares of the Company in the capital of the start-up companies in addition to the audit report about said company whereby the value of the transferred shares is indicated; the Central Bank preserves its right to appoint one or several experts which fees shall be paid by company in order for said expert (s) to evaluate the portfolio of the company. 8. To provide the Central Bank with the following documents: Financial Statements; List of the shareholders of the Company; List of the members of the board of directors and general managers and auditors; Auditor’s report showing the evolution of the Company’s business taking into consideration the possibility of the Central Bank to object the appointment of the auditor of the Company.”
[72]Article 25 relates to the authority of general managers and assistant general managers, and provides as follows:
“ARTICLE 25 : CHAIRMAN – GENERAL MANAGER – ASSISTANT MANAGER The Chairman of the Board shall act as General Manager of the Company. He may suggest to the Board the designation of a General Manager from amongst the shareholders or from non-shareholders, to carry out general acts of administration provided the appointed manager performs his duties under the Chairman’s supervision and responsibility. … The Chairman, the Vice-President, the General Manager or the Assistant Manager, represents the Company vis-à-vis any and all third parties, executes the resolutions of the Board, and manages the Company in accordance with such resolutions.”
[73]Part VI, entitled “General Assemblies” contained the provisions for convening and voting at a general assembly of Cedar Mundi. The Articles also contained detailed provisions giving effect to the Default Mechanism (Article 10).

B3.4 Investment portfolio

[74]Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio consisted of minority investments in a range of companies. Its most valuable investment was in Proximie SAL (a Lebanese company before a 2018 restructuring) or Proximie Ltd (a UK company after that restructuring) (“Proximie”). Proximie provided healthtech that, by 2020, was deployed at 300 hospital and university sites across the US, UK, and Europe.[75]The remaining investment portfolio comprised:(i) Band Industries SAL (“Band Industries”), a musictech business;(ii) Cardiodiagnostics SAL (“Cardiodiagnostics”), another healthcare business;(iii) Crystalign SAL (“Crystalign”), an orthodontics business;(iv) Ecomz SAL (“EComz”), an e-commerce platform;(v) Loolia Ventures SAL (“Loolia”), an e-commerce brand agency;(vi) Quiqup Ltd (“Quiqup”), a logistics and delivery company;(vii) SOSF (Holding) SAL (“SOSF”), another private equity fund;(viii) Washmen Holding Ltd (“Washmen”), a laundry and drycleaning business; and(ix) White Lab SAL (“White Lab”), an air conditioning company.

B3.5 The Capital Calls

[76]The investments held in Cedar Mundi’s portfolio were funded by the C-331 Shareholders and MABIL pursuant to the Capital Calls under the PPM. Cedar Mundi made three Capital Calls during the Investment Period.

The First Capital Call

[77]The First Capital Call was made on 23 May 2016. SGBL (as placing agent on behalf of the Cedar Mundi BoD) gave notice of the first call, calling for 25% of each shareholder’s commitments under the PPM (except for Bank Audi), and requested that payment “be settled in aggregate by no later than June 23rd 2016”. On 3 June 2016, Mr Attieh as General Manager of Cedar Mundi, wrote to the BdL to inform it of the Cedar Mundi BoD’s decision in respect of the First Capital Call, and to request that the BdL grant the necessary facilities to the C-331 Shareholders.[78]The First Capital Call ultimately raised US$7,366,400 from the C-331 Shareholders and US$2,622,000 from MABIL. There were no issues in respect of BdL consent for the First Capital Call.

The Second Capital Call

[79]The Second Capital Call was made on 9 June 2017 and called for a further 25% of the total commitments from each shareholder under the PPM, except for Bank Audi, from which 50% was called (Bank Audi having not participated in the First Capital Call). On the same day, Mr Attieh notified the BdL that the Cedar Mundi BoD had resolved to make the Second Capital Call in the total amount of US$12,222,000, of which US$9,587,000 was the share of the C-331 Shareholders. However, the Governor of the BdL only consented to Cedar Mundi obtaining US$10,842,000 by way of the Second Capital Call, due to the “lack of agreement to calculate the ‘allocations for management fees during the harvest period’ (US$1,380,000)”, as it communicated in a letter to Cedar Mundi on 30 October 2017.[80]MABIL paid its called-upon contribution of US$2,625,000 to Cedar Mundi on 10 June 2017, prior to the adjustment, which MABIL says led to an overpayment of US$296,392 (the “Alleged MABIL Overpayment”). This payment was subsequently recorded in Cedar Mundi’s audited accounts for the 2017 financial year as a balance due from Cedar Mundi to MABIL, and which stated that “[t]he balance due to related parties does not bear interest and is repayable on demand.”[81]Mr Attieh did not accept that the BdL had a right to vary Cedar Mundi’s capital call, and stated in his evidence that “the only authority that basically is able to reduce the capital calls is the Cedar Mundi board of directors” (Day 6 page 31 lines 2 to 4). In any event, he “made the determination that an underpayment of the second capital call by circa 10% did not materially jeopardise Cedar Mundi’s ability to operate” (Attieh 1 at para 80).[82]On 31 October 2017, the day after Cedar Mundi received the letter from the BdL, Mr Attieh wrote to Mr Chélala (COO of Cedar Mundi), noting that a board meeting would be required to formalise the reduction, and stating that “the excess paid by [MABIL] will be recognised as an advance on the 3rd capital call”. The Second Capital Call was subsequently adjusted and on 7 November 2017, Cedar Mundi acting by Mr Attieh issued further letters to the C-331 Shareholders requesting payment of their shares of the adjusted capital call. The C-331 Shareholders paid their respective contributions at various times after this date, and the Second Capital Call ultimately raised US$8,513,392 from the C-331 Shareholders.

The Third Capital Call

[83]The Third Capital Call was made on 25 April 2019 and called for a further 38% of each shareholder’s commitments under the PPM. Mr Attieh notified the BdL that the Cedar Mundi BoD had resolved to make the Third Capital Call in the sum of US$16,805,325 a month earlier, on 25 March 2019, which would have brought the total contributions to US$37,943,716 (i.e. 85.4% of the committed amounts).[84]MABIL, which did not require BdL funding, paid its contribution of US$3,940,661 in “fresh” US Dollars to Cedar Mundi on 13 June 2019, but the BdL did not confirm its consent to the Third Capital Call until much later, with the consequence that the C-331 Shareholders did not at this stage pay their respective contributions. In his evidence Mr Attieh accepted that this was because the BdL had a number of questions about the proposed use of funds for the Third Capital Call, including the use of warrant structures (see Day 6 page 45 line 20 to Day 6 page 48 line 5). Mr Attieh also accepted that the BdL had a legitimate interest in ensuring that “their funds are actually going to support Lebanese companies and not companies outside of Lebanon” (Day 6 page 49 lines 13 to 15). Mr El Azar similarly acknowledged that there had been a delay in BdL approval for the Third Capital Call, which he considered was due to the BdL “not being satisfied with the information provided by the fund manager” (Day 4 page 50 lines 13 to 16, and Day 4 page 54 line 24 to page 55 line 1), but which he considered to be a matter for its regulatory “discretion” (Day 4 page 56 line 21).[85]In any event, on 19 July 2019, Mr Chélala sent Cedar Mundi’s quarterly report for Q2 2019 to the BdL, which stated:
“We are now waiting for a meeting with the Head of the Real Estate and Financial Assets Department, Mr Ricardo Skaf, around the 20th of July” and “[n]ow, due to the investment needs of our Portfolio companies, CMH is on the brink of becoming short on money for further investments and follow-ons”
. Several meetings took place with Cedar Mundi and the BdL in July to discuss the Third Capital Call.[86]Mr Chélala sought a bridging loan of US$1,500,000 – US$2,000,000 from SGBL “pending the release of the 3rd capital call by the BDL”, as he confirmed in his email to Mr Attieh on 8 August 2019. At the same time, Mr Chélala wrote to Mrs Jinan Ezzeddine at the BdL in relation to various points concerning Cedar Mundi’s warrant structure, ultimately stating: “We emphasize on the urgent need to meet in order to settle outstanding issues for the release of the third Capital call which is of paramount importance especially for our Portfolio Companies” and confirmed that Cedar Mundi was at this stage seeking bridging loans.[87]In September 2019, six months after the Third Capital Call was notified to the C-331 Shareholders, Mr Attieh wrote to Mr Saghbini referring to:
“… Cedar Mundi having diligently and comprehensively answered all BdL enquiries demonstrating in every instance a strict compliance with all the provisions of its Private Placement Memorandum across all its investments”
. He further stated that Cedar Mundi viewed “the continuing failure by the banks to pay our third capital call more than 6 months after its due date as unjustified and endangering greatly the interests of our fund” and that the failure was “starting to impact negatively on the investment of [MABIL] which has paid its share of the third capital call in full and on time”. Around the same time, Mr Chélala arranged for a meeting to be held on 3 October 2019 with the Mr Attieh, Mr El Azar, Mr Ezzeddine, Mr Najjar, and the Governor of the BdL.[88]In October, Cedar Mundi had still not received any approval from the BdL, nor was a bridging loan from SGBL forthcoming. Mr Attieh contacted Mr Saghbini on 8 October 2019 via WhatsApp:
“Cedar Mundi has $ 4 m in term deposit at sgbl. We need to have a credit line on those urgently because the bdl is 8 mths late on the 3rd capital [call] and we need $1M advance to cover our investment commitments urgently. SGBL is saying they need your authorization. Please advise” and “George we need a loan !!”
. Mr Saghbini responded by stating “No loan my friend”, and “It’s impossible …”.[89]On 18 October 2019, Mr Chélala sent to the BdL Cedar Mundi’s next quarterly report (for Q3 2019), which stated: “We are still waiting for the disbursement of capital knowing that we are very tight on cash considering the “imminent” investments” and that “[a]ll of the “imminent” opportunities presented have become very urgent”.[90]On 14 November 2019, Mr Attieh sent a copy of a letter to Mr Saghbini and Mr El Azar which he had received from KHCK (on behalf of MABIL) to the BdL, in which KHCK expressed its concern over “the recent and worrying developments” in relation to Cedar Mundi and the settlement of the Third Capital Call: “after the passing of approximately 8 months from the capital call the BdL has not paid, even though the management of the fund has answered all the queries of the BdL in a comprehensive and full manner … the non-compliance of the banks with their contractual obligations exposed the interests of the fund and its shareholders to danger”.[91]On 9 December 2019, the BdL confirmed that the Third Capital Call would be divided into two tranches, the first being for US$9,000,000 and the second for US$6,350,000 (a total of US$15,350,000). The first tranche was approved at this time, but the second tranche was not approved (at this time or thereafter). The BdL confirmed that the payment should be in Lebanese Lira.[92]Mr Attieh initially claimed that this was a surprise (Day 6 page 52 lines 19 to 25), but he had in fact anticipated it. Several days earlier, Mr Attieh had sought and received legal advice about the issue from Mr Najjar. The legal advice confirmed that, pursuant to Article 301 of the Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts, “in Lebanon, payments should be made in LBP even if contracts mention that the payment should be made in USD”. Indeed, before Mr Attieh received this legal advice, he had already opened a Lira account for Cedar Mundi on 3 December 2019, which fact he sought to conceal from the C-331 Shareholders because he did not want it to appear that he had accepted that the Third Capital Call could be paid in Lebanese Lira. In an email, Mr Attieh instructed Mr Chélala that “[t]he details of this new account and its existence must not be disclosed. For the time being, our position vis-à-vis the banks is that they must pay in DOLLARS”. In cross-examination he confirmed that “I have actually said to Mr Chélala that in no instance we will actually give the banks something that they could construe as being our acceptance of the payment in lira” (Day 6 page 61 lines 8 to 11).[93]On the following day, Mr Attieh wrote to the C-331 Shareholders to request payment of their portions of the first tranche of the Third Capital Call, providing the US Dollar sum which each respective shareholder owed, but he did not mention that payment should be made in Lebanese Lira. On receipt of Mr Attieh’s letters, two of the C-331 Shareholders (Fransabank/Fransa Invest and Bank Audi) queried whether the Third Capital Call was to be paid in LBP. Mr Chélala followed up with an additional letter to the C-331 Shareholders which provided details of the new account opened specifically for this purpose. Shortly after, Ms Randa Safah from Bank Audi responded to ask if the account details Mr Chélala had provided were for an LBP account. Mr Chélala passed this query on to Mr Attieh, who instructed Mr Chélala as follows:
“Please call Mrs Safah on Monday and tell her I am on leave until the 30th and confirm VERBALLY that the account is in LBP. DO NOT CONFIRM ANYTHING IN WRITING.”
[94]Around this time, on 13 December 2019 the BdL informed lead C-331 Shareholder SGBL that, further to the Governor’s instructions the BdL would cover only 75% of the Third Capital Call, to be paid in Lebanese Lira and that the C-331 Shareholders would pay their portions in Lebanese Lira at the official rate of LBP1,507 to the US Dollar.[95]Thereafter, all but one of the C-331 Shareholders paid to Cedar Mundi amounts in respect of the Third Capital Call. The Bank of Beirut paid US$612,827 in “fresh” US Dollars, and the remaining C-331 Shareholders paid a total of LBP9,450,808,893. Jammal paid nothing because it was by then in liquidation.[96]No further payments were made to Cedar Mundi by the C-331 Shareholders in respect of the Third Capital Call. MABIL contends that the sum they paid in June prior to the BdL’s adjustment of the Third Capital Call, amounted to an overcontribution and therefore increased the Alleged MABIL Overpayment to a total of US$2,092,158. The Alleged MABIL Overpayment is addressed in Section F2.1 below.

B3.6 The Lebanese financial crisis

[97]The Third Capital Call, along with the BdL and C-331 Shareholder response to it, is to be understood in the context of the Lebanese financial crisis. The immediate catalyst of the crisis was nationwide political unrest in the autumn of 2019, causing all banks to close for two weeks. When the banks reopened, large numbers of customers attempted to obtain their foreign currency. To prevent collapse, de facto currency controls were introduced which severely restricted the amount of foreign currency available from the BdL to Lebanese banks and which generated a substantial devaluation of the Lebanese Lira against the US Dollar.[98]The Lebanese financial crisis and its impact on depositor’s ability to transfer funds out of Lebanon has already been well documented in previous decisions of this Court. The fullest description of the crisis is given in Manoukian v SGBL & Bank Audi [2022] EWHC 699 (QB) by Picken J at [19]-[25] (cited with approval in Bitar v Bank of Beirut SAL [2022] EWHC 2163 (QB) at [18]-[20] (Freedman J) and Alesayi v Bank Audi SAL [2025] EWHC 440 (KB) at [11] (Dexter Dias J). A shorter summary was given by Foxton J in Khalifeh v Blom Bank SAL [2021] EWHC 3399 (QB) at [34].[99]It is worth quoting [19]-[25] of Manoukian in full:
“19. That there is an ongoing financial crisis in Lebanon is well known and not in dispute. It has been described by the Spring 2021 Lebanon Economic Monitor as in the top ten “most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century” and is the cause of liquidity problems which currently pervade the Lebanese banking sector. It appears, indeed, that, were Lebanese banks to accede to all international transfer requests, there would be a run on the banks and a collapse of the banking sector. That said, as Mr Toledano QC highlighted, the Banks do not say that the transfers were impossible. Nor have they alleged force majeure. Their case, rather, is that, although they could have made the transfers, they were (and are) under no obligation to do so. 20. The crisis’s immediate catalyst was nationwide political unrest in the autumn of 2019, triggered by a proposal by the government to tax calls made by WhatsApp. Due to that unrest, which included protests, street riots and roadblocks, Lebanese banks were closed for two weeks between 18 October 2019 and 31 October 2019. During this time, SGBL issued a blanket directive to refuse all requests for international transfers and Bank Audi directed employees not to process any new cross-border requests until after the Bank reopened and resumed business. When the banks reopened on 1 November 2019, there was a run on all Lebanese banks, with large numbers of clients attempting to withdraw all their foreign currency or transfer it all abroad. 21. Anticipating such a run, SGBL issued a directive to its employees that, from 1 November 2019, no international transfers were to be made for any purpose. Bank Audi similarly imposed severe restrictions on international transfers, directing staff that foreign exchange transactions exceeding US$10,000 must not be accepted unless approved by Bank Audi’s central Treasury Unit. Such international transfers were only to be permitted for personal expenses. These initial directives were intended as temporary, stop-gap measures. At the time, the Banks thought that the crisis would be short-lived and that clients’ loss of confidence resulting from the protests and the October 2019 bank closures would be restored. Instead, the crisis deepened, due to problems at a macro-economic level in Lebanon. 22. Systemic issues within Lebanon’s banking sector mean that Lebanese banks are highly exposed to fiscal issues with the Lebanese state. This is because Lebanese banks rely heavily on the Banque du Liban (‘BdL’), the central bank, for their foreign currency liquidity. As the crisis unfolded, however, it meant that BdL could in practice ‘turn off the taps’ by restricting Lebanese banks’ access to their foreign currency deposits for international transfers. The net result is that the Banks (along with all other Lebanese banks) have been operating with severe foreign currency shortages since October 2019. Lebanon’s economic turmoil and political unrest have worsened since then, the Lebanese pound (LBP) having lost 90% of its value amid dwindling confidence in the Lebanese economy, which has itself shrunk by 40%. … 23. On 11 November 2019, after 10 days of further unrest, including bank employees being subjected to verbal and physical abuse, the Lebanese Syndicate of Bank Employees called for a general strike over concerns for safety, and the Banks were forced to close once more. Also on 11 November 2019, the Governor of BdL asked the banks to process cross-border transfers for personal necessities only - a signal to clients that the Banks were acting in accordance with a public directive, which began to manage expectations. 24. The Association of Lebanese Banks (the ‘ABL’) began developing a harmonised policy on international transfers, which was formally released on 17 November 2019 (the ‘ABL Circular’). The ABL Circular directed that transfers abroad were to be limited to urgent personal expenses and set out maximum recommended levels of transfers abroad. Whilst the ABL Circular did not have legal force, it was adopted by the banking sector to achieve a fair and consistent approach across the sector and protect the banks’ shrinking foreign currency liquidity. The publication of the ABL Circular, and the stationing of police officers near each bank branch to ensure employees’ safety, helped calm the immediate situation and bring the Lebanese bank employees’ strike to an end. 25. Over the following months, the Banks each began to tighten their policies and transfer limits as it became plain that the crisis was not transient, and in accordance with subsequent BdL Circulars (BdL Circulars 150, 151, 153 and 155). Each of BdL Circulars 150, 151, 153 and 155 stipulates the amounts and specified purposes for which Banks are required to permit clients to transfer overseas, primarily in respect of Lebanese students abroad. The Banks’ case was that implicit in these Circulars is the acknowledgement that banks are not obliged to provide international transfer services in amounts or for reasons other than those stipulated.”
[100]As Picken J made clear at [19], this was not a situation in which the banks were unable to make payments. Rather, the de facto controls were introduced as a practical response to ensure that there would not be a run on the banks and a collapse of the banking sector. It was in these circumstances that a distinction arose between “fresh” US Dollars and “Lollars”.[101]Mr Hatem, the Claimants’ expert, explained the distinction at paragraph 15 of his report:
“Fresh Dollars”: USD obtained from outside the Lebanese banking system, fully liquid and usable locally or internationally (and hence the same as USD in other jurisdictions). “Lollars”: A colloquial term used to refer to US Dollars deposited in Lebanese banks, which were no longer withdrawable in cash or transferrable abroad and so ‘trapped’ in Lebanon (sometimes referred to as “Restricted Dollars”).”
[102]Mr Hatem proceeded to explain that this distinction created a “two-tiered monetary reality”, in which “Lollars were treated as a discounted currency, usable only within the Lebanese banking system or for certain domestic transactions” (at para 16). This resulted in informal markets for Dollar/Lollar conversions, in addition to US$/LBP conversions, below the official rate set by the BdL.[103]In Attieh 1 at paras 121 and 123 Mr Attieh alleged that Cedar Mundi was, at this point, “operating under severe financial constraints” and that:
“[A]s a result of receiving the majority of the third capital call in Lebanese Lira the fund was in a situation where it did not have enough capital to meet its commitments to its portfolio companies. The Lebanese Lira we could access were of limited use to the portfolio companies in Lebanon, because they already had bank accounts in that currency which were losing value by the day … This meant that the portfolio companies were unable to meet their immediate financial obligations in Lebanon such as paying employees, suppliers, and other third parties in Lebanese Lira, and they urgently needed US Dollars instead.”
[104]In contrast, in El Azar 1 at para 62, Mr El Azar asserted that, following the financial crisis:
“Cedar Mundi could have stopped actively investing and entered the divestment period where it would have held its then existing portfolio assets until a divestment opportunity presented itself. This is the approach that other 331 funds with which SGBL has been involved took following the onset of the Lebanese financial crisis.”
[105]In the event, this was not the course of action taken by Mr Attieh.

B3.7 Alleged MABIL Overpayment

[106]As already noted, Mr Attieh’s position was that the Third Capital Call increased the amount of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment. At para 127 of Attieh 1, Mr Attieh stated that: “On or around the beginning of 2020, Talal [Al Bahar] asked me to arrange for Cedar Mundi to repay MABIL the excess funds that it had paid in response to the reduced third capital call”.[107]Mr Wilson KC put to Mr Attieh in the course of cross-examination that in circumstances where a shareholder believes that they are owed a sum of money and are requesting its repayment, “the proper course of action would have been for you to go to the board of directors to discuss whether that would be an appropriate course of action for Cedar Mundi to take” (see Day 6 page 62 line 24 to page 63 line 2). That would, self-evidently, have been an appropriate course of action. However, Mr Attieh responded, “No, I don’t believe so.” (Day 6 page 63 line 3). Evidently Mr Attieh preferred to deal with this by himself, without consulting anyone else at Cedar Mundi.[108]Mr Attieh’s evidence, in Attieh 1 at para 232, was that he and Mr Al Bahar had discussed the need for Cedar Mundi to repay MABIL, and that in fact Mr Al Bahar had “instructed me to prepare, and I prepared, a draft letter to Cedar Mundi which MABIL issued, asking the Board of Directors to serve a notice of default on the C-331 Shareholders under the “Event of Default” provisions in the PPM” (see also Day 6 page 62 line 7 to page 63 line 3 and Day 6 page 73 at lines 19 to 20). This is but one example of Mr Attieh acting in the interests of Mr Al Bahar.[109]This letter was (on its face) sent by Mr Al Bahar, as director of MABIL, to Mr Attieh in his Cedar Mundi capacity. The letter demanded repayment of US$1,795,766 to MABIL’s account with UBS in Zurich, Switzerland. Mr Attieh, having received this letter, then used it to purport to instruct SGBL on behalf of Cedar Mundi on 12 February 2020 to repay to MABIL’s account in Zurich, noting that this was “an urgent instruction” from MABIL “to return to them the excess amount contributed by them to CMH’s 3rd Capital Call”. Mr Attieh accepted in cross examination that he kept a “tight control over this whole process” (Day 6 page 68 lines 20 to 22) and he instructed Mr Chélala in an email: “do not send anything until I tell you”.[110]Several hours after that email was sent, Mr Attieh sent another instruction to Mr Chélala:
“The instruction to SGBL should be a normal instruction without the need of words adding a sense of urgency, panic.. etc…. etc… nor is there a need to involve people that have no business in the normal operation of the bank accounts of the fund. Therefore, the normal format of instruction should be sent to Marina @ SGBL as follows (no need to sent the letter received from Med Al Bahar)”
[111]As instructed, Mr Chélala wrote to SGBL to request payment of the US$1,795,66 from Cedar Mundi’s SGBL account, to the MABIL account in Zurich and in a separate email, Mr Attieh confirmed these instructions. SGBL responded, predictably, that it was “unable to transfer money outside of lebanon for the time being”, to which Mr Attieh simply responded, “noted”.[112]The Claimant submit, and I accept, that this “whole process” was simply “un artifice, un stratagème” (see Day 6 page 70 line 11). When it was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination that this exchange was designed to “set up the MABIL overpayment as if it were a crystallised debt that had been demanded but had remained unpaid” (Day 6 page 72 lines 23 to 25), he (less than credibly) rejected this (see Day 6 page 70 line 14 and page 73 lines 1 to 3). The reality is that Mr Attieh was also well aware that the banks were not transferring foreign currency outside of Lebanon.[113]I address the Alleged MABIL Overpayment in Section F2.1 below in the context of Issue 10(2). B4. THE 2020 TRANSACTION

B4.1 The Portfolio Preservation and Continuity Agreement

[114]By the Portfolio Preservation and Continuity Agreement (the “PPC Agreement”), Mr Attieh (acting for Cedar Mundi), Mr Talal Al Bahar (acting for MABIL), and Mr Marzouq Al Bahar (Mr Talal Al Bahar’s brother, acting for KHCK) agreed to transfer various of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio companies to IFAC (the “2020 Transaction”). The key terms of the PPC Agreement are addressed below.[115]The recitals to the PPC Agreement begin by acknowledging the “Capital Controls” affecting Lebanese banks, including the controls and restrictions on monetary transactions, whether formal or informal (recital C) before identifying two (purported) justifications for the 2020 Transaction. The first appears to be an assertion that various portfolio companies were heading towards “imminent and certain bankruptcy”, on the basis that Cedar Mundi is unable to invest in its portfolio, and that Cedar Mundi accordingly needs “an alternative source of funding” (see recitals E, F, J and K). The second is an assertion that MABIL was owed the Alleged MABIL Overpayment, which Cedar Mundi had been “unable to settle” (recitals D, G, H and I).[116]By clauses 1 and 2, the parties (i.e. Mr Attieh and Mr Al Bahar) (had purportedly) “selected the investments with significant potential for future growth and value”, the ownership interests of which were transferred to IFAC (the “SPV”). Appendix 1 identified the portfolio companies to be transferred and provided that Cedar Mundi and MABCO would hold their respective shares in IFAC as the “SPV”, which itself held the majority of what had been Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio:
“Subject to subsequent adjustment as per Clause 5 of this Agreement to the Transfer Value, the respective interests in the SPV shall therefore be initially as follows: CMH interest 84,07% corresponding to Transfer Value MAB interest 15,93% corresponding to MABIL Receivable”
CMH interest 84,07% corresponding to Transfer Value MAB interest 15,93% corresponding to MABIL Receivable”

CMH interest 84,07% corresponding to Transfer Value

[117]Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that the 15.93% was “supposed to correspond to the value of the MABIL receivable” (Day 6 Page 89 lines 5 to 7). Accordingly, Cedar Mundi’s effective interest in its portfolio companies was diluted.[118]By clauses 3 to 5, it is stated that Cedar Mundi “confirms its inability to honour the demand made by MABIL”, and the Alleged MABIL Overpayment was assigned to MAB, who would then confer on Cedar Mundi the share capital in IFAC minus a retained shareholding reflecting the value of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment.[119]Clause 5 provided:
“ADJUSTMENT TO TRANSFER VALUE. The Parties agree that the Transfer Value may be adjusted by mutual agreement after completion of the transfer of the Qualifying Portfolio on the basis of adjustments made by the statutory auditor to the fair value of the Qualifying Portfolio as per the audited financial statements of CMH for the year ended Dec. 31st, 2019. Any adjustment shall be agreed no later than May 30th, 2020 and shall result in the consequential adjustment of the Parties’ respective interests in the SPV.”
[120]After the PPC Agreement, Mr Attieh purported to increase the MABCO interest in IFAC from 15.93% to 25.5%. He explained in Attieh 1 at para 156, that while he did “not remember how I arrived at the figure of 25.5%”, he had at that stage “a better and more accurate understanding of the fair value of the portfolio, and I adjusted the figures to reflect this”.[121]In cross-examination, Mr Attieh argued that he was entitled to make this adjustment under clause 5, but the conditions for such an adjustment were not met. In particular, Cedar Mundi’s “statutory auditor” had not yet provided Cedar Mundi with a draft of their audit until 16 December 2020. When this was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination he dismissed it, stating that “the audit basically was underway and we had more or less basically the figures” (see Day 6 page 107 lines 10 to 15), and that his action was justified because “we were actually living in exceptional circumstances” (Day 6 page 108 lines 21 to 22; and Day 6 page 109 lines 3 to 9).[122]By clauses 6 to 8, CMCH was to manage the investments transferred to IFAC on “terms to be agreed”; new investors could be brought into IFAC by subscribing to shares or other instruments issued by the SPV; and importantly, “any term of the PPM which may contradict and/or impede directly or indirectly the execution of the provisions of the current Agreement shall be suspended for as long as this Agreement is in force”. In cross-examination, Mr Attieh accepted that he inserted this last provision (clause 8), which allowed a minority shareholder, MABIL, to override part of the constitutional foundation of the fund (Day 6 page 93 line 25 to page 95 lines 6 to 20), which purported to override the requirements of the PPM and Circular 331, including the requirement that the capital be invested in Lebanon.[123]By clauses 9 to 10, the 2020 Transaction required by way of “closing actions” that the parties endeavour and cause the “effective and complete transfer to the SPV of the ownership interests of CMH together with all their attached rights in the Qualifying Portfolio”, and the “effective and complete transfer to CMH of the beneficial interest of the SPV corresponding to the Transfer Value”. Cedar Mundi was given a repurchase right by which, “after the lifting of all Capital Controls” and subject to a complicated formula, Cedar Mundi could repurchase the balance of the shares in IFAC.[124]In Attieh 1 paras 149 to 151, Mr Attieh stated that he entered into the 2020 Transaction on behalf of Cedar Mundi on 16 March 2020 after having received advice from his legal counsel, Mr Najjar. However, and as already noted above, Mr Attieh and Mr Al Bahar had in fact signed an earlier version of the PPC Agreement on or around 23 January 2020, as he accepted in cross-examination (Day 6 page 75 line 23 to page 77 line 1). Mr Attieh attempted to argue that this version, and the other earlier versions “were never final” (Day 6 page 78 lines 17 to 19), but the agreement was signed by both parties, and was clearly intended to be final by Mr Attieh.[125]The only reason the PPC Agreement was re-signed in March 2020 was to reduce Kuwaiti stamp duty, as is evident from Mr Attieh’s email to Ms Jaber at Kuwait Holding on 8 March 2020:
“Can you please print the attached and have it initialled and signed by Talal ? Talal already signed this doc in Kuwait last week but I was advised to amend it to reduce the stamp duty we should pay on registration with the Ministry of Finance.”
[126]Mr Attieh was further clear during his cross-examination that “I’m not seeking legal advice” on the 2020 Transaction, but that “I’m just informing the head of the audit and compliance committee that this is what I’m going to do” (Day 6 page 121 lines 12 to 16). Shortly after this concession, Mr Attieh attempted to argue that “obviously I had conversations with Maître Najjar much before basically that final version was done” (Day 6 page 122 lines 10 to 11), but there is no evidence to support this and it is inconsistent with what Mr Attieh himself said at Attieh 1 para 149 - i.e. that he sent the PPC Agreement to Mr Najjar first.[127]In any event, and fundamentally, the PPC Agreement was concealed from Cedar Mundi’s board of directors, investment committee, shareholders, auditor, Midclear, and the BdL until after the 13 April 2021 board meeting. As Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination, the only people that knew about the PPC Agreement at the time were Mr Attieh himself, Mr Najjar, and Mr Al Bahar (Day 6 page 74 lines 21 to 25).[128]When I asked Mr Attieh why he did not tell anyone else about the 2020 Transaction, he gave what I consider to be a long, and unconvincing, answer (Day 6 page 98 line 16 to page 101 line 3), including:
“So, why basically we kept it confidential with Nadi is that basically we did not want to put in front of people who already are denying that they caused a problem a solution to that problem, because if they accepted that solution, which was impossible for them, it would mean they would accept basically they caused the problem, because the entire PPC was only caused by their default and their bad faith and their collusion or contraption with the BdL.”
[129]In Attieh 1 at para 150, Mr Attieh stated that “I also had a telephone conversation with Ms Safa Tfaili about the transfer of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio to IFAC, and she advised me that if I went ahead, I would need to inform the Board “at some point”. In hindsight, I should have informed the Board”. In cross-examination Mr Attieh unambiguously accepted that he did in fact know that the PPC Agreement required board authorisation at the time (as was obviously the case):
“Q… I have to suggest to you, Mr Attieh, there’s no question of hindsight at all. You knew very well, at the time you entered the PPC, and at the time you transferred the portfolio shares, that this required a board resolution. A. Yes, that basically I knew. … MR JUSTICE BRYAN: I think what’s being put to you is that you have just acknowledged that you knew at the time when you transferred the portfolio that it required a board resolution? A. Oh, yes, I knew. I mean, Mrs Safa Tfaili told me and obviously my experience said I knew that it was an unauthorised transaction, my Lord…”
[130]Despite knowing that the PPC Agreement required board authorisation, Mr Attieh nevertheless chose not to take the matter to the Cedar Mundi BoD, stating, “I think I made it clear why we did not at the time want to involve SGBL at that stage” (Day 6 page 110 lines 19-20).[131]When it was (rightly) put to Mr Attieh that the other board members were entitled to give their view of the transaction, he simply answered: “[n]ot against the interest of the company and the interest of the company was to preserve the portfolio” (Day 8 page 123 lines 7 to 12). Whilst Mr Attieh asserted that the board “didn’t oppose it” (Day 8 page 123 lines 20 to 24), the fact is that the board was never aware of the decision, due to Mr Attieh’s failure to inform them about it, and so were not in a position to oppose it.[132]In any event, Mr Attieh (rightly) accepted that the 2020 Transaction was unauthorised at various times, including in the quote above, but most clearly in response to a question I asked (Day 6 page 115 lines 6 to 8):
“MR JUSTICE BRYAN: Anyway, your evidence is that you regarded it as unauthorised, as you have said twice? A. Unauthorised. I was informed so by legal counsel, yes.”
[133]Initially, the Defendants had presented a case that the 2020 Transaction had been authorised. This case has evolved over time, and Mr Attieh subsequently argued that he intended to ensure the 2020 Transaction received authorisation under Article 158 of the LCC “at some point in time” (Day 6 page 112 line 15) but that this never happened.[134]The Defendants did not maintain at trial that the 2020 Transaction was authorised, and it clearly was not authorised, and I so find.[135]Mr Attieh also contended that the 2020 Transaction did not dilute Cedar Mundi’s interest in the investment portfolio, stating in cross-examination that “there is no dilution of anybody’s value of – interest value by basically just converting a debt capital – a debt interest into equity interest (Day 6 page 116 line 25 to page 117 line 1). Mr Attieh also argued that the 2020 Transaction was not after all valid and binding. In Attieh 1 at paras 150 and 170 Mr Attieh stated that “the PPC Agreement never completed and I believed it had become irrelevant”, and that “I believed that the PPC Agreement was not valid or binding because it had not completed”. Mr Attieh maintained this position in cross-examination.[136]Mr Attieh’s insistence that the PPC Agreement had not been completed was non-sensical, and when it was put to him, he was unable to explain how it was that IFAC came to hold most of the investment interests of Cedar Mundi, if not transferred by the PPC Agreement. The portfolio companies were, as a matter of fact, transferred, and they were transferred pursuant to the PPC Agreement which Mr Attieh viewed as valid and binding.

B4.2 Mr Attieh’s justifications for the 2020 Transaction

[137]Quite apart from the fact that the 2020 Transaction was simply not authorised, Mr Attieh claimed that when he entered into the PPC Agreement, “the only interest that I had at heart was the interest of Cedar Mundi” (Day 6 page 92 lines 5 to 7), and that the “PPC was designed to be a temporary agreement, extending the lifeline to CMH during basically the troubled time of the financial crisis” (Day 6 page 113 lines 1 to 3). According to Mr Attieh, Cedar Mundi had no access to hard currency, i.e. fresh US Dollars, and Lollars or LBP “were of no use” (Day 6 page 85 line 16).[138]It was suggested that this necessitated the use of a non-Lebanese entity (such as IFAC) to ensure that US Dollars did not become trapped in the Lebanese banking system. According to Mr Attieh he had “no alternative but to actually turn to the only shareholder [i.e. MABIL] who could actually have provided basically this hard currency and that was the whole purpose, to set up this PPC in the entire interest of Cedar Mundi” (Day 6 page 85 lines 17 to 21). I do not consider that Mr Attieh was acting in the interests of Cedar Mundi, and he entirely ignores the obvious conflict of interest created by the fact that he was, in fact, acting in the interests of Mr Al Bahar and the Al Bahar Group.[139]Mr Attieh observed that the Al Bahar Group was “not a charity” (Day 6 page 127 lines 16 to 17), and indeed Mr Al Bahar’s evidence, which was not challenged, was that he was not prepared to provide any further financing to Cedar Mundi, unless an arrangement could be made “where [his] additional investment over and above the other investors was protected” (i.e. the Alleged MABIL Overpayment) (see Al Bahar 2 at paragraphs 43 to 48, which effectively parrots Mr Attieh’s evidence).[140]Mr Attieh’s solution was to convert the “debt” owed by MABIL into equity, as he said in cross-examination (Day 6 page 90 lines 10 to 15):
“this debt, which funded basically this portfolio, is now funding this same portfolio but under the form of equity. So there was basically just a debt interest that was converted to an equity interest but the exposure of that capital is exactly the same as it was in CMH.”
[141]Mr Attieh’s intention was therefore that the “debt” owed by Cedar Mundi to MABIL would be “cancelled” (ignoring, for the moment that, properly construed, the Alleged MABIL Overpayment is not a debt but equity, as addressed in Section F2.1 in relation to Issue 10(2)), which Mr Attieh subsequently confirmed was the true “purpose and intent” of the PPC Agreement (Day 6 page 102 lines 11 to 18).[142]This is plainly inconsistent with the evidence that Mr Attieh gave on two occasions earlier in his cross-examination (Day 5 page 154 line 22 to page 155 line 6):
“… about the PPC transaction which occurred basically around I think February/March of 2020, the context was, my Lord, that, as the vice-chairman of the fund, I was faced with the situation where basically the fund was cut off from any source of funding because of the default of the banks and because of the unilateral restrictions put by the banks on all the fund’s bank accounts. I had to operate and I was responsible basically for a company and for a fund that had no means basically to continue operating as it was expected to.”
And (Day 6 page 85 lines 11 to 21): “… we had basically a fund which was cut off from any source of funding in hard currency … I had only no alternative but to actually turn to the only shareholder who could actually have provided basically this hard currency and that was the whole purpose, to set up this PPC in the entire interest of Cedar Mundi”.[143]I am not persuaded by Mr Attieh’s evidence as to why the PPC Agreement was entered into. For one thing, the structure created by the PPC Agreement was not in fact used to provide hard currency to the portfolio companies as Mr Attieh had suggested. With the exception of a modest loan made to Quiqup, none of the other portfolio companies were supported in this way. In particular, the structure was not used when there was a further round of funding for Proximie which closed in March 2021.[144]In any event, as Mr El Koussa’s evidence revealed, the 2020 Transaction was not actually necessary from the perspective of Quiqup (Day 7 page 51 line 6 to page 52 line 9). In fact, during cross-examination Mr El Koussa confirmed that the funding actually provided to Quiqup by IFAC was “bridge” finance ahead of Quiqup completing its “Series B4” equity fundraising in August 2020, with the bridge finance then being converted into equity as part of that fundraise (Day 7 page 38 lines 12 to 17, and page 48 line 19 to page 49 line 12). Mr El Koussa accepted that Quiqup had successfully raised funds from a range of investors, had a diversified investor base, and did not contend that Quiqup ever “had to rely solely on Cedar Mundi” (Day 7 page 38 line 18 to page 39 line 25).[145]Even if the purpose of the PPC Agreement had been as Mr Attieh had suggested the first time round (i.e. to promote the interests of Cedar Mundi), which I do not consider it was, the IFAC structure was not necessary to affect that purpose. There was nothing to stop MABIL from independently investing in or providing loans or other funding to Quiqup or to any of the portfolio companies had it chosen to do so. The SCFAs also explicitly permitted Cedar Mundi to obtain short term finance to invest in portfolio companies where there was a liquidity need (by clause 9). Although Mr Attieh argued that the PPC Agreement was the only option, that there was “no alternative”, he at no stage provided any evidence that clause 9 was unavailable to Cedar Mundi.[146]I am satisfied, as is also obvious from the form and content of the PPC Agreement, that its true purpose was to protect the interests of the Al Bahar Group, in that the 2020 Transaction provided in effect a repayment of the Alleged Mabil Overpayment, or security for the same.[147]When Mr Wilson put this to Mr Attieh during cross-examination, he initially denied it (Day 6 page 89, line 18 to page 92 line 5). However, given the circumstances in which Mr Attieh signed the PPC Agreement, including his false claim that the 2020 Transaction had been entered into in March 2020 only after he sought advice from Mr Najjar and Ms Tfaili, whereas in fact the agreement had been signed by him and Mr Al Bahar earlier in January 2020, it is difficult to ascribe any credibility to Mr Attieh’s denial. The terms of the PPC Agreement itself plainly give MABCO, as an assignee of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment, an indirect ownership interest in assets corresponding to the value of that alleged overpayment (and also giving a priority to it, over any other creditors). It is clear that Mr Attieh was not prioritising the interests of Cedar Mundi, but rather those of Mr Al Bahar and the Al Bahar Group, and I so find. B5. THE ORIGINS OF THE 2021 TRANSACTION[148]The 2021 Transaction originated in a proposal by Mr Attieh (unknown to the C-331 Shareholders at the time) for an “LP-led” secondary transaction, i.e. a transaction in which the C-331 Shareholders would sell their shares and interests under the SCFAs in Cedar Mundi and so new investors would buy into the existing Cedar Mundi structure. When a marketing process for that apparently failed, Mr Attieh switched to a proposal for a “GP-led” transaction, i.e. a transaction in which new investors would invest via a continuation fund (i.e. Cedar II) that would be set up on new terms that would acquire Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio.

B5.1 Engagement of BSEC

[149]At some time in July or August 2020, just a few months after the final PPC Agreement was signed, Mr Attieh approached BEMO Securitisation SAL (“BSEC”) with a view to sounding out the market for interest in acquiring the C-331 Shareholders’ shares in Cedar Mundi. Contrary to his second witness statement in which Mr Attieh suggested that he only instructed BSEC after having reached an “understanding” with SGBL in September 2020 (at paras 14 to 15), he accepted during cross-examination that he had in fact approached BSEC before any consultation with the C-331 Shareholders (Day 6 page 151 lines 9 to 17). In doing so, Mr Attieh shared confidential information about Cedar Mundi, including the PPC Agreement (which still had not been disclosed to the C-331 Shareholders), with BSEC in a data-room under a non-disclosure agreement.[150]Then, on 31 August 2020, BSEC sent an email to Mr Attieh including a detailed mandate proposal for a “Capital Raising Project”, including terms of engagement and a term sheet for an LP-led secondary transaction. The term sheet proposed the sale of the C-331 Shareholders’ shares in Cedar Mundi for a transaction amount of L$22,000,000, and US$11,000,000. Under this proposal, the Lollars would be paid to the C-331 Shareholders, and the fresh US Dollars would be fresh commitments to Cedar II. BSEC would be paid a one-time success fee of 3%.[151]After discussion and review with BSEC, Mr Attieh entered into the agreement on behalf of Cedar Mundi with BSEC on 1 September 2020. According to which BSEC was to act as “exclusive arranger, structurer, placement agent, book runner (the “Arranger”) of the purchase of the interests of a category of shareholders holding 76.4%...of the issued and outstanding share-capital of the Company (“the C331 Investors”) (the “Transaction”)”.[152]Whilst Mr Attieh sought to argue in cross-examination that “basically this was not a sale exercise; it was a price discovery exercise that would come up with an offer that [the C-331 Shareholders] were free to turn down” (Day 7 page 111 lines 20-25) I do not accept that this was the case given that it is evident from the terms of the term sheet that the agreement contemplated a sale, and was not merely a price discovery exercise.

B5.2 Meeting at the Al Mandoloun Café (September 2020)

[153]The parties agree that a meeting took place between Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar at the Al Mandoloun Café in Beirut on 23 September 2020 but there was no agreement as to what was discussed (or allegedly agreed).[154]The Defendants’ pleaded case is that Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar “agreed that: Cedar Mundi’s fund was no longer sustainable considering the economic conditions in Lebanon; and [t]he C-331 Shareholders should exit by selling their shares in Cedar Mundi” (Amended Defence at para 89).[155]In Attieh 1 at para 175 Mr Attieh stated:
“At this meeting we discussed the structuring of an offer to buy the C-331 Shareholders’ shares in Cedar Mundi. I told him that I was going to give BSEC the mandate to present an offer to buy their shares. I remember that Jimmy said to me that SGBL was interested in being given the mandate, but I said no…”
[156]In Attieh 2 at paras 12 to 13, Mr Attieh made a similar comment, and added: “During this lunch, I asked Jimmy if the C-331 Shareholders would be willing to sell their shares in Cedar Mundi for a price that would reimburse their investment in Cedar Mundi in non-fresh Dollars, plus or minus 10%. … Jimmy did not reject the proposal and I took that to mean that Jimmy was agreeable”.[157]Accordingly, Mr Attieh’s own written evidence is inconsistent with the Defendants’ pleaded case. Mr Attieh did not say that that there was any actual agreement between him and Mr El Azar, nor did he mention that he had already engaged BSEC.[158]Mr Attieh retreated further from the pleaded case that there was an actual agreement during cross-examination, in which he said (Day 6 page 144 lines 3 to 10):
“… the purpose of basically our meeting, my Lord, was basically to see if he was agreeable or basically sympathetic to this proposal for this project and … I didn’t mean agreeable on behalf of SGBL or he had the authority to agree for SGBL. I didn’t mean that. I said agreeable as in, you know, he was willing to listen and he was sympathetic.”
[159]When questioned further about the proposal that the C-331 Shareholders would be willing to sell their shares in Cedar Mundi, Mr Attieh conceded that there was no proposal as such: “there is no proposal that basically we were discussing … there’s no proposal here” (Day 6 page 144 lines 21 to 25, and page 145 lines 5 to 12). This concession was inconsistent with Mr Attieh’s earlier written evidence, where (as above) he referred to “the proposal” (in Attieh 2 at para 13). When this inconsistency was put to Mr Attieh, he said that he meant the “proposal meaning the idea of hiring BSEC and embarking basically on formulating an offer” (Day 6 page 146 lines 14 to 18).[160]There is no evidence at all that Mr El Azar or SGBL knew that BSEC had already been engaged by Mr Attieh. On Mr Attieh’s own evidence, he had not informed Mr El Azar about BSEC until this meeting. Nor is there any evidence that SGBL or any of the C-331 Shareholders authorised BSEC to market an LP-led transaction at this time.[161]Mr El Azar himself candidly accepted that he did not recall the specific details of what was discussed during this meeting (see Day 4 page 124 lines 3 to 4 and El Azar 1 at para 72); but that if Mr Attieh had made any proposal to him verbally, he would as a matter of custom “have invited him to put this in writing so that SGBL could consider and formally respond” (Day 4 page 124 at lines 17 to 21). There is no evidence that such a proposal was ever made.[162]In the above circumstances, I reject the Defendants’ pleaded case that at the meeting it was agreed between Mr Attieh and El Azar either that Cedar Mundi’s fund was no longer sustainable considering the economic conditions in Lebanon or that the C-331 Shareholders should exit by selling their shares in Cedar Mundi.[163]Mr Attieh further alleged that a meeting took place between him and Mr Saghbini in September 2020. This was first mentioned in Attieh 2 (it was not mentioned in Attieh 1 or in his pleaded case). Mr Attieh claimed that during this alleged meeting, Mr Saghbini “was sympathetic to my proposal which provided me with additional comfort that SGBL was agreeable to the idea of the C-331 shareholders being reimbursed for their investment at par in non-fresh Dollars” (Attieh 2 at para 13).[164]Mr Attieh put matters rather differently when cross-examined, explaining that while Mr Saghbini was not formally agreeing to his proposal, “[i]t was just a principle to see basically if we could embark on expanding the time, effort and money with BSEC to actually formulate that proposal” (Day 6 page 146 lines 2 to 4). As noted above, it is clear from the documentary record that Mr Attieh had already engaged BSEC without consulting or informing either SGBL or the C-331 Shareholders, and Mr Attieh himself gave evidence that “[t]here was no proposal” (Day 6 page 146 at line 8).[165]Mr Saghbini accepted in cross-examination that he had met with Mr Attieh and Mr Najjar at some time in the Autumn of 2020, but he could not recall the details of that meeting. While he accepted that Mr Attieh might have suggested a “proposal”, he denied having had any sympathy with such a proposal (contrary to Mr Attieh’s evidence in this regard (Day 3 page 39 at lines 5 to 7), which is evidence I reject).[166]Around the same time, on 1 September 2020, Mr Skaf from the BdL sent an email to Mr Attieh and Mr Chélala to advise that from this time onwards, the BdL would have “an oversight and a non-objection stance” on any divestments from the portfolio companies, “specifically in terms of compliance with 311 Rules and Regulations” before any final decisions on divestments could be taken by shareholders.

B5.3 Mr Attieh and BSEC’s work on an LP-led secondary transaction (Autumn 2020)

[167]Over a period of about four months, Mr Attieh and BSEC took steps to present and market an LP-led secondary transaction. This involved the production of three documents, which were updated from time-to-time.[168]The first document was a draft information memorandum (“Information Memorandum”). The first draft was prepared by Mr Attieh on or around 29 September 2020, but further iterations were produced on 11 November 2020, 13 November 2020 and 25 November 2020 to incorporate various comments and revisions from BSEC. According to the Information Memorandum, an LP-led secondary transaction was necessary because it was “highly unlikely that(i) the financial position of C331 Investors improves or(ii) capital controls will be loosened or lifted in the foreseeable future” and because of “MABIL’s unwillingness to continue funding singlehandedly a Fund in which it has a minority stake”.[169]Mr Attieh pitched the transaction in the following terms:
“The opportunity arising from the present context is essentially to apply severely devalued dollar deposits in Lebanese Banks to buy shares in a portfolio of mature international tech startups which are international, fast growing and uncorrelated with Lebanon’s country and financial risks.”
[170]Subsequent iterations of the Information Memorandum included the following:
“C331 Investors are not soliciting an offer to purchase their interests in the Fund nor have they committed to accept such an offer; therefore, interested buyers should be aware that their indications of interest for the Transaction may not be acceptable to C331 Investors or may differ from the final terms to be negotiated by BSEC with C331 Investors. However, at the date of writing of this IM, the Fund’s management is unaware of any information that would lead it to believe C331 Investors would reject a transparent, fair and market-based offer; furthermore, an informal approach to certain C331 Investors has confirmed their readiness to consider such a transaction favourably.”
[171]The second document was a lengthy presentation entitled “An Opportunity to Purchase Distressed Interests in a high-performance VC portfolio”, which the Claimant refer to as the “Investment Teaser”. The first draft was prepared by Mr Attieh on or around 6 October 2020 and was updated from time-to-time including in late October. The Investment Teaser set out indicative heads of terms for the transaction together with a diverse range of information in relation to Cedar Mundi’s investments. In particular, it included a “unit price” of L$1,341 per share and confidential information relating to the performance of both Cedar Mundi and its investment portfolio. It further pitched the investment opportunity as involving “[l]ittle or no haircut on L$ and significant upside on US$ … For every 1 L$ and $ 0.68, only the most extreme case shows a significant L$ haircut”.[172]When questioned about the Investment Teaser during cross-examination, Mr Attieh conceded that he had shared detailed information about the portfolio with prospective investors via the Investment Teaser itself and the corresponding covering emails. Some of this information, Mr Attieh accepted, had not been shared with the C-331 Shareholders themselves (see Day 6 page 159 line 6 to page 164 line 22).[173]In particular, in one email sent to a potential investor, BSEC wrote as follows:
“The opportunity consists of acquiring up to circa 54% of the shares of the portfolio invested by Cedar Mundi (i.e. Acquisition of c. 76% of the shares of Cedar Mundi Holding SAL, which owns c. 70% of IFA Capital Ltd. BVI, which is equivalent to circa 54% of the shares of the portfolio companies)”
(emphasis in original) And “Proximie, one of the portfolio’s start companies, is expected to have a Series-B round in Q1-2021, which could result in a portfolio markup of 2.5x ranking the Fund in the first quartile of the best performing funds worldwide” (emphasis in original)[174]Mr Attieh’s evidence was that he “shared everything” with BSEC, including information which was confidential, which information was in turn shared with prospective investors, but this information was not shared with the C-331 Shareholders themselves.[175]One version of the Investment Teaser was put to Mr Attieh in the course of cross-examination, which explained the unit price of L$1,341 per share as having been calculated by taking an adjusted net asset value for the investment portfolio of US$26,812,409, obtaining a “discount of circa 58% if the funds are disbursed from outside of Lebanon”, and then dividing that sum by Cedar Mundi’s issued share capital.[176]As the Claimant rightly points out, there is no attempt at price discovery in this page of the Investment Teaser. Rather, the focus was the “par” value of the investments. Mr Attieh attempted to argue that Lollars were not the sole focus for the discount (see Day 7 page 55 at lines 17 to 22), but it is clear that the 58% discount is simply derived from applying a Lollar/Dollar multiplier, as can be seen from the arithmetic. This was noted in the Claimant’s written Closing Submissions:
“(a) a multiplier of 2.4 means the conversion rate from US Dollars to Lollars is 2.4; (b) to convert the other way around, from Lollars to US Dollars, requires the inversion of the multiplier, i.e. 1/2.4, = 0.42, or 42% as a percentage; (c) hence the percentage discount is 100% - 42% = 58%.”
[177]That this is correct is also apparent from the third document, a further investment teaser produced on or around 14 October 2020 entitled “An opportunity to turn Lebanese $ deposits into a profitable investment” (the “Lollars Teaser”). This document focussed on the Lollars aspect of the investment opportunity and explained that the discount to fair value was a result of paying in Lollars, because the asset side of the balance sheet is in US Dollars and the liability side in Lollars. The pricing in the Lollars Teaser again underlines the absence of any proper price discovery exercise. Moreover, the discount to fair value envisaged by the Lollars Teaser is derived entirely from Mr Attieh’s information as to applicable Lollars multipliers at the time.[178]The Lollars Teaser also said, “marking to market L$ means a windfall profit of 15-20M US$”. It pitched a significant profit to any investors that might invest in the portfolio. Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that there was an opportunity for such a “windfall profit”, and that “the whole game is knowing what is real dollar and what is lollar” (Day 7 page 57 lines 20 to 22).[179]While these documents were developing and being shared by BSEC with prospective investors, Mr Attieh sent updates to Mr Al Bahar. For example, on 15 October 2020, Mr Attieh sent to Mr Al Bahar “two high level presentations of the buy-out transaction and of our investment portfolio in Cedar Mundi”.[180]Later, on 26 October 2020 Mr Attieh had a telephone call with Mr Al Bahar to discuss the Al Bahar Group itself investing in an LP-led secondary transaction. Following that call, Mr Attieh sent a further email to Mr Al Bahar with the Investment Teaser attached, in which he stated:
“This is an exceptional opportunity to buy at a deep discount (65% currently) shares into a high-growth portfolio with very good visibility (due to our position as GP); financial returns are extremely attractive with low risk due to the mature section of our portfolio of which you are fully aware. For our VC business, it makes absolute sense from a business development perspective to select the very-best family offices and institutions to be our co-investors in the fund. … to illustrate the opportunity in a compelling manner, you have here below a back-of-the-envelope cash-on-cash calculation taking into account one exit only (a Proximie exit) in 2021 (which is highly likely); … This means that the family will end up owning 44% of the fund through the buyout, that is a NAV value of $10.6M at current fair value, for substantially no cash outlay!”
(emphasis in original)[181]In Attieh 1 at para 172, and in reference to this email to Mr Al Bahar, Mr Attieh said “I do not remember this email” but that he thought he “prepared this email in the context of trying to convince Talal that purchasing the C-331 Shareholders’ shares was a worthwhile opportunity for the Al Bahar Group and wider network”.[182]In cross-examination, Mr Attieh accepted that if this transaction had gone through, it would have resulted in the Al Bahar Group obtaining the majority shareholding and control of Cedar Mundi (Day 7 page 65 lines 4 to 10). Mr Attieh also accepted that the discount to fair value was calculated by reference only to the application of a Lollar multiplier, at this stage a multiplier of 2.8 (creating a discount of 65%) (Day 7 page 66 line 11 to page 67 line 13). At the same time, Mr Attieh was anticipating a significant profit to the portfolio from the Proximie sale.[183]It was put to Mr Attieh by Mr Wilson that this optimistic account as to the future performance of Cedar Mundi was very different from the account given to the C-331 Shareholders as to Cedar Mundi’s difficulties following the Third Capital Call, Mr Attieh responded shortly: “So obviously I’m not going to tell Mr Al Bahar it’s a bad deal, please go ahead and come in.” (Day 7 page 70 lines 2 to 3). However, what is said has to be seen in light of the fact that Mr Attieh was, throughout, acting in the best interests of Mr Al Bahar and the Al Bahar Group.[184]On the following day, 27 October 2020 and ahead of a further call with Mr Al Bahar on 28 October 2020, Mr Attieh sent to Mr Al Bahar the text for a draft covering email to be sent to potential investors. The draft provided as follows:
“We are in the process of building the book for an offer to buy out the interests of the Lebanese Banks in our Venture Capital fund. Our fund has invested over $ 25M in high-growth technology companies which have performed quite well, are mature and are materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk. Indeed, the fund’s portfolio is made up of businesses which operations, revenues and domiciliation are essentially outside of Lebanon (mainly UK, US and the Gulf). As you know, the current dislocation of the banking sector in Lebanon and the restrictions on withdrawals/transfers have led depositors at Lebanese banks to seek investments denominated in local dollars which could offer payouts outside of the Lebanese Banking system. This is precisely what our transaction is designed to achieve and we have so far seen a lot of appetite from such investors. Our position as GP of the fund also means that we have access to privileged information and insights in relation to the portfolio; we are therefore confident that investors would likely achieve exceptional returns in a short period of time. These exceptional returns are driven by (i) the purchase of the banks interest in “Lebanese dollars” which means a deep discount (cc 65%) to fair value and (ii) by the maturity of the portfolio (4+ years) where several investments are close to $100M+ valuations. Our estimate of net investors payouts range between 2x to 6x the cost of investment, with the first exit likely to occur within 2 years. Because the risk/return profile is so attractive, we would like to make this unique opportunity accessible to a select number of key investors and allied families which our group has a special relationship with. As these investors may not necessarily have dollars deposited at Lebanese banks, we can arrange for dollars transferred to Lebanon for the purpose of this transaction to be credited with a multiplier of cc 2.8 X, which means they can also buy out the bank’s interests in our fund at a deep discount to fair value.”
[185]Mr Attieh sought to explain the context of this email during cross-examination, in these terms (Day 7 page 73 lines 14 to 20):
“Following basically my email of the day before, Mr Al Bahar came back, my Lord, and said: I’m not interested. I don’t want to actually increase my exposure. I’m not interested in your proposal, but I’ll try to help you basically with people I know in Kuwait, but please draft me something that I can send to them. So that’s basically the purpose of the email.”
[186]Mr Attieh attempted to distance himself from his optimistic vision of the investment portfolio as being simply “estimates” (Day 7 page 76 line 3), but at the same time maintained that the email was not misleading (Day 7 page 75 line 24 to page 76 line 3).[187]The text of Mr Attieh’s proposed email to investors on 27 October 2020, along with the Investment Teaser and the Lollars Teaser reveal that the discount to fair value was calculated simply by application of a Lollar multiplier. There was, however, truth in what Mr Attieh said in relation to the fund being invested in high-growth technology companies which were materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk, and in terms of the portfolio being made up of businesses which operations, revenues and domiciliation are essentially outside of Lebanon (mainly UK, US and the Gulf), all of which are relevant to valuation.[188]In the event, it appears that Mr Attieh and BSEC failed to find bidders interested in making an offer to purchase the Cedar Mundi shares, despite (it is said) approaching 166 potential investors. Mr Attieh stated at Attieh 1 para 179 that, “when it came time for investors to submit a formal bid, we received none at all”.

B5.4 Mr Attieh proposes a GP-led secondary transaction (December 2020)

[189]In December 2020, Mr Attieh proposed a GP-led secondary transaction (i.e. an asset sale to a continuation fund, which is distinct from the previously marketed LP-led transaction, which involves a share sale).[190]Mr Attieh was at this stage envisaging that the 2021 Transaction would take the form of an asset sale rather than a share sale: “At this point in time, we were actually, yes, presenting an option, which is basically the buy-out of the portfolio as opposed basically to the buy-out of the defaulted shareholders” (Day 7 page 98 lines 15 to 18).[191]This originated with a presentation which he prepared for the Cedar Mundi BoD entitled “The Lebanese Situation: Consequences and Remedies” (the “December Presentation”).[192]This was, in essence, a presentation setting out indicative terms for a portfolio sale. The presentation stated that “[t]he banks repeatedly breached their commitments under the PPM” and “the fund is no longer a workable framework to realize portfolio value”, and proposed the following “[c]ontrolled sale”:
“Hive-off portfolio into separate SPV Anchor GP maintains its fresh commitments to portfolio ex-Lebanese banks to provide traction Sell the portfolio as an ongoing fund to continuing fresh $ investors Restructure Startups to mitigate Lebanese risks ex-C331 Selling LP’s can expect Par +/-15% in L$”
Anchor GP maintains its fresh commitments to portfolio ex-Lebanese banks to provide traction Sell the portfolio as an ongoing fund to continuing fresh $ investors Restructure Startups to mitigate Lebanese risks ex-C331 Selling LP’s can expect Par +/-15% in L$”

Restructure Startups to mitigate Lebanese risks ex-C331

[193]Under the heading “Indicative terms for the portfolio sale”, and sub-heading “Banks will be freed from their commitment and will get back their investment”, the presentation stated:
“Banks would get back their total investment $ 18 M(+/-10%) distributed to them post sale by the Fund. If buyers are settling [the consideration paid to the C-331 Shareholders] in fresh US$, the official multiplier between the two official rates will apply. Buyers will commit to take over the banks outstanding obligations with aggregate future funding of $ 11M in fresh dollars Banks will avoid financial and reputational losses from a fire sale of the portfolio or resulting from bankruptcy auction under the PPM.”
[194]Mr Attieh claimed in the December Presentation that the Lebanese financial crisis had had a “[h]eavy impact … in terms of funding rounds and valuations” but this statement is, of course, inconsistent with Mr Attieh’s earlier statements, which he communicated to Mr Al Bahar (on whose behalf he acted over many years), that the investment portfolio is “materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk”. When this inconsistency was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination, he implausibly denied it (see Day 7 page 92 line 15 to page 93 line 25).[195]The December Presentation also confirmed that Cedar Mundi had already moved from its investment phase, which ended in May 2020, to the divestment phase, as Mr Attieh accepted during cross-examination (Day 7 page 96 line 24 to page 97 line 1). Mr Attieh shortly after confirmed that Cedar Mundi was only ever a minority investor in each of the portfolio companies, and that none of the start-ups wholly relied on Cedar Mundi for their investment (Day 7 page 97 line 21 to page 98 line 8). It follows that those portfolio companies did potentially have access to cash from other investors.[196]Mr Attieh also confirmed that where the December Presentation referred to a “separate SPV”, that he was referring to “a new fund. An ongoing fund is a new fund. It’s what would become eventually Cedar II” (Day 7 page 102 lines 20 to 23). It was further envisaged that the new fund would not be subject to Circular 331, which Mr Attieh ironically described as a “constraint” which “prevents start-ups to grow” (Day 7 page 102 line 24 to page 103 line 7).[197]It was also put to Mr Attieh in the course of cross-examination that the proposal in the December Presentation that “[s]elling LPs can expect Par +/-15% in L$” meant that the C-331 Shareholders via Cedar Mundi would not necessarily receive market value from the 2021 Transaction. In other words, the C-331 Shareholders could get their investment back, less 15%, and it would only be a coincidence if the market price was at par to investment.[198]Mr Attieh responded that “I’m telling them you can expect par plus or minus because I have done my homework in the price discovery mechanism and there is no reason to believe, given the worsening position of the fund and the worsening position of Lebanon, that basically suddenly prices are going to go up again.” (Day 7 page 108 lines 13 to 19). However, Mr Attieh had not done his “homework” in circumstances where it is clear that no true price discovery exercise ever took place. Rather, BSEC had simply tested whether there was any market appetite for an LP-led secondary transaction at the price proposed by Mr Attieh (that did not result in a bid).[199]On 8 December 2020, Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar met and discussed whether Cedar Mundi might divest its investment portfolio. It remains unclear precisely what was discussed at this meeting. At Attieh 1 para 184, Mr Attieh stated that:
“we discussed the key concepts of how to structure the buy-out of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio. I explained to Jimmy that the fund could no longer continue to operate with its current Investors and that we urgently needed a solution to avoid all Investors losing their investments. I also explained that BSEC had failed to present a third-party firm offer for the purchase of the C-331 Shareholders’ shares in the fund. Accordingly, given the ongoing lack of funding from the C-331 Shareholders, my opinion was that it was necessary to organise a buy-out of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio. I remember that during this dinner, Jimmy agreed with my proposal to sell the portfolio to a new continuation fund.”
(emphasis added)[200]However, the Defendants’ position on what happened during this meeting changed during the course of the proceedings. Eventually, the Defendants’ pleaded position became that no legally binding “at par” agreement was alleged, but that instead “Mr Attieh asked SGBL … whether the C-331 Shareholders might agree to a sale of Cedar Mundi’s assets at a price that would allow Cedar Mundi to reimburse them as above” (RRFI Response 1.2). It was not contended that this was agreed, but only that “SGBL indicated that it believed it could persuade the C-331 Shareholders to accept such a transaction” (RRFI Response 1.2). Two days later, on 10 December 2020, Mr Attieh met with Mr Saghbini to discuss “the way forward for the fund”.[201]Mr Attieh initially contended that he provided a copy of the December Presentation to Mr El Azar and Mr Saghbini during these meetings in December (Attieh 1 para 185), but by the time of his second witness statement he was simply stating that the December Presentation was “consistent with my recollection that I discussed with Georges and Jimmy” (Attieh 2 para 35).[202]In evidence, Mr El Azar insisted that he was not present at this meeting with Mr Saghbini on 10 December 2020, which he repeatedly confirmed in cross-examination (see, for example, Day 4 page 131 lines 3 to 10, page 137 line 14 and page 140 lines 18 to 22). He accepted, however that he had met Mr Attieh at CMCH’s offices on 8 December 2020 during which “there may have been slides being projected on a screen, but the focus was mostly on the discussion and the conversation that was going on between Mr Attieh and myself” (Day 4 page 132 lines 9 to 12). That is consistent with what he had said in El Azar 1 at para 75, “[i]t is possible that Mr Attieh projected a presentation on a screen during the meeting of 8 December 2020, but I do not specifically recollect if it was this presentation. My vague recollection is that we had very different perspectives, and the conversation became heated/tense. I do not believe that I have ever been given a copy of this presentation at any time…”.[203]Mr El Azar’s evidence was that he did not recall whether the slides which may have been shown were from the December Presentation, he had “no specific recollection of this presentation”, and “no specific recollection of what was discussed during that meeting” (Day 4 page 133 lines 9 to 24). However, Mr El Azar accepted that Mr Attieh “would have expressed his concerns regarding the company during that meeting” (Day 4 page 135 line 25 to page 136 line 1). His evidence was that he and Mr Attieh “weren’t seeing eye to eye” (Day 4 page 138 lines 9 to 10).[204]Mr Saghbini was unable to recall a physical meeting taking place on 8 December 2020, but accepted that he met with Mr Attieh on 10 December 2020, although he could not recall what had been discussed, other than that there was “an agreement in principle that the parties would move forward to develop a proposal for the sale of Cedar Mundi or its assets” (Day 3 page 49 lines 6 to 11). He did not recall there being any “at par” discussion at this time (Day 3 page 46 lines 4 to 13).[205]What emerges from the evidence, notwithstanding the lack of clarity as to precisely what was discussed (and between whom), is that no agreement was reached between Mr Attieh, Mr El Azar, and Mr Saghbini, nor was there any suggestion that there was even any discussion (or agreement) to circumvent the need for(i) approval or non-objection of the BdL, and(ii) the consent of the C-331 Shareholders in a meeting of a general assembly.[206]Nevertheless, soon after these meetings it was understood by SGBL that Mr Attieh was at this stage proposing that Cedar Mundi “divest itself of its assets in a single bundled sale” (i.e. a GP-led secondary transaction), as Mr El Azar accepted during cross-examination (Day 4 page 141 line 21 to page 142 line 1).[207]On 11 December 2020, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mr Saghbini which attached a “draft letter which we expect to send as a board to the investors informing them of our exit plans for the Fund”. Mr Attieh forwarded this email to Mr El Azar on the same day, acknowledging that “[a]fter our heated discussions and as requested…… As we concluded, it is absolutely necessary to have a four-eyed sit down between George and the governor [of the BdL] to secure a formal no-objection before we can proceed” (emphasis added). The reference to “heated discussions” is entirely consistent with the above recollections of Mr El Azar.[208]The attachments to this email included(i) a draft letter to the C-331 Shareholders which proposed “selling the Portfolio of investments as a bundle” to potential investors who would commit to settle in “fresh” US Dollars “the unfunded obligations of the Lebanese banks towards the Fund amounting to US$ 11,200,505” in order to ensure that new investors would be at par with MABIL’s contributions; and(ii) the instruction email from the BdL dated 1 September 2020 confirming that all exits from Circular 331 regulated investments required the BdL’s oversight and non-objection.[209]It is thus readily apparent that Mr Attieh at this stage considered that all exits from Circular 331 regulated investments required the BdL’s oversight and non-objection. His assertion in cross-examination that he did not consider BdL’s instructions to be binding was unconvincing and is contrary to the contemporary correspondence: “in terms basically of where this email originated from, it is an email from an employee of the BdL. It’s not a regulation in its form and it’s not something basically that is a decision that is binding”. (Day 6 page 19 lines 3 to 6).[210]In contrast, Mr El Azar “viewed this email as a regulatory requirement, which is consistent with my view (as communicated to Mr Attieh) that the Central Bank needed to approve, or at least not object to a disposal of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio”.[211]Mr Attieh followed up on this email with Mr El Azar on 21 December 2020 with a proposed draft letter to the BdL seeking that non-objection stance. The letter requested that, in light of the ongoing difficulties Cedar Mundi faced as a result of the “persistent crisis in Lebanon”, the Governor “help accelerate the issuance of a non-objection letter” from the BdL in relation to the Buy Out “[a]s a matter of utmost urgency”. The very content of that proposed draft letter shows that Mr Attieh recognised the need for a non-objection letter.[212]Mr El Azar’s evidence was that Mr Attieh’s proposals and drafts were “problematic” for three main reasons, as he explained in El Azar 1 at para 76:
“First, it was not consistent with my perspective, namely that MABIL or a MABIL related party would bid for Cedar Mundi’s portfolio. Second, it contemplated that the board, rather than MABIL or its related party, would hire a placing agent to help with the sale. Third, it set out Mr Attieh’s view that the “Board [was] left with no choice but to consider a premature exit from the Fund’s investments prior to their maturity” which is not something that the board had determined or agreed. From my point of view, at this time (December 2020) an exit transaction was hypothetical, and nothing had been agreed to by SGBL.”
[213]Mr El Azar considered that the draft letter was “unacceptable both in terms of the substance of the proposal and also because Mr Attieh was seeking to present his views and opinions as if they had been agreed by the board” (El Azar 1 at para 77).[214]Accordingly, Mr El Azar prepared his own proposed structure for an exit by C-331 Shareholders, which did not envisage any “at par” transaction but rather a GP-led secondary transaction driven by an independent fairness opinion followed by obtaining a non-objection stance from the BdL, prior to any divestiture of the portfolio (the “SGBL Schematic”). This presentation set out SGBL’s working understanding of an indicative exit mechanism, including the provision of a fairness opinion (given by an independent auditor) on the value of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio, the divesture of that entire portfolio “via a buy-out by possibly an anchor LP &/or GP-related party” for cash consideration (to be funded by the raising of “irrevocable commitments” by international investors and the undrawn LP commitments) to be paid into “LPs [C-331 Shareholders] designated accounts (including with international correspondents)”, disclosure of the exit mechanism to the C-331 Shareholders and BdL oversight (vetting and the provision of a non-objection stance).[215]A copy was sent to Mr Saghbini on 23 December 2020 under a covering email which read “[k]indly find attached a self-explanatory schematic on a possible exit mechanism that could possibly eliminate foreseen conflicts of interest and relieve SGBL (as representative of the 331 banks) from responsibility vis-à-vis its fellow LPs”, and which was later forwarded to Mr Attieh on 24 January 2021. The evidence of Mr El Azar is that this was sent because SGBL was being chased for its response to Mr Attieh’s proposal (Attieh 1 para 81).[216]Mr El Azar confirmed in cross-examination (Day 4 page 148 lines 10 to 11) that the SGBL Schematic was intended to be “a more acceptable mechanism” for a related-party sale of the whole portfolio, than the proposal made by Mr Attieh in December 2020.[217]The Defendants submitted in closing submissions that Mr El Azar’s proposal, “in commercial terms, it is very similar to Mr Attieh’s proposal” (at para 125). However, Mr El Azar’s view was that the SGBL Schematic was “very different” from what Mr Attieh had in mind for the 2021 Transaction, and there are, in fact clear differences. In this regard Mr El Azar referred to four components which he considered distinguished the proposals (Day 4 page 152 lines 13 to 15) (there are two “step 8’s” in the presentation):
“1 Fairness Opinion on Portfolio Value [from an] Independent Auditor 2 Disclosure of Exit Mechanism to LPs for alignment on process and indicative price range [to the] Fund’s Limited Partners 4 Non-objection stance on Exit Mechanism [from the] BdL 8 Full Fund “Portfolio” divestiture. via a buy-out by possibly an anchor LP &/or GP-related Party 8 Payment of Cash Consideration in LP’s designated accounts (including with international correspondents)”
[218]Mr Attieh accepted that he was provided with the SGBL Schematic from Mr Najjar (Day 7 page 121 lines 7 to 15) so he must have understood that SGBL wanted an independent valuation of the portfolio as a starting point, and that BdL non-objection should be obtained early on. It was also (rightly) put to Mr Attieh during cross-examination that the SGBL Schematic did not envisage an “at par” exit, but Mr Attieh unconvincingly denied this saying “[b]ecause this is not the subject its addressing. It’s addressing the exit mechanism from the point of view of SGBL of how to manage basically the BdL and the Circular 331 shareholders” (Day 7 page 131 lines 9 to 14).[219]About one month later, on 26 January 2021, Mr Attieh sent to Mr Al Bahar some “[s]ummary points for discussion” in relation to the proposed transaction. In his summary, Mr Attieh noted that the “[p]urchase of the Banks share is subject to the approval of the Central Bank” and that “[t]he sale of the Fund’s portfolio is not subject to the Central Bank’s approval but necessitates 2/3 of the GA approving the transaction as they assimilate such sale to a liquidation [disputed]”. The summary also stated that “[t]he offer was coordinated with SGBL which indicated that it would support the acceptance of the offer by the qualified majority of the banks. However, nothing has been done since December due to(i) inertia and lack of clarity from SGBL management and(ii) to the context (lockdown and crisis) in Lebanon. We had a follow up call on Jan 21st with SGBL (Saghbini) and tentatively agreed that the GA should be held by end of February 2021, which means he will need to approach the banks for approval in the first half of February”.[220]On the following day Mr Attieh held a Zoom call with Mr Al Bahar. Mr Attieh’s notes in preparation for that call included three options for pushing forward with the 2021 Transaction:
“Option (a): We have a clear agreement at the board level with SGBL to approve the proposed transaction and SGBL effectively approaches key banks (Audi, Fransa, BLOM) and gets their endorsement for the transaction. If 2/3 is assured, we will call with for a GA to formally approve and execute the transaction to sell the portfolio of the Fund to the investors. Option (b): if we see SGBL is not cooperating, we could leverage our access to the governor of the BDL to pressure them into accelerating the GA process. We need to secure this access and make clear that the current situation is totally unfair and unacceptable for us as Kuwaiti investor; the purpose here is to get the BdL to contact the banks to instruct them to accept the offer. High level G2G backing is critical in Option (b). Option (c): if options (a) and (b) do not occur for any reason, we will have no choice but to try leveraging our majority at the board and the provisions of the LPA.”
[221]It is clear from this that Mr Attieh knew and understood that each of these three options required approval by Cedar Mundi’s general assembly or invocation of the Default Mechanism to force a transfer of the C-331 Shareholders’ shares (which would require prior BdL written approval, and which Mr Attieh recognised would be “very difficult … given the context in Lebanon”). Mr Attieh shared this with Mr Al Bahar, and then gave instructions for the preparation of draft board and general assembly resolutions for the 2021 Transaction.[222]On 28 January 2021, and further to a telephone conversation with Mr Najjar of the same day, Mr Attieh sent to Ms Tfaili and Mr Najjar the presentation entitled “The Lebanese Situation: Consequences and Remedies”, which he said had been provided to SGBL “in anticipation of the board and GA”. Mr Attieh asked Ms Tfaili to prepare the draft minutes of the BoD “with the items as mentioned in the attached presentation”, which included approving “the adjustment to the subordinated loans paid by the banks in LBP to reflect the official platform rate of LBP/$ 3,900.- (lets proceed as is for now though SGBL has suggested another procedure)” and the sale of the portfolio as per the terms presented by BSEC “and [subsequent liquidation of CMH] + recommendation to the GA for the approval of the transaction and [subsequent liquidation]”.[223]On 1 February 2021, BSEC sent an update to Mr Attieh about their placement efforts so far. At this stage, BSEC were attempting to find potential investors, albeit before either the heads of terms or fairness opinion had come into existence. They provided a list of potential investors, which included BSEC itself and Mr Charles Najjar, the cousin of Mr Nadi Najjar. B5.5 The period prior to the 16 March 2021 board meeting The Draft board presentation

B5.5 The period prior to the 16 March 2021 board meeting

[224]The draft board presentation was prepared by Mr Attieh and purported to justify the proposed 2021 Transaction and included two spreadsheets with calculations pertaining to that transaction. The presentation listed five reasons why it was said Cedar Mundi could not continue, including:(i) “Startups do not accept LBP for investments”;(ii) “Banks are in default of their outstanding funding commitments in “Fresh” US$ as per their PPM obligations”;(iii) “L$ is discounted s2.6x to 3x in any funding round; this means that for each investment we make in L$, the Fund incurs an immediate loss of 40% to 60%”;(iv) “Banks defaults and constant delays in settling capital calls reduced our effective investment period to less than 2 years as opposed to the statutory 4 years; this means that the Fund is much smaller than expected with a disproportionately high expense ratio”; and(v) “Co-investors in startups can pre-empt any sale by the Fund and pay in heavily discounted L$ or LBP the nominal price offered in fresh $; this means that the Fund cannot exit any of its investments on the secondary market.”[225]The presentation also recognised that Proximie was “raising Series C in Q1 21 due to increased cash burn – mark-up anticipated but further dilution due to unavailability of follow-on funds”. In other words, Proximie was at this stage expected to increase in value in a future fundraise, although Cedar Mundi would be diluted. Indeed, Proximie’s funding round had been disclosed in BdL reports for Q3 2020, which stated under “Key Objectives for Q4 2020” for Proximie that it “start raising new international round”. In cross-examination, Mr El Azar accepted that he was aware from those reports that Proximie was raising funds (Day 5 page 95 lines 15 to 19), and that he anticipated an independent valuation “that would have captured the developments of Proximie -- amongst other assets held by the portfolio.” (Day 5 page 99 lines 13 to 15).

The Draft Heads of Terms

[226]The Draft Heads of Terms (the “Draft HoT”) were presented as coming from KHCK as general partner of Cedar II and entitled “Offer to purchase the investment portfolio of Cedar Mundi (Holding) Sal”. They stated the offer price for the 2021 Transaction as being L$27,000,000 to be paid in part by way of set off the Alleged MABIL Overpayment with the remaining amount to be paid in Lollars.[227]In cross-examination, Mr Attieh acknowledged that the Draft Heads of Terms/Heads of Terms were prepared by “Nadi Najjar and myself, in co-ordination with Mr Al Bahar” (Day 7 page 133 lines 21 to 22), although there is no documentary evidence evidencing that Mr Najjar did, in fact, have any input. Once Mr Attieh was satisfied with the language that he had drafted, Mr Al Bahar signed the document on behalf of KHCK.[228]It is clear, therefore, that Mr Attieh drafted the Draft HoT/HoT on behalf of the Al Bahar Group, because the Al Bahar Group (via KHCK) was making that offer, which was then sent to Cedar Mundi and received by Mr Attieh acting in his capacity as a director of Cedar Mundi, as he acknowledged in cross-examination (Day 7 page 138 line 20 to page 139 line 1). Despite this, Mr Attieh sought to argue, unrealistically, that he was not acting on both sides of the transaction (Day 7 page 138 line 20 to page 139 line 1), when he clearly was.[229]I am satisfied that the HoT were drafted deliberately to avoid any reference to IFAC or the fact that the majority of Cedar Mundi’s investments were now held indirectly via IFAC, but rather gave the impression that Cedar Mundi wholly and directly owned the interests referred to in the HoT. Mr Attieh sought to argue again that “IFAC did not complete” (see Day 7 page 134 line 24 to page 135 line 25), but this was not the true position. I infer that the HoT were drafted in the way they were to avoid disclosing the 2020 Transaction to the C-331 Shareholders. Mr Attieh again (implausibly) denied this (either as something “concealed” or even when put in neutral terms - see, in particular, Day 7 page 145 lines 13 to 17).[230]Mr Attieh accepted that he came up with the proposed consideration or offer price of L$27,000,000 for the 2021 Transaction, which he calculated by reference to his valuation spreadsheet (Day 7 page 141 lines 6 to 12). He accepted that the number was not produced by BSEC, but that it was “based on the BSEC basically price discovery exercise” (Day 7 page 141 lines 13 to 18) which, of course, was not actually a price discovery exercise at all. The valuation spreadsheet essentially shows how, in substance, Mr Attieh worked backwards from his decision that the C-331 Shareholders should exit “at par” to justify the consideration also on a market value basis and imposing severe discounts to the fair value of the investment portfolio.[231]Mr Attieh’s evidence on the function of the valuation spreadsheet was not consistent. In Attieh 1 at para 203, he claimed that “I prepared this document to satisfy myself, and Cedar Mundi’s board, that the offered price of US$ 27 million (non-fresh) was indeed fair”. This cannot have been the correct position since Mr Attieh himself had come up with that figure. In Attieh 2 at para 36 Mr Attieh said that “I worked to structure an offer from KHCK for US$ 27 million (payable in local dollars). This figure was based on the financial models and valuation work carried out by me and BSEC during the BSEC mandate…”. It was in this context that the valuation spreadsheet was produced.

The BSEC fairness opinion

[232]As to BSEC’s fairness opinion, Mr Attieh confirmed during cross-examination that he had not asked BSEC to “start from scratch and see if you also come up with 27 million”, but rather to check the work that Mr Attieh had already done (Day 7 page 151 lines 19 to 22).[233]The first draft of the fairness opinion was produced and sent (amongst other documents) to Mr Attieh on 5 February 2021 (the “Draft Fairness Opinion”) under a cover email which confirmed that the documents had not been reviewed by BSEC’s lawyer, but that BSEC “would like to discuss them with you before sending them to the lawyer”. The attached letter of intent(i) set out the valuation of each of the included portfolio companies as at 30 June 2020, listing a combined cost of US$21,850,000; and(ii) suggested that:
“given that the Portfolio is held at the level of the Target, in which Cedar Mundi owns only 70.23% of the Target’s issued and outstanding shares, the suggested Purchase Price to buy Cedar Mundi shares out of the total fair value of USD 36.92 million should equal to USD 25.92 million to be paid in local US Dollars. Out of the Purchase Price of USD 25.92 million, USD [x] million will be paid in local US Dollars to the Banks.”
[234]The Draft Fairness Opinion itself also specified an offer of “US$25.92m … for the total acquisition of the said Shares, which will result in a payment of USD [x] million to be paid in local US Dollars”. Soon after, on or around 10 February 2021, Mr Attieh prepared a “Transaction Brief” for a proposed purchase by Cedar II of 100% of the share capital of IFAC, “at an intended price of $28’500’000 or such other acceptable price as negotiated (“Sale Price”) payable in Lebanon in local dollars”.[235]On 18 February 2021, BSEC sent a further version of the Draft Fairness Opinion to Mr Attieh, which had been reviewed and marked up by BSEC’s legal counsel. Mr Attieh evidently was unimpressed with the revisions, and responded shortly:
“The propose amendments render the fairness opinion absolutely meaningless. This is a non-starter”
. In response, BSEC asked how Mr Attieh would like the opinion to be amended. This is but one example of a pattern of behaviour in which Mr Attieh over-involves himself in what are said to be “independent” opinions.[236]BSEC essentially accommodated all of Mr Attieh’s comments on the content of the Fairness Opinion. For example, in BSEC’s version of the fairness opinion, it begins by stating:
“a pool of investors (the “Acquirers”) proposes to buy shares in IFA Capital Ltd. (BVI) (“IFAC” or the “Target”) from Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL…”
Whereas in the final version, or Mr Attieh’s version, the opinion begins by stating:
“Cedar II Fund LP, Cayman Islands (“C2” or the “Buyer”) is offering to purchase directly or indirectly (the “Transaction”) investment interests from CMH…”
[237]It is self-evident that by Mr Attieh’s comments, all references from the Fairness Opinion that would have disclosed the existence of the 2020 Transaction were removed. Indeed, there is not a single reference to IFAC in the final version, nor any explanation of how the portfolio interests were held. There can be no doubt that this was Mr Attieh’s intention, and that his intention was to conceal the 2020 Transaction from the C-331 Shareholders.[238]In cross-examination, Mr Attieh denied that the Fairness Opinion lacked integrity and independence, but it plainly did. The Claimant identifies four points that they submit support this conclusion, and I am satisfied that they do so.[239]First, the Draft Fairness Opinion (which was first produced on 5 February 2021) was produced before the Draft HoT and hence does not refer at all to the HoT. As such, BSEC could not have been considering the fairness of the 2021 Transaction (this was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination – see Day 7 page 155 line 11 to page 156 line 18).[240]Second, the Fairness Opinion ended up being in large part a product of Mr Attieh’s own drafting which obviously compromised the independence of the exercise. Mr Attieh disagreed that his involvement did effect such a compromise (Day 7 page 160 lines 1 to 6), but it is impossible to see how it could not have done so given the changes that he proposed.[241]Third, the Fairness Opinion was not given by a recognised international firm for valuation work, but a Lebanese investment bank that was already acting as an adviser for the 2021 Transaction (again this was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination (Day 7 page 160 lines 20 to 23)).[242]Fourth, BSEC or its affiliate (although it was the same individuals in both cases, principally Mr Michael Ziadeh) was being remunerated by way of a success fee for the 2021 Transaction, and either it or some other client had subscribed to invest in Cedar II (again this was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination – Day 7 page 161 line 2 to page 165 line 20).[243]Mr Attieh gave no convincing answer to any of these points when they were put to him, and he was singularly unwilling to acknowledge that such matters impacted upon BSEC’s independence (which they clearly did).[244]Following his receipt of these documents in draft form, Mr El Azar’s recollection of the call which took place on 18 February 2021, was that “Mr Attieh and I did not see eye to eye on the content of the documents that Mr Attieh had circulated and the terms which were being proposed”, and the proposal which was put forward by Mr Attieh was “very different to the SGBL Schematic which had been shared in January” (see El Azar 1 at para 84).[245]Moreover, Mr El Azar’s evidence (which I accept) was that he was:
“… sceptical about that as the limited information provided by Mr Attieh (in the presentation) about the real value of the portfolio investments was unaudited and seemed to be dated as at end of year 2020 and the draft fairness opinion was unsatisfactory and unsupported by any analytical support, and we did not perceive BSEC to be independent because (at least as far as SGBL was understood at the time) it had been retained by MABIL or a MABIL related party and the fact that Mr Attieh was connected to IFA Group/MABIL which I thought would likely have influenced his ability to act in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole and seek the best bid price possible for the Portfolio Assets.”
And he was further concerned about Mr Attieh’s suggestion that the consideration would be paid in Lollars rather than Dollars (El Azar 1 at para 85).[246]In Attieh 1 at para 212, Mr Attieh said that he did “not recall if this call ultimately took place, and if it did, who attended or what was discussed”, but the documents show that Mr Attieh must have known that SGBL was not supportive of the proposed 2021 Transaction, and indeed Mr Attieh later accepted in cross-examination that he knew that SGBL considered the Fairness Opinion provided by Mr Attieh in respect of the 2021 Transaction to be “hollow”, albeit he said that was not his view (Day 7 page 190 at lines 1 to 12).[247]On or around 21 February 2021, Mr Attieh and Mr Al Bahar spoke, following which Mr Attieh emailed Mr Al Bahar a set of “talking points” for an upcoming conversation between Mr Al Bahar and the Governor of the BdL, asking the Governor to “convey to SGBL personally and in no uncertain terms the urgent necessity of endorsing this fair offer”. According to Mr Attieh this call with the Governor never took place, as he stated in Attieh 1 at para 213 that: “I prepared the talking points for him in case he was able to reach the Governor, but I understand from Talal that he was unable to reach the Governor and a call never took place between them”.[248]In any event, Mr Attieh’s “talking points” were that:
“1. Cedar Mundi fund is no longer able to operate or achieve its objectives in the current crisis a. LBP or local Lebanese $ paid by banks on capital calls are not investable and drag performance down. b. Our investment portfolio is losing value because startups cannot access fresh US$ ; for the first time, the fund incurred audited losses of $8m+ in 2019. c. Any exit in the Lebanese context is not possible (no market, country risk, devalued currency) or if possible would be at a staggering loss (fire sale). 2. The banks are in default of their contractual obligations and this violates the statutory principle of equal treatment between our group (MABIL) and the Banks a. Banks settled 53% of their dues on the last capital call in Lebanese Pounds @1507 and 8 months late from the due date. b. MABIL settled 100% of their dues on time (march 2019) in accordance with their contractual obligations to the fund. c. Hence, the real value of MABIL’s contributions to the fund far exceeds its % ownership; this is unfair and violates the principle of equal treatment between shareholders. d. The Banks are therefore liable for the losses of MABIL resulting from the continuing default on their obligations. 3. To avoid further liabilities and litigations, our group is leading an offer to buy the portfolio and take over the defaulted obligations of the Banks a. The fair price is market-determined and is confirmed by a fairness opinion from an independent regulated investment bank (Bemo Securitization SAL) b. The offer is made by a new offshore fund which will also take over the defaulted commitments of the Banks thus waiving the liability and litigation resulting from the Banks default. c. The offer price should allow to reimburse the banks cumulated contributions AT PAR in local $ thus avoiding any material loss on their investment. d. Most importantly, this new offshore fund carries on the initial objective of our partnership under C331 which is to support the growth and success of Lebanese startups in fresh US$. 4. … e. We therefore urgently need SGBL to formally approve this transaction at the board meeting convened for March 8th 2021 and hope your Excellency conveys to SGBL personally and in no uncertain terms the urgent necessity of endorsing this fair offer which safeguards the interest of all investors and, most importantly, the survival of Lebanese technology startups.”
(emphasis in original)[249]It could not be clearer from these “talking points” (prepared by Mr Attieh for Mr Al Bahar) that Mr Attieh is acting for Mr Al Bahar and the Al Bahar Group, and is pleading MABIL’s position, in the context of seeking to persuade the BdL to act for the benefit of those interests.[250]On the following day, 22 February 2021, Fastnet (in its capacity as General Partner) and WNL Limited (in its capacity as Initial Limited Partner) entered into an Initial Exempted Limited Partnership Agreement by which they formed Cedar II as an exempted limited partnership under the laws of the Cayman Islands.[251]On 24 February 2021, BSEC sent a further revised version of the Draft Fairness Opinion to Mr Attieh, which he described as “taking into consideration most of the remaining points we discussed last time in relation thereto”, and he requested Mr Attieh’s agreement to issue the execution version. On the same day, Mr Attieh responded to BSEC, “thank you. I think there is still some confusion… Let’s finalize with Nadi” and then together with Mr Najjar, BSEC, and BIF agreed to schedule a call for 25 February 2021 to discuss the Draft Fairness Opinion.[252]On 26 February 2021, Mr El Azar sent an email to Mr Saghbini and Mr Dahdah with a number of comments on the Draft HoT and Fairness Opinion. Mr El Azar provided his own “remarks to the draft TS and draft fairness opinion…that the GP and Manager of Cedar Mundi…are in the process of finalising for submittal to the Board of the Fund for consideration and follow up”.[253]In particular:
“Draft TS: 1. Given that the offer is by the GP and as facilitated by the delegated Manager of the Fund, we clearly need to eliminate any potential conflicts of interest as far as the bid and execution processes are concerned; 2. I am skeptical that the proposed transaction may qualify as "permitted" to waive the pre-emptive rights of investee companies (the "Investees") shareholders, particularly that it is never the case that the Fund holds any majority stake in the said Investees - drilling down on the individual shareholders agreements may be necessary to determine the validity of such a waiver; 3. The transaction structuring expenses should be rather borne by the offeror; 4. Termination and potential later terms inclusions in the definitive agreement should be symmetrical across all parties to the transaction; 5. An explicit clause needs to be inserted as to the conditions precedent to the transaction, including inter alia (i) vetting the transaction with BDL, (ii) obtaining an independent expert's fair valuation of the portfolio (possibly PWC's) and (iii) the EGA approving the portfolio exit mechanism and the transaction in particular; 6. There is no reason why the applicable laws should be those of England & Wales, particularly if the proposed consideration is to be settled in local Dollars; 7. A data library containing all contractual arrangements and shareholders agreements entered into by the Company should be made available, and a legal due diligence report should be issued to clear the Company from any potential liabilities (direct or contingent) the Company may be subject to as a result of the transaction; 8. The TS should explicitly mention that the Bid Price be subject to a Fairness Opinion by the financial advisor/agent solicited by the bidder towards raising subscriptions on best execution basis; 9. To remove the penalty for liquidated damages; 10. The consideration should theoretically be in real Dollars, payable anywhere at the discretion of the selling LPs. Alternative local arrangements should factor in the illiquidity premium of local funds; 11. GP-LP dealings should be at arms' length with the Company, so no exclusivity provisions should apply apart from ensuring non-circumvention of the proposed transaction; 12. More clarity is to be obtained in respect of the GP's offset amount between CMH and C2; 13. Preliminary analysis based on the provided unaudited FV of the portfolio indicatively suggests a reference valuation of $16mn (real) + $5.5mn (local) - to discuss on how this could be baked into the deal and inform the setting of the bid- ask range; Draft Fairness Opinion: 1. The draft should globally correct any confusion between the Manager and the BoD of the Fund; 2. The opinion itself is rather hollow and fails to address the financial advisor / agent's (in this case BSEC) acting in good faith and on best execution basis to get the best bid price relative to the FV; 3. The opinion should be explicit that BSEC has been solicited by the GP and/or Manager but certainly not the Fund; 4. The opinion should be explicit that only the GP or the Manager will be liable for any remuneration to BSEC in their capacity as financial advisors; 5. Disclosure permission of the opinion should not exclude the remaining LPs of the Fund; 6. The opinion should include a definition of what BSEC qualify as "fair", and representation should be made that BSEC has sought the best bid price in the market relative to a fair valuation as provided by an independent expert; 7. The Fund's audited financial statements should be made available, which could provide the reference basis for negotiating the execution price.”
(emphasis added)

Draft Fairness Opinion:

[254]Mr El Azar asked Mr Saghbini and Mr Dahdah to discuss his comments “so we can start communicating with fellow LPs towards aligning on progress integrity and roadmap to potential execution.” In this exchange SGBL made it clear that a general assembly meeting was needed to approve the 2021 Transaction.[255]However, instead of waiting to receive any comments from SGBL in respect of the draft documents, on 27 February 2021, Mr Attieh called for a Cedar Mundi board meeting for 10 March 2021 to review and discuss “Draft minutes of the Board meeting” and “Head of Terms submitted by Cedar II Fund LP”. Mr Attieh then proceeded to cause the HoT to be signed and the BSEC Fairness Opinion to be finalised, which he subsequently presented as further board papers on 3 March 2021.[256]Essentially, Mr Attieh was proposing a meeting to approve the sale of the investment portfolio to Cedar II and to have a resolution dealing with that. He attached a draft of the board minutes. The draft board minutes contained resolutions to “approve the proposed transaction as per the head of terms”, and to convene a general assembly to grant the directors the “authorizations provided for in Articles 158 and 159 of the Code of Commerce” in respect of the 2021 Transaction.[257]It is abundantly clear from this that Mr Attieh himself contemplated that a general assembly would be required and would be convened. There was no draft of the SPA in circulation at this point, indeed no such draft was shared with SGBL until after the 13 April 2021 board meeting. In the event, the board meeting was postponed to 16 March 2021. An amended version of the draft minutes was circulated on 9 March 2021.[258]On 2 March 2021, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mr Najjar and Ms Tfaili in relation to “some issues that need to be prepared and iron clad” ahead of a meeting of the Cedar Mundi BoD scheduled for 10 March 2021. In this email, Mr Attieh noted that “we need to manage carefully the claim of conflict of interest on the board”, and identified himself, Mr Saghbini, and Mr El Azar as potentially conflicted. Mr Attieh also set out his understanding of his conversations with Mr Najjar and Ms Tfaili in relation to why the Proposed Transaction was not a “tacit” liquidation.[259]Then, on 3 March 2021, KHCK executed the heads of terms for the proposed transaction (the “HoT”) (the executed HoT are dated 28 February 2021 but were executed by KHCK on 3 March 2021). The HoT noted in the context of “[t]he current and persisting economic crisis in Lebanon [which] has made it impossible for the Company to carry on its investment business and for its shareholders, to the exception of MABIL, to honour their funding commitments under the PPM…the GP has deemed it appropriate to initiate the Transaction with the objective of(i) safeguarding shareholders’ value and(ii) finding alternative sources of fresh capital from new investors…Under the Transaction, MABIL has accepted to swap its existing interests in and capital commitments to the Company with equivalent interest in and commitments to C2 and shall therefore continue to act as the cornerstone limited partner of C2. C2 will pursue an investment strategy broadly similar to the Company’s and its management will be entrusted to [Cedar Mundi’s] management team”.[260]The Transaction envisaged(i) the sale of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio (as defined in the HoT) for consideration of an “Offer Price” of US$27,000,000 “payable exclusively and entirely in non-fresh United States Dollars”;(ii) that “the Offer price shall be settled (i) by setting off against the Offer Price all balances due to MABIL by [Cedar Mundi] at the date of completion of the Transaction and (ii) by transfer of the remaining balance of the Offer Price in Local Dollars to [Cedar Mundi’s] bank account held at SGBL Bank SAL (Lebanon)”; and(iii) that “MABIL shall assign in full the amounts receivable from [Cedar Mundi] to C2 for settling part of the consideration payable and agreed by the Parties in relation to the Transaction”.[261]On the same date, the BSEC Fairness Opinion was issued, and the BSEC Mandate was terminated. Subsequently, BIF accepted the mandate to act as exclusive arranger and placement agent of the private placing of Cedar II.[262]On 8 March 2021, Ms Tfaili sent an email to Mr Attieh on a different point: “You have asked me to highlight what could be the responsibility of the members of the board of directors of Cedar Mundi … should the board of directors pass a resolution to execute the contemplated transaction for the sale of its portfolio and what would be their responsibility toward the shareholders of the Company and any third party, specifically the Central Bank of Lebanon”.[263]Under the first heading, “Fraudulent acts and infringement of law”, Ms Tfaili pointed out that under Article 166 of the LCC, “directors are responsible even to third parties, for all fraudulent acts and all infringements to the law and the articles”, that “in the event of a fraudulent act, the Company may obtain an annulment of the act if it is based on an illegal ground”, but that “in the event of infringement of the law or the articles, such decision may be nullified. Nevertheless, in the event a decision was taken by the board which is not the competent body to decide on such matter, a general assembly resolution may confirm such decision at a later stage and prevent nullity”. This email did not deal with the need to comply with Articles 157 and 158 of the LCC. It would appear that Ms Tfaili had not been asked about them.

Responses

[264]The draft fairness opinion from BSEC as to the proposed consideration for the 2021 Transaction was a very short letter, which stated simply that the proposal was “fair, from a financial point of view”. SGBL and the other C-331 Shareholders raised a number of concerns and objections to the 2021 Transaction prior to the board meeting taking place. Three emails in particular from this period set out the C-331 Shareholders’ position.[265]First, on 9 March 2021, Mr El Azar emailed Mr Attieh to state that neither Mr Saghbini nor SGBL would be attending the board meeting, stating:
“Further to our recent calls, we regret to inform you that SGBL and Georges Saghbini shall abstain from attending the aforesaid meeting for reasons of both form and substance. 1 – In form: Pursuant to the provisions of Article 22 of the Company’s Bylaws and Article 156 of the Code of commerce (as amended by Law 126/2019) this BOD meeting may not be held by videoconference as it aims inter alia at reviewing the FY 2019 statements in view of submitting them to the OGA’s approval. 2 – In substance: We are of the opinion that the proposed divestment should be subject – prior to submitting the same to the Company’s corporate competent bodies – to further diligence, let alone that any potential conflict of interest should be cleared at the outset. Without going into details at this stage, we believe that the proposed transaction should take into account the following matters. 2.1. From a legal standpoint: i. divesting out of the overwhelming majority of the Fund s investments would have a direct repercussion as to the continuity of the Company’s business and hence its existence. As such, this resolution should be taken by the appropriate corporate body. Therefore, this matter requires further consideration. ii. as indicated above, a conflict of interest issue may potentially be raised by any of the LPS in respect of this transaction, notably based on the provisions of Article 158 of the Code of commerce (as amended by Law 126/2019). 2.2. From a regulatory standpoint, and notwithstanding the provisions of Article 20 paragraph 7 of the Company’s Bylaws (as amended), the Company’s management should definitely submit the proposed transaction to BDL’s review and consideration in all its aspects, notably in light of the current critical situation in Lebanon. 2.3. From a financial standpoint, the scope of the Fairness Opinion submitted by BSEC is extremely limited and does not reference the portfolio’s fair valuation in seeking the best available price on the market; BSEC has naturally included all usual disclaimers. The offered price may be called into question by the LPs based on several criteria, notably in light of the past fair valuations of the Company’s portfolio. Therefore, this matter requires further consideration. As a result, we believe that passing this resolution at the BOD level is premature and potentially irregular.”
[266]Mr Attieh responded to this email, the following day, in these terms:
“1. On form It is true that Article 22 of the Company’s bylaws forbids videoconferencing for Board meetings examining annual accounts. It is also true that the ongoing unrest and sanitary situation in Lebanon led the Commerce registry to tolerate Board videoconferencing for reasons one can easily understand. It is for these same reasons (such as the impracticability or even the impossibility for key members to travel to Lebanon) that I proposed by emails dated March 3rd and March 8th to switch the initial invite from a meeting at the Company’s head office to videoconferencing. I take your point nonetheless and because we all highly value SGBL s esteemed attendance at the board, I am happy to remove the examination of the very belated 2019 accounts of the Company from the agenda and reconvene the board for next Tuesday March 16th 2021 by videoconference. Kindly let me know a few convenient times for you before I send the invite. We certainly look forward to SGBL s attendance. 2. On substance 2.1.i. Nature of the proposed Transaction: the board is the right forum for SGBL and all other members to approach this matter based on a lucid examination of the Bylaws, the transaction at hand and to hear the advice of the Company’s legal counsel in relation thereto. My conviction is that the proposed offer to purchase some of the Company’s investments is strictly within the normal course of business and has no impact whatsoever on the continuity or existence of the Company but is, on the contrary, beneficial to and in the interest of the Company. 2.1.ii. Potential conflict of interest: you already raised this matter with the legal counsel of the Company and his answer in no uncertain terms was that no member of the Board is conflicted with the proposed transaction. Here again, the board is the right forum if you want to argue your case. 2.2. BdL notification: the rights of BDL pursuant to Article 20 of the Bylaws are certainly reserved and we shall insert wording to that effect in the minutes of the Board. 2.3. Fairness Opinion: As you well know, the Fairness Opinion is a professional representation which obeys strict standards of form and substance. It is issued by a regulated and licensed financial institution which one assumes has applied suitable standards unless there is, as you seem to imply, indications to the contrary. I therefore fail to understand your objection in relation thereto and reiterate my earlier suggestion that you satisfy yourself with BSEC’s professional conduct by reviewing their work or making any enquiry you wish directly to them. Nor do I understand your reference to a “market” in the context. I am unaware of the existence anywhere in the world, let alone in Lebanon, of an organized market or venue for secondary startup transactions where “best available prices” can somehow be found or guaranteed. The Board will certainly be interested to hear you on this topic. 2.4 Directors responsibility: we are all well aware that, pursuant to article 167 of the Lebanese Code of Commerce, Directors are responsible towards shareholders for their management of the Company. This responsibility is comprehensive and not transferrable; thus, all acts of management in relation to the Company’s business are the sole prerogative of the Board. In the transaction at hand, I am fully satisfied on the basis of the information and evidence presented that (i) approving the offer is in the best interest of the Company and discharges my Director’s duty of care given the challenges and risks facing the Company, and (ii) that the terms of the offer are beneficial for the Company in its current and foreseeable contexts.”
[267]Mr El Azar then responded on the same date, 10 March 2021, in a further email stating that “the Board does provide a suitable forum for examining and discussing the proposed offer, but not approving any sale as per our judgement”, that “the sanitary situation in Lebanon and worldwide does not allow us to override or circumvent the provisions of both the Company’s Bylaws and Article 156 of the Code of commerce” and that SGBL had “constructively raised the irregularity of the process [that Mr Attieh had] initiated in connection with the proposed transaction”.[268]Mr El Azar also noted that SGBL was “well into the process of consulting with fellow [C-331 Shareholders] in relation to the proposed transaction and accordingly [sic], would look to revert with consensus remarks and suggestions ensuring the widest LP-GP alignment”. Mr Attieh claimed in cross-examination that “all indications from SGBL after 10 March was that they were going to attend” (Day 8 page 4 lines 6 to 8), but there was no such assurance in this email, nor anywhere else.[269]On 11 March 2021, Mr El Azar wrote to the C-331 Shareholders, following separate phone conversations, attaching an email dated 3 March 2021 from Mr Attieh to the Cedar Mundi BoD containing the agenda for and documents relating to the upcoming board meeting. He informed the C-331 Shareholders that SGBL and Mr Saghbini had chosen to abstain from attending the board meeting “for reasons to do with form and substance (without going into much detail)” and that SGBL were “of the opinion that the Proposed Transaction should be subject to further diligence and consideration prior to submitting the same to the Company’s corporate competent bodies and BDL; seeking the GA’s approval should, in our opinion, be considered in light of the particulars of the Proposed Transaction”. Further, that SGBL had sought to consult with the C-331 Shareholders “in order to convey to the Board (where necessary) remarks and suggestions aimed at ensuring the widest LP-GP alignment in this regard”. On the following day Mr El Azar held a Zoom call with the C-331 Shareholders to discuss the upcoming board meeting.[270]Also on 15 March 2021, Mr Attieh received an email from BSEC in the evening, stating “given the position you are expecting from SGBL which is to abstain … we believe that the following should be done…: 1. Obtaining a second legal due diligence whereby the sale can be validated by any one of the two governing bodies, GA or Board, on top of the Chairman’s decision: Otherwise, the only legal DD that we have at hand recommends that an EGA is necessary; therefore it is better to have an alternative legal DD as well 2. Contacting BDL and obtaining their feedback on the Transaction immediately after your official notification in parallel to a call between Mr Talal Al-Bahr and Governor Salameh to get a potential support on the deal 3. Obtaining separate emails from several banks (any banks) acknowledging that they are aware of the transaction and that they do not oppose to it” (emphasis in original)[271]BSEC concluded: “We believe it is better not to proceed with the transaction without the above mentioned elements, as I have already mentioned it to you in my several zoom exchanges”.[272]Then, on 16 March 2021, before the board meeting, and having consulted with the other C-331 Shareholders, Mr El Azar emailed Mr Attieh again:
“… we regret to inform you that SGBL and Georges Saghbini shall abstain from attending the aforesaid Board meeting for the main reasons raised in our email dated March 9th, notably due to the persistent divergences between us regarding the approach of the proposed transaction (as more particularly set out in the Heads of Terms) and the interpretation of the applicable provisions of law.”
[273]Having repeated the legal, regulatory, and commercial concerns, Mr El Azar continued that the C-331 Shareholders had agreed as follows:
“… (i) an updated fair valuation of the portfolio to be performed by an independent expert, (ii) that the GA should be the competent corporate body to approve the proposed transaction, (iii) that BDL be informed without delay of the specifics of the proposed transaction to ensure a timely non-objection stance or approval thereon as the case may be, and (iv) that this should be an offer for the buyout of the entire portfolio of the fund.”
(emphasis added)[274]In each of Mr El Azar’s three emails (on 9, 10, and 16 March 2021) it was stated explicitly that SGBL required that the decision to enter into the 2021 Transaction was to be taken by the general assembly.[275]Indeed, Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that he knew that SGBL required BdL approval/non-objection, general assembly approval, and obtaining an independent fair valuation to be conditions precedent to any transaction (Day 7 page 189 lines 12 to 17). Mr Attieh also accepted that, as at 16 March 2021, there was no agreement by SGBL that the 2021 Transaction should not be put to a vote of the general assembly (Day 7 page 213 line 16 to page 214 line 1).[276]Importantly, it is clear from his contemporaneous communications with the other parties that Mr Attieh’s own understanding was that general assembly approval was required as a pre-condition to the 2021 Transaction. In particular, on 27 January 2021, Mr Attieh had a call with Mr Al Bahar in advance of which he prepared a note. Mr Attieh said that the advice he had received was that “[t]he sale of the Fund’s portfolio is not subject to the Central Bank’s approval but necessitates 2/3 of the GA approving the transaction as they assimilate such a sale to a liquidation”, adding in red text next to this the word “disputed”. In cross-examination, Mr Attieh claimed that the word “disputed” related to the need for a general assembly meeting, and not whether the BdL needed to approve the transaction (Day 7 page 128 lines 19 to 24). However, the three options which Mr Attieh then set out for Mr Al Bahar each contemplated that there would be a general assembly meeting on the proposed 2021 Transaction. The third option envisaged using the Default Mechanism to remove the C-331 Shareholders’ votes at a general assembly, but Mr Attieh accepted that this would be more difficult given the requirement for BdL consent (Day 7 page 127 lines 14 to 22).[277]Moreover, at least by 2 March 2021, Mr Attieh was conscious of the risk that he was in a personal conflict of interest position, and he sought advice on this from Mr Najjar’s law firm (this is also dealt with in Section D5.3 below). Mr Attieh also sought advice at the same time as to whether “the sale of a portion of the portfolio is a ‘tacit’ liquidation” requiring general assembly approval under Article 157 of the LCC. Mr Najjar responded on the following day by calling Mr Attieh, during or following which he sent a picture of Article 158 of the LCC, in the background of which was a print-out of Mr Attieh’s email together with a handwritten annotation, which read “Yes – BA conflict”.[278]During cross-examination, Mr Attieh confirmed that Mr Najjar advised him on 3 March 2021 that the 2021 Transaction would be a related-party transaction and therefore subject to Article 158 (Day 7 page 169 line 21 to page 170 line 2) but he also contended that Mr Najjar had advised him that he was not conflicted, stating “no, there is no issues with basically being conflicted at the board for you” (Day 7 page 170 lines 3 to 11). There is no evidence to support Mr Attieh’s contention, which is rejected. He clearly was conflicted (see also Section D5.3 below).[279]Mr Attieh argued that his subsequent resignation as a director of Fastnet on 5 March 2021 was unconnected and not because of any conflict, but rather to be on the “safe side” and to avoid any “confusion” as to the application of the new version of Article 158 (Day 7 page 170 line 23 to page 171 line 4). As addressed in detail in Section D5.3 below, the true position is that Mr Attieh resigned from Fastnet precisely because he knew he was conflicted, and in order to avoid the application of Article 158 and its prohibition against him voting as a conflicted director, and to ensure that his vote would count at any board meetings voting on the 2021 Transaction. This resignation is “pure form” and there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Attieh otherwise stepped back from acting on the Cedar II side of the transaction as well as continuing to act for Cedar Mundi.[280]Also on 3 March 2021, Professor Nasri Diab provided an opinion commissioned by BSEC in respect of the proposed 2021 Transaction. Mr Attieh sought in cross-examination to downplay this opinion and impugn Professor Diab’s credentials, contending, variously, that his advice was “unsolicited” (Day 7 page 178 line 5), that he “disagree[d] with it” (Day 7 page 180 line 20), and that Professor Diab was not to be trusted because he was “the lawyer of the Lebanese banking association” and so lacked independence and was “conflicted” (Day 7 page 179 line 21 to page 180 line 25), adding that “I am doubting any legal advice that’s coming from basically a lawyer who is associated with these banks” (Day 7 page 182 line 25 to page 183 line 2). None of Mr Attieh’s criticisms bears examination, it is clear that Professor Diab’s opinions were not only honestly held, but are right, and the reality is that Mr Attieh simply did not like (and does not like) the opinions expressed by Professor Diab, advice which had been commissioned by BSEC, and the cost of which was charged back to Cedar Mundi.[281]The clear terms of Professor Diab’s advice were(i) that BSEC check how to clear the proposed 2021 Transaction with the BdL given that Cedar Mundi “is governed by the directives/circular of the Central Bank of Lebanon (“BDL”) directives, and it is under the supervision of both the BDL and the Banking Control Commission (Article 1 of the Articles of Incorporation)”; and(ii) that the proposed transaction be approved by Cedar Mundi’s extraordinary general assembly:
“I recommend that the Transaction be approved by the Extraordinary General Assembly”
(emphasis in original) because it did not fall within the “regular course” of Cedar Mundi’s business, and because it was “equivalent to the liquidation of the Company”. Professor Diab did not opine on Article 158 because he was not informed that the 2021 Transaction would be a related-party transaction.[282]Mr Attieh further contended that Mr Najjar disagreed with the advice received from Professor Diab (Day 7 page 181 line 9 to page 182 line 2), but he was unable to point to any written opinion (or any record at all) which evidenced this. According to Mr Attieh, the only advice from Mr Najjar came on telephone calls in respect of which there are no records and no notes (which Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination (Day 7 page 186 line 5)). This all seems inherently implausible given the purpose of seeking and receiving legal advice and the need to evidence the same (if advice was, indeed, given).[283]For example, where Professor Diab said in his report that “[t]he sale of all (or almost all of) the Company’s assets is equivalent to the liquidation of the Company”, Mr Attieh said this is advice “that’s been disputed by our own legal counsel [i.e. Mr Najjar]” (Day 7 page 184 line 25 to page 185 line 1), and later that Mr Najjar “reported to me that he did not agree fully and see eye to eye with [Professor Diab] on some of his -- between brackets -- advice” (Day 7 at page 184 line 21 to page 186 line 19).[284]BSEC’s understanding was that the only advice it had seen, i.e. the advice given by Professor Diab, was contrary to Mr Attieh’s proposed course of action (Mr Attieh accepted that this was the only advice seen by BSEC (Day 8 page 8 lines 9 to 11). There is no evidence of any second opinion by Mr Najjar, and indeed had there been, Mr Attieh would surely have provided it to BSEC. Mr Attieh’s answer that he didn’t need to because “basically Nadi Najjar was in contact with BSEC and with Professor Diab to discuss the legal points” (Day 8 page 9 lines 8 to 9), is simply inconsistent with the email received from BSEC which explicitly stated “the only legal DD that we have at hand recommends that an EGA is necessary”. There is no reference at all to any communication with Professor Diab.[285]In any event, BSEC urged Mr Attieh on 15 March 2021, the evening before the board meeting, and in the same email that he should seek a “second legal due diligence” before proceeding with the 2021 Transaction. Mr Attieh dismissed this, stating in cross-examination that “we basically had debated enough” (Day 8 page 28 line 15), and that “I disagreed with the advice and this is my prerogative and the prerogative of the board. This is an advice, it’s not an instruction” (Day 8 page 29 lines 1 to 3). There was no such contrary opinion from Mr Najjar, and Mr Najjar (in any event at least as late as 31 March 2021) appeared to be operating on the basis that there would be a general assembly meeting, since he stated in a WhatsApp audio message to Mr Attieh: “So, in this case, it’s the Board that will make all the decisions, and we certainly won’t wait for the auditor’s report before the GA makes its decision”.[286]It follows from the above that the advice Mr Attieh received from Mr Najjar (as evidenced in writing) and from Professor Diab on 3 March 2021 (as identified above), as to the need for general assembly approval, was consistent with SGBL’s own position as communicated to Mr Attieh prior to the 16 March 2021 board meeting, in the emails outlined above. It is, as shall be seen, also consistent with the position, as a matter of law, under Lebanese law, as addressed in Sections D1 and D2 below.[287]All of this is inconsistent with what Mr Attieh stated in his email on 10 March 2021 that “the board is the right forum” for approving the 2021 Transaction, and his claim that he had received advice “in no uncertain terms that no member of the Board is conflicted with the proposed transaction”.

B5.6 The Board meeting on 16 March 2021

[288]On 16 March 2021, the board meeting took place. Mr Attieh and Mrs Al Qatami attended (the latter also holding Mr Santiso’s proxy). According to the board minutes, the purpose of the meeting was “Reviewing and discussing the head of terms submitted by Cedar II Fund, LP (Cayman) in relation to the sale of some of the Company’s portfolio” (i.e. the HoT). This “purpose” was somewhat illusory given that Mr Attieh had himself drafted the terms for KHCK, as he acknowledged in cross-examination (Day 8 page 16 line 21 to page 17 line 3).[289]The minutes recorded Mr Attieh setting out at length the purported rationale for the proposed 2021 Transaction. The Cedar Mundi BoD resolved that it was “in the best interest” of Cedar Mundi to approve the proposed 2021 Transaction as contemplated in the HoT and that Mr Attieh and Mrs Al Qatami were authorised to negotiate and execute it. The resolution was as follows:
“The Board of Directors examined the head of terms received from Cedar Fund II, LP (Cayman) as well as the fairness opinion in relation thereto issued by Bemo Securitization SAL and in light of the current financial situation in Lebanon and the inability of most shareholders to fulfil their commitments towards the Company… as per the head of terms submitted by Cedar II Fund, LP (Cayman). The rights of the Central Bank of Lebanon under article 20 of the Company’s bylaws are reserved. Further, the Board of Directors authorized the shareholder ‘Med Al Bahar International – Cayman Islands’ to conduct the deal with the Company in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Commercial Code. The Board of Directors additionally resolved to empower the Chairman Mrs. Wafa Al-Qatami and/or the Vice Chairman Mr. Bassel Attieh with the full and necessary powers to separately negotiate and execute the transaction with Cedar II Fund, LP (Cayman) materially in accordance with the head of terms hereby approved.”
(emphasis added)[290]Mr Attieh’s evidence during cross-examination was that the board minutes had been drafted by Mr Najjar following discussion with Mr Attieh (Day 7 page 193 lines 14 to 18). Mr Attieh further argued that the absence of SGBL and Mr Saghbini from the 16 March 2021 board meeting was a “red herring” and simply a reflection of their desire to avoid any discussion as to “the central issue, which is the dire situation they put the company in due to their default” (Day 7 page 201 lines 6 to 11), and further adding that “they knew the board basically was examining the consequences of their default and basically of their collusion with the Central Bank to defraud the company from the money they owed it” (Day 8 page 5 lines 17 to 21). This allegation was never put to Cedar Mundi’s witnesses during cross-examination and is unsubstantiated, and instead the Defendants have sought to argue that Mr Saghbini did not attend on 16 March 2021 owing to a scheduling mix-up (see Day 3 page 67 line 22 to page 69 line 2). Not only is this unsupported by the documentary evidence, it is inconsistent even with Mr Attieh’s evidence.[291]It appears that Mr Attieh’s view of the C-331 Shareholders, as expressed by him, informed his conduct as a director of Cedar Mundi (see Day 8 page 27 line 19 to page 28 line 4):
“Q. … You had decided, at this point in time, that the banks were guilty, with the BdL, of fraudulent conduct and that governed your own decision-making processes from this point on? … A. What my personal basically opinion of the banks is, obviously I was alive to basically what they were doing and I had my personal opinion, but that has nothing to do with that resolution of the board which is not making any determination as to the nature of their conduct but just stating that they had caused damage to the company.”
[292]Mr Attieh also claimed that the resolutions on 16 March 2021 only purported to be “an approval for entering into a negotiation”, rather than entry into the sale and purchase agreement (see Day 7 page 194 line 12 to page 198 line 17) – despite the words used in the resolutions, which include both the words “execute” and “negotiate”. Mr Attieh stated in cross-examination that “[m]y intention was that this board should be the forum in which basically all the parties would express basically their comments or objection to the offer that was submitted” (Day 8 page 19 line 12 to 15), and that “basically this first board was just basically to get everybody’s opinion” (Day 8 page 19 line 2 to 23 ).[293]Mr Attieh further claimed that the resolutions did not state that the 2021 Transaction had to be approved by the general assembly under Article 158 of the LCC, despite fact that the resolution contained the wording that “the deal” with MABIL had to be conducted “in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Code of Commerce”.[294]That said, in his further evidence the following day, Mr Attieh appeared to accept that it was understood at the time of the board meeting that “it was not sufficient” for there to be board authorisation in order to proceed with the 2021 Transaction. Rather, the resolution reflected an understanding that Article 158 required general assembly approval or ratification for a related party transaction (Day 8 page 19 line 16 to page 20 line 3). Indeed, Mr Attieh accepted, that “under the full understanding then once these negotiations have been done, they will submit -- we will submit basically this transaction, the final terms of this transaction, to Article 158” (Day 8 page 22 lines 13 to 16). B6. NEGOTIATION OF THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD RESOLUTIONS[295]On 17 March 2021, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mr Al Bahar with Mr Najjar and Ms Tfaili in copy to confirm that the Cedar Mundi BoD had approved the HoT, which he attached in executed form.[296]On the same day, Mr El Azar sent an email to the C-331 Shareholders informing them that SGBL “opted to abstain yet again from attending” the 16 March 2021 board meeting, while reiterating its concerns about the proposed 2021 Transaction to Mr Attieh. Mr El Azar also explained that he had been informed by Mr Najjar, as follows:
“(i) the Offeror is open to the outcome of an updated fair valuation as may performed by an independent expert (possibly the auditor of the Company, PWC), with the Offeror undertaking to pay any difference in price if the independent valuation exceeds the Offered price by over 10%; (ii) the GA (held extraordinarily) would ratify (by circulation) the Board’s decision to execute the proposed transaction; (iii) BDL will be notified the full details of the proposed transaction immediately after GA ratification; and (iv) the Offeror would undertake to, subsequently to the execution of the proposed transaction, buy the remaining assets of the Company.”
[297]Mr El Azar asked the C-331 Shareholders for their “responses on the above suggestion towards conveying the 331 LPs’ final position to the Vice Chairman and Board members of the Company”.[298]In their written closing submissions, the Defendants state that “none of the banks indicated that they were opposed to a sale” and that they were in principle in favour of a sale “provided that the price was right and the BdL was content” (at para 162). These statements are something of an understatement and simplification, particularly as concerns the BdL and its role.[299]For example, Ms Aida Abou Hanna of the Bank of Beirut explained that “BDL is the main source of funding and … should be immediately aware of the transaction and not after ratification of the GA”. Ms Randa Semaan of Fransabank stated to similar effect, “[i]t is not enough to notify BDL. We reiterate your proposal to obtain either the non-objection or approval of BDL simultaneously with the Board decision (without delay)”. Mr Fadi Osseiran of Blom, stated as follows: “the most important comment I would propose is to secure an independent valuation of the underlying companies by an expert who is not the auditor of the Fund”, and “it seems to me that the offer on the table is very low to what we expect as valuation. But again we can wait for a non conflicted expert and for sure not similar to what BSEC confirmed”.[300]At the same time, Mr Attieh sent the following email to Mr Okais at BSEC:
“1. The minutes are in the process of being signed; Nadi was present and took the minutes. I have no objections for him to share these minutes with you while we are waiting for the formalization to happen. 2. I will forward Jimmy Elazar s email of March 9th 2021 and my answer as well which has now been approved by the board. However, to cut short endless speculations on interpreting of SGBL constantly changing position, you are requested to let us know your decision tomorrow to withdraw or not from the private placement on the assumption that SGBL will not agree to the ratification of the proposed transaction. I am sure you understand that there is no more time for sterile meandering. The board is fully aware of its imperious responsibility in the current context and is not seeking any reassurance or advice in relation to what he has determined to be the right course of action for the Company.”
(emphasis in original) Essentially, Mr Attieh was saying that he did not want any more advice on the transaction, and that he will “execute” it.[301]Around the same time, Ms Tfaili sent by email to Mr Attieh a draft agreement to be entered into between SGBL and Cedar II in relation to the obtaining of a valuation from an independent expert for the proposed 2021 Transaction. The draft agreement envisaged that SGBL would obtain, at the C-331 Shareholders’ expense, a valuation from PWC. The draft agreement provided that in the event that the value determined by PWC exceeded by a margin of 10% the consideration to be paid to Cedar II as set out in the HoT, Cedar II would pay the difference to Cedar Mundi.

B6.1 Agreement that there should be a general assembly meeting

[302]On 18 March 2021, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mr El Azar to say that the board meeting on 16 March 2021 had gone ahead, and noting that:
“The Board shall of course inform the GA in due time and in strict accordance with applicable laws and regulations; the board has approved the proposed head of terms in its meeting on March 16th 2021.”
[303]By another email of the same day, Mr Attieh sent to Mr El Azar a draft “deed of undertaking” to be given by SGBL. This referred to an agreement to engage auditors, namely PWC, to “conduct a peer review of the Fairness Opinion … to provide to SGBL and the Board the appropriate additional assurance report on the Consideration”. The draft deed of undertaking also included an irrevocable commitment from SGBL to vote in favour of “the ratification of the sale transaction as per the HoT … approved by the Board at its meeting dated March 16th 2021”. None of this had been agreed by SGBL, as Mr Attieh was aware, and SGBL therefore refused to sign the deed.[304]Less than 24 hours later, Mr Attieh sent a chaser email to Mr El Azar, noting that the draft deed of undertaking and “proposals provide the additional comfort you are requesting…while preserving the supreme interests of [Cedar Mundi] in the proposed Transaction which the board has approved as urgent and necessary in the current situation”. Mr Attieh concluded his email by stating that if he did not hear back within 48 hours, “we shall consider that SGBL has reneged on the proposed understanding intermediated by Mr Najjar”.[305]The evening before the board meeting took place, Mr Al Bahar acting for MABIL, sent a letter to Mr Attieh requesting that Cedar Mundi serve each C-331 Shareholder with a notice of default in respect of defaults in meeting the Third Capital Call. On 22 March 2021, Mr Attieh caused MABIL to send purported Notices of Default to the C-331 Shareholders in relation to the Third Capital Call (see Attieh 1 at para 232 to 233). Each Notice of Default purported to give notice that the Default Mechanism under the respective PPMs would be triggered unless the C-331 Shareholders settled their “outstanding dues in fresh, freely transferable United States dollars”.[306]These notices were of no legal effect whatsoever since only Cedar Mundi could validly issue a Notice of Default under the SCFAs, which it never did, and in any event the implementation of the Default Mechanism required the “prior written approval” of the BdL. I am in no doubt that these purported Notices of Default were intended by Mr Attieh to exert commercial pressure on the C-331 Shareholders. Indeed, Mr Dahdah’s evidence in cross-examination confirmed that he saw these notices as “nothing more than a pressure tactic” (Day 3 page 174 lines 7 to 15).[307]SGBL responded on the following day to Mr Al Bahar, stating “we would be grateful if you could specify in which capacity you are addressing the aforesaid letter to SGBL by reference to the relevant PPM and corporate documentation of the Company”. No response was received from Mr Al Bahar.[308]Mr El Azar consulted with the C-331 Shareholders before responding to Mr Attieh on 23 March 2021. He rejected the “irregular approach in sending directions and deadlines to SGBL” and stating “[l]et alone that we do not accept being presented with a “fait accompli” or being subjected to any threat, particularly when the request is inconsistent with the very basic rules of law”.[309]Mr El Azar stated:
“We were about to provide you with a comprehensive response to your two emails dated 18 and 19 March (in line with our previous communications) with the conveying of consensus requirements by the 331 shareholders (as at 22 March 2021) regarding the proposed transaction but refrained to do so just in time as we were utterly surprised to receive an email from a fellow shareholder of the Company, Med AlBahar International Ltd. "MABIL"), regarding an alleged default by SGBL in connection with the PPM. Naturally, MABIL's claim is legally baseless, it being specified that the sender has no legal capacity whatsoever to send such a notice of default. … The least we can say at this stage is that the conflict of interest matter raised by SGBL and all the 331 shareholders in connection with both the proposed transaction and the approach adopted in connection therewith, proved to be more than justified and founded.”
[310]He further proposed the following “consensus requirements” of the C-331 Shareholders for the proposed 2021 Transaction:
“1- At the outset, we recommend adhering to the regular process through the Company's competent bodies, especially that SGBL is in no position nor has a legal capacity to sign any bilateral document in respect of the proposed transaction, not least given (i) our fiduciary duty towards the Company's 331 shareholders and (ii) that we find this request inconsistent with the applicable rules of law. 2- The Company’s GA should be called to meet (extraordinarily) the soonest possible to consider the proposed transaction; 3- Ratification of the proposed transaction by the GA should be subject to the Board seeking a non- conflicted expert valuation (in real Dollars) within a reasonable timeframe; 4- Ratification of the proposed transaction by the GA should be subject to the sale price accounting for the illiquidity and capital controls premia should payment be envisaged in locally restricted Dollars; 5- Ratification of the proposed transaction by the GA should be subject to the undertaking by the Offeror that it will compensate the Company for any difference between an acceptable best price (the "Best Price") and the risk-adjusted fair valuation-based price (the "Fair Price") should the latter exceed the former by at least 1.1 times; 6- Alternatively to points (4) and/or (5) above, ratification of the proposed transaction by the GA should be subject to adding a warrants clause in the definitive agreement in favor of the Company, exercisable to compensate the Company in-kind (i.e., shares in the C2 fund) for any difference between the Best Price and the Fair Price; 7- Ratification of the proposed transaction by the GA should be subject to the Vice Chairman, on behalf of the Board of the Company seeking (without delay) the non-objection stance or approval of BDL, as the case may be, by providing the full specifics of the proposed transaction, in any case no later than immediately after GA ratification of the proposed transaction; 8- Ratification subject to (a) obtaining an undertaking by the Offeror that it will, subsequently to the consummation of the proposed transaction, acquire any residual holdings of the Company within a pre- agreed period of time and at a price that will be determined by the outcome of the independent valuation (taking into account points (4) and (5) above), and (b) adding a warrants clause in the definitive agreement to provide security against the Offeror's failure to comply with the terms of the undertaking.”
(emphasis added)[311]Mr Attieh sent his comments in respect of Mr El Azar’s email to Mr Najjar, which included agreeing that the General Assembly should be called to meet as soon as possible to ratify the Proposed Transaction, such ratification to be subject to(i) the Board of Directors accepting to seek a “second non-conflicted expert valuation (PwC) on the fairness of the consideration offered”,(ii) “BDL rights under the art. 20 of the Bylaws being expressly reserved” and(iii) an undertaking from the Offeror to compensate Cedar Mundi for any difference in price exceeding 10% between the offered price and the second expert valuation. Mr Attieh added that “[s]hould the board fail to obtain such undertaking, then the board shall refrain from executing the definitive agreement. If the Fair Price is lower than the offer price, then the offer price shall be adjusted accordingly”. Mr Attieh struck through various other of the consensus requirements and stated that he would discuss with the board and revert to Mr Najjar.[312]On 23 March 2021, Mr Saghbini tendered his resignation from the Cedar Mundi BoD, by letter to Mrs Al Qatami, copied to Mr Skaf at the BdL, giving his reasons, citing a “strong disagreement with the irregular approach to the proposed divestment of the Company’s portfolio initiated by the Vice Chairman” and the “unacceptable means of pressure exerted in this regard”. Mr Saghbini accepted in his evidence that “from the beginning. I wasn’t against the sale of the portfolio” (Day 3 page 70 lines 23 to 24). But I do not consider that such acceptance justifies any inference that the expressed reason was not the real reason for his resignation (as the Defendants invite the Court to infer).[313]On 25 March 2021, Mr Attieh responded to Mr El Azar’s email of 23 March 2021. He said that he had “consulted with the rest of the board members” and that the consulted members were agreeable to the Cedar Mundi Board of Directors engaging PWC “to issue an additional assurance report on the Fairness Opinion of Bemo” and that this step would be taken “out of an abundance of goodwill to provide SGBL, at its request, with yet another layer of assurance”.[314]Importantly, Mr Attieh also made clear that he considered that general assembly approval was required, stating: “It has always been the intention of the Board to include in the agenda of the next General Assembly the ratification of the proposed transaction pursuant to the relevant provisions of companies law. … The Board shall of course inform BDL timely of the proposed transaction when and if it completes. The board has already expressly reserved the rights of BDL as per Article 20 of the bylaws in relation to this Transaction”.[315]It was put to Mr Attieh in the course of cross-examination that this represented his genuine intention at the time, and he confirmed that it did (Day 8 page 33 lines 19 to 25):
“… so basically I knew that related-party transactions always have to go to a general assembly meeting. So that’s basically what I was saying, I was saying we all accept there should be -- there should be basically the legal process through the board and then through the general assembly for this transaction because in the offer itself we say it’s a related party.”
[316]Mr Attieh then sought immediately to resile from this position, and argued that it all depended on the effect of “the relevant provisions of companies law” (Day 8 page 35 lines 17 to 20). When Mr Wilson put to Mr Attieh that this would be misleading the banks, since SGBL would have understood that Mr Attieh had agreed to a general assembly meeting as a pre-condition to entry into the 2021 Transaction, Mr Attieh dismissed it, stating that “the banks had the opportunity to ask. They are banks. If they had basically any doubt about what I’m saying they could ask and I would have answered, but they didn’t ask.” (Day 8 page 36 lines 1 to 3). But the point is that SGBL had no need to ask, as there was never any doubt. It was clear from Mr Attieh’s email that it was agreed that there should be a general assembly meeting before any SPA was signed.[317]The next day, on 26 March 2021, Mr Attieh, Mr El Azar, Mr Dahdah, and Mr Najjar held a call to discuss these exchanges, following which Mr El Azar emailed Mr Attieh on 30 March 2021, with the others in copy, to set out the terms on which “the majority of 331 shareholders would be willing to positively consider the ratification of the proposed transaction upon the convening of an ordinary GA (to be held extraordinarily) at the first opportunity” (emphasis added).[318]The terms here are what Mr El Azar previously described as “consensus requirements” and are broadly consistent with what Mr Saghbini earlier described as his “primary concerns”. Those terms included confirmations that:(1) MABIL’s Notices of Default were ineffective;(2) the 2021 Transaction would be subject to an “additional assurance report” from PWC;(3) the 2021 Transaction would be put to Cedar Mundi’s general assembly; and(4) the BdL would be “immediately inform[ed] of the full specifics of the proposed transaction for non-objection stance or approval as the case may be.” (emphasis added)[319]Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that he understood from this email that(i) the C-331 Shareholders were relying on his assurance that there would be a general assembly meeting (Day 8 page 37 lines 3 to 10); and(ii) support at the general assembly meeting was contingent on both (a) obtaining a further valuation of the investment portfolio (Day 8 page 38 lines 9 to 24), and (b) informing the BdL of the proposed transaction immediately (although Mr Attieh claimed that this “was their starting negotiating position and then we negotiated that”) (Day 8 page 39 line 19 to page 40 line 15). In fact, it is clear that this was the common contemplation at this stage.[320]In cross-examination, Mr El Azar explained that during this time period, there had been concerns about the price, transaction structure and efficiency of the proposed 2021 Transaction (Day 4 page 175 lines 1 to 11), the “integrity of the process” (Day 5 page 1 lines 11 to 22), and legal and regulatory issues. Mr El Azar’s evidence was that, as regards price, “at the time we had no reliable information to assess whether the proposed consideration was adequate at all or reflected the fair value of the portfolio” (Day 4 page 160 line 25 to page 161 line 2). Indeed, Mr El Azar’s initial position, which he had given way on in negotiations, was that any transaction should have “fresh”, unrestricted US Dollar consideration. Mr El Azar’s evidence is that he was, “sceptical” and had “suspicions” that the consideration in fact proposed by Mr Attieh was “low” and “far and away from the fair value of the portfolio” (Day 4 page 162 lines 5 to 13). I am satisfied that this evidence represents Mr El Azar’s contemporary belief.[321]In relation to the BSEC Fairness Opinion, Mr El Azar stated as follows (Day 4 page 162 line 19 to page 163 line 6):
“first of all, that fairness opinion seemed to be hollow. I mean, it lacked the basic components of a professional fairness opinion. It had no analytical support and no reference to a fair valuation. It did not opine on the transaction structure, it did not opine on the efficiency and I think -- I think it was not adequate at all. It did not meet the professional standards of a fairness opinion. Plus, we viewed, my Lord, BSEC as conflicted because they were assuming both capacities, or our understanding was that they were assuming the capacity of the placement agent at the same time.”

B6.2 Mr Attieh’s analyse juridique

[322]Unknown to SGBL, on 22 March 2021 (the same day on which MABIL sent the purported Notices of Default), Mr Attieh was also formulating a plan to circumvent the requirement for a general assembly altogether.[323]On this date, Mr Attieh sent by email to Mr Najjar a legal analysis (or “analyse juridique”) which he had drafted, stating:
“Sir Could you kindly mark my homework (out of 20)”
. This was a memorandum in relation to the proposed 2021 Transaction, which included an analysis in relation to the remarks made by SGBL in its email of 16 March 2021, and associated potential litigations, i.e. an action for annulment by shareholders due to conflict of interest and an action against the BoD for exceeding authority. In this document Mr Attieh set out his attempted rebuttals. In respect of the former Mr Attieh wrote that (i) the shareholders would need to establish that the 2021 Transaction was to the detriment of Cedar Mundi, but that (ii) independent experts had already judged it as being in the interests of Cedar Mundi. He added that, under French law the failure of the AGM to ratify the decision of the BoD is not enforceable against non-contracting parties (i.e. BIF) and that, as long as a court does not void the transaction, the transaction is valid as between the contracting parties and takes effect by virtue of its approval by the BoD. As to the latter, Mr Attieh wrote that this was an issue between the BoD and the shareholders, and voiding the decision of the BOD is not effective against third parties (i.e. Cedar II), meaning that the acquisition by Cedar II of the investments remained valid.[324]Mr Najjar responded, saying “I’m hiring you”, in response to which Mr Attieh asked if Mr Najjar could speak with BSEC, suggesting that this would “help them in their gloubiboulga” (this is a colloquialism deriving from French children’s television and can be translated as “confusion”, “gibberish”, or “gobbledygook”), to which Mr Najjar agreed. I do not consider that Mr Najjar’s flippant remark that “I’m hiring you” justifies a leap to the conclusion that Mr Attieh’s analyse juridique was an accurate or complete representation of Mr Najjar’s professional views (which remain unevidenced and uncorroborated) still less that what Mr Attieh stated was a correct statement of French law or Lebanese law, and as addressed in Sections D1 and D2 it most certainly does not represent the position in Lebanese law.[325]Mr Attieh confirmed in cross-examination that the analyse juridique is a document in which “I am basically setting out my thinking about what this transaction could -- how this transaction could proceed and what are its implications” (Day 8 page 43 lines 18 to 20). However, he rejected the “insinuation” that he was thereby developing a strategy to circumvent the general assembly in private, whilst at the same time misleadingly assuring SGBL that the 2021 Transaction would be subject to general assembly approval (Day 8 page 45 line 24 to page 46 line 12). However, I am in no doubt that that is what Mr Attieh was up to. I do not consider that the contrast between Mr Attieh’s communications with SGBL, and with Mr Najjar, can be explained in any other way. Indeed, the analyse juridique serves no purpose if this was not Mr Attieh’s true intention.[326]Around the same time, on 22 March 2021, Mr Attieh sent another email to Mr Najjar with the subject “Talking points TJB<>RTS”, containing discussion points for a meeting with the BdL, including:
“1. The fund is incurring huge losses due to the default of the banks on the capital calls – paying in LBP or L$ is the same as defaulting 2. The insolvency of the banks is clear and BdL/Lebanon have other priorities for their fresh dollars than financing VCs through Circular-331 3. The banks are completely unresponsive and do not care about the fund because they know losses are entirely supported by the BDL, not them. 4. Given this situation, our group has worked for the past 6 months to limit the losses of CMH by (i) pooling private investors for an offer to buy investments of CMH at a fair price which allows the reimbursement at +/- par of materially all the banks contributions and (ii) committing new investors to take over the defaulted commitments of the banks in fresh dollars and therefore continue funding the startups as per the objective of C311 5. Bemo securities SAL conducted due diligence and issued a fairness opinion on the offer as an independent expert. 6. In spite of that the banks, especially SGBL, are still trying to derail and delay the transaction under false pretexts which are harmful to the fund, its shareholders and its startups. 7. We have additionally agreed to have a second independent expert look at the fairness of the transaction and, should there be a difference in favour of the Fund with the first opinion, to pay the difference. 8. In spite of all our goodwill to limit the losses resulting from their own default, the Banks (especially, SGBL) are still stalling in violation of their duty of care to the Fund, to BDL and to the objective of C-331 which is ultimately to support the startups, not deprive them of funding. 9. The board of the fund decided to approve the offer and we are asking your Excellency to support the board’s position so the majority of the banks commit formally to ratify the transaction in the next upcoming general assembly.”
[327]On 30 March 2021, Mr Attieh emailed to Mr Najjar and Ms Tfaili the draft share sale and purchase agreement (the “Draft SPA”) for their “review and comment” ahead of the Cedar Mundi BoD scheduled for the following week. Mr Attieh did not circulate the Draft SPA with the other parties at this stage, presumably because he was conscious that doing so would result in having to disclose the 2020 Transaction (which only occurred later).[328]Indeed, in Attieh 1 at para 189, Mr Attieh is uncharacteristically candid in admitting that:
“I chose not to disclose to Jimmy or Georges that the transfer of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio to IFAC had already happened because I did not want to introduce a potential bone of contention between the Investors during a complicated time for the fund, and when the continued goodwill of all Investors was necessary to find a solution for Cedar Mundi’s problems.”

B6.3 Negotiation of the text of the resolutions

[329]From early April 2021, the parties negotiated to document the “consensus requirements” set out by Mr El Azar in his email of 30 March 2021 in draft board minutes. Multiple drafts and “many iterations” were exchanged in the first two weeks of April 2021 between Mr Attieh, Mr Najjar, Ms Tfaili, Mr El Azar, and Mr Dahdah, who had been engaged by SGBL. A WhatsApp group was also set up to enable efficient communications during the negotiations. The aim was for everyone to reach agreement on the material terms before the board meeting.[330]Mr Attieh initially sent an invitation on 3 April 2021 to convene a board meeting for 8 April 2021, but this was postponed to 13 April 2021 further to an updated invitation sent by Mr Attieh on 8 April 2021.[331]Both Mr Dahdah and Mr El Azar were cross-examined about the negotiations leading up to the 13 April 2021 board meeting. Mr El Azar accepted that he had “no specific recollection” about the detailed textual changes which took place between different iterations of the draft resolutions (Day 5 page 52 line 20 to page 54 line 18).[332]In Dahdah 1 at para 27 Mr Dahdah said that after receiving Mr Najjar’s first drafts on 4 April 2021, “[m]y mark-up was quite heavy”. As he explained:
“I considered it important to have everything recapped, with a very detailed timeline, not least of all to be able to show the other C-331 Shareholders and the BdL that SGBL was acting professionally, ethically and in their best interests. The minutes from the board meeting on 16 March 2021 had been inadequate and completely irregular, allowing Mr Attieh and Mrs Al Qatami to act in their sole discretion. I wanted to ensure that all of the necessary information was included, and that all of the necessary requirements were met for the Proposed Transaction and all other related matters to be duly submitted to the General Assembly for ratification including inter alia the authorisation granted in accordance with the provisions of Article 158 LCC.”
[333]Mr Dahdah’s evidence in cross-examination (which I consider to be credible) was that the negotiations had proceeded under “pressure” from Mr Attieh to move “fast” towards the board meeting and a “forcing to go through this transaction” (Day 3 page 148 line 22 to page 151 line 9). He described the negotiation process as “very hectic and very draining” (Day 3 page 152 line 24), with “sometimes three, four or five calls a day and until very late at night” (Day 3 page 167 lines 18 to 20).[334]During his cross-examination Mr Dahdah was taken to his first two mark-ups of the draft board resolutions on 6 April 2021, with the focus being on the second of those mark-ups. The most important changes, to the fifth, sixth, and seventh, resolutions, as against the final version were as follows:(1) The fifth resolution: a) Mr Dahdah’s second mark-up: b) The final version:(2) The sixth resolution: a) Mr Dahdah’s second mark-up: b) The final version:(3) The seventh resolution: a) Mr Dahdah’s second mark-up: b) The final version:[335]In cross-examination, Mr Dahdah confirmed that his addition of the words “deliberating on” in the seventh resolution, which were retained in the final version, reflected his understanding that there would be a proper discussion and deliberation by the C-331 Shareholders about the merits of the 2021 Transaction either before or at the general assembly: “SGBL was the only bank at the level of the board and all the other C-331 Shareholders had to discuss, deliberate on”; “we negotiated the minutes of meeting way before the meeting and during the meeting it was as well read, discussed and deliberated. This is how it happens under Lebanese law. You have to discuss, deliberate and vote.” (Day 4 page 21 line 10 to page 23 line 10).[336]Mr El Azar gave similar evidence, stating “the final draft minutes would have had to be circulated to the 331 shareholders for comments and for full alignment” (Day 5 page 47 lines 3 to 5). The general assembly was “not a simple formality” but an essential forum for the other C-331 Shareholders to consider the transaction and have their say (Day 4 page 44 line 22 to page 45 line 15). It was not the case that the terms were agreed or intended to be agreed in advance of the board meeting.[337]Moreover, during these negotiations Mr Attieh had never said “words to the effect that as a matter of law there was no need for a general assembly resolution and/or that there was not going to be one”, as Mr Dahdah confirmed in re-examination (Day 4 page 44 lines 2 to 6). Rather, Mr Dahdah’s understanding was that “the general assembly was to be held because, as I said, this was part of all the discussions, it was the agreement that it was a whole -- this transaction has to be approached as a whole transaction and Mr Attieh called a meeting, convened the shareholders to a GA meeting on April 19th, I assume.” (Day 4 page 44 lines 15 to 21). Mr Dahdah also rejected the suggestion that the general assembly meeting itself was only going to be a formality, stating, “of course not, because the general assembly has an essential role in all this mechanism of authorisation and the general assembly gives the vote to people that are not sitting on the board of directors … and … we could not contravene or breach the specific provisions of the Lebanese Code of Commerce…” (Day 4 page 44 line 25 to page 45 line 8)[338]Indeed, at a candid moment in his cross-examination Mr Attieh acknowledged the following (Day 8 page 64 line 23 to page 65 line 2):
“Q. -- you must have understood the intention and outcome of the 13 April 2021 meeting to mean that there did indeed now need to be a general assembly meeting to deal with the matters set out in the agenda; yes? A. Yes, that was the agreement, yes.”
(emphasis added)[339]Mr Attieh was also asked during cross-examination on several occasions to explain his understanding of the inclusion of the words “deliberating on”, but (unconvincingly) when pressed, he could say only, “I don’t know”, “I don’t remember” (Day 8 page 49 lines 5 to 16).[340]As I have already addressed in Section B2.2 above, and in a true low point in his evidence, Mr Attieh then went so far as to invent a factual narrative, that was contrary to the terms of the 13 April board resolution itself, and is clearly untrue (Day 8 page 50 lines 1 to 8):
“I told [Mr Najjar] it’s very long basically to actually have a formal general assembly meeting and we are time-sensitive -- under time pressure because of the mounting losses and the raising of Cedar II. So Nadi basically answered me that he actually spoke to Farid Dahdah and Jimmy and they all agreed that all the decisions will be made at the board and there is no need basically to wait for a general assembly meeting.”
[341]This was a wholly new allegation. It did not appear in any of Mr Attieh’s witness statements, and it was not put to Mr El Azar or Mr Dahdah (which is hardly surprising as it was a clear invention by Mr Attieh, “on the hoof”). Mr Najjar, of course, was not called as a witness by the Defendants either.[342]Mr Attieh was later to retreat from this untrue allegation, to say that all that had been agreed with SGBL was that “the decisions will be made at the board and there is no need to wait for the statutory auditors’ report to conclude -- to call for the general assembly meeting. There is no need to wait for the statutory auditor report” (Day 8 page 52 lines 5 to 10), albeit that remains an equally untruthful account, and that had not been agreed with SGBL either.[343]Mr Attieh then pivoted again to make an alternative and inconsistent allegation, when it was put to him that at no point during the negotiations did SGBL agree that the transaction could be entered into without the prior approval of the general assembly, as follows (Day 8 page 55 lines 16 to 23):
“basically my understanding, based basically on the discussion that I had with Nadi, who relayed basically what he discussed with Jimmy and Dahdah, is that this general assembly that we were calling forward was just for the pure form because SGBL was already liaising to get the approval of all the Circular 331 shareholders on the conditions on which basically that board has resolved to enter into the transaction.”
[344]Mr Attieh repeated this allegation, that the general assembly was simply for “pure form” later in the same day, denying that it was understood between the parties that the general assembly was a necessary precursor to the transaction, and stating that the point of it was “[p]our la forme … For pure form.” (Day 8 page 65 lines 3 to 11).[345]Such allegations did not appear in any of Mr Attieh’s witness statements and, tellingly, they were not put to Mr El Azar or Mr Dahdah (as they would have been had that been the Defendants’ understanding of Mr Attieh’s evidence (or indeed their case)). They were not, of course, corroborated by Mr Najjar either, as the Defendants did not call him. This is another example of Mr Attieh making matters up “on the hoof”, and in a way that is plainly inconsistent with the wording of the board resolutions, as addressed in due course below.[346]Throughout this negotiation process, SGBL kept the C-331 Shareholders informed of developments in relation to the proposed 2021 Transaction. Mr El Azar sent the first email to the C-331 Shareholders on 1 April 2021, “so we could update you on where discussions stand in respect of the proposed transaction and align on the next steps”. Mr El Azar said that he had had discussions with Mr Attieh and “legal advisors” the previous day regarding PWC’s prospective mission, which “touched on a further adjustment to the price that accounts for any disproportionate funding of the portfolio by [MABIL], which may be reasonable should such an adjustment be founded.”[347]Mr El Azar added that PWC had “touched on at least 2 of the 3 core issues relating to their prospective mission”, including(i) “[e]xpressing independence restrictions that they are subject to given the risk of a self-review threat. Consequently, this may restrict the type and scope of mission they may be able to take on”; and(ii) “[t]hat an independent valuations team, should PwC be able to offer certain capabilities, could be tasked with performing a review of valuation providing an objective assessment resulting in a due diligence report (including sensitivity analysis)”.[348]Mr El Azar requested that the C-331 Shareholders have a call on 6 April 2021 to discuss these matters further, noting that SGBL had suggested waiting for PWC’s feedback on prospective capabilities before proceeding with next steps and that a “crucial element” for any missions with PWC was reaching alignment on the definition of a fair price.[349]SGBL scheduled a Zoom meeting with the C-331 Shareholders for 6 April 2021, which (per El Azar 1 at para 102), “was to update the other C-331 Shareholders on where things had reached and agree on next steps”.[350]The next significant update was on 12 April 2021 when Mr El Azar sent a further email, in which he explained:
“After a long weekend of onerous drafting and negotiations” with Mr Attieh, SGBL believed that they were “nearing a workable understanding with the majority Board members of the Company in anticipation of a scheduled Board meeting for 13 April 2021.” and that Mr Attieh had agreed that SGBL (on behalf of Cedar Mundi) would appoint an independent expert to produce a report in respect of the proposed 2021 Transaction “based on a scope of work that would be agreed upon between SGBL (on behalf of the 331 shareholders) and the independent expert”
. A Zoom call was arranged for later that day to discuss. Whilst the Defendants invite the Court to infer that on this call the shareholders approved the terms of the transaction, there is simply insufficient evidence for any such inference to be drawn, and the board resolutions must be construed on their own merits.[351]Around the same time and further to discussions with Mr Attieh, Mr El Azar informed the C-331 Shareholders that PWC had declined to act as an independent valuation expert given their independence restrictions and therefore that the C-331 Shareholders were “yet to agree with the majority of the board members on an alternative independent expert”.

B6.4 The Board resolutions

[352]On 13 April 2021, the board meeting took place as planned. It was attended by Mr Attieh, Mrs Al Qatami (for herself and also representing Mr Santiso), and SGBL (represented by Mr El Azar). Both Mr Najjar and Mr Dahdah attended as observers. The meeting took place remotely and a video recording together with a transcript were made.[353]The board approved seven resolutions at the board meeting. The last five are the most important.[354]The first resolution provided as follows:
“The Board of Directors hereby acknowledges Mr. Georges Saghbini’s resignation from office as member of the Board of Directors as of 23 March 2021 pursuant to his letter addressed to the Company’s Chairman on the same day, and therefore decides to duly inform all relevant bodies and authorities of such resignation.”
[355]The second resolution provided as follows:
“The Board of Directors hereby confirms that no Notice of Default has been served by the Company on the Company’s shareholders as of the day of this meeting. The Board further acknowledges receipt of the letter dated March 15th, 2021 received by the Company from Med Al Bahar International (Ltd). and whilst preserving the rights and interests of the Company. it resolves to withhold any position by the Company in relation thereto. SGBL informed the Board that it has already replied in writing to the aforesaid Notice of Default and stated that (i) neither SGBL nor the other 331 shareholders were in default under the PPM and (ii) Med Al Bahar International (Ltd.) had no capacity whatsoever to send such a notice to the Company's shareholders irrespective of the legality and/or merits thereof.”
[356]The third resolution provided for “the appointment of an independent expert by SGBL (on behalf of the Company)” to produce a report in respect of the proposed 2021 Transaction and the value of the investment portfolio. That report was to be submitted to “the Final Expert as per the arbitration procedure” if Cedar II wished to challenge such post-closing adjustment.[357]The fourth resolution contained a series of further terms for the SPA, including detailed provisions as to any post-closing adjustment. It also included resolutions waiving any claims by the Company against the C-331 Shareholders; releasing the C-331 Shareholders from any capital commitments; and requiring CMCH to continue as manager “until such time as the Company’s assets are fully divested, and the Company is wound-up …”[358]The fifth resolution provided as follows:
“The Board of Directors hereby empowers the Chairwoman and/or the Vice Chairman to enter into the Definitive Agreement with Cedar II Fund LP (Cayman Islands) and to do all preparatory actions in connection therewith, on certain terms set out in the Heads of Terms with the express requirement and subject to the inclusion in the Definitive Agreement of the key terms and clauses enumerated in the Third and Fourth Resolutions hereabove.”
[359]The sixth resolution provided as follows:
“The Board of Directors reiterates its decision to provide the Central Bank of Lebanon with the full specifics of the Proposed Transaction timely in accordance with the provisions of Article 20 of the Company’s bylaws and the applicable regulatory requirements.”
[360]The seventh resolution provided as follows (with blanks left for the time and date):
“The Board of Directors resolves to invite the General Assembly to be held extraordinarily at a.m. on 2021 by video-conference to deliberate on the following agenda: 1 Taking note of, deliberating on and ratifying the Proposed Transaction and the Third, Fourth and Sixth Resolutions passed by the Board of Directors during its meeting held on April 13th, 2021. 2 Ratifying the authorization granted by the Board of Directors to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Code of commerce, 3 Other matters.”
[361]On 16 April 2021, Mr El Azar sent the final board minutes to the C-331 Shareholders, under a cover email which stated:
“I am pleased to advise that after several weeks of strenuous and onerous negotiations/drafting, we have managed to reach a workable understanding (the Understanding ) with the majority members of the Board of Directors (the Board) of Cedar Mundi Holding SAL (the Company ) consistent with the consensus reached by the majority of the 331 shareholders of the Company.”
[362]Mr El Azar then set out the key commercial terms that had been agreed, including that Cedar Mundi would confirm that there had been no default; that an independent expert would be appointed and there would be a price adjustment mechanism linked to a further valuation; and that upon ratification by the general assembly, the C-331 Shareholders “shall be irrevocably deemed as fully and finally released” from their capital commitments. B7. CONSTRUCTION OF THE 13 APRIL BOARD MINUTES (ISSUE 4)[363]It is convenient to address at this point a core issue on the validity of the 2021 Transaction, namely Issue 4.[364]Issue 4 is:
“On the true construction of the minutes of the board meeting on 13 April 2021, was the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification?”
[365]Issue 4 is an important issue because (as the parties confirmed in the course of oral closing submissions) if it is answered in the affirmative, then subject to Issue 7(2) (ratification), the 2021 Transaction is void and there are proprietary claims against Cedar II and the 2020 Transaction is void and there are proprietary claims against IFAC.[366]For its part, the Claimant submits that on the true construction of the board minutes the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction was conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification. They say this is so(i) based on the true construction of the Board minutes themselves on their face, and(ii) having regard to the conduct and communications between the parties both (a) before and (b) after the board meeting and approval of the minutes. They also say that this is consistent with the proper interpretation of Article 158 of the LCC, which they say is no doubt why it was agreed that the board’s authorisation was subject to general assembly ratification. In this regard the Defendants (rightly) accept that whilst “[t]his issue of construction is distinct from the question of the legal effect of board authorisation. It is however informed by the legal framework, including the terms of Article 158” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 488).[367]In contrast, the Defendants submit that on the true construction of the board minutes (and in particular in reliance of the Fifth Resolution) the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction was not conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification, and that even before, and also absent, general assembly ratification, the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction was valid, and allowed the 2021 Transaction to be entered into.

B7.1 Relevant principles in relation to construction

[368]Ultimately it is a question of fact as to what was factually agreed at the meeting of 13 April 2021 on the proper construction of the minutes of that meeting. This was common ground, as was expressly confirmed in oral closings, e.g. by Mr Montagu-Smith KC at Day 17 page 116 at lines 5 to 15. That question is a matter for the Court and, in the first instance, can be answered by reference to the contents of the minutes on their face.[369]It is also common ground that the minutes have to be read as a whole, and that individual resolutions have to be read together with all other relevant parts of the minutes (as Mr Montagu-Smith also confirmed in oral closing at Day 17 page 133 lines 23 to 25 and page 134 lines 1 to 5 respectively).[370]There are, however, differences between the parties as to whether it is appropriate and permissible to also have regard to matters before or after the 13 April 2021 board meeting when construing the board minutes.[371]Both parties also agreed that Issue 4 needs to be considered in the light of the Lebanese legal position (as Mr Montagu-Smith himself stated in oral closing (Day 17 page 104 lines 10 to 11)), including provisions of Lebanese law including Article 158.[372]However whilst, at various times, Mr Montagu-Smith accepted that under Lebanese law it is permissible to have regard to negotiations between the parties in terms of earlier drafts of the board minutes – see Day 17 page 156 lines 21 to 25 and page 157 lines 1 to 3 (which is, of course, different to the position in English law in relation to contracts), he also alleged that construction of the minutes must be interpreted objectively and without regard to the background knowledge available to the parties, relying upon the approach in English law as to the construction of minutes, and the English cases of Heran v Younger [2002] EWHC 963 (Ch) at [81] and Cherry Tree Investments v Landmain Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 736 at [129]-[130] that where a document is registered and publicly available for inspection evidence of matters known only to the parties who drafted it is generally irrelevant.[373]I address this issue separately below before considering the surrounding circumstances. Suffice it to say that, despite the parties having served, and relied upon, extensive evidence as to Lebanese law and principles of construction, there is no evidence that there is any such principle in Lebanese law, and I do not consider that the Defendants are right to say that regard may not be had to matters that take place before or after the 13 April 2021 board meeting when construing the board minutes of a Lebanese company in relation to what was or was not agreed.[374]In terms of applicable principles of construction, the minutes are not a legal contract between two parties, and so in construing the minutes one is not construing a bilateral contract between two parties. As already noted, the issue of construction is a question of what is factually agreed (which will determine what authority is thereby conferred). What is under consideration is what was agreed in the minutes, including whether there was any agreement to enter into the 2021 Transaction, and if so whether such agreement was conditional upon general assembly ratification.[375]In such circumstances, I consider that the Claimant is right in its submission that in construing the minutes, regard can be had to Lebanese law principles of contractual construction, and indeed the parties invited the experts to opine on such principles and they have done so. I would note that neither party has identified any alternative approach. Mr Sakr also accepted that Lebanese principles of contractual construction would apply to corporate resolutions as set out in board minutes, “if we consider that the company’s resolution have a contractual nature” (Day 11 page 151 lines 13 to 14). The minutes undoubtably are of a contractual nature in the sense that they evidence what was or was not agreed, including as to whether there was an agreement to enter into the 2021 Transaction and if so whether that was conditional upon general assembly ratification.[376]I accordingly set out the applicable principles of Lebanese law as to contractual construction, which were common ground between the experts. I would only add at the outset that I do not believe it makes any difference (when construing the minutes on their face), whether or not regard is had to Lebanese principles of contractual construction, as I consider that as a matter of fact, the minutes are clear on their face (such minutes reflecting, on their face, the objective common intention of the parties). Nevertheless, if one has regard to such principles I consider they support the construction I place upon the minutes. It is when one looks to matters before and after the 13 April 2021, in the context of construing the minutes, that such principles of Lebanese law, and the associated Lebanese law expert evidence most obviously come into play.[377]The essential principles of Lebanese contractual interpretation are set out in Articles 366 to 371 of the CoC under a section entitled “On the Rules of Interpretation of Legal Acts”. These provisions set out a number of rules according to which contracts must be interpreted, the most relevant of which for present purposes are the following three, which provide:
“Article 366: In legal acts, the judge shall ascertain the true … mutual intent of all contracting parties (in the case of a contract), and shall not be bound by the literal meaning of the wording of the text. Article 367: Where a provision admits of two interpretations, the one most consonant with the spirit of the contract and its intended purpose shall prevail. In all cases, the meaning that gives effect to the text shall be preferred over one that leaves it without effect. Article 368: The clauses of a single agreement shall be harmonised and interpreted together, having regard to the agreement as a whole.”
[378]Professor Soumrani’s evidence, with which Mr Sakr agreed at paragraph 186 of Sakr 1 (save in respect of one issue which concerns the operation of Article 369 of the CoC), is as follows:
“259. Primacy of the common intention of the parties. Pursuant to Article 366 CoC, the judge must determine the true intent of the contracting parties rather than merely relying on the express wording of the contract’s text. However, when doing so, the judge cannot give a meaning to clear provisions of a contract that contradicts their plain wording, because doing so constitutes a distortion of the text (denaturation) that may lead to the annulment of his judgment by a higher court. 260. Primacy of the spirit of the contract. If a provision of a contract can be interpreted in two manners, Article 367 CoC provides that the interpretation that is the closest to the spirit and the purpose of the contract must be adopted; and in all events, the sense that gives the provision legal effect must prevail over the one that renders it ineffective. 261. Harmonization of the contractual clauses. Article 368 CoC provides that the clauses of the same contract must be coordinated and interpreted in relation to each other, in light of the contract as a whole. Mr M. El Auji notes that when faced with an ambiguous clause or with provisions that are contradictory or inconsistent with each other, the judge must interpret the contract based on its overall content and in light of what the parties intended to achieve through it.”
[379]It is also common ground between the Lebanese law experts that when construing a contract under Lebanese law the judge must look for the common intention of the parties beyond the mere text of the contract. Thus, the experts agree, as set out in paragraph 64 of the Experts Agreed Joint Memo as follows: “When a judge interprets a contract under Lebanese law, he must look for the common intention of the parties beyond the mere text of the contract, but without distorting (denaturer) such text”. (emphasis added)[380]In this regard Mr Sakr confirmed, in cross-examination, that in interpreting a contract a Court can properly look at the surrounding communications of the parties both before and after the contract has been concluded as an aid to interpreting their true meaning (see Day 11 page 150 line 21 to page 151 line 6):
“Q. So does this mean, just to be clear, that in interpreting a contract, the court can properly look not only at the contract itself but the surrounding communications of the parties? A. To -- in order to understand the real intent of the party. Q. Right. So is it right the court can take into account the conduct and actions of the parties, both before and after the contract has been concluded, as you say, as an aid to interpreting their true intent? A. Yes.”
A. Yes.”

B7.2 The construction of the board minutes on their face

[381]As I have already noted, the board minutes have to be read as a whole, and individual resolutions have to be read together with all other relevant parts of the minutes, when construing the minutes.[382]The Board Minutes expressly record that:
“[t]he meeting was presided by Mrs. Wafa Al Qatami who mentioned that the Board was invited to deliberate on the following agenda: … 2) Discussing the letter dated March 15th, 2021 sent by Med Al Bahar International (Ltd) to SGBL and the other 331 shareholders. 3) Discussing the emails dated March 9th, 16th, 23rd and 30th, 2021, addressed by SGBL to the Board of Directors in relation to the “Proposed Transaction” as contemplated in the Heads of Terms submitted by Kuwait Holding Company K.S.C.C. (“KH”) for and on behalf of Cedar II Fund LP (Grand Cayman) (“C2”) and approved by the Board of Directors during its meeting held on 16 March 2021 in the absence of SGBL and the resigning Board member, Mr Georges Saghbini. 4) Discussing and approving the appointment of an independent expert by SGBL (on behalf of the Company) from among qualified international firms to produce a report in respect of the Proposed Transaction in accordance with international standards. 5) Reviewing and discussing certain key terms to be provided for in the Definitive Agreement with Cedar II Fund LP (Cayman Islands) in connection with the Proposed Transaction. 6) Empowering the Chairwoman and/or the Vice Chairman to negotiate and enter into the Definitive Agreement on behalf of the Company in accordance with the present minutes of the meeting. 7) Providing the Central Bank of Lebanon with the full specifics of the Proposed Transaction in accordance with Article 20 of the Company’s Bylaws and the applicable regulatory requirements. 8) Convening the Company’s Ordinary General Assembly to meet extraordinarily to take note of, deliberate on and ratify the Proposed Transaction and, accordingly, the Third, Fourth and Sixth resolutions passed during the present Board meeting, as well as setting its agenda. After discussion and deliberation, the Board of Directors resolved the following:”
(emphasis added) After discussion and deliberation, the Board of Directors resolved the following:”[383]In relation to 3), the letters of 9, 16 and 23 March 2021 all contemplated there being a general assembly to approve the 2021 Transaction. In relation to 8), this expressly contemplated “Convening the Company’s Ordinary General Assembly to meet extraordinarily to take note of, deliberate on and ratify the Proposed Transaction” (emphasis added), which is entirely consistent with the Claimant’s construction of the minutes and the meaning and effect of Resolution 7 thereof, whilst the Defendants’ construction does not give any real meaning and effect to the words, “deliberate on” here, or in Resolution 7.[384]The Third Resolution provided for “the appointment of an independent expert by SGBL (on behalf of the Company) … to produce a report (at the Company’s cost and expenses)” in respect of the proposed 2021 Transaction and the value of the investment portfolio.[385]The Fourth Resolution provided:
“After hearing the Vice Chairman on the pressing issues facing the Company in light of the current economic turmoil in Lebanon, the Board of Directors hereby decides to include in the contemplated Definitive Agreement to be entered into with Cedar II Fund LP (Cayman Islands) (the “Definitive Agreement”), the following key terms:”
[386]There then followed a series of ten key terms for the SPA, including provisions as to any post-closing adjustments. Resolution 4 then continued with Resolutions A and B. Resolution A provided:
“Furthermore, the Board of Directors hereby resolves that: A. Immediately upon and subject to ratification by the Company’s General Assembly of the Proposed Transaction and the Third, Fourth and Sixth resolutions passed by the Board of Directors during this meeting, (i) the Board shall be deemed to have waive any and all claims whatsoever towards the 331 shareholders in respect of any called and/or uncalled capital by the Company, and (ii) the Company’s shareholders shall be irrevocably deemed as fully and finally released from any and all obligations in respect of such called and/or uncalled capital…”
[387]The Fourth Resolution accordingly includes (within it) Resolution A, with Resolution A being an integral part of the Fourth Resolution – as shown by the ending words, “This Resolution was approved unanimously”.[388]In Resolution A the words, “subject to” are express words of conditionality. Resolution A is recognising that the matters specified in (i) and (ii) are conditional upon the ratification by the Company’s General Assembly of the Proposed Transaction, and it is also a further express recognition that the Proposed Transaction is itself going to be considered (and potentially ratified) at the Company’s General Assembly (as Resolution 7 then addresses).[389]For ease of reference I will set out the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Resolutions again at this point. The Fifth Resolution provided: “The Board of Directors hereby empowers the Chairwoman and/or the Vice Chairman to enter into the Definitive Agreement with Cedar II Fund LP (Cayman Islands) and to do all preparatory actions in connection therewith, on certain terms set out in the Heads of Terms with the express requirement and subject to the inclusion in the Definitive Agreement of the key terms and clauses enumerated in the Third and Fourth Resolutions hereabove”.[390]The Sixth Resolution provided:
“The Board of Directors reiterates its decision to provide the Central Bank of Lebanon with the full specifics of the Proposed Transaction timely in accordance with the provisions of Article 20 of the Company’s Bylaws and the applicable regulatory requirements.”
[391]And the Seventh Resolution provided:
“The Board of Directors resolves to invite the General Assembly to be held extraordinarily at a.m. on 2021 by video-conference to deliberate on the following agenda: 1 Taking note of, deliberating on and ratifying the Proposed Transaction and the Third, Fourth and Sixth Resolutions passed by the Board of Directors during its meeting held on April 13th, 2021. 2 Ratifying the authorization granted by the Board of Directors to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Code of commerce, 3 Other matters.”
[392]As I have identified above, and as is common ground, these resolutions must be read together as a whole, and not with an exclusionary focus on one resolution over another, still less construing one resolution in isolation or without regard to other resolutions. What is more, this is not simply a principle of construction (though it is that as well). It is plain that these resolutions are interlinked, and the true meaning of any one resolution can only be ascertained by considering it in the context of all the resolutions, and the minutes as a whole.[393]This was rightly recognised by Mr Dahdah in his evidence. As he put it (Day 3 page 189 lines 6 to 19), the Fifth Resolution must not be put “out of context”, “[i]t’s a whole transaction. It’s not only board minutes or one resolution here and one resolution there”. As he also rightly stated, the minutes “have to be read all together. We cannot read two sentences without the rest of the minutes of meeting” (Day 4 page 10 lines 5 to 7).[394]By the Fifth Resolution the Board of Directors “empowers the Chairwoman and/or the Vice Chairman to enter into the Definitive Agreement with [Cedar II]” i.e. it provides the power (or authority) whereby they will be able to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement without the need to go back to the Board of Directors in the future, but it says nothing about when they can do so.[395]For that one has to look at the minutes as a whole, and specifically the Seventh Resolution which addresses the “when”, and which makes clear not only that there must be a general assembly held but that the purpose of that general assembly “is to deliberate on” (the ordinary and natural meaning of such words being to debate and decide whether or not to do) that which is the subject matter of the two agenda items, namely:(1) “Taking note of, deliberating on and ratifying the Proposed Transaction and the Third, Fourth and Sixth resolutions passed by the Board of Directors during the meeting held on April 13th, 2021”, and(2) “Ratifying the authorization granted by the Board of Directors to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Code of commerce”.[396]It is important to note that (2) is also subject to the opening words, “deliberate on”, so it is not only expressly contemplated in(1) that general assembly may “deliberate on” and may decide not to ratify the Proposed Transaction; it is also expressly contemplated in(2) that the general assembly is “to deliberate on … ratifying the authorisation granted by the Board to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement” and may decide not to ratify the authorisation granted by the Board to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement.[397]The Seventh Resolution, therefore, makes absolutely plain that the board authorisation in the Fifth Resolution is subject to, and conditional upon, the general assembly ratifying not only the Proposed Transaction but also the authorisation granted by the Board to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement.[398]Accordingly, what is contemplated factually is that there will be a deliberation on the Proposed Transaction at a general assembly, and the ordinary and natural meaning of the Seventh Resolution (both in relation to Agenda item (1) and Agenda item (2)) is that if there is not a positive outcome on those agenda items then the Proposed Transaction is not ratified, and the authorisation granted by the Board of Directors to enter into the Proposed Transaction and Definitive Agreement (the very opening words and subject matter of the Fifth Resolution) is not ratified, which means that the empowerment in the Fifth Resolution is conditional upon there being a positive outcome at the general assembly. If that were not the case (as the Defendants allege) that would fail to give meaning and effect to the very words of the Seventh Resolution. Put another way, they would have no meaning and effect.[399]In this regard Mr Montagu-Smith rightly accepted that the “Proposed Transaction” referred to in the Seventh Resolution is the subject matter of the Fifth Resolution (Day 17 page 137 lines 1 to 3). It follows that Fifth Resolution must be subject to (and qualified by) what is stated in the Seventh Resolution.[400]Yet further, the very language selected by the parties in relation to first Agenda Item under the Seventh Resolution i.e. “[t]aking note of, deliberating on and ratifying the Proposed Transaction and the Third, Fourth and Sixth Resolutions” necessarily presupposes that the 2021 Transaction was not otherwise authorised. If the opposite were true, and the correct construction was that the 2021 Transaction was already authorised by the board minutes alone, there would be no consequence to the general assembly deliberating on the Proposed 2021 Transaction and determining that it should not be entered into. But this is not the case, as Mr Montagu-Smith seemed to accept when it was put to him by the Court during Closing Submissions (Day 17 page 139 lines 2 to 11):
“Q. … do you accept that if … there’s an actual general assembly, it takes place, and at the general assembly it’s resolved the proposed transaction will not be entered into. A. Yes. Q. Do you accept that’s an outcome that can happen at the general assembly? A. Yes, of course, as a matter of logic.”
Q. Do you accept that’s an outcome that can happen at the general assembly? A. Yes, of course, as a matter of logic.”

Q. Do you accept that’s an outcome that can happen at the general assembly?

[401]If it possible for the general assembly to effectively prevent the 2021 Transaction from proceeding, then it must be the case that the authorisation to enter into that transaction must be conditional upon approval or ratification of that decision at the general assembly. This is consistent with the fact that the insertion and ultimate inclusion of the words “deliberating on” in the Seventh Resolution show that the parties contemplated, as a matter of fact, that there would be a deliberation on the Proposed 2021 Transaction, which could not be passed without a positive outcome at the general assembly. If there was not a positive outcome at the general assembly, then the ordinary, natural meaning of the Seventh Resolution would be that the Fifth Resolution is conditional upon that outcome. To construe the resolutions otherwise would be to render the Seventh Resolution meaningless and legally ineffective.[402]The clue is also in how the transaction is described, it is the “Proposed” Transaction. It is not a transaction that has been decided upon or approved unless and until it is deliberated upon and ratified by the General Assembly.[403]Looking at the remainder of the Fifth Resolution, it also empowers the Chairwoman and/or the Vice Chairman “to do all preparatory actions in connection therewith, on certain terms set out in the Heads of Terms with the express requirement and subject to the inclusion in the Definitive Agreement of the key terms and clauses enumerated in the Third and Fourth Resolutions”.[404]There are two points to note about this part of the Fifth Resolution. The first is that this part also authorises those individuals to “do all preparatory actions” so that empowers them to do such preparatory actions, that is actions in advance of the entering into the Definitive Agreement (as logically such matters must all be done before the entering into of the Definitive Agreements), so this part of the Fifth Resolution facilitates taking forward matters that must be done before the entering into of the Definitive Agreement.[405]The second point of note is that those Third and Fourth Resolutions are themselves expressly identified in the Seventh Resolution as requiring a vote by the general assembly so that the Fifth Resolution is intrinsically bound up with the Seventh Resolution. There is therefore nothing in the fact that the Seventh Resolution does not also cross refer to the Fifth Resolution (or vice versa) as quite apart from the terms of the Seventh Resolution as to deliberation (as addressed above), the Fifth Resolution is expressly bound up with the Seventh Resolution via the Third and Fourth Resolutions passed at the same board meeting.[406]The difficulty with the Defendants’ construction of the Fifth Resolution is that it transparently (and wrongly) seeks to construe the Fifth Resolution in isolation. Thus, the Defendants assert that “on its face the Fifth Resolution was unconditional. There was no express condition in the resolution” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 501). Quite apart from the fact that the Fifth Resolution is silent as to timing i.e. when the Definitive Agreement may be entered into – for which see the Seventh Resolution, such assertion entirely ignores the other resolutions including the Third, Fourth and Seventh Resolutions.[407]The Defendants then assert that, “to construe [the Fifth Resolution] as being subject to general assembly ratification would be to read words into the resolution which do not exist” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 501) but there is no need to read any words into the Fifth Resolution. It is common ground that the minutes have to be read as a whole, with the result that it is appropriate (and necessary) to have regard to the Seventh Resolution, and what is there contemplated, when construing the Fifth Resolution.[408]There is a yet further point which supports the Claimant’s construction which relates to the second agenda item to be deliberated, namely:
“to deliberate on the following agenda … 2. Ratifying the authorization granted by the Board of Directors to enter into the Proposed Transaction and the Definitive Agreement in accordance with the provisions of article 158 of the Code of commerce.”
(emphasis added)[409]I address Article 158 in Section D2 below. For present purposes it suffices to note two points. First that the parties clearly contemplated as a matter of fact that Article 158 was applicable in the factual scenario under consideration, and second the last sentence of Article 158 provides “[i]n all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”. Plainly, this was an agenda item for the general assembly precisely because it was contemplated that these were matters which the board of directors had agreed that the general assembly should determine, and any authorisation was not to be deemed effective until after there had been ratification by the general assembly. This is entirely consistent with, and indeed supportive of, the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction being conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification.[410]In this context, the Fifth Resolution was not providing Mr Attieh with an immediate and unrestricted power to proceed to execute the SPA without having to wait for the matters specified in the Sixth Resolution (i.e. providing the BdL “with the full specifics of the Proposed Transaction timely” and the Seventh Resolution (including the general assembly deliberating on and (if it saw fit) ratifying the Proposed Transaction). The contrary construction, as advocated by the Defendants, whereby Mr Attieh could immediately proceed without informing the BdL and without general assembly ratification would denude the Sixth and Seventh Resolutions of meaning and effect, and would also be contrary to the express terms of Article 158 (which applied), and would be inconsistent with the process required by Article 158 (as addressed in Section D2 in the context of Issue 2).[411]Whilst recognising that the issue of construction is distinct from the legal effect of board authorisation, the Defendants also submit that the issue of construction is informed by the legal framework including the terms of Article 158. Again, I address Article 158, in detail, in Section D2 below. For present purposes it suffices to note the overall structure in sub-paragraph 3 and following of Article 158 which culminates in the final sentence of Article 158 and encapsulates what both experts refer to as the “Control Procedure” (see Soumrani 2 at para 114 and Sakr 1 at para 72). It can be broken down into five stages:(1) The First Stage is that the related party must inform the board of directors of the proposed transaction (para 3 of Article 158)).(2) The Second Stage is that the board of directors must review the “authorisations for” the proposed transaction and do so within a reasonable period of time before convening the general assembly (para 4.a). This must mean that the board of directors must decide whether or not to approve/authorise the proposed transaction (a proposition with which Mr Sakr agreed during the course of his cross-examination (see Day 11 page 41 at lines 5 to 13)).(3) The Third Stage is that the board of directors must submit a report to the general assembly (para 4.a of Article 158) which specifically contemplates, therefore, that there will be a general assembly. As Mr Sakr accepted (Day 11 page 41 lines 17 to 20), the purpose of the board of director’s report is to inform the general assembly for the purposes of its decision as to whether to ratify the authorisation.(4) The Fourth Stage is that the board must notify the auditors, and the auditors must submit a special report on the proposed transaction to the general assembly (para 4.b of Article 158), which again specifically contemplates that there will be a general assembly. As Mr Sakr accepted (Day 11 page 42 lines 4 to 8), the purpose of the auditors’ report is to provide necessary information to the general assembly for its decision as to whether to ratify the authorisation.(5) The Fifth Stage is that the general assembly must meet to decide whether to ratify the authorisation. This is an important stage which is expressly recognised by both experts in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo at para 25 (last sentence), “The general assembly must meet to ratify the authorisation granted by the board of directors” (emphasis added) (the same was also confirmed by Mr Sakr in cross-examination (Day 11 page 42 lines 9 to 12). And (crucially) the final sentence says that “in all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”.[412]In the context of construing the minutes, the Defendants submit that it is contemplated in the stages identified above (or what the Defendants refer to as the “sequence of events”) that these take place in a chronological order, and it is submitted that the “logical consequence of this would be that it would not be possible for the board to grant authorisation which was – on its own terms – conditional on general assembly ratification” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 492). This is simply incorrect, and indeed it fails to have regard to the very structure of Article 158.[413]The Second Stage is that the board of directors must review the “authorisations for” the proposed transaction and do so within a reasonable period of time before convening the general assembly (para 4.a). This means that the board of directors must decide whether or not to approve/authorise the proposed transaction. That is precisely what is done in the Fifth Resolution, but such authorisation can be (and on the proper construction of the minutes was) as a matter of fact conditional upon subsequent ratification at the general assembly (such ratification being at the Fifth Stage). It is perfectly possible for it to be agreed factually that the authorisation (the Second Stage) is conditional upon subsequent ratification (at the Fifth Stage). This does not prevent the Second Stage having taken place, so that the Third to Fifth Stages can take place thereafter. Indeed, that is what was contemplated in the minutes culminating in the Fifth Stage (as catered for in the Seventh Resolution).[414]The minutes and associated board resolutions (as addressed above) plainly anticipate that a general assembly meeting will be held to consider the transaction and the Cedar Mundi BoD’s authorisation, not simply as a matter of procedure or formality dictated by Article 158, but as a matter of fact on the true and proper construction of the minutes.[415]Accordingly on the true and proper construction of the minutes (on their face), and for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied, and find, that the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction was conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification.

B7.3 The construction of the board minutes having regard to the surrounding circumstances

[416]This construction of the board minutes is further supported, and justified, having regard to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and finalisation of the board minutes, together with the subsequent conduct of the parties.[417]Whilst the Defendants themselves sought to rely upon the negotiations in relation to what became the wording of particular board resolutions (and said that the same was permitted), the Defendants (somewhat inconsistently) submitted that the Court was not permitted to have regard to the surrounding circumstances to identify the intentions of the parties, not even what (in English law) would be referred to as the surrounding factual matrix.[418]Upon examination, however, it became apparent that the Defendants were seeking to rely upon what they submitted was a principle of English law, submitting that “where a document is registered and publicly available for inspection, evidence of matters known only to the parties who drafted the instrument is generally irrelevant”. In support of this proposition, the Defendants cited a passage from Lewison LJ in Cherry Tree Investments v Landmain Ltd, at [129]-[130], as follows:
“In Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988, para 36 Lord Hoffmann himself said of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal discussing a company’s articles of association: “Because the articles are required to be registered, addressed to anyone who wishes to inspect them, the admissible background for the purposes of construction must be limited to what any reader would reasonably be supposed to know. It cannot include extrinsic facts which were known only to some of the people involved in the formation of the company.”
In my judgment this is the key to the present case. The reasonable reader’s background knowledge would, of course, include the knowledge that the charge would be registered in a publicly accessible register upon which third parties might be expected to rely. In other words a publicly registered document is addressed to anyone who wishes to inspect it. His knowledge would include the knowledge that in so far as documents or copy documents were retained by the registrar they were to be taken as containing all material terms…”[419]The Defendants submit that the same considerations apply in the instant case, and since the 13 April 2021 board minutes were registered with the Lebanese Commercial Registry on 21 April 2021, from which point they were publicly available, it would be wrong to construe the minutes by reference to information which was available only to the parties.[420]However, properly analysed, the presumption of similarity (which is what the Defendants are relying upon) cannot apply in this case, and it is therefore wrong to import the dicta of Lewison LJ, and any associated principle of English law, into the construction of the minutes of a Lebanese company, and what was agreed therein in the context of Lebanese law being applicable.[421]The editors of Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws identify in relation to proof of foreign law as follows in Rule 2:
“RULE 2—(1) Where a party relies on foreign law, that law must be pleaded and proved as a fact to the satisfaction of the court by evidence or sometimes by other means. (2) In a case involving a foreign element in which foreign law is not pleaded, the court will apply English law. (3) Where foreign law is recognised to be applicable, but there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, of the content of the foreign law, it will in general be presumed to be the same as English law.”
[422]Rule 2(2) is what Lord Legatt described in Brownlie v FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC [2011] UKSC 45 (“Brownlie”) as the “default rule”. However, that is not in play in the present case because both parties have agreed that Lebanese law applies, and accordingly the present situation raises the issue of whether the presumption of similarity in Rule 2(3) applies.[423]The editors of Dicey address the presumption of similarity at paragraph 3-026:
“3–026 The presumption of similarity. In Brownlie v FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC Lord Leggatt said that the presumption of similarity was justified by a combination of four factors: first, there were often similarities between the laws of different countries, especially in the case of common law countries; second, unless there would be a real likelihood that any differences between the applicable foreign law and English law on a particular issue may lead to a different outcome, there is no good reason to put a party to the trouble and expense of adducing evidence of foreign law; third, the presumption of similarity does not itself determine any legal issue, and only operates unless and until evidence of foreign law is adduced; fourth, the presumption does not alter the legal burden of proof, but merely places the burden of adducing evidence on a party who wishes to displace it. But the presumption of similarity applies only where it is a fair and reasonable assumption to make in the particular case. The question is one of fact: in the circumstances is it reasonable to expect that the applicable foreign law is likely to be materially similar to English law on the matter in issue (meaning that any difference between the two systems are unlikely to lead to a different substantive outcome)?”
(emphasis added)[424]In the present case the Court does have evidence of Lebanese law and principles of construction in Lebanese law. Indeed, it was an agreed issue for the experts to opine on, namely “[w]hat are the principles of contractual construction in Lebanese law”, and the relevant answers are substantially agreed between the experts (as already addressed above).[425]It will be recalled that it is common ground between the Lebanese law experts that when construing a contract under Lebanese law the judge must look for the common intention of the parties beyond the mere text of the contract. Thus, the experts agree, as set out in para 64 of the Experts Agreed Joint Memo as follows:
“When a judge interprets a contract under Lebanese law, he must look for the common intention of the parties beyond the mere text of the contract, but without distorting ( dénaturer) such text”
(emphasis added)[426]Equally, Mr Sakr confirmed, in cross-examination, that in interpreting a contract the Court can properly look at the surrounding communications of the parties both before and after a contract has been concluded as an aid to interpreting their true meaning (see Day 11 page 150 line 21 to page 151 line 6):
“Q. So does this mean, just to be clear, that in interpreting a contract the court can properly look not only at the contract itself but the surrounding communications of the parties? A. To -- in order to understand the real intent of the party. Q. Right. So is it right the court can take into account the conduct and actions of the parties, both before and after the contract has been concluded, as you say, as an aid to interpreting their true intent? A. Yes.”
A. Yes.”[427]For the reasons already addressed above, I consider that the above principles are applicable when construing the board minutes.[428]There is also no suggestion that the principle of English law that the Defendants seek to rely upon has any application in Lebanese law (and that was not put to the experts) and there is no reason to believe there would be similarities in the case of a civil law system such as Lebanese law, and indeed every likelihood that the law might be different and might lead to a different substantive outcome. It is not reasonable to expect that the applicable foreign law is likely to be materially similar to English law on the matter in issue. Indeed, it is notable that in a different context (fiduciary duty) the Defendants themselves identify and rely upon cautionary factors existing which militate against applying the presumption in Brownlie (see para 706 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions).[429]In such circumstances I do not consider that there is any scope for the application of the presumption of similarity, and the Court has sufficient evidence of Lebanese law to conduct the construction exercise without reverting to such presumption.[430]I would only add that I do not consider that the Defendants are, in any event, right as to what the position would have been in English law as between parties (such as the present) who have full knowledge of the surrounding circumstances (as do the relevant third parties) and in circumstances where what is being construed is what the minutes mean having regard to the true intention of those involved in the board meeting. I note that in the case of Hearn v Younger [2002] EWHC 965 (Ch), which is said to evidence that “minutes are interpreted objectively, in the same way as contracts” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 514), Etherton J (as he then was) stated at [81] that: “The inevitable conclusion from this analysis of the documentation leading up to the decisions of the Company and of the Trustees in April and May is that the Company and the Trustees, when referring to their agreement to “guarantee” future increases to pensions in payment at 5% LPI in the Company notice signed by the joint chairmen, and in the minutes of the Trustees’ decision on 10 May 1993, and indeed in the actual discussions to which the minutes refer, were using a shorthand. The Company and the Trustees, or at any event the majority of the Trustees, understood, and any reasonable person having their background knowledge would reasonably have understood, that shorthand to be a reference to the rate specified in Rule 23.1. Accordingly, applying the ordinary objective test applicable to the interpretation of contracts and the principles of interpretation set out in the speech of Lord Hoffmann in the ICS case at [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912g-913e, both the Company and the Trustees intended and agreed to amend the Rules by increasing the rate specified in Rule 23.1 to 5%”. (emphasis added)[431]It is clear from this that when construing minutes, the approach under English law is to apply the principles of interpretation in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL 28; [1998 1 WLR 896 (the “ICS case”) which, of course, includes having regard to the surrounding factual matrix, which extends to what was reasonably available to the parties including absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man, thus extending, even under English law (had it been applicable), to much of what the Claimant relies upon.[432]Applying the applicable principles of Lebanese law as to construction, it is appropriate to consider the circumstances and conduct surrounding the 13 April 2021 board meeting. I have already set out in detail the relevant evidence in Sections B5 and B6 above (and address the evidence after the 13 April 2021 board meeting in Section B8 below).[433]In relation to such evidence I make the following factual findings, all of which support the conclusion that the authorisation to enter into the 2021 Transaction was conditional upon, and subject to, general assembly deliberation, approval, and ratification:(1) SGBL first flagged the need for a general meeting to approve the 2021 Transaction in writing internally in an email from Mr El Azar to Mr Saghbini and Mr Dahdah on 26 February 2021, having received the Draft HoT from Mr Attieh on 18 April 2021.(2) Before seeing these comments, on 27 February 2021, Mr Attieh circulated the papers for the 16 March 2021 board meeting. These papers contemplated that a general assembly would be convened to grant the board authorisation to enter into the 2021 Transaction.(3) Each of the three emails from Mr El Azar to Mr Attieh before the 16 March 2021 board meeting (on 9, 10, and 16 March 2021) made explicit that SGBL required that the decision to enter into the 2021 Transaction be taken by the general assembly.(4) Mr Attieh not only knew that this was SGBL’s pre-condition for the 2021 Transaction before the 16 March 2021 board meeting, but the advice he received at the time, including from Mr Najjar’s law firm and Professor Diab, was also clear that general assembly approval was required.(5) The resolutions passed on 16 March 2021 (in the absence of SGBL and Mr Saghbini) made it clear that “the deal with the Company [would be] in accordance with Article 158” which necessarily meant that there would be a general assembly meeting. The resolution reflected an understanding that Article 158 required general assembly approval for a related party transaction (and, as is addressed in Section D2 below, Article 158 does so require).(6) After the board meeting of 16 March 2021, Mr Attieh assured SGBL that “[i]t ha[d] always been the intention of the Board to include in the agenda of the next General Assembly the ratification of the Proposed transaction”, and SGBL made clear on 26 March 2021 that this was a requirement for its support at any further board meeting considering the 2021 Transaction (Mr El Azar’s “consensus requirements”). The consensus requirements reflected SGBL’s position at the time as to its understanding of Article 158, and were the basis on which the board resolutions were subsequently negotiated.(7) At no point before 13 April 2021 did Mr Attieh share his ‘analyse juridique’ with SGBL or otherwise suggest to SGBL that Article 158 did not require general assembly approval as a pre-condition to the validity of the 2021 Transaction. SGBL therefore never understood that this fundamental aspect of the consensus requirements was in issue.(8) Although Mr Attieh’s evidence was not always consistent, he conceded in cross-examination that the intention and outcome of the negotiations over the precise wording of the 13 April 2021 board resolutions was an agreement that there would be a general assembly to ratify the 2021 Transaction. That was also the clear and consistent evidence of Mr El Azar and Mr Dahdah.(9) That evidence is also consistent with the evolution of the drafting of the resolutions, including Mr Attieh’s agreement to the inclusion of the seventh resolution that the general assembly would “deliberat[e]” on, and not just ratify, the 2021 Transaction.(10) After the 13 April 2021 board meeting (and as addressed in Section B8.1 below), Mr Attieh took steps to arrange a general assembly meeting, which was subsequently postponed but not cancelled, and Mr Dahdah inserted conditions precedent into the draft SPA to require a general assembly meeting. These were consistent with, and reflected, the prior agreement that had in fact been reached on the need for a general assembly meeting.[434]Mr Attieh’s claims that SGBL in fact agreed before (or after) the 13 April 2021 board meeting that there was no need for general assembly approval for the 2021 Transaction, that “all the decisions will be made at the board” and that the general assembly was “just for the pure form” are without any credible evidential foundation, and are contrary to the documentary record and to the evidence of Mr El Azar and Mr Dahdah (which evidence I accept). Such claims are accordingly rejected.[435]Accordingly, a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, before and after the 13 April 2021 meeting further strongly supports the construction I have placed on the minutes namely that the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction was conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification.[436]Finally, on Issue 4, such construction also accords with the proper interpretation of Article 158 as addressed in Section D2 below, in the context of Issue 2. This is no coincidence and no doubt why SGBL (and contemporaneously Mr Attieh) contemplated that the Proposed Transaction had to be approved at a general assembly, and why the Seventh Resolution was included in the board minutes.

B7.4 Conclusion on Issue 4

[437]For all the above reasons, Issue 4, namely “On the true construction of the minutes of the board meeting on 13 April 2021, was the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification” is to be answered in the affirmative. B8. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MEETING

B8.1 Convening of the general assembly

[438]After the conclusion of the meeting, Mr El Azar sent to the C-331 Shareholders a copy of the board minutes, stating that “after several weeks of strenuous and onerous negotiations/drafting, we have managed to reach a workable understanding … with the majority members of the Board [of Cedar Mundi]… consistent with the consensus reached by the majority of the 331 shareholders of the Company”. Mr El Azar also noted Cedar Mundi BoD’s(i) “inclusion in the Definitive Agreement of a post-closing adjustment provision” based on the report of the “Additional Expert”;(ii) adoption of the SGBL Valuation Mechanism, stating that SGBL had “reached out to EY and other international experts to explore capabilities they could offer toward conducting the missions as per the attached BoD minutes”;(iii) resolution that “immediately upon and subject to the ratification by [Cedar Mundi’s] GA of the Proposed Transaction and the relevant resolutions passed by the Board”, following which Cedar Mundi’s shareholders would be “irrevocably deemed as fully and finally released from any and all obligations in respect of such called and/or uncalled capital by [Cedar Mundi]” (emphasis added).[439]On 17 April 2021, Mr Attieh convened a general assembly meeting which is consistent with what I am sure was his contemporary understanding, namely, that such a meeting was required in accordance with the Seventh Resolution and the need for deliberation upon, and ratification of, the Proposed Transaction and ratification of the board authorisation, each of which was required before the 2021 Transaction could be entered into.[440]Mr Attieh circulated a notice to attend and set a date of 3 May 2021 (which was rescheduled to 4 May 2021 to accommodate a public holiday in Lebanon), which he sent to the C-331 Shareholders. In his invitation, Mr Attieh attached a revised version of the Special Report from the Cedar Mundi BoD to the General Assembly, and stated: “[t]he above authorization was granted in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders in light of the current economic turmoil in Lebanon, subject to the terms and conditions detailed in the minutes of the meeting of the Board held on April 13th, 2021” (one of which, of course, was the Seventh Resolution).[441]Subsequent to the 13 April 2021 board meeting, SGBL and the other C-331 Shareholders made several important discoveries in respect of matters previously concealed by Mr Attieh.

B8.2 Discovery of the 2020 Transaction

[442]Soon after the 13 April 2021 board meeting concluded, work began on drafting the SPA. Mr Najjar’s firm assisted in the preparation of the draft and on 14 April 2021 supplied draft general assembly minutes to Mr Attieh, Mr El Azar, and Mr Dahdah “for review and comments”. Various drafts were exchanged between the parties.[443]It was put to Mr Dahdah and Mr El Azar in cross-examination that there had been no expectation that the SPA would be subject to negotiation after the 13 April 2021 board meeting, but both witnesses rejected this characterisation. Mr Dahdah stated: “The board minutes are not intended to reflect all the -- as I said, all the conditions of the SPA or the definitive agreement” (Day 4 page 30 lines 23 to 25). Mr El Azar explained that “[t]he understanding reached during the board meeting of April 13th would not touch on that level of detail as to how the contract would look like. The contract -- or the definitive agreement was being -- got negotiated … and it was never finalised” (Day 5 page 25 lines 4 to 11). Key terms captured in the minutes from the 13 April 2021 board meeting “wouldn’t have been exhaustive and exclusive of any other key terms that would be later on negotiated or we had started negotiating” (Day 5 page 26 line 24 to page 27 line 2).[444]Indeed this process was necessary, given that Mr El Azar “disagreed that the 331 shareholders had approved the proposed transaction in the run-up to the April 13th board meeting as they had yet to convene at the general assembly to deliberate and then decide whether to vote in favour, or to -- or not.” (Day 5 page 118 lines 1 to 6), a stance that was correct given my findings as to the proper construction of the minutes.[445]If negotiation over the terms of the SPA had not been contemplated, a draft would never have been sent to Mr El Azar and Mr Dahdah for comment. This was put to Mr Attieh in the course of cross-examination. His answer (Day 8 page 110 line 16 to page 111 line 3) was unconvincing:
“Q. … it was always going to be the case that the banks would participate in the actual formation of the – what’s called the definitive agreement? A. Absolutely not. Q. And this was going to be part of that process? A. Absolutely not. Q. So why did you send them a draft SPA at all in that case, Mr Attieh? A. Because basically I sent them an SPA because it was collaborative -- we actually were working together, we reached an agreement at the board and basically that was part of the package of documentation we were actually discussing with them.”

Q. And this was going to be part of that process?

[446]It was because Mr Attieh understood that the SPA needed to be agreed with SGBL, that on or around 20 April 2021, during a telephone call with Mr El Azar Mr Attieh finally disclosed that the majority of Cedar Mundi’s interests in its portfolio companies had already been transferred to an SPV. This is the first time that the C-331 Shareholders learned about the 2020 Transaction (although not in any detail, as Mr Attieh accepted – Day 8 page 85 line 25 to page 86 line 3), the same having previously been deliberately concealed by Mr Attieh.[447]The reality, as Mr Attieh well knew (hence why he gave such disclosure), is that some information had to be disclosed at this stage in order to progress the terms of the SPA, which terms identified that Cedar II would acquire those interests by acquiring IFAC (except for the relatively few portfolio companies that were still directly owned by Cedar Mundi). Even so, Mr Attieh still did not at this stage explain what had happened or which portfolio companies had been transferred.[448]The C-331 Shareholders were understandably outraged to learn that their assets had been covertly transferred out of Cedar Mundi. In El Azar 1 at para 116, Mr El Azar stated that he “thought that the transfer of Cedar Mundi’s assets without the board or the C-331 Shareholders knowledge and approval was outrageous”. Mr Saghbini considered that “there had been serious wrongdoing by Mr Attieh at this point”, as he explained in Saghbini 1 at para 25. I consider that these were entirely understandable (and genuinely held) sentiments given what Mr Attieh had done, and what he had concealed in relation thereto.[449]Mr Saghbini confirmed in his oral evidence that this “triggered many things” Day 3 page 93 line 8) stating “[h]ow can you transact with someone who deliberately and willingly transferred assets?” and adding that “the IFAC transaction is not a small thing” (Day 3 page 93 lines 12 to 16). Mr Saghbini saw this transaction as a “theft” and a “fraud” (Day 3 page 95 lines 21 to 24). As for Mr Dahdah, his evidence was that he was “stunned to hear about the IFAC Transaction” (Dahdah 1 at para 31).[450]The PPC Agreement itself was never disclosed by Mr Attieh and was only ever disclosed to the C-331 Shareholders during the course of these proceedings.[451]Shortly after this revelation, Mr Attieh produced the “Trust Undertaking”. In Attieh 1 at paras 260 to 263, Mr Attieh stated that this was signed on or around 22 April 2021. Mr Attieh sent a draft undertaking to Mr Najjar and requested his comments before sending the document for signature: “Swiss standards model… Your comments pls before sending for signature…”.[452]Mr Attieh claimed that he “pulled” the template “from one of my files, you know, on a transaction we worked on before” (Day 8 page 67 lines 7 to 8). Mr Attieh in fact backdated this document to 1 June 2020, to give the false impression that Cedar Mundi had always had 100% ownership of IFAC, consistent with what Mr Attieh had told Mr El Azar on their earlier telephone call. In cross-examination Mr Attieh accepted that he had backdated the document but said, implausibly and in the absence of any documentary evidence, that he did so “because Nadi Najjar asked me to backdate it. I didn’t understand why, but I did it” (Day 8 page 70 lines 10 to 11). This is another example of deflecting matters onto Mr Najjar (who the Defendants did not call as a witness). Mr Attieh also claimed (falsely) that Cedar Mundi’s interests in IFAC had never been diluted.[453]The Trust Undertaking was not provided to Cedar Mundi until December 2023, as Mr El Azar explained in El Azar 1 at para 114, and therefore only after this litigation had commenced. In cross-examination, Mr Attieh claimed that this document had been negotiated by Mr Dahdah and Mr Najjar (Day 8 page 73 lines 12 to 13, Day 8 page 80 lines 16 to 23 and Day 8 page 81 lines 5 to 11). There is no documentary record to support such claim and, unsurprisingly, the allegation was never put to Mr Dahdah (and could not be put to Mr Najjar). The claim is yet another untruth from Mr Attieh.[454]On 27 April 2021, Mr Dahdah emailed Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar with “comments and proposed adjustments” on the Draft SPA. In one of his margin comments, Mr Dahdah stated “[a]s discussed, please provide us with clarifications as to the purpose, ownership structure, date of transfer or underlying assets as well as necessary authorizations (corporate and/or regulatory) to that end…”.[455]Mr Dahdah also added, amongst other things, various conditions precedent to the Draft SPA, including that the obligations of the parties to complete the transactions were subject to the following conditions:(i) the ratification of Cedar Mundi’s General Assembly of “the authorization granted by its Board of Directors to enter into the Transaction and [the SPA] in accordance with Article 158 [LCC]” and(ii) the provision to the BdL of “the full specifics of the Transaction” in accordance with Article 20 of Cedar Mundi’s Articles of Incorporation “immediately after the [General Assembly’s] ratification”. All such condition precedents are entirely consistent with my findings as to the proper construction of the board minutes, and I am satisfied that they reflect Mr Dahdah’s contemporary understanding of what was required.[456]Mr Attieh’s first written (purported) explanation of the 2020 Transaction was given on 30 April 2021 in a marginal comment to a page of the Draft SPA, in response to Mr Dahdah:
“Purpose: IFAC is an SPV the purposes of which are i) safeguard the value of the portfolio by providing unrestricted $ funding to investee companies which would otherwise face bankruptcy and total loss and ii) to avail such critical funding to investees from med Al Bahar on the condition that such funding is kept outside the Lebanese banking system. Ownership: 100% beneficially owned by CMH with voting rights held by MABCO to be able to operate the bank account held at NBK (Switzerland). Compliance at foreign banks do not accept as controlling persons Lebanese Banks given reputational/country risks and OFAC listing of JTB. Date of transfer: transfers of investees in April-May 2021 when the scale and severity of the Lebanese monetary crisis became clear. We will provide you with the exact dates of transfer of each company separately.”
[457]This explanation was, at best, misleading if not positively untruthful. Mr Attieh never answered the rest of Mr Dahdah’s questions in his comment, and never provided “(i) a detailed schedule with a breakdown of all interests held directly by IFAC, and (ii) copies of the relevant share transfer agreements/forms, with full disclosure thereof to all 331 shareholders” (as Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination Day 8 page 106 lines 3 to 9 and Day 8 page 127 line 1 to page 128 line 4).

B8.3 Discovery of the Proximie Fundraise

[458]On 21 April 2021, Proximie publicly announced the closing of its US$38 million Series B equity financing funding round, reported via PR Newswire.com.[459]The reporting of Proximie had hitherto been uninformative for the last few quarters, as although a regular report was sent to the C-331 Shareholders the section on Proximie, which would ordinarily give all of the details of its value and activities, said something to the effect that Proximie had not reported in the requested time period. This prompted Bank Audi to contact Mr Aziz at Cedar Mundi, stating that “[u]pdates have been missing from your report for more than two quarters” and requesting that he “[p]rovide us with company’s updates including the financial data for Proximie”.[460]Mr Aziz responded the same day, stating that Proximie “have been working around the clock for the past two quarters to close a Series B round abroad, which they just finalized yesterday!” and that “[t]heir team resources have been exhausted focusing on the deal at hand and thus, the financials are as of now, still unavailable. I will make sure to share them ASAP upon receival.”[461]On 26 April 2021, Fransa Bank and Bank Audi both contacted Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar requesting information about Proximie, including “[w]hy no information could be provided?”. It was only at this stage that Mr Attieh provided any information, in the following terms, to Fransa Bank and Bank Audi respectively:
“Proximie raised funding of $ 38 M with UK/US at a pre-money valuation of $90M. On a fully diluted basis, CMH’s ownership is down to 16.5% of Proximie as CMH could not follow-on. As Proximie was busy closing this round, it could not provide updates regarding budget, financial projects etc… in the time for the Q1 21 reporting”
. And:
“Regarding Proximie’s Series B, the round raised funding of $ 38 M with UK/US VCs at a pre-money valuation of $90M . We are all very proud of this achievement !”
[462]On 27 April 2021, Bank Audi suggested that in light of the Proximie close, “there should be an immediate adjustment of the offer” to the consideration payable in respect of the Proposed Transaction.[463]Mr Attieh responded on the same date, having first shared a draft response with Mr Najjar, stating:
“Even though this round just closed, its indicative terms were fully disclosed during the Offeror’s due diligence and its Offer was therefore made accordingly. Additionally, the same was disclosed to BEMO Securities SAL for the purpose of issuing their Fairness Opinion on the Transaction. Nonetheless, for additional assurance and based on SGBL’s request, the board of Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL has further obtained the Offeror’s commitment to a comprehensive post-closing adjustment mechanism which, based on independent expertise, shall take into account not only Proximie but also any and all factors relevant to the fair pricing of the Transaction.”
[464]In other words, Mr Attieh stated that the terms were already fully disclosed to Cedar II and BSEC when the consideration of L$27 million had been determined, and in any event could be resolved through the proposed post-closing mechanism for adjusting that consideration. It is notable that this had not been disclosed to the SGBL board members or the C-331 Shareholders.[465]For Mr El Azar, as he stated in El Azar 1 at para 119, this was a “surprise and a shock” which added to the “concern as to the bid price for the Proposed Transaction”:
“Proximie was understood to be the most valuable asset in Cedar Mundi’s portfolio, and this information was hard data confirming that Proximie was much more valuable than anyone had realised. In our view, simply relying on a post-closing adjustment was no longer sufficient; this revelation triggered real scepticism on SGBL’s part as to the proposed bid price.”
[466]Mr Attieh recognised at the time that Proximie’s 2021 fundraise meant that the value of Cedar Mundi’s investment (leaving aside its dilution by the 2020 Transaction) had increased from approximately US$10.8 million to more than US$20 million. Mr Attieh nevertheless claimed that BSEC’s Fairness Opinion had taken this into account, stating in Attieh 1 at para 267:
“I had nonetheless instructed BSEC to take into account the indicative terms of Proximie’s funding round in producing their fairness opinion. This is despite the fact that there had been a recent secondary transaction on Proximie”
. There is no supporting evidence demonstrating that this funding round was, in fact, properly taken into consideration.[467]In cross-examination, Mr El Azar fairly accepted that he knew Proximie was undertaking a fundraising exercise in later 2020 or early 2021 (Day 5 page 95 lines 15 to 25) but the “fact that the round had closed and at a certain price, at a certain pre-money valuation, that we were not given any information on” (Day 5 page 96 lines 21 to 23). It was expected by Mr El Azar that Mr Attieh would have proactively disclosed that information “out of transparency and of course because it is their duty to do so” (Day 5 page 100 lines 12 to 14), but it was not. Mr El Azar evidence was that “this followed after the IFAC revelation and the good faith of the other party became questionable at that time. It was a second revelation that was really puzzling” (Day 5 page 105 lines 14 to 17).[468]In contrast, Mr Attieh sought to argue that “Proximie was basically disclosed” (Day 8 page 144 lines 2 to 3) and had been at the “board of 16 March” (Day 8 page 142 line 20 to 21). “Basically disclosed” is hardly a sufficient level of disclosure for such an important financial event, and this is basically more spin from Mr Attieh. There was no proper disclosure of the amount of the funding.

B8.4 The BdL Letters

[469]Shortly after the 13 April 2021 board meeting, and these discussions, the BdL sent two letters stating its opposition to the 2021 Transaction.[470]The First BdL Letter, dated 28 April 2021, raised concerns that the 2021 Transaction would prejudice the BdL’s position, sought further information, and warned against “taking any decisions or actions that would diminish or harm, directly or indirectly, the rights of the [BdL] and the banks contributing to your company”.[471]Mr Skaf emailed the C-331 Shareholders a copy of the letter sent by the BdL to Cedar Mundi that day regarding Cedar Mundi’s general assembly meeting fixed for 4 May 2021. The First BdL Letter(a) requested that Cedar Mundi provide BdL with all relevant documents and information pertaining to the Proposed Transaction “including a properly structured report that includes the value of the shares to be transferred” so that the BdL could “take the appropriate stance” with respect to the Proposed Transaction and(b) stated that “we warn you against taking any decisions or actions that would diminish or harm, directly or indirectly, the rights of the Banque du Liban and the banks contributing to your company, which will also assume any consequences resulting from the decisions taken by the Assembly”.[472]Following receipt of the First BdL Letter, SGBL expressed to Mr Skaf “…confidence and assurances that the Understanding and the resolutions of the Board dated April 13th 2021 were in line with your Excellence’s (i.e. the BdL Governor’s) directions”.[473]On 29 April 2021, Mr Attieh informed the C-331 Shareholders that the general assembly meeting convened for 4 May 2021 was postponed to 17 May 2021 because “the Chairman of the Board has received a request from the Central Bank of Lebanon to provide supplemental information in relation to the Transaction authorised by the Board on April 13th 2021 and which was due to be ratified on May 4th 2021 pursuant to Art. 158 CC” (i.e. the matters contained in the First BdL Letter). No doubt at this stage Mr Attieh appreciated that the general assembly would not vote for the 2021 Transaction.[474]On 3 May 2021, Mr Attieh responded to the First BdL Letter and sent an information pack to the BdL in relation to the Proposed Transaction, comprising:(a) the HoT,(b) the BSEC Fairness Opinion,(c) the Audited FS 2019 and(d) (unexecuted) minutes of the meeting of the Cedar Mundi BoD on 13 April 2021, together with an explanation for the 2021 Transaction.[475]Mr El Azar responded to Mr Attieh’s email of 3 May 2021 to the BdL, thanking Mr Attieh for his “initiative in providing subject information pack to BDL representatives”, but noting that(i) the email did not represent SGBL’s position in respect of the Proposed Transaction “in any way whatsoever” and(ii) SGBL was in the process of “independently putting its formal position to BDL, in consistence with its previous deliberations with and consensus reached by the majority of the 331 shareholders in respect of the Proposed Transaction, which led to the understanding at the level of the Board of Directors of the Company on April 13th, 2021”.[476]Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that Cedar Mundi’s response to the First BdL Letter had been drafted by him and Mr Najjar and he rejected the suggestion that he should have involved SGBL in that process (Day 8 page 133 lines 4 to 15). In contrast, Mr Attieh forwarded the First BdL Letter by email onto Mr Al Bahar within an hour of receiving it, and shared the draft response to the First BdL Letter with Mr Al Bahar also in case he had any comments. As he stated in cross-examination, “if he had any comments I would take them on board” (Day 8 page 138 lines 2 to 3). This is, perhaps, an indication of where Mr Attieh’s true loyalties lay (which were not as a director of Cedar Mundi).[477]The Second BdL Letter, dated 11 May 2021, stated that “under penalty of taking appropriate legal measures against you…we warn you again, and for the last time, against the consequences of taking any decisions or actions, current or future, that would impair or prejudice, directly or indirectly, the rights of the BDL and the banks contributing to your company, which will also assume any consequences resulting from the decisions that will be taken by you. We also call upon you again to adopt absolute transparency in your dealings with the BDL and to provide us as quickly as possible with the necessary documents in order to enable us to take the appropriate position in this regard”.[478]In other words, the Second BdL Letter demanded a pause on the 2021 Transaction until further information had been provided, including a valuation report from a recognised expert, detailed information about the proposed sale price, currency, and payment dates, and an explanation of the anticipated fate of Cedar Mundi. The BdL repeated the warning set out in the First BdL Letter as to the consequences if its contents were ignored. Again, within hours of receipt, Mr Attieh forwarded this letter by an email to Mr Al Bahar which stated, “Lets discuss”.[479]On 12 May 2021, Mr Louis Mrad (of Roger Najjar Law Firm) emailed Mr Attieh, copying Mr Najjar, a draft response to the Second BdL Letter. Mr Attieh forwarded this letter to BSEC for comments. Mr Okais responded with suggestions, including the addition of “an explanation of the “Conflict of Interest” point highlighted in the BDL’s second letter (which was now answered)”. Mr Attieh responded that “there is no conflict of interest…they tend to assimilate the majority of the board as having an interest in Mabil. But according to Nadi all board members are independent according to the Lebanese law as myself, wafa al qatami or Javier don’t have interest in buyer nor seller…so board decision are all valid…lets discuss before you go to legal department with Nadi”.[480]Mr Attieh subsequently sent a response to the Second BdL Letter, confirming that Cedar Mundi would send documents separately for the BdL’s review and reconfirming the postponement of the Cedar Mundi general assembly meeting so that the BdL would have time to review the information and adopt the appropriate position. Mr Attieh confirmed in his response “that the company will postpone the General Assembly so that the Banque du Liban may review all that has been made available and provided in the file of this transaction at its request, in preparation for taking the appropriate stance regarding the same”.[481]On 13 May 2021, Mr Attieh provided the BdL with the BSEC Valuation Report. This included the information requested by the BdL in the Second BdL Letter, and the following documents in relation to the Proposed Transaction:(i) unsigned draft heads of terms;(ii) the BSEC Valuation Report; and(iii) a draft amended and restated exempted limited partnership agreement of Cedar II.[482]On the same date, Mr Attieh informed the C-331 Shareholders that the Cedar Mundi general assembly due to take place on 17 May 2021 would be postponed “until further notice” following the Second BdL Letter, and further that “[i]n the coming days and weeks, the board shall endeavor to provide the Central Bank with all requisite facts and information to fully dispel the misunderstandings or miscommunications which have unfortunately arisen”.[483]On 18 May 2021, BSEC wrote to Mr Attieh to report on a “long phone discussion” with the BdL, explaining that:
“The process that was initially used by CMH, i.e. to proceed with the general assembly without providing full view to the shareholders nor to the BDL, was very badly perceived by the BDL according to Mr Skaff, and he highlighted several times the “damage” done by such actions at the level of the BDL: they perceived this as a tentative of “assets flight”… However according to Mr Skaff this is now in the past given that this General Assembly didn’t take place, and that there is a chance now to proceed with a more proper process and reach a closing in the best interest of all the stakeholders including the banks, the portfolio startups, the buyer … BSEC opinion is that (i) a calm discussion with the above mentioned banks, (ii) a fully transparent approach with the BDL especially in relation to the potential conflict of interest related to MABIL and Bassel Attieh (a related party to MABIL) and elaborate as much as possible on the purpose of the transaction which is the survival of the portfolio rather than an asset flight transaction, (iii) refraining from using a confrontational approach with the banks or the BDL.”
[484]Mr Attieh claimed in cross-examination that he was prepared to follow this advice (Day 8 page 146 lines 15 to 24), and that even at this stage in late May 2021, “I was basically hopeful that we could actually proceed with a general assembly meeting” (Day 8 page 147 lines 2 to 4). Certainly, the advice from BSEC appeared to identify a path through to obtaining a non-objection stance from the BdL, which in turn would unlock C-331 Shareholder support for the 2021 Transaction at a general assembly meeting.[485]However, the true position was, I am satisfied, that Mr Attieh was not prepared to wait and wanted to push through the transaction without BdL approval and without a general assembly meeting (contrary to what was agreed, and envisaged, in the minutes).[486]In contrast, I am satisfied that the C-331 Shareholders were entitled to take the view that they would not take any further steps in relation to the 2021 Transaction until the BdL granted its approval or non-objection. SGBL communicated formally that this was their position later on 23 July 2021, stating that “the 331 shareholders shall hold off and refrain from taking any decision or action whatsoever in respect of the “Proposed Transaction” pending due receipt by the Company’s board of directors of BdL’s written(i) approval or non-objection stance (as the case may be) or(ii) refusal”.[487]Later, on 19 May 2021, Mr Attieh sent to Mr Najjar and Mr Okais for their review a draft letter addressed to Mr Skaf “following his discussion with BEMO”. The draft letter covered a number of points in respect of the proposed 2021 Transaction, including “treatment of conflicts of interest”, with the draft stating that “none of the Board members has a conflict of interest in connection with the Transaction pursuant to Art. XXX of the Code of Commerce as per the guidance and advice of the Company’s legal counsel who thoroughly examined this matter prior to the board meetings”.[488]On the same day, 19 May 2021, Mr El Azar sent a draft memo in respect of Cedar Mundi, addressed to the Governor of the BdL, to Mr Skaf for his comment. The draft memo stated that it provided “pertinent clarifications in relation to the merits of the resolutions passed” during the Cedar Mundi BoD on 13 April 2021, which “aimed first and foremost” at:
“1- Preserving the regular status of the 311 shareholders, as non-defaulting parties in [Cedar Mundi]; this ultimately preserves – indirectly – BDL’s interests as well; 2- Subjecting any irregular resolutions taken by the previous Board meeting held on March 16th, 2021 in the absence of SGBL and Mr Georges Saghbini to supplemental terms aimed at restoring the integrity of the due process, as relating to any proposed transaction by [Mr Attieh]…; 3- Addressing the pressing issues (as expressed by [Mr Attieh]) facing [Cedar Mundi] in light of the current economic turmoil in Lebanon and the implications as to the going concern of [Cedar Mundi]; 4- Reinforcing the 331 shareholders’ and BDL’s interests and rights by imposing objective, binding and independent mechanisms to (i) protect the value of the investments made by [Cedar Mundi] and (ii) optimize the value of any consideration that may be paid by a willing buyer …”
[489]On 24 May 2021, Mr Attieh sent a further letter to the BdL to “clarify” various matters, including,(i) as to the objectives of the Proposed Transaction, “Securing alternative sources of capital growth for the start-up companies invested in, in light of the current economic crisis in Lebanon, which has made it impossible for the Company to continue its investment activity and to fulfil its financing obligations towards early-stage start-up companies facing talent loss and imminent insolvency” and “Preserving the value of shareholders’ equity after exiting the Company’s investments at a fair price and limiting future portfolio losses resulting from the lack of financing”; and(ii) to address the issue of conflict of interest, the Cedar Mundi BoD has “as a matter of caution, requested an impartial report on the Deal price from BEMO” and stated that “we would like to emphasize that no member of the Board of Directors has a conflict of interests regarding the Deal, pursuant to the provisions of Article 158 of the Lebanese Code of Commerce”. The letter requested that the BdL contact Mr Najjar for “any details on this matter”.[490]On 6 June 2021, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mrs Al Qatami, copied to Mr Al Bahar, with “key talking points” for a conversation with the Governor of the BdL, including that Cedar Mundi’s losses were increasing “due to the default of the banks and the inability to provide startups with fresh $ funding (not LBP)”, but that the C-331 Shareholders “do not care about the fund’s performance or the growth or survival of the 14 startups”. Mr Attieh stated that, “[t]he Offer was presented to the board on 28 February 2021 and after 1 ½ month of negotiation, an agreement was reached and the transaction approved unanimously by the board on April 13th 2021, including the positive vote of SGBL, as board representative of all banks”. Mr Attieh added that the “board fails to understand the unjustified persistent hostility and negative attitude of some persons at the central bank towards a transaction which primary purpose is to provide alternative fresh growth capital to the Lebanese eco-system in a very difficult environment” and that the Cedar Mundi BoD “feels that it is being blackmailed by certain people who are in bad faith misinforming you to serve fallacious interests far removed from those of the fund, the objectives of Circular 331 or the pressing needs of the Lebanese startups.”

B8.5 Mr Attieh implements the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval

[491]According to Mr Attieh, Mr Najjar had told him (though there is no documentary evidence to support the same) that French law did not require general assembly approval for a related party transaction but that “he could not be 100% certain how Lebanese law would apply, because there were no precedents” (see Attieh 1 at para 277 and Day 8 page 153 line 22 to page 154 line 8).[492]On 7 May 2021 Mr Attieh went to another Lebanese lawyer, Mr Khoury. Mr Attieh’s evidence (at Attieh 1 para 277) was that “the advice I received from Mr Khoury is that the authorisation of the Board was sufficient basis … The absence of ratification by the General Assembly would not invalidate the agreement.”[493]Mr Khoury’s final advice dated 25 May 2021 did indeed state (incorrectly, as it happens, based on my findings as to the proper construction of the minutes and as to the proper interpretation of Article 158 in Section D2 below) that “Article 158 CC could only be interpreted as providing the General Assembly with an ex-post ‘Droit de regard’ in relation to the Regulated Agreements authorized by the Board of Directors.” But this advice was not the independent product of Mr Khoury. It had been produced under the influence of Mr Attieh.[494]In particular, on 7 May 2021 when Mr Attieh first contacted Mr Khoury, he provided him with a one-sided and incomplete set of instructions (after the First BdL Letter and before the Second BdL Letter). The instructions contained a series of highly contestable assertions, including as regards the Alleged MABIL Overpayment and the effect of the 16 March 2021 board meeting, and omissions, including as to the timing of the Trust Undertaking. Indeed, Mr Attieh accepted the final point in cross-examination (Day 8 page 160 lines 7 to 11):
“Q. Right. So Mr Khoury, reading this, and receiving those documents, would have no idea that the trust undertaking had been executed only a few weeks before these instructions had been backdated, would he? A. No.”
[495]The instructions also referred to the “view” of the board, whereas in fact the view expressed was, in reality, the view of Mr Attieh alone. In cross-examination Mr Attieh acknowledged that he could not “recall” discussing these issues with Mrs Al Qatami and he “[didn’t] think we discussed basically Lebanese legal issues.” (Day 8 page 166 line 13 to page 175 line 4).[496]On 15 May 2021, Mr Khoury produced a draft advice in these terms:
“If a Regulated Agreement was entered into based on the authorization granted by the Board of Directors and later not ratified by the General Assembly, it shall continue to be in force towards concerned third parties. While in the French Code of Commerce, it is clearly stated that the prejudicial consequences for the company of non approved agreements may be charged to the interested party and, potentially, to the other members of the board of directors, nothing similar has been stipulated in the Lebanese Code of Commerce. Still, it is likely that the courts of justice will retain a similar solution when they will have to rule on such a problem upon its occurrence.”
[497]Whilst Mr Attieh sought to debate the distinction between “third parties” and “the interested party” in cross-examination (Day 8 page 180 line 8 to page 181 line 7), it is in any event clear from Mr Khoury’s advice as a whole that Cedar II would be the latter, i.e. an interested party.[498]Then on 21 May 2021, Mr Khoury sent Mr Attieh an updated advice that clearly was intended to be in final form, since it was signed and sent in PDF with “draft” markings removed. Mr Khoury had changed his advice on Article 158 but still referred to the distinction between “concerned third parties” and the “interested party”, but in less stark terms. Mr Attieh claimed in cross-examination to have a lack of recollection as to whether he and Mr Khoury had discussed these changes before they were made (Day 8 page 193 line 17 to page 195 line 17), but it is difficult to imagine why Mr Khoury would have changed his advice absent such a discussion.[499]Be that as it may, Mr Attieh was evidently still unhappy even with this version of the advice, since on 24 May 2021 he emailed a revised version to Mr Khoury, and stated:
“Thank you for your clear advice which is well received. I have taken the liberty to express your opinion in “less technical” language with the purpose of being more intelligible to board members (who may not be fully conversant legally). Do you mind if we jump on a quick call to finalize the attached file? Let me know. This is a priority.”
[500]Mr Attieh’s reference to “board members” needing to find the advice “more intelligible” was itself a nonsense and a charade. The only recipient who intended to act on this advice was Mr Attieh himself, who plainly understood it. The reality is that Mr Attieh simply invented a pretext to justify it being rewritten in a manner even more to his liking. There is no evidence that any other board member ever saw Mr Khoury’s advice, or was intended to.[501]Mr Attieh did not merely suggest amendments as to how the advice was drafted, which would itself have been inappropriate, but in fact edited, and was therefore effectively involved in, the drafting of the advice, which was even more obviously inappropriate.[502]Mr Attieh’s changes to the final advice included the following:[503]Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination that he had made these changes (Day 8 page 204 lines 19 to 21 and page 209 line 24 to page 210 line 4), including the deletion of the critical last paragraph of Article 158, and the addition of the assertion that Article 158 “could only be interpreted” as removing the need for general assembly authorisation, which Mr Khoury then retained in the final version. Mr Attieh said he made this addition “based on [his] experience under French law” (Day 9 page 4 lines 23 to 24), but he did not identify what this “experience” of French law was.[504]I am satisfied that the reality was, as was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination, that “this is not a situation where you have gone to a third party lawyer and simply asked for his advice and accepted his advice. This is a situation where you, yourself, have been closely involved in and have in part drafted the very advice on which you then seek to rely.” (Day 8 page 208 lines 3 to 8). Mr Attieh implausibly (but predictably) denied this.[505]The explanation that he gave in his first witness statement, that “the advice I received from Mr Khoury is that the authorisation of the Board was sufficient basis … The absence of ratification by the General Assembly would not invalidate the agreement” (Attieh 1 para 277) is both incomplete and misleading.[506]Indeed, once the partial way in which the advice was produced becomes clear, it is apparent that its production was simply an attempt by Mr Attieh to “cover his back” and provide support for a decision he had already reached. I am satisfied that by this stage Mr Attieh had already decided that he was going to proceed to execute the SPA without general assembly approval and what he was now doing was simply creating a protective trail for his own benefit. He was not, in fact, doing “what is best for the company”, and this was not an “exercise in due care” (Day 9 page 8 lines 2 to 6).[507]Notably, in drafting a further letter to the BdL in late May 2021 setting out the rationale for the 2021 Transaction, Mr Attieh’s final “as sent” version dated 24 May 2021 omitted the assurance given in the first draft, which read: “Art. 18 of the Lebanese Code of Commerce stipulates that the Transaction has to be authorized by the board of directors and subsequently ratified by the General Assembly of shareholders. The Board fully complied with such mandated procedure…”.[508]Mr Attieh’s denial in cross-examination that at this stage he was not “hatching a plan not to call for a general assembly” (Day 8 page 151 lines 4 to 10) by 24 May 2021 defies belief given his exchanges with Mr Khoury by this date and his reformulation of the 24 May 2021 letter to the BdL.[509]Having decided to proceed with the 2021 Transaction without obtaining general assembly approval, and knowing that he had misled the C-331 Shareholders who had understood that negotiations with the BdL had not yet closed, and in any event that Mr Attieh had agreed not to act without general assembly approval, Mr Attieh nevertheless signed the SPA on 28 June 2021.[510]The version of the SPA which he signed included almost none of the changes proposed by Mr Dahdah, including the insertion of the condition precedent for general assembly approval. Mr Attieh in Attieh 1 at para 291 said that he had waited for “news from the BdL before executing the SPA”, but “could not wait any longer” and so signed it, without authority, on 28 June 2021. But, as Mr El Azar rightly noted in cross-examination, Mr Attieh had never actually provided the BdL with the “full specifics” they had requested (Day 5 page 107 line 25).[511]The SPA was, on its face, executed by Cedar Mundi (acting by Mr Attieh as Vice Chairman) and Cedar II (acting by Mr Al Bahar as Director of Fastnet) in respect of “Interests” (as defined in clause 1.1 of the SPA) for a price of US$27,000,000 in local “non-fresh” US Dollars (the “Consideration”) (as defined in clause 2.1). The SPA was executed in substantially the same form as the original draft which had been sent to SGBL on or around 22 April 2021, but without any of SGBL’s amendments.[512]Clause 2.1 of the SPA provided for the Consideration to be settled by:(i) setting off sums owed by Cedar Mundi to MABIL (the “MABIL Receivable”), which debts the SPA contemplated MABIL would assign to Cedar II by way of an assignment agreement (the “Assignment Deed”); and(ii) Paying the balance by transfer of cheque. The Assignment Deed was, on its face, executed by Cedar Mundi (again acting by Mr Attieh as General Manager), by Fastnet as general partner of Cedar II (acting by Mr Talal Al Bahar) and MABIL (acting by Mr Marzouq Al Bahar).[513]Even before the SPA was signed, Mr Attieh had already taken steps to advance the 2021 Transaction. On 7 June 2021, Mr Attieh signed a transfer of share agreement of the same date by which Cedar Mundi’s holding in IFAC was transferred to Cedar II which he was not authorised to do. The transfer was approved by IFAC’s board of directors on the same day and on 14 June 2021 the transfer was completed.[514]Whilst Mr Attieh claimed that these were “preparatory steps to enable basically the execution of the SPA” (Day 9 page 10 lines 13 to 14), these were, on any view, real steps taken in performance of the SPA even before it had been signed.[515]Mr Attieh took further steps by procuring the Cedar II investors to pay their Lollars into an account in Cedar Mundi’s name held at BEMO (the “BEMO Account”) from 18 June 2021, about which the wider board and shareholders knew absolutely nothing, as Mr Attieh effectively acknowledged in cross-examination (Day 9 page 29 lines 2 to 12), Mr Attieh asserting that “[t]his was in my authority to open any bank account I want for the Cedar Mundi” and “I don’t need to tell any banks. It’s my authority” (Day 9 page 31 line 15 to page 33 line 3, and page 34 line 1 to page 36 line 1), conveniently ignoring the reason why he was doing this. Mr Attieh again sought to characterise this as “preparatory steps basically to complete the transaction” (Day 9 page 30 lines 11 to 12) when the reality is that it was facilitating the actual performance of the SPA.[516]In cross-examination, Mr Attieh confirmed that only he, Mr Al Bahar, and Mr Najjar knew that any of this was going on at this stage (Day 9 page 12 lines 1 to 14) and it is perfectly clear that Mr Attieh was intent on avoiding any possibility that the C-331 Shareholders might be alerted as to what he was going to do.[517]This is evidenced, first, by Mr Attieh ensuring that the BVI agents, Maples, should not see the Trust Undertaking, which is why when asking Mr Jas Bagri (the Financial Controller at KHCK, and described as “our Fund’s FO” to prepare with Maples a set of documents to sell the MAB shares to Cedar II, Mr Attieh stated: “MABCO holds its shares of IFA Capital in fiduciary for CMH as indicated in the attached [Trust Undertaking]. However, you will NOT disclose that to Maples. This document is for your eyes only. (emphasis in original) Mr Attieh sent this email shortly after having instructed MAB, in its capacity as fiduciary holder for Cedar Mundi of the MAB Shares, to arrange their transfer to Cedar II, on 11 June 2021.[518]Second, Mr Attieh ensured that the Lollar payments from Cedar II investors were not paid into SGBL accounts, contrary to the terms of the HoT. In cross-examination, Mr Attieh unconvincingly argued that this was because “again, most of the subscribers that basically were coming in to Cedar II were basically clients of BSEC, of Bemo, and therefore Bemo, to accept their funds, did not need actually to run again lengthy KYC, which any other bank would have to do, to do that. So obviously, again, it was, again, for the benefit of time” (Day 9 page 33 lines 7 to 13). It is also telling that in the drafting process of the SPA, Mr Attieh deleted any reference to any specific account before sharing it with SGBL.[519]Third, Mr Attieh took steps to ensure that any emails were sent to his Kuwait Holdings address, rather than his Cedar Mundi email address, which I am satisfied was so that no one at Cedar Mundi would be alerted to what he was doing (see Day 9 page 17 lines 11 to 20).[520]Mr Attieh took yet further steps during this period to mislead(i) the BdL in June 2021, by ensuring that Cedar Mundi’s asset position would be mis-stated in Cedar Mundi’s Q2 2021 report, given that the IFAC and other shares had already been transferred, but not recorded in the report; and(ii) Midclear (the BdL’s subsidiary and Lebanon’s central depository) during July 2021 by giving information that could only be correct if the 2021 Transaction had not yet occurred, when in fact it had.[521]It was entirely unclear to Midclear that shares had in fact already been transferred away from Cedar Mundi. This is evidenced by Mrs Abou-Jaoude’s (of Midclear) email to Mr Chélala and Ms Darine Dib of PWC, with Mr Attieh copied, on 1 July 2021, which said:
“More importantly, I noticed that in the GA of Loolia dated 06/10/2020, Cedar Mundi Holding is not anymore a shareholder. Instead, IFA Capital holds the 63,992 shares that previously belonged to CMH. I do not have any SPA or info about this exit. Moreover, the books of CMH are not correct at the end of year 2020 and till today. you are therefore kindly requested to send me all documents related to this exit as soon as possible. Having discovered this by accident makes me wonder if there are any other transactions that I have not been informed of in a timely manner.”
[522]On 16 July 2021, more than two weeks later, Mr Attieh replied in the following terms:
“[A]s mentioned, CMH ran out of “non-restricted/transferable” funds to finance its portfolio of startups following the Lebanese crisis which started in 2019. In the interest of safeguarding the value of CMH portfolio, MABIL agreed to extend emergency funding to avoid the bankruptcy of CMH investments on the condition that such transfer go to non-Lebanese banks. Therefore, CMH set up in Q1 2020 IFA Capital Ltd BVI, a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) which is 100% beneficially owned by CMH and to which startups were transferred under the “permitted transfers” clause of their shareholders agreements. This SPV could then receive fresh $ transfers from MABIL into its foreign bank account and transferred it to bank accounts of startups in need of critical funding.”
(emphasis in original)[523]On 23 July 2021, Mr El Azar sent an email to Mr Attieh, including a letter from the C-331 Shareholders dated 6 July 2021, which(i) noted the BdL’s position (as per its letters of 28 April and 11 May 2021) that the Proposed 2021 Transaction was “irregular from both legal and regulatory standpoints” and that the convening of any general assembly meeting would “flagrantly violate the applicable Lebanese laws”, expose Cedar Mundi to civil and criminal action and expose the C-331 Shareholders to regulatory consequences; and(ii) stated that the C-331 Shareholders “shall hold off and refrain from taking any decision or action whatsoever in respect of the “Proposed Transaction” pending due receipt of the Company’s board of directors of BDL’s written (i) approval or non-objection stance (as the case may be) or (ii) refusal, in respect thereof”. Of course, the SPA had already been signed at this stage, but had been concealed from SGBL and the other C-331 Shareholders by Mr Attieh.[524]Also on 23 July 2021, by a transfer of shares agreement, Cedar Mundi transferred 1,000 Class B shares in White Lab to Cedar II. On 15 August 2021, Cedar II transferred to MABIL 5,000 Class A voting shares and 4,940 Class B non-voting shares in IFAC (the “IFAC Transfer”). IFAC authorised and approved the IFAC Transfer on the same date.[525]Following the execution of the SPA, Cedar II was fully constituted as an investment fund. Its Limited Partnership Agreement was executed on 20 July 2021.

B8.6 Resignations

[526]Around 25 August 2021, communications from Mr Attieh dried up. Mr El Azar emailed Mr Attieh on this date requesting an update, with the shareholder banks in copy. Mr Attieh did not reply to this email, but himself resigned as a director and manager of Cedar Mundi on 6 September 2021, having tendered his resignation on 30 August 2021.[527]On 30 August 2021, Mr Santiso also resigned from the Cedar Mundi BoD, effective after the next BoD meeting scheduled for 6 September 2021. Mr Attieh and Mr Santiso in their letters cited similar reasons for resignation, including that the “mandate was made all but impossible by the default of major shareholders on their funding commitments to the Company and the [crippling/mounting] monetary and banking crisis in Lebanon”.[528]According to Mr Attieh’s letter, he:
“fully supported the board’s initiative to seek a workable solution to safeguard shareholders value by way of an orderly and managed secondary disposal of the Company’s investments at the best achievable price. Six-months on, and in-spite of a very volatile situation and somewhat malevolent hurdles, the board can be commended for having successfully executed this initiative to the highest standards of diligence and due process. Most importantly, it has enabled the Company’s Lebanese tech start-ups to seek and access the fresh growth capital they need to survive and thrive.”
[529]Mr Santiso stated that he “supported the board’s initiative to limit the Company’s losses and seek alternative sources of funding for the Company’s portfolio by way of an orderly and managed secondary disposal of its investments”, but that he could not continue his association with Cedar Mundi as he had been “incurring considerable reputational risk and professional harm by continuing my association through the board of Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL with the Lebanese banking system some key participants of which are now under criminal investigation”.[530]On the next day, 31 August 2021, Mrs Al Qatami tendered her resignation, and Mr Attieh circulated to the members of the Cedar Mundi BoD an invitation to a board meeting on 6 September 2021.[531]On 1 September 2021, Mr Skaf emailed a letter to Mr Attieh, dated 31 August 2021, in relation to the Proposed Transaction, notifying the decision of the Governor of the BdL that the C-331 Shareholders and Cedar Mundi should provide, at the latter’s expense, to the BdL expert reports including a detailed assessment in fresh US Dollars of the value of the shares of the Portfolio Companies intended to be transferred (the “Third BdL Letter”).[532]On 6 September 2021, SGBL tendered its resignation from(i) the Cedar Mundi BoD citing, amongst other things, “all the irregularities, lack of transparency and unacceptable approach” in relation to the Proposed Transaction and confirmed that it would not attend the meeting convened for that day and reserved its rights to (a) challenge the validity and legality of that board meeting and (b) take “all appropriate actions in this regard”; and(ii) Cedar Mundi’s investment committee. Mr El Azar forwarded SGBL’s letter of resignation from the Cedar Mundi BoD to the BdL.[533]On 6 September 2021, before the resignations were effective, the Cedar Mundi BoD met. Mrs Al Qatami was present, on behalf of herself and Mr Santiso, and Mr Attieh also attended. By its first resolution, the Cedar Mundi BoD “acknowledge[d] and resolve[d] the default of certain shareholders on the settlement of their obligations to the Company under the capital call resolved by the Board of Directors held on March 20, 2019 while reserving in full the rights of the Company and the shareholders in connection therewith”. By its second, third, and fourth resolutions, it took note of the resignations of Mrs Al Qatami, Mr Attieh, and Mr Santiso, effective from the end of the meeting. By its fifth resolution, the Cedar Mundi BoD resolved to invite the General Assembly to convene on 21 September 2021. And by its sixth resolution, it approved a response from Mrs Al Qatami as Chairman to the Third BdL Letter. This letter was sent on 10 September 2021, which rejected the BdL’s request in their letter of 31 August 2021 and asserted that “it is unlawful”. This letter was forwarded by Mr Skaf to the C-331 Shareholders.[534]On the same date, Mr Najjar also tendered his resignation as Cedar Mundi’s legal counsel to the Cedar Mundi BoD.[535]By 8 September 2021, Cedar II had paid Cedar Mundi US$16,643,954.76 into Cedar Mundi’s account with BEMO Bank.[536]On 8 September 2021, MABIL was entered as a member on IFAC’s register of members, and Fastnet wrote to Cedar Mundi, noting that “the Transaction is deemed to have been completed and consummated in full as of the date of this letter”, with the transfer of the Remaining Interest having been completed save for shares held in three companies, Cardiodiagnostics SAL, CardioDiagnostics Offshore SAL, and SOS Fund (Holding) SAL, in respect of which Cedar II was exercising its right to adjust the Consideration to L$25,631,854.

B8.7 Discovery of the implementation of the 2021 Transaction

[537]The fact that the SPA had been executed was not revealed until 20 September 2021, and only then by accident. Ms Yasmine Safa Tfaili at Roger Najjar sent an email to Mr Attieh and Mr El Azar, which read: “Kindly find attached 2 letters that we received today at the office”, which attached two documents received after Mr Najjar had ceased to act as Cedar Mundi’s legal counsel, including the final version of the SPA and a letter from Fastnet which stated that as at 8 September 2021, all of the portfolio interest that had been held directly by Cedar Mundi had been transferred to Cedar II, apart from three companies listed in that letter, namely two Cardiodiagnostics companies and the SOS fund, which were never transferred. The letter also included a downward adjustment on the consideration under the SPA, and reference to the separate bank account created by Mr Attieh.[538]On 21 September 2021, Mr El Azar forwarded Ms Tfaili’s email to the other C-331 Shareholders,(i) indicating SGBL’s views that the transaction under the SPA was a “material breach and infringement” of various documents including resolutions of the Cedar Mundi BoD “as well as further applicable laws and regulations”; and(ii) recommending taking control of the Cedar Mundi BoD is “imperative to overturn unlawful and conflicted decisions irregularly made and enacted by the GP/VC of CMH, and to initiate legal proceedings against the resigned Chairman, VC and fund manager for material breach of their fiduciary duties towards CMH and/or its 331 shareholders.” Mr El Azar then forwarded this email to Mr Skaf and others at the BdL.[539]It is clear that the C-331 Shareholders were shocked by this revelation. As noted above, they had told Mr Attieh on 23 July 2021, that they intended to “hold off and refrain from taking any decision or action whatsoever in respect of the ‘Proposed Transaction’ … pending due receipt … of BDL’s written(i) approval or non-objection stance (as the case may be) or(ii) refusal, in respect thereof”. Mr Attieh never responded to this email from Mr El Azar, and gave evidence in cross-examination that “Nadi Najjar said disregard it” (Day 9 page 48 line 7), which I consider is highly unlikely, and it is, of course, yet another instance of Mr Attieh giving evidence as to what Mr Najjar allegedly said or advised, which is uncorroborated. Mr Attieh never expressed any disagreement to Mr El Azar’s position.[540]Mr El Azar’s evidence, which I accept, was that SGBL “had no idea that Mr Attieh had gone ahead and executed the proposed transaction with Cedar II” (El Azar 1 at para 146). This is also evidenced by the fact that Mr El Azar sent an email to Mr Attieh on 25 August 2021 requesting an update on “CMH’s state of things”, to which Mr Attieh did not respond by telling him that the 2021 Transaction had been implemented.[541]Mr Saghbini described this in Saghbini 1 at para 34 as “effectively a heist”, and Mr Dahdah stated in Dahdah 1 at para 38 that “[t]o learn that the SPA had been executed without discussion and deliberation at, or ratification by, the General Assembly left me feeling deceived”. Such sentiments have the ring of truth about them – Mr Attieh had indeed taken away the assets, and he had concealed the fact that the SPA had been entered into, thereby deceiving SGBL and the C-331 Shareholders as to what the factual position was.[542]At the time of the discovery, Cedar Mundi was without any directors, as the existing directors had all resigned. The C-331 Shareholders appointed a new board on 25 October 2021 comprising SGBL, Bank of Beirut, Bank Audi, BLOM, Fransabank and Mr Saghbini.[543]On the same day, the new board of directors passed resolutions, including by its first resolution:
“ascertain and confirm that none of the shareholder banks had defaulted on any of its obligations towards the Company, particularly in connection with the 3rd capital call, as they have all fulfilled their aforesaid payment obligations in accordance with BDL’s written approval dated 13 December 2019; cancel the First Resolution of the Board of Directors held on 6 September 2021 as deem it null and void particularly that (i) it is legally baseless and (ii) it merely served a pressure mean by the former executive management to incite the shareholder banks to accept the Proposed Transaction at the level of the General Assembly.”
[544]And by its second resolution to:
“ascertain and confirm that the Proposed Transaction has been unilaterally executed by the former Vice Chairman, Mr Bassel Attieh, acting as the Deputy General Manager under the supervision and responsibility of the former Chairwoman of the company, Mrs Wafa Al-Qatami, and flagrantly concealed from the bank shareholders; ascertain and confirm that the unlawful and irregular transfer of the Company’s assets constitutes a material breach by the former Chairwoman and Vice Chairman of the resolutions of the Board meetings dated 16 March and 13 April 2021, the two letters of H.E. the Governor dated 28 April 2021 and 11 May 2021, the letter of the bank shareholders addressed to the former Vice Chairman on 23 July 2021, BDL’s letter dated 31 August 2021, the provisions of Article 158 of the Code of Commerce and Article 20 of the Company’s bylaws, as well as further applicable laws and regulations.”
[545]The new board also resolved to take steps to recover the lost investment portfolio. This preceded correspondence between Cedar Mundi, Cedar II and the various portfolio companies, including in particular the writing and sending of various “stop letters” on 5 April 2022 to Band Industries, Crystalign, Ecomz, Loolia, Proximie, and White Lab, notifying them that the sale and transfer of their shares to Cedar II was invalid, that Cedar Mundi was “currently initiating all necessary steps, measures and legal actions aiming at cancelling and reversing the effects of the aforesaid transfer transactions(s)”, and to request that that they “refrain from accepting any transfer or such other act of disposition” in relation to the shares transferred by the SPA.[546]The new board recognised that any attempt to trigger the post-closing adjustment mechanism within the SPA would be said to be inconsistent with its rejection of the 2021 Transaction as being unauthorised and unlawful and with its resolution to recover its assets, and in any event they had entirely lost trust in Mr Attieh. I accept Mr El Azar’s evidence in this regard at El Azar 1 para 151, that “the C-331 Shareholders were not prepared to validate what we thought was an unlawful agreement by taking steps to appoint an Additional Expert or engage in a process with the Executive Directors and MABIL whom I believe the C331 Shareholders considered to have acted in bad faith and could no longer trust.”[547]While the BdL had previously requested the appointment of an independent expert, or that Cedar Mundi seek an independent valuation, and while Mr El Azar had taken steps to appoint EY, following the discovery of the SPA and its covert implementation, there was understandably a concern not to “validate … the executed SPA”, and so the additional expert to activate the price adjustment clause was never appointed (as confirmed by Mr El Azar in evidence – see Day 5 page 109 line 25 to page 110 line 1, page 112 lines 12 to 21 and page 113 lines 3 to 10).[548]Indeed, on 7 October 2021, Mr El Azar sent an email to the C-331 Shareholders, asking them to provide their position on engaging EY for a valuation, and noting that, “in view of the concealment and unilateral execution of the Proposed Transaction by CMH’s Chairman and VC, care may have to be given as to the capacity by which the 331 shareholders should request the independent valuation given the material breach by CMH’s Chairman and VC of corporate resolutions, statutory clauses, BDL warnings and requirements, as well as applicable laws and regulations”. Mr El Azar also stated that the C-331 Shareholders “must make sure that initiating the contemplated independent valuation cannot be interpreted by MABIL Group as an acceptance of the forced Proposed Transaction that has been consummated in total breach of the decisions of the BOD as well as in violation of all legal and regulatory requirements”.[549]Mr El Azar’s evidence was further corroborated, in this regard, by Mr Saghbini, who explained in cross-examination, as follows (Day 3 page 115 lines 20 to 25):
“My Lord, our opinion at that time, that this transaction was a fraud, from IFAC to the disposal of the assets, especially when we came off -- when the Proximie fundraising came to our attention and this is where we-- as LPs, we believe that we have to take back the -- I mean, to regain possession of the assets.”
[550]Mr Saghbini added that there were “many reasons” why an expert was not appointed under the SPA, including the fact that the “SPA was concealed” (Day 3 page 122 line 19). From the perspective of the board, the SPA had been “unilaterally executed” and was not, and would not be, authorised (Day 3 page 128 lines 22 to 23).

B8.8 Mr Attieh’s bonus and the new board’s resolutions

[551]On 25 October 2021, Mr Attieh sent an email to Mr Al Bahar about his bonus, stating “there remains the issue of my bonus for the elapsed 2016/20 period”, and how his work on Cedar Mundi and Cedar II needed to be recognised financially. Mr Attieh requested a bonus of US$2.104 million. On 22 November 2021, Mr Al Bahar responded to Mr Attieh in the following terms:
“I want to start by thank you for the great effort and achievement by closing Cedar I and starting Cedar 2 while continuing developing your portfolio companies I am happy to give you 1,643m bonus and wish you all the success in Cedar 2 and the future funds.”
[552]It was put to Mr Al Bahar that this bonus was purely for Mr Attieh’s work in relation to the transfer of portfolio assets. Mr Al Bahar’s evidence was that it was for several years’ work (Day 9 page 141 line 13 to page 143 line 9). On 30 November 2021, Mr Al Bahar sent a formal letter recording the award of Mr Attieh’s bonus, which stated that a decision had been made “to grant you a performance bonus in recognition for your work at Cedar Mundi Capital (Holding) SAL”, and continued:
“You have been awarded a bonus of USD 1’634’000. (US Dollars one million six hundred thirty-four thousand only) for your contribution in relation to setting up Cedar Mundi (Holding) SAL and subsequently serving on its board and investment committee for the period Jan 2015 to Dec 2020 in Lebanon.”
[553]The matters undertaken by Mr Attieh included, of course, the transfer of the portfolio assets away from Cedar Mundi, together with the effective “recovery” of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment for Mr Al Bahar.[554]On 28 February 2022, the Cedar Mundi BoD wrote to the BdL setting out “the background information and relevant sequence of events surrounding the Proposed Transaction … toward seeking [the BdL’s] assistance in rectifying the unlawful disposal of Cedar Mundi’s assets by its former executive management”.[555]On 3 March 2022, Mr El Azar emailed a copy of this letter to the Cedar Mundi BoD members to schedule a board meeting over the next few days, the agenda for which would include “Review and sign-off of the draft letter to be addressed to all relevant portfolio companies while reserving all rights of CMH and its 331 shareholders in respect of unlawfully transferred assets by the previous GP” and “[d]elegating representatives from among the Board members to pursue and/or coordinate the relevant efforts in relation to the different tracks ahead (including legal, regulatory, statutory, strategic, administrative etc)”.[556]The Cedar Mundi BoD subsequently met on 11 March 2022 and resolved to(i) implement an executive committee and a legal committee “to pursue and coordinate the necessary efforts in relation to the different actions and procedures which must be carried out to preserve the Company’s rights and interests”; and(ii) to validate two draft letters, the first “to be addressed to the former Chairwoman [sic] [Mrs Al Qatami] aiming at requesting from her to handover all the Company’s registers, files, documents and bank accounts” and the second “to be addressed to all relevant portfolio companies aiming at reserving all the rights of the Company and the bank shareholders in respect of the unlawful transfer of the Company’s assets by the former executive management”.[557]On 14 April 2022, the Cedar Mundi BoD wrote to Mrs Al Qatami to request that she “hand over” to Cedar Mundi “all the Company’s documents and information including inter alia the Company’s registers, reports, data, shares’ certificates, accounting folders, files and spreadsheets, as well as all information and documents pertaining to the Company’s bank accounts” within five calendar days.[558]Mrs Al Qatami responded by her lawyers on the following day, 28 April 2022,(i) stating that all of Cedar Mundi’s records “were fully up-to-date and properly maintained in good standing until the date of [Mrs Al Qatami’s] resignation” from the Cedar Mundi BoD and that the new board “has full access to all corporate records”; and(ii) denying and rejecting “the baseless accusations and falsehoods” in Cedar Mundi’s letter and stating that “[a]ll of the actions undertaken by the Board of Directors under my client’s chairmanship were in full and strict compliance with the Company’s bylaws and with the applicable laws and regulations in Lebanon”.[559]On 25 October 2023, Cedar II issued a claim against Cedar Mundi for a declaration that the SPA was valid, which ultimately led to this trial. C. THE EXPERT EVIDENCE C1. LEBANESE LAW

C1.1 Areas of agreement and areas no longer in issue or relevant

[560]A very large number of the issues in relation to Lebanese law are either agreed between the experts or have fallen away as a matter of relevance. The main remaining areas of disagreement between the experts are(1) aspects of the principles in relation to statutory interpretation and(2) the interpretation and effect of Articles 157 and 158 of the LCC (including as to the good faith and benefit exceptions to Article 158).[561]There were areas of disagreement in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo that were not subject to cross-examination. Constructively, it has been agreed between counsel that the Court need not concern itself with the following:(1) Articles 806 and 905 of the CoC: Lebanese Law Joint Memo, paras 18-19. This was relevant to the question of whether a director could be treated as an agent under the general law of agency, and if so whether under Lebanese agency principles a principal is bound by a transaction which is to his benefit. But this is no longer relevant since the Defendants rely instead on the “benefit” exception to Article 158, which does not depend on the law of agency.(2) Article 153 of the LCC: Lebanese Law Joint Memo, paras 20-21. This had been relevant to the question of whether Mr Attieh was validly an assistant general manager at the relevant time, but this is no longer relevant because the Defendants do not assert that the Transactions were within Mr Attieh’s power in that capacity (as opposed to being within the power of the board of directors).(3) Article 166 of the LCC: Lebanese Law Joint Memo. Whilst this is the primary subject of Sakr 2, it is no longer relevant since it is common ground that the company can bring personal claims and the procedural route through which that would be done in Lebanon does not matter for the purposes of these proceedings (and/or for the reasons identified in sub-paragraph (5) below).(4) Article 253 of the LCC: Lebanese Law Joint Memo, paras 72-73 (as the difference between the experts is de minimis).(5) Joint and several liability under the CoC: Lebanese Law Joint Memo, paras 47-48. These issues fall away in circumstances where (other than in respect of the existence of any fiduciary duty) the parties are proceeding on the basis that English law applies to the personal claims.

C1.2 The Lebanese law experts and their respective expertise and evidence

[562]There is, I am satisfied, a notable difference in the experts’ respective expertise and experience which I consider to be of relevance in the context of the issues that remain in dispute.[563]As to their respective expertise, Professor Soumrani is Professor of Corporate and Company law at St Joseph University in Beirut (the areas of law under consideration) and he is a practising attorney in Lebanon with corporate and business law as a major field of expertise. He thus has relevant academic and professional experience of the aspects of corporate law under consideration. Yet further, such expertise was not challenged in cross-examination.[564]In contrast, it is apparent from both his CV, and his evidence when cross-examined, that not only does Mr Sakr not hold any academic position, but he has published nothing on Lebanese corporate law over the last twenty years and, even more importantly, he appears to be an arbitration rather than a corporate law specialist. In this regard his publications largely concern arbitration, his list of “case notes” includes no cases on Lebanese corporate law over the last twenty years and it appears that, since 2017, his practice has been increasingly UAE-focussed.[565]When he was cross-examined, Mr Sakr said that his arbitration cases included company disputes, but he accepted that these would not necessarily be Lebanese law governed cases (Day 11 page 4 lines 11 to 17). He did say that his practice had included corporate law cases, but, apart from “a case” under Lebanese law in the DIFC, this also appeared to refer to international disputes which would not necessarily be governed by Lebanese law (Day 11 page 5 lines 16 to 24). I also note that there would not appear to be any such cases listed in his CV.[566]Accordingly, and where there is a difference of opinion between the experts, I consider that Professor Soumrani has the greater, and more relevant experience, which I have taken into account when considering which, of their respective expert opinions, I should accept, and what the position under Lebanese law is.[567]However, more fundamentally, I consider that Professor Soumrani’s evidence in relation to the issues that remain in relation to statutory interpretation and each of Articles 157 and 158 to be more consistent with the actual language used, the ordinary meaning of the provisions concerned, and with the relevant case law and academic commentaries. In this regard I do not consider that Professor Soumrani was (as the Defendants allege) an unsatisfactory witness, or that he was partisan. On the contrary, and as shall be seen, his evidence is consistent with, and is supported by, the actual language used, the ordinary meaning of the provisions concerned and with the relevant case law and academic commentaries.[568]In contrast, I consider that there are shortcomings in Mr Sakr’s evidence in relation to statutory interpretation (in which he does not apply the very principles of statutory interpretation to which he, himself, refers in relation to the literal meaning of provisions), in relation to Article 157 where his approach is not supported by the cases he cites, and in relation to Article 158 where he not only fails to apply the principles of statutory interpretation to which he has referred, but he also seeks to interpret the last sentence of paragraph 158 by reference to Parliament’s supposed intention to introduce a rule of French law, notwithstanding the fact that he accepts that it is not possible to discern the legislative intention behind the last paragraph of Article 158, and in circumstances in which the equivalent provisions of the French Commercial Code have not been adopted into the LCC, and indeed the key respective provisions are in inconsistent (indeed opposite) terms.[569]In any event, where there is a difference of opinion between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr, I set out why it is that I prefer the evidence of Professor Soumrani over that of Mr Sakr on the issue of Lebanese law in question. C2. LOLLARS

C2.1 Applicable principles

[570]The parties had permission to call expert evidence on “currency exchange rates” and in particular “prevailing market exchange rates” between US Dollars and Lollars in the period to September 2021. In some respects, this was an unusual subject, given that Lollars are not a true currency trading on a normal foreign exchange market. Instead, they represent a grey market in Lebanon as parties transact in and out of the capital controls. In those circumstances, neither expert was ever going to be able to supply this court with perfect and precise information on this issue.[571]The role of the Court in valuation is not to determine an immaculate or absolute value, but to determine what the most likely figure is, on the basis of the evidence heard, and the fact that the evidence heard may not be perfect, is not a reason not to reach a finding. This point is made by Gross LJ in Capita Alternative Fund Services v Drivers Jonas [2012] EWCA Civ 1417, where he set out the following “initial observations”, at [43]:
“It is as well to emphasise that a Judge is never bound by expert evidence (even, though that does not arise here, undisputed expert evidence). While a Judge must have a reasoned or rational basis for a decision – on issues of quantum as on other issues – the Judge is in no way confined to the figures contended for by the experts. This is manifestly so in a typical valuation case where the figure arrived at by the Judge may well lie somewhere in between those advanced by the rival experts. Moreover, having regard to the true nature of quantum disputes and their history as jury questions, a Judge will sometimes find himself needing to do the best he can: see, for example, Dennard v Pricewaterhouse Coopers [2010] EWHC 812 (Ch), at [182]. In her skeleton argument, Ms Carr summarised the task of the Judge in such circumstances as follows: “The exercise required is not about the Court reaching an immaculate or absolute value, but about reaching the most likely figure on the basis of the evidence it has heard. That evidence may well not be perfect, indeed it is unlikely ever to be so.”
I agree. ii) As is well established, valuation is an art not a science; not every error will amount to a breach of duty and “pinpoint accuracy” in the result is not to be expected: Watkins J (as he then was) in Singer & Friedlander v John D Wood & Co [1977] 2 EGLR 84, at p. 86. In order to establish negligence, it must be shown both that the valuer failed to exercise reasonable skill and care and that the result was “wrong” – i.e., outside the permissible range or bracket. Depending on the property in question, margins of error may be of some degree of magnitude. Once the Court has formed a view of what the correct valuation would have been (the figure it considers most likely that a competent valuer would have put forward), damages will be assessed by reference to that figure. The law is clear in this regard and appears from [140] – [146] of the judgment, together with the authorities there cited. I cannot detect any error either in the Judge’s analysis or his application of the relevant principles and did not understand Drivers Jonas to argue the contrary. The very nature of valuation and the inherent imprecision in the exercise underline the intensely factual nature of this Issue – and, for my part, a reluctance to interfere with the Judge’s conclusion unless driven to do so.”[572]A similar point was made by Moore-Bick LJ in his concurring judgment, at [80]:
“[T]he court must do its best on the material before it. … I do not, with respect, think that it [the comment of Devlin J in Biggin & Co] can be taken as justifying the court in rejecting the claim altogether if the claimant has failed to adduce the best evidence reasonably obtainable. … The assessment of damages is essentially a jury question. The court’s task is to make whatever findings it can on the evidence before it…”
[573]It is this approach which the Court must take to the Lollars evidence.

C2.2 Dr Nahas

[574]The Defendants’ expert, Dr Nahas, is a former Lebanese cabinet minister, and founder and secretary general of the radical, populist “Citizens in State” political party. A very significant part of Dr Nahas’ evidence took the form of a political speech, and indeed Dr Nahas confirmed in the course of cross-examination that:(1) He had “no particular professional expertise in currency exchange rates or lollars multipliers” (Day 12 page 114 lines 9 to 12).(2) His political views informed the opinions he expressed in his expert reports (Day 12 page 103 line 24 to page 104 line 8).(3) His evidence “was not based on any expertise or professional experience” but rather was “about what someone else [had] told [him]” (Day 12 page 148 lines 11 to 22) about a so-called “internal document from the BdL” (Day 12 page 134 lines 20 to 22 and see para 27 of Nahas 1).(4) That “internal document” in any event did not “purport to show historic Lollar conversion rates” (Day 12 page 163 lines 21 to 23).(5) He was a friend of Mr Attieh’s sister and her husband, Mr Chélala (who also worked for Mr Attieh), and knew Mr Attieh socially (Day 12 page 105 line 24 to page 107 line 3).(6) He considered the C-331 Shareholders including SGBL and the BdL to be criminals, thieves and knowingly complicit in a fraudulent scheme (see variously, Day 12 page 94 line 20 to page 99 line 7).[575]It will be readily apparent from the above, truly quite extraordinary, revelations coming from an expert witness, that Dr Nahas was not an independent and disinterested expert seeking to assist the Court with his professional opinions, nor did he appear to have any relevant expertise (even had he chosen to comply with his duties as an expert).[576]Quite apart from the above, the General Counsel of the BdL (a respected former judge) has expressly confirmed that the so-called internal BdL document relied on by Dr Nahas is not in fact a BdL document at all, and that the BdL does not have any data on Lollar conversion rates:
“1. Was the BdL Document produced by the Banque du Liban? I have enquired with the officials at BdL who are in charge of producing various reports and confirm that, to our knowledge, the Document is not part of any report (or even drafts) produced by BdL. In fact, the Document purports to analyze the treatment of various types of deposits with the Lebanese commercial banks, including accrued interest. To date, BdL has not produced or published any final report regarding BdL’s views on the treatment of such deposits and the figures in the Document do not correspond to any figures or categories either previously or currently under discussion by BdL. 2. If so, by whom, when and for what purpose was it produced? Please see response to question one above. 3. Please explain what is being described in Section B of the BdL Document (“Non-Eligible to Eligible deposits”); in particular, please explain what is being referred to or described by the years and respective percentages set out in this section and whether the discount set out relate to the multiplier for transactions between Lollars and fresh funds as described above. The Document purports to describe the treatment of non-eligible deposits in Lebanese commercial banks into eligible deposits, payable with a discount and over time, as part of a restructuring proposal for deposits maintained at Lebanese banks prior to November 2019. As stated above, to our knowledge, the Document has not been produced by BdL and does not reflect BdL’s position on this subject matter. In any event, the ratio of non-Eligible to Eligible deposits, if and when agreed, does not in any way reflect the rates of conversion of local US Dollars in Lebanese banks (i.e. US dollars sitting to the credit of accounts in Lebanese banks prior to November 2019 (“Lollars”)) to “fresh”
US dollars. The conversion of Lollars to fresh US dollars is not regulated by the Central Bank and is an informal market between depositors in Lebanese banks. As such, BdL does not have data on these conversion rates.” (emphasis added)[577]Dr Nahas was reduced to speculating that the BdL’s General Counsel was not acting in good faith but simply “executing instructions” to deny knowledge of the document (Day 12 page 157 line 10 to page 160 line 19). That is a serious allegation to make which was wholly unproven. I consider that the explanation given by a named senior officer of the BdL is likely to be more reliable than the explanation of an (anonymous) contact of Dr Nahas, who apparently provided Dr Nahas with the basis for his evidence to the contrary, and who appears to have been motivated by political sympathies (Day 12 page 154 lines 6 to 23). The Defendants were required by a notice to prove that the so-called internal BdL document was what Dr Nahas claimed it to be. They failed to do so.[578]It is clear that Dr Nahas was neither an expert nor independent, which he himself candidly accepted, and neither was his evidence or methodology credible. In such circumstances I cannot place any reliance on views expressed by him, and I prefer the expert evidence of Mr Hatem (as addressed below) on the issues that arise.

C2.3 Mr Hatem

[579]Mr Hatem is a senior financial consultant based in Beirut. He came across as a calm and professional witness who answered the questions put to him fairly and openly. No challenge was made to his expertise or standing to give expert evidence on the question of Lollars. Nor was the substance of most of his evidence challenged. In particular, there was no challenge in cross-examination to his description of the Lebanese financial crisis (Hatem 1 paras 11 to 14), his explanation for the emergence of Lollars (Hatem 1 paras 15 to 17), his evidence as to the development of a “secondary informal market” for US Dollar/Lollar exchanges (Hatem 1 paras 23 to 25) , in which there was no “official exchange rate” (Hatem 1 para 29 and Day 12 page 6 lines 24 to 25), and his explanation as to the role of Lebanese commercial banks in that informal market (see Hatem 2 para 6 and Day 12 page 5 line 16 to page 6 line 22): “In the early stages of the crisis, transactions … occurred between clients of different banks. Subsequently, this practice became largely restricted to transactions between depositors and borrowers within the same bank. These transactions were carried out directly between the two parties, allowing for the netting of accounts between depositors and borrowers, while the cash consideration was settled outside the banking system. Although banks were not formally involved in these transactions, they were aware of the prevailing conditions and the conversion rates applied between their clients. In several instances, banks acted as informal or indirect facilitators of these arrangements. Information regarding applicable rates and conditions was widely exchanged among market participants, leading to the establishment of informal networks aimed at securing the most favourable terms. In this context, bankers were in a prime position to observe and understand the prevailing market conditions and conversion rates applied by their clients, and, in certain cases, leveraged their own networks to obtain improved terms”.[580]In those circumstances, I consider that Mr Hatem’s methodology of approaching contacts at a sample of banks, and a large real estate trader, to provide their aggregate monthly observed multipliers was an appropriate one, not least in circumstances where there were no official exchange rates.[581]As Mr Hatem explained (Day 12 page 10 line 24 to page 11 line 5), “the initial information obtained from the bank was on a no-name basis. I approach friends of mine, my contacts within different banks, and obtained from them, unofficially and informally, the rate based on the information they gathered. Later on, I asked to be provided with a letter, with an email from the bank, for me to have supportive documentation”.[582]As Mr Hatem put it, “the bankers were in the frontline to get this information. That’s why I decided to approach the banks” (Day 12 page 12 line 25 to page 13 line 2). Indeed, this is what BSEC itself did to validate its approach to the Lollar multiplier for the period up to February 2021: “BSEC … discussed the conversion rates trends with some Lebanese banks and validated that this is coherent with the trends shown in the market” (BSEC Valuation Report page 9).[583]I am satisfied that the multipliers sourced by Mr Hatem can be treated as being a fair reflection of market exchange rates on the basis they are broadly consistent in each month and change broadly consistently between months (see para 28 of Hatem 1).[584]The cross-examination of Mr Hatem mainly focussed on whether his sample could have been(1) more precise or granular or(2) representative. It is not clear to me where such criticisms were leading, given that there was no evidence that a more precise or granular or representative approach sample would have identified a lower multiplier. In any event, I do not consider that either criticism is well founded.[585]As to the former, given the nature of the informal market, I consider it to be unsurprising that Mr Hatem was not able to obtain more precise or granular information (i.e. beyond monthly aggregate figures) from his contacts. The questions in cross-examination in this regard appeared to proceed on the basis of a misapprehension that the grey market for Lollars within Lebanon might operate in the same transparent way as the international wholesale foreign exchange markets (see Day 12 page 46 line 2 to page 47 line 8 and page 54 line 2 to 56 line 11) and without regard to banking secrecy requirements preventing Lebanese banks from disclosing particular details of Lollar transactions (Day 12 page 44 line 10 to page 46 line 1).[586]As to the latter, I consider that the sample was representative, being of a large cross-section of the market. As Mr Hatem said (Day 12 page 13 lines 7 to 8), “I’ve chosen the biggest banks to make sure it covers the bulk of the market”. It included Bank Audi which, as Mr Hatem noted, was “by far” the largest Lebanese retail bank and BLOM, which was “a very big bank” (Day 12 page 76 line 15). Dr Nahas agreed that Bank Audi was “probably the largest” holder of deposits in Lebanon (Day 12 page 170 lines 12 to 13), with BLOM as the “next largest” (Day 12 page 170 lines 14 to 16), and Fransabank “third or fourth largest” (Day 12 page 170 lines 17 to 19). Mr Hatem also named the real estate trader as Ashada (Day 12 page 38 line 13) which had a very substantial operation and exchanged Lollars into US Dollars 2-3 times each month (Day 12 page 77 line 19 to page 78 line 22).[587]Further, using the “Bilanbanques” data as a rough proxy, Mr Hatem’s sample covered over half of the banking market (per para 9 of Hatem 3). He was cross-examined at length in relation to the Bilanbanques rankings (see Day 12 page 14 line 12 to page 29 line 7) but this appeared to be directed at showing these rankings could not be a precise measure of the share of the market represented, but Cedar Mundi never suggested it was. Equally, this was based on the false premise that a deposit in a bank account only appears as a liability and not also an asset on a bank’s balance sheet (Day 12 page 16 line 19 to page 17 line 19).[588]Mr Hatem was also asked to comment on an attempted valuation by Mr El Azar to pay Grant Thornton in Lollars in April 2021 (Day 12 page 60 line 2 to page 63 line 9). I consider that these questions should have been put to Mr El Azar himself. In any event, I consider that Mr Hatem was right to say that a multiplier cannot be divined from a negotiation where the price for the goods or services is also up for negotiation. I am satisfied that that is different from a “pure” Lollar-US Dollar exchange (see Day 12 page 62 lines 16 to 19).[589]Ultimately, I do not consider that the Defendants’ criticisms of Mr Hatem were well founded in relation to reliability, as to whether the data relied upon was representative and as to his sources. Given the nature of the beast (and the lack of any official exchange rate) it was, I consider, inevitable that there were limitations on the available information. Nevertheless, I consider that, in contrast to Dr Nahas, Mr Hatem had the requisite expertise, was independent, and the data he used is, at the very least, the best available. Mr Hatem considered answers and his methodology (i.e. to consult the commercial banks) was, I am satisfied, the most appropriate course to adopt in the circumstances, and in fact the same approach as that taken by BSEC at the time.[590]In such circumstances, I prefer the evidence of Mr Hatem and find that the approximate appropriate multipliers in the month that the SPA was signed (June 2021) and the month on which the consideration for the 2021 Transaction was adjusted (September 2021) were as follows:(1) June 2021 – 4.35. This is a conservative figure. The SPA was signed on 28 June 2021, and in July 2021 the Lollar multiplier increased to 5.37 (see Hatem 1 para 28).(2) September 2021 – 4.50. Again, the SPA was signed on 28 June 2021 and the aggregate average multipliers for July and August 2021 were higher still, at 5.37 and 5.64 (see Day 2 page 57 lines 15 to 21). C3. VALUATIONS[591]The expert evidence provided by Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip on valuation is relevant to two core issues:(1) whether the 2021 Transaction was beneficial to Cedar Mundi (such that it may in the Court’s discretion be validated even if it was unauthorised absent general assembly approval under Article 158 of the LCC); and(2) the quantification of any in personam monetary remedies ordered against Defendants.[592]I consider that Mr Pearson gave careful and considered evidence in response to the two core issues. Mr Pearson’s conclusions and reasoning, including the underlying factual assumptions he relied upon, were cogent and robust in substance. Importantly, Mr Pearson was prepared to evaluate, critically, those assumptions when he was provided with additional information during cross-examination. I reject the suggestion (to the extent advanced) that he did not have the requisite expertise to opine on the issues under consideration. He clearly did.[593]In contrast, Mr Worsnip at times gave evidence on issues on which he could not properly comment. At the same time, he was unable to answer certain questions put to him in cross-examination, preferring to deflect or avoid giving direct answers, and ultimately stuck closely to the Defendants’ case, even when doing so undermined the credibility of his evidence. As identified below, on more than one occasion he “entered the arena” in respects that favoured the Defendants’ case. It also became increasingly apparent during the course of cross-examination that Mr Worsnip either had not been provided with important documents from the Defendants’ own disclosure, or if he had, he had failed to consider the same. This impacted upon his ability to undertake the valuation exercise accurately, which inevitably also impacted upon the reliability of his evidence. He also, somewhat bizarrely, sought to characterise the 2021 Transaction as an LP-led share sale when it was, I am satisfied, both in form and in substance a GP-led asset sale to Cedar II as a continuation fund.[594]In the above circumstances, I prefer the evidence of Mr Pearson to that of Mr Worsnip where there were relevant differences between them in relation to valuation.[595]As for valuation dates, a 5 February 2021 valuation date (which is the focus of the Defendants’ case), exists only to scrutinise the analysis in the BSEC Valuation Report (see Day 2 page 57 lines 15 to 21), which may have marginal relevance to the question of the fraudulent act doctrine, but informs neither of the two issues outlined above. The valuation date for the purposes of determining whether the 2021 Transaction was in fact at an undervalue is 28 June 2021, i.e. the date on which the SPA took place or, failing that, 8 September 2021. On either date, the evidence is that the 2021 Transaction was at a substantial undervalue.[596]The Claimant’s case is that the 2021 Transaction gave rise to a loss of (fresh) US$22 million or more. As the Claimant identified in its pleaded case, there are three main elements to the valuation enquiry (whichever date is adopted):(1) The fair value of Cedar Mundi’s investment in each portfolio company;(2) The appropriate secondary discount and/or other adjustments; and(3) A multiplier to reflect payment in Lollars not “fresh” US Dollars.[597]As the Claimant notes in its written Closing Submissions (at para 242), although these are the elements also found in the Valuation Spreadsheet as endorsed in the BSEC Valuation Report, they notably did not feature in Mr Attieh’s earlier methodology for fixing the consideration of the 2021 Transaction at L$27 million:(1) Mr Attieh’s starting point, on his own evidence, was that he was pursuing an “at par” exit for the existing shareholders of Cedar Mundi. If no multiplier is used to reflect the difference in value between US Dollars and Lollars, while L$27 million does not exactly correspond to the total of the First, Second, and first tranche of the First Capital Call, it is also not far from it (and within the 15% margin of error contemplated by the December Presentation). Indeed, it would have been a pure coincidence if an “at par” exit had also reflected the current market price for the investment portfolio, since they are different exercises.(2) Mr Attieh’s valuation technique when marketing an LP-led transaction (i.e. of the C-331 Shareholders’ shares in Cedar Mundi) in the second half of 2020 was simply to apply a 2.4 Lollar-to-Dollar ratio to drive a 58% discount to “par” in an LP-led transaction. Mr Attieh knew that this did not result in a market price, telling potential investors that “marking to market L$ sub loans means a windfall profit of 15-20m US$”. The language of “windfall profit” is further indicative that Mr Attieh was suggesting that new investors could arbitrage Lollars for profit to the expense of Cedar Mundi, and the other C-331 Shareholders.[598]As the Claimant points out, it would have been entirely coincidental if either of these approaches for calculating the consideration for the 2021 Transaction had, by chance, also identified the proper market value for Cedar Mundi’s portfolio (at less than US$6 million, after application of the correct Lollars multiplier).[599]I am in no doubt that Mr Attieh did not accidentally alight upon the proper market value, or anything close to it:(1) Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip agree that the fair value of the portfolio investments as at 5 February 2021 was approximately US$32.1 million, rising to approximately US$33.2 million by 28 June 2021, adjusted to remove investments that could not be transferred to Cedar II to approximately US$29.05 million as at 8 September 2021 (see para 7.3 of the Valuation Joint Memo).(2) Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip fundamentally disagree as to the appropriate secondary discount. Mr Pearson’s opinion was that a discount of 22.5% - 27.5% would be appropriate (see Pearson 3 para 6.5), whereas Mr Worsnip contended for a discount of 62% (see Worsnip 1 at para 7.3.21 and Table 21), together with a further adjustment in respect of capital contributions on a share sale basis – see paras 8.1.12 to 8.1.19 of Worsnip 1, on an asset sale basis see paras 5.2.4 to 5.2.6 of Worsnip and para 5.3.3 and Table 2 of Worsnip 2, which in aggregate resulted in a discount of around 80% (as Mr Pearson noted in cross-examination – see Day 13 page 192 lines 14 to 20).(3) The question of the correct Lollars multiplier was outside the expertise of the valuation experts. It was instead addressed in the expert evidence of Mr Hatem and the evidence of Dr Nahas. On the basis of the available Lollars evidence, I am satisfied (and have found) that the appropriate multiplier as at the date of the SPA (28 June 2021) was 4.35, rising to 4.50 as at the date on which the consideration under the SPA was adjusted (8 September 2021). It was common ground between the parties that the multiplier prevailing on the valuation date should be used (see at paragraph 11.2 of the Valuation Joint Memo).[600]The conclusion on the Lollars expert evidence is sufficient by itself to establish that the 2021 Transaction was at an undervalue—since BSEC applied a multiplier of 2.5 – 2.9, and Mr Worsnip applied a multiplier of 3.42 as at 28 June 2021 and 3.58 as at 8 September 2021.[601]Nevertheless, I have considered the Claimant’s submission that Mr Pearson’s evidence on the appropriate secondary sale discount should be accepted, and that Mr Worsnip’s corresponding evidence should be rejected for five reasons which the Claimant advances, and which I address below:(1) First, Mr Worsnip’s proposed secondary discount is significantly out of line with the market in the relevant period, i.e. in the first half of 2021 when there was very significant demand for secondary transactions (resulting in a decline in discounts and a rise in prices), and US sanctions made no difference to Cedar Mundi’s access to that market.(2) Second, Mr Worsnip’s proposed secondary sale discount to reflect Lebanese country risk does not reflect the fact that (as Mr Attieh himself said at the time) the investment portfolio was “materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk”.(3) Third, Mr Worsnip’s further discount on the basis that the 2021 Transaction was a distressed sale and/or Cedar Mundi was a distressed asset is untenable on the available evidence.(4) Fourth, Mr Worsnip’s proposed adjustments for capital contributions are based on an artificial recharacterisation of the 2021 Transaction as a sale of Cedar Mundi itself, and in any event are wrong.(5) Fifth, Mr Worsnip’s proposed discount does not “price in” the potential significant upside on White Lab.[602]I address each of these points in detail below. However, it suffices to note at the outset that I consider that the Claimant is right in relation to each of these five points essentially for the reasons given at paras 246 to 293 of the Claimant’s written closing submissions.

C3.1 Secondary discount: market trends in 2020 and 2021 and sanctions

[603]As explained in the Journal of Financial Economics by TD Nadauld, BA Sensoy, K Vorkink and MS Weisbach, ‘The liquidity cost of private equity investments: Evidence from secondary market transactions’ (2019) 132 Journal of Financial Economics 158 – 181 (the “JFE Article”):
“…investments in private equity funds are relatively illiquid, and this illiquidity can be a substantial cost of investing in private equity. The market response to the illiquidity of private equity investments was to form a secondary market in which investors can trade those stakes.”
[604]As in any market-determined price, the level of discount required to secure a transaction between a willing seller and willing buyer may increase or decrease depending upon supply (i.e. private equity investors willing to sell on the secondary market) and demand (i.e. private equity investors willing to buy on the secondary market) (see Worsnip 2 at paras 3.2.1 – 3.2.3). Hence average discounts will increase, lowering returns for sellers, where there is greater supply than demand. Conversely average discounts will decrease, increasing returns for sellers, where there is greater demand than supply. And in some market conditions there may in fact be no discount, or the secondary transaction might take place at a premium to fair value.[605]The first half of 2020 and the first half of 2021 saw fundamentally different market conditions, as the experts both agreed during cross-examination. The change of market conditions was not in 2021, but it was in the second half of 2020 that the market conditions picked up (Day 16 page 37 lines 15 to 20).[606]The first half of 2020 saw demand fall very substantially as a result of the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, which drove discounts up and prices down. As Mr Worsnip put it, “there was a lack of buyers during the pandemic for all assets” (Day 14 page 166 lines 8 to 9). Mr Pearson agreed, explaining that references in the literature to investors “keeping their powder dry” during 2020 were describing investors who “were not investing until they saw how the macroeconomic environment developed over the coming months” (Day 13 page 203 line 24 to page 204 line 1).[607]In this regard: (1) KPMG said in its Q1 2021 report “Q1/20 was unlike any quarter on record. The emergence of the novel coronavirus COVID-19 shattered original expectations for the year … Q2/20 is expected to be a rough quarter for VC investment in every jurisdiction”, adding:
“While there continues to be an enormous amount of dry powder in the global VC market, many investors will likely sit on the fence until the ramifications of the pandemic become clearer.” (2) Setter Capital’s 2020 report reported that “[a]s a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, FY 2020 volume decreased 27.7% compared to FY 2019” and “[l]ooking forward, buyers expect FY 2021 volume to rebound to $89.84 billion
. Thus, as identified in Setter Capital’s August 2020 report (the “Setter August 2020 Report”), there had been a sharp reduction in prices for secondary transactions across all categories by mid-2020.[608]Mr Pearson’s evidence was that the first half of 2021 saw a surge in demand, driving discounts down and prices up. As Mr Pearson put it “there had been a significant upturn in many markets” (Day 13 page 202 lines 15 to 16), and the market was “above trend as there was a catch-up” (Day 13 page 205 lines 9 to 10) and “I know from personal experience that there was, in general, an uptick in transactions in terms of corporate finance activity dipped a lot at the start of Covid, then there was a bit of boom in M&A activities, in general, in kind of late 2020 into 2021” (Day 13 page 87 lines 3 to 7).[609]In contrast, Mr Worsnip was reluctant to concede that this went beyond Western Europe and the US, recognising the difficulties that this market shift caused for the conclusions in his expert report (Day 14 page 166 lines 20 to 22).[610]I prefer the evidence of Mr Pearson which is more consistent with contemporary commentaries:(1) KPMG said in its Q4 2020 report that “[d]uring Q4/20, VC investment was very strong in all regions of the world” (emphasis added), with a focus on “sectors that have seen high demand given the ongoing pandemic, including logistics and mobility, healthcare and biotech, fintech, edtech, and gaming”. KPMG noted that “all-time records in the back half of 2020 as more clarity around economic fortunes was achieved”, and for technology and other sectors KPMG predicted “[t]hat momentum is only going to continue heading into Q1/21”.(2) Jeffries’ global market review in July 2021 (the “Jeffries Report”) also evidenced that the market was buoyant:
“Highlights From the First Half ▪ Global secondary volume was $48 billion, setting a first-half record. GP-led transactions accounted for 60% of volume, solidifying a new “normal” of consistent prominence ▪ Average pricing for all strategies was 90% of NAV in LP secondary transactions, marking a pivotal rebound after three consecutive annual declines ▪ Private equity sponsors continue to identify “trophy” assets for GP-led opportunities; single-asset continuation fund transactions represented 45% of total GP-led volume ▪ Near-term available capital stands at a record $231 billion, but aggressive capital deployment drove the capital overhang multiple down to 2.6x from 3.1x at the end of 2020 ▪ After LPs sat on the secondary sideline for most of 2020, they have returned to the market in earnest in 2021; traditional LP sales were $19 billion in 1H 2021, representing a 58% increase from 1H 2020”
. Jeffries attributed this in large part to “pent-up buyer demand for high quality assets and portfolios” following the pandemic, with assets in GP-led transactions on average around “6 years old, considerably more recent than prior years”. Market demand for secondary transactions was not limited to late-stage company initial public offerings.[611]Based on the above evidence of Mr Pearson as supported by the above commentaries, I am satisfied that reports and data on appropriate secondary discounts produced in 2020, during the pandemic, provide no useful guidance for appropriate discounts in 2021, after the pandemic. This was memorably (and aptly) described by the Claimant as being like trying to resolve a damages claim under section 51 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 for non-delivery of a cargo of oil due on a date after the 2026 Iran war broke out by reference to the prevailing market price for oil before the start of such war.[612]I accept Mr Pearson’s evidence that literature from mid-2020 had “very little relevance, other than understanding the movements over previous years” (Day 13 page 204 lines 15 to 16) and that the “2020 data was fairly atypical due to the impacts of Covid” (Day 13 page 71 lines 19 to 20) which is consistent with the commentaries identified above. Realistically, Mr Worsnip ultimately acknowledged what is obvious, namely that for a valuation date of 28 June 2021 or 8 September 2021, “the more recent data is more relevant” (Day 14 page 167 lines 16-17).[613]This has major implications for the worth of the conclusions in Mr Worsnip’s expert report. Mr Worsnip referred to four sources to identify typical levels of liquidity discount in secondary transactions:(1) a Greenhill presentation from January 2020;(2) the Setter August 2020 Report;(3) the JFE Article, for its data on discounts during the 2008 financial crisis; and(4) the Jeffries Report, to identify a typical discount of 20-25% (see paras 7.1.30 to 7.1.31 of Worsnip 1). Of these only the Jeffries Report reflects prevailing market conditions at the date that the SPA was signed. The other data sources relate to discounts in earlier periods of time when it is clear that market conditions were different.[614]In contrast, Mr Pearson focussed on the data relating to the secondary market in 2021 which is, I am satisfied, the more appropriate approach (see Pearson 1 paras 10.47 to 10.57, 10.60 to 10.67 and 11.13 to 11.16).[615]Applying this approach, there are three key sources (emphasis circled and in red). First, the Jefferies Report itself, which shows that the average secondary market pricing for venture capital was at 84% in the first half of 2021:[616]Second, data from Secondary Link which shows (consistently with the Jeffries Report) that between late 2020 and late 2021 the average discount pricing was no more than 20%:[617]Third, data from Greenhill, not from 2020 but in respect of 2021, which shows an average 21% discount for venture capital:[618]Hence, the average discount across all geographies and sizes (save for Secondary Link where the data is limited to transactions of $250 million or less) in the relevant period is in fact 16-21%, not 20-25% as suggested by Mr Worsnip.[619]In contrast, Mr Pearson’s evidence that “an average secondary sale discount of 20% is appropriate in 2021” (Pearson 3 para 3.21) accords with the available data.[620]Nevertheless, the Defendants criticise the approach of Mr Pearson. I do not consider that such criticisms bear examination. First, it is said that Mr Pearson adopted his starting point uncritically (see para 287 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions), but I am satisfied that Mr Pearson considered the position critically and moved away from the starting point to reflect Lebanese country risk and the size of the fund, amongst other factors. This is evident from para 6.5 of Pearson 3: “In line with my First Report, I have increased the discount rate by an additional 2.5% to 7.5% to take into account the other risk facts connected to this transaction”.[621]Second, Mr Pearson is criticised (at para 289 of the Defendants’ written closings) for relying on the 16% discount and the Jeffries Report. However, Mr Pearson in fact starts with a discount of 20%, not 16% and hence the Defendants’ assertion that, “Mr Pearson had just used the 16% figure without analysis or making any upwards adjustment” (Day 16 page 41 line 19 to page 21 line 1) is not correct. Moreover, the Jeffries Report made it clear that the pricing in this period was driven by increased demand generally and was not limited to mature technology secondary transactions. In this regard Mr Attieh’s own position at the time was that this involved a mature secondary transaction, where Mr Attieh sent to Mr Al Bahar the text for an email to be sent to potential investors in the 2021 Transaction:
“… Our fund has invested in over $25M in high-growth technology companies which have performed quite well, are mature and are materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk.”
Mr Attieh further explained in the same text:
“These exceptional returns are driven by (i) the purchase of the banks interest in Lebanese dollars which means a deep discount … by the maturity of the portfolio (4+ years) where several investments are close to $100M+ valuations.”
[622]Third, the Defendants rely on the Setter Report at para 290 of their written closing submissions, but that report is not relevant as it reflects prices in the first half of 2020, not 2021, when market conditions were markedly different. The average discounts in August 2020, the date of the Setter Report, were very different to June 2021 or even February 2021, and so are not relevant.[623]Fourth, Mr Pearson is further criticised at para 291 of the Defendants' written closing submissions (where the Defendants refer to Secondary Link), for not adjusting for venture funds or the size of the funds. However, Mr Pearson did make adjustments in part to reflect the size of the fund, and in any event the starting point of the experts of 20% is 7% above what Secondary Link shows for the September valuation date. If anything, I consider that Mr Pearson’s evidence is conservative.[624]Fifth, at para 292 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions, the Defendants criticise Mr Pearson for missing the transcription error in the Blackrock document referred to, where they transposed over the Greenhill data. This is in fact something which Mr Worsnip also missed, but the Greenhill data is nevertheless relied upon, and the transcription error makes no real difference to the 20% starting point.[625]Ultimately the Defendants argued, at para 293 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions that these sources all suggest that a venture capital fund the size of Cedar Mundi was likely to attract a discount of at least greater than 30% before even considering country risk or overweight to Proximie. However, this proposition is not supported by either expert and is inconsistent with the Defendants’ own expert evidence. Mr Worsnip did not suggest a 30% discount just on this point, nor was the point put to Mr Pearson in cross-examination.[626]Overall, and in the circumstances identified above, I am satisfied that Mr Pearson’s evidence that “an average secondary sale discount of 20% is appropriate in 2021” (Pearson 3 para 3.21) accords with the available data, and I find that an average secondary sale discount of 20% is appropriate for 2021.

Sanctions

[627]Insofar as sanctions are concerned, Mr Worsnip suggested in his supplemental report that these general market averages for liquidity discounts were inapplicable because a minority shareholder of Cedar Mundi, Jammal which held a 2.25% shareholding, was subject to US sanctions, meaning that US investors “may well” have been unable to participate in the 2021 Transaction (Worsnip 2 para 3.4.3 of his second expert report). However, I do not consider that suggestion carries any real weight, for a number of reasons:(1) Mr Worsnip himself made clear that “I’m not a sanctions expert” (Day 14 page 169 line 24) and “I couldn’t comment on the legal restriction” (Day 14 page 170 line 19). He also confirmed that he was not an expert on the operation of US private equity secondary markets and the impact of sanctions on those markets (Day 14 page 170 lines 20 to 24).(2) Somewhat troublingly, it is apparent that this was not a point that Mr Worsnip had come up with himself. Rather it had been suggested to him before he prepared his second report (Day 14 page 170 lines 2 to 12). It is notable that it was not a point that had been identified by BSEC as being relevant. It also appears that Mr Worsnip was willing to adopt this point without any due diligence, including failing to ask whether Jammal was in an insolvency process, and if so, the identity of its officeholders (Day 14 page 171 lines 8 to 18).(3) The reality is that the Defendants knew, but had not told Mr Worsnip, that the Deputy Governor of the BdL had been appointed as liquidator of Jammal. Mr Worsnip was asked whether this made a difference to the ability of US investors to participate in the 2021 Transaction and he replied “[i]t may and I’m no legal expert, but it may lift the legal restriction” (Day 14 page 172 lines 15 to 16).(4) The Defendants also knew, but again had not told Mr Worsnip, that Cedar Mundi had itself passed resolutions on 8 December 2020 prohibiting Cedar Mundi from accepting any further funds from Jammal or paying anything due to Jammal. Those minutes were put to Mr Worsnip during cross-examination, but having set the hare running at the Defendants’ suggestion, he wasn’t willing to comment (Day 14 page 175 lines 13 to 17):
“Q. Now, all of those things might well be relevant to whether the existence of US sanctions would actually have an impact on the liquidity of the transaction. That’s right, isn’t it? A. I couldn’t say”. (5) I consider that there is force in the Claimant’s submission that the effect of the Defendants withholding these documents from Mr Worsnip was that, whilst suggesting arguments to him with which to support the valuation for the 2021 Transaction, they were blindfolding Mr Worsnip as to the true scope of the issues. When this was put to Mr Worsnip, he did not really have any answer (Day 14 page 173 lines 17 to 23): “Q. You're effectively being asked to give an opinion blindfolded because you're not being given any of the documents relating to the sanctions issue, aren't you? A. I'm asked to be -- to consider what the impact on liquidity would be if this business was -- if this entity was sanctioned and I have the -- I've been given the understanding that it was sanctioned.”
[628]I do not consider that any weight can be attached to Mr Worsnip’s evidence in relation to sanctions, or as to the sanctions point more generally. Mr Worsnip had been starved of relevant documentation, and he did not have the relevant expertise in any event. The point has all the hallmarks of a lawyer inspired idea, and if the Defendants considered that there was anything in the point they could, and should, have sought leave to call a US sanctions expert at the CMC. They did not do so. Accordingly, I consider that the general market averages for liquidity discounts were applicable.

C3.2 Secondary discount: country risk

[629]Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip agreed that a further discount away from the average is required in respect of Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio. Mr Pearson proposed a further discount of 2.5% - 7.5% (leading to a 22.5% - 27.5% overall discount) (Pearson 3 para 6.5) Mr Pearson attributed the need for this further discount to three factors:(1) geographic risk;(2) the relatively small size of the portfolio; and(3) the relative value of the investment in Proximie compared to the rest of the portfolio (para 11.17 of Pearson 1 and para 6.5 of Pearson 3).[630]Whilst Mr Worsnip agreed with the need for a further discount he contended that it should be 20% not 2.5% - 7.5%, to reflect Lebanese country risk (Worsnip 1 para 7.2.18).[631]There are three core principles for determining country risk. First, the experts agree that the country risk will have been priced into the recent transactions by which the fair value of the investment portfolio was identified. As recorded in the Valuation Joint Memo, at para 9.10: Country risk already included in NAV Mr Pearson also considers that the country risk factors would already have been taken into account in determining market value of the individual Portfolio Assets. For example, the fund raising undertaken by Proximie in both 2020 and 2021, any Lebanon country risk factors would have been known. Mr Worsnip considers it is likely that part of the country risk premium associated with the financial crisis in Lebanon is reflected in the NAV but not all. The financial crisis would have restricted the pool of investors willing and able to invest in Lebanon. New investors considering acquisitions in the secondary market will require a higher level of discount because of the restricted liquidity.[632]Too large a further discount for country risk therefore risks double counting. The relevant question (following Mr Worsnip’s own reasoning) is what further discount is required to reflect, in particular, the risk of any portfolio company “associated with the financial crisis in Lebanon” not already captured in the existing valuation. Or in other words, should there be an additional discount to reflect some exposure to the Lebanese financial crisis, not already captured by fair value?[633]Second, Professor Aswath Damodaran has identified a 20% risk premium for pure Lebanese companies, but where a company is not a pure Lebanese company, the risk premium would be reduced. The experts agreed that the leading authority in this area is Professor Damodaran of New York University Stern School of Business. Mr Pearson described Professor Damodaran as “widely respected as probably one of the foremost valuation experts in the world” (Day 13 page 118 lines 8 to 10), and Mr Worsnip accepted that Professor Damodaran was a particularly eminent authority in this field (Day 14 page 30 lines 4 to 6). In this regard Professor Damodaran has also been referred to in a number of cases previously before this Court.[634]Professor Damodaran’s analysis shows a country risk premium for Lebanon of 19.18% as at January 2021 (para 9.3 of the Valuation Joint Statement). Mr Pearson’s evidence was that that was the discount that should be applied to a “pure Lebanese company” (Day 13 page 116 line 5) namely (Day 13 page 116 lines 16 to 19): “… when I say ‘Lebanese company’, that’s using an example of a company that has its headquarters in Lebanon, makes all its sales in Lebanon, and has all its staff in Lebanon”.[635]Third, both Professor Damodaran and wider scholarship identify (rightly in my view) that the focus should be on countries of operation, not countries of incorporation. Professor Damodaran has written extensively on measuring country risk, including Country Risk: Determinants, Measures and Implications. In the 2021 edition, Professor Damodaran explains:
“There are three broad approaches to dealing with country risk. The first and simplest is to base the country risk assessment on where the company is incorporated. Thus, all Brazilian companies are assumed to be exposed to only Brazilian country risk and US companies to US country risk. The second and more sensible (in my view) approach is to base the country risk exposure on where a company operates rather than where it is incorporated. The third approach requires us to estimate a relative measure of company exposure to company risk, akin to a beta, that we will term lambda.”
(emphasis added)[636]In assessing the jurisdictions of value to a company, Professor Damodaran explains that “[s]ince value is difficult to estimate, by country, the weighting has to be based on more observable variables such as revenues or operating income”. As Mr Pearson accepted, often revenue can be used as a “proxy” for identifying countries in which value is being created (Day 13 page 121 lines 1 to 10). The Defendants identified no secondary literature to support their assertion that for start-up companies less weight should be placed on revenue location.[637]Professor Damodaran cautions that a focus on revenue might be misleading for some companies, “especially if they are service or consumer product companies, it is revenue location that works best”. Accordingly, “the discount rate for a project should reflect the risk of the project, not the risk of the entity looking at the project”, and it is “corporate finance malpractice” to focus only on a company’s country of incorporation.

Proximie

[638]Proximie represented, by value, 63.2% of the portfolio at the date of the SPA and 72.2% of the portfolio at the date that the consideration was adjusted (see Pearson 3 para 4.22). On the evidence before me it had no observable Lebanese country risk that would require any discount to fair value:(1) Cedar Mundi’s investment was in a UK incorporated company not a Lebanese company (contrary to what was stated in table 18 to Worsnip 1).(2) Mr Worsnip’s table 18 did not identify any operating costs in Lebanon. He claimed to have seen a “split of operating costs”, but any such document has not been disclosed, and as such, cannot be relied upon (see Day 14 page 37 lines 13 to 25 and page 47 lines 5 to 7). There is no evidence that the support operations of Proximie were in Lebanon wholly or predominantly.(3) Mr Worsnip’s table 18 stated that 46% of Proximie’s workforce was in Lebanon. However: (a) that was based on Cedar Mundi’s Q3 2020 report to the BdL when 16 of Proximie’s 35 employees were in Lebanon. As Mr Pearson noted, since that was nearly a year before the SPA was signed, that was “obviously quite a while before the valuation dates (Day 13 page 211 lines 21 to 22”; (b) Mr Worsnip also relied on Cedar Mundi’s Q1 2021 report, but this simply said that “Proximie failed to report within the requested timeframe”. Mr Worsnip accepted that this was “wholly uninformative” and, again, it had been “an error” to refer to it (Day 14 page 38 lines 13 to 17); (c) in contrast, Cedar Mundi’s Q2 2021 report showed that Proximie’s workforce had grown to 93 but without breakdown as to jurisdiction. Mr Worsnip rightly accepted that “[w]e just don’t know” whether the 46% split remained accurate (Day 14 page 41 line 10 to page 42 line 6):
“Q. You have no basis for saying that 46% of Proximie’s workforce was in Lebanon as at the date of the SPA, do you? A. I have no basis for understanding how that proportion would have changed over the subsequent 12 months, that’s correct. Q. And you have no basis for saying that 46% of the Proximie workforce was in Lebanon as at the date that the consideration of the SPA was the adjusted, do you? A. Again, I have no basis for -- to say how that split in workforce would have evolved over that period of time.”
And (d) Proximie’s own Q1 2021 investor update disclosed that it had, by that time, 23 full time employees in the US. Indeed, Proximie’s growth in 2021 was primarily in the US. Mr Worsnip accepted that this underlined that the workforce had changed very considerably by the date of the SPA (Day 14 page 55 line 22 to page 56 line 10).[639]Mr Worsnip suggested (Day 14 page 28 lines 17 to 22) that it might be relevant that Proximie had a Lebanese subsidiary because that might expose its group to Lebanese country risk, which is pure speculation (the existence of the subsidiary was no doubt to comply with the incorporation requirement to qualify for funding under Circular 331). Mr Worsnip realistically accepted that “it rather depend[s] on what the Lebanese entity is doing” (Day 14 page 28 lines 23 to 25), so that (to take an extreme example) “if it was only a corporate shell that existed in Lebanon, then that wouldn’t have any bearing, I don’t think, on the way you would look at country risk.” (Day 14 page 36 lines 20 to 22). But he then speculated that Proximie had nonetheless “significant operations”, via this subsidiary, in Lebanon (Day 14 page 36 line 24) which was said to comprise “software development, the operations and the R&D” (Day 14 page 56 lines 16 to 17), but he did not identify any documents that would support such a suggestion (and nor was he taken to any such documents in re-examination). Equally, there is no evidence that the tech operations of Proximie were in the Lebanon (a suggestion made at paragraph 308 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions).[640]The same is true of the point made at para 312 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions that the subsidiary was clearly still “active” at the time of the April 2021 fundraising (referring to Clause 12.4 thereof) without any evidence as to what was being done and for what value. As such it is no more than a repackaged argument in relation to the company of incorporation point.[641]It was suggested to Mr Pearson in cross-examination that Proximie generated revenue from trading in Lebanon (Day 13 page 124 line 12 to page 132 line 21), which was neither pleaded, nor supported by any evidence. Unsurprisingly, Mr Pearson “strongly disagreed with that conclusion” (Day 13 page 207 lines 1 to 2), given that the documentary evidence clearly showed that Proximie traded outside of Lebanon, primarily in the US and Europe, as Mr Pearson confirmed in re-examination (Day 13 page 206 line 8 to page 210 line 2). Mr Worsnip also accepted that he could have asked Mr Attieh about the source of Proximie’s revenues but had not done so (Day 14 page 27 lines 2 to 6).[642]It was also put to Mr Pearson that the Lebanese subsidiary held intellectual property rights (Day 13 page 138 line 7 to page 139 line 7) but in fact, the only intellectual property was registered in the US, as Proximie confirmed in a disclosure letter dated 1 April 2021 and Mr Pearson confirmed that the relevant question from a country risk perspective was where the intellectual property was registered, not which entity held it (Day 13 page 211 lines 2 to 11) which would appear to be correct (contrary to the submission of the Defendants at paras 310 to 311 of the Defendants’ written closing submissions).[643]Importantly, Mr Worsnip accepted that there was no evidence that Proximie was exposed to the Lebanese financial risk (which was the whole basis for him applying a 20% discount to fair value for country risk) (see Day 14 page 57 lines 9 to 21):
“Q. You’re recorded [in the Valuation Joint Memo] as saying that: ‘... it is likely that part of the country risk premium associated with the financial crisis in Lebanon is reflected in the NAV but not all.’ Do you see that? A. I see that. Q. That’s the basis on which you say there has to be a separate and further discount for country risk; yes? A. Yes. Q. There’s no evidence at all, is there, that Proximie has suffered in any way by reason of the Lebanese financial crisis? That’s right, isn’t it? A. I see no evidence of disruption to the company, no.”
A. I see no evidence of disruption to the company, no.”[644]Accordingly, and for all above reasons, I reject the suggestion that there should have been a 20% discount to the fair value of Proximie to reflect Lebanese country risk.[645]It appears that Mr Worsnip’s erroneous opinion as to Proximie’s country risk was also a consequence of him having been provided with only limited documentation rather than all relevant documentation. In this regard, in cross-examination, he was taken to three documents which he had not previously seen, concerning Proximie’s operations: (1) Mr Attieh described Proximie to potential investors in what became the 2021 Transaction as a mature company, with an international investor base (including Tim Draper Associates, Admiral Group and BECO Capital) and a roster of household name clients in the US and the UK (Johnson & Johnson, Abbott Laboratories, Stryker, the UK Ministry of Defence and the UK National Health Service), adding:
“The healthtech sector is extremely hot and Proximie is deployed on 300 sites today (hospitals, universities…) with 60% in the US and the balance in UK/Europe.”
Mr Worsnip accepted, in cross-examination, that Mr Attieh’s description of Proximie did not include anything that could amount to Lebanese country risk (Day 14 page 46 lines 8 to 12). (2) The announcement of the close of Proximie’s fundraise in April 2021 described Proximie as a London-headquartered business which “has enjoyed rapid growth over the last 12 months, having conducted over 10,000 surgical interactions in 300 hospitals over 40 countries”, targeting “expansion in the US and European markets”. The same announcement also stated:
“Over the last twelve months, Proximie has grown exponentially, especially, in the US, and we are enormously excited to continue our development so we can democratise access to the best possible healthcare worldwide.”
Mr Worsnip accepted that the announcement did not link Proximie with Lebanon in any way (Day 14 page 49 lines 20 to 22). (3) Proximie’s own Q1 2021 investor update identified 5x quarter-on-quarter revenue growth in the US, with key clients being signed in that market. It did not identify any connection between Proximie and Lebanon. Mr Worsnip said that he would need to “study it more to accept that” (Day 14 page 52 line 7). This is a sorry state of affairs. The reality is that Mr Worsnip simply did not have all relevant documentation before him when he prepared his expert reports.[646]The Defendants sought to down-play the significance of these documents in closing (see para 313 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions) but they are, on any view, relevant and paint a different picture to that which Mr Worsnip and the Defendants seek to portray.[647]Mr Worsnip placed significant weight in his reports on the 72% discount to fair value applied to a Proximie secondary transaction in August 2020, when one of its founders, Mr Ali Ahmad, sold his significant holding in Proximie to a fund known as Global Ventures:(1) This is again something on which Mr Attieh (who was a director of Proximie) could have given evidence. He did not do so (one infers because it would not have help the Defendants’ case). The documentary evidence that is available shows that: (a) legal proceedings between Proximie and Mr Ahmad began at some point in Q2 2020; (b) on 21 August 2020, Mr Ahmad sold his shares in Proximie to Global Ventures on terms which appeared to include a settlement of aspects of that underlying dispute; and (c) Proximie’s later disclosure letter of 1 April 2021 disclosed that there was litigation relating to a director’s loan account and Proximie’s intellectual property rights.(2) Mr Pearson’s evidence on this was as follows (Day 13 page 168 lines 8 to 19):
“[MR PEARSON]. … All I’m saying is that Mr Ahmad doesn’t appear to have been an ordinary seller, in the sense that it appears that there were wider discussions around his exit from the group. Q. Well, I mean, the only solid fact we actually have in relation to this is that there was a secondary sale and it attracted a 72% discount? A. Yes. Q. The rest is just speculation, isn’t it? … A. Yes, that [is] correct.”
Q. The rest is just speculation, isn’t it? … A. Yes, that [is] correct.” (3) Mr Worsnip’s evidence was as follows (Day 14 page 18 lines 11 to 16):
“Q. … it’s not clear when Mr Ahmad’s litigation with Proximie settled and whether that secondary transaction was part of a wider settlement? A. No, it’s not clear. Q. You just don’t know, do you? A. No.”

And (Day 14 page 21 line 12 to page 22 line 10):

“Q. …the value of the earlier transaction may well have been driven by the particular dispute between Mr Ahmad and Proximie. That’s right, isn’t it? A. I really can’t comment. I can’t exclude that possibility, that’s true, but equally I don’t think we know enough about the nature of that dispute. It’s certainly not unusual for founders to fall out with one another and to have litigation on all sorts of different issues. It may well be that he simply had an amount that he had lent to the company at some point, that he required to be repaid to him. Q. Well, there may be all sorts of other factors driving the terms on which Mr Ahmad sold his shares. So, for example, the dispute on his director’s loan account and his IP claims, intellectual property claims, and the terms of any settlement. Those may all be factors driving the discount that we see as against Proximie for this secondary sale. That’s right, isn’t it? A. They are all related to his employment obligations and his position within the company. This concerns a disposal to a third party, this transaction, so there may be some relevance. It may be completely irrelevant. We just don’t know.”
Q. You just don’t know, do you? A. No.” And (Day 14 page 21 line 12 to page 22 line 10): (4) The reality is that, in the circumstances, Mr Ahmad’s secondary transaction cannot be treated as a normal, arm’s length market transaction. Not enough is known about that transaction. The discount could well reflect particular dynamics reflecting Mr Ahmad’s wider dispute with and exit from Proximie, and so cannot serve as any useful guide as to what Cedar Mundi could obtain for its shares in Proximie. Much more would need to be known about the circumstances of that transaction before reliance could safely be placed on it as indicative of an appropriate secondary discount for Cedar Mundi. In any event, and as Mr Pearson noted, there may be a difference between the discount to be applied on the secondary sale of a particular investment (with its particular set of risks) and the discount to be applied upon the sale of a portfolio (with diversified risks) (see Day 13 page 172 line 13 to page 173 line 15).[648]Proximie’s country risk is a significant point in relation to valuation, given, first, its value relative to the rest of the investment portfolio (63.2% - 72.2%) and, second, the significant (20%) discount proposed by Mr Worsnip: Value (US$) Deduction required by 20% discount (US$) At 28 June 2021 33,176,598 6,635,319 Excluding Proximie 11,982,926 2,442,040 At 8 September 2021 29,055,685 5,811,137 Excluding Proximie 8,089,285 1,617,857[649]Mr Worsnip accepted that, if he was wrong about Proximie being exposed to Lebanese country risk, (as I am sure he was) that would add US$4-5 million onto the correct valuation for Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio (Day 14 page 60 lines 14 to 19).[650]In this regard:(1) The difference if Proximie is excluded for country risk purposes as at either valuation date is US$4,193,280. This is a further point which, in of itself establishes that the 2021 Transaction was at an undervalue.(2) The effect of the 20% discount on the remaining portfolio companies is within the range suggested by Mr Pearson for country risk (i.e. a discount of up to 7.5% to the portfolio as a whole): Value (US$) Deduction required by 7.5% discount (US$) Value at 28 June 2021 33,176,598 2,488,245 Value at 8 September 2021 29,055,685 2,179,176

Other companies

[651]The other companies within the investment portfolio are only relevant insofar as it is necessary to determine whether a discount lower than the upper end of Mr Pearson’s range (i.e. less than 7.5%) would be appropriate.[652]It is notable that the only revenue that has been classified as being generated inside of Lebanon is in relation to Loolia and eComz (the former with revenue of US$4,594,072 which accounts for circa 96% of the total revenue classified as being generated inside Lebanon). Loolia only makes up circa 3% of the fair value of the Portfolio Assets (see Pearson 1 at para 10.11).

Quiqup

[653]This is the second most valuable company in the investment portfolio, representing by value 7.1% of the portfolio at the date of the SPA (but 1.6% at the date that the consideration was adjusted) (see Pearson 3 at para 4.22).[654]In contrast to the position in relation to the other portfolio companies, its founder, Mr El Koussa, gave evidence at trial. In this regard:(1) Mr El Koussa’s evidence was that Quiqup had been founded in the UK and generated its revenue primarily in the UAE (and to a lesser extent in other GCC countries) and had incorporated a Lebanese subsidiary in order to qualify for Circular 331 funding (see paras 1, 8 to 9, and 12 of El Koussa 1). It transpired that Mr Worsnip had not taken any of this into account because (surprisingly) he had not been given Mr El Koussa’s witness statement when preparing his report (Day 14 page 63 lines 19 to 25).(2) The Defendants’ case for country risk rests on Mr El Koussa’s oral evidence (and hence evidence that is not referred to in Mr Worsnip’s expert reports), that Quiqup employed software engineers and others in Lebanon (Mr El Koussa said that “I would say it was, like a 65/35 split, as in 65 were in the UAE and 35 were in Lebanon, perhaps” – Day 7 page 26 lines 19 to 21), who were paid in US Dollars because they had “the benefit of being able to work internationally, regardless of where they live” (Day 7 page 28 lines 1 to 2). This is to be contrasted with Cedar Mundi’s reports which suggested that in Q2 2021 only 7 of its 75 employees were based in Lebanon, albeit Mr El Koussa said that this was inaccurate (Day 7 page 26 lines 7 to 10).(3) Mr Pearson’s evidence in re-examination, in light of Mr El Koussa’s oral evidence, was that where employees are physically located in Lebanon but work internationally and are paid in US Dollars, that “probably reduces risk to them. In terms of the company, I think one would need to understand the more specific factors to reach a conclusion on that” (Day 13 page 214 lines 14 to 17). Mr Worsnip debated as to whether it “reduces [country risk exposure] significantly” (Day 14 page 70 line 21), although he accepted that “Quiqup’s operations are less exposed to Lebanese risk than others” in the portfolio (Day 14 page 72 lines 23 to 24). Certainly, the Lebanese entity does not appear to have been generating revenue and, if necessary, software engineers being paid in dollars could logically be sourced worldwide.(4) Quiqup completed a secondary transaction in September 2020 which contained a discount of 30% (see Worsnip 1 para 7.1.10). which is much closer to Mr Pearson’s conclusion on the applicable discount (up to 27.5%) than the bottom end of Mr Worsnip’s proposed discount (40% before any further discount for distress), as Mr Pearson noted during his cross-examination (Day 13 page 214 line 24 to page 215 line 8). This is not dealt with by the Defendants in the Defendants’ written closing submissions. Tellingly (and in stark contrast to his approach in relation to the Proximie secondary transaction) Mr Worsnip sought to distance himself from this transaction, saying that it was a product of its particular buyer. This inconsistency was put to Mr Worsnip, but he was not able to explain it satisfactorily (Day 14 page 74 line 15 to page 76 line 14).

White Lab

[655]White Lab was the third most valuable company in the investment portfolio, representing by value 6% of the portfolio as at the date of the SPA and 6.9% as at the date that the consideration was adjusted (Day 14 page 77 line 13 to 20). Late disclosure suggested that White Lab had the potential to be much more valuable than accounted for in any of the expert evidence (as addressed in Section C3.5 below).[656]Mr Worsnip effectively acknowledges, in cross-examination, that there was no country risk in relation to White Lab (Day 14 page 77 line 21 to page 77 line 21):
“Q. Now, let’s look at what you say about country risk as regards White Lab. This is your report, table 18. You accept -- well, say there are no employees in Lebanon. Is that right? A. Yes, that’s what I say. Q. There are no known operating costs in Lebanon. Is that right? A. Yes. Q. There are no known operations in Lebanon, are there? We’ve seen it’s not even a target market? A. No. Q. Mr Pearson has identified that all trading activities were actually being done in London. Can I just show you that. That’s Mr Pearson’s third report. Can I ask you just to read paragraphs 4.58 and 4.59. Can you see that? (Pause) A. Thank you. Q. You have no reason to disagree with what Mr Pearson says there, have you? A. I don’t, no.”
Q. There are no known operating costs in Lebanon. Is that right? Q. You have no reason to disagree with what Mr Pearson says there, have you? A. I don’t, no.”

Q. You have no reason to disagree with what Mr Pearson says there, have you?

[657]This evidence confined the Defendants’ case on country risk for White Lab to the bare fact that there was a Lebanese company within the corporate group. But as Professor Damodaran has identified, as explained above, country risk cannot be assessed by reference to country of incorporation, without more, and in any event a restructuring from Lebanon to the UK was already underway (and completed by Q3 2021). Mr Worsnip confirmed that he had not taken this into account, having not been provided with the relevant information (Day 14 page 79 line 8 to 19). Mr Worsnip was left asking “why did the entity [in Lebanon] exist, why was there an incorporated entity in Lebanon?” (Day 14 page 80 lines 11 to 12), which rather highlighted that he had no basis for suggesting that White Lab was exposed to Lebanese country risk.[658]In its written closing submissions (at para 320) the Defendants referred to Pearson 1 para 4.35 and the fact that in March 2020 and following it appeared that Daewoo was considering a significant investment in White Lab conditional on the liquidation of the Lebanese subsidiary and refocus of all activities in White Lab UK and White Lab US, which only completed very much later and following a restructuring. However, insufficient is known as to the reasons for Daewoo’s stance, and it may simply be that it did not wish to have any presence in Lebanon. That is not, in of itself, any reason for concluding that White Lab had a significant Lebanese country risk. I address the relevance of the Daewoo investment further in Section C3.5 below.

Washmen

[659]Washmen represented by value 4.1% of the portfolio at the date of the SPA and 4.7% at the date that the consideration was adjusted (see para 4.22 of Pearson 3). The evidence is that Washmen had limited, if any, Lebanese country risk:(1) Table 18 in Mr Worsnip’s first expert report relied on the fact that 16% of the workforce and 29% of operating costs were in Lebanon. However, the operating company was incorporated in Abu Dhabi and traded solely in Dubai and that was the focus of its operations and growth strategy, and that was where its only laundry was located (Day 14 page 98 lines 12 to 24).(2) Further, the workforce had completely relocated to the UAE by Q4 2021, making its Lebanese subsidiary dormant. This restructuring appeared to have no impact on Washmen’s revenue growth, which in the same period grew 63% year-on-year.(3) Mr Worsnip also accepted in cross-examination that “post-restructuring, they appear to have limited their exposure to Lebanon” (Day 14 page 99 lines 2 to 3), and even before that restructuring “its exposure to Lebanon is limited” (Day 14 page 99 line 9).

Crystalign

[660]Crystalign represented by value 3.8% of the portfolio at the date of the SPA and 5.4% at the date that the consideration was adjusted (Pearson 3 at para 4.22). The evidence is that this company had limited if any Lebanese country risk:(1) Table 18 in Mr Worsnip’s first expert report wrongly presented this company as being incorporated and operating in Lebanon with the majority of its workforce in Lebanon. Mr Worsnip accepted in cross-examination that this presentation was incomplete (Day 14 page 109 lines 1 to 15).(2) In fact, the documentary evidence (none of which had been provided to Mr Worsnip), showed that the business had been restructured, with Cedar Mundi holding an investment in a UK company (Day 14 page 105 lines 21 to 24), and trading in just eight cities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (Day 14 page 105 lines 6 to 11).(3) The Lebanese country risk therefore appeared to be limited to the existence of a 3D printer located in Lebanon, which is portable technology easily replicable in, for example, the UK or the UAE (Day 14 page 106 lines 17 to 25). The monthly performance report for March 2021 identified that only 13.9% of the revenue was generated from Lebanon.[661]These four portfolio companies (Quiqup, White Lab, Washmen, and Crystalign) represent by value 21% of the investment portfolio (and together with Proximie, 84.2% of the investment portfolio) at the date of the SPA, 28 June 2021, and 18.6% of the investment portfolio (and together with Proximie, 90.8% of the investment portfolio) at the date that the consideration was adjusted, 8 September 2021.[662]In the above circumstances, I prefer the evidence of Mr Pearson to that of Mr Worsnip that the Lebanese country risk for each of these companies was limited, and fully reflected in their existing fair value, with the result that I accept the bottom of Mr Pearson’s range for country risk of 2.5%.

Mr Attieh’s assessment of country risk

[663]The Defendants’ case that the portfolio carried significant country risk is also contrary to Mr Attieh’s own assessment at the time when describing the portfolio to potential investors in what became the 2021 Transaction, which, as already mentioned, he did in the following terms:
“Our fund has so far invested over $25M in high-growth technology companies which have performed quite well, are mature and are materially decorrelated from Lebanese country risk. Indeed, the fund’s portfolio is made up of businesses which operations, revenues and domiciliation are essentially outside of Lebanon (mainly UK, US and the Gulf).”
(emphasis added) When this email was put to Mr Attieh, he maintained that it was not misleading and that it represented his true view at the time (Day 7 page 75 line 24 to page 76 line 2).[664]When this email was put to Mr Worsnip he accepted that Mr Attieh, given his roles on both the boards of Cedar Mundi, its fund manager CMCH, and individual portfolio companies (albeit for some portfolio companies, such as Quiqup, Mr Attieh was or is a board observer not a director), was the person in a better place to assess the country risk of the portfolio companies (Day 14 page 115 lines 16 to 21), and accepted that “there are certainly assets within that portfolio that don’t have significant exposure” (Day 14 page 116 lines 18 to 19) but suggested that Mr Attieh was in this email putting a “spin on it” (Day 14 page 116 line 12). I do not consider that this is a fair characterisation of the email (which, after all, accords with the evidence of Mr Pearson, and indeed the documentary evidence concerning the companies concerned), but it is an example of Mr Worsnip “entering the arena” which is unbecoming of an expert witness. More tellingly, the Defendants did not address Mr Attieh’s email at all in their written closing submissions.[665]Ultimately, Mr Worsnip was not provided with all material documents for the purpose of assessing Lebanese company risk and the percentage risk he ascribed is simply untenable having regard to such documentation as a whole. I consider that Mr Pearson’s evidence as to the appropriate discount for country risk (2.5% to 7.5%) is to be preferred, supported, as it is, by a closer engagement with the documentary evidence that exists.

C3.3 Secondary discount: alleged distress

[666]Mr Worsnip’s evidence was that a further 30% discount should be applied (after his proposed 45% discount addressed in Sections C3.1 and C3.2 above), implying a cumulative 62% discount overall) (see Worsnip 1 at para 7.3.21) on the basis of distress: “I consider that both Cedar Mundi and the C-331 shareholders were distressed sellers” (see Worsnip 1 at para 2.5.1 and Worsnip 2 at para 5.2.9, “I apply a discount of 30% to recognise the fact that Cedar Mundi and the C-331 Shareholders were distressed sellers”).[667]It will be seen that Mr Worsnip treats in one breath, two distinct allegations, namely(1) whether the C-331 Shareholders were distressed; and(2) whether Cedar Mundi was distressed (I address each below).[668]As to the relevant valuation principles, the experts both agreed that, if the 2021 Transaction was a distressed sale, that would justify a higher discount.[669]The International Valuation Standards (“IVS”) (described in Pearson 1 at para 3.3 as “widely used globally by valuation professionals”, and which Mr Worsnip agreed were “authoritative” (Day 14 page 122 lines 11 to 13)), provide that market value reflects a transaction between “a willing buyer and a willing seller” where the parties acted “without compulsion”. A “willing seller” is “neither an over-eager nor a forced seller prepared to sell at any price” and the definition of “without compulsion” excludes distressed sales (as Mr Worsnip confirmed – Day 14 page 123 lines 7 to 14). In particular, “without compulsion” provides that “each party is motivated to undertake the transaction, but neither is forced or unduly coerced to complete it” and the definition of “forced sale” includes distressed sales.[670]The International Financial Reporting Standards 13 (“IFRS 13”) have a similar structure. There, an orderly transaction is defined in opposition to “a forced transaction (e.g. a forced liquidation or distress sale)” such that a transaction is not orderly if “[t]he seller is in or near bankruptcy or receivership (i.e. the seller is distressed)”. Mr Worsnip confirmed that this is “the same principle” as under the IVS (Day 14 page 125 line 1 to 3).[671]These principles were explored with the experts in cross-examination, whose evidence was that:(1) Distress is relevant to valuation because it means that the seller has a weakened negotiating position and a limited period of time to sell, driving a further discount to fair value above an ordinary secondary transaction discount (Mr Worsnip Day 14 page 125 lines 13 to 22).(2) As such, a sale is not distressed if the seller is not forced to or is under no pressure to sell, such that they can (usually) walk away from the transaction if the price is not right (Mr Worsnip Day 14 page 126 lines 7 to 10).(3) Thus, “having a motivation to sell is different to … being in distress and having to sell” (Mr Pearson Day 13 page 181 lines 24 to 25); “it depends on [the seller’s] motives in terms of whether they absolutely need to realise cash or its desirable to them to sell” (Mr Pearson Day 13 page 182 lines 15 to 17).(4) Similarly, a seller or asset “operat[ing] in a non-optimal way” is not per se distressed (Mr Pearson Day 13 page 186 lines 23 to 25), and indeed “there’s a difference between distress and operating sub-optimally” (Mr Pearson Day 13 page 217 lines 12-13).

The C-331 Shareholders as distressed sellers

[672]Mr El Azar’s unchallenged evidence at trial (El Azar 1 at para 62) was that, following the Lebanese financial crisis:
“Cedar Mundi could have stopped actively investing and entered the divestment period where it would have held its then existing portfolio assets until a divestment opportunity presented itself. This is the approach that other 331 funds with which SGBL has been involved took following the onset of the Lebanese financial crisis.”
I accept that evidence, which is consistent with the IVS principles.[673]In contrast, Mr Worsnip struggled to accept that this was not a distressed sale if the Court accepted such factual evidence, despite being given repeated opportunities to do so (see Day 14 page 128 line 23 to page 130 line 18):
“Q. … if the court were to accept the last two sentences of this paragraph of Mr El Azar’s evidence, it would be wrong then to characterise this as a distressed sale because it was open to SGBL and the other C-331 shareholders simply to hold on to what they had without investing more? A. Well, I mean, I don’t believe it was open to SGBL to not follow through with its commitments to Cedar Mundi. Q. That’s not my question. MR JUSTICE BRYAN: That’s a factual question, I think. MR DAY: Yes. Assume this evidence is correct -- you’re not in a position to make findings of fact yourself. I’m just asking you to assume that this evidence is correct. It’s right, in those circumstances, isn’t it, that this wouldn’t be a distressed sale because Cedar Mundi and the C-331 shareholders could simply hold on to what they had without investing more? A. Well, the circumstances of the financial crisis in Lebanon had put all of those banks in a situation where they were starved of US dollars, fresh US dollars, which is really what Cedar Mundi and the portfolio companies needed, and if -- and I accept that this is a matter of fact but if they were unable, because of that situation, to follow through with their commitments, then I would say that that is evidence of distress and indeed it is the consequence of distress that they fail to meet their obligations as they fall due. So that is evidence of distress. Q. Well, we’ve looked at the International Valuation Standards and we’ve looked at IFRS 13 and you agreed with the principle that distress is relevant to valuation because it means a weakened negotiating position of the seller. So let me just put the question one final time and I want you to focus on the opinion in terms of valuation, not the underlying facts, which isn’t for you. If the court accepts this evidence, it would be wrong to characterise this as a distressed sale because it was open to the C-331 shareholders simply to hold on to what they had without investing more. That’s right, isn’t it? A. If it was -- if it was open to the 331 shareholders not to meet their obligations, then they wouldn’t have been in -- then that disposal of 331 shares and then the disposal of the portfolio wouldn’t have been distressed, if that’s correct.”
I am in no doubt that the reason that Mr Worsnip deflected such questions, and did not give a direct answer, was because he understood that on that factual scenario the sale was not a distressed sale.[674]Quite apart from Mr Pearson’s evidence being preferable to Mr Worsnip’s on this point (which suffices to dispose of the allegation that the C-331 Shareholders were distressed), there are a number of other reasons why Mr Worsnip’s views lacked substance. First, Mr Worsnip had conducted no balance sheet or cash flow assessment of the position of the C-331 Shareholders (Day 14 page 130 line 20 to page 131 line 3). Mr Worsnip was therefore not in a position to say that any C-331 Shareholder did not have the funds to meet any obligations to Cedar Mundi, which in some cases were as low as US$100,000. Mr Worsnip resorted to relying upon the fact that the C-331 Shareholders were “restricted” by capital controls “in making US dollar transfers” (Day 14 page 134 lines 12 to 13).[675]Second, leaving aside generalisations about the Lebanese financial crisis (Day 14 page 131 line 12 to page 132 line 12), as to which Mr Worsnip was not an expert, Mr Worsnip’s conclusion as to the distress of the C-331 Shareholders was based on his instruction that the C-331 Shareholders had not discharged their obligations under the Third Capital Call (see Worsnip 1 at para 2.5.1), but non-payment by the C-331 Shareholders under the Third Capital Call may just reflect that they were not prepared to act in the absence of BdL approval, a point on which Mr Worsnip had no answer (Day 14 page 136 lines 1 to 21).[676]Third, it appears that Mr Worsnip was assuming that Cedar Mundi could have invoked the Default Mechanism against the C-331 Shareholders in respect of the Third Capital Call and forced a transfer of their shares that way (see paras 2.5.3 to 2.5.6 and 4.4.12 to 4.4.19 of Worsnip 1 and the Valuation Joint Memo at paras 5.8 and 5.12 to 5.13). However, the 2021 Transaction was not under the Default Mechanism, and Mr Worsnip’s assumption (at footnote 21 in Worsnip 1) that the BdL would have consented to such a transfer, when the C-331 Shareholders had acted in line with BdL approvals, does not follow. When this was put to Mr Worsnip during cross-examination, he could only say that this was “speculating” (Day 14 page 140 line 21).[677]In the above circumstances, I do not consider that the Defendants established that the C-331 Shareholders were distressed sellers.

Cedar Mundi as a distressed asset (or a distressed seller)

[678]This part of Mr Worsnip’s expert opinion was again based on the Third Capital Call. He argued that the C-331 Shareholder’s actions in respect of the Third Capital Call had left Cedar Mundi with an “urgent liquidity shortfall” (Worsnip 1 para 7.3.10). In cross-examination, Mr Worsnip expressed the view that Cedar Mundi had “a strain on cash flow” and left it “cash flow insolvency … at the gift of MABIL” (Day 14 page 142 line 25 to page 143 line 1), and so called into question whether Cedar Mundi “could continue to operate normally and therefore whether the going concern principle was appropriate” (Day 14 page 144 lines 1 to 3). However there a number of difficulties with this expressed opinion.[679]First, Mr Worsnip had failed to take into account in his expert reports that Mr Attieh and PWC had signed off on both Cedar Mundi’s 2018 audited accounts in April 2019 and its 2019 audited accounts in February 2021. The latter provided, around two years after the Third Capital Call, that “management believe that there is no material uncertainty with respect to the Fund’s ability to continue as a going concern”, and that was endorsed by PWC. Mr Worsnip accepted that he had no basis for disagreeing with this (Day 14 page 160 lines 8 to 10), but it did him no credit to speculate that comfort letters could have been signed by MABIL to permit PWC to reach this conclusion in circumstances in which no such letters have been disclosed. This is another example of where Mr Worsnip clearly “entered into the arena”.[680]Second, Mr Worsnip’s opinion relied on Attieh 1 at para 123 which provided, “as a result of receiving the majority of the third capital call in Lebanese Lira the fund was in a situation where it did not have enough capital to meet its commitments to its portfolio companies”, but Mr Worsnip had understood this to refer to legal commitments (Day 14 page 145 lines 13 to 24), because he had not been provided with the RFFI which made clear that Mr Attieh had intended “commitments” to include “all ways in which Cedar Mundi might need to deploy its capital”.[681]This led to the following concessions (Day 14 page 148 line 17 to page 149 line 19):
“Q. … With this clarification as to 123 of Mr Attieh’s first witness statement, the position is not that Cedar Mundi was not able to meet its obligations as they fell due, but that it wasn’t able to deploy further capital in respect of its portfolio interests. That’s right, isn’t it? A. That’s right. Q. We can agree, can’t we, that an inability to make further investments, new investments, is not the same as an urgent liquidity shortfall? A. That’s right, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the business is not distressed. Q. Well, a fund may not be able to make follow-on investment for all sorts of reasons. It may just simply be beyond its investment period, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the fund is distressed, does it? A. It means that it’s not operating as it intends to operate and therefore this sort of concept of going concern, if it is being restricted in some way through that, then that is certainly stress, if not distress. Q. Just focus on the question I asked you. A fund may not be able to make follow-on investments for all sorts of reasons. It may simply just be beyond its investment period. That doesn’t necessarily mean the fund is distressed, does it; yes or no? A. That doesn’t mean it’s distressed, no. Q. It doesn’t mean that it’s cash flow insolvent by itself? A. Not in itself, no.”
Q. It doesn’t mean that it’s cash flow insolvent by itself? A. Not in itself, no.”

Q. It doesn’t mean that it’s cash flow insolvent by itself?

[682]Third, Mr Worsnip also accepted when he was taken to Mr Attieh’s letter to the BdL dated 25 March 2019, which set out the proposed purposes for the Third Capital Call, that Cedar Mundi had sufficient capital to meet its legally binding commitments (Day 14 page 153 lines 9 to 13). Mr Worsnip was not sure whether he had previously been provided with this document, but it did not appear in the schedule of documents provided to him.[683]Mr Worsnip similarly accepted that Cedar Mundi did not exhibit typical signs of distress (Day 14 page 154 line 2 to page 155 line 18). In particular, he accepted that there was no constant lack of cash, no defaulting on bills, no extended debtor or creditor delays, no failing margins, and no “unhappiness” sufficient to constitute distress. Mr Worsnip did suggest that there was “20% interest on the MABIL loan” sufficient to constitute “high interest payments”, but that was not factually correct as the SCFA between Cedar Mundi and MABIL provided for 4% interest.[684]I accordingly prefer Mr Pearson’s evidence in relation to distress, and in particular I accept the following evidence of Mr Pearson (Day 13 page 186 lines 17 to 25 and page 187 line 20 to page 188 line 2):
“I accept that Cedar Mundi, as I say here, not having as much money as it needs, could have an impact on its operations. Obviously that partly would be dependent on what cash balances it had and I believe in ‘21 it did have several million on its balance sheet. But more significantly, you know, I can see the fund would operate in a non-optimal way, but that doesn’t mean that the fund itself or the company is distressed. […] I understand it did have money on its balance sheet and I haven’t seen anything suggesting it couldn’t meet its obligations as they fell due, as opposed to not being able to partake in fundraising, say, which would be about optimising the value of its portfolio. I think there is a difference between distress and, to use my phrase, you know, operating sub-optimally.”
[685]Whilst the Defendants did not appear to suggest in their closing submissions that the 2021 Transaction was itself distressed, they did appear to suggest a counterfactual in which without the 2021 Transaction, Cedar Mundi would not have been able to pay the costs of maintaining the assets and so would have engaged in a fire sale to meet its liabilities. This case was not pleaded and nor was it properly put to Mr El Azar, whose evidence flatly contradicted the idea that there should be a fire sale. It was also inconsistent with the other evidence, including Cedar Mundi’s audited accounts (referred to above), which confirm that the management believed at that point there was no material uncertainty with respect to the ability of the fund to continue as a going concern. This evidence is inconsistent with the Defendants’ case that Cedar Mundi was heading inexorably to insolvency.[686]The Defendants assert at para 733 of their written closing submissions, that the management fees charged by CMCH to Cedar Mundi, would drive it into insolvency. However, there is no basis for assuming that the Cedar Mundi BoD would have stood by passively and allowed the management fees to accrue until Cedar Mundi was driven into insolvency, and indeed such a case is unsupported by evidence and is inherently implausible. No such case was put to Mr El Azar or Mr Saghbini either (who presumably, on this counterfactual, would have remained a director of Cedar Mundi).[687]The Defendants also argue at para 736 that “[t]ermination would also have exposed Cedar Mundi to liable to pay CMCH its ‘carried interest’ (even post termination)”. However, carried interest only becomes due and payable upon an exit from an investment, as the MAA provides:
“A. Measurement In addition to the Management Fees, the Managing Agent shall be entitled to a portion of the Portfolio performance measured at time t as follows; Carry Interest (t) = MAX [0, 20% x (RG(t)] Where - t is the date of measurement of the Carry Interest - RG (t) is the aggregate realized net gain or loss derived from the disposal of investments in the Portfolio from its inception to time t. For the purpose of calculating RG(t), capitalized debt funding costs, if any, shall be excluded. For the purpose of this paragraph, debt funding costs refer to the interest charged on the amounts drawn by the Fund under the Subordinated Credit Facilities.”
Carry Interest (t) = MAX [0, 20% x (RG(t)][688]Accordingly, carry interest is calculated as a percentage of RG(t), and RG(t) is the aggregate realised net gain or loss derived from the disposal of investments from its inception to time t. Then, under the next heading “B. Payment Terms” the MAA unambiguously provides that “Carry Interest shall become due upon and payable within 30 days from the realization of profits by the Fund resulting from Portfolio’s exits after the deployed Committed Investments having been reimbursed in full” (emphasis added). Accordingly, in circumstances where there is no disposal, there is no exit which generates cash, and there is no carry interest which becomes due and payable. Moreover, carry interest is by its definition only ever a proportion of the net gain, so it can necessarily always be paid. It is by its nature incapable of driving a company into insolvency.[689]In the above circumstances, I do not consider that the Defendants have established that Cedar Mundi was a distressed asset (or a distressed seller), and no further discount (still less a discount of 30%) should be applied on the basis that the 2021 Transaction was a distressed sale. On the contrary, I agree with the Claimant’s submission that it was a transaction that (per the IVS principles) could and should have achieved market value.

C3.4 Adjustment/secondary discount: capital commitments

[690]Mr Worsnip’s evidence was that valuation principles also required adjustments to be made to reflect “Unfunded Capital Commitments” (see Worsnip 1 paras 2.3.2 to 2.3.3, and 8.1.12 to 8.1.19), defined as “[c]apital injections that investors in a VC fund are contractually obliged to make but that have yet to be called by the GP”. In particular, Mr Worsnip proposed(1) an adjustment for net capital contributions of approximately US$8.2 million to be added prior to the secondary discount, thereby increasing the effect of that discount; and(2) a further adjustment for gross capital contributions of approximately US$15.2 million to be deducted after the secondary discount (at Worsnip 1 para 10.1.10). This was identical to “Approach 1” in the BSEC Valuation Report.[691]Mr Worsnip’s opinion on this issue was contingent on characterising the 2021 Transaction as a sale of Cedar Mundi itself (i.e. an LP-led transaction) not the investment portfolio to Cedar II as a continuation fund (conversely, Mr Pearson’s opinion was contingent on the 2021 Transaction being in substance as well as form a GP-led asset sale - see e.g. Day 13 page 28 line 22 to page 51 line 5). Mr Worsnip’s evidence was that “there would not be a specific adjustment” if the 2021 Transaction was characterised as a GP-led transaction (see Worsnip 1 para 2.3.7), but according to Mr Worsnip, there would be a higher secondary discount instead (although he did not identify what he was saying that would be).[692]As the Claimant points out, a striking feature of this part of Mr Worsnip’s evidence was his inability to identify any secondary literature to support his approach. It was put to Mr Worsnip in cross-examination that he had not been able to find any supportive literature on making adjustments for capital contributions, or recharacterising a GP-led transaction as a LP-led transaction, or recharacterising a share sale as an asset sale. He never answered the question (see Day 14 page 211 line 2 to page 213 line 1), no doubt because there was no such supportive secondary literature.[693]I do not consider that Mr Worsnip’s approach is justifiable as a matter of principle. The basis on which it was suggested by Mr Worsnip that the costs of setting up Cedar II, the fees for managing Cedar II for its term, and making follow-on investment should be borne by Cedar Mundi’s (exiting) investors did not bear examination. Mr Worsnip accepted that the capital commitments were to make fresh follow-on investments “to enhance” the value of the portfolio (Day 14 page 210 line 15), but if Cedar II investors were to take the benefit of an enhanced portfolio there was no good valuation reason for imposing the burden of making those investments on Cedar Mundi’s investors. As Mr Pearson explained, incoming investors would expect to take the “upside” and the “downside” of the further capital contributions (see Day 13 page 41 line 5 and Pearson 1 at para 9.26). As Mr Pearson said, “the management fees are something a shareholder would expect a fund to incur as part of realising the gains they would expect or hope to get from that fund in the ordinary course of events” (Day 13 page 57 lines 4 to 7). Hence, as Mr Pearson also said, “the upside needs to be sufficient for a purchaser of any asset to account for the costs … that’s no different to any other fund that’s set up to acquire assets in the hope that, as a portfolio, they will increase in value” (Day 13 page 60 lines 17 to 22).[694]I am also satisfied that the 2021 Transaction was in neither form nor substance a share sale of Cedar Mundi itself. Having accepted that this question of characterisation required an assessment of all the circumstances and all aspects of the 2021 Transaction (Day 14 page 181 lines 8 to 12) Mr Worsnip accepted each of the following:(1) The SPA was in the form of an asset sale not a share sale (Day 14 page 177 lines 12 to 19).(2) The term duration of Cedar II was different to Cedar Mundi (see Day 14 page 182 line 8 to page 183 line 13, and see also Day 14 page 183 lines 14 to 23).(3) The investment or commitment periods (and hence dilution risks – see Day 14 page 187 line 18 to page 188 line 4) for Cedar II were different to Cedar Mundi (see Day 14 page 184 line 3 to page 192 line 4 and page 185 line 19 to page 186 line 16).(4) Cedar II had a different investment framework to Cedar Mundi, and did not have to invest in a way that could benefit the Lebanese economy (see Day 14 page 190 line 9 to page 192 line 4 and see also Day 14 page 192 lines 5 to 9).(5) The extent of management fees due upon investment in Cedar II were different to the management fees due had shares been bought in Cedar Mundi (see Day 14 page 188 line 5 to page 189 line 16 and page 189 line 17 to page 190 line 5).(6) Cedar II did not acquire all of Cedar Mundi’s assets, including certain investments and balances held in bank accounts (Day 14 page 192 line 17 to page 193 line 12).(7) As Mr Attieh himself had confirmed to a Cedar II investor at the time “there are no previously committed investments taken over by C2”.[695]It is plain from all of the above that the 2021 Transaction was a GP-led asset sale whereas Mr Worsnip maintained the untenable position that the 2021 Transaction fell to be (re-)characterised as a LP-led share sale, by virtue of the warranty in the SPA that Cedar II would invest a further US$14 million in fresh follow-on investment in portfolio companies (see Day 14 page 197 line 1 to page 198 line 16 and SPA, clause 5.2(d)), yet there is no basis for such an approach to valuation, and I reject it.[696]Even if (contrary to my finding above) Mr Worsnip’s approach had been justifiable, his methodology contained errors. First, Mr Worsnip has taken his numbers from the BSEC Valuation Report, but those numbers are incorrect: the unpaid gross capital contributions associated with the Third Capital Call were at most US$12,251,877 (and less still if the LBP9,808,893 is taken into account). This error was put to Mr Worsnip in cross-examination, but he had no good explanation for it (Day 14 page 200 line 17 to page 201 line 25), and he accepted that he had used an approximately US$15.2 million figure that did not reflect his definition of “Unfunded Capital Commitments” (Day 14 page 201 lines 19 to 25).[697]Second, Mr Worsnip’s decision to make the positive adjustments before and the negative after the secondary discount had an unduly depressive effect on valuation, as Mr Pearson noted in his evidence, coming close to an 80% cumulative discount to fair value (after accounting also for Mr Worsnip’s other discounts - see Valuation Joint Memo, para 8.6). This was put to Mr Worsnip during cross-examination, and he was unable to explain why the secondary discount for liquidity and country risk should be interposed between the two adjustments relating to capital contributions, eventually resorting to saying that “I’m not really sure I understand your question, what you’re driving at. If it’s maths you want, then that’s – we can do that, but I’m hoping you have a better question” (Day 14 page 205 line 24 to page 206 line 2), a somewhat unedifying answer from an expert witness.[698]Mr Worsnip conceded that, if an adjustment for capital contributions associated with Cedar II management fees were to be made, there would need to be a present value adjustment, which would reduce the value of those fees, and he had not attempted to do this (Day 14 page 208 lines 6 to 14). I agree with the Claimant’s submission (at para 288(3) of the Claimant’s written closing submissions) that this appears to have been prompted by Mr Pearson’s evidence the previous day: “in terms of modelling you would discount expected future cash flows and actually here you’re lumping all the costs which have been calculated on certain levels of management fees upfront.” (Day 13 page 54 lines 4 to 7).[699]Despite conceding that his proposed adjustments would not apply unless the 2021 Transaction was characterised as a share sale, Mr Worsnip failed to identify the discounts that he said would apply if the 2021 Transaction was characterised as an asset sale. Instead, he continued to apply the same form of specific adjustments, albeit with modified numbers (see Worsnip 2 at para 5.3.3). When this was put to him in cross-examination, he responded: “I would agree that there’s an inconsistency between that agreed point [in the Valuation Joint Memo at para 8.2] and the way in which I then approach it” (Day 14 page 214 lines 7 to 8). Mr Pearson’s evidence the previous day was that the further discount would be approximately 5% (Day 13 page 48 lines 7 to 9).

C3.5 White Lab

[700]The information available to Cedar Mundi in respect of the proper valuation of its investment in White Lab changed significantly shortly before trial. Following disclosure, the following became understood to Cedar Mundi:(1) As at 30 June 2020, White Lab had been Cedar Mundi’s most valuable investment with a fair value of US$15,166,667, with Proximie then being the second most valuable investment with a fair value of US$10,828,800 (Valuation Spreadsheet, “Fair value estimation” tab, cells I8 & I9).(2) As at 5 February 2021, the fair value of White Lab’s investment had collapsed to US$2 million, which the Valuation Spreadsheet explained was cost price (Valuation Spreadsheet, “Fair value estimation” tab, cell N8). That “at cost” assessment was the fair value endorsed by the BSEC Valuation Report.(3) The higher valuation had been based on an increase in value driven by investment from Daikin which had been “pulled” in early 2021, but was back “on the table” in July 2021, after the SPA had been signed, and expected to complete in September 2021 (see Pearson 1 paras 4.35 to 4.37).[701]However, documents in the Defendants’ disclosure suggested that Pinsent Masons had in fact acted for Cedar Mundi in respect of the White Lab restructuring. Pinsent Masons was therefore asked to provide the client file on 13 October 2025. After a series of chasers, Pinsent Masons finally responded on 22 December 2025 refusing to hand over the full client file. On 20 January 2026, the Defendants disclosed 555 documents derived from the White Lab client file, and on 22 January 2026, Pinsent Masons agreed to provide the full client file up to and including 18 August 2021 (the date on which it was said that Cedar Mundi ceased to be a client). Those documents were provided on 12 February 2026.[702]As the Claimant addresses in its written closing submissions (at para 291), these new documents shed a different light on the timing of the White Lab restructuring. Daikin in fact confirmed on 28 May 2021, very shortly before the SPA was signed, that it would continue with its proposed investment in White Lab, subject to a restructuring allowing “an investment into the Company to be made by Daikin in the near future” in the form of a convertible loan note structure.[703]That confirmation had been provided by Daikin’s solicitors, Allen & Overy, to White Lab and its solicitors, Irwin Mitchell, but forwarded immediately by Irwin Mitchell to Mr Attieh asking for Cedar Mundi’s confirmation that “this is a very positive development and one that the Company should proceed with without delay”. At the time, Mr Attieh recognised that, post restructuring and investment, the fair value of Cedar Mundi’s interest in White Lab could be “in the range of $11M to $12M”.[704]This development had not been previously disclosed to Cedar Mundi or the C-331 Shareholders and so the valuation reports were prepared by Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip with incomplete knowledge as to the status of White Lab as at the relevant valuation dates.[705]During cross-examination, Mr Worsnip was asked about the impact of Daikin’s investment being back “on the table” before the SPA was signed, and he accepted that this should be taken into account (Day 14 page 89 line 14 to page 90 line 14):
“[MR WORSNIP]. I think from a valuer’s perspective, seeing this potential for a valuation uplift, then you would want to take some consideration of it into account. Q. And that’s because, isn’t it, a reasonable seller and buyer would take this into account when negotiating the price for the transaction, the prospect of significant upside on this investment; yes? A. Yes. So as a -- if you’re the -- if you’re acquiring an interest in the fund or the portfolio, on either basis then you want to understand what your potential cash flows are likely to look like. And if you know that this secondary transaction is going to happen, then you would take an uplift in relation to that. Q. So it’s right, isn’t it, that it would either be taken into account as a matter of fair value at the top of the calculation or it might impact the level of the secondary discount that’s applied to the existing fair value, but, one way or the other, you would take this into account, wouldn’t you? A. It would be influential in terms of that, correct. Q. Do we have a particular view as to whether it would be in the fair value stage or the secondary discount stage? A. Well, I would -- if the NAV is kept pure, which I think you ought to for consistency, then I would take it in as part of the discount and not adjust the -- not adjust the NAV.”
[706]This is no different in principle to the experts agreed position that, as at 5 February 2021, the Proximie fundraising had not been completed and so a range of discounts might need to be considered to reflect the uncertainty of the position (Day 13 page 25 lines 13 to 18). Neither expert suggested that an anticipated future transaction was to be ignored.[707]This information provides further support for the application of the lower end of Mr Pearson’s proposed discounts from fair value to account for liquidity and country risk (22.5%). As the Claimant points out, this approach is generous to the Defendants in circumstances where the developments regarding the Daikin investment before the SPA was signed could have resulted in a material change, in Cedar Mundi’s favour, in the appropriate discount from fair value.

C3.6 Conclusions on valuation

[708]In the “typical valuation case”, the Court may arrive at a figure “somewhere between those advanced by the rival experts” (Capita Alternative Fund Services v Drivers Jonas [2012] EWCA Civ 1417, Gross LJ at [43]).[709]In the present case, even a figure between the valuations of Mr Pearson and Mr Worsnip would establish that the 2021 Transaction was at an undervalue. Indeed, in order for the Defendants to succeed on this issue, they would need to be right on every material issue, i.e. the correct average liquidity discount; country risk; distress; adjustments for capital commitments; and the Lollar multiplier. However, and for the reasons given above, I have in each instance preferred the evidence of Mr Pearson. There can be no doubt that the 2021 Transaction was at a (significant) undervalue.[710]I accordingly find, on the basis of the evidence of Mr Pearson, in Lollars terms (see Pearson 3 para 6.21):(1) The investment portfolio at the date of the SPA, 28 June 2021, was worth at least L$111,846,607, in contrast to the L$27 million consideration agreed under the SPA; and(2) The investment portfolio transferred as at the date of the adjusted consideration under the SPA, 8 September 2021, was worth at least L$101,331,701, in contrast to the L$25,631,854 paid under the SPA.[711]The 2021 Transaction therefore crystallised losses for Cedar Mundi (applying the Lollars multipliers identified above), on 28 June 2021 of US$19,504,967 (or, as a fall back, at 8 September 2021, of US$16,822,188). D. THE CORE VALIDITY ISSUES ON THE 2021 TRANSACTION D0. THE LEGAL BACKDROP

D0.1 The proper approach to Foreign law

[712]The proper approach to foreign law was common ground between the parties and is well established. In this regard I was referred to Dexia Crediop S.p.A. v Comune di Prato [2015] EWHC 1746 (Comm) (“Dexia Crediop”) and Byers and others v Saudi National Bank [2022] 4 WLR 22 (“Byers”).[713]In Dexia Crediop (a case concerning Italian law), Walker J stated at [127]-[130] as follows: “127. Each side identified propositions concerning the English court’s approach to questions of Italian law. In most respects they were not disputed by the other side. I set out some of them below, modified so as to limit them to what was common ground.128. The task for the Court is to evaluate the expert evidence of Italian law and to predict the likely decision of the highest court in the relevant Italian system of law if this case had been litigated there on each of the points in dispute. As explained below, these courts are the Council of State for administrative law matters and the Court of Cassation for civil law matters.129. Issues of foreign law are to be proved as a fact by expert evidence. Both parties make positive (rival) cases as to the content of Italian law. Accordingly, both parties bear the burden of proving the propositions of Italian law on which they rely. The court will therefore need to decide which evidence it prefers. In other words, this is not a case in which the court can hold that Italian law is not sufficiently proved and therefore presume that Italian law is the same as English law: both parties agree that it is not, and lead evidence as to the respects in which it differs from English law.130. When there is conflicting evidence as to what foreign law is, “the court should approach the conflict in the same way as it approaches other conflicts of fact”, which means evaluating the evidence of the expert witnesses “in much the same way as [the judge] would evaluate the evidence of any witness of fact”. (emphasis added)[714]In Byers at [103]-[105] Newey LJ (giving the judgment of the Court), stated as follows: 103. Foreign law is a question of fact which the trial judge is required to determine on the basis of the evidence deployed by the parties. The task for the judge is to determine what the highest available court in the foreign jurisdiction would decide if the point had come before it: Dexia Crediop SpA v Comune di Prato [2017] EWCA Civ 428; [2017] 1 CLC 969, para 34… The approach remains the starting point in any appeal from such a determination of foreign law (ibid para 36). However it may be qualified, because a question of foreign law has been described as “a question of fact of a peculiar kind”: Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233, 250. In Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 4) [1999] CLC 417, Evans LJ giving the judgment of this court said, at para 12–13:
“12. So we come to consider what the court’s approach should be when the trial judge has heard expert evidence as to foreign law and made findings which are challenged on appeal. What difference does it make that these are findings of fact but of a ‘peculiar kind’ because they are concerned with issues of foreign law? “13. In our judgment, the answer varies according to the nature of the issue which arises in the particular case and the kind of decision which the trial judge and now the Court of Appeal is called upon to make. Sometimes the foreign law, apart from being in a foreign language, may involve principles and concepts which are unfamiliar to an English lawyer. The English judge’s training and experience in English law, therefore, can only make a limited contribution to his decision on the issue of foreign law. But the foreign law may be written in the English language; and its concepts may not be so different from English law. Then the English judge’s knowledge of the common law and of the rules of statutory construction cannot be left out of account. He is entitled and indeed bound to bring that part of his qualifications to bear on the issue which he has to decide, notwithstanding that it is an issue of foreign law. There is a legal input from him, in addition to the judicial task of assessing the weight of the evidence given. The same applies, in our judgment, in the Court of Appeal. When and to the extent that the issue calls for the exercise of legal judgment, by reference to principles and legal concepts which are familiar to an English lawyer, then the court is as well placed as the trial judge to form its own independent view.” 104. Mr Chapman relied on this qualification to submit that this court is as well placed as the Judge to decide what article 27(d) of CMR meant, because there was no issue between the experts as to the Saudi Arabian principles of construction. We cannot accept this submission. Where the foreign law is in the form of a provision in a code, statute or other written source, the task of the court remains one of determining how the foreign courts would interpret and apply it, based on the evidence of the expert witnesses. Generally speaking the court’s task is not to address how it would itself interpret and apply the provision; the wording of the provision is to be considered only as part of the evidence and as a help to decide between conflicting expert testimony: see A/S Tallinna Laevauhisus v Estonian State Steamship Line (1946) 80 Ll L Rep 99, 107, Lazard Bros & Co v Midland Bank Ltd [1933] AC 289, 298 and Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2009] EWCA Civ 755; [2011] 1 AC 763, para 69. There is a qualification to this general principle, recognised in Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust (No 4), and applicable to a first instance court as well as on appeal, where the nature of the foreign law issue means that the English Court’s expertise approaches that of any foreign law expert, for example where the foreign law is written in the English language and involves concepts similar to English law and familiar to English judges; or where the foreign courts would be influenced by the English Courts’ decisions on the issue: see King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 235; [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, para 68. 105. However, there is no scope for applying any such qualification to the general principle in this case. The only authorised texts of CMR and CR are in Arabic and the trial judge had to work from an agreed translation, albeit that in the case of CMR it was one published by the CMA….”
(emphasis added)[715]In the present case the qualification does not arise in circumstances where I am concerned with Lebanese statutes in French, Lebanese law being a civil law system, and the applicable principles are those identified in Dexia Crediop and Byers, in the passages I have highlighted above.[716]During the course of oral closing submissions I was also referred to the case of Kyrgyz Republic v Stans Energy Corporation & Others [2017] EWHC 2539 (Comm) (“Kyrgyz Republic”), in which I addressed, amongst other matters, the correct approach to issues of foreign law (in that case Kyrgyz law), in particular where there is a conflict of evidence between the respective experts (see at [44]-[50]) in terms which were not disputed by either party. I address the Kyrgyz Republic further below in the context of what I stated in relation to statutory interpretation as a matter of English law (in relation to which there is an issue as to whether that is of any relevance in relation to Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation).

D0.2 SOURCES OF LEBANESE LAW

[717]There is agreement between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr as to the sources of Lebanese Law which they have set out in the Agreed Statement on Sources and Content of Lebanese Law dated 17 July 2025 (the “Agreed Statement”).[718]It is convenient to set out what is stated in paragraphs 1 to 9 of the Agreed Statement as they provide a convenient summary of the sources of Lebanese law which are to be borne in mind when considering the issues of Lebanese law that arise for consideration.

Overview

[719]Lebanese law is a codified system of law. The primary sources of law are the Lebanese constitution and codes and legislation passed by Parliament, as well as government decrees, ministerial decisions and decisions issued by regulatory authorities. The decisions of Lebanese courts do not operate as precedent, but the decisions of higher Lebanese courts can establish, or evidence legal principles (especially where a principle is consistently endorsed in a number of cases).

Lebanese codes and legislation

[720]The main sources for Lebanese law are laws passed by Parliament and include the following codified laws:(1) The Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts originally enacted on 9 March 1932 (“CoC”), which prescribes general rules governing the law of obligations including in respect of contracts.(2) The Lebanese Code of Commerce originally enacted on 24 December 1942 (“LCC”), which supplements the CoC by providing a specific set of rules for commercial parties and companies (and which, as a specific code, prevails over the general code in the CoC in the event of any conflict by reason of the principle specialia generalibus derogant).(3) The Lebanese Criminal Code originally enacted on 1 March 1943 (“LCL”), which prescribes the general principles of Lebanese criminal law and sets out the elements of, and punishments for, a number of offences under Lebanese law.[721]Each of the CoC, LCC and LCL have been amended from time to time following their original enactment. The authoritative versions of Lebanese law are published in Lebanon’s Official Gazette in Arabic. The parties have agreed English translations of the relevant provisions of the CoC, LCC and LCL.

Regulation of Financial Services

[722]The Banque du Liban (the BdL), which was established by the Code of Money and Credit enacted on 1 August 1963 is empowered, through the use of decisions and circulars using the authority conferred on the BdL by the Code of Money and Credit, to regulate the financial services sector. One such circular is Circular 331.

Lebanese courts

[723]The first instance courts that deal with civil, commercial and criminal matters fall under the administration of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature. There are also courts of summary jurisdiction which may provide urgent relief without determining the merits of the rights and obligations of the parties. The first instance courts can comprise a single judge or three judges (being one president and two members), depending on the value or type of the dispute.[724]Decisions from these first instance courts may be appealed to the Courts of Appeal and from the Courts of Appeal to the Court of Cassation. The Courts of Appeal sit in chambers consisting of three judges. Issues of both fact and law can be appealed. The Court of Cassation is the highest court in Lebanon, and (ordinarily) sits in chambers consisting of three judges. The Court of Cassation initially may only re-examine the issues of law but, if the judgment rendered by the Court of Cassation annuls the judgment of the inferior court, the Court of Cassation may also re-examine the issues of fact.[725]As already noted above, the decisions of Lebanese courts do not operate as precedent. That means that the decision of a court cannot be overturned on appeal simply because it failed to follow an earlier decision or treat it as binding authority. However:(1) Lebanese case law can establish, or evidence, legal principles, especially where a principle is consistently endorsed in a number of cases (a jurisprudence constant).(2) Further, greater respect may be given to the decisions of courts of higher (as opposed to lower or coordinate) jurisdiction. In particular, decisions of the Courts of Appeal have more authority than decisions of the lower courts; decisions of the Court of Cassation have more authority than decisions of the Courts of Appeal.(3) Particular weight may be given to Court of Cassation decisions (i) given in assemble plénière (a general assembly comprising the presidents of the chambers of the Court of Cassation chaired by the presiding judge of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) rather than by a chamber of the Court of Cassation, (ii) annulling the judgments of inferior courts or which constitute an arrêt de principe (decision of principle), and/or (iii) which are more recent in time.[726]Lebanese courts do not have the power to challenge a law on the grounds that its application would be contrary to the Lebanese constitution: that is a power exclusively reserved to the constitutional council.

Other sources of law

[727]A number of significant Lebanese laws were derived or adapted from French law, including the CoC, LCC and LCL, each of which was originally enacted during the French Mandate. Further, the CoC was drafted under the influence of French jurist Professor Josserand. Where the text of a Lebanese law is similar to the text of a French law and/or has French origins, Lebanese courts and legal practitioners will draw upon sources of French law, i.e., the equivalent French provision and French case law and scholarship on that provision, particularly (but not only) where there are no relevant Lebanese legal sources. On occasion, reference may also be made to sources from other civilian jurisdictions.[728]Lebanese courts and legal practitioners will also draw upon doctrinal scholarship of legal academics and practitioners. The weight to be given to scholarship by the Court will depend on the authority of the author, how widely their opinion is accepted, and the strength of their reasoning.[729]Well established customs of law or convention act as subsidiary sources of law which may be taken into account in limited circumstances.

D0.3 Lebanese Principles of Statutory Interpretation

[730]The scope and effect of particular articles of the Lebanese Code of Commerce (LCC), including Articles 157 and 158 thereof, involves an exercise in Lebanese statutory interpretation. Both Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr address the relevant principles of Lebanese law in their respective reports, and they were also cross-examined in relation to the same.[731]There is a difference between the parties as to what they say are the Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation which is based on the differences between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr, in their evidence, in relation to the same. The difference is most relevant to the interpretation of the wording of Article 158 (Issue 2), but it is convenient to address the matter at this point before considering any of the Articles of the LCC.[732]In summary, and based on Professor Soumrani’s evidence, Cedar Mundi says that in Lebanese law, and based on Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation, where the statutory text is clear and unequivocal, there can be no further search for the meaning of (i.e., further interpretation of) the words. That is because “the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator” i.e., the words mean what they say, referring to Professor Soumrani’s evidence, in particular in Soumrani 3 at paras 90 to 94: “90. Scholars and case law unanimously affirm that when a text is clear and unequivocal on its own terms, it must not be interpreted in the sense that there can be no further search for the meaning of the words in those circumstances. There is therefore no need to resort to the teleological interpretation explained by Mr Sakr [Sakr 1 paras 123-125], be it in French law or in Lebanese law.91. In French law, and according to Ms. V. Lasserre: “Interpretatio cessat in claris – The interpretation is the search for the meaning of the words. But it supposes that the text is unclear, ambiguous or incomplete. A clear text, i.e., a text that can be held to be certain, should not be interpreted. It will only be applied, understand by this to the letter. A clear and precise text, that therefore does not require any interpretation, must be applied purely and simply. Case law shows that any search for the legislator’s intent by way of interpretation is forbidden to the judge whenever the meaning of the law as it results from the drafting is neither unclear, nor ambiguous, and must therefore be held for certain.” [V. Lasserre: Loi et Règlement, Répertoire de Droit Civil, Dalloz, n. 243]92. In Lebanese law and in the same vein, Mr El Auji cited by Mr Sakr [Sakr 1 para 117 fn 96 and para 118, fn 97] confirms that an interpretative technique emerged that focuses on interpretating a legal text according to its own content, without resorting to any attempt to go beyond that text. It considered that the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator and does not call for the search for any other intent, which could only be presumed; as such intent reflect the interpreter’s own understanding rather than the legislator’s intent [M. El Auji: The Legal Principles in the Civil Law, 2013, Al Halabi, p. 163]93. Furthermore, and as mentioned by Mr Sakr [Sakr para 121], if a clear text is construed in a manner that contradicts its literal meaning, the Lebanese Court of Cassation considers, in its decision n. 125, dated 1 September 2020 cited by Mr Sakr, that such a construction is an error in the interpretation of a legal text.94. Indeed, the Lebanese Court of Cassation, in its formation of assemblée plénière, held in two rulings that the Court may only interpret the legal text when it is ambiguous, unclear or incomplete, and is required, when the legal text is clear and explicit, to apply it correctly and refrain from suspending or disregarding its provisions. [Lebanese Court of Cassation, Civil Chamber, assemblée plénière ruling n. 49, dated 19 May 2014 and Lebanese Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, assemblée plénière ruling n. 29, dated 18 May 2020]” “Interpretatio cessat in claris – The interpretation is the search for the meaning of the words. But it supposes that the text is unclear, ambiguous or incomplete. A clear text, i.e., a text that can be held to be certain, should not be interpreted. It will only be applied, understand by this to the letter. A clear and precise text, that therefore does not require any interpretation, must be applied purely and simply. Case law shows that any search for the legislator’s intent by way of interpretation is forbidden to the judge whenever the meaning of the law as it results from the drafting is neither unclear, nor ambiguous, and must therefore be held for certain.” [V. Lasserre: Loi et Règlement, Répertoire de Droit Civil, Dalloz, n. 243]

[M. El Auji: The Legal Principles in the Civil Law, 2013, Al Halabi, p. 163]

[733]In contrast, Mr Sakr states as follows at Sakr 1 paras 116-118: “116. A Lebanese court is required when interpreting statutes to give effect to the legislator’s purpose. Pursuant to article 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the courts are bound to rule and must interpret the text in an efficient manner in accordance with the intent of the legislator which was behind the adoption of the reform.117. Lebanese scholars have explained that when the question of statutory interpretation arises, the interpreter must take into consideration the circumstances encompassed by the legal rule and strive to achieve the purpose intended by it, through an interpretation of its content that aligns with both the meaning of the text as an expression of the legislator’s will and the practical realities, without neglecting the human and social dimensions underlying the rule. [Mustafa Al Awji, The Legal rule in civil law, Al Halabi publishers, 2013, p.168]118. This approach was affirmed in a legal opinion issued by the Legislative and Consultation Committee of the Ministry of Justice, which held that the interpretation of a legal provision must always be made in light of the purpose for which it was enacted, and with regard to the economic, social, and political considerations that accompanied its adoption. Otherwise, the interpretation loses its living substance, and the application of the law risks producing practical results contrary to its intended purpose.” [Mustafa Al Awji, The Legal rule in civil law, Al Halabi publishers, 2013, p.168 citing: Legislative and Consultation Committee of the Ministry of Justice, Opinion dated 16/9/1967, RJL 1968, p.1100].”

[Mustafa Al Awji, The Legal rule in civil law, Al Halabi publishers, 2013, p.168]

[734]The evidence of Professor Soumrani is supported by the weight of Lebanese cases, and by both Lebanese and French commentaries, and I prefer his evidence to that of Mr Sakr (which is not supported by the weight of case law or commentaries). I am satisfied that based on Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation, where the statutory text is clear and unequivocal, there can be no further search for the meaning of (i.e., further interpretation of) the words. That is because “the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator” i.e., the words mean what they say. I address such commentaries and case law in due course below.[735]I am satisfied that it is only where the text is ambiguous, unclear or incomplete, that a teleological method (méthode du but social) is to be adopted to interpret the text in accordance with the legislator’s intent or purpose (as to which see Soumrani 3, paras 88 and 94 and Sakr 1, paras 116 and 124).[736]In that context, the Court “must interpret and apply the law in a way that ensures its effectiveness and fulfils the objectives intended by the legislature” (see Sakr 1 para 121), and as Mr Sakr states at para 117, the Court: “…must take into consideration the circumstances encompassed by the legal rule and strive to achieve the purpose intended by it, through an interpretation of its content that aligns with both the meaning of the text … and the practical realities”.[737]Where the text is ambiguous, unclear or incomplete would include circumstances where the text contains an obvious mistake or terminological error (“obvious error”) (Soumrani 3, para 96), but an obvious mistake (and the need for correction) may be apparent simply by reading the text itself.[738]See, in this regard, the commentary of Dr Al Awji The Legal Rule in Civil Law, 2013 at p. 166 where he gives examples:(1) “An example is found in article 285 of the Code of Obligations and Contracts providing that the assignment of debt transmits to the assignee the debt with all its accessories, as well as all the defects with which the debt was affected and the particularities which were inherent to it. Paragraph 2 adds that “the debtor may therefore raise against the assignee the exceptions and means of defense which he could have used against the assignee”. The error here consists of having used the term “cessionnaire” when it is the term “cédant”, used in the French text, which corresponds to the logic of the text.” Contrary to the Defendants’ submissions, it was not necessary to look beyond the words of statute to reach this conclusion. It was clear from reading the words themselves that there was an obvious error – the wrong word (“assignee”) had been used when the correct word was “assignor”. In fact, the Defendants accepted this when they acknowledged that, “to an extent, this involved an error which could be identified without looking beyond the four corners of the statute”.(2) “Likewise, article 326 of the Code of Obligations and Contracts provides that the creditor cannot waive the limitation period in advance, when in fact it is the debtor, given that the debtor, and not the creditor, is the party that invokes the prescription, which is enacted in favour of the debtor”. Once again, it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute to identify, and correct, the obvious error – the wrong word “creditor” has been used instead of “debtor”. Whilst the Defendants refer to the fact that Professor Soumrani accepted in cross-examination that the correction involved the Court “looking outside” the words of the statute, the reason he gave was because “the context is obvious” – that context derives from the words themselves, and what any reader would know is meant by those words, so there is no need to look outside the words of the statute to make the correction.[739]Another example that is relied upon by the Defendants is Article 199 of the LCC (in its earlier form) which stated, “In all cases where no contrary provision exists, decisions shall be taken by an absolute majority of the number of shareholders present or represented.” There was a consensus among commentators that the legislation contained an obvious error. According to Professor Soumrani, this was because “it is undisputed that quorum and majority are calculated on the number of shares/votes rather than on the number of shareholders” (See Soumrani 3, at para 96). Again, any reader would know that quorum and majority are calculated by the number of shares, and would realise the error simply by reading the text.[740]Returning to the situation where the statutory text is clear, I am satisfied that the weight of the case law, and the commentaries, is that in such circumstances there can be no further search for the meaning of the words, as a matter of Lebanese statutory interpretation.[741]In this regard I was referred to the Lebanese Court of Cassation, Civil Chamber, assemblée plénière ruling n. 49, dated 19 May 2014, which provides (in translation):
“Whereas, although adopting the interpretation given to a legal text in jurisprudence is not considered a serious error, it is necessary to distinguish between the judge’s right to interpret a text when it is ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete, and the obligation to apply the text correctly when it is clear, without suspending or disregarding its provisions.”
(emphasis added)[742]This shows that where the text is clear, the obligation is to apply that clear meaning. Mr Sakr was cross-examined about the above extract, and I understood him to accept that (Day 11 page 81 line 22 to page 82 line 9):
“Q. So that reflects a basic principle of Lebanese law, doesn't it, that where a statutory text is clear, the court must apply it; it can't just disregard a provision? Do you agree with that proposition? A. I agree it reflects the general rule, when a judge should interpret a statute, yes. Q. Okay. A. But this is the main −− this is the main rule. This is a general rule −− Q. Yes. A. −− on what −− on when interpretation is needed. Q. Okay. A. Yes.” a provision? Do you agree with that proposition? A. Yes.”

a provision? Do you agree with that proposition?

[743]In this regard I was also referred to the Lebanese Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, assemblée plénière ruling n. 29, dated 18 May 2020, which provides (in translation):
“Whereas, under Article 671 of the Penal Code, anyone who handles a sum of money or other items entrusted to them for a specific purpose, knowing or having reason to know that they cannot return the same, and who fails to clear their liability despite notice, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to one-quarter of the value of the items, as well as compensation for loss and damage, provided that the fine does not amount to less than fifty thousand Lebanese pounds. Whereas, although it is up to the adjudicating court to interpret a legal text when it is ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete, however when the legal text is clear and explicit, the court must apply it correctly and not suspend its provisions - particularly with regard to penal provisions, which are governed by the principle of no crime and no punishment without a law. Whereas it is established that the text of the aforementioned Article 671 is clear (…)”
(emphasis added) Whereas it is established that the text of the aforementioned Article 671 is clear (…)”[744]Professor Soumrani also refers (in Soumrani 3 at para 93, as quoted above) to another Cassation Decision which is cited by Mr Sakr, at Sakr 1 para 121:
“121. The Lebanese Court of Cassation has held that an error in the interpretation of a statutory provision or law arises when either: (i) a clear legal text is construed in a manner that plainly contradicts its literal meaning, or; (ii) where a legal text is construed in a manner inconsistent with the purpose for which the provision was enacted. In other words, the court emphasizes that a judge’s duty is to interpret and apply the law in a way that ensures its effectiveness and fulfils the objectives intended by the legislature.”
(emphasis added)[745]I consider that in this part of his evidence, Mr Sakr does recognise that a legal error occurs where “a clear legal text is construed in a manner that plainly contradicts its literal meaning”. The case is Court of Cassation, Crim. Ch., Decision n. 125 dated 1st September 2020, Al Adl 2021, which provides (in free translation) at p. 1273:
“Whereas the violation of the law specified in clause (b) of Article 296 Civil Code is achieved when the Court disregards the legal text, so deviates from it, and adopts an approach that is contrary to the content of legal rule specified in it; whereas the error in the interpretation of the law and in its application occurs in the case of interpreting a clear legal article in a manner that clearly contradicts its linguistic meaning, or interpreting this legal article in a manner that contradicts the principles of interpretation and the general and fundamental legal principles relating to the subject matter regulated by legal rule under consideration, or in a manner that conflicts with the underlying purpose of that legal rule; …”
(emphasis added)[746]The second part of para 121 of Sakr 1, and indeed the latter part of the above passage, are concerned with the situation where the statutory text is not clear (but rather is ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete). It is at that stage that the Court adopts a teleological method and interprets the text in accordance with the legislator’s intent or purpose (see Soumrani 3 at paras 88 and 94). The weight of the case law, however, as addressed above, is that where the statutory text is clear there can be no further search for meaning of the words.[747]The Defendants rely on a State Council Decision number 2022, Al-Ad; 2022 p. 967, but it is necessary to be cautious about that decision given that there is only a partial extract available, and the two passages quoted are not consistent with each other: At p.968 (or thereafter):
“When a legal text states the authority of an administrative power, there is no room for interpretation, as the judge does not resort to analogy or interpretation except in the case of ambiguity or lack of texts relating to the authority”
. Which is to be contrasted with an extract from p. 974 (though it is not known what text precedes it):
“And it is more than that when interpreting a text by the administrative judge, it is up to him to examine the spirit of the text and to give precedence to this spirit over the literal meaning of what is stated in it, in order to ensure the proper administration of justice, and he therefore has the power to broaden or narrow the scope of application of the text before him.”
[748]I am satisfied that the weight of Lebanese case law is that where the statutory text is clear there can be no further search for the meaning of the words, as a matter of Lebanese statutory interpretation, and this is the approach that would be applied by the Lebanese courts.[749]Turning to commentaries, I am satisfied that they are to like effect. In this regard I was referred to a translation of an extract from Mr El Auji: The Legal Principles in the Civil Law, 2013, Al Halabi, p. 163, which provides:
“An interpretative technique emerged that focuses on interpretating a legal text according to its own content, without resorting to any attempt to go beyond that text. It considered that the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator and does not call for the search for any other intent, which could only be presumed; as such intent reflect the interpreter’s own understanding rather than the legislator’s intent.”
[750]In an unguarded moment this was (rightly) accepted by Mr Sakr by reference to this passage, although he had no sooner accepted this, that he attempted to backtrack, but not in a manner that undermines such acceptance:
“Q. Again, this principle is straightforward , isn’t it ? If the statutory text is clear, there's no need to go beyond it to search for the legislature 's intention? Is that expressing the same principle that you were just referring to? A, Yes, but, again, I think the whole section or passage or paragraph must be read. This is −− this is a textbook… MR WILSON: Just to be clear as to what the principle is, Mr Sakr. So can I summarise it this way: unless the text of a statutory provision is unclear, or there is an identifiable ambiguity, Lebanese courts should apply the words of the statute as written, without resorting to a teleological positive interpretation ? A. Yes, but −− no, no, I did −− you want me to answer? Q. Yes, please. A. So there are two points here that I need to make…. [his first point was that it was a textbook and as such it gave a general view on all interpretive techniques under Lebanese and, indeed, under French law]. My second one is, yes, I agree, the interpretation should take place when a text is −− should not take place −− should not take place when the text is clear, but my proposition is that the last paragraph or the sentence "shall not −− shall be deemed −− shall not be deemed effective" is not clear and requires interpretation. … But what I want to clarify , my Lord, is that the literal meaning can be clear but cannot be clear at the same time. So the literal meaning of the word. So the literal meaning here is "shall not be deemed effective". That's the literal . So what does the word say? But the meaning of the words are not clear, you see? I don't know if this distinction is clear?”
(emphasis added)

A. Yes, but −− no, no, I did −− you want me to answer?

[751]I consider that taking such evidence as a whole Mr Sakr was accepting that interpretation should not take place where the text is clear (which was Professor Soumrani’s evidence as supported by the cases and the commentaries). The point Mr Sakr goes on to make was his view as to whether the last sentence of Article 158 was clear (which is a separate point relating to the wording itself, which I address in relation to Article 158). A similar theme (as to whether the last sentence of Article 158 was clear) was advanced by Mr Montagu-Smith in his oral closing submissions, but this is a separate point to the applicable principles on statutory interpretation (and whether the text is clear is itself ultimately a matter for the court).[752]Professor Soumrani’s evidence is also consistent with French law in this regard, as is shown by this extract from the French text V. Lasserre : Loi et Règlement, Répertoire de Droit Civil, Dalloz, n.243L- “Conditions of interpretation 241. If the judge has the obligation to adjudicate even in the case of ambiguity in the law, interpretation is subordinated to the obscurity of the text. (…) B- Obscurity of the text 243. Interpretatio cessat in claris – The interpretation is the search for the meaning of the words. But it supposes that the text is unclear, ambiguous or incomplete. A clear text, i.e., a text that can be held to be certain, should not be interpreted. It will only be applied, understand by this to the letter. A clear and precise text, that therefore does not require any interpretation, must be applied purely and simply. Case law shows that any search for the legislator’s intent by way of interpretation is forbidden to the judge whenever the meaning of the law as it results from the drafting is neither unclear, nor ambiguous, and must therefore be held for certain.” (emphasis added)

B- Obscurity of the text

[753]I conclude based on the evidence of Professor Soumrani (which I prefer to that of Mr Sakr where it differs), supported by the case law, and Lebanese and French commentaries, that unless the text of a statutory provision is unclear, or there is an identifiable ambiguity or obvious error, Lebanese courts will apply the words of the statute as written, without resorting to a teleological interpretation to interpret the text in accordance with any legislator’s intent or purpose.[754]In such circumstances, I was not assisted by considering English law principles of contractual construction and statutory interpretation to which I was referred by the Defendants (such as the well-known passage in Arbuthnott v Fagan [1996] LRLR 135, at p. 140, which I cited in the Kyrgyz case, supra, at [60], in the context of similarities with Kyrgyz law). In the present case we are concerned, and concerned only, with Lebanese statutes and Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation based on the expert evidence as to Lebanese law that is before me, which is a more appropriate, and surer, foundation, in the case of the civil law system in Lebanon, than seeking analogies with the approach to statutory interpretation under English law (see, in this regard, the Kyrgyz case at [62]). D1. ARTICLE 157 OF THE LCC (ISSUE 1)

D1.1 Introduction

[755]Issue 1 is:
“Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 157 of the LCC or Cedar Mundi’s Articles of Association?”
[756]Cedar Mundi’s case is that in relation to Article 157, and even without taking into account the fact that it was a related transaction, the SPA fell outside the powers of Cedar Mundi’s board of directors, and instead required a resolution of the general assembly. In contrast, the Defendants’ position is that the board had the necessary power pursuant to Article 157 alternatively pursuant to Article 19 of Cedar Mundi's Articles of Association.[757]The issue in relation to Article 157 of the LCC, is an exercise in statutory interpretation (applying the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation already identified). In this regard the relevant part of Article 157 (in the version currently in force) provides as follows:
“The Board of Directors possesses extensive authority to implement resolutions of the General Assembly and undertake all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company which do not fall within the current affairs. These powers are unrestricted, save for provisions delineated in the Law or in the company's bylaws.”
(emphasis added)[758]Cedar Mundi makes two preliminary points, which are either not disputed or in relation to which I consider that Cedar Mundi is clearly right. The first is that the words, “which do not fall within the current affairs” are there to delineate the powers that are reserved to the chairman/general manager (and so are not relevant in any event in the present case). This was confirmed by Mr Sakr (Day 11 page 12 lines 11 to 19). The second is that the reference in the last sentence to “These powers” is a reference back to the powers defined in the previous sentence, and as such does not extend such powers, whilst provisions delineated in the Law or in the company’s bylaws may restrict such powers. That is clearly so as a matter of construction of the words used, and when this was put to Mr Sakr he did not disagree with such construction (Day 11 page 13 lines 13 to 21).[759]Cedar Mundi’s case (based on the language of Article 157 itself) is that Article 157 limits the board’s powers to act that are necessary for the regular operation of the company (tracking the express wording of Article 157 itself). The SPA was a contract to dispose of Cedar Mundi’s entire investment portfolio (apart from a small residue of non-performing shares) in a single transaction. That cannot, submits Cedar Mundi, sensibly be described as a necessary act for the “regular operation” of the company.[760]The Defendants’ case is that the test under Article 157 (as to whether an act is within the power of the board of directors) is whether the act is within the company’s purpose or object. Cedar Mundi submits that this is plainly wrong on the basis that such an interpretation is contrary to(1) the ordinary and natural language of Article 157;(2) Lebanese authority; and(3) the hierarchical structure of a Lebanese joint stock company and the respective roles of its corporate organs. Cedar Mundi submits that the Defendants’ alternative case, that the Articles of Association override Article 157 and expand the board’s powers so that the SPA was within their scope, is not open to the Defendants on their pleaded case and expert evidence, but in any event is plainly incorrect.[761]Cedar Mundi also says (although it is not necessary for Cedar Mundi to prove this for the purposes of its case since it is common ground that there was no general assembly or general assembly resolution), that this was a transaction which required an extraordinary general assembly resolution, as it is said that the SPA was of such a nature as to risk the cessation of the corporate object, in that its consequence was that Cedar Mundi would be unlikely to be (and in fact was not) able to continue as an operative fund.[762]Ultimately, and as Mr Montagu-Smith accepted in the course of his oral closing (Day 15 page 109 lines 13 to 18), the ultimate question is what is within the “regular operation of the company” as that is the actual language of Article 157.

D1.2 The respective positions of Experts

[763]There is a stark difference of opinion between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr as to the scope of Article 157 and the defined scope of the board’s powers. Professor Soumrani’s evidence is that Article 157 defines the scope of the board’s powers, as set out in the wording of Article 157 itself, namely “all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company”, and his evidence is that as a matter both of language and jurisprudence, the criterion for deciding whether an act falls outside the board’s powers is whether the nature, magnitude or importance of the act is such that it exceeds the ordinary regular functioning of the company, in which case it requires a general assembly ratification (see Soumrani 3 paras 34, 35 and 39).[764]Cedar Mundi submits that Professor Soumrani’s position is supported by Lebanese jurisprudence (as addressed below) and not only accords with the actual words of Article 157 and their ordinary and natural meaning, but also reflects, and gives meaning and effect to, the respective roles of the board and the general assembly as distinct corporate organs within a Lebanese joint stock company.[765]Thus, Professor Soumrani states in Soumrani 3 at paras 34, 35 and 39 as follows: “34. … Mr Sakr agrees that Article 157 LCC gives the board of directors the power to conduct the regular operation of the company, i.e., its normal, usual operation. 35. This is not the case when it comes to the sale, in one single transaction, of all or substantially all of a company’s assets. Such sale cannot, because of its magnitude and importance, be characterized as a “regular operation” and therefore requires the authorisation of the general assembly. The touchstone of whether a transaction is within the authority of the board cannot simply be whether or not the transaction falls within the company’s corporate purpose, since if the transaction is outside the corporate purpose, the company cannot enter into it at all, and the question of the board’s authority becomes irrelevant. … [after addressing Lebanese commentaries] 39. In light of the above, it is clear that the criterion for an act to fall outside of the board’s powers is not whether it is within or outside the purpose of the company, but rather if its magnitude and importance exceed the regular functioning of the company; in which case it requires a resolution of the general assembly.”

[after addressing Lebanese commentaries]

[766]This was also the evidence that Professor Soumrani gave in the course of his cross-examination, as exemplified by the following answer (Day 10 page 26 line 4 to page 26 line 17):
“Q. So that is the part of the authorities that you say supports your position that large transactions are outside the scope of the board's authority; yes? A. Large or important transactions. Q. When you say "large or important" – A. Yes. Q. -- you take that from the words "substantial borrowings"; yes? A. No, I would even add to that, I underlined substantial borrowings to highlight the fact that it's on the magnitude, but there are also transactions that because of their nature fall outside the competence of the board because they do not relate to the regular operation of the company.”
Q. When you say "large or important" –

Q. -- you take that from the words "substantial borrowings"; yes?

[767]Mr Sakr’s evidence is very different, and is that the question of whether an act is within the power of the board is whether it is within the corporate purpose. This is best encapsulated by what he states at paras 40 to 44 and 55 of Sakr 1:
“40. … Article 157 LCC grants the board authority to carry out the regular operation of the company (save for what Mr Soumrani translates as the “current affairs” but which might be better called ‘day-to-day operations’ which are reserved to the chairman general manager). 41. Thus, when considering whether the board is authorised to do something, the real issue is whether what is being proposed is within the corporate purpose of the company. For instance, Mr A. Najjar gives the example of the sale or purchase of real estate being outside the operations of a company “except in the case of a real estate company”
. In other words, whilst the sale or purchase of real estate may not be within the corporate purpose of a company whose object, for example, is the manufacture and sale of goods, it will be within the purpose of a company whose object is the purchase and sale of real estate. 42. The starting point for determining the corporate purpose (or object) of a company are its articles of association… … 44. … the sale and purchase of shares (or similar interests) in companies is part of the corporate purpose or object of a Lebanese holding company. In those circumstances, absent an express restriction on the board’s power in the articles of association, I do not see how the sale or purchase of shares by a joint-stock holding company could ever constitute the sale of assets that are “not necessary to the functioning of the business” and so could be outside the board’s powers. Such a transaction is within the corporate purpose or objects of a holding company, particularly a company managing an investment portfolio. A holding company that managed an investment portfolio could not practically or efficiently function if it had to seek general assembly authorisation from shareholders each time it wished to acquire or dispose of a share (or other investment) … 55. The result, in my view, is that where a company’s object or corporate purpose is to acquire and sell shares, absent an express restriction in the articles of association, the sale of all of the company’s assets, namely the shares that it holds, will never be outside the company’s object or corporate purpose and therefore not outside the board’s authority. The company could, for example, use the sale proceeds to acquire further shares. Indeed, that is how investment companies conduct business. Its corporate purpose is not rendered impossible simply because some or all of the portfolio is sold.” (emphasis added)[768]Whilst in closing the Defendants denied that Mr Sakr was saying that when considering whether the board is authorised to do something, the real issue is whether what is being proposed is within the corporate purpose of the company, that is, I am satisfied, precisely what Mr Sakr was saying (see, in particular, para 41 of Sakr 2 as quoted above).[769]For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the evidence of Professor Soumrani is to be preferred to that of Mr Sakr in relation to Article 157, in circumstances where it reflects the express language of Article 157, and is consistently supported by Lebanese scholarship, in contrast to the evidence of Mr Sakr, in circumstances where neither the Lebanese scholarship, nor the cases referred to by Mr Sakr (which are not in point), support Mr Sakr’s proposition that whether an act is within the power of the board is whether it is within the corporate purpose.[770]Even before considering such Lebanese commentaries and case law there are obvious, and I am satisfied ultimately insurmountable, difficulties with Mr Sakr’s evidence as to the interpretation and application of Article 157. First, and fundamentally, it does not accord with the actual language of Article 157 and the ordinary and natural meaning of the words “all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company”. Whilst Mr Montagu-Smith submitted in his oral closing that this depends on what is meant by the “regular operation of the company”, neither Mr Sakr, nor the Defendants, grapple with, or give meaning and effect to, such wording, still less in the context of the allocation of powers between the different corporate organs within a hierarchical structure (with the board below the general assembly).[771]Second, and relatedly, it cannot be the case that anything that is within the corporate purpose/object is within the board’s powers, as that would then make the board of directors as powerful as the ordinary general assembly, which would be inconsistent with the hierarchical structure of a Lebanese joint stock company which envisages the distinct separation of powers between the different corporate organs (and which is addressed below).[772]Third, I consider that Cedar Mundi are right in their submission that Mr Sakr’s position wrongly elides two different concepts. The concept of corporate purpose is concerned with the capacity of the company overall, i.e., it defines what the company can and cannot do (through any corporate organ); whereas what is under consideration here is what the respective powers are (and how those powers have been allocated) as between two different corporate organs (the board and the general assembly) which are part of a hierarchical structure.[773]The nearest that Mr Sakr came to recognising that Article 157 is about what power is granted to the board by the words “to undertake all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company”, rather than whether something was within the corporate object or purpose of the company, came in the following exchange during the course of Mr Sakr’s cross-examination (Day 11 page 16 line 17 to page 17 line 3):
“Q. Okay, but … [corporate object or purpose is] a different question from the board’s authority or the question of -- the question of the board’s authority is determined by allocation of powers between the various organs of the company; yes? I’m putting to you that’s a separate issue from the overarching question of corporate purpose. Do you understand what I mean? A. Yes, but, again, they’re not totally separate because if you, again, look at the section here, it gives the board of director all necessary -- the power to undertake all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company.”
(emphasis added)[774]In this passage I consider that Mr Sakr did acknowledge that the power is given by the words, “all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company” (in circumstances where such tasks will necessarily be within the corporate object or purpose of the company) so, to that extent, they are not totally separate but, based on the words of Article 157 itself, it is the wording that is the touchstone for the power of the board not whether a power would be within the corporate purpose.[775]Fourth, there is also an illogicality in Mr Sakr’s evidence that the touchstone of whether an act is within the power of the board is whether it is within its corporate purpose. As Professor Soumrani identified at para 35 of Soumrani 3 (rightly in my view):
“The touchstone of whether a transaction is within the authority of the board cannot simply be whether or not the transaction falls within the company’s corporate purpose, since if the transaction is outside the corporate purpose, the company cannot enter into it at all, and the question of the board’s authority becomes irrelevant.”

D1.3 The distinct powers of the corporate organs

[776]The evidence that is before me as to a Lebanese joint stock company is that such a company is “a company whose bodies (the general assembly of shareholders, the board of directors, the chairman) are hierarchically organised by law, each vested with distinct powers” – Alexandre Najjar L’administration de la Société Anonyme Libanaise at 55.[777]What is more, in the context of a hierarchical structure of bodies each with distinct powers, it is clearly the position under Lebanese law that such distinct powers should be respected by each of the bodies and that such bodies should not encroach upon the powers of another. As Alexandre Najjar states in L’administration de la Société Anonyme Libanaise, at 56:
“In application of these principles, which are consistent with corporate governance principles that support the specialization and separation of corporate bodies, the board of directors may not encroach on the powers conferred by law upon other bodies of the company… Similarly, a delegation of powers that is excessively broad or unrestricted is not permissible.”
(emphasis added)[778]This is a further reason why I cannot accept Mr Sakr’s interpretation of Article 157, as it would mean that the board of directors would have full power to do anything within the corporate purpose. That cannot be right, as the board of directors would not merely be encroaching upon the function and purpose of the ordinary general assembly (and extraordinary general assembly), it would potentially render redundant the function and purpose of an ordinary general assembly and an extraordinary general assembly.[779]The hierarchical organisation of the bodies is addressed by Professor Soumrani in Soumrani 2 at para 111:
“111. Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn: (i) The general assembly is the most powerful corporate body of the joint-stock company. It is entrusted with the major decisions relating to the company such as the amendment of the articles of association, the company’s winding-up, the approval of the company’s financial statements and the allocation of profits. (ii) The board of directors manages the normal functioning of the company. Its general powers essentially include performing all acts required for the normal functioning of the company, excluding current affairs. (iii) The chairman general manager, the general manager and the assistant general manager, as applicable, implement the board's decisions, manage the current affairs of the company and represent it towards third parties. (iv) The vice president, which is a position created by practice, has limited powers that he exercises in the absence of the chairman: these powers consist in the convening of the board of directors, the setting of its agenda and the presiding of its meetings. Such powers do not include executive general management powers. (v) Given the principles of hierarchy and separation of powers that underlie the functioning of joint-stock companies and which are of public order, each corporate body has its own distinct and specific powers (pouvoirs propres) that cannot be delegated to other corporate bodies. Only general powers can be delegated, and in such case, only partially and for a limited period.”
[780]I do not understand that evidence to be controversial, and certainly Mr Sakr did not disagree with it in Sakr 1, and he accepted the following in cross-examination (see Day 11 page 6 at line 19 to page 8 at line 19):
“Q. Let's start with some very general propositions. So, as a matter of corporate structure, I think you would agree that there are three main statutory corporate bodies: the general assembly, the board of directors and the general manager or chairman, yes? A. Yes. Q. Those bodies sit in a hierarchical structure? A. Yes. … Q. So the general assembly sits at the top of the structure and that's the most important corporate body; yes? A. Yes. Q. The general assembly is entrusted with the most important decisions about the company, would you agree with that? A. Yes, with −−if I may −−can make an observation here? Q. Yes. A. It 's not necessarily a hierarchy between the different −−the different bodies that you have. There are separate powers for each of these which are not necessarily in the −−one does not fit into one single hierarchy. Q. I understand. So we have the general assembly and then we have the board of directors and the board of directors is entrusted with the regular operation and management of the company; yes? A. Yes. Q. And then we have the chairman or general manager, or sometimes an assistant general manager, and that function is to deal with what we call the current affairs , which really means the day−to−day management? A. Yes. … Q. Within that hierarchy, it 's a hierarchy because the general manager is subordinate to the board? A. In that sense, yes. Q. Yes, and in the same sort of sense, the board is subordinate to the general assembly? A. Yes. Q. And then I think the point you were making a moment ago is each of the corporate bodies is vested with powers that are distinct from the other bodies, is that correct? A. That is exactly so, yes. Q. So, for example, the board of directors may not encroach upon the powers conferred to, well, either the chairman at one end or the general assembly at the other, yes? A. Correct.”
Q. Those bodies sit in a hierarchical structure? A. Yes. … A. Yes, with −−if I may −−can make an observation here? A. Yes. … A. Correct.”

A. Yes. …

[781]It is also common ground that there is a distinction between the extraordinary general assembly and the ordinary general assembly, in certain matters, such as amending the constitution or corporate purpose, or dissolving the company or otherwise bringing it to an end, which are exclusively matters for the extraordinary general assembly. The distinction is of relevance when considering some of the Lebanese case law referred to by the experts. Professor Soumrani addresses the distinction between types of general assembly at Soumrani 3, para 42 footnote 33.[782]The distinction was accepted by Mr Sakr during the course of his cross-examination (Day 11 page 8 line 20 to page 9 line 4):
“Q. Now, there's also a distinction, when we're looking at the general assembly, between an ordinary general assembly and an extraordinary general assembly? A. Correct. Q. There are certain things that only an extraordinary general assembly can do and those things would typically include amending the company's constitution, changing its corporate purpose, dissolving the company or just bringing it to an end, is that all −− A. That's correct”
A. That's correct”

D1.4 Lebanese Scholarship

[783]I am satisfied that Lebanese scholarship consistently describes the respective powers of the board of directors and the general assembly in terms which are consistent with Professor Soumrani’s evidence, and inconsistent with the premise of Mr Sakr that anything within the corporate purpose must be within the board’s powers, such writers treating important acts of disposition and other major transactions as matters for the general assembly, rather than the board, notwithstanding that such acts may well fall within the company’s purpose and object. In this regard Professor Soumrani concludes at Soumrani 3 para 39 (having quoted two of the Lebanese works set out below (that of Emile Tyan and that of Edward Eid and Christine Eid): “In light of the above, it is clear that the criterion for an act to fall outside of the board’s powers is not whether it is within or outside the purpose of the company, but rather if its magnitude and importance exceed the regular functioning of the company; in which case it requires a resolution of the general assembly”.[784]In this regard all the Lebanese scholarship that has been identified consistently treat important acts of disposition and other major transactions as matters for the general assembly, notwithstanding that such acts may well fall within the company’s purpose and object.[785]Thus, in Emile Tyan, Droit Commercial, Tome 1 (2017), para 605, it is stated: “On the other hand, powers exceeding those of the board fall within the competence of the general assembly, such as acts of disposal (transfers, mortgages, pledges) that are not necessary for the operation of the company; - substantial borrowings, particularly bond issues, the sale or pledging of the business, mergers with another company, etc.”. (emphasis added)[786]In similar terms it is stated in Edward Eid & Christine Eid, Al-Wassett in Commercial Law, Vol 2 (Commercial Companies) (2009), at 391-392:
“The ordinary general assembly is also competent to look into any matter that is under that the company’s articles of association defer to its competence, and in any matter that relates to the company’s management and that does not fall in the competence of the board of directors or the chairman general manager: such as an important loan - particularly if it is made by issuance of bonds -, the sale or pledge of the company’s shop, the granting of free guarantees, the settlement and arbitration in matters that are outside the competence of the board, the revocation of the directors, as well as other relevant matters that fall outside of the scope of the usual exploitation of the business.”
(emphasis added)[787]In Georges Naffah, Droit des sociétés, Tome 2 (2025), it is stated at para 719: “Are notably of the competence of the general assembly of shareholders: acts of disposition that are not necessary to the functioning of the business: mortgages, pledges, purchase or sale of properties (except in the case of a real estate company), as well as important donations and gifts, important loans, the contribution of assets to another company, the merger, sale or contractual pledge of the stock-in-trade, as well as the revocation of directors”. (emphasis added)[788]The text is under the heading, “Les attributions du conseil d’administration” (“the powers of the board of directors”), then the subheading (“Les attributions générales du conseil d’administration”, “the general powers of the board of directors”) and the first (untranslated) words of para 719 (in the extract before me) are: “Les limites relatives aux actes relevant de la compétence de l’assemblée générale” (“The limits relating to acts falling within the competence of the general assembly”) (such headings and translations being confirmed by Mr Sakr in the course of his cross-examination).[789]A very recent text (the extract of which was only introduced to the trial bundle during Professor Soumrani’s cross-examination) is that of Norma Shuman, Commercial Companies in Lebanese Law, (2026), p 349, which is in a similar vein: “It is considered an excess of the powers of the Board of Directors, unless otherwise provided in the company’s internal regulations, acts which by their nature fall within the powers of the General Assembly, such as substantial or long-term loans; entering into participations or making advances to other companies; undertaking investments of substantial magnitude; selling or mortgaging the commercial establishment or any essential part of its assets; carrying out mergers or acquisitions; as well as granting gifts or donations likely to have a significant impact on the company’s financial position”. (emphasis added)[790]What is being recognised in all these texts is that whilst many of the types of transactions envisaged will typically be within the corporate object, nevertheless there are certain transactions which, by virtue of their nature, magnitude or importance, will fall outside of the competency of the board of directors and must be for the general assembly, which accords with Professor Soumrani’s evidence, and is contrary to the evidence of Mr Sakr.[791]Neither expert suggested that the examples given by Lebanese scholars were either isolated, or exhaustive examples, or closed categories, and as such they are clearly examples of acts and transactions, whether they are substantial loans, sales or whatever, which though they are within the capacity of the company, are for the ordinary (or in certain cases for the extraordinary) general assembly rather than being within the competence of the board of directors.[792]In oral closings, Mr Montagu-Smith sought to make a point that the lists cited by the various commentators were very similar, and he also sought to submit that all one gathers from the commentaries is that significant loans are not within the general powers of the board (subject to what is said in the articles of association). Indeed, he made the point that Professor Soumrani had underlined the words “substantial borrowings” and “important loan” in Soumrani 3 at paras 37 and 38 (as he had).[793]In this regard he took the Court to an extract from Najjar at p. 191 (which Professor Soumrani had referred to in Soumrani 2), which was in these terms:
“159. According to Lebanese legal doctrine, the following are considered part of the company's “normal course of business”, and therefore fall outside both the authority of the chairman general manager and the competence of the general assembly: – The organization of the company staff; – The appointment and dismissal of executives; – The execution of low-value loan agreements; (see Head of the Beirut Executive Office, July 2, 1966, RJL 1966.778). – The transactions. – The conclusion of lease agreements. However, the following fall within the competence of the general meeting: – amendment of the articles of association; – approval of the financial statements; – appointment of the supervisory commissioner; – acts of disposal that are not “necessary for the operation of the company”: mortgages, pledges, sale or purchase of real estate — except in the case of a real estate company (Fabia and Safa, art. 157, no. 16, Beirut Court of First Instance, March 23, 1974, aforesaid) – significant donations and gifts; – significant loans (cf. South Lebanon High Court, January 28, 2020, cited above, which considers that loans, current account advances, and guarantees fall within the competence of the general meeting); – the contribution of assets to another company; – the merger with another company; – the sale or pledging of business assets (cf. Beirut Court of Appeal, January 18, 1967, H. 1969.53); – the conclusion of onerous insurance contracts (Beirut Court of Appeal, August 2, 1973, Al-Adl, 1974.187). – the appointment or removal of directors. – the allocation of directors' attendance fees...”
(emphasis added)

However, the following fall within the competence of the general meeting:

[794]From the highlighted passages concerning loans (which each refer to case law) it was submitted that what this shows is that there is a rule about substantial loans as opposed to substantial transactions, and that this rule is in some way specific to substantial loans rather than substantial transactions generally. I have some difficulty with that submission which I do not consider fairly reflects the passage as a whole (or the text relating to matters other than loans).[795]As I foreshadowed when this submission was made in closing, this passage (and indeed the cases there cited which were not before me) appears to be drawing a distinction between low value loans (within the board’s powers as part of the normal course of business) (the top part of the quotation), and significant loans (which are for the general assembly) (the lower part of the quotation).[796]This does appear to draw the very distinction that Professor Soumrani and Cedar Mundi make, namely that major transactions (in this instance substantial loans) are for the general assembly (and not the board of directors) and there would not appear to be any good reason to confine this as a special rule relating to loans (as opposed to an example/illustration of the point that is being made by Najjar and by Professor Soumrani).[797]Indeed, loans are but one example of matters that fall within the competence of the general assembly (i.e. out-with the power of the board) and they include many (substantial) transactions quite separate from loans, such as mortgages, pledges, sale or purchase of real estate – except in the case of a real estate company, contribution of assets to another company etc. The distinguishing feature is accordingly not loans (and not confined to loans) but important acts of disposition and other major transactions. This forces the Defendants to say that other examples are the result of an express rule imposed by law (the example they give is amendment of the articles of association), but this does not account for all the entries, and I consider that the overall theme is, indeed, important acts of disposition and other major transactions, which are within the competence of the general assembly and not within the power of the board.

D1.5 Case law relied upon by Mr Sakr and the Defendants

[798]Mr Sakr relies on three cases in support of his proposition that the sale of a company’s assets falls within the company’s purpose and are therefore within the scope of the authority of the board. I am satisfied that, upon examination, none of these cases support Mr Sakr’s proposition, and indeed they are, in each case, about whether the relevant transaction was of such a nature as to require an extraordinary general assembly (as opposed to a general assembly), and they are not addressing the relevant question, namely the dividing line between the board and the general assembly. I will consider each of these authorities in turn.[799]The circumstances in which Mr Sakr considered these cases was what Professor Soumrani had said in Soumrani 2 that, “the sale of all a company’s assets that are used for the company’s activity” is outside the board’s authority, Professor Soumrani referring to a Fabia and Safa commentary on the old version of Article 157 LCC, which in turn refers to a dcision of the Court of First Instance in Beirut from 1972 (Nasr v Lebanese Maritime Shipping, Beirut Court of First Instance, no 649, 25 May 1972) and a French decision (Société des Mines de fer de Fillols v Société de Denain et d’Anzin, Seine Civil Court, 3 May 1956). Mr Sakr commented on these cases and a more recent French Cour de Cassation case (Société Crystal Holding v M. Grenon-Andrieu, Cass. com., 7 October 2008) in Sakr 1.

Nasr v Lebanese Maritime Shipping

[800]It is clear enough from Mr Sakr’s own description of this case (at Sakr 1, para 46(a)) that this was a case about the dividing line between a decision that could only be taken at an extraordinary general assembly and not at a general assembly:
“In the Lebanese case of Nasr v Lebanese Maritime Shipping, it appears from the judgement that the company’s object according to its articles of association was the exploitation of the vessels owned by the company. The court thus considered that the sale of all the vessels by decision of the ordinary general assembly made it impossible for the company to continue performing its object, which amounted, in practice, to winding-up the company and its liquidation, a decision that could only be taken by an extraordinary general assembly.”
(emphasis added)[801]Mr Sakr accepted that this was the case in cross-examination (Day 11 page 25 lines 8 to 20):
“Q. So, on the basis of your description here, this was a case about the dividing line between the powers of the ordinary general assembly and the extraordinary general assembly, wasn't it? A. Yes. Q. So it wasn't a case about the dividing line between the powers of the board of directors and an ordinary general assembly? … A. Yes, but the principle is the same”
A. Yes, but the principle is the same”[802]He did not, however, provide any justification for adding, the words “but the principle is the same” and an examination of the fullest report of the case (provided in translation at I3/426.1) clearly shows that the case was indeed addressing the distinction between an extraordinary general assembly and a general assembly, and such references as there are to the board of directors (as quoted below) does not support what Mr Sakr states.[803]In this regard the headnote provides, amongst other matters “Company — Act that would Result in the Practical Dissolution and Winding-Up of the Company — Lack of Competence of the Ordinary General Assembly to Adopt a Resolution Thereon — Such Act Falling Within the Competence of the Extraordinary General Assembly [1.4].” Then at page 2 it is stated:
“Whereas, further to the foregoing, the sale of the company's assets — and in particular all of the vessels related to the company’s operations, and for the continuation of its business in a normal manner — falls within the scope of the powers of the Board of Directors, which is authorised to carry out partial sales falling within the ambit of the company's management and which are not of a nature to paralyse the company's operations in their entirety, in accordance with Articles 16 and 2 of the Company's Articles of Association; especially since the company's objects consist in reality in the operation of its own vessels, and the sale of all of those vessels — which are necessary for pursuing that operation — and the freezing of the company's activities would ultimately result in the amendment of the company's objects, the amendment of the fundamental purpose for which it was incorporated, and the practical disappearance of the company. [1.12] Whereas such a resolution does not therefore constitute an administrative decision that would secure the company's object (Article 2 of the Company's Articles of Association), and the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 196 of the Code of Commerce do not apply to it, nor is it subject to its provisions; rather, it constitutes an act of disposition of the company's assets that are intrinsically linked to and inseparable from the exploitation of the company's object, and it falls squarely within the competence of the Extraordinary General Assembly as provided for in Articles 200, 201, and 202 of the Code of Commerce — particularly since it is of a nature to dissolve the company and wind it up in practical terms. [1.13] Acts of disposition relating to the company's assets are ordinarily reserved to the Extraordinary General Assembly. Indeed, in most cases, the exploitation of those assets forms part of the company's object, which only the Extraordinary General Assembly may modify. However, the Ordinary General Assembly may resolve to dispose of assets that do not form part of the company's object. It is important here to distinguish between acts of administration, which the Board of Directors may carry out, and acts of disposal. [1.14] • Jean Noirel, La société anonyme devant la jurisprudence moderne [The Joint-Stock Company in Modern Case Law], No. 340, p. 238. [1.15] Additional references: • Civil Tribunal of the Seine, 3 May 1956, Gaz. Pal. 1956, 2, 93; Paris, 14 May 1957, S. 1957, 1, 154. [1.16] Whereas the resolution of the Ordinary General Assembly held on 24 June 1968, ordering the sale of the company's assets and enterprise, is accordingly null and void on this ground as well. [1.17]”

Additional references:

[804]In the Defendants’ Closing Submissions at para 339 it is asserted that the principles apply equally to the board, and it is asserted that Lebanese law permits decisions that are not caught by the rule (that decisons that would amount to the dissolution of the company would require extraordinary general assembly approval), “to be taken by either the board or the ordinary general assembly” but no authority is cited for that proposition, Nasr is not authority for that proposition, and it begs the question what is a power for the board and what is a power for the general assembly in circumstances where their roles are not interchangeable, and there is, as already noted, a hierarchy between them.

Société des Mines de fer de Fillols v Société de Denain d’Anzin

[805]It is necessary to be somewhat cautious about this case, given that there is no equivalent of Article 157 in the French Civil Code, and the full judgment is not available either. However, it is a case about a company’s purpose/object, and, as Mr Sakr confirmed in cross-examination, this was a case where the company’s purpose/object was to exploit certain mining concessions, the company had entered into a lease which was perpetual (i.e., until the mines were exhausted) and hence, the argument (which the Court accepted) was that the effect of the lease was to deprive the company of its only real asset, denuding its corporate purpose—and that could only be done by an extraordinary general assembly (see Mr Sakr’s answers at Day 11 page 25 line 21 to page 26 line 10). There is, however, nothing in the judgment to suggest that this set of circumstances represents the boundary between general assembly and board, and the case itself says nothing about the dividing line between the board and the general assembly.

Société Crystal Holding v M. Grenon-Andrieu

[806]This is a 2008 French Cour de Cassation decision. The report summarises the facts and decision as follows (emphasis added): “Whereas, according to the judgment under appeal, in 1994, Messrs. X..., Z... and Y... formed the civil company Crystal Holding, whose purpose was the acquisition, management and administration of company securities, to which they each contributed an identical number of shares held by them in the capital of the company Crystal Finance; whereas, by resolution adopted at the ordinary general meeting on May 9, 2005, the partners of the company Crystal Holding decided by majority vote to authorize the management to proceed with the sale of the shares of the company Crystal Finance; whereas MY..., arguing in particular that this resolution had the effect of depriving the company of its purpose, sought its annulment; […] Whereas, in granting this request, the judgment holds that the shares of Crystal Finance constituted the sole asset of Crystal Holding, that their transfer was equivalent to the dissolution of that company, and that such a decision could, according to the articles of association, only be taken at an extraordinary general meeting and by shareholders representing at least three-quarters of the share capital; Whereas, in so ruling, after having noted that the statutory purpose of Crystal Holding was the acquisition, management, and administration of securities of companies, from which it followed that the transfer by that company of the shares it held in the capital of Crystal Finance did not result in the extinction of its purpose and therefore did not imply its dissolution, the Court of Appeal failed to draw the legal conclusions from its findings and violated the aforementioned provision”. (emphasis added)[807]The decision was, therefore, clearly taken at an ordinary general meeting, and this case is about the dividing line between the ordinary and extraordinary general assembly. There is no suggestion that a disposal such as this did not require an ordinary general assembly, or that the board of directors had the power to undertake it.[808]As Mr Sakr agreed in cross-examination (Day 11 page 31 lines 11 to 18):
“Q. But this case suggests, because there was an ordinary general assembly, that a substantial asset disposal did require an ordinary shareholder authorisation , even though it would not amount to a dissolution of the company −−holding company, but it required an ordinary general assembly resolution? A. Well, yes, because we don't know anything about the articles of that company.”
(emphasis added) A. Well, yes, because we don't know anything about the articles of that company.”[809]Mr Sakr’s caveat about not knowing anything about the articles of that company, is not strictly apposite as it is clear from the judgment that the argument was that the transfer of shares was equivalent to the dissolution of the company, “and that such decision could, according to the articles of association, only be taken at an extraordinary general meeting” (emphasis added). The very fact of such provision in the articles of association renders it implausible that the articles of association permitted a substantial asset disposal by the board. There is nothing in the case to suggest that a substantial asset disposal would be within the power of the board, and the very fact that it was passed by resolution at a general assembly suggests the contrary (given the hierarchy of corporate bodies).

The Beirut Civil Court of First Instance (bankruptcy) case of 22 July 1965

[810]The Defendants, in their Written Closing, rely on a first instance decision of the Beirut Court of First Instance (sitting in bankruptcy) dated 22 July 1965. Neither expert relied on this case in the context of Article 157 (which is perhaps unsurprising as it relates to a previous wording which is different to the current wording of Article 157), and Mr Sakr did not give any relevant evidence about it in this context (it is notable that there are no references to Mr Sakr, or his evidence, in the relevant section of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions).[811]Yet submissions on this case, by the Defendants’ English lawyers and their interpretation of it, featured prominently in the Defendants’ Written Closing Submissions. In this regard I bear well in mind that the task for the Court is to evaluate the expert evidence of Lebanese law and to predict the likely decision of the highest court in the relevant Lebanese system of law if this case had been litigated there on each of the points in dispute. For that I have regard to the Lebanese expert evidence as a whole (as addressed above), not an English lawyer’s interpretation of a Lebanese case from 60 years ago that neither expert considered relevant in their respective reports. However, given that the Defendants now seek to place such reliance on the case, I address it below.[812]Before turning to the case itself, I should first address the Defendants’ criticisms of Professor Soumrani, for not referring to this case in his third report and for not drawing it to the attention of the Court, which were put to him in cross-examination. I consider that such criticisms, and associated line of cross-examination, were misplaced.[813]First, and as already foreshadowed, Mr Sakr himself does not rely on this decision in support of his proposition that the test under Article 157 of whether an act is within the board’s powers is the corporate object test, and indeed he does not deploy it as an Article 157 authority at all. It is clear that this must have been a conscious decision given that Mr Sakr does refer to the case, in Sakr 1, para 88, fn 71 and Sakr 1, para 99, fn 83, in an entirely different context, namely in relation to the supposed good faith and benefit exceptions under the old (pre-reform) Article 158 (which are addressed in due course below in Section D.3).[814]Second, the case was never even discussed between the experts as a relevant Article 157 authority and, as such it does not appear in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo in that context. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Professor Soumrani did not respond to it in his third (responsive) report.[815]Third, if Mr Sakr had himself considered that the case was relevant and supported his evidence, or was contrary to the evidence of Professor Soumrani, he would surely have raised it when giving evidence.[816]Turning to the case itself, and such evidence as I have from the Lebanese law experts about it (which is limited to that of Professor Soumrani, who did not agree with what was being put to him) I am satisfied that it does not assist the Defendants, or support the approach of Mr Sakr and, indeed, I am satisfied that it does not represent current Lebanese law.[817]First, and fundamentally, this 1965 case is not even addressing the current wording of Article 157, but the 1942 version which was differently worded, and so what is said in that case related to a different and, as shall be seen, materially less confined provision. The Defendants candidly (and realistically) accepted in their oral closing that it is an indisputable fact that the wording had changed.[818]This previous version provided (in translation):
“Without prejudice to the provisions of the bylaws, the members of the board of directors shall carry out all the work required for the proper conduct of the company’s project in the usual manner, and the company shall be bound by this to that extent”
. That text was replaced by the different (and clearly more limiting words) “all necessary tasks for the regular operation of the company” and those words remain in the 2019 (current) version.[819]It is an obvious point, but the Court was not addressing, and could not have been addressing, what were all necessary tasks for the “regular operation” of the company. It was addressing “all work required for the proper conduct of the company’s project in the usual manner”. Whilst Mr Montagu-Smith sought to equate the two in his oral closing, that is neither supported by the language itself nor, more pertinently, by any evidence from the Lebanese experts in relation to the respective wordings. Yet further, the words that follow in the present Article 157 “These powers are unrestricted, save for provisions delineated in the Law or in the company’s bylaws” (my emphasis) have the potential to restrict the powers of the board.[820]In oral closings, the Defendants asked (rhetorically) whether there is really a difference between “in the usual manner” and “regular operation”. The short answer (as a matter of Lebanese law/Lebanese expert evidence) is that there is no evidence that they are the same. Yet further, and as a matter of language, they are different. “Regular” is something that happens regularly, whilst “in the usual manner” is concerned with what is usual, the concepts are different.[821]In that case the argument that was run (in contending that the guarantee was not enforceable against the bank) was that “the board’s authority was confined to transactions falling within the ordinary course of business and that the guarantee, by reason of the magnitude, fell outside its scope” (see at p 643). It was in that context that it was said (at p 653):
“The corporate object is to be understood as comprising the commercial activities designated in the articles of association as those to be pursued in furtherance of the intended profit, together with such ancillary acts as are necessary for the conduct of those activities in the manner most advantageous to the company. It follows that the criterion in this regard lies not in the magnitude or gravity of the act in itself, but in its nature. Either the act undertaken by the board of directors falls within the category of commercial activities contemplated by the articles of association, or is necessary for the proper conduct of the common enterprise, or it does not. In the former case, the board is competent to perform the act in question irrespective of its gravity relative to the company's resources. In the latter case alone is the company not bound, however trivial and inconsequential the act may be. In consequence, the word “ordinary” as it appears in Article 157 of the Commercial Code is to be understood in a qualitative, not a quantitative, sense.”
[822]It is hardly surprising that the Court rejected the argument that the guarantee did not fall within the ordinary course of business because of its magnitude, given that the relevant company was a bank, and it was found that the provision of guarantees was part of its core function. That is very different to the situation under consideration in relation to the 2021 Transaction, and neither expert considered that this case was relevant to the proper interpretation of the current version of Article 157.[823]In any event, and quite apart from the fact that case was considering a different wording, it is clear that neither Lebanese scholars nor Lebanese courts have treated it as representing the current state of Lebanese law. As such I consider that Professor Soumrani was right to say (when asked about this case in cross-examination) that this judgment is outdated, and (importantly) it is contradicted by the subsequent doctrinal writings that have already been identified. As Professor Soumrani said (and as I consider is consistent with a consideration of the doctrinal writings above): “Tyan has been published the first time in 1968. From 1968 until 2026 all scholars consider that important transactions are of the competence of the general assembly”.[824]None of the doctrinal writings in relation to Lebanese law (which a Lebanese court would have regard to) refers to, or suggest, that the 1965 case is relevant in relation to this issue. They surely would have done so had any of them considered it to be of relevance to the issue they were addressing in relation to the respective power of the board and the general assembly. They clearly did not, and neither did Mr Sakr or Professor Soumrani (given that neither of them addressed the case on this point in their respective reports).[825]In conclusion therefore, and on the basis of the evidence of Professor Soumrani as identified above (which I accept), as supported by the language of Article 157, and by all the Lebanese commentaries (which is not contradicted by any relevant case law), I am satisfied that by virtue of the terms of Article 157 the board’s power is limited to acts that are necessary for the regular operation of the company, and do not extend to important acts of disposition and other major transactions which are (at least) matters for the general assembly, rather than the board.

D1.6 Article 19 of the Articles of Association

[826]At the commencement of the trial, the Defendants sought to advance a further case, that notwithstanding the terms of Article 157 (and any findings that might be made about it), the articles of association (specifically Article 19) were sufficiently wide to vest in the board the power to undertake transactions such as the 2021 Transaction.[827]The way that it was put in opening was as follows. In the Defendants’ written opening submissions, it was submitted (at para 160) that “whatever might be the board’s usual authority in Lebanese law (presumably a reference to Article 157), Article 19 of Cedar Mundi’s articles vested the board with the “widest powers”. In the Defendants’ oral opening submissions, it was submitted that “even if [the SPA is] not within Article 157, those powers can be expanded by the articles of association (Day 2 page 165 lines 9-13). The implicit submission in each case is that the powers were so expanded (by Article 19) and, in each case as so expanded, gave the board the power to enter into the 2021 Transaction notwithstanding the terms of Article 157 (as interpreted above). This was how it was put in the Defendants’ Closing Submissions (at para 361).[828]The first difficulty with such a case is that it is not pleaded. This, in of itself, is fatal to the advancement of such case. The Defendants do not even attempt to address this in their Written Closing Submissions, whilst in their oral closing submissions they acknowledge Cedar Mundi’s stance about the lack of a pleaded case, but do not address this omission, referring instead to aspects of Professor Soumrani’s evidence (as addressed below). But that is no answer to the fact that the case they seek to advance is unpleaded.[829]Second (and no doubt as a consequence of it not having been pleaded), the Defendants’ expert Mr Sakr does not address Article 19 in his expert reports, and so does not give evidence on, or lend his support to, any such submission. In this regard Mr Sakr’s reports do not say that Article 157 can be overridden by a company’s articles of association. Rather, as addressed above, his contention is that Article 157 defines the board’s powers by reference to the company’s objects, which in turn are found within its constitution. The contention by reference to the company’s objects (which I have in any event rejected as addressed above) does not provide any support for this latest unpleaded case.[830]Yet further, when asked about the topic in cross-examination Mr Sakr said that he had not been asked to consider such a case, and indeed did not think he had even seen the articles, though he was not sure (Day 11 page 37 lines 7 to 15): “Q. So I don't know if you understand this or not, but the defendants' case in these proceedings is that the scope of the board's powers has been extended beyond the words used in Article 157 specifically by the wording of Article 19 of the articles of association. Is that something you have considered? A. No, because that was not asked for me to consider. I even -- I do not think even I have seen the articles of that case. I'm not sure”.[831]Whilst it transpired during the course of the Defendants’ oral closing that Mr Sakr had been provided with the articles, it is clear from his above answer that he had no recollection of seeing the articles, and his positive evidence was that he had not considered such a case.[832]The Defendants seek to rely on high level general statements of Professor Soumrani in Soumrani 2. What Professor Soumrani actually stated at para 102 was as follows:
“102. The articles of association may expand or restrict the general powers of the board of directors, provided this does not encroach on powers conferred on the board of directors by law or reserved to other statutory corporate bodies. In this respect, a leading Lebanese scholar, Mr A. Najjar, considers that the articles of association may authorize the board of directors to sell or mortgage the company’s assets, contract loans, or on the contrary subject these acts to the prior authorization of the general assembly. [footnote 46 - A. Najjar, op. cit., p. 192]”
(emphasis added) [footnote 46 - A. Najjar, op. cit., p. 192]”[833]I have already found that transactions of the importance and magnitude of the 2021 Transaction are, “reserved to other statutory corporate bodies”, namely the general assembly, so this evidence of Professor Soumrani, in itself, does not help the Defendants, not least in circumstances where the Defendants accept, in their written Closing Submissions both that the expert evidence is that the Articles cannot confer on the board powers reserved to another corporate body (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 365 first sentence) and that “where the law states that only the extraordinary general assembly shall have authority to alter the company’s objects, the articles cannot confer that power on the board” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 365 second sentence).[834]Some general questions were asked of Professor Soumrani, by reference to para 102. It was put that the powers of the board can be increased by the articles, “Q. You accept, I think, that those powers can be increased by the articles of association of the company?” to which Professor Soumrani replied, “A. As long as, but as long as they do not go against the law. Q. Yes, I see. All right” (Day 10 page 68 lines 20 to 24).[835]In cross-examination, Professor Soumrani’s evidence was that whilst the articles can confer additional powers, “this is done only on specific points and for a limited duration. You cannot give the board extensive powers, such that you remove all powers of the general assembly” (Day 10 page 69 lines 11 to 14) and “you cannot give all powers that are within the general assembly in a general manner to the board of directors” (Day 10 page 72 lines 9 to 11).[836]Whilst these further answers are criticised by the Defendants and it is said that Professor Soumrani’s evidence is mere assertion or “bare ipse dixit” (and so should carry little weight, relying on what was said in Kennedy v Cordis (Services) LLP (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 6 at [48]), I do not consider that there is any need to go into such matters. It is clear from Professor Soumrani’s own evidence that the articles of association may expand or restrict the general powers of the board of directors, provided this does not encroach on powers conferred on the board of directors by law or reserved to other statutory corporate bodies. However, this takes the Defendants nowhere (in terms of the expert evidence) given that it was never even put to Professor Soumrani that Article 19 did have the effect of overriding Article 157, and I have found that Article 157 has the meaning contended for by Cedar Mundi.[837]The Defendants then fall back on the submission that beyond any principles of Lebanese construction, it is not for the experts to opine on the meaning of any particular provision (referring to Deutsche Bank AG v Comune di Savona [2018] EWCA Civ 1740 at [15]), but had it been pleaded, I consider the Court would have been assisted by expert evidence on the inter relationship between Article 157 and the wording of Article 19.[838]In any event, and even were it open to the Defendants to advance a case in relation to Article 19 (contrary to my finding above), they have not established that Article 19 has the effect they contend for.[839]Article 19 provides: “The Board of Directors is vested with the widest powers to represent the Company vis-à-vis any and all third parties, to execute the resolutions of the General Assembly and to carry out any and all acts and operations relating to its object, with no limitation or reserve whatsoever except those laid by the Law and the present Articles of Incorporation”. (emphasis added)[840]Article 19 is therefore subject to the limitations “laid by the law”, which must include the limitations expressed in Article 157 itself. The Defendants have not established that it is permissible, as a matter of law, to use the articles of association to override the restrictions which are, as a matter of law, set out in Article 157 of the LCC. Indeed, if the Defendants wished to suggest that Article 19 overrode, and was not subject to, Article 157 this should have been addressed by Mr Sakr, and put to Professor Soumrani, but neither was done.[841]In any event, the earlier wide words relied upon by the Defendants are not specific, and do not purport to override Article 157. Any such construction would also fall foul of the hierarchy of the corporate organs, and the principle (as addressed above) that the board cannot encroach upon powers that are properly vested in the other corporate organs (here the general assembly). On the Defendants’ construction the words would allow the board to do absolutely anything, including matters indisputably the prerogative of the general assembly and indeed even those that are the prerogative of an extraordinary general assembly. I consider that far clearer words would be necessary to do that even assuming (had that been established) that such a possibility was permitted by law.[842]Yet further (and as the Defendants accepted) Article 19 has to be read together with the other articles. Article 1 expressly states that “This Company shall be governed by the Code of Commerce” (which is the LCC) and which includes Article 157. The Objects of the company are set out at Article 3, namely “The acquisition of stocks or shares in Lebanese and foreign joint stock companies”, the “management of companies in which it owns shares or stock”, “Granting loans to companies in which it owns shares or stocks”, “Acquisitions of patents, licenses and trademarks” and “Acquisition of moveable or non-moveable properties”. The objects are not stated to extend to the disposal of shares (still less all the company’s investments at one time). In fact disposal of particular shares (but not the divestment of all the company’s investments) is dealt with in relation to director’s duties which include, at Article 20.7, the duty to “Inform the Central Bank [i.e. the BdL] of any transfer of the shares of the Company in the capital of the start-up companies in addition to the audit report about said company whereby the value of the transferred shares is indicated”, and which is to be read together with Article 1 which itself refers to Circular 331.[843]In such circumstances, I reject the submission (had it been open to the Defendants) that Article 19 bears the meaning ascribed to it by the Defendants or that it provided the board of directors with authority, without a general assembly resolution, to dispose of all or materially all of the investment portfolio of the company in a single transaction.

D1.7 Conclusion on Article 157 and Application to the facts

[844]As I have already concluded above, and on the basis of the evidence of Professor Soumrani as identified above (which I accept), and which is supported by the language of Article 157, and by all the Lebanese commentaries (and is not contradicted by any relevant case law), the board’s power is limited to acts that are necessary for the regular operation of the company, and do not extend to important acts of disposition and other major transactions which are (at least) matters for the general assembly, rather than the board.[845]On no possible view was the 2021 Transaction an act within the regular operation of the company and it was (at least) a matter for the general assembly. I am satisfied that the highest court in Lebanon would so find.[846]The 2021 Transaction contemplated the transfer to Cedar II of the entirety of Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio (as diluted by the unauthorised 2020 Transaction), leaving Cedar Mundi with only the balances in its bank accounts (which could not be re-invested since the Investment Period had expired) and those unsuccessful investments that had been written off (i.e. the assets that Cedar Mundi held post the 2021 Transaction).[847]In the event, two investments (i.e., Cardiodiagnostics and SOSF) could not be transferred, but those represented only 5.2% of the portfolio by value at the date that the SPA was signed, and, since they were included in the SPA, I am satisfied that the fact they were ultimately not transferred does not change the analysis that this was not within the “regular operation” of Cedar Mundi.[848]On any view, the 2021 Transaction brought to an end Cedar Mundi’s operation as a fund and I am satisfied that, had this litigation not arisen, Cedar Mundi would have distributed its cash balances to its shareholders and been put into liquidation (or left as a shell passively holding its remaining investments, without CMCH or another fund manager operating on its behalf).[849]I note that this is consistent with the contemporaneous advice that Cedar Mundi received from Professor Diab, shortly before the March 2021 board meeting, namely that “the simultaneous sale of all (or almost all of) the Company’s assets does not qualify as an action comprised in the regular course (functioning) of the Company, and hence it does not fall within the powers of the Board” (see Section B5.5 above and the Claimant’s Closing at para 144) and rather “the sale of all (or almost all of) the Company’s assets is equivalent to the liquidation of the Company”. It is also consistent with SGBL’s own position before the 2021 Transaction (see Section B5.5 above and Claimant’s Closing at paras 135 and 137).[850]It appears that Mr Attieh himself regarded Cedar Mundi’s activities as at an end, and no longer in need of a fund manager, stating (in Attieh 1 at para 298), “I had completed the mission”. I also note that Mr Worsnip’s opinion in relation to valuation and a secondary discount was contingent upon characterising the 2021 Transaction as a sale of Cedar Mundi itself.[851]Accordingly, given that no general assembly took place, and no general assembly authorisation was given to the 2021 Transaction, the 2021 Transaction was void, as set out in the Agreed Decision Tree, unless it was ratified (which is addressed in due course in Section E2).

D1.8 Was an extraordinary general assembly required?

[852]If, contrary to my conclusions above, the Defendants (and Mr Sakr) were right that the board would have full power to do anything within the corporate object, I am satisfied that the 2021 Transaction would, in any event, have required an extraordinary general assembly. In this regard, Mr Sakr himself accepted that acts which would render the continuation of the corporate object impossible or would lead to the dissolution of the company would require an extraordinary general assembly, and this can also be seen from the Nasr and the Société des Mines cases (as addressed above).[853]Whilst Mr Sakr argued that as a holding company, the disposal of all of the assets can never be outside of its corporate object (referring to the Société Crystal Holding case), he provided no convincing justification for his analysis, and he accepted in relation to Société Crystal Holding that it depended on the facts (Day 11 page 36 line 8). This is also how the case is seen by the commentator Vincent Téchené, who identifies that on the facts of that case the asset disposal did not prevent the company from acquiring new portfolio shares and continuing its operation, and the dissolution was only being sought by one shareholder with the others (it was inferred) intending to keep it operational.[854]On this, I again prefer the evidence of Professor Soumrani which was that, following Nasr, it is the “mere risk of an ultimate amendment of the company’s purpose” which gives rise to the need for an extraordinary general assembly (Soumrani 3 at para 42). Professor Soumrani confirmed such evidence, by reference to the Nasr case, when he was cross-examined:
“Q. So -- and then -- and which would, in effect, result in practical dissolution. So, again, the court wasn't saying: if you sell all your vessels there's a risk that you will in practice be dissolved. The court was saying: because the purpose of the company was the operation of its vessels, if you sell all the vessels, there are no vessels to operate and, therefore, the purpose has to be suspended. That's what they are saying, isn't it? A. Not really. I don't agree with you. What this judgment says is that the freezing of the company's activity "would ultimately lead", which means if it persists, this would end up with a practical dissolution of the company, thereby affecting the purpose”. … Q. They specifically say, in the fifth line: "This is particularly so given that the company's actual purpose is the operation of its own vessels~..." So they're drawing a distinction, aren't they, between a situation where you have a company, like a holding company, which is entitled to buy, sell and operate assets, and, on the other hand, a company which is only entitled to -- or its only purpose is the operation of assets? That's the distinction they're drawing there, isn't it? A. There is no distinction here with the holding company. This is specific to the operation of its own vessels, but in the case the company wouldn't buy new vessels, then you would have this problem of dissolution. And for the court, my reading, my analysis of this judgment is that, given the ultimate risk of dissolution, it has to be taken by an extraordinary general assembly. That's it.”
[855]As addressed above, Mr Sakr considered that he had not even seen the articles of association (albeit it appears he was mistaken about that), but on any view he clearly had not reviewed them or put his mind to them. Had he done so he would have seen that Article 43 of the articles of association, provides:
“ARTICLE 43 : THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMPANY The Company shall be dissolved upon the expiry of its term, or upon the completion or impossibility of completion of its Object; by the will of the shareholders expressed in an Extraordinary General Assembly, in accordance with the quorum and majority required as per Articles 202 and 204 of the Lebanese Code of Commerce; for any other reason provide by the Law.”
(emphasis added)[856]Accordingly, even if, contrary to my findings, the Defendants had been correct that the test under Article 157 was by reference to a company’s corporate object, the 2021 Transaction was of a nature as to bring about, or at least risk, the cessation of the corporate object, because its consequence was that Cedar Mundi would be unlikely to be (and in fact was not) able to continue as an operative fund. Such a situation is to be distinguished from a situation where Cedar Mundi had sold some of its shares but in a transaction that did not impinge upon its ability to continue operating as a fund. Clearly, in this regard, all share sales cannot be treated the same, and regardless of their nature, magnitude, importance or consequence.[857]Even if, therefore, the Defendants had been correct as to the applicable test in relation to Article 157 (which they are not for the reasons addressed above), the 2021 Transaction was in any event a situation that required an extraordinary general assembly resolution, and that never occurred with the result that, as set out in the Agreed Decision Tree, the 2021 Transaction would void (unless ratified).

D1.9 Conclusion on Issue 1

[858]For all the above reasons, Issue 1, namely, “Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 157 of the LCC or Cedar Mundi’s Articles of Association?” is to be answered in the negative. D2. ARTICLE 158 OF THE LCC (ISSUE 2)

D2.1 The text, structure and meaning of Article 158

[859]Issue 2 is:
“Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 158 of the LCC?”
[860]The central issue under Article 158 is whether the SPA was a nullity because of the non-compliance with the requirement for there to be general assembly ratification of the authorisation of the 2021 Transaction.[861]Article 158 of the LCC, in its current form, provides as follows:
“1- The members and Chairman of the Board of Directors, the General Manager, the Assistant General Manager, and any shareholder holding directly or indirectly voting rights exceeding five percent (5%) of the company's capital, must obtain prior authorization from the Board of Directors for every contract, agreement, or obligation1 intended to be concluded with the company, irrespective of whether such agreement is enacted directly, indirectly, or under the guise of a third party. None of the aforementioned persons are entitled to participate in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorization, and their votes shall not be counted towards the attendance or voting quorum when discussing said authorization. The contracts, agreements and obligations falling within the ordinary business operations between the company and its clients are exempted from this requirement and from the provisions governing authorization. 2- Any agreement between the company and another entity requires the prior authorization of the Board of Directors if any of the persons mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article is: a. a shareholder directly or indirectly holding voting rights exceeding five percent (5%) of the capital of that company. b. a joint partner or a managing general partner in that company, regardless of their share percentage in its capital, if it is a partnership or a limited partnership company. c. a director or a member of the board of directors of that company. Such persons are not entitled to participate in voting on the decision to grant or reject the authorization related to that company, and their votes shall not be counted in the attendance or voting quorum when discussing the authorization. 3. Persons falling under the conditions mentioned in the first two paragraphs here-above must [FIRST STAGE] promptly inform the Board of Directors in writing and in detail. 4. The Board of Directors is required to: a. [SECOND STAGE] Review the authorizations for contracts, agreements, and obligations outlined in the first and second paragraphs of this article within a reasonable period and before convening the General Assembly. If the authorizations are approved, [THIRD STAGE] it shall submit a report to the next General Assembly, whether ordinary or extraordinary, for ratification. The persons mentioned in the first paragraph of this article are not entitled to participate in voting on the ratification resolution, and their shares shall not be counted in the quorum. b.[FOURTH STAGE] Notify the auditors of the contracts, agreements, and obligations that have been authorized, within fifteen days from the date of the authorization resolution. The auditors shall submit their special report to the General Assembly concerning the aforementioned contracts, agreements, and obligations, along with their opinion regarding their impact on the financial statements and accompanying explanations, to be duly voted on. [5. …] [FIFTH STAGE] In all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly.”
(emphasis and annotated stages added)[862]It is common ground that the interpretation of Article 158, and accordingly the determination of Issue 2, is an exercise in Lebanese statutory interpretation. I have already addressed the applicable principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation in Section D0.3 above.[863]As addressed, unless the text of a statutory provision is unclear, or there is an identifiable ambiguity or obvious error, Lebanese courts will apply the words of the statute as written, without resorting to a teleological interpretation to interpret the text in accordance with any legislator’s intent or purpose.[864]Accordingly, where the statutory text is clear and unequivocal, there can be no further search for the meaning of (i.e., further interpretation of) the words. That is because “the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator” i.e., the words mean what they say.[865]Cedar Mundi’s case is that the words of the final sentence of Article 158, based on their ordinary and natural meaning, are clear and unequivocal, and that general assembly ratification was a precondition of the legal effectiveness of the board authorisation. Absent general assembly ratification, there was no effective authorisation, and hence the SPA was unauthorised. As a matter of Lebanese law, that means that the SPA was a nullity (as reflected in the Agreed Decision Tree) (see Claimant’s Written Closing at para 339).[866]Cedar Mundi’s interpretation is based not only upon what it says is the clear meaning of the last sentence of Article 158, but also the envisaged role of the general assembly as reflected in the staged process set out in Article 158.[867]The Defendants address their case on the proper interpretation of Article 158 (including the last sentence thereof) at paras 371 to 448 of their Written Closings (some 79 pages, much of which relates to Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation which has already been addressed in Section D0.3 above) but, perhaps tellingly, the Defendants do not articulate what they say their interpretation of Article 158 is at the outset of their submissions, only stating (at para 371): “The issue at this stage is the status of a related-party transaction which(i) the board has approved;(ii) has been actually concluded with the counterparty; but(iii) which the general assembly has not ratified. In deciding that, the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 is clearly of central importance”.[868]It may be thought that the statement (in paragraph 371) that “the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 is clearly of central importance” is a statement of the bleeding obvious (in the words of Basil Fawlty). But what it is not, is a statement of what the last sentence of Article 158, applying principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation, actually means. For that one has to wait to the final paragraph of the section (paragraph 447), which provides: “The Court is therefore invited to conclude that Cedar Mundi’s board could authorise entry into the SPA under Article 158 without general assembly ratification”.[869]But that, with respect, is to give the last sentence of Article 158 no meaning at all, and on any view does violence to the last sentence of Article 158, which it will be recalled provides: “In all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”.[870]It is important to understand how the Defendants get to their invitation to the Court at para 447 of their Written Closing Submissions. It depends on showing that the legislative intention was something other than is reflected in the actual text of Article 158, and that a teleological reading should be adopted in preference to the literal meaning in order to give effect to that intention.[871]Cedar Mundi (rightly) identifies that in order for the Defendants to be able to make such invitation to the Court, the Defendants must persuade the Court to accept each of the steps in the following line of argument:(1) First, that the legislative intention underlying the reform of Article 158 (by Law 126 of 2019 (“Law 126”)) was to achieve the same result as under French law.(2) Second, that under the French Code of Commerce, the validity of a related party transaction authorised by the board does not depend on its ratification by the general assembly; and(3) Third, that as a matter of statutory interpretation under Lebanese law, it is permissible (and necessary) for the Court to construe Article 158 so as to achieve the same result, notwithstanding its literal (clear) meaning.[872]Cedar Mundi submits that there are fundamental (and ultimately insurmountable) difficulties with the Defendants’ argument at every stage:(1) First, in accordance with the Lebanese principles of statutory construction, it is not open to the Court to apply a teleological interpretation and thereby depart from the text of Article 158 unless the text itself contains an ambiguity or an obvious error. On its face, Article 158 taken as a whole is perfectly clear and coherent.(2) Second, the Defendants have been unable to demonstrate that the intention of Parliament in enacting Article 158 in its final form was in fact as they contend.(3) Third, and relatedly, this is demonstrated by the marked differences between Article 158 as enacted and the provisions of the French Code of Commerce dealing with related party transactions.[873]I address the first of these matters directly below, and then address the second and third of these matters in Sections D2.2 and D2.3 respectively, in due course below.[874]It will be immediately seen, however, that the first matter is an overarching point that is determinative in favour of Cedar Mundi’s interpretation of Article 158 if the last sentence of Article 158 is clear, in circumstances where I have already addressed the relevant principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation, and made my findings in relation thereto, it not being open to the Court to apply a teleological interpretation and thereby depart from the text of Article 158 unless the text itself contains an ambiguity or an obvious error (which Cedar Mundi submits it clearly does not).[875]Before turning to the final sentence of Article 158, it is important to have regard to, and understand, the overall structure in sub-para 3 and following of Article 158 which culminates in the final sentence of Article 158 and encapsulates what both experts refer to as the “Control Procedure” (see Soumrani 2 at para 114 and Sakr 1 at para 72). It can be broken down into five stages (as I have annotated onto the quotation of Article 158 above):(1) The First Stage is that the related party must inform the board of directors of the proposed transaction (para 3 of Article 158)).(2) The Second Stage is that the board of directors must review the “authorisations for” the proposed transaction and do so within a reasonable period of time before convening the general assembly (para 4.a). This must mean that the board of directors must decide whether or not to approve/authorise the proposed transaction (a proposition with which Mr Sakr agreed during the course of his cross-examination (see Day 11 page 41 at lines 5 to 13)).(3) The Third Stage is that the board of directors must submit a report to the general assembly (para 4.a of Article 158) which specifically contemplates, therefore, that there will be a general assembly. As Mr Sakr accepted (Day 11 page 41 lines 17 to 20), the purpose of the board of director’s report is to inform the general assembly for the purposes of its decision as to whether to ratify the authorisation.(4) The Fourth Stage is that the board must notify the auditors, and the auditors must submit a special report on the proposed transaction to the general assembly (para 4.b of Article 158), which again specifically contemplates that there will be a general assembly. As Mr Sakr accepted (Day 11 page 42 lines 4 to 8), the purpose of the auditors’ report is to provide necessary information to the general assembly for its decision as to whether to ratify the authorisation.(5) The Fifth Stage is that the general assembly must meet to decide whether to ratify the authorisation. This is an important stage which is expressly recognised by both experts in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo at para 25 (last sentence), “The general assembly must meet to ratify the authorisation granted by the board of directors” (emphasis added). The same was also confirmed by Mr Sakr in cross-examination (Day 11 page 42 lines 9 to 12). And (crucially) the final sentence expressly provides that “in all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”.[876]It will be seen that the involvement of the general assembly is embedded throughout the process, with it playing a central role in the process. Indeed, most of these stages are concerned with steps pertaining to the provision of relevant information to the general assembly for the purposes of considering the proposed transaction and the convening of a general assembly meeting for the purposes of ratification.[877]Based on the ordinary and natural meaning of what is stated in Article 158 and the stages that are set out, Article 158 envisages that the concept of authorisation is something that requires both the resolution of the board of directors and the ratification of the general assembly before it is effective. Thus Article 158 does not contemplate circumstances where a decision of the board of directors is implemented but the matter is never referred to general assembly (which is, of course, what happened here). There is one overall process that involves, leads to, and culminates in, a general assembly meeting and the ratification (or not) by the general assembly, prior to which, authorisation shall not be deemed effective. In other words, there is no effective authorisation without ratification of the general assembly which is precisely what is being said in the final sentence of Article 158.[878]The Defendants attempt to draw a distinction between authorisation by the board binding on the company against third parties (said to be effective before ratification) and ratification by the general assembly (absent which the directors will be under a liability), but that is simply not what Article 158 provides for (and it could easily have so provided had that been the statutory intention). On the established principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation it is, in any event, to be interpreted in accordance with its clear terms.[879]It is indisputable that the key words are those in the final sentence (and all that has gone before is leading to those key words). Notwithstanding the Defendants valiant, but ultimately misplaced, attempts to suggest that the meaning of those words is not clear, I am satisfied that the meaning of those words is clear and unequivocal, namely that “in all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”. Thus, as per the clear words of the statute, in every case, the authorisation shall not be effective until after it has been ratified by the general assembly. Each of these words has a (clear) ordinary and natural meaning, and on the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation I have identified, stands to be applied in accordance with such clear meaning. That really is the long and short of the matter. Absent general assembly ratification, there was no effective authorisation, and hence the SPA was itself unauthorised.[880]Whilst ultimately, the interpretation of Article 158 is a matter for the Court applying the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation I have found, the reality is that both experts also acknowledged that the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 was clear (certainly on its face/in terms of its literal meaning). To the extent that there are differences between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr in this regard, I accept the evidence of Professor Soumrani which accords with the language of the last sentence of Article 158.[881]I have already addressed the position of Mr Sakr. It will be recalled that the following exchange took place when he was cross-examined:
“Q. Again, this principle is straightforward , isn’t it ? If the statutory text is clear, there's no need to go beyond it to search for the legislature 's intention? Is that expressing the same principle that you were just referring to? A. Yes, but, again, I think the whole section or passage or paragraph must be read. This is −− this is a textbook… MR WILSON: Just to be clear as to what the principle is, Mr Sakr. So can I summarise it this way: unless the text of a statutory provision is unclear, or there is an identifiable ambiguity, Lebanese courts should apply the words of the statute as written, without resorting to a teleological positive interpretation ? A. Yes, but −− no, no, I did −− you want me to answer? Q. Yes, please. A. So there are two points here that I need to make…. [his first point was that it was a textbook and as such it gave a general view on all interpretive techniques under Lebanese and, indeed, under French law]. My second one is, yes, I agree, the interpretation should take place when a text is −− should not take place −− should not take place when the text is clear, but my proposition is that the last paragraph or the sentence "shall not −− shall be deemed −− shall not be deemed effective" is not clear and requires interpretation. … But what I want to clarify , my Lord, is that the literal meaning can be clear but cannot be clear at the same time. So the literal meaning of the word. So the literal meaning here is "shall not be deemed effective". That's the literal . So what does the word say? But the meaning of the words are not clear, you see? I don't know if this distinction is clear?”
(emphasis added)

A. Yes, but −− no, no, I did −− you want me to answer?

[882]In the final part of Mr Sakr’s evidence above he is accepting that the literal meaning of the words (which I consider is the clear meaning of the words) is “shall not be deemed effective” but he attempts to say that despite that the words are not clear. That is not a tenable stance. It has echoes of the position that the Defendants were forced to adopt when making their closing submissions that the last sentence of Article 158 is not clear (when it clearly is).[883]This is not the only passage in which Mr Sakr comes close to accepting that the meaning of the last sentence is clear. Thus, in Sakr 1 at para 131 he states he does not think that “the literal wording of the last sentence of Article 158” would prevent a Lebanese court from coming to the conclusion that he (and the Defendants) advocate. It is plain that he considers that the literal meaning is that the authorisation was not deemed effective. That is very close to accepting that this is the clear meaning. I twice asked Mr Sakr the question as to what he said the literal meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 was. I have quoted the second exchange above. The first was as follows (and was a question in relation Sakr 1 at para 131) (Day 11 page 68 line 1 to page 68 line 17): “MR JUSTICE BRYAN: You say: "I do not think that the literal wording of the last sentence of Article 158 would prevent a Lebanese court from coming to that conclusion … So what do you understand the literal wording of the last sentence of Article 158 to be? A. Yes. MR JUSTICE BRYAN: Can you tell me what you understand the literal wording of the last sentence −−you seem to be distinguishing between the conclusion you reach and what the literal wording is, so what do you say the literal wording of the last sentence is? A. The literal −−by "literal wording" I meant shall not −− the authorisation shall not be deemed effective. That's what I meant”.[884]It is notable (and I consider telling) that the Defendants were themselves disinclined to answer a direct question about the literal meaning of the last sentence of Article 158, even when pressed by the Court to do so during the course of the Defendants’ oral closing (Day 16 page 167 line 3 to page 167 line 20):
“MR JUSTICE BRYAN: Let me ask you a question then, … do you accept that on its face it appears to bear the meaning that the claimants suggest it means? MR MONTAGU-SMITH: Not in its context we would say, no. MR JUSTICE BRYAN: Hold on. I'm asking you, leave aside its context. MR MONTAGU-SMITH: I hesitate to answer the question directly. MR JUSTICE BRYAN: Why do you hesitate? Legitimately I can ask you that question because they say that Lebanese law is if a legal text is clear you can't go outside the wording. If they're right -- you say they're wrong about that, but if they are right about that, I think my question is legitimate. MR MONTAGU-SMITH: But what it does is it assumes that one can find a clear meaning without context. That's the point that we disagree with.”
[885]The premise on which I was putting the question reflects the findings that I have made as to Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation as addressed above, and as confirmed in the commentaries (for example El Auji: The Legal Principles in the Civil Law, 2013, Al Halabi, p. 163, “the text expresses by itself the intent of the legislator and does not call for the search for any other intent”) and the case law (for example, the Lebanese Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, assemblée plénière ruling n. 29, dated 18 May 2020, “Whereas, although it is up to the adjudicating court to interpret a legal text when it is ambiguous, unclear, or incomplete, however when the legal text is clear and explicit, the court must apply it correctly and not suspend its provisions”).[886]The reality is that the Defendants have no positive case on the clear meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 because they know perfectly well that its clear meaning is as contended for by Cedar Mundi. That is why they strive to interpret it by appealing to a wider context, but that is precisely the legal error that is not permitted under Lebanese law (see the reference in Sakr 1 para 121 to “The Lebanese Court of Cassation has held that an error in the interpretation of a statutory provision or law arises when … (i) a clear legal text is construed in a manner that plainly contradicts its literal meaning”).[887]Ultimately Mr Montagu-Smith accepted, “I agree there can be declarative sentences that can be clear … I totally accept that”. I am satisfied that the last sentence of Article 158 is just such a sentence.[888]For his part Professor Soumrani’s evidence is that the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 is not unclear or ambiguous and should be applied in accordance with what it says (see Soumrani 3 at paras 97 and 102):
“97. Turning to Article 158 LCC, its plain text and meaning are not unclear or ambiguous; they are simply different from their corresponding Articles of the FCC. Consequently, insisting on interpretating Article 158 LCC to align it with its French counterpart at a time the Lebanese legislator’s intent remains unclear, as explained in paras 77 to 82 above, inevitably leads to contradicting its literal meaning and introducing sanctions that are inexistent, which goes against the fundamental rules of interpretation. … 102. The second reason is that the general wording of the last paragraph of Article 158 LCC is drafted in absolute terms, without differentiating between the internal relationship within the company and the relationship with the contracting party. Mr Sakr’s interpretation would thus violate an important interpretation principle according to which one cannot create a differentiation where the law does not specifically provide for it (là où la loi ne distingue pas, il ne faut pas distinguer). 103. The interpretation of Article 158 LCC should, contrary to what Mr Sakr proposes, be that the Related Party Transaction being concluded without authorisation, should be sanctioned, as explained in my Second Report, by nullity. Nullity has been consistently recognised under Lebanese law, before and after the 2019 reform - and even under French law - as the applicable sanction for unauthorised Transactions.”
[889]He confirmed this evidence when he was cross-examined (Day 10, page 167 lines 5 to 16):
“Q. …, but you say at 102: "The second reason is that the general wording of the last paragraph of Article 158 is drafted in absolute terms, without differentiating between the internal relationship within the company and the relationship with the contracting party." I want to ask you about that. I take it what you mean from that is that where the legislation says authorisation shall not be deemed effective, you mean it shall not be deemed -- it shall be ineffective for all purposes? A. Absolutely.”
A. Absolutely.”[890]It is because the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 is clear (despite the assertion of the Defendants that it is not clear), that the Defendants are forced to submit that there has been “an obvious drafting error” (and then relying on the case law already addressed above with a view to give the words a different meaning) – see the Defendants’ Closing Submissions at para 434 and following.[891]But the difficulties with this submission are manifold. First, there is no obvious drafting error. The words mean what they say (and for what it is worth, the words make perfect sense on their face). Second, the cases on “obvious errors”, as addressed above, are not in point, and deal with very different situations (where there has, indeed, been an obvious error as is apparent simply from a consideration of the text). Third, and to make the point, the Defendants have to go behind the provision to what they assert was the purpose of the provision. But that is, itself, an impermissible approach in relation to Lebanese statutory interpretation where, as here, the provision is clear. Fourth, and as addressed in due course below, the Defendants have been unable to demonstrate that the intention of Parliament in enacting Article 158 in its final form was in fact as they contend (so they cannot make good any “obvious error” for the purpose of this argument). In fact, and as addressed in due course below, the insertion of the last sentence of Article 158 was a deliberate addition when the draft legislation was being considered by a sub-committee of the Committee of Administration of Justice.[892]This point was put to Professor Soumrani in cross-examination, and he was clear that what occurred was not an obvious error (Day 10 page 154 lines 7 to 12):
“Q. I think where I'm getting to is to say isn't this an obvious drafting error? A. Is that a question? Q. Yes. A. No, it is not, because it's a clear text, it's unequivocal. …”
A. Is that a question? A. No, it is not, because it's a clear text, it's unequivocal. …”

A. Is that a question?

[893]For the reasons identified above, I am satisfied that the meaning of those words is clear and unequivocal, namely that “in all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”. Thus, as per the clear words of the statute, in every case, the authorisation shall not be effective until after it has been ratified by the general assembly. Each of these words has a (clear) ordinary and natural meaning, and on the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation I have identified, stands to be applied in accordance with such clear meaning. Absent general assembly ratification, there was no effective authorisation, and hence the SPA was unauthorised. As a matter of Lebanese law, that means that the SPA was a nullity subject only to consideration of Issue 3 (whether the 2021 Transaction was in good faith , and if not whether it was beneficial), as reflected in the Agreed Decision Tree.[894]It is not necessary to go beyond the words of the last sentence of Article 158 to reach that conclusion, as such words bear their ordinary and natural meaning, and that meaning is clear, and should be applied as such on the Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation that I have identified and addressed.[895]However, the same conclusion is reached if one considers the evidence that is before me as to the individual words used. After doing that, I will then address the further lines of argument of the Defendants in relation to legislative intention (Section D2.2 below) and the provisions of the French Code of Commerce (Section D2.3 below), before considering doctrinal writings in relation to Article 158. None of these matters justify giving the words of the last sentence of Article 158 anything other than their ordinary and natural meaning.

The meaning of “authorisation”

[896]The Lebanese expert evidence before me is that authorisation is a legal concept. It is concerned with the conferral of power to create legally binding relationships. Specifically in the context of Article 158, it determines whether the company has the power to bind itself under the proposed transaction. Mr Sakr substantially accepted this during the course of his cross-examination (see Day 11 page 43 lines 18 to 25) (also Day 11 page 53 lines 19 to 22). The legal consequence of the absence of authorisation would be that the company does not have the power to bind itself to the transaction and hence the transaction is a nullity. In Lebanese law, the nullity is “relative” in the sense that the transaction could still be ratified or upheld by the Court (I address this is the context of Issue 3 and the good faith and benefit exceptions), but absent those supervening acts, the transaction is a nullité for want of authority.[897]It is common ground between the experts that the consequence of the absence of authorisation by the board of directors of a related party transaction means the transaction is a relative nullity in Lebanese law. As Mr Sakr puts it in Sakr 1 para 73, “Mr Soumrani and I agree that if the board of directors does not consider and authorise the transaction, then it is not valid. It is a relative nullity (a nullité relative). Mr Soumrani and I agree on the meaning of relative nullity”.

The meaning of authorisation shall not be deemed “effective”

[898]The ordinary and natural meaning of “effective” in the context of a legislative provision is that it is concerned with the question of legal effect. That is confirmed by an extract from the French legal dictionary, which defines “ineffectiveness” (“ineffectivité”) as “the characteristic of a legal rule that does not produce its intended effect…” (“caractère d’une règle de droit qui ne produit pas l’effet voulu”). That is to be contrasted with “inefficiency” (“inopposabilité”) which is where an act is not enforceable against a third party (e.g., the sale of immovable property may not be enforceable against third parties absent registration).[899]It follows that a legally ineffective board authorisation is the same as no board authorisation at all. Thus, the absence of general assembly ratification means that the board authorisation is not legally effective; without a legally effective board authorisation, there can have been no valid conferral of power to bind the company to the transaction; and the transaction is a nullité.[900]This is the evidence of Professor Soumrani (see Soumrani 3 at para 105), which I accept, and which accords with the ordinary and natural meaning of “shall not be deemed effective”: “I agree with Mr Sakr that a board authorisation remains ineffective as long as it is not ratified by the general assembly. I note however that ineffectiveness, as explained by Mr Cornu, means that the said authorisation ‘does not produce its intended effect’ in broad absolute terms. It follows that the board’s decision that is not ratified remains without any effect, which is tantamount to no authorisation having been given by the board of directors”. (emphasis added)[901]Professor Soumrani confirmed that this was his evidence in the course of his cross-examination (Day 10 page 167 lines 5 to 16) which I will repeat for ease of reference:
“Q. …, but you say at 102: "The second reason is that the general wording of the last paragraph of Article 158 is drafted in absolute terms, without differentiating between the internal relationship within the company and the relationship with the contracting party." I want to ask you about that. I take it what you mean from that is that where the legislation says authorisation shall not be deemed effective, you mean it shall not be deemed -- it shall be ineffective for all purposes? A. Absolutely.”
A. Absolutely.”[902]The Defendants say that such interpretation renders the position of the board of directors as so marginal as to be insignificant. But that is not right. It is clear from Article 158 itself that the board of directors has an important role to play. They have to review the proposed transaction, they have to decide on whether to approve it, and if they do not do so then it does not go any further. Their authorisation is therefore required as is clear from the fourth para of Article 158 (which they give at Stage Two), but it is clear that ratification by the general assembly is also required (Stage Five), and as the final sentence of Article 158 spells out, the authorisation (of the board) shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the general assembly.[903]It is notable, as I have already identified above, that the Defendants do not really have any positive case about what the last sentence of Article 158 means if it does not mean that the authorisation shall not be effective until ratification by the general assembly, and their submissions are largely expressed in negative terms (as to what it is said it does not mean). The closest the Defendants appear to get to a positive case in relation to the meaning of the last sentence of Article 158 is at para 140 of their Closing Submissions, but even then they do not ascribe a positive meaning to the last sentence: “The issue is therefore what the consequence is of a lack of ratification – this operates as a sanction, rather than as a finding that some essential element of a transaction is missing. French law makes detailed provision for those circumstances. It is true that Lebanese law does not specify the sanction (in either direction). However, it is significant that the French legislation on which Article 158 is modelled does not treat ratification as a precondition to concluding a contract”. (emphasis added)[904]The Defendants there assert that “Lebanese law does not specify the sanction (in either direction)”, but if that were so, then one would be left with giving the words of the last sentence of para 158 their clear meaning. In fact (and as already addressed above, and by Professor Soumrani), in Lebanese law the lack of ratification by the general assembly means that the board’s decision is not of any effect (it shall be ineffective for all purposes). That is to be contrasted with the very different provision in French law (see L.225-41 FCC, which provides “Agreements approved by the general assembly, as well as those it disapproves, shall produce their effects towards third parties, except where they are annulled in cases of fraud”. Article 158 could have so provided, if that was what was intended, but on the contrary not only does it not do so, but it provides for a different result in the clear terms of the last sentence of Article 158.[905]As for Mr Sakr, when he was cross-examined, he sought to draw a distinction between “no authorisation” and “no effective authorisation”, with opposite outcomes (no board authorisation meant the transaction was a nullity, no effective board authorisation meant that it was valid) (see Day 11 page 56 at line 15 to page 57 at line 1):
“Q. Yes. I ' ll try −−I'll ask you this one more time … what I 'm suggesting to you [on Mr Sakr’s interpretation] is we end up with a strangely narrow distinction between a situation where there's been no actual authorisation by the board and no effective authorisation by the board. A. Yes. Q. You understand that? A. Yes. Q. I think it remains your view, does it, that those do end up with completely different consequences? Q. You understand that? Q. I think it remains your view, does it, that those do end up with completely different consequences? A. Yes”

up with completely different consequences?

[906]No logical basis for this supposed distinction was identified by Mr Sakr, and Mr Sakr was forced to assert that the word “effective” in Article 158 meant something different to its clear meaning on its face. He suggested that to say that the authority is not effective merely means that the transaction is “unenforceable as a matter of the company’s internal governance”, i.e., that the transaction would remain valid “but the relevant related party could not rely on the board’s authorisation to relieve them of personal liability if the transaction caused harm to the company” (Sakr 1 paras 138 to 139).[907]I agree with Cedar Mundi’s submission (Claimant’s Closing Submissions para 353), that this part of Mr Sakr’s evidence is confused and is difficult to follow. Mr Sakr refers to the distinction in French law between the concepts of ineffectivité and inopposabilité (Sakr 1 para 134). He then cites an Egyptian author who, confusingly, appears to use the term ineffectiveness to mean inopposabilité. In cross-examination, Mr Sakr said that the Egyptian author was using the two terms in an “interchanging way” (Day 11 page 65 line 16 to page 66 line 3). His conclusion appears to be that it is possible to read the word “effective” in the last sentence of Article 158 as “inefficient”. However, I am satisfied that there is no basis for such an interpretation.[908]This is plainly a strained attempt to give Article 158 a meaning that it cannot bear on its face. What is more, and as Professor Soumrani explains, Mr Sakr is mixing up concepts of ineffectivité and inopposabilité. Professor Soumrani refers to Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire Juridique on the definition of inopposabilité to show that it is fundamentally different from the idea of effectiveness. “Inopposabilité” (inefficiency) is where a third party is allowed to ignore an act and its effect because of the absence of one of the conditions of its integration to the legal order, e.g., a publicity formality.[909]Second, and as Professor Soumrani points out, Mr Sakr’s argument simply does not accord with the wording of the last sentence of Article 158, which uses the term “effective” not “opposable”. Mr Sakr ultimately accepted in cross-examination that the words used in Article 158 were a lot closer to the concept of ineffectiveness than inopposabilité: “Q. The concept of inopposabilité is a different concept from the concept of ineffectivité ; yes? A. Yes. Q. Okay. These words, they don't specifically say " ineffectivité " but they are closer −−a lot closer to the concept of effectiveness than opposabilité, aren't they? A. Yes, again, this is a matter of translation”.[910]Third, and as I consider Professor Soumrani is right to point out, there is nothing in the wording of Article 158 which differentiates “between the internal relationship within the company and the relationship with the contracting party. Mr Sakr’s interpretation would thus violate an important interpretation principle according to which one cannot create a differentiation where the law does not specifically provide for it (là où la loi ne distingue pas, il ne faut pas distinguer)”. Professor Soumrani relies in this regard on various French authorities - see Soumrani 3, fn 96, citing the French author, V Lasserre (“Where the law makes no distinction, one should not make a distinction”), a French Cour de Cassation decision from 2025 (“There is no need to distinguish where the law does not distinguish”) and a French Court of Appeal (Rennes) decision also from 2025 (“no distinction may be made where the law does not distinguish”) .[911]Ultimately to the extent that any concepts of Lebanese law assist in interpreting the last sentence of Article 158 (and for my part I consider that the words are clear in any event and it is their clear meaning that will be applied by the Lebanese court applying Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation), I accept the evidence of Professor Soumrani that the absence of general assembly ratification means that the board authorisation is not legally effective, and without a legally effective board authorisation, there can have been no valid conferral of power to bind the company to the transaction, and a board’s decision that is not ratified remains without any effect (See Soumrani 3 at para 105 as quoted above).

D2.2 Legislative intention

[912]As already addressed above, under Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation it is not appropriate (or permissible) to apply a teleological interpretation where, as here, the text does not contain an ambiguity or an obvious error. However, as I have received expert evidence in relation thereto, and received submissions on such matters, I address the question of legislative intention below. In any event, and as shall appear, the Defendants have not demonstrated that the intention of Parliament, in enacting Article 158 in its final form, was in fact as they contend (to achieve the same effect as under current French law).[913]Professor Soumrani’s evidence as to legislative intention is that it may well have been the Lebanese Parliament’s original intention to introduce into Lebanese law the model of the French Code of Commerce. As he said in cross-examination (Day 10 page 144 lines 14 to 25):
“Q. Would you accept that the intention behind or the reason behind introducing a two-tier control procedure in Lebanon was the same as in France? A. Initially, yes, perhaps. … Q. So initially -- ,,, the intention was to allow the company to contract without waiting for the general assembly; yes? … A. Yes, yes.”
A. Yes, yes.”[914]However, and as Professor Soumrani explained in Soumrani 3 at para 80:
“Even if the Lebanese legislator’s initial intent was to introduce a two-tier Control Procedure like the one provided for in the FCC, this intent seems to have been altered in the legislative process, as evidenced by the new text of Article 158 LCC. The intent of the Lebanese legislator is to be judged by reference to the final text of Article 158 LCC, not by reference to earlier drafts of the legislation that were not enacted.”
[915]The evidence before me is that the inclusion of the final sentence of Article 158, far from being some mistake or drafting error was, in fact, a deliberate addition when the draft legislation was being considered by the subcommittee of the Committee of Administration and Justice, which was shown by a comparative table (dated 27 May 2015), that the experts addressed. Both Mr Sakr and Professor Soumrani accepted that this provision was a deliberate addition (Day 11 page 73 lines 18 to 22 and Day 10 page 218 line 19 to page 219 line 2).[916]As the legislative intent is to be judged by reference to final text of an article (here Article 158) and, in the context of the deliberate addition of the final sentence of Article 158, it cannot be said that the final legislative intention, at the time of enactment, was to reflect French law. Thus, as Professor Soumrani said in re-examination (Day 10 page 219 at line 16 to page 220 at line 4):
“…if things had gone like they should have, the Lebanese Parliament should have put in place a piece of legislation that looks like the French Code of Commerce, if this was the intent they had in the beginning, and I assume it was, but not only they added the last paragraph of Article 158, they also missed… what I call the sanction matrix that tells you what happens if you have a transaction that is authorised but is not ratified…; all these provisions that make the articles of the French Commerce Code a comprehensive and readable piece of legislation. Unfortunately we did not get there. We are very far from that.”
[917]This echoes what Professor Soumrani has said in his academic writings (Soumrani, Le remaniement des règles applicables aux conventions règlementées, Revue Proche Orient Etudes Juridiques, 2021-2022, pp.87 to 88):
“The major flaw of the new Article 158 lies in its final paragraph, which nullifies the reform’s practical utility by stipulating: ‘In all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective unless ratified by the General Assembly.’ Such a provision contradicts the logical solution inspired by French law, according to which a transaction authorized by the Board of Directors cannot later be challenged, except in cases of fraud, though lack of subsequent ratification may entail director liability if the company suffers damage. Legislative intervention is therefore urgently required to restore the intended effectiveness of the text.”
[918]Mr Sakr’s evidence is that under the 1968 reforms to Lebanese company law, the intention was to “incorporate the principles of the 1943 French reform, in other words to introduce a two-stage procedure whereby authorisation would be given by the board of directors followed by subsequent approval or disapproval by the general assembly, which would not affect the validity of the related party transaction”. However, as he acknowledged in Sakr 1 at para 97, “that draft was not adopted by the Lebanese legislature, which chose to maintain the previous system. Therefore, following the 1968 reform, the situation remained unchanged and related party transactions continued to require general assembly authorization” – i.e. the legislative intent was as expressed in final form.[919]Mr Sakr’s evidence is that thereafter a draft law was presented to Parliament that was again based on the French model. But as Mr Sakr accepted, and as noted above, during the legislative process (at the committee stage) the last sentence of Article 158 was deliberately added, and he acknowledged that despite undertaking considerable efforts to ascertain why the last sentence was added to Article 158 he was unable to do so. Notwithstanding this he concluded that, “Parliament’s clear intention in enacting the 2019 reform was to change Lebanese law so that it mirrored French law” (Sakr 1 at para 115).[920]The difficulties with that conclusion are manifold. First, it is not supported by anything that has gone before in his report. Second, and given his lack of success in ascertaining the purpose behind the introduction of the last sentence of Article 158, he has no basis for giving the last sentence anything other than the meaning it has on its face. Third, it is that wording which reflects the legislative intent, whatever may have been the original intent. Fourth, the meaning of the last sentence is clear (as addressed above, and as also reflected in Professor’s Soumrani’s writings and evidence). The difference between Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr was that the former applied the language of the last sentence (even when he disagreed as to whether that should be the law), whereas Mr Sakr fails to give meaning and effect to the last sentence, or the intention of Parliament given that such sentence was deliberately added at the committee stage (something that Mr Sakr accepts, but does not carry into effect).[921]When cross-examined, Mr Sakr said that he meant that the “general intent” behind the reform was to introduce French law, but he was not able to discern the intention behind the last para of Article 158. However, Article 158 has to be construed as a whole, including the last sentence of Article 158 as enacted, it is that which reflects Parliament’s intention, and Parliament’s intention is therefore to be taken to be that which they deliberately inserted, and the meaning of which is clear (as addressed above). To that extent what may have been the original intention is simply not in point, and nor is Mr Sakr’s distinction.[922]Mr Sakr’s evidence in this regard was as follows (Day 11 page 75 line 11 to page 76 line 16):
“A. What I was saying in the previous paragraph is that I was not able to understand why the last paragraph of Article 158 was added by whom and what was the intent there, but the general intent behind the reform of Article 158 in the 2019 reform was very clear, even Professor Soumrani agrees with that. So this is what I'm saying here. These are two separate matters. The general intention behind the reform of Article 158 and the specific addition of the last paragraph. Q. Yes. A. But the general reform, aiming at having a two-step authorisation by the board and ratification by the general assembly, I think we are in agreement with that. Q. Yes. I think what Professor -- so, just to be clear, because we heard his evidence -- I don't know if you were here last week? Professor Soumrani's evidence was, that was the original intention, but he equally doesn't know what happened in the halls of Parliament between that original intention and the actual enactment, so I think you're both in the same position there? A. Very well, yes. Q. So ultimately, ultimately, in terms of looking at the act as it is, Article 158 as a whole, now, you can't say what the ultimate legislative intention was that gave rise to that, can you? A. To the general -- we can -- we know what was the general intention for the general -- for the reform of Article 158 in general, but if we are talking about the last -- the addition of the last paragraph, yes, we don't know. It's unclear.”
[923]I reject Mr Sakr’s conclusion that Parliament’s intention, at the time of enactment, was to change Lebanese law so that it mirrored French law, and I prefer Professor Soumrani’s conclusion on this, which is also supported by the express words of the last sentence.[924]Accordingly, if contrary to my findings above, regard can be had to Parliamentary intention, the same does not assist the Defendants, and Parliament’s intention is reflected in Article 158 as enacted, including the last sentence therefore, the meaning of which is clear (as addressed above).

D2.3 The provisions of the French Code of Commerce

[925]As addressed below I am satisfied that the relevant provisions of the French Code of Commerce, do not reflect Lebanese law under Article 158, and indeed are very different.[926]The French Code of Commerce has, since 1943, expressly provided that related party agreements can only be annulled in the absence of board authorisation, with the absence of general assembly approval of an agreement, or even positive disapproval by the general assembly, having no effect on its validity, and the Code has drawn a clear distinction between the validity of the agreement and the personal liability of the persons who brought the agreement into place.[927]Article 40 of the 1943 French Code of Commerce expressly provided: “Agreements disapproved by the General Assembly shall nevertheless remain effective; however, any harmful consequences that may result therefrom shall, in the event of fraud, be borne by the director concerned and, where applicable, by the Board of Directors”.[928]The French Code of Commerce was amended in 1966 (when the relevant provisions became new Articles 101 to 104). This broadened the application of the provisions beyond directors to other related parties (and also expressly introduced the express provision stating that an agreement remained valid even absent board authorisation unless it caused harm to the company). It retained the express statement that “agreements approved by the General Assembly, as well as those it disapproves, shall be binding upon third parties, except where they are annulled in cases of fraud”.[929]The French Code of Commerce was amended again in 2001 (and 2014). This involved a reordering of the Code, such that the 1966 Articles 101 to 105 became the modern L.225-38 to L.225-42, and there were some other more minor amendments, but the rules on nullity and liability (what Professor Soumrani calls the “sanction matrix”) remained essentially the same.[930]In their current form:(1) Article L.225-38 defines related party agreements and contains the general rule requiring prior authorisation by the board of directors.(2) Article L.225-39 excludes agreements relating to day-to-day operations and other specific agreements from the definition of related party agreements.(3) Article L.225-40 requires the related party to inform the board of their interest; the chairman of the board shall then notify the auditors of “all authorised and concluded agreements” (emphasis added) which are then submitted to the general assembly; the auditors (or if none have been appointed, the chairman of the board) shall submit a special report on these agreements to the general assembly.(4) Article L.225-41 provides that (save for agreements annulled in case of fraud) agreements are binding or, more literally, “shall produce their effects towards” (“produisent leurs effets à l’égard”), and this is expressly the case for both “agreements approved by the general assembly, as well as those it disapproves”.(5) Article L.225-42 provides:
“Without prejudice to the liability of the person concerned, agreements… entered into without prior authorisation from the board of directors may be annulled if they have had harmful consequences for the company”
. It also stipulates a 3-year time limit for an action for annulment (subject to an extension in the event of concealment).[931]Such provisions are clearly, and obviously, very different to those under Lebanese law and Article 158. As Cedar Mundi rightly points out in their Closing Submissions, the French law appears, since 1943, to have been influenced by a broad policy decision to uphold the validity of agreements notwithstanding competing policy concerns about conflicts of interest. The whole concept of authority under the French Commercial Code relates only to the board of directors. It is expressly only the board of directors who need to authorise the agreement.[932]It is clear that the control procedure is not the same under French law as it is under Lebanese law, and Article 158 of the LCC. In French law, only authorised and concluded agreements are to be put to the general assembly. And it is not part of the function of the general assembly to ratify the authorisation of the board. Rather, Article L.225-41 speaks only of the approval or disapproval of the agreement, and makes clear that this is irrelevant to its validity (and hence cannot be relevant to the effectiveness of the board’s authorisation).[933]It will be seen that this is the very antithesis of the position under Lebanese law in Article 158, which specifically, and expressly, makes the effectiveness of the underlying authorisation dependent on general assembly ratification, and hence envisages the “authority” to bind the company is something that can only be granted (and made “effective”) by both the board and the general assembly acting together.[934]There are also obvious differences between Lebanese law and French law in material respects. Thus in French law, unlike in Lebanese law, there is no need for both a special board report and a special auditors’ report to the general assembly (the board only need to report if no auditors have been appointed); (2) there is a distinction drawn between the personal liabilities that may arise from the authorisation of an agreement and the validity of that agreement, and even agreements concluded absent board authorisation are expressly valid unless they have had harmful consequences for the company and, even then, actions for annulment are subject to a 3-year time limit.[935]Mr Sakr accepted, in cross-examination, that there was no equivalent in Lebanese law to Article L.225-41 to 42 (see at (Day 11 page 75 lines 5 to 20, page 79 lines 5 to 20 and page 80 line 24 to page 81 line 21).[936]Thus, the provisions of the French Code of Commerce are different to those under Article 158 and, as such, do not assist in construing Article 158, or the legislative intention of Parliament as Article 158 was enacted (were that to be relevant contrary to my findings above).

D2.4 Case law

[937]Neither expert has been able to identify any decided cases in Lebanon on the 2019 reform of Article 158. In such circumstances the Court’s task (as addressed in Section D0.1 above) is to evaluate the expert evidence of Lebanese law and to predict the likely decision of the highest court in the Lebanese system of law if this case had been litigated there on each of the points in dispute (per Walker J in Dexia Crediop S.p.A v Comune di Prato [2015] EWHC 1746 (Comm) at [128] and see Banca Intesa Sanpaolo SpA v Comune di Venezia [2023] EWCA Civ 1482, [2024] Bus LR 228 at [17] (Flaux C). That is what I have done in my findings as to Article 158 based on the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation that I have identified and applied.[938]In his oral closing submissions, and in the context of the fact that foreign law is a “special kind of fact”, Mr Montagu-Smith submitted that in my position as a judge dealing with legal issues of all sorts, this was an area where I would be “less guided simply by the stated conclusions of the experts and more guided by what lies underneath [and] [t]hat could well cause you to take a more nuanced outcome than simply ‘I agree with them but not with them’”. I bear such submission in mind. However, and as appears, the findings I have made, on this and other provisions of Lebanese law, accord with the relevant principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation, doctrinal writings and (where they exist) case law.

D2.5 Doctrinal Writings

[939]There has been doctrinal scholarship both before and after the reforms, which the experts agree is a source of law, forming part of Lebanese jurisprudence. Whilst Mr Montagu-Smith, on behalf of the Defendants, submitted in his oral closing that, “the commentaries … don’t help very much” (which I rather felt was a reflection of the fact that they do not help the Defendants), I am satisfied that to the extent that such doctrinal writings provide assistance, and I consider that they are of some assistance, the weight of such writings supports Article 158 being interpreted in the way that I have found. The one text that the Defendants seek to place reliance upon (Tyan (supplement)) is, I am satisfied, an expression of what the author considers Lebanese law should be, not what it is.[940]Alexandre Najjar. L’administration de la Société Anonyme Libanaise. The relevant part of the current (2023) edition of this book, under the heading “Sanctions for non-compliance with the formalities under Article 158 of the Code of Commerce” states at para 173:
“In the case of regulated agreements, failure to comply with the formalities set forth in Article 158 of the Code of Commerce renders any agreement concluded in breach thereof null and void. It also gives rise to the liability of the directors who failed to comply with the applicable legal provisions. Nevertheless, prevailing Lebanese legal doctrine… and case law consider that the rules governing agreements concluded with directors are subject to the sanction of relative nullity, given that the purpose of such rules is the protection of private interests.”
(emphasis added)[941]Whilst the Defendants (and Mr Sakr) sought to suggest that the authors had not considered the reforms, the text appears in the current, post 2019 reform, edition of this book, the front cover of which says “À jour de la réforme du Code de commerce (loi no 126/2019)” (“Up to date of the reform of the Commercial Code (law no. 126/2019”). In such circumstances I do not consider there is substance in such suggestion (and it would be surprising if the authors had not had regard to the reforms).[942]Importantly, and as Mr Montagu-Smith accepted, in the second para the authors still wed themselves to the concept of “relative nullity”, about which the experts are in agreement: see, for example, Soumrani 2 at para 143: “A relative nullity is a nullity(i) that can be invoked only by the victim or the person that the law aims to protect (in this case the company) and not by third parties, and(ii) that can afterwards be ratified by such victim or person provided that the requirements that have not been complied with under Article 158 LCC are subsequently respected in the ratification process”.[943]Returning to the Najjar text, if it is appropriate to have regard to purpose, and the protection of private interests, Mr Montagu-Smith accepted that he could see that it might be said that Professor Soumrani’s interpretation is the one that more furthers the protection of private interests (Day 17 page 34 at lines 15 to 19).[944]Karim Torbey. Karim Torbey, La réforme du Code de Commerce: Entre forces et faiblesses, in Regards croisés de l’école et du palais à l’aune de la réforme du Code de Commerce libanais, Actes du Colloque international organisé par l’Institut d’Etudes Judiciaires et l’USEK (12 February 2020), p 153. As can be seen from the extract below, the author is critical of the perceived failure of the 2019 reform, but confirms that the effect of the current version of Article 158 requires both board approval and general assembly ratification. “According to the text, the board’s authorisation is not effective until it has been ratified by the shareholders’ assembly. This renders the board’s authorisation useless in our opinion. The same solution as that adopted in France (Article L.225-41) should have been followed, by making the board’s authorisation effective vis-à-vis third parties, except where the related-party agreements are set aside on grounds of fraud. In other words, making the board’s authorization subject to approval by the shareholders’ assembly deprives it of any usefulness”.[945]In other words, the 2019 reform failed to change the law (as reflected in Professor Soumrani’s academic writings, as quoted above), which had been understood as providing that a related party agreement entered into without general assembly ratification is a relative nullity and could be set aside by the company (which Mr Sakr himself accepted was the law prior to 2019, and as is set out in the pre-reform texts as quoted below). Mr Montagu-Smith candidly accepted that Torbey (like Najjar) was of the view that Article 158 had the effect contended for by Cedar Mundi (Day 17 page 35 lines 8 to 9).[946]Turning to the pre-reform texts, the first is that of Ghaleb Mahmassani, Proche Orient études juridiques, 1969, p 64 which states (under the heading “The Nullity of the Agreement”):
“Although Article 158 of the Code of Commerce does not expressly provide for the nullity of agreements concluded in violation of its regulatory provisions, it is undisputed that such nullity must be incurred for any failure to comply with any of the formalities required by the aforementioned article. Indeed, it is universally accepted that the omission of or non-compliance with a formality or condition established by the legislator as a prerequisite for the validity of a given legal act constitutes grounds for the nullity of that act, even in the absence of an explicit text stating such nullity… 1) Conditions for Nullity As a general rule, the nullity of the agreement must be incurred whenever any of the formalities or requirements set out in Article 158 have not been duly observed in the conclusion of such agreement. Thus, the following must be considered null: … b) Any agreement that has not been duly authorized by the general assembly of the shareholders. This shall apply in all of the following cases: … - If the general assembly is not convened before the agreement is concluded, any subsequent authorization would violate the law and is therefore treated as if no authorization had been given. - If the assembly, duly convened, refuses to authorize the agreement or grants an irregular authorization. - If the assembly votes on the authorization without receiving, or before receiving, one of the two special reports required from the board of directors and the supervisory auditors, or relies on incomplete reports. - If the assembly itself is irregular, either in its convening or in the conduct of its meeting.”
(emphasis added) Thus, the following must be considered null: …

This shall apply in all of the following cases: …

[947]Equally the 2017 edition of Emile Tyan, Droit Commercial, Tome 1, (authored by N Tyan, MA Karam and A Najjar) states at p680:
“Regulated agreements: … The control procedure… proceeds in four stages: - The interested director informs the board of directors of the situation requiring authorization; - The board notifies the statutory auditor of the proposed agreements; - The board and the auditor each submit a separate special report on the proposed agreements to the general assembly; - The general assembly makes its decision in light of these reports: it either approves the agreement or rejects it. In the latter case, the agreement cannot be concluded without risking nullity. [General assembly] approved agreements may only be challenged in cases of fraud. Sanctions Failure to comply with the formalities set out in Article 158 exposes the directors to liability for breaching the legal requirements. It also renders any agreement concluded in violation of this article null and void. Lebanese doctrine and case law consider that the regulation of agreements concluded with directors is subject to a relative nullity, given that the purpose of such regulation is to safeguard private interests, namely those of the company and its shareholders.”
(emphasis added)

Sanctions

[948]The 2025 supplement to Tyan (authored by Hyam Mallat and Nady Tyan) is relied on by Mr Sakr and the Defendants in support of their interpretation of Article 158, where it states:
“In this regard, the final paragraph 5 of [Article 158] clearly provides that ‘In all cases, the authorisation shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly’. In our view, the terminology of this article should not run counter to the practical life of the company. In other words, such an agreement should not have its implementation suspended pending ratification by a general assembly that may not be scheduled until several months after the conclusion of the agreement. Case law will have to rule on this issue to allow the performance of such an agreement between the parties, while making it enforceable against uninformed shareholders only after its ratification, thereby enabling them to refuse ratification and to require the parties to the agreement to bear any potential damage suffered by the company. … Otherwise, and if such ratification is interpreted as preventing the execution of the agreement even between the parties, it will then be appropriate to amend the text so that it conforms to the company’s life and does not hinder its operations.”
(emphasis added)[949]There was some debate as to how much input Nady Tyan would have had in this supplement (set against the backdrop that he is now 85), and as to the qualifications of Hyam Mallat to opine on such matters (given that his main practice and published works appear to have been in the field of social security law and environmental law). Professor Soumrani undoubtedly held strong views about that. I do not consider it fruitful to reach any conclusions on relative experience or expertise. I consider that the text of any general commercial work merits consideration. However, upon examination, I do not consider that this text provides support for the Defendants’ interpretation as to what the law is (as opposed to what the authors consider it ought to be).[950]In this regard it is clear from the language they use that they are recognising that (in their opinion) it is not clear-cut because there is going to have to be case law and they are expressing their view as to what the outcome of that case law should be, and as such it is not the strongest of foundations (to which Mr Montagu-Smith candidly stated in his oral closings, “I agree” (Day 17 page 37 line 10)).[951]Mr Montagu-Smith also agreed that the passage, “Otherwise, and if such ratification is interpreted as preventing the execution of the agreement even between the parties, it will then be appropriate to amend the text so that it conforms to the company’s life and does not hinder its operations” expressly envisages the possibility that further legislative amendment may be required to achieve the result which those authors are advocating (Day 17 page 38 line 14).[952]I consider that it is clear that the authors are not making a statement of what the law currently is. Rather they are expressing a view as to how they consider it should be interpreted. This was acknowledged by Mr Sakr when he was cross-examined, “It is an opinion of how, in the author’s opinion, case law should interpret this para” (Day 11 page 95 lines 3 to 4).[953]Second, the text is not suggesting that the legislative intention was to reflect the French Code of Commerce (and it is difficult to see how they could given the legislative differences identified above). In particular, the text does not suggest that the law should be that the agreement is valid whether the general assembly approves or disapproves (i.e., in line with French law), it is simply saying that it would be better if an agreement did not have its “implementation” suspended pending a general assembly ratification that might take place substantially later than the board meeting, but that is not what Article 158 provides for in the final sentence.[954]Third, there is no analysis of whether (applying Lebanese principles of statutory interpretation) it would be permissible for a Lebanese court to interpret Article 158 so as to produce the result contended for. Rather, the text is simply advocating as a matter of practicality that it would be better to have a system where the validity of the agreement did not need to wait until general assembly ratification, whilst the passage beginning “Otherwise” (as quoted above) itself expressly envisages that further legislative amendment may be required to achieve the result which the text is advocating.[955]Fourth, the text appears to contemplate that, even on the approach suggested, an agreement which had not been ratified would not be enforceable against “uninformed shareholders”. But it is not clear what is meant by this, given that, as Professor Soumrani explained in cross-examination, there is no concept under Article 158 of “uninformed shareholders”.[956]In the light of the wording of the text itself, and the above points, I consider that the weight to be attached to the Tyan supplement text is limited, and I am satisfied that it does not provide any reasoned, or meaningful, support for Mr Sakr’s (and the Defendants’) interpretation of Article 158.

D2.6 Conclusion on Article 158 and its application to the facts

[957]Applying the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation that I have identified, I am satisfied that the meaning of the final sentence of Article 158 is clear and unequivocal, namely that “in all cases, authorization shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly”. Thus, as per the clear words of the statute, in every case, the authorisation shall not be effective until after it has been ratified by the general assembly. Each of these words has a (clear) ordinary and natural meaning, and on the principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation I have identified, stands to be applied in accordance with such clear meaning. Yet further, and as addressed above, such conclusion is supported by the weight of the expert evidence, specifically that of Professor Soumrani (whose evidence I prefer), and by the weight of the doctrinal writings, and (had it been relevant, which it is not, on the findings I have made), no contrary statutory intention has been demonstrated in relation to Article 158 as enacted.[958]Absent general assembly ratification, there was no effective authorisation, and hence the SPA was unauthorised. As a matter of Lebanese law, that means that the SPA was a nullity, subject to consideration of Issue 3 (whether the 2021 Transaction was in good faith, and if not whether it was beneficial), as reflected in the Agreed Decision Tree. I am satisfied that the highest court in Lebanon would so find.

D2.7 Conclusion on Issue 2

[959]For all the above reasons, Issue 2, namely, “Could the board of directors authorise the 2021 Transaction without general assembly approval under Article 158 of the LCC?” is to be answered in the negative. D3. GOOD FAITH / BENEFIT EXCEPTIONS (ISSUE 3)[960]Issue 3 is:
“If the answer to issue 2 is “No”, was the 2021 Transaction nonetheless authorised for the purpose of Article 158 because: (1) It was entered into by Cedar II in good faith; and/or (2) It was beneficial to Cedar Mundi?”
[961]I address each of these exceptions below.

D3.1 The Good faith exception (Issue 3(1))

[962]The parties agree that the good faith exception applies if the related party had only an indirect interest in the transaction and the third party acted in good faith. The differences between the parties are as to:(1) the type of third party that (or the circumstances in which a third party) can rely on this exception;(2) the meaning of good faith in this context; and(3) the legal consequences of a finding of good faith.[963]As per para 380 of the Claimant’s written Closing Submissions, Cedar Mundi’s position is that:(1) only true strangers to the related party and the conflict (étrangers) can rely on this exception;(2) good faith in this context means, a minima, that the third party is in ignorance of the fact that the transaction was a related party transaction and as such subject to a procedure; and(3) a finding of good faith does not preclude a judicial declaration of nullity.

D3.1.1 The doctrine only applies to étrangers

[964]It appears that the experts are in agreement that the doctrine only applies to étrangers. So far as Mr Sakr is concerned, in his description of the (old) French law on this subject (i.e. the former Article 49 of the French Code of Commerce), he cites (the French text) Charles Houpin and Henry Bosvieux (in translation): “When the director has only an indirect interest in a contract concluded without his involvement, there is no reason to terminate it if the third-party contractor acted in good faith”. (emphasis added) The French at page 223 (under para 1083, Sanctions) refers to a contract concluded “en dehors de lui”, which would literally translate as “outside of him”, i.e., outside of the director/related party.[965]The Houpin text was itself cited in the 1965 case, Beirut Civil Court of First Instance Judgment No. 1992, dated 22 July 1965 (at page 29) (a case which both experts have relied upon in various contexts), “All learned authors are in agreement on this point. The only controversy that has arisen concerns the scope of the rule against nullity where the member is not himself a contracting party: certain authorities hold that nullity attaches to the contract where the third party has colluded with the member to the detriment of the company; See for example Houpin & Bosvieux op. cit. Volume II No. 1060 others maintain that even collusion does not attract nullity and that the remedy remains confined to the member's personal liability towards his company. (Pie & Kréber cit). It follows that, in the absence of collusion, nullity cannot arise — in the view of all learned authorities — wherever the company has contracted with a third party and a member of the board of directors merely has an interest in the transaction, and that member has participated in the contract not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as representative of the company of whose board he is a member and on whose behalf he is authorised to sign.”[966]I would only add that to the extent that this case suggested that bad faith and collusion were required to annul a related party transaction neither expert suggested that this represented the current state of Lebanese law (albeit, in closing, Mr Wilson submitted that were that to represent the position under Lebanese law (contrary to Cedar Mundi’s submissions), collusion and bad faith were established on the facts).[967]At para 99 of Sakr 1, when addressing Lebanese law, Mr Sakr states as follows:
“99. Lebanese case law also held that, as was the case under the old law, there was no nullity if the related party transaction was beneficial to the company or if the counterparty was not the related party and that counterparty had acted in good faith”
(emphasis added)[968]Whilst it is said that Mr Sakr was not citing this passage for the proposition now under consideration (a requirement that the party be unrelated) but rather as simply a reference to the good faith exception, he would surely not have cited it if he did not consider that it represented Lebanese law. As I put to Mr Montagu-Smith during his oral closing, if Mr Sakr did not consider it represented Lebanese law, would it not have jarred with him when he quoted it, to which Mr Montagu-Smith replied, “Well it might do” (Day 17 page 52 line 23).[969]In fact, it is clear that Mr Sakr was buying into this principle as representing Lebanese law, as not only does he state himself, “or if the counterparty was not the related party” (the very issue now under consideration) but he then supports what he has said, as to this statement of Lebanese law by quoting Alexandre Najjar, L’administration de la société Anonyme Libanaise, 3e Ed. Bruylant Point Delta, 2017 (i.e. a recent edition) (in translation):
“174. In cases where agreements are indirectly concluded with a director, and such agreements are signed by third parties who are unrelated to the company’s dealings with its directors, Lebanese case law considers that such agreements remain valid if the third party acted in good faith (Beirut Court of First Instance, 21 July 1965, R.J.L., 1965.640). However, the contracting party cannot itself invoke the nullity of the agreement (Cass. com., 15 March 1994, LPA, 1 February 1995, note Gibrila). It was held that annulment may be refused if the disputed agreement proves beneficial to the company. (…)”
(emphasis added)[970]The French text refers to third parties as those who are “étrangers aux relations de la société avec ses administrateurs” (strangers to the relationship). So what Mr Sakr states is clearly supported by what is stated in Najjar as to the position in Lebanese law. For the good faith exception to apply, the third party must be unrelated to the company’s dealings (i.e. étrangers). Incidentally the principle is no longer limited to directors, as the category of related parties has been expanded by the first para Article 158 in terms of who it applies to, and it also extends to an agreement “irrespective of whether such agreement is enacted directly, indirectly, or under the guise of a third party”. It is clear, therefore, that the current legislation is concerned with substance rather than form.[971]Professor Soumrani expresses similar sentiments as to the narrowness of the good faith exception in Soumrani 3 at para 75 when commenting on what had been said by Mr Sakr (in Sakr 1 para 99, as summarised at para 101(b)):
“75. Mr Sakr also explains that according to Article 158 LCC as it stood prior to Law 126, if the company entered with a third party into a Related Party Transaction that was not authorised by the general assembly, that Transaction was a relative nullity unless the Transaction benefitted to the company, or whenever (i) the Transaction was entered into indirectly by the Related Party, and (ii) the third party acted in good faith. I agree but I clarify here that according to Mr A. Najjar, cited by Mr Sakr, the said third party must be totally unrelated [étranger] to the company’s relationship with its directors.”
(emphasis added)[972]Professor Soumrani maintained his evidence during the course of his cross-examination (Day 10 page 202 lines 12 to 20): “Q. Right. This judgment is in fact referred to in the Najjar extract that you yourself refer to, isn't it? A. Yes, but Najjar says something else in his book. He refers to this -- he referred to this judgment as being probably one of the rare, if not the only one, that deals with the question. But if you look at how Najjar describes it, he doesn't describe it this way. He tells you that the third party must be totally unrelated. He uses the term "étranger" to the transaction”.[973]And see also this exchange during the course of Professor Soumrani’s cross-examination (Day 10 page 209 lines 3 to 19):
“Q. So are you saying that this principle of good faith only applies if the third party's completely unconnected with the related party? "A. Yes, this is what Najjar says. Q. Just as a matter of logic, if the third party was completely unrelated to the related party, then Article 158 wouldn't be engaged at all, would it? A. But we are talking about an indirect transaction, so the related party is indirectly interested. Q. Yes. But I'm asking you about your view that they have to be completely unrelated, but it can't be right that they have to be completely unrelated? A. The third party must be totally unrelated to the company's relationship with its director. So what's happening here is that a totally unrelated third party is entering into a contract with a company in which he doesn't know who the directors are.”
[974]It became apparent during the course of Mr Montagu-Smith’s oral closing submissions that the Defendants were seeking to distance themselves not only from Professor Soumrani’s views but also those of their own expert (Mr Sakr) where they both rely on the very same paragraph in the context of the very issue being dealt with (which is when the good faith exception applies), and when I asked whether this was a mischaracterisation of the Defendants’ position, Mr Montagu-Smith (realistically) replied “Probably not”.[975]The Defendants were forced to take the extreme position that a counterparty is an étranger merely because the counterparty is legally distinct from the related party (so as to then submit that Cedar II is legally distinct from MABIL). Neither expert said that an étranger is to be defined in such a limited way, it is not supported by the doctrinal writings cited by them, and the line in the 1965 case that the Defendants rely upon (that the director and the company were separate legal persons) is clearly not stating any general principle of Lebanese law in relation to indirect parties and the good faith exception. Yet further, even if it were, that does not reflect the current state of Lebanese law (as reflected in the 2017 edition of Najjar over 50 years on), and the expert evidence of Professor Soumrani and Mr Sakr. Indeed, and as the Claimant’s pointed out in their oral closing, if that was the dividing line, then a related party could always avoid Article 158 by creating a special purpose vehicle to be the counterparty rather than directly contracting, which cannot be right in the context of what is a good faith exception.[976]I consider it to be clear in relation to Lebanese law that what is being contemplated, by Najjar, and by the experts who quote what he states, is a situation where the third party is a true stranger to the relationship that gives rise to fact that the transaction is a related party transaction. It is not difficult to see the rationale for such a principle, for in such circumstances the transaction will not, in reality, have been tainted by the conflict of interest. Put another way, what is sought to be protected is a third party who is substantively independent from the conflict of interest which will be the case if they are an étranger.[977]That is not, of course, the present situation. Cedar II is not unrelated to the relationship between Cedar Mundi and its director (Mr Attieh), and as Mr Montagu-Smith acknowledged, Cedar II was indirectly, a related party (Day 17 page 56 lines 17 to 19). If what Mr Najjar states, as reflected in the expert evidence I have identified above, correctly reflects Lebanese law then the good faith exception is not available, as was acknowledged by Mr Montagu-Smith in his oral closing submissions (Day 17 page 46 line 3). I am satisfied that the expert evidence and the doctrinal writings that I have quoted above, do reflect Lebanese law as it would be found in the highest Lebanese Courts.[978]The Defendants criticise Professor Soumrani for introducing the word “totally” so that the entity must be “totally unrelated”, but I do not consider that addition actually makes any difference. What is clear in terms of the position under Lebanese law is that the entity must be unrelated (étranger). It is not directed at “unrelated” in the narrow sense that the Defendants (but not the experts) seek to give it, but rather to a counterparty who is substantively independent from the conflict thereby allowing for situations of genuine independence.[979]On no view was Cedar II unrelated, an étranger, and, indeed, Cedar II is at the extreme end of the spectrum. The SPA was driven by Mr Attieh who was on any view acting on the MABIL side as well as the Cedar II side, Cedar II and MABIL had common owners and controllers, with both companies having overlapping interests, with Cedar II being part of the intended transactional structure – indeed it only came into existence as an SPV to take over the interests that were being transferred under the SPA.[980]Cedar II was not an étranger applying the principles of Lebanese law identified above, and accordingly the good faith exception is not available. I will, nevertheless, address the other two aspects of the good faith exception below.

D3.1.2 The meaning of good faith

[981]A preliminary point is that it is common ground that in relation to good faith the burden is upon the party relying upon good faith to demonstrate the same.[982]The evidence of Professor Soumrani (as set out in Soumrani 3 para 65) is that “as to the good faith of the third-party counterparty in the context of Article 158 LCC, it means a minima ignorance of the fact that the Transaction was subject to the Control Procedure”.[983]In this regard he refers to the text of a French scholar (Mrs I. Parachkevova) who considers that such good faith must be proven by the third party, which, particularly for Related Parties Transactions, is difficult. Professor Soumrani quotes the following passage from I. Parachkevova: JurisClasseur Sociétés Traité – Fasc. 150-30 Administration – Contrats de travail entre les administrateurs et la société, para 99:
“In theory, third parties may, here as elsewhere, rely on their good faith to avoid the enforceability of nullity against them (Commercial Code, art. L. 235-12; Civil Code, art. 1844-16). This situation may arise where the annulled agreement does not directly bind its beneficiary. One may think in particular of an agreement in which the executive or subject shareholder has an indirect interest, or of an agreement concluded with a commonly managed company. In such cases, it is conceivable that the contracting third party acted in good faith, and it would be unjust to make that party bear the effects of the nullity (see, for example, P.-A.Rosenfeld, À propos de l’article 40, Rev. sociétés 1958, p. 360). However, proof of good faith, which indeed lies with the third party, is in practice difficult, because it requires demonstrating ignorance of the fact that the agreement was a regulated transaction subject to a control procedure, something very difficult in these circumstances (see, for example, Cass. com., 3 June 2008, no. 07-12.307: JurisData no. 2008-044246; RJDA 10/2008, no. 1041), except in a situation involving fraud (A. Charveriat, A. Couret, M.-E. Sebire and B. Zabala, Sociétés commerciales, op. cit., esp. no. 52880).”
(emphasis added)[984]Professor Soumrani confirmed that this remained his evidence in re-examination:
“Q. Finally, on the question of good faith, you made reference to what you described, I think, as the latest position on the doctrine of good faith in this context. I think the article you were intending to refer to may be the one at [E3.3/152.1]. Is this what you had in mind by referring to the latest position and, if so, can I give you the opportunity to comment on that? A. Yes. When I look at this, it reflects the position of the French scholars who consider that today it is very difficult for a third party to demonstrate that it is acting in good faith in an indirect transaction, particularly when you are in a group of companies. And if I look at what it says in approximately half of the paragraph, it says: "... proof of good faith, which indeed lies with the third party, is in practice difficult, because it requires demonstrating ignorance of the fact that the agreement was a regulated transaction subject to a control procedure ..." So we have -- they have to demonstrate it is their proof that the related party -- it is not a related-party transaction, and the author adds: "... something very difficult in these circumstances.”
[985]Mr Sakr does not really address what is meant by good faith beyond what he states at para 99 of Sakr 1 which I will repeat for ease of reference: “99. Lebanese case law also held that, as was the case under the old law, there was no nullity if the related party transaction was beneficial to the company or if the counterparty was not the related party and that counterparty had acted in good faith: “174. In cases where agreements are indirectly concluded with a director, and such agreements are signed by third parties who are unrelated to the company’s dealings with its directors, Lebanese case law considers that such agreements remain valid if the third party acted in good faith (Beirut Court of First Instance, 21 July 1965, R.J.L., 1965.640). However, the contracting party cannot itself invoke the nullity of the agreement (Cass. com., 15 March 1994, LPA, 1 February 1995, note Gibrila). It was held that annulment may be refused if the disputed agreement proves beneficial to the company. (…)”.[986]So all that he really says about good faith is to quote Najjar. Mr Sakr then summarises his views at Sakr 2 para 101 including in relation to good faith at para 101(b), but again without elaborating as to what is encompassed within good faith:
“101. Thus, in summary, as the law stood under the immediate predecessor to the current Article 158, if the company entered into a related party transaction that was not authorised by the general assembly: (a) the related party transaction was validly authorised and the company could not set it aside where the agreement was beneficial for the company; (b) the same was true where the related party transaction had been entered into with a counterparty with whom the related party had an indirect interest, provided the counterparty was acting in good faith…”
[987]In their Written Closing Submissions (at para 476) the Defendants submit, by reference to the 1965 Beirut Court of First Instance case, that, “where there is an indirect interest, bad faith and collusion are required to annul a related party transaction”, but that, on any view, cannot represent the current state of Lebanese law, which would negate the very utility of Article 158 which is concerned with related party transactions, and conflicts of interest, not bad faith, and it is certainly not supported by anything that Mr Sakr says, and is contrary to the evidence of Professor Soumrani.[988]The 1965 case (which was put to Professor Soumrani, and with which Professor Soumrani did not agree on this point) was cited by Mr Sakr in two footnotes on the topic of the good faith exception, but Mr Sakr did not suggest that it defined the meaning of good faith in the modern law, and it clearly cannot do so.[989]What that case says is that, where the related party only has an indirect interest in the transaction, there can be no question of nullity at all, irrespective of the good faith of the third party, and indeed even if the third party is acting in bad faith. Neither of the experts has suggested that this represents current Lebanese law, and the Defendants have identified no subsequent case law or commentary to the effect that it represents modern Lebanese law on this point.[990]It is in any event clear that even at the time, the 1965 case was not recognised as authority for the proposition contended for by the Defendants. In this regard Mr Sakr cites (in Sakr 1 footnote 83) Ghaleb Mahmassani, Les contrats des administrateurs de société on the question of good faith (in a text dating to 1968 i.e. after the 1965 case), which states the uncontroversial general proposition that indirect related party agreements remain valid if the third party contractor is acting in good faith.[991]As Professor Soumrani pointed out when cross-examined, it does not follow in any event that, just because Alexandre Najjar cites the 1965 case to demonstrate the existence of a good faith exception to Article 158, Najjar was accepting the correctness of all the various points addressed in that case.[992]Whilst Mr Sakr in cross-examination did not accept that ignorance of the fact that it is a related party transaction was a minimum requirement for good faith, he did not suggest that there was any divergence between French law and Lebanese law on this point, and he did not offer any alternative definition of good faith.[993]If one stands back for a moment and considers the Parachkevova text (reflecting French law), and the views expressed by Professor Soumrani (to the effect that that is also the position in Lebanese law), such an understanding of the law is entirely consistent with the Article 158 regime in relation to related party transactions. It is difficult to see on what basis there could or should be a good faith exception where the third party has knowledge of the fact that the transaction was a related party transaction subject to the Article 158 control regime that requires both board authorisation and ratification by the General Assembly to save a transaction where such ratification did not take place.[994]Contrast that with the situation where the third party is ignorant of the fact that the transaction was a related party transaction subject to the Article 158 control regime. In that scenario there is every reason for there to be a good faith exception for the benefit of the third party acting in ignorance of the fact that it is a related party transaction, in circumstances where the Article 158 regime had not been properly followed. This is also entirely consistent with the conclusion (addressed above) that the good faith exception only applies to étrangers, as it is étrangers who would be ignorant of the fact that it was a related party transaction.[995]Accordingly, I accept Professor Soumrani’s evidence, supported as it is by the French Parachkevova text, that good faith requires, as a minimum, an ignorance of the fact that the transaction was subject to the Article 158 regime. It follows that for this further reason the good faith exception does not arise on the facts of the present case.

D3.1.3 The legal consequences of a finding of good faith

[996]In Sakr 1, and by reference to his original evidence under (old) French law, Mr Sakr was of the view that (as expressed in Sakr 1 para 86): “86. French law thus distinguished between the direct and indirect interest of the related party to decide whether the transaction ought to be a nullity. Where the director only had an indirect interest, the company could not set aside the transaction if the counterparty acted in good faith”.[997]In cross-examination, Mr Sakr’s attention was drawn to an extract from Fady Nammour, Rémy Cabrillac, Séverine Cabrillac and Hervé Lecuyer, Droit des obligations (2006), p138 (and which Mr Sakr himself cited at Sakr 1 para 152):
“Consequently, the void act continues to produce its effect vis-à-vis the party who has good faith until judicial declaration of such nullity”
. When it was put to Mr Sakr that it followed that there could still be a declaration of nullity by the Court, notwithstanding good faith, he initially appeared to accept that stating, “I stand corrected” (Day 11 page 133 lines 19 to 20), and he also accepted that the court would have a discretion to annul or validate the transaction (Day 11 page 134 lines 9 to 12). However, he went on to say that where the exception applies, the transaction is not a relative nullity at all, it is just valid (Day 11 page 135 lines 9 to 15).[998]When it was put to him that there were other factors that the Court may take into account (such as the nature of the breach of Article 158), he appeared to accept that the Court could do so but then stated that good faith “usually” overrides “other requirements” (Day 11 page 138 lines 4 to 7).[999]I found this evidence of Mr Sakr all rather contradictory, and difficult to synthesise given the inconsistencies in his evidence within short order, but I consider that the passage that probably best reflected his evidence (albeit in the context of subsequent questions about “benefit”, though expressed to apply generally), was this evidence (Day 11 page 140 line 23 to page 141 line 5): “…perhaps I need to explain something here. When you talk about judicial… intervention, there’s always a ‘may’ under Lebanese law… There’s nothing mandatory. That is not – there is no, like in English law, doctrine of precedent or binding precedent. So there is always a ‘may’. So this is normal”. (emphasis added)[1000]I took from all of this that where the good faith exception is established, the Court may, but is not obliged, to uphold the transaction. I suspect, however, that the real deciding factor in most cases will be at the earlier stage as to whether there is good faith or not, which will depend on the circumstances (and the nature of the breach), and which will likely be highly relevant, if not determinative, when considering whether to uphold the transaction.

D3.1.4 Application of the good faith exception to the facts

[1001]On the basis of my findings above, the stage of considering good faith itself and its application to the facts, does not arise: first, because, factually, Cedar II was not an étranger and, second, because Cedar II was not in ignorance of the fact that the transaction was subject to the Article 158 regime as a related party transaction, not least given that Mr Al Bahar understood at the time of the 2021 Transaction that it was a related party transaction (Day 9 page 115 line 25 to page 116 line 5):
“Q. No, I do need a "yes" or "no" from you, I'm afraid. Did you understand this to be a proposed related-party transaction? A. Okay. Q. Was that a "yes". Does that mean "yes"? A. As you're saying it, yes, it is a related party.”
Q. Was that a "yes". Does that mean "yes"? A. As you're saying it, yes, it is a related party.”

Q. Was that a "yes". Does that mean "yes"?

[1002]In this regard the Defendants, “accept that Mr Al Bahar’s knowledge and intent falls to be attributed to Cedar II” (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 480). Mr Al Bahar was also aware that there was a legal risk in proceeding with the 2021 Transaction without complying with Article 158’s requirement for general assembly ratification, as a result of the presentation to him by Mr Attieh. This is a further reason that Mr Al Bahar knew that the transaction was subject to the Article 158 regime as a related party transaction.[1003]In this context (and given Mr Al Bahar’s knowledge) it matters not whether Mr Attieh’s knowledge is attributable to Cedar II, although I am satisfied it plainly is given his role on both sides of the 2021 Transaction. In this regard, Mr Attieh was named as a “key person” along with Mr Al Bahar in the Cedar II Partnership Agreement (Clause 18.1), and he was, from the outset, acting for Cedar II as its fund manager (by definition since Cedar II was a “continuation fund”) - see, for example, the Cedar II “launch” letter dated 24 September 2021. The continuation fund was itself contemplated by Mr Attieh in the December Presentation. It was also Mr Attieh who was telling Cedar II investors to pay their Lollars into the BEMO account with him handling all day-to-day matters for Cedar II (which was also consistent with Mr Al Bahar’s evidence). The Defendants have also not put forward any other person as representing Cedar II’s bona fides at the time of the 2021 Transaction said to be unaware that it was a related party transaction.[1004]I address separately below in Section D5.3 Mr Attieh’s appointment and resignation as a director of Fastnet (Cedar II’s general partner). I would only add that I did not find convincing Mr Attieh’s evidence that he did not act on the Al Bahar side of the transaction, or his assertion that during the negotiation of the 2021 Transaction he was “representing Cedar Mundi, all shareholders”. That was clearly not the case, and was another instance where I cannot accept the veracity of Mr Attieh’s evidence.[1005]Mr Attieh knew that Lebanese law had requirements for related party transactions from at least 2017 onwards in the context of the debt owed by Cedar Mundi to MABIL which was a related party transaction (and recorded as such in Cedar Mundi’s 2017 financial statements (as signed off by the full board)) with Cedar Mundi complying with the requirements of Article 158 including the preparation of an auditor’s report and seeking general assembly approval, as Mr Attieh accepted in cross-examination (Day 6 page 39 lines 5 to 14):
“Q. ... to approve the transaction carried out ... which are mentioned in the special report submitted by the Board and the special report of the auditors, and resolved to grant each of the Chairman, General Manager and the Members of the Board ... the authorisations provided for in Article 158~..." So this was specifically, and we've just seen the auditor's report, to cover off the transaction recorded in the accounts showing sums due to MABIL; correct? A. This is indeed correct. …”
A. This is indeed correct. …”[1006]The fact that Mr Attieh took advice on Lebanese law is not relevant (given my findings), but in any event, the Defendants’ submission that Mr Attieh was simply following advice he had received is not an accurate summary of the history of matters, and the advice he received.[1007]By at least 2 March 2021, Mr Attieh was conscious of the risk that he was in a personal conflict of interest position, and he sought advice on this from Mr Najjar’s firm. Mr Najjar responded by calling Mr Attieh the following day, during or following which he sent Mr Attieh a picture of Article 158 of the LCC, in the background of which was a print-out of Mr Attieh’s email together with the manuscript note “Yes – BA conflict”. Indeed, Mr Attieh confirmed that Mr Najjar advised on 3 March 2021 that the 2021 Transaction would be a related-party transaction (see Day 7 page 170 line 2), although he contended (I consider improbably) that Mr Najjar had advised him that he was not conflicted (Day 7 page 170 lines 3 to 11). Certainly, Mr Attieh’s understanding by the 16 March 2021 board meeting was that a general assembly meeting was required (from which I am satisfied that it can be inferred that this was Mr Najjar’s advice).[1008]Mr Attieh was also aware that SGBL’s position, on advice from Mr Dahdah, was that Article 158 required general assembly approval for the 2021 Transaction as a pre-condition to its validity.[1009]Further, the advice which Mr Khoury provided to Mr Attieh was substantially re-written by Mr Attieh himself. Mr Najjar had himself advised Mr Attieh that there was legal risk in proceeding without a general assembly meeting.[1010]In any event, and even if there was some wider definition of good faith, as advocated by the Defendants, albeit without supporting Lebanese law evidence from Mr Sakr or any other source, I do not consider that such good faith exception can possibly apply to the facts of the present case. In this regard, Mr Montagu-Smith himself volunteered in his oral closing submissions that if there had been a deliberate and serious breach of Article 158 then it wouldn’t be in good faith (Day 17 page 68 lines 3 to 4) and that “if there is a deliberate and serious breach of 158, in other words he knows that he’s got to comply but he doesn’t comply and he knows he can’t enter into a contract in those circumstances [then] you don’t get into good faith” (Day 17 page 68 lines 9 to 12). That is precisely the present situation.[1011]I am in no doubt that notwithstanding the “window-dressing” of the advice he received (as addressed in Section 7.5.5 above), Mr Attieh knew perfectly well that general assembly ratification was required, and that he knew that he could not enter into the SPA without such general assembly ratification because that is what Article 158 required, and in such circumstances one does not get into good faith. The same is also true, quite apart from Article 158, given that Mr Attieh knew perfectly well that what had been factually contemplated and agreed was that board authorisation was subject to general assembly approval (as addressed above and under Issue 4). He was not acting in good faith in proceeding without it.

D3.1.5 Conclusion on Issue 3(1)

[1012]For all the above reasons, Issue 3(1), namely, “If the answer to issue 2 is “No”, was the 2021 Transaction nonetheless authorised for the purpose of Article 158 because: (1) it was entered into by Cedar II in good faith” is to be answered in the negative.

D3.2 THE BENEFIT EXCEPTION (ISSUE 3(2))

[1013]Issue 3(2) is:
“If the answer to issue 2 is “No”, was the 2021 Transaction nonetheless authorised for the purpose of Article 158 because: … (2) It was beneficial to Cedar Mundi?”
[1014]It is common ground that there is a “benefit” exception to Article 158. The issues that arise are(1) whether there has to be a positive benefit or merely an absence of harm,(2) where there has been a transaction that is beneficial to the company whether the transaction may be upheld (Professor Soumrani’s expressed view) or whether the Court cannot annul the transaction (Mr Sakr’s expressed view), and(3) whether the 2021 Transaction was or was not beneficial to the company. I consider each of these issues below.

D3.2.1 The nature of the exception

[1015]The Defendants’ pleaded case, and the agreed issue for determination (Issue 3(2)) are each clear and unequivocal in their terms that there needs to be a benefit to the company in order for the exception to apply. Issue 3(2) asks, “was the 2021 Transaction … beneficial to Cedar Mundi”.[1016]This accords with the way the Defendants pleaded their case on this exception, at para 195.5.1 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim which expressly pleads that the issue is whether the company “in fact” benefited: “195.5 Yet further, where a company entered into a transaction with a counterparty within the scope of Article 158 but which was not ratified by the General Assembly, it was validly authorised and was not a nullity if: 195.5.1 the company in fact benefited from the transaction”. (emphasis added)[1017]It is to be inferred that such pleaded case would not have been advanced without the Defendants having sought advice as to Lebanese law from Mr Sakr as to the scope of the benefit exception, and received advice from Mr Sakr to the effect pleaded. In fact, such inference is corroborated by the fact that the plea expressly tracks the words of Mr Sakr in Sakr 1 at para 67 (as addressed below). Such pleaded case not only informed the list of issues but also what the experts addressed in their reports.[1018]Yet in closing, the Defendants sought to advance an (unpleaded) case that the exception applied provided that there was an absence of harm. Indeed, they went so far as to assert (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 453), “The correct test is … whether the transaction was harmful to the company. If it was not, the transaction should not be set aside” (emphasis added).[1019]Quite apart from the fact that such new case is inconsistent with both the Defendants’ pleaded case and the agreed issue for determination (which is hardly an auspicious start to advance such a new case), it would be very surprising if this was the test, for if the exception arises simply where there was an absence of harm, this would clearly negate the Article 158 regime in its entirety, as a transaction would be valid even if not authorised by the board and/or not approved by the general assembly provided it was not harmful/there was an absence of harm.[1020]I am satisfied that the Defendants’ new (unpleaded) case does not bear examination and does not represent the position under Lebanese law. As will be seen it is an attempt to import (but only in part) the position under certain Articles of the French Code of Commerce that have no parallel in Lebanese law.[1021]In their reports, both experts cite from the Alexandre Najjar text, where it is made clear that the exception is about benefit, whether the agreement proves beneficial to the company:
“174. In cases where agreements are indirectly concluded with a director, and such agreements are signed by third parties who are unrelated to the company’s dealings with its directors, Lebanese case law considers that such agreements remain valid if the third party acted in good faith (Beirut Court of First Instance, 21 July 1965, R.J.L., 1965.640). However, the contracting party cannot itself invoke the nullity of the agreement (Cass. com., 15 March 1994, LPA, 1 February 1995, note Gibrila). It was held that annulment may be refused if the disputed agreement proves beneficial to the company. (…)”
(emphasis added) The test is therefore whether the agreement “proves beneficial” (as translated) or, more literally, proves itself profitable – “s’avère profitable”.[1022]This was also the contemporary factual advice of a related, but different, Mr Najjar in the table produced by him, which answers the question, “the definitive agreement can be annulled if GA does not ratify”, as follows:
“Uncertain as this is a new law in Lebanon (since 07/2019) but based on precedents (from old law) cannot be annulled if the definitive agreement was beneficial to CMH.”
(emphasis added)[1023]In their reports both experts used the language of “benefit”. Mr Sakr stated as follows at para 78 of Sakr 1 (language, which, as already noted, mirrors the Defendants’ pleaded case):
“78.

(i) the company in fact benefited from the transaction…”

(emphasis added) The Defendants at para 450 of their Closing Submissions candidly accept that, “Mr Sakr’s position is that the transaction could not be set aside if the company benefitted from it”.[1024]Equally, Professor Soumrani, in Soumrani 3 at paras 63 and 64 expressed the exception in terms of benefit:
“63. … Regarding Mr Sakr’s opinion under (ii) above, I do not agree that the Transaction “cannot” be set aside if the company benefitted: a court would have a discretion to decide whether or not to set aside a Related Party Transaction that benefitted the company. I would also like to clarify in the following paragraphs the concept of benefit incurred by the company …in the context of Article 158 LCC. 64. Regarding the concept of benefit, a company is considered to benefit from a Transaction where, for example, such Transaction allowed its survival at a time it is facing a financial deadlock”
(emphasis added)[1025]When Mr Sakr was taken to para 78 of Sakr 1 (which refers to the exception in terms of “in fact benefited [sic]”), he replied, “Yes, but I'm sure somewhere there is a reference to the company having not suffered any harm”, thereby seemingly disagreeing with his own evidence, in Sakr 1, and the Defendants’ pleaded case which was clearly based on that – see Day 11 page 115 at lines 19 to 23. When Mr Wilson asked him further questions about this he replied as follows (Day 11 page 143 line 14 to page 144 line 5):
“Q. … In your evidence earlier on I understood you to be saying that the exception applies almost in any case -- in any case where there is no proof of harm to the company. Those are two different concepts. A. But they're related. Q. Okay. But which is it in Lebanese law? Which is it? A. I think both concepts have been used interchangeably for the same. Q. Well, I have to put to you that in your report you nowhere say that it is sufficient merely that the company is not able to point to harm. A. Yes, but I think I have cited -- I need to refresh my memory -- one of the Lebanese authorities or at least two, perhaps, that says that – including Alexandre Najjar, who refers to the no harm suffered as well.”

Q. Okay. But which is it in Lebanese law? Which is it?

[1026]Mr Sakr appeared to be deriving the “no harm” concept from French law and Articles L225-42 of the French Code of Commerce but as shall appear, those provisions are very specific to French law and there is no equivalent in Lebanese law and the LCC.[1027]This was then developed by the Defendants’ lawyers, in the Defendants’ Closing Submissions, who refer to the fact that Alexandre Najjar (in the passage quoted above) refers to three French cases including a decision of the Versailles Court of Appeal decision in Ingenia v Mognetti Versailles Court of Appeal, 12th Chamber, 2nd Section, 7 June 2001, No. 98/5924 in which it was stated, “whereas the nullity of the agreement, lacking prior authorisation, can only be pronounced on the condition that the company invoking it establishes the reality of the harmful consequences it caused”, and a French Court of Cassation decision, Sparflex Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation, No. 07-43601, 16 September. However, as is clear, and as the Defendants expressly acknowledge (at para 453 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions), these cases address the position by reference to Article 225-42 of the French Code of Commerce. Like is not being compared with like.[1028]Article 225-42 of the French Code of Commerce expressly provides as follows:
“Without prejudice to the liability of the person concerned, agreements referred to in Article L. 225-38 and entered into without prior authorisation from the board of directors may be annulled if they have had harmful consequences for the company. The action for annulment shall be time-barred three years after the date of the agreement. However, if the agreement has been concealed, the starting point of the limitation period shall be postponed to the day on which it was revealed.”
(emphasis added)[1029]It is clear that the French cases are addressing (and track) a specific provision of the French Code of Commerce, and there are no equivalent provisions in Lebanese law.[1030]What is more, it is also clear that these express provisions of French law (which deal with where there is no prior authorisation by the board of directors) simply do not represent the position in Lebanese law in any event given the position in Lebanese law where there is no prior authorisation by the board. Thus, the Defendants’ own case (as expressly set out at para 418(1) of their Closing Submissions) is as follows: “(1) Absent board authorisation, there would be no contract. At the least, the parties agree that the defences of good faith and benefit would not apply where a transaction has been neither approved by the board nor ratified”. (emphasis added)[1031]This is an express recognition that Lebanese law is not the same as French law. French law (Article 225-42 of the French Code of Commerce) is that even in the absence of board of directors authorisation there is a contract and it is not annulled unless it has harmful consequences for the company. The Defendants accept (and indeed aver) that that is not the position in Lebanese law. This is a yet further reason why it is not possible to transpose a different French law provision into Lebanese law.[1032]Quite apart from the fact that the Defendants’ characterisation of the benefit exception would negate the Article 158 regime in its entirety, as a transaction would be valid even if not authorised by the board or not approved by the general assembly provided it was not harmful/there was an absence of harm, it is difficult to see how such an exception protects the interests of those affected.[1033]There is yet a further point, I understood that at one point the Defendants even attempted to reverse the burden of proof and suggest that it would be for the party seeking to nullify the transaction (i.e. here Cedar Mundi) to prove harm, whereas it was (and should) be common ground that it is for the Defendants to prove benefit to bring themselves within the exception, something that Mr Montagu-Smith did expressly accept (in terms of burden of proof) when addressing whether or not there was a benefit (in the context of seeking to rebut Cedar Mundi’s submissions on benefit) – see Day 17 page 80 lines 13 to 17, “Q. Surely it's not valid unless it's beneficial? A. Yes. Q. On which you bear the burden. A. Yes”. It may be, however, that the Defendants do (rightly) accept that the burden is upon them even if the exception is triggered by the absence of harm, as Mr Montagu-Smith also said this in his oral closing submissions (Day 17 page 75 lines 13 to 16): “The way I would put it is that if I can establish that it was not detrimental then I will establish my case as a matter of Lebanese law that it was beneficial or a benefit”.[1034]It is clear, beyond dispute, that both Mr Sakr (Sakr 1 para 78) and Professor Soumrani (Soumrani 3 paras 63 to 64) treated the exception as a benefit exception on which the burden is upon the Defendants whereby annulment may be refused if the disputed agreement proves beneficial to the company, and that is also the view expressed by Alexandre Najjar (as quoted above).[1035]The Defendants seek to place reliance on the fact that Najjar cites three French authorities including the Versailles Court of Appeal case and that Professor Soumrani refers to that case in the context of the example he gives at para 64 of Soumrani 3. But Professor Soumrani made clear that in considering what amounts to benefit, French law is not a good guide to Lebanese law given that French law has particular codified provisions, with particular language, that do not exist in the LCC or any equivalent code. See in this regard Day 10 page 196 lines 4 to 18:
“Q. So it's fair to say, isn't it, that when you're considering what amounts to benefit, French law is a good guide to Lebanese law in this regard? Do you agree? A. No, because under the French law, the concept of benefit is provided for in two articles -- in one article of the law. You have a transaction that is unauthorised, cannot be set aside, unless it is harmful for the context. You have a text which is the Article 225-41 or 42, if we can see them, of the Code of Commerce”
Q. Right. A. They are based -- the court cases -- the French court cases, although cited by Najjar, are pure French law cases based on French law legislation. It's a bit difficult to take them and apply them in Lebanon at a time you don't have the same text existing in the Lebanese legislation.”[1036]The Defendants suggest that this response was highly surprising, but it is perfectly understandable. There are specific provisions of the French Code of Commerce and there is not the same text in Lebanese legislation. Professor Soumrani’s reference to the case itself was in the context of a specific factual scenario where there may have been a benefit to the company, namely where the transaction allowed its survival at a time it was facing a financial deadlock (see Soumrani 3 at para 65) – he was not suggesting the application of Article 225-42 of the French Code of Commerce as reflecting Lebanese law. Indeed, and as quoted above, he had just rejected that very proposition.[1037]This is also clear from a further passage from Professor Soumrani’s cross-examination (Day 10 page 198 line 10 to 21):
“Q. So, on your own authority, isn't it right that we can look to French law to understand what amounts to benefit as it would be applied by a Lebanese court? A. Yes, if the Lebanese court decided to apply the notion of benefit to keep the transaction valid, despite the fact that it is not authorised. Q. You accept, I think, that the test under French law is whether the transaction is harmful to the company; yes? A. Actually there is harmful or benefit. The text talks about harm but in the case law I think it's benefit, in the decisions. It is not just not harmful to the company…”
[1038]It is clear that Professor Soumrani remained of the view that in Lebanese law the exception was about benefit. French case law can provide examples of where there was a benefit, but the French statutory provisions do not assist as they do not exist in Lebanese law. This can also be seen from how Professor Soumrani put it during the course of his re-examination (Day 10 page 217 lines 14 to 20):
“So this is also a text that we do not have in Lebanon. If it is interpreted au contraire, it means that in case the transaction is not harmful, is beneficial for the company, they may not be annulled, but, again, this is something we don't have. So of course in Lebanon we'll have to decide independently from any text that guides us.”
[1039]For the reasons that I have identified above, I am satisfied that as a matter of Lebanese law the exception under consideration is indeed a benefit exception the question being whether the company in fact benefited from the transaction, and it would be so understood and applied by the highest courts in Lebanon. This is consistent with the Defendants’ pleaded case, with the agreed issue for determination, with the evidence of Mr Sakr (per Sakr 1), and with Professor Soumrani’s evidence as properly understood (as addressed above).[1040]I also reject the suggestion of Mr Montagu-Smith that benefit and absence of harm are the same thing, or that if the Defendants prove the transaction was not detrimental, this establishes that it was beneficial or was a benefit. The burden is upon the Defendants to show that the transaction was beneficial to Cedar Mundi.[1041]For completeness, however, when applying the exception to the facts, and making findings as to whether there was a benefit, I will also consider the alternative, namely whether there was an absence of harm. In the event, and as will appear, the outcome is no different whichever test were to be applied.

D3.2.2 The legal consequences of a finding of benefit

[1042]I have already addressed the similar question in relation to the good faith exception in Section 3.1.3 above. The issue arises because Mr Sakr in Sakr 1 at 101 (and see also at 78), “as the law stood under the immediate predecessor to the current Article 158, if the company entered into a related party transaction that was not authorised by the general assembly: (a) the related party transaction was validly authorised and the company could not set it aside where the agreement was beneficial for the company”.[1043]If that was the position then, as the Claimant rightly points out in its Closing Submissions (at para 401), Article 158 could, and no doubt would, have provided something along the lines of, “authorisation shall not be deemed effective until after it has been ratified by the General Assembly unless the contracts, agreements and/or obligations have proved beneficial to the company”, but it does not do so.[1044]Mr Sakr does not cite any authority or text for his proposition, and the relevant text which both Mr Sakr and Professor Soumrani rely on, namely para 174 of Najjar, expresses the principle not in mandatory terms but in (judicial) discretionary language. It will be recalled the passage (already quoted above) provides:
“It was held that annulment may be refused if the disputed agreement proves beneficial to the company (…)”
(emphasis added) None of the cases referred to (in the 2017 or 2023 editions) contains any statement about the benefit exception (save the French cases addressed above viz Article 225-42 of the French Code of Commerce) and none of them support Mr Sakr’s position on this point.[1045]Ultimately (and as quoted above in the context of good faith), Mr Sakr did give this evidence (Day 11 page 140 line 23 to page 141 line 5): “…perhaps I need to explain something here. When you talk about judicial… intervention, there’s always a ‘may’ under Lebanese law… There’s nothing mandatory. That is not – there is no, like in English law, doctrine of precedent or binding precedent. So there is always a ‘may’. So this is normal”. (emphasis added)[1046]I am satisfied that the position has always been, and remains, under Lebanese law, that a related party transaction that has been executed absent general assembly ratification is a relative nullity, the company can therefore apply to annul the transaction; and the Court has a discretion whether to annul it. This accords with the very concept of a “relative nullity” which by its very nature involves a judicial assessment of whether annulment should be granted. This also accords with Professor Soumrani’s evidence in Soumrani 3 para 63 and in re-examination that, “we cannot say that [the Court] will necessarily save the transaction if it is beneficial” (Day 10 page 220 lines 20 to 21).[1047]As with good faith, I suspect that the real deciding factor in most cases will be at the earlier stage as to whether there is a benefit or not and the nature of that benefit (or if the Defendants were correct at the earlier stage as to whether there is harm, and the nature of that harm), which will depend on the circumstances, and which will likely be highly relevant, if not determinative when considering whether to annul the transaction.

D3.2.3 The application of the benefit exception

[1048]The Claimant submits that on no view was the 2021 Transaction positively beneficial to Cedar Mundi. Even if Mr Worsnip’s evidence were to be accepted that would suggest a net neutral transaction, but in fact Mr Pearson’s evidence should be preferred with the result that the Transaction was at a substantial under value. In contrast, the Defendants invite the Court to conclude that the SPA was for the benefit of Cedar Mundi, in the sense that the transaction was not harmful to Cedar Mundi, but if (as I have concluded) Lebanese law requires the Defendants to show a positive benefit, it is submitted that this standard is met.[1049]Cedar Mundi submits, rightly, that the relevant valuation date in relation to Issue 3(2) and the benefit exception is the date of the SPA of 28 June 2021. I have already addressed the respective evidence of Mr Worsnip and Mr Pearson in Section C3 above. For the reasons set out I prefer the evidence of Mr Pearson to Mr Worsnip and, as I have there found, as at 28 June 2021 the 2021 Transaction was at a substantial undervalue of some US$19,504,967. In such circumstances I am satisfied that the 2021 Transaction was not beneficial to Cedar Mundi given that it was at a substantial undervalue and equally, in such circumstances, the 2021 Transaction was harmful to Cedar Mundi. In such circumstances the benefit exception does not apply.[1050]In their Closing Submissions the Defendants seek to sideline the valuation evidence in the context of Issue 3(2) and the benefit exception, and at para 456 and following of their Closing Submissions they give a number of alleged (non−valuation) reasons for saying that the 2021 Transaction was a benefit to Cedar Mundi notwithstanding that it was at a substantial undervalue. Even had they been of merit, I do not consider that they would have outweighed the fact that the transaction was at a substantial undervalue. However, I am satisfied that none of them are of merit or begin to demonstrate that the 2021 Transaction was of benefit.[1051]At para 457 it is said that the Court should be sceptical of Cedar Mundi’s assertion that the terms of the 2021 Transaction were not beneficial given that the board (including SGBL) voted in favour of the transaction. I have already addressed the circumstances of the board resolution and what was agreed, and why the board voted in the way it did (including the requirement for general assembly approval), which provides no support to the Defendants on this point. But, in any event, the ultimate issue is whether the 2021 Transaction was at an undervalue, which is a quite separate question from why the board voted as it did. The benefit exception is also only being considered in circumstances where there should have been general assembly approval on my findings in relation to Issue 2. To suggest involvement in the board approval as an answer would swallow up the rule (the rule being that general assembly approval is required) and would negate Article 158 of effect. I am satisfied this point provides no support for saying that the transaction was beneficial and therefore valid. The same is true of the Defendants’ reliance on SGBL’s memo to the BdL which self-evidently was drafted with a view to persuade the BdL to give its approval (in tandem with general assembly approval), and the BdL never said that it was persuaded that the transaction was beneficial to Cedar Mundi (whilst making clear that it needed to be persuaded).[1052]Then at paras 458 and 459 the Defendants submit that, by reason of the price adjustment mechanism in the SPA, the 2021 Transaction “could not be harmful to the company”. Quite apart from the fact that an absence of harm is not the correct test, and the fact that I do not see how a mere price adjustment mechanism could (in of itself) make the transaction “beneficial”, I consider that there are a number of difficulties with the Defendants’ submission which were encapsulated by the Claimant in five related points that Mr Day made in the course of his oral closing submissions, and which I consider have force, and negate any benefit (and any suggestion of a lack of harm, if relevant):(1) The first point is that the price adjustment mechanism was never invoked and the price was never adjusted, so as the price was at an undervalue this was never cured (a transaction at an undervalue being, by definition, harmful and, by definition, not beneficial for the purposes of Article 158 and the benefit exception). Whilst Mr Montagu-Smith submitted that the price adjustment mechanism was baked into the transaction and you have to view matters at the date of signing the SPA (in fact surely when the C-331 Shareholders and newly re-constituted board became aware of the signing of the SPA before which they were not in a position to act), the premise is that Article 158 has not been complied with, general assembly approval should have been obtained and so the transaction is a nullity subject to the benefit exception. The Defendants’ stance presupposes that Cedar Mundi could (and should) have evoked the price adjustment mechanism. But there are at least two good reasons why it did not. First (and this is point(2) below), the Defendants would inevitably have asserted that Cedar Mundi thereby affirmed the 2021 Transaction (a point of some force) and Cedar Mundi would thereby have suffered detriment, and second Cedar Mundi’s position would in any event have been that factually the 2021 Transaction was subject to general assembly approval, and if they gave that argument up (by going ahead with the 2021 Transaction), that would itself be to their detriment. Of course if Cedar Mundi succeed factually on Issue 4 (as they have done), Issues 1 to 3 are irrelevant in any event. (2) The second point is that the price adjustment mechanism was not invoked for good reason because the concern at the September board meeting was not to do anything that might result in ratifying or validating the 2021 Transaction (see the stance of the board as reflected in the declarations made). In such circumstances, and in reality, no “choice” arose, for if the mechanism was invoked, the Defendants would have cried “ratification” (as indeed they have in other respects). Yet further, and as Mr El Azar states at El Azar 1 at para 151, “the C-331 Shareholders were not prepared to validate what we thought was an unlawful agreement by taking steps to appoint an Additional Expert or engage in a process with the Executive Directors and MABIL whom I believe the C331 Shareholders considered to have acted in bad faith and could no longer trust”. It is clear that had the price mechanism been evoked not only would this be contrary to the stance adopted by the Board (and the shareholders), it would have resulted in the Defendants crying “ratification” (as indeed they did in different respects) which would have been contrary to Cedar Mundi’s interests (perceived and actual), and so detrimental to Cedar Mundi. As Cedar Mundi submit, it cannot be right that the price adjustment clause should act as some form of legal Catch 22 whereby if it is invoked then Cedar Mundi is taken to ratify the transaction but if it is not invoked that can be held against Cedar Mundi in the exercise of the Court's discretion under the benefit exception.(3) The third point is that the evidence before me (including that of Mr El Azar) is to the effect that trust in Mr Attieh had collapsed by September given the discoveries after the 13 April board meeting, evidence which I find to be credible, and accept, given such discoveries. In this regard, the price adjustment provisions could only work fairly for Cedar Mundi and the C−331 shareholders if there was confidence that the independent expert was given all relevant information, and Mr Attieh was in a position to control what information was given. As the evidence shows, as at September 2021 Mr Attieh had been controlling and manipulating the flow of information and indeed concealing important matters, including the fact of the 2020 Transaction and information about the Proximie fundraise, both of which had been discovered by that point (and it has since transpired that Mr Attieh had knowledge of the White Lab transaction). This is not about pleaded allegations (such as a lack of plea of deceit) but about a loss of trust in Mr Attieh as a result of the revelations. In such circumstances I do not consider that Cedar Mundi would have had faith in going through the price adjustment mechanism (even had that been possible without being found to have ratified).(4) The fourth point is that price adjustment is not the same as, and is very much second best, to Cedar Mundi itself agreeing a price with or without expert assistance, not least because the former would have involved a surrender of commercial autonomy to a third party. In this regard Mr Saghbini compared it in his evidence to selling your house at a price to be determined by an independent evaluator. The Claimant says that analogy neatly captures point. Valuation can be subjective and the seller normally wants their own view to prevail in the event of differing views. It is for that reason that a commercial transaction normally has the price agreed, not the price to be set by a third party on the basis of whatever information your counterparty makes available.(5) The fifth point made by the Claimant is to say that it cannot be right that the mere existence of a price adjustment clause means that the benefit exception cannot be invoked. In essence that would be an argument that the parties can contract out of the benefit exception, but there's no evidence from either Lebanese law expert that the benefit exception was some form of default rule that can be overridden by the contractual terms. On the contrary (and as I have found), the benefit exception invokes a discretion for the Court. So, the Claimant says that has no basis in the evidence that was adduced.[1053]In the above circumstances, I do not consider that the price adjustment mechanism means that the 2021 Transaction was beneficial to Cedar Mundi or that Cedar Mundi did not suffer harm.[1054]Turning to the other benefits that the Defendants allege accrued to Cedar Mundi at paragraphs 461 to 466. The first is that it is said that “entry into the SPA enabled Cedar Mundi to avoid impending insolvency”, albeit in the course of oral argument this was diluted down to an inability to pay management fees based on the true value of cash in the bank. I do not consider that it has been demonstrated that Cedar Mundi faced impending insolvency (the statutory accounts signed off by Mr Attieh had confirmed that as at February 2021 Cedar Mundi was able to continue as a going concern), and I consider that Cedar Mundi would have taken whatever steps it needed to take in the future to avoid insolvency. Quite apart from any steps it might have taken to raise any necessary funds, it could have sought to re-negotiate fees with CMCH (some fees no doubt being better than none from CMCH’s perspective, and it would not have been in CMCH’s interests to drive Cedar Mundi into insolvency), and it would only be in case of termination that the termination provisions would have been triggered (even assuming it was in CMCH’s interests to hold Cedar Mundi to them in full or in part). In any event any alleged potential benefit to Cedar Mundi’s financial position was swamped by the detriment of a transaction at a substantial undervalue.[1055]The second alleged benefit was that the SPA released Cedar Mundi from liability to MABIL. This is addressed in relation to Issue 10(2), but, in summary, it is common ground that you cannot justify repayment on the basis of the subordinated credit facility agreement terms which forces the Defendants to say that either there was some other agreement or that there is a claim in restitution. There is, before me, no evidence of any such other agreement (which would, in any event be a related party transaction subject to Article 158). Equally, in relation to restitution, as in the English law of unjust enrichment, in Lebanese law (amongst other matters), “(iii) the enrichment and correlative impoverishment must be devoid of a justifying cause” (Agreed Statement of Experts para 21(b)), and here the subordinated credit facility agreement was a justifying cause as it required payment. As addressed in relation to Issue 10(2), the amounts that MABIL paid constitute quasi-equity and they are only due if and when the conditions of the subordinated credit facility agreements are met. On any view there was no immediate right to payment (and no agreement giving rise to a debt) – any obligation would have come very much later. However, even had the MABIL overpayment been due and payable, the Defendants have not demonstrated that it would have been payable to an account outside Lebanon, not least given that the payment was from an account in Lebanon, and in such circumstances Cedar Mundi could just discharge any such debt by paying the face value of the dollars (which are subject to capital controls) into another bank account in Lebanon. In any event, even had there been any benefit, such benefit did not outweigh the detriment of the transaction being at a substantial undervalue.[1056]The third alleged benefit was that the sale under the SPA ensured that the fund was not operating sub-optimally with a risk of a loss of future value (relying on what Mr Pearson had said about the difference between distress and operating sub-optimally (Day 13 page 217 at lines 12 to 15)). I cannot see the logic of this argument, which would also appear to be no more than speculation as to how the fund might have performed going forward. In any event, and on any view, had there been any such benefit it would on no view have outweighed the detriment of the transaction being at a substantial under value, and so detrimental/not beneficial overall.[1057]The final point relates to whether there was a benefit because the deal struck on 13 April 2021 was the first step in a transaction that would resolve what is said to be the default (or at the very least potential default) of the C-331 Shareholders, which raises the issue as to whether the default mechanism could have been used against the C−331 Shareholders in respect of the third capital call. I do not consider that there is anything in this point in the context of the benefit exception. First, and foremost, it is aimed at the wrong target (the C-331 shareholders): the benefit exception is concerned with what is beneficial to the company (Cedar Mundi) not what is beneficial to its majority shareholders. Second, there is an issue as to whether there was any breach at all in circumstances where the BdL provided only limited consent and the C-331 shareholders acted pursuant to that limited consent in respect of the third capital call, and in paying in the terms they did. Third, I do not consider that the BdL would have permitted the use of the default mechanism against the C-331 shareholders in circumstances where all that the C-331 shareholders had done was follow the BdL's instructions in respect of the third capital call. Indeed, that may be why Mr Attieh never sought to even try and get the BdL's consent to pursue the default mechanism against the C-331 shareholders. In such circumstances I do not consider that there was any real benefit in contrast to the detriment in entering into the transaction at an under value.

D3.2.4 Conclusion on Issue 3(2)

[1058]I am satisfied that the 2021 Transaction was at a substantial undervalue, was not beneficial to Cedar Mundi and was to Cedar Mundi’s detriment. In such circumstances the Defendants have not established that the benefit exception applies.[1059]For all the above reasons, Issue 3(2), namely, “If the answer to issue 2 is “No”, was the 2021 Transaction nonetheless authorised for the purpose of Article 158 because it was beneficial to Cedar Mundi?” is to be answered in the negative. D4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE 13 APRIL 2021 BOARD MINUTES (ISSUE 4)[1060]Issue 4 is:
“On the true construction of the minutes of the board meeting on 13 April 2021, was the board’s authorisation of the 2021 Transaction conditional upon subsequent general assembly ratification?”
[1061]As addressed in Section B7, and for the reasons there set out, Issue 4 is answered in the affirmative. D5. VOTING AT THE 13 APRIL BOARD MEETING (ISSUE 5)[1062]Issue 5 is:
“At the board meeting on 13 April 2021: (1) Was Mr Attieh prohibited from voting by Article 158 by reason of the circumstances of his resignation from Fastnet (applying the Lebanese doctrine of fraudulent acts in its strict sense)? (2) If Mr Attieh was not entitled to vote at the meeting (or is to be treated as not having been entitled to vote) was the effect of Article 158 that the board meeting was invalidly constituted?”
[1063]Issue 5 does not arise on the operative path as reflected in the Decision Tree, given my findings, and associated answers, to Issues 1 to 3, and to Issue 4 above. It would, however, in itself (per Cedar Mundi’s interpretation) render the board authorisation a nullity which would be an alternative route to the same ultimate conclusion, as can be seen from the Decision Tree. I accordingly address it below.

D5.1 The proper interpretation of the relevant part of Article 158

[1064]The relevant part of Article 158 provides as follows: “[1] None of the aforementioned persons are entitled to participate in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorization, and [2] their votes shall not be counted towards the attendance or voting quorum when discussing said authorization.” (numbering and emphasis added)[1065]The factual context in which the issue of interpretation arises is that Cedar Mundi say that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet was a fraudulent act in the strict sense and as a consequence he would be treated as still being a director of Fastnet for the purpose of the board meeting on 13 April 2021 i.e. that Mr Attieh would be treated as a related party for the purpose of Article 158 (this consequence is common ground – see para 534 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions).[1066]In consequence Mr Attieh would be prohibited from participating in the voting process at the 13 April 2021 board meeting (and in voting), and Cedar Mundi say that the consequence of him doing so is that the 13 April 2021 board meeting was invalidly constituted and the authorisation was a nullity. The Defendants deny that this was so based on their interpretation of the applicable sentence in Article 158.[1067]Accordingly, before considering the application of this part of Article 158 to the particular facts of the present case, it is necessary to interpret the provision itself.[1068]On this the parties’ respective positions are as follows. Cedar Mundi submit that there are two elements to this part of Article 158(1) a rule against related parties participating in the voting process, including, but not limited to, by voting (and the consequences of the same), and(2) a rule as to how to calculate the quorum of a board of directors where there is a related party. Cedar Mundi say that the latter is dealt with in the second part ([2]) having regard to what is also said in the first part [1], whilst the former is dealt with in the first part ([1]) and the rule in the second part of the sentence [2] is not a sanction (or the only sanction) for non-compliance with the first part of the sentence [1]. The result is that, quite apart from any issues as to quorum that may arise, if a related party does participate in the voting process, including, but not limited to, by voting, then the authorisation is a nullity.[1069]In contrast, the Defendants submit that the first part [1] establishes the rule, and the second part [2] establishes the consequence of the breach of the rule, namely that the related party’s vote “shall not be counted”. In consequence they say that the effect of a related party voting at the board meeting to authorise a transaction is that the relevant director’s vote is not counted, not that the meeting as a whole (or the particular resolution) is a nullity.[1070]In this regard, both experts opine on the meaning of this part of Article 158. I have already addressed the relevant principles of Lebanese statutory interpretation. The only additional point to note here is that Mr Sakr confirmed in cross-examination that there is a general principle of Lebanese law that effect should be given to the entirety of a statutory provision, which I understood to be common ground. The experts also opine on the effect of a breach of any part of Article 158 as a matter of Lebanese law. Beyond that it is necessary to interpret what this part of Article 158 means (on its face unless there is an ambiguity or obvious error).[1071]Before addressing the particular parts of this sentence of Article 158, if one stands back and reads the provision as a whole, it is clear that it is contemplated that a conflicted director (i.e. a director who is also a director of the related party or its shareholder) should not participate in the voting process as to whether to authorise the related party transaction.[1072]Turning to the parts that make up this sentence of Article 158, I consider that it is best to start with a consideration of the second part [2], viewed in the context of the first part [1], as once its proper interpretation is understood, it assists when interpreting the first part [1].[1073]As to the second part, the evidence before me is that the default position under Lebanese law is that a board of directors is quorate if 50% of the board is present (Mr Sakr said it is 50% +1, but nothing would appear to turn on this). Under the Articles of Association, “The Board of Directors is deemed validly convened if at least half of its members are present or represented”. If this is considered together with the first part [1] of this sentence of Article 158 i.e. that conflicted directors are not entitled to participate in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorisation then, without some further provision, this would mean that the board could never be quorate in the event that 50% or more of its number were conflicted.[1074]A further provision is therefore needed to deal with this situation, and that is, I am satisfied, the second part of the sentence [2]. This redefines the denominator of the calculation of the quorum as being only the non-conflicted directors rather than all the directors. This rule ensures that the board can still make a decision even if several directors are conflicted. Various examples were given in the proceedings. The Claimant gave the example of a board of six directors, with three being conflicted, the base for the calculation of quorum becomes the three remaining (non-conflicted) directors, and the meeting would be quorate if two of those three directors attended.[1075]Professor Soumrani expresses matters in these terms in his evidence (Day 10 page 84 lines 15 to 24): “The interpretation of this article is very simple. What it says is that… the votes of a person who is not allowed [to vote] … are not counted … they are not counted to calculate the vote, meaning if I have ten directors, two are not allowed to vote, I will calculate quorum and majority on the remaining eight. I will consider as if the eight were the total on which I must calculate my quorum and majority. So it’s not a sanction. It’s a method of calculation”.[1076]I do not understand the quorate aspect of the second part to be controversial between the parties. Mr Sakr accepted that this was the purpose and effect of the rule in the second part of the text (see Day 11 page 106 line 19 to Day 11 page 107 line 8):
“Q. Now, let's look at the second part of the paragraph: " ... and their votes shall not be counted towards the attendance or voting quorum when discussing said authorization." So this rule is about calculating the quorum where there are conflicted directors on the board as a whole; yes? A. Yes. Q. And the rule is that the quorum is to be calculated by reference only to the non−conflicted directors; yes? A. Yes. Q. And that's there because it ensures that the board can still take a decision even if several directors are conflicted ; yes? A. Yes”
A. Yes”[1077]Where the parties part company, in terms of the interpretation of this sentence of Article 158, is in relation to first part of the sentence and what it provides where a conflicted director participates in the voting process (including, but not limited to, by voting), and what the consequences of the same are.[1078]The position of Mr Sakr, and the Defendants, is that the rule in the second part of the sentence also provides the only sanction for non-compliance with the first part of the sentence (prohibiting conflicted directors from participating in the voting process). I consider there are numerous, and insurmountable difficulties with such interpretation which does not give full or proper meaning and effect to the first part [1] of the sentence (and under Lebanese law effect should be given to the entirety of a statutory provision).[1079]First, and as a preliminary point, Mr Sakr’s and the Defendants interpretation on the second part is that it is dealing with a breach of the prohibition in the first part. But in fact, what it is dealing with is how you deal with attendance and what is quorate where there is a conflicted director i.e. how the meeting is lawfully to be conducted for such purposes.[1080]Second, and fundamentally, the prohibition in the first part of the sentence [1] is clear and unequivocal, “none of the aforementioned persons are entitled to participate in the voting process”. On its face this is an express prohibition of a conflicted person participating in the voting process. They should not take part in the “voting process” (full stop). This part of the sentence shows that it is not just about their vote not counting, or as to how one calculates whether the meeting is quorate (as to which see the second part). Meaning and effect should be given to the express prohibition in this first part, which is separate from the second part, being separated by the word “and”. On Mr Sakr’s interpretation (and that of Mr Sakr) there would be no need for the first part at all – it could simply have stated, “votes of conflicted directors shall not be counted”.[1081]Professor Soumrai’s opinion is also that meaning and effect should be given to the first part separately from the second part (which is to do with attendance and quorum). As he states in Soumrani 3 at para 47:
“The use of the conjunction “and” clearly shows in my opinion that the exclusion of the Related Party’s votes is not a sanction - if it were, the legislator would have used a different wording such as “under penalty of” - but rather serves as a clarification regarding the manner in which the quorum and majority are to be calculated in this situation.”
[1082]Third, the “voting process” is clearly wider than the vote itself and clearly encompasses both(i) the debate (the process) and(ii) the vote. Were that otherwise it would surely say “shall not vote” and would not extend to the voting process itself.[1083]Fourth, this is obviously to ensure two matters(i) that only non-conflicted directors take part in the debate and(ii) that only non-conflicted directors’ vote. The former is important because (as is self-evident) a conflicted director could influence the other directors if they were allowed to take part in the debate (the process) and so the damage would be done even before one got to the vote.[1084]Both these matters were ultimately accepted by Mr Sakr. As to the former see Day 11 page 105 line 24 to page 106 line 18:
“Q. So conflicted directors cannot take part in the voting process because −−well, by virtue of their being conflicted , they are disabled from doing so. That's the first point. Do you agree? A. Yes. Q. Okay. It's also because part of that policy is if a conflicted director takes part in the voting process, he could influence the decision , even if whether or not he formally casts a vote. Do you agree with that. A. Yes. It 's the same sentence so it's −− Q. Yes. A. −−a continuation … Q. The only safe way of ensuring the independence of the board is to ensure that the director does not take part in the voting process? A. Yes.”
(emphasis added) A. Yes. It 's the same sentence so it's −− A. −−a continuation … A. Yes.”

A. −−a continuation …

[1085]As to the latter point and Mr Sakr’s evidence, see Day 11 page 105 line 15 to page 106 line 3:
“Q. … the first part says: "None of the aforementioned persons [so the related parties or conflicted parties ] are entitled to participate in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorization ... " So the policy behind that rule must be to ensure that the board decision is taken only by directors who are non−conflicted. Do you agree with that? A. Yes. Q. So conflicted directors cannot take part in the voting process because −−well, by virtue of their being conflicted , they are disabled from doing so. That's the first point. Do you agree? A. Yes”
(emphasis added) A. Yes”[1086]Mr Sakr’s above evidence as to why the conflicted director cannot take part in the voting process is not only consistent with the language of the first part [1] of Article 158, it is also consistent with the evidence of Professor Soumrani when he explained that this provides the policy rationale for nullifying a resolution in which a conflicted director has participated, see Day 10 page 94 line 14 to page 95 line 5:
“Q. Yes. So if you have five people who are at the meeting, one is not entitled to vote, four vote in favour, but −− in fact , sorry , they all vote in favour but one was not entitled to vote, what you do is you knock off the one who wasn't entitled to vote and you ask yourself the question: what about the rest, and you say: well, they all voted in favour, so you would conclude, as a matter of law, that that resolution was passed unanimously; yes? A. No, because the presence of this fifth person, the one who hasn't the right to vote, the fact that he attends, deliberates and vote vitiates the whole resolution. Because of the deliberation of this person, he can have influenced the remaining four persons and this is why his mere presence in the vote and voting, which is preceded by a deliberation, means that there is vitiation of the resolution that must be announced.”
(emphasis added)[1087]The Defendants’ question fails to have regard to, and give meaning and effect to, the first part [1] of the sentence. The answer given by Professor Soumrani addresses the question of what the consequence is of participation (in the voting process, the debate and the vote) which is addressed further below, but it can be seen that both Mr Sakr and Professor Soumrani, recognise that only non-conflicted directors can take part in the debate and that only non-conflicted directors can vote. They each also give the same rationale for why a conflicted director cannot take part in the voting process, namely that a conflicted director could influence the other directors if they were allowed to take part in the debate (the process) just as much as if they voted, which is why both are prohibited.[1088]In oral closing submissions, Mr Montagu-Smith responded to the fact that “if you have conflicted directors voting they may influence the vote” by saying, “But that is, we say, not a realistic submission, voting doesn’t take place in a vacuum. Conflicted directors are not banned from deliberating, they’re not banned from persuading, cajoling”. This is simply wrong on the express language of the first part of the sentence. “participat[ing] in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorization”. The voting process includes the discussion and the deliberation before any vote, and so conflicting directors are banned from deliberating, and they are banned from persuading or cajoling on the express language of the first part. So the submission of the Claimant (and Professor Soumrani, and for that matter Mr Sakr) is a realistic one – a conflicted director may well seek to take part in voting process by deliberating, persuading and cajoling, and the vice is not protected by the Defendants’ interpretation of the second part.[1089]In contrast, as Professor Soumrani said in response to questioning in cross-examination:
“A. … The mere fact that this person is present, if … he's present, he must not vote. Q. Yes. A. If he votes, automatically there is a problem −−a flaw in the system. This person has added a vote. He has influenced the remaining directors . By influencing the remaining directors with his vote, you cannot simply just remove this vote and pass the resolution with the remaining. He shouldn't have voted at all. He shouldn't have expressed an opinion. He shouldn't have deliberated.”
(emphasis added)[1090]I prefer the evidence of Professor Soumrani over Mr Sakr in relation to Mr Sakr maintaining that the only sanction for non-compliance with the first part [1] is that the vote should not count (referring to the second part [2]). The fundamental difficulty with this, which Mr Sakr failed to recognise (despite agreeing with the matters quoted above), is that this simply fails to give effect to the first part of the sentence [1] which expressly prohibits participation in the voting process (“None of the aforementioned persons are entitled to participate in the voting process”). The conflicted director must not take part in the debate and must not vote. Mr Sakr ultimately candidly accepted that his interpretation that the only sanction is the non-counting of the vote (per Sakr 1 para 61) was based solely on his reading of the current version of Article 158, and not on any authority (Day 11 page 119 line 1), a reading with which Professor Soumrani disagrees. Mr Sakr’s interpretation (simply not counting the vote) does not negate the risk that this sentence of Article 158 guards against (the conflicted director participating in the voting process and potentially influencing other directors, whether or not he votes).[1091]In their written Closing Submissions, the Defendants sought to argue that the words “their votes shall not” count in the second part [2] meant that the provision envisaged that the conflicted director can vote, it is simply that the vote shall not be counted towards voting quorum. However, such a reading of the second part [2] would be inconsistent with the first part (given the express prohibition in the first part - they cannot take part in the voting process at all, still less vote), so that interpretation would do violence to the first sentence. The better, and more natural reading of the second part [2], read together with the first part [1] is that the second part is simply concerned with calculating attendance and quorum whereby their presence and their “vote” (in the sense of every director having a “vote”) does not count towards attendance and quorum. In other words, the second part is not about sanction at all, but simply about calculating attendance (which of course pre-dates an actual vote as such) and quorum. This is also shown by the reference to “attendance” itself which is quite separate to actually voting.[1092]The next question is therefore what is the consequence of a breach of the prohibition in the first part? Mr Sakr says there is no sanction at all for influencing the other directors by participating in the voting process (even if they do not vote). I reject that evidence, which cannot be right. It is inconsistent with the evidence of Professor Soumrani, it is inconsistent with giving meaning and effect to the first part [1] of Article 158 (aspects of which Mr Sakr agreed as quoted above), and it is inconsistent with Article 158 read as a whole. It also defies belief and would make no sense. If the only sanction (if it is even right to characterise that as a “sanction”) is that the conflicted director’s vote (if actually cast) does not count (the Defendants’ interpretation) then that does not address the prohibition in the first part [1] that they should not take part in the voting process at all, nor (importantly) the vice of the conflicted director taking part in the voting process (on which the experts are agreed). The damage has already been done even before the time of the vote itself.[1093]I am satisfied that this sentence of Article 158, read as a whole, is not simply seeking to neutralise the numerical weight of conflicted votes; it is there to ensure that the board’s decision is the product of a deliberative process conducted by directors whose judgment is not compromised by a conflict of interest. As the Claimant rightly point out, if the conflicted directors were permitted to participate, with the law responding only by discounting their votes after the event, the protection afforded by the provision would merely be formal and would fail to address the real mischief. In contrast, Professor Soumrani’s evidence is to the effect that the participation of the conflicted director taints the process which is why such participation invalidates the authorisation itself.[1094]Professor Soumrani’s evidence in this regard can be seen from Soumrani 3 at paras 45 to 50 which merit quoting in full:
“45. [Mr Sakr] however concludes with a proposition that, if a Related Party not allowed to participate in a vote but nevertheless does participate and vote, the sanction should be merely that such vote does not count for the calculation of the quorum and majority of the meeting. According to him, the Transaction concluded following such vote should not be invalid. 46. I disagree for two reasons. 47. The first reason is that Mr Sakr’s reasoning mixes the organization of the rule forbidding the participation in the vote and its sanction. Indeed, the plain wording of Article 158 LCC provides that the Related Party is not allowed to participate in the vote and that its votes are not counted for the calculation of quorum and majority. The use of the conjunction “and” clearly shows in my opinion that the exclusion of the Related Party’s votes is not a sanction - if it were, the legislator would have used a different wording such as “under penalty of” – but rather serves as a clarification regarding the manner in which the quorum and majority are to be calculated in this situation. 48. The second reason is that the sanction for such participation should be, as for any violation of the provisions of Article 158 LCC, the nullity of the resolution, which in turn entails the nullity of the Transaction concluded on its basis, as explained in paragraph 143 of my Second Report. 49. At paragraph 143 of my Second Report, I cited Mr E. Tyan’s scholarship and a Court of Cassation decision in support of my analysis on this point. According to the Lebanese Court of Cassation: “Whereas a violation of the provisions relating to authorisation results in the nullity of the contract, such nullity is, however, relative, and may be cured by approval, or more specifically, the subsequent approval of the contract by the general assembly following the submission of the board of directors’ report and the auditors’ report.” 50. For completeness I note that Mr S. Zreik also confirms this position: “(…) A director who takes part in the vote exposes the transaction in which he has an interest to nullity, even in the absence of proof of prejudice to the company, and even if his vote does not influence the outcome, the majority being reached in any event, excluding his votes. Where fraudulent means have been used in order to procure votes, the deliberation shall be null, even if the number of votes obtained through such means did not affect the majority. Under Lebanese law, the concept of the useful vote is set aside, in cases of fraud, as in cases of abuse of voting rights or abuse of majority. A deliberation may also be annulled where it is abusive, even though this ground for annulment is not expressly provided for by law.” “Whereas a violation of the provisions relating to authorisation results in the nullity of the contract, such nullity is, however, relative, and may be cured by approval, or more specifically, the subsequent approval of the contract by the general assembly following the submission of the board of directors’ report and the auditors’ report.” 50. For completeness I note that Mr S. Zreik also confirms this position: “(…) A director who takes part in the vote exposes the transaction in which he has an interest to nullity, even in the absence of proof of prejudice to the company, and even if his vote does not influence the outcome, the majority being reached in any event, excluding his votes. Where fraudulent means have been used in order to procure votes, the deliberation shall be null, even if the number of votes obtained through such means did not affect the majority. Under Lebanese law, the concept of the useful vote is set aside, in cases of fraud, as in cases of abuse of voting rights or abuse of majority. A deliberation may also be annulled where it is abusive, even though this ground for annulment is not expressly provided for by law.”
[1095]Professor Soumrani maintained such evidence in cross-examination (see Day 10 page 94 line 23 to page 95 line 5):
“ …the one who hasn't the right to vote, the fact that he attends, deliberates and vote vitiates the whole resolution. Because of the deliberation of this person, he can have influenced the remaining four persons and this is why his mere presence in the vote and voting, which is preceded by a deliberation, means that there is vitiation of the resolution that must be announced.”
[1096]It is said that this is simply ipse dixit, but it is not. It is giving meaning and effect to the first part [1] of the sentence, and it is giving expert evidence as to what the consequence of the same is as a matter of Lebanese law – the nullity of the resolution, like any other breach of Article 158. This aspect has already been addressed above (in Section D2). It will be recalled from the doctrinal writings (addressed in Section D2.5 above) that non-compliance with any of the requirements of Article 158 results in the relative nullity of the transaction.[1097]Thus, as Ghaleb Mahmassani, states (in Proche Orient études juridiques, 1969, p 64) under the heading “The Nullity of the Agreement”:
“Although Article 158 of the Code of Commerce does not expressly provide for the nullity of agreements concluded in violation of its regulatory provisions, it is undisputed that such nullity must be incurred for any failure to comply with any of the formalities required by the aforementioned article. Indeed, it is universally accepted that the omission of or non-compliance with a formality or condition established by the legislator as a prerequisite for the validity of a given legal act constitutes grounds for the nullity of that act, even in the absence of an explicit text stating such nullity…”
(emphasis added)[1098]There is no evidence that the law in this regard, in relation to Article 158, has changed substantially (or indeed at all) in this regard post 2019, nor has any reason for any change been identified. The point is that this sentence was inserted into Article 158 in 2019, and as such the question of the consequence of non-compliance with the first part has to be answered in the context of Article 158 as a whole (where the consequence of non-compliance has long been clear). Contrary to Mr Montagu-Smith’s oral submission in closing, Article 158 does not (“fall … to be interpreted afresh”). Rather the additional sentence has to be construed in the context of Article 158 as a whole.[1099]In this regard I accept the evidence of Professor Soumrani as to the effect of non-compliance with Article 158. I would simply add that Professor Soumrani’s evidence, and Cedar Mundi’s case on this sentence, not only gives meaning and effect to the prohibition in the first part [1] of the sentence, but also accords with the whole rationale of a conflicted director not being permitted to participate in the voting process with their involvement tainting the process if they do.[1100]I am accordingly satisfied, and find, that the highest courts of Lebanon would conclude that if a conflicted director participated in the voting process this would render the authorisation a nullity.[1101]The next question therefore, is whether Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet was a fraud in the narrow sense.

D5.2 Fraud in the narrow sense in Lebanese law

[1102]It is not disputed that Mr Attieh would have been within the list of related parties in Article 158 if he had still been a director of Fastnet (the general partner of Cedar II) when he attended the board meeting. The question that therefore arises is whether Mr Attieh’s resignation before the board meeting was a fraudulent act (in the narrow sense) such that it can be disregarded with the result that he is treated as a related party.[1103]The circumstances in which this arises were common ground between the experts. Professor Soumrani addresses fraud in the narrow/strict sense in these terms (Soumrani 2, at para 158): “158. Fraud stricto sensu or fraud to the law, expressed by the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit, is defined as the manipulation of legal rules one against the other, not fictitiously but genuinely, by altering a factual situation to activate a legal rule capable of neutralizing the rule that should have initially applied and that the fraudulent party wishes to evade, and thus achieving the desired result. In this situation, the fraudulent party does not simulate a deceptive appearance that contradicts reality; it alters instead this reality to fall outside the scope of the unfavorable legal provision [Footnote 92]”.[1104]Footnote 92 provides:
“92 J. Ghestin, [Traité de Droit Civil, Introduction Générale, 4th edition, LGDJ-Delta] p. 801,802 [Exhibit PS2/101]. See also: J. Ghestin, op. cit., p. 815. This would be the case, for example, when for the sole purpose of evading legal rules governing the termination of employment contract having an undetermined period (and which provide for a prior notice and compensation to the employee), an employer concludes with such employee successive employment contracts having each a limited and short period. … This should also be the case, in my opinion, when a director of a joint-stock company resigns from office shortly before a contemplated resolution to be passed or transaction to be entered into, so as to avoid being subjected to the legal constraints and rule that are imposed by law on directors.”
[1105]Professor Soumrani continued at paras 159 to 161 as follows:
“159. The sanction of fraud in the strict sense consists in the unenforceability of the fraudulent act. Mr J. Ghestin states that the sanction of the fraud in this case “must result in its own ineffectiveness”
. Thus, the distinctive nature of the sanction of fraud to the law lies in the fact that it restores the application of the rule that the fraudulent party sought to evade. 160. In practice, case law examination shows that the courts retain discretion to assess, on a case-by-case basis, the most appropriate sanction: whether to annul the entire transaction, or to merely declare it unenforceable. 161. In the absence of a legislative definition with general scope, Lebanese and French scholars, followed by Lebanese case law, consider that three cumulative elements are required to establish a fraud stricto sensu which will attract legal sanction: a. An imperative rule (legal element). Such rule can be any rule the conditions of which are met and that consequently becomes applicable and binding. The imperative rule can be a legal rule, such as the LCC, or a contractual obligation. b. A fraudulent intent (intentional element). According to French and Lebanese scholars, fraudulent intent is the deliberate will to circumvent an imperative rule. However, the weight of the fraudulent intent is not the same in the case of fraud in the strict sense as it is in the case of fraud in the broad sense. In the case of fraud in the broad sense, fraudulent intent is not essential, and does not constitute a core element of the fraud; it may, however, be taken into account by the courts to strengthen their legal reasoning. On the contrary, in the case of fraud in the strict sense, fraudulent intent must be established to sanction the maneuver undertaken by the fraudulent party; it is not sufficient to merely observe that the objective pursued by the legislator has not been achieved. Fraudulent intent, when it is required, needs in order to be established more than the mere knowledge or conscience of a result; it requires the intention to cause that result. Case law does not provide for a clear criterion to identify fraudulent intent; it rather considers a variety of indicators. Certain decisions imply, for instance, fraudulent intent when the act is carried out with the intent to harm a creditor or to evade the application of the law that would normally govern a situation. In other cases, the Lebanese Court of Cassation appears to require fraudulent collusion, that is the deliberate and informed cooperation of all parties to the fraudulent act. Such Court considered in this respect in a ruling dated 8 March 2011 that in the absence of evidence proving collusion between the seller and the buyer of a stock-in-trade with the intent of harming the rights of the property owner where the stock-in-trade was located, there is no ground for applying the legal principle fraus omnia corrumpit. c. The use of an effective and genuine legal mechanism (material element). In order to achieve his objective, the fraudulent party must alter the factual elements of his legal situation by means of an effective, genuine, and lawful mechanism; thereby removing itself from the scope of application of the imperative rule”. (emphasis added)[1106]I have highlighted the above passages because they show that fraudulent intent, when it is required, needs, in order to be established, more than the mere knowledge or conscience of a result; it requires the intention to cause that result, but, in this regard, case law does not provide for a clear criterion to identify fraudulent intent; it rather considers a variety of indicators. Certain decisions imply, for instance, fraudulent intent when the act is carried out (and he gives the example) to evade the application of the law that would normally govern a situation (which might well be thought to be highly apposite to the present situation). He then says that in other cases, the Lebanese Court of Cassation appears to require fraudulent collusion (that is the deliberate and informed cooperation of all parties to the fraudulent act).[1107]In cross-examination Mr Montagu-Smith focussed on this case and put to Professor Soumrani by reference to this Lebanese Court of Cassation case that, “Is it right then that if a Lebanese court was considering strict sense fraud, narrow sense fraud, it would conclude that what needs to be established is fraudulent collusion” to which Professor Soumrani replied “Yes” (Day 10 page 79 lines 20 to 24). I am satisfied that that answer can only be understood in the context of fraudulent intent involving two or more parties, and that the Lebanese law doctrine of fraud in the narrow sense is not so circumscribed in all cases, and certainly is not so circumscribed in the context of unilateral acts, which, by their very nature, cannot involve collusion, and cannot require collusion. To introduce such a requirement would deprive the doctrine of any application or effect in unilateral situations, and allow the very conduct that the doctrine is designed to prevent.[1108]In fact, and as is clear from para 158 of Professor Soumrani’s second report, and indeed what he states in para 161 itself, fraud in the strict sense in Lebanese law is not limited to fraudulent collusion. In this regard Mr Sakr unconditionally agrees with Professor Soumrani’s conclusions and propositions related to fraud in its narrow sense and the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit as set out in the entirety of Soumrani 2 paras 148 to 162 (see para 32 of the Lebanese Law Joint Statement which records Mr Sakr’s agreement). Yet further, the experts in summarising their conclusions in relation to this principle at para 33 of the Lebanese Law Joint Statement do not limit the principle to that of fraudulent collusion:
“33. These conclusions are summarized as follows: The concept of fraud has both a narrow (or strict) and a broad meaning. A fraudulent authorization or transaction by a director or agent of the company can be voided in the circumstances of fraud in its strict sense on the basis of the principle fraus omnia corrumpit i.e., whenever a legal subject evades a mandatory rule by deliberately altering his factual situation to fall outside its scope, and under the scope of a more favorable one.”
(emphasis added)[1109]I am satisfied that it is clear that in Lebanese law fraudulent intent is wider than, and is not limited to, a situation where there is fraudulent collusion. It is whenever a legal subject evades a mandatory rule by deliberately altering its factual situation to fall outside the imperative rule. It must also, as Professor Soumrani opines in his report, depend on the type of situation that is being considered. In the present case we are concerned with what is essentially a unilateral act, the resignation of Mr Attieh and so it is not a situation involving two persons colluding at all (fraudulent collusion requires the deliberate and informed cooperation of all parties to the fraudulent act). Here there is only one party to a unilateral act said to be acting with fraudulent intent. That is a situation which I am satisfied amounts to fraud in the narrow sense in Lebanese law.[1110]Here there is a director of a joint-stock company unilaterally resigning from office shortly before a contemplated resolution to be passed or transaction to be entered into, so as to avoid being subjected to the legal constraints and rules that are imposed by law on directors. In such a situation it is difficult to see who the other party to the collusion would be, or who there would be a collusion between (and the Defendants do not identify anyone else), yet the principle, as expressed, and agreed by both experts, is clearly wide enough (and apt) to cover the present unilateral situation. The gravamen of the fraudulent intent is whenever a legal subject evades a mandatory rule by deliberately altering the factual situation so as to fall outside the mandatory rule, which is precisely what the Claimant says Mr Attieh did.[1111]Accordingly, I am satisfied and find that the situation under contemplation is within the Lebanese law doctrine of fraud within the narrow sense, and where, as here, what is being considered is a unilateral act, there is no requirement for fraudulent collusion between two or more parties, and the highest courts in Lebanon would so find, consistent with the expert evidence that is before me. All that is necessary (in addition to the other requirements) is fraudulent intent by the party carrying out the unilateral act.[1112]Thus, to establish strict sense fraud, three elements needed to be made out:(1) an imperative rule;(2) a fraudulent intent; and(3) the use of a genuine and effective legal mechanism (see Soumrani 2, at para 161 as quoted above).

D5.3 Application to the facts

[1113]In the present case there is no dispute that there is a relevant imperative rule, namely the rule in Article 158 that none of the related parties defined in that Article “are entitled to participate in the voting process concerning the decision to grant or reject the authorization”. There is also no dispute that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 was genuine and effective (i.e. it was not a sham or void). The issue, therefore, is whether Mr Attieh resigned with a “fraudulent intent”. The Claimant submits that this is precisely what happened in the present case. Mr Najjar advised Mr Attieh that he was conflicted and, as a matter of pure form, he resigned his directorship of Fastnet. In those circumstances, the doctrine is engaged and the relevant sentence of Article 158 is engaged as addressed above.[1114]A preliminary point is that the Defendants say that the Claimant’s case is not pleaded, or not pleaded with the particularity required when pleading fraud. Upon examination it is readily apparent that this is an unmeritorious submission. First, the Claimant’s case is sufficiently pleaded. At paras 127 to 130 of the Amended Particulars of Claim it is pleaded:
“127. Further, and in any event, the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfers of the Interests thereunder, via the transfer of the IFAC Interest or otherwise) was (or were each): 127.A1. the type of transaction which could only be authorised by Cedar Mundi’s General Assembly (i.e., the transfer of the substantial majority of a company’s assets outside the ordinary course of business). 127.1. in any event a related-party transaction for the purposes of Article 158 LCC because Cedar II and/or Fastnet was in and/or affiliated to the Med Al Bahar Group which was also via MABIL a c.23% shareholder in Cedar Mundi and/or by reason of Mr Al Bahar’s status (and/or that of his family) as an indirect significant (>5%) shareholder in both Cedar II and Cedar Mundi. 127.1A. approved by Cedar Mundi’s Board of Directors only to permit the transaction to be considered at General Assembly (and with no intention of usurping the function of the General Assembly in that regard). 127.2. not approved (prior to the transaction or at all) by Cedar Mundi’s General Assembly nor permitted by any authorisation from the Board of Directors that was subsequently so ratified. 127.3. neither approved by the BdL nor was the BdL’s non-objection stance secured. 128. Further, neither Mr Attieh nor Ms Wafa Al Qatami was entitled to vote at the 16 March Board Meeting or the 13 April Board Meeting, which was contrary to Article 158 LCC. More particularly, pending disclosure and/or further information, Mr Attieh and/or Ms Wafa Al Qatami were each related parties under Article 158 LCC, including because, in the case of Mr Attieh, he was not only director of Cedar Mundi but also was a director of CMCH (which was the proposed fund manager and administrator of Cedar II), until 5 March 2021 was a director of Fastnet (the general partner of Cedar II), was a director of Fastnet Capital, was otherwise acting for or in the interests of Cedar II, and/or stood to benefit personally from the proposed transaction (as to which paragraph 75A above is repeated). 128A. Further, or alternatively, such inference to be drawn from (i) their Mr Attieh’s (known) roles and positions in the Med Al Bahar (and IFA) Group (as pleaded in Section I(B) above), including his appointment to the Board of Directors of Cedar Mundi as representatives of that group; (ii) his recognition that the authorisation granted by the Board of Directors in accordance with Article 158 LCC and the execution of the SPA (and thus any purported transfer thereunder) required the ratification of the General Assembly under Article 158 LCC (as is apparent from the minutes of the 13 April Board Meeting pleaded in paragraph 54 above); (iii) the fact that Mr Attieh did not contest the C-331 Shareholders’ position (set out in inter alia the correspondence pleaded in paragraph 48 above) that the transaction required ratification under Article 158 LCC; (iv) the secrecy of the execution of the SPA, as pleaded in paragraph 63 above; and/or (v) their his acting contrary to the interests of 55 A9/2/55Amended Particulars of Claim under CPR rule 17.1(2)(a) dated 3 December 2025 Cedar Mundi (and in favour of the Med Al Bahar (and IFA) Group or entities therein) in the respects pleaded above. In the premises, even the prior purported authorisation of the Board of Directors was void, independently of and in addition to the absence of ratification by the General Assembly under Article 158 LCC. 129. Further or alternatively, in the premises of paragraphs 75A, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81 and/or 127 above, each of Mr Attieh’s and Ms Wafa Al Qatami’s voting at the 16 March Board Meeting and/or the 13 April Board Meeting, the SPA, the Assignment Deed (or their execution) and any purported transfer of the Interests thereunder constituted a ‘fraudulent act’. For the avoidance of doubt, this was so regardless of whether those steps were otherwise purportedly authorised or was a related party transaction under Article 158 LCC: “129.1. …. 129.2. The SPA and the Assignment Deed (and thus any purported transfers thereunder) were each palpably contrary to the interests of Cedar Mundi and the C-331 Shareholders in at least the respects pleaded in paragraphs 77, 78 and 79 above. 129.3. It is to be inferred that each of Mr Attieh, Ms Wafa Al Qatami, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar and Mr Talal Al Bahar (and accordingly and via the attribution of their knowledge, conduct and intentions, variously to each of IFAC, IFAK, MABIL, MAB and (directly or indirectly, through Fastnet and/or MABIL) Cedar II, those entities) knew and intended this (and knew and intended that it was, on the contrary, in the interests of MABIL, IFAC, IFAK, Cedar II, MAB, and/or other entities in the Med Al Bahar (and IFA) Group and/or, through those entities, themselves). Paragraph 80 above is repeated. 129.4. It is to be inferred that the, or an, objective of the SPA and the Assignment Deed was that pleaded in paragraph 81 above. 129.4A. If the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfers of the Interests thereunder, via the transfer of the IFAC Interest or otherwise) was not subject to Article 158 LCC and/or other provisions of the LCC, that was by reason of some effective and genuine legal mechanism used to avoid such imperative rules of law with fraudulent intent. In particular, it is Cedar Mundi’s case that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC in the circumstances constituted a fraudulent act. 129.5. the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder involved the commission of offences as pleaded in Section VIII(C2) below. 129.6. In the premises, the 16 March Board Meeting and/or the 13 April Board Meeting, which each preceded the execution of and was in furtherance of the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder were (or the participation in and voting at by Mr Attieh and Ms Wafa Al Qatami were) also, therefore, a ‘fraudulent act’. 130. Accordingly, the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfer of the Interests thereunder) was (or were each) unauthorised and accordingly void.”
(emphasis added) 127.A1. the type of transaction which could only be authorised by Cedar Mundi’s General Assembly (i.e., the transfer of the substantial majority of a company’s assets outside the ordinary course of business). 127.1. in any event a related-party transaction for the purposes of Article 158 LCC because Cedar II and/or Fastnet was in and/or affiliated to the Med Al Bahar Group which was also via MABIL a c.23% shareholder in Cedar Mundi and/or by reason of Mr Al Bahar’s status (and/or that of his family) as an indirect significant (>5%) shareholder in both Cedar II and Cedar Mundi. 127.1A. approved by Cedar Mundi’s Board of Directors only to permit the transaction to be considered at General Assembly (and with no intention of usurping the function of the General Assembly in that regard). 127.2. not approved (prior to the transaction or at all) by Cedar Mundi’s General Assembly nor permitted by any authorisation from the Board of Directors that was subsequently so ratified. 127.3. neither approved by the BdL nor was the BdL’s non-objection stance secured. “129.1. …. 129.2. The SPA and the Assignment Deed (and thus any purported transfers thereunder) were each palpably contrary to the interests of Cedar Mundi and the C-331 Shareholders in at least the respects pleaded in paragraphs 77, 78 and 79 above. 129.3. It is to be inferred that each of Mr Attieh, Ms Wafa Al Qatami, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar and Mr Talal Al Bahar (and accordingly and via the attribution of their knowledge, conduct and intentions, variously to each of IFAC, IFAK, MABIL, MAB and (directly or indirectly, through Fastnet and/or MABIL) Cedar II, those entities) knew and intended this (and knew and intended that it was, on the contrary, in the interests of MABIL, IFAC, IFAK, Cedar II, MAB, and/or other entities in the Med Al Bahar (and IFA) Group and/or, through those entities, themselves). Paragraph 80 above is repeated. 129.4. It is to be inferred that the, or an, objective of the SPA and the Assignment Deed was that pleaded in paragraph 81 above. 129.4A. If the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfers of the Interests thereunder, via the transfer of the IFAC Interest or otherwise) was not subject to Article 158 LCC and/or other provisions of the LCC, that was by reason of some effective and genuine legal mechanism used to avoid such imperative rules of law with fraudulent intent. In particular, it is Cedar Mundi’s case that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC in the circumstances constituted a fraudulent act. 129.5. the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder involved the commission of offences as pleaded in Section VIII(C2) below. 129.6. In the premises, the 16 March Board Meeting and/or the 13 April Board Meeting, which each preceded the execution of and was in furtherance of the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder were (or the participation in and voting at by Mr Attieh and Ms Wafa Al Qatami were) also, therefore, a ‘fraudulent act’. 130. Accordingly, the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfer of the Interests thereunder) was (or were each) unauthorised and accordingly void.”[1115]It is clear from the above, and in particular those pleas highlighted above, that Cedar Mundi pleaded (amongst other matters)(1) that Mr Attieh was not entitled to vote at the 13 April 2021 board meeting (para 128),(2) that one of the reasons for this was because Mr Attieh was “until 5 March 2021 a director of Fastnet” (para 128) and(3) that Mr Attieh’s, “voting … at the …. 13 April Board Meeting … constituted a fraudulent act” (para 129). Yet further para 129.4A expressly pleaded out a case involving the three ingredients of fraud in the narrow sense under Lebanese law – i.e., that Article 158 had been avoided by reason of “some effective and genuine legal mechanism used to avoid such imperative rules of law with fraudulent intent. In particular, it is Cedar Mundi’s case that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC in the circumstances constituted a fraudulent act”. As foreshadowed by the words “In particular” these were particulars of the plea, and it is clear what the Claimant was alleging against Mr Attieh.[1116]In such circumstances, I am satisfied that the case now advanced was sufficiently pleaded. The Defendants expressly joined issue with such pleas, and pleaded back to such pleas, in their Defence, and in the widest of terms that make clear that they understood perfectly well what was being alleged viz Mr Attieh and fraudulent intent (see also the Amended Defence and Counterclaim at para 236). The Defendants were expressly on notice that the Claimant’s case was that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet was to avoid the application of Article 158 and in the circumstances constituted a fraudulent act. It is notable (in contrast to their stance in closing) that they did not seek further particulars or suggest that the plea was not properly particularised contemporaneously or indeed seek to strike the plea out as improperly pleaded or lacking in particularity. The reality is that there were, and would be, two aspects to a consideration of the plea, the documents and the evidence of Mr Attieh, both could be addressed, and were addressed, based on the pleaded case.[1117]Second, therefore, the Defendants were in a position to meet such case, and the Defendants (including Mr Attieh as the First Defendant) knew perfectly well the case they had to meet. Indeed, Mr Attieh specifically addressed the plea (and without any protestation of difficulty in doing so) in Section D of Attieh 2 at paras 60 and 61:
“D. My Directorship of Fastnet “60. I understand that at paragraph 129.4A of the APoC {A9/2/56}, Cedar Mundi alleges that I resigned from Fastnet to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC and this constituted a fraudulent act. This is not true. 61. I was initially appointed director of Fastnet in order to be able to expedite the administrative tasks necessary to incorporate the GP entity. This is part of my role, as Talal and Marzouq do not deal with these kinds of technicalities. After Fastnet was incorporated, I resigned from my directorship because Nadi advised me that it was best I step down so as not to create confusion ahead of the authorisation of the proposed sale of Cedar Mundi’s portfolio assets under Article 158 of the LCC. I do not recall if Nadi provided this advice to me in writing or orally, and when he did so. I resigned my directorship on 5 March 2021. My understanding at the time was that Article 158 would apply to the proposed transaction whether or not I was a director of Fastnet. I did not think that by resigning, Article 158 could be avoided.”
[1118]It will be seen that Mr Attieh does descend, in detail, and with particularity as to what he was allegedly advised, and he is clearly addressing this because he is aware of, and dealing with, the plea of fraudulent intent on his part. Contrary to the Defendants’ submission in oral closing, it is clear that this was properly addressed in the evidence, indeed in Mr Attieh’s own evidence, and unsurprisingly (and as Mr Attieh and the Defendants no doubt anticipated), Mr Attieh was perfectly properly cross-examined about his resignation from Fastnet and was asked directly about his resignation and replied directly thereto (and all without objection from the Defendants). His evidence in this regard, is addressed in due course below. There can be no suggestion of prejudice or unfairness or that Mr Attieh was wrong footed. He addressed the pleaded allegation head on and was cross-examined about it head on.[1119]Third, in terms of fraud in the narrow sense and the relevant principles, this was also expressly addressed in the List of Issues and in the expert evidence, and both parties had every opportunity to say whatever they wished about that doctrine both in terms of factual and expert evidence, before trial, at trial, and in closing submissions.[1120]In such circumstances I am satisfied there is no merit in the Defendants’ point as to the pleaded issues.[1121]Turning to the facts, I am in no doubt whatsoever that Mr Attieh resigned from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 so as to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC in the circumstances that constituted a fraudulent act. I am satisfied that his whole (and only) purpose in doing so was to seek to avoid the application of Article 158 due to his position as a director of Fastnet.[1122]I have already addressed the chronology of events in this regard in Section B5.5. It will be recalled that, at least by 2 March 2021, Mr Attieh was conscious of the risk that he was in a personal conflict of interest position, and he sought advice on this from Mr Najjar’s firm. He also sought advice at the same time as to whether “the sale of a portion of the portfolio is a ‘tacit’ liquidation” requiring general assembly approval under the Article 157 of the LCC. Mr Najjar responded by calling Mr Attieh the following day (3 March 2021), during or following which he sent Mr Attieh a picture of Article 158 of the LCC, in the background of which was a print-out of Mr Attieh’s email together with the manuscript note “Yes – BA conflict”:[1123]I do not consider that this document can be dismissed as “a fragment of a note which has been cut off” (as the Defendants sought to belittle it in closing). It is clear on its face as being advice from Mr Najjar to Mr Attieh as to whether there was a conflict (advice Mr Attieh had actually sought from Mr Najjar the previous day, and which Mr Najjar is clearly giving). Mr Attieh resigned from Fastnet only two days later (and long before the WhatsApp message on 11 March 2021 that Mr Montagu-Smith referred to in closing, which is not in point being long after the resignation from Fastnet).[1124]When the “Yes – BA Conflict” document was put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination (Day 7 page 169 lines 19 to 20) he replied, “Well, frankly I didn't actually at the time look at this”. Quite apart from my findings about Mr Attieh and his evidence generally (see Section B2.3 above), and this being a classic example of deflection, this answer defies belief in its own right given that Mr Attieh was indisputably seeking advice from Mr Najjar, and Mr Najjar is here, indisputably giving him advice that he is conflicted (“Yes – BA conflict”) and it defies belief that Mr Attieh would not therefore look at what he was being sent which in clear and unequivocal terms identifies the advice that he is being given which is that he has a conflict.[1125]Mr Attieh also accepted in cross-examination that he knew that the 2021 Transaction would be a related-party transaction (see Day 7 page 170 at line 2). I found his (inconsistent) contention that, Mr Najjar had advised him that he was not conflicted not only improbable (not least given the above contrary advice from Mr Najjar, and the fact that Mr Attieh was obviously a related party in Lebanese law at this time as is common ground) but again incapable of belief (see Day 7 page 170 lines 3 to 17).[1126]Mr Attieh contended that his subsequent resignation as a director of Fastnet on 5 March 2021 was not because of any conflict but rather to be on the “safe side” and to avoid any “confusion” as to the application of new version of Article 158 (Day 7 page 170 line 23 to page 171 line 10):
“A. Fastnet GP, yes, I resigned basically after setting up Fastnet GP, yes, because Nadi Najjar told me there is confusion about basically whether or not basically this would pose a problem. We don't know yet because it's a new law but just to be on the safe side resign, which I resigned. Q. Right. So let's be very clear about that. They were saying that potentially if you stayed on, you would be conflicted and that your vote may not count? A. What Mr Najjar was saying, he's saying it's a new law, it's uncertain, just to be on the safe side just resign basically, so we don't have any confusion. That basically was his advice and I actually followed it.”
[1127]I find this evidence incredible. Mr Najjar (who was not called to give evidence by the Defendants about what was, after all, alleged oral advice) has clearly advised that Mr Attieh is conflicted, Mr Najjar is a lawyer, he would not be confused as to whether there is a problem, and the suggestion that Mr Attieh resign “to be on the safe side” does not have the ring of truth about it, and I reject such evidence. I am satisfied that Mr Attieh was resigning from Fastnet precisely because he knew he was conflicted, and in order to avoid the prohibition in Article 158 against him voting as a conflicted director, and to ensure that his vote would count at any board meetings voting on the 2021 Transaction. I am satisfied that that is the truth as to why Mr Attieh resigned and that fulfils all the elements of fraud in the narrow sense, as he had the necessary fraudulent intent to evade the imperative rule in Article 158 when it would otherwise have applied. Such conclusion is also bolstered and reinforced by the fact that Mr Attieh had no credible reason for resigning from Fastnet at this time (again contrary to his evidence), not least in circumstances where there is no evidence that Mr Attieh otherwise stepped back from acting on the Cedar II side of the transaction as well as continuing to act for Cedar Mundi.[1128]Accordingly, I am satisfied that the doctrine is engaged, and it is common ground that the consequence is that Mr Attieh is to be treated as still being a director of Fastnet for the purposes of the board meeting, with the consequence that Mr Attieh is treated as a related party for the purpose of Article 158 (Defendants’ Closing Submissions para 534).[1129]In such circumstances, and in circumstances in which Mr Attieh participated in the voting process, on the proper interpretation of the relevant sentence in Article 158 (as addressed above), this renders the authorisation a nullity for the reasons given above.

D5.4 Conclusion on Issue 5

[1130]Accordingly Issue 5(1) “At the board meeting on 13 April 2021: (1) Was Mr Attieh prohibited from voting by Article 158 by reason of the circumstances of his resignation from Fastnet (applying the Lebanese doctrine of fraudulent acts in its strict sense)?” is to be answered in the affirmative.[1131]Equally, Issue 5(2), “ If Mr Attieh was not entitled to vote at the meeting (or is to be treated as not having been entitled to vote) was the effect of Article 158 that the board meeting was invalidly constituted?” is to be answered in the affirmative, and the consequence is that the authorisation was a nullity.[1132]Thus again, and subject to Issue 7(2), the 2021 Transaction is void. D6. WAS THE 2021 TRANSACTION A FRAUDULENT ACT (IN ITS BROAD SENSE) (ISSUE 6)[1133]Issue 6 is:
“Was the 2021 Transaction unauthorised because it was a fraudulent act (in its broad sense)?”

D6.1 Fraud in the broad sense in Lebanese law

[1134]The meaning of fraud in a broad sense in Lebanese law is common ground between the experts, and is summarised by them in these terms at para 33 of the Lebanese Law Joint Statement:
“The authorization or transaction can also be voided by reason of fraud in its broad sense, which means the existence of illicit manoeuvres, including deceit and trickery.”
[1135]Professor Soumrani expanded on this exposition of fraud in the broad sense at paras 148 to 162 of Soumrani 2 (with which Mr Sakr agreed – see para 32 of the Joint Statement). In particular, Professor Soumrani states at para 156 of Soumrani 2:
“Fraud in the broad sense encompasses various forms of dishonest conduct, including deceit, trickery, and fraudulent manipulation intended either to circumvent a rule of law, or to mislead a contracting party. This definition is confirmed by Mr P. Toubia who defines fraud in its broad sense as illicit manoeuvres, including deceit and trickery. In these cases of fraud, the fraudulent party often seeks to conceal a factual situation to avoid its legal consequences. The fraudulent party hence demonstrates considerable creativity in constructing a fictitious transaction designed to obscure its true intent and achieve a result prohibited by law. Ultimately, fraud in the broad sense consists of a deception, often reinforced by a deliberately orchestrated scheme.”
[1136]P Toubia stated that “[f]raud, in its broad sense, means: an illicit maneuver, trickery, or deception. This concept encompasses deceit committed at the time of the formation of legal acts, as well as unlawful simulated transactions involving fraud”.[1137]Equally, J Ghestin states that “In its broad sense, the word “fraud” is synonymous with fraudulent maneuver, trickery or deception”.[1138]In the Defendants’ Written Closing Submissions (at para 561) it is suggested that fraud in the broad sense is akin to the English tort of deceit (it appears latching onto the reference to “deceit” in the above passage from P Toubia).[1139]However, there is no supporting Lebanese law evidence for this submission. The reference to deceit by P Toubia is simply that encompassed within fraud in the broad sense is deceit, from which it is clear that deceit far from being the whole universe of fraud in its broad sense is but one example of what is within it. Even in relation to such reference to deceit there is no Lebanese evidence of what deceit involves in Lebanese law, or indeed that it is a distinct legal concept, as opposed to a mere description of an example of fraudulent manoeuvre, trickery or deception.[1140]Indeed, it is clear that fraud in its broad senses is wider than, and different to, deceit as a matter of English law. The requirements of deceit in English law have been well established at least since Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 - i.e. a false representation made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, intended to be relied upon, that is relied upon resulting in loss. It is clear, however, that fraud in its broad sense in Lebanese law is not limited to misrepresentation.[1141]In his oral closing submissions, Mr Montagu-Smith submitted (without any support from the Lebanese law experts) that you have to have reliance as a matter of Lebanese law for broad sense fraud (Day 17 page 182 line 13). He cited no Lebanese authority or doctrinal writing for that proposition, nor any view expressed by either expert. Rather he argued that fraud consists of a deception, which is someone being tricked and you have to rely on something to be tricked (Day 17 page 182 line 16 to page 184 line 25).[1142]I have no doubt that fraud in the broad sense will include the type of conduct being posited by Mr Montagu-Smith, but it is not so confined based on the expert evidence before me. In Lebanese law fraud in its broad sense, means “the existence of illicit manoeuvres, including deceit and trickery” and “encompasses various forms of dishonest conduct, including deceit, trickery, and fraudulent manipulation intended either to circumvent a rule of law, or to mislead a contracting party”. From this very definition it can be seen that it includes “circumventing a rule of law”, and there can be no requirement of reliance there, and it clearly extends to omissions (as I understood the Defendants to accept). Once one is in the world of omission this is potentially wider than the English law of deceit where there is still debate whether a pure omission (absent a duty to speak) is actionable. I also do not accept that “illicit manoeuvres”, “deception” and “trickery” necessarily require reliance (and the same has certainly not been proved as a matter of Lebanese law before me). Yet further, once one is in the world of omission “reliance” can be somewhat artificial as ex hypothesi the other party does not know of the matter that is concealed. If one were even in that world, it would be a counter-factual world (if I had been told that, then …).[1143]The reason why the Defendants are so keen to stray so far from the Lebanese law evidence that is before me is clear. It is in support of their submission that the pleas of broad sense fraud should have included express pleas (and particularised pleas) of detrimental reliance, with specific evidence being adduced of such detrimental reliance. I do not consider that is correct, given that it has not been established that detrimental reliance is a requisite element of broad sense fraud in Lebanese law, and had it so featured then one would have expected it to have been articulated by the Lebanese law experts in their reports, or addressed with them in cross-examination. Neither occurred.

D6.2 Application to the facts

[1144]There is, however, more merit in a wider submission of the Defendants as to what is pleaded by the Claimant, and what is then relied upon by the Claimant in closing.[1145]The Claimant’s pleaded case on fraudulent intent is set out at para 129 of the APoC (cross-referring back to a number of earlier paras of the APoC). Paragraph 129 is as follows:
“129. Further or alternatively, in the premises of paragraphs 75A, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81 and/or 127 above, each of Mr Attieh’s and Ms Wafa Al Qatami’s voting at the 16 March Board Meeting and/or the 13 April Board Meeting, the SPA, the Assignment Deed (or their execution) and any purported transfer of the Interests thereunder constituted a ‘fraudulent act’. For the avoidance of doubt, this was so regardless of whether those steps were otherwise purportedly authorised or was a related party transaction under Article 158 LCC: 129.1. … 129.2. The SPA and the Assignment Deed (and thus any purported transfers thereunder) were each palpably contrary to the interests of Cedar Mundi and the C-331 Shareholders in at least the respects pleaded in paragraphs 77, 78 and 79 above. 129.3. It is to be inferred that each of Mr Attieh, Ms Wafa Al Qatami, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar and Mr Talal Al Bahar (and accordingly and via the attribution of their knowledge, conduct and intentions, variously to each of IFAC, IFAK, MABIL, MAB and (directly or indirectly, through Fastnet and/or MABIL) Cedar II, those entities) knew and intended this (and knew and intended that it was, on the contrary, in the interests of MABIL, IFAC, IFAK, Cedar II, MAB, and/or other entities in the Med Al Bahar (and IFA) Group and/or, through those entities, themselves). Paragraph 80 above is repeated. 129.4. It is to be inferred that the, or an, objective of the SPA and the Assignment Deed was that pleaded in paragraph 81 above. 129.4A. If the SPA and the Assignment Deed (and any purported transfers of the Interests thereunder, via the transfer of the IFAC Interest or otherwise) was not subject to Article 158 LCC and/or other provisions of the LCC, that was by reason of some effective and genuine legal mechanism used to avoid such imperative rules of law with fraudulent intent. In particular, it is Cedar Mundi’s case that Mr Attieh’s resignation from Fastnet on 5 March 2021 to avoid the application of Article 158 LCC in the circumstances constituted a fraudulent act. 129.5. the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder involved the commission of offences as pleaded in Section VIII(C2) below. 129.6. In the premises, the 16 March Board Meeting and/or the 13 April Board Meeting, which each preceded the execution of and was in furtherance of the SPA, the Assignment Deed and any purported transfer thereunder were (or the participation in and voting at by Mr Attieh and Ms Wafa Al Qatami were) also, therefore, a ‘fraudulent act’.”
[1146]In essence the fraud is alleged to be that a transaction was voted on and executed which was, and was known, and intended to be, contrary to Cedar Mundi’s interests. However, such a case does not (as such) plead particulars of illicit manoeuvres, including deceit and trickery.[1147]Such case is to be contrasted with the Claimant’s submissions on fraud in the broad sense in their written closings at paras 437 to 440:
“437. As a final fallback, even if the 13 April 2021 board meeting had otherwise conferred effective authority on Mr Attieh to enter into the SPA and transfer Cedar Mundi’s investment portfolio under it to Cedar II, Cedar Mundi contends that the 2021 Transaction was a fraudulent act. 438. Mr Attieh’s conduct throughout is properly to be characterised as dishonest, involving a series of fraudulent manipulations and illicit manoeuvres, with material information that should have been shared with the C-331 Shareholders and Cedar Mundi’s board of directors concealed until after the 13 April 2021 board meeting. Cedar Mundi relies on Mr Attieh’s entire course of conduct as set out in Section B above. 439. Mr Attieh’s trickery of the board of directors and the C-331 Shareholders includes, most obviously, the existence and effect of the 2020 Transaction. That was carefully concealed until after the 13 April 2021 board meeting, including by holding back any SPA drafts until after the board meeting, and drafting the HoTs and the Fairness Opinion in a way which did not disclose the existence of the IFAC or the 2020 Transaction. Mr Attieh knew that revealing the 2020 Transaction before the 13 April 2021 board meeting would prevent reaching any agreement on the board resolutions. 440. Mr Attieh’s fraudulent conduct also includes his concealed involvement on both sides of the 2021 Transaction from August 2020 onwards, including: (1) the drafting the HoTs (which was then presented as coming from KHCK); (2) calculating the consideration to be offered for Cedar Mundi or its investment portfolio (the workings for which were never disclosed until this litigation—unsurprisingly since that analysis presented the economics of the deal in a fundamentally different light); (3) substantially changing the terms of the Fairness Opinion (which was then presented as being an independent assessment by BSEC); (4) holding back (from the banks but not the Al Bahar group) relevant information about the Proximie fundraise; (5) concealing any intention to proceed with the 2021 Transaction without a general assembly meeting (despite Mr Attieh’s preparation of the analyse juridique prior to the 13 April 2021 meeting); and (6) concealing from the board and the C-331 Shareholders the confirmation provided by Allen & Overy in their letter of 28 May 2021 concerning Daikin’s proposed investment in White Lab .”
(emphasis added)[1148]Such submissions are not encompassed within what is pleaded at para 129 and the paras cross-referred thereto in the APoC, but do assert a case of fraud in the broad sense. However, that is not a pleaded case (save as discussed below in relation to the 2020 Transaction), and the submissions are also very wide ranging and are largely unparticularised. Section B, which is relied upon as to the “series of fraudulent manipulations and illicit manoeuvres”, is some 77 odd pages long and is the entirety of the factual section (the Claimant’s case on the facts) – the equivalent of Section B of this judgment. No doubt the Claimant could have drawn out particular matters (and indeed they do at paras 439 and 440) and pleaded such a case. However subject to what I say below it has not done so.[1149]In his oral closing submissions (at Day 16 page 23 lines 3 to 6) Mr Wilson candidly stated, “We recognise that our pleading on this could have been fuller in terms of our fraud pleading but again the question is really where does that leave us in terms of substantive fairness or unfairness” and “it would really be a question of … every time we refer to the facts, cross-referencing over that to our fraud plea, and that it can fairly be said against us, hasn’t been done as fully as perhaps one would like in hindsight. However, my answer to that is a substantive point about whether this has led to any substantive unfairness” (Day 16 page 23 line 4 to page 24 line 2). In relation to this point Mr Wilson then submitted as follows (Day 16 page 24 lines 8 to 17): “So whilst we didn’t specifically cross-refer to each of those factual matters they were all squarely put to Mr Attieh, he gave his evidence on those matters, and importantly the defendants are not now saying that they would have adduced further or different evidence if our pleaded case had been expressed differently or they’re not saying that there’s some other prejudice to them. So as I say, they’ve managed – they’ve been perfectly able and have dealt with in some detail the whole of the factual case”.[1150]In contrast to the Claimant’s case in relation to narrow sense fraud which I am satisfied was sufficiently pleaded (as addressed above) I do not consider that the case as sought to be advanced in closing in relation to broad sense fraud was sufficiently pleaded, (subject to what I address below in relation to the 2020 Transaction and its concealment by reference to the Heads of Term). I consider that in the context of what is a plea of fraud, the Claimant should, at the very least, plead the matters that are said to amount to illicit manoeuvres, including deceit and trickery.[1151]The Claimant did plead that the 2020 Transaction was concealed, albeit (expressly) as a particular of why the 2020 Transaction was void as a fraudulent act, it being pleaded at para 43.2 of the APoC:
“43.2. The IFAC Transaction was (so Cedar Mundi infers, deliberately) concealed by at least Mr Attieh, Ms Wafa Al Qatami, Mr Talal Al Bahar, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar, IFAC, MABIL and MAB (or some of them) from Cedar Mundi, Midclear SAL (the custodian and administrator of the fund) (“Midclear”), Cedar Mundi’s auditors, the C-331 Shareholders and (Cedar Mundi infers) the BdL: 43.2.1. As pleaded above, Mr Attieh never referred to the PPC Agreement or provided a copy of it to Cedar Mundi, its Investment Committee, any of the C-331 Shareholders or to Cedar Mundi’s Board of Directors or General Assembly. The IFAC Transaction was never put before the Investment Committee at all. 43.2.2. Ms Wafa Al Qatami (and Mr Talal Al Bahar, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar, IFAC, MABIL and MAB) also never referred to the PPC Agreement or provided a copy of it to Cedar Mundi, its Investment Committee, any of the C-331 Shareholders or to Cedar Mundi’s Board of Directors or General Assembly. 43.2.3. As Mr Attieh acknowledged in his margin comment on the draft SPA on or about 30 April 2021, Mr Attieh did not seek the consent or approval of the Board of Directors, the General Assembly or any of the C-331 Shareholders for any of the PPC Agreement, the Trust Undertaking or the purported transfers that they envisaged. 43.2.4. Mr Attieh did not even inform the Board of Directors, the General Assembly or any of the C-331 Shareholders of any purported transfer of the Portfolio Assets to IFAC. Neither did Ms Wafa Al Qatami or any of Mr Talal Al Bahar, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar, IFAC, MABIL or MAB. 43.2.5. None of Cedar II, KHCK, MABIL or Mr Talal Al Bahar referred to the IFAC Transaction in the Heads of Terms (pleaded below) circulated in 2021, which set out a proposal for the purchase by Cedar II of various of Cedar Mundi’s assets. 43.2.6. Cedar II only provided a copy of the PPC Agreement for the first time on 29 May 2024 in connection with the Cedar II Proceedings. Cedar Mundi does not presently know how Cedar II, which was not a party to the PPC Agreement, obtained a copy of it. 43.2.7. To the best of Cedar Mundi’s knowledge, except in the limited and incomplete respect pleaded in paragraph 36 above, none of Mr Attieh, Ms Wafa Al Qatami, Ms Talal Al Bahar, Mr Marzouq Al Bahar, IFAC, MABIL or MAB informed any of Cedar Mundi, Midclear, Cedar Mundi’s auditors, the C-331 Shareholders or the BdL of the IFAC Transaction. 43.2.8. Cedar II also did not inform any of Cedar Mundi, Midclear, Cedar Mundi’s auditors, the C-331 Shareholders or the BdL of the existence or content of the PPC Agreement or the Trust Undertaking in the lead up to or in the context of the execution of the SPA or Assignment Deed (which are pleaded below).”
[1152]Whilst it is true that there was not a cross-reference to para 43.2 in para 129, Mr Attieh’s concealment of the 2020 Transaction from Cedar Mundi and the shareholders in advance of the 13 April 2021 board meeting was expressly, and extensively, explored with Mr Attieh in cross-examination in the context of why the Heads of Terms (HoT) were drafted in the way they were (namely to conceal the 2020 Transaction).[1153]As I have already found above (in Section B5.5) I am satisfied that the HoT were drafted deliberately to avoid any reference to IFAC or the fact that the majority of Cedar Mundi’s investments were now held indirectly via IFAC, but rather gave the impression that Cedar Mundi wholly and directly owned the interests referred to in the HoT, and I infer that the HoT were drafted in the way they were to avoid disclosing the 2020 Transaction to the C-331 Shareholders.[1154]Such a case was fairly put to Mr Attieh in cross-examination both in terms of concealment (Day 7 page 143 line 7 to page 144 line 19), and in more neutral terms (once it was clear that Mr Attieh denied any proposition that involved the word “conceal” - see Day 7 page 144 line 20 to page 145 line 10, but Mr Attieh (implausibly) denied the same (either as something “concealed” or even when put in neutral terms - see, in particular, Day 7 page 145 lines 13 to 23).[1155]In the above circumstances, and whilst it would have been better (from a pleading perspective) if paragraph 43.2 had been cross-referred to in paragraph 129 of the APoC, the Defendants and Mr Attieh were, and are, well aware of the Claimant’s case in this regard (which was an obvious one given the terms of the HoT and the non-disclosure of the 2020 Transaction in advance of the 13 April 2021 board meeting), Mr Attieh was able to deal, and did deal with such case, which was squarely put to him, and the Defendants and Mr Attieh have not suggested (and in reality could not suggest) that they would have adduced further or different evidence if the case now relied upon had been pleaded more specifically. There can be no suggestion of any prejudice in the Claimant being permitted to advance such a case in closing.[1156]Accordingly, and whilst I do consider that the wider allegations of broad sense fraud first advanced in closing cannot properly be relied upon by the Claimant, I am satisfied that the Claimant can properly and fairly rely upon Mr Attieh’s concealment of the 2020 Transaction before and at the time of the 13 April 2021 meeting, and I am satisfied that that does amount to fraud in the broad sense. In such circumstances such broad sense fraud vitiated any alleged authority conferred upon Mr Attieh on 13 April 2021 (the source of any authority to enter into the SPA and the Assignment Deed). This is, therefore, a yet further reason why the 13 April 2021 board meeting did not confer authority on Mr Attieh to enter into the SPA.

D6.3 Conclusion on Issue 6

[1157]Accordingly Issue 6, “Was the 2021 Transaction unauthorised because it was a fraudulent act (in its broad sense)?” is to be answered in the affirmative. E. FURTHER VALIDITY ISSUES ON BOTH TRANSACTIONS E1. INTRODUCTION[1158]In circumstances in which Issue 7(1) (ratification and the 2020 Transaction) and Issue 8 (illegality) no longer arose for consideration by the time of the parties’ oral closing submissions, the only remaining further validity issue that arises for consideration is Issue 7(2), which is addressed below. E2. RATIFICATION (ISSUE 7(2))

E2.1 Introduction

[1159]Issue 7(2) arises because the Court has concluded that the 2021 Transaction was not authorised for one or more of the reasons found in Section D above. Issue 7(2) is:
“As to ratification: (2) Was the 2021 Transaction ratified by the board meeting on 25 October 2021 and/or by Cedar Mundi accepting receipt of the cash consideration pursuant to the SPA, retaining that cash consideration and/or using some of those funds for its own purposes?” (2) Was the 2021 Transaction ratified by the board meeting on 25 October 2021 and/or by Cedar Mundi accepting receipt of the cash consideration pursuant to the SPA, retaining that cash consideration and/or using some of those funds for its own purposes?”

E2.2 Applicable Principles

[1160]It is common ground that ratification in relation to the 2021 Transaction is governed by English law. The applicable principles of English law were, unsurprisingly, largely common ground between the parties although there were differences in emphasis on particular aspects of the principles between the parties. I take what follows largely from the parties’ respective Written Closing Submissions (neither party taking issue with their respective identification of the principles in their oral closing submissions).[1161]Ratification is actual authority conferred after the event, see Koenigsblatt v Sweet [1923] 2 Ch 314 (CA) at 325 (per Lord Sterndale MR) and as it is put by the editors of Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency 23rd ed (2023) para 2.048, “ratification should be regarded as providing a normal case of agency, but one where the intention of the parties is given effect to retrospectively”.[1162]It is only available where the unauthorised agent purports to be acting for the principal: Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240 (HL). Its primary function is to enable principals to sue on contracts where the agent had only apparent authority (which acts as an estoppel and so permits the third party to sue the principal but not vice-versa). Thus “a transaction with an agent known to have no authority would be a complete nullity”, and so outwith the scope of any putative act of ratification (see Bowstead & Reynolds, para 2.051). Consistent with its nature as ex post facto actual authority, the principal must have had the capacity to enter into the transaction at the relevant time (see Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Farnham [1957] 1 WLR 1051 (Ch)). Thus, until there was statutory reform in UK companies law, ratification could not be effective in respect of acts that were nullities as a matter of company law (see Bowstead & Reynolds, para 2.058). It is not suggested that the 2021 Transaction was ultra vires (in terms of the capacity of the company to contract for the purposes of ratification).[1163]The adoption of part of a transaction operates as a ratification of the whole (see Bowstead & Reynolds, at 2-074). In this regard, and as is stated by the editors of Bowstead & Reynolds at para 2-081:
“A principal cannot adopt the favourable parts of a transaction and disaffirm the rest: the principal cannot approbate and reprobate,” reprobate, for this would enable the principal to effect a transaction into which the third party had never intended to enter. A principal must therefore adopt or reject the transaction in toto, and where it can be said that this has not been done, the conclusion may be drawn that there was no ratification (though where an agent has effected several separate transactions, the principal may ratify certain transactions individually and refuse to ratify others).”
[1164]A party may ratify a transaction even after he has first refused to do (see Bowstead & Reynolds at paras 2-084 and 2-085) and a principal may ratify a contract even where it was procured by fraud (see Bowstead & Reynolds at para 2-055:
“Even a contract induced by a fraudulent, and therefore tortious, profession of agency can be ratified, though the agent might be liable to the principal. The right to rescind for misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or innocent, is clearly extinguished.”
[1165]Ratification has three principal requirements. First, there must be an act of ratification that objectively evinces an intention to adopt the unauthorised conduct of the agent. That “may be expressed in words or implied from or involved in acts … when you cannot logically analyse the act without imputing such approval to the party”: Harrison & Crossfield Ltd v London & North-Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 755 (KB) at 758 (Rowlatt J).[1166]As was stated by Andrew Smith J in Sea Emerald SA v Prominvestbank v Joint Stockpoint Commercial Industrial and Investment Bank [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep Plus 96, at [102]:
“102. The principles governing ratification by a purported principal of an act done in his name were considered by Waller J in Suncorp Insurance and Finance v Milano Assicurazioni SpA [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 225 especially at page 234 and by Moore-Bick J in Yona International Ltd v La RéunionFrancaise SA [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 84 especially at pages 103 and 106. Ratification may be implied as well as express, and there is no requirement that it be communicated to either the agent or the person with whom the agent entered into the contract: it operates as a unilateral manifestation of will. Mere acquiescence or inactivity may be sufficient to constitute ratification. However, it involves a conscious decision to adopt an unauthorised act, and in order for there to be ratification: (i) The act of ratification must be that of the principal or of someone competent at the time of ratification to make the contract in question or to do the relevant act for the principal. (ii) The person ratifying the agent's conduct must know of all the material circumstances, unless he evinces an intention to ratify the contractual or other act regardless of them. (iii) In a case of ratification through silence and inactivity, it must be such as to manifest unequivocally an intention to adopt the act in question”
(emphasis added)[1167]In relation to implied ratification, and as is stated by the editors of Bowstead & Reynolds at para 2-077:
“Such words or conduct must be unequivocal: they must not be such that they could be accounted for by other possible interpretations, e.g. that the principal is simply resuming possession of his own property. … Such reasoning is necessary to protect the principal against too easily being held liable as having ratified.”
(emphasis added)[1168]The requirement for an unequivocal election means that “mere acquiescence or inactivity may be sufficient to constitute ratification if, in the circumstances, it amounts to clear evidence of an intention to adopt the act in question”, but not otherwise – see Yona International Ltd v La Réunion Française Société Anonyme D’Assurances et de Réassurances [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 84 (Com Ct) at p 103 (per Moore-Bick J) (emphasis added), and see also at p 106: “silence or inactivity may simply reflect an unwillingness or inability on the part of the principal to commit himself”.[1169]Thus, as explained in Tan CH, The Law of Agency 2nd ed (2017) paras 6.037-6.038 (citing Forman & Co Proprietary Ltd v The Liddesdale [1900] AC 190 (PC) and Swotbooks.com v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2011] EWHC 2025 (QB)): “if the principal’s conduct can be reasonably accounted for because of other reasons, there may be no ratification … Where the principal’s actions are inconsistent in that there are acts that suggest both ratification and a desire not to ratify, the circumstances may not be sufficiently unequivocal for ratification to be made out”.[1170]As to the acts that may constitute ratification, it is “objective appearances that matter not the internal intentions of the principal” (see Bowstead & Reynolds at 2-078). As Waller J said in Suncorp Insurance and Finance v Milano Assicurazioni SpA [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 225, at p.235, “It seems to me that it should not be open to a principal, who to the outside world by his conduct, or that of his duly authorised agents, appears to have adopted a transaction to be able to prove subjectively that in fact he had not...”[1171]The Defendants submit that, “The question for the Court is therefore whether the objective appearance of the act is consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction”. I did not understand the Claimant to disagree with such submission which appears to be consistent with the authorities.[1172]Where the transaction is the sale of property, the receipt and use by the seller of the purchase price is generally consistent only with the seller’s adoption of the transaction. Thus, where a ship is sold by its master without authority, and the owners receive (and it appears use for their own purposes) the sale proceeds, the sale was held to have been ratified (Hunter v Parker (1840) 151 ER 789). Equally, where an agent purchased goods at a price exceeding his authority, and the principal objected but sold some of the goods as his own, the contract was held to have been ratified: Cornwal v Wilson (1750) 28 ER 504.[1173]See also what is said in Bowstead & Reynolds at para 2-075:
“receipt or retention of money with knowledge of the circumstances of a contract under which it is paid will normally constitute ratification of that contract, as will use or disposal of goods received under it unless the supposed principal did not assent to the transaction and had no alternative but to receive them and use them as they were, e.g. where they were already his own.”
[1174]In this regard, and by way of example, the Defendants referred to the cases of in Re Mawcon [1969] 1 WLR 78 and Simpole v Chee [2013] EWHC 4444 (Ch). In the former case a provisional liquidator did not authorise the hiring of lorries for the company’s business, but the liquidator retained the profit, and the Court held (at p. 83) that the contracts of hire were ratified. In the latter case a vendor was found to have ratified the sale of real estate in circumstances where he retained the sale proceeds that had been paid to him (see at [F]):
“It is not open to the liquidator to retain the proceeds of the transactions in which the lorries were employed and at the same time to repudiate the authority of the directors to employ the lorries.”
[1175]Second, unless there is a clear waiver (which is not alleged in this case), the principal must have “full knowledge of all material matters” at the time of the act of ratification, i.e., the election must be conscious and on an informed basis: Bowstead & Reynolds, para 2.071 (Article 16).[1176]Thus, and as was stated by Waller J in Suncorp at p 234:
“… In order that a person may be held to have ratified an act done without his authority, it is necessary that at the time of the ratification, he should have full knowledge of all the material circumstances in which the act was done, unless he intended to ratify and take the risk whatever the circumstances may have been. (See Bowstead art. 16, p. 64.) The commentary makes clear however that this principle, designed to protect the principal from being held too readily to have ratified acts of his agent, is less strict in the contractual context than it is in a tort context.”
[1177]The burden of proof is on the Defendants to show that Cedar Mundi had full knowledge of all material matters (see Bowstead & Reynolds, para 2.072).[1178]Third, the act of ratification must be by the principal or an agent “by an agent who has authority to ratify”, and, in ascertaining whether the agent has authority to ratify, “usually such agent will have authority to do an act of the type in question” (see Bowstead & Reynolds, para 2.062). As Andrew Smith J put it in Sea Emerald, supra, at [102(i)], “[t]he act of ratification must be that of the principal, or of someone competent at the time of ratification to make the contract in question”. It follows that if the act of ratification is done by an agent who themselves lacks authority to perform that act on behalf of the principal, there can be no ratification - see Suncorp at 235 (Waller LJ).

E2.3 Ratification and the 2021 Transaction

[1179]The Defendants’ case on ratification and the 2021 Transaction narrowed somewhat by the time of their written and oral closings. It was not suggested in the Defendants’ written Closing Submissions (or orally) that the 2021 Transaction was ratified by the board meeting on 25 October 2021 (as Issue 7(2) had, in part, been framed), and rightly so, for far from there being anything in the board meeting that gave the objective appearance of an act consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction, the minutes of the board meeting are very much to the contrary, showing an intention to take action in relation to the “unlawful and irregular transfer of the company’s assets”. This is not simply a neutral point, such board minutes are part of the objective appearance and context for the remaining points relied upon by the Defendants and tell against any ratification by reason of the matters still relied upon by the Defendants as they most certainly are not consistent with an intention to adopt the transaction.[1180]In this regard the second resolution at the 25 October 2021 board meeting, which was passed unanimously, was as follows: Second Resolution: After having reviewed the documents provided by email on 20 September 2021 by the Company's former legal counsel, Nadi Najjar, Esq, the Board hereby decides to: 1) ascertain and confirm that the Proposed Transaction has been unilaterally executed by the former Vice Chairman, Mr Bassel Attieh, acting as the Deputy General Manager under the supervision and responsibility of the former Chairwoman of the company, Mrs Wafa Al-Qatami, and flagrantly concealed from the bank shareholders; 2) ascertain and confirm that the unlawful and irregular transfer of the Company's assets constitutes a material breach by the former Chairwoman and Vice Chairman of the resolutions of the Board meetings dated 16 March and 13 April 2021, the two letters of H.E. the Governor dated 28 April 2021 and 11 May 2021, the letter of the bank shareholders addressed to the former Vice Chairman on 23 July 2021, BDL's letter dated 31 August 2021, the provisions of Article 158 of the Code of Commerce and Article 20 of the Company's bylaws, as well as further applicable laws and regulations; 3) initiate all necessary legal actions and conservatory, precautionary and provisional measures, in Lebanon and abroad, in connection with the unlawful and irregular transfer of the Company's assets pursuant to the Proposed Transaction towards preserving the rights and interests of each of the Company, its bank shareholders and BDL.[1181]The case as advanced in the Defendants’ written closing submissions was narrowed, and was centred on the fact that management fees were deducted by BEMO from the BEMO account (set up by Mr Attieh) into which the cash consideration paid under the SPA was paid. The assertion of the Defendants was in these terms (at paras 616-617):
“616. Cedar Mundi ratified the 2021 Transaction by using the cash consideration paid under the SPA into the BEMO account to pay fees due to BEMO to maintain Cedar Mundi’s accounts. … 617. The use of the cash consideration thus is an unequivocal act. It is inconsistent with Cedar Mundi’s case that the SPA is void”
(emphasis added)[1182]In this regard it is said that it was open to Cedar Mundi to make other funds available to pay those fees, and that whilst Cedar Mundi continued to assert in correspondence and in these proceedings that the SPA was invalid, “it cannot approbate and reprobate; the use of the cash consideration is an unequivocal act adopting the transaction”.[1183]The evidence of Mr Saghbini, which I accept, was that:(1) The BEMO “annual management fees” were “automatically deducted” (by BEMO) – see Saghbini 2 para 12.(2) If the bank statements show that BEMO had charged such management fees that must be correct (Day 3 page 132 lines 8-9).(3) He was not aware of the terms of the accounts which permitted BEMO to charge management fees without specific authorisation from the account holder (he had not read them), but it was perfectly normal (“common practice”) for banks to charge management fees for these accounts (Day 3 page 134 lines 12 to 16 and also page 136 lines 10-19):
“Q. When you took over this account, you must have known that the money in the account would be used to fund this management fee expense? A. My Lord, as I said, this is common practice to pay management fees when you have an account open with the bank. Q. I'm asking about your knowledge. So I'll ask one more time. A. My knowledge -- I mean, this is not a question that you ask yourself, since it's a common practice. …”
[1184]It is also submitted that it is sufficient to ratify that Cedar Mundi retained the cash consideration (simply by leaving it in the BEMO account i.e. by doing nothing), and that despite purporting to disavow the SPA on 25 October 2021 Cedar Mundi took no steps to return the cash consideration.[1185]It is further asserted at para 619 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions as follows: “Further, the C-331 Shareholders caused Cedar Mundi to waive their defaults under their subordinated facility agreements … The 13 April 2021 board resolutions provided that such waiver was conditional upon the C-331 Shareholders ratifying the SPA in a general assembly. They and Cedar Mundi cannot adopt part of the transaction and repudiate the balance”.[1186]I will deal with this last point first. It is hopeless. It was a matter for the board if it wished to waive any defaults under the subordinated facility agreements for whatever reason. That is quite separate from whatever the regime was in relation to the 13 April board resolution. This is not a case of the C-331 Shareholders and Cedar Mundi adopting part of the transaction and repudiating the balance as alleged by the Defendants. Cedar Mundi had an unfettered right to waive any defaults under the subordinated facility agreements, and such right was not tethered to, or dependent upon, either the 13 April board meeting or their adopted stance in relation to the 2021 Transaction.[1187]In any event, none of the aspects of the ratification case (as identified above) bear examination or amount to ratification of the 2021 Transaction.[1188]First, the objective appearance of the matters relied upon (essentially leaving the monies in the BEMO account, opened by Mr Attieh, with automatic deduction of annual management fees by BEMO), when viewed together with Cedar Mundi’s denunciation of the 2021 Transaction (as reflected in the 25 October 2021 board second resolution, the correspondence and the proceedings) is not consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction. On the contrary it is entirely consistent with an intention to reject the transaction.[1189]Cedar Mundi’s decision to leave untouched the Lollars received pursuant to the 2021 Transaction in the bank account set up by Mr Attieh, even if subject to automatic charges, does not amount to an intention to adopt Mr Attieh’s unauthorised conduct in respect of the 2021 Transaction, and it is not, on any view an unequivocal act. In fact, it shows the opposite: Cedar Mundi has chosen not to do anything with the proceeds of the 2021 Transaction, but has left it in the BEMO Account, because it did not want to adopt the 2021 Transaction. Even that inaction is not to be construed in a vacuum – the objective appearance is that it was sitting there pending determination of Cedar Mundi’s denunciation of the 2021 Transaction (which is conduct inconsistent with ratification). Put another way, if you are repudiating the whole transaction, the act of someone else auto-deducting money from the sums sitting in the bank account as a result of standard banking terms, cannot be regarded as conduct on your part consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction.[1190]The automatic deduction of fees is, itself, perfectly consistent with this simply being in accordance with the way the account was set up by Mr Attieh himself (itself in accordance with common practice that commercial bank accounts are subject to management fees). It is not, in such circumstances, a situation where the only logical explanation is an intention (on Cedar Mundi’s part) to adopt the 2021 Transaction.[1191]Equally, Cedar Mundi did not “use” the monies in the BEMO account in any real sense (still less “use” them in a manner that would give rise to ratification). As no doubt with any commercial bank account (as corroborated by Mr Saghbini), it is perfectly normal for banks to charge management fees for commercial bank accounts, and to deduct such fees from such bank accounts. In other words, any commercial bank account would be subject to such fees, which would be taken in the manner in which they were taken.[1192]Put another way, there was no act by Cedar Mundi (or “use” by Cedar Mundi), the only actions are the normal (and automatic) actions of an independent third party, BEMO, to deduct management fees from the sums standing to the account (as would be the case with any commercial bank account). Such inaction on the part of Cedar Mundi (in the face of automatic deductions) does not amount to clear evidence of an intention to adopt the 2021 Transaction (a fortiori not when viewed with Cedar Mundi’s actions in terms of the second board resolution, the correspondence, and the proceedings). It is also completely contrived (if not surreal) to suggest that such automatic deductions should have been countered by positive payments from other monetary sources. The reality is that Cedar Mundi did nothing, and was not obliged to do anything, and, by doing nothing this was not clear evidence of an intention to adopt the act in question.[1193]Second, and independently, I am satisfied that Cedar Mundi did not, in any event, have full knowledge of all material matters at the time of the alleged acts of ratification, and so there was no ratification for this further reason. Mr Saghbini became the sole signatory on Cedar Mundi’s USD account with BEMO Bank in July 2022. It appears that the deductions (post 2021 Transaction) were on 18 November 2022, an unknown date in 2023 (as the balance dropped between statements) and 20 September 2024. The evidence before me does not prove as to whether there was a further deduction in 2025. In any event, it is clear that the deductions were all automatic deductions. The earliest deduction pre-dated the proceedings, and the 2024 payment is long before disclosure. It was not until then that the full extent of Mr Attieh’s conduct in respect of the 2021 Transaction became apparent. In this regard it was only after the commencement of the proceedings that Cedar Mundi saw the PPC agreement and the full extent of BSEC’s role in the 2021 Transaction and the extent of its interaction with Mr Attieh and the instructions he was giving. It was not until 2 July 2025 that extended disclosure was completed, with further disclosure being given as recently as 20 January 2026.[1194]Of course, knowledge also has to be seen together with objective appearances. After the action was commenced, the act of any further automatic deductions by a third party is not consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction on the part of Cedar Mundi whatever the state of Cedar Mundi’s knowledge.[1195]Third, I have accepted Cedar Mundi’s case in relation to Article 157 and Article 158. In such circumstances the Defendants cannot point to any act of ratification performed by a body of Cedar Mundi which had actual authority to enter into the Transactions. It is well established that the act of ratification has to be done by a properly authorised entity, so when the act or transaction is beyond the powers of the directors it can only be ratified by ordinary resolution of the shareholders. Thus, upon examination, by reason of my findings in relation to Issues 1 to 3, ratification does not, in fact, provide the Defendants with a fallback case, as they cannot point to any general assembly meeting at which the 2021 Transaction was considered and approved.[1196]This point was not addressed by the Defendants in their written closing. In oral closing Mr Montagu-Smith KC submitted that all that matters was whether the act was authorised and attributable to the company (referring to the Sea Emerald), but I do not consider that works as only the general assembly could authorise (and therefore only the general assembly could ratify) the 2021 Transaction. Mr Montagu-Smith KC was forced to fall back onto a submission that if a general assembly act is needed (as I find it was), the act is inaction, and that is something that the whole company has done by omission. That cannot be right. It is entirely contrived to suggest that the company has acted by omission in simply leaving the money in an account set up by Mr Attieh. On no view has there been any act or omission by the company itself consistent only with an intention to adopt the transaction, and I do not consider that general assembly approval can be circumvented in the manner suggested by the Defendants, for the purpose of ratification.

E2.4 Conclusion on Issue 7(2)

[1197]For all the above reasons, Issue 7(2), namely, “Was the 2021 Transaction ratified by the board meeting on 25 October 2021 and/or by Cedar Mundi accepting receipt of the cash consideration pursuant to the SPA, retaining that cash consideration and/or using some of those funds for its own purposes?” is to be answered in the negative.[1198]It follows (as reflected in the agreed Decision Tree), that the 2021 Transaction is void, and there are proprietary claims against Cedar II, and also that the 2020 Transaction is void, and there are proprietary claims against IFAC. F. CONSEQUENTIAL VALIDITY ISSUES F1. CONSEQUENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 2021 TRANSACTION (ISSUE 9)[1199]Issue 9(1) is, “if the 2021 Transaction is valid … Does that extinguish any claims Cedar Mundi has against IFAC for the return of the assets transferred to it under the 2020 Transaction?”[1200]Issue 9(2) is, “If the 2021 Transaction is valid … (2) Is Cedar II liable to Cedar Mundi for any outstanding part of the consideration?” This issue was agreed to be deferred in any event.[1201]These issues do not arise, as I have found that the 2021 Transaction was void and that there are proprietary claims against Cedar II, and the 2020 Transaction is void with proprietary claims against IFAC. F2. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVALIDITY OF THE TRANSACTIONS (ISSUE 10)[1202]Issue 10(1) is, “(1) If the Transactions are invalid:
“Are Cedar II / IFAC entitled (whether as trustees or in unjust enrichment from Cedar Mundi) to the sums expended in maintaining the investment portfolio and should any order for the transfer of assets by them be conditional upon payment of the same?”
[1203]Issue 10(2) is, “(2) If the Transactions are invalid “Is Cedar Mundi liable to MABIL in respect of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment?”[1204]I have found that the Transactions are invalid, so Issue 10 arises. However, it has been agreed that Issue 10(1) is to be deferred. Accordingly, I address Issue 10(2) below. F2.1 Is Cedar Mundi liable to MABIL in respect of the alleged MABIL overpayment? (Issue 10(2))[1205]I have already referred to this claim in summary terms in Section B3.7. MABIL advances what it alleges is a Lebanese law claim in debt against Cedar Mundi in respect of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment (claimed in an amount of US$1,860,609.40). MABIL says that if there was no debt there would be a good claim in restitution under Lebanese law. MABIL’s pleas in this regard are as follows (see Amended Defence and Counterclaim paras 286 to 287):
“286. MABIL hereby demands (to the extent demand has not already been made) repayment of the entire MABIL Overpayment. 287. Consequently, Cedar Mundi is liable under Lebanese law in debt, alternatively restitution to pay the sum of $1,860,609.40. Paragraphs 40 and 52 above are repeated.”
[1206]As a preliminary point it should be noted that MABIL paid the Third Capital Call from a bank account held within Lebanon (the potential relevance of this is that MABIL has since alleged that it is not only entitled to repayment, but repayment to a bank account outside Lebanon).[1207]Cedar Mundi says that it owes no liability for the Alleged MABIL Overpayment. In this regard it says that no repayment is required on the express terms of the SCFA, and Cedar Mundi never otherwise agreed to repay any “overpayment” arising from the Third Capital Call. In any event (say Cedar Mundi) any such agreement would be a related party transaction under Article 158 (as Mr Attieh recognised in respect of the (discharged) Alleged MABIL Overpayment arising from the Second Capital Call) and would need to be ratified by a general assembly to be effective. For its part MABIL denies that Article 158 is engaged whether its claim arises in debt or unjust enrichment.[1208]This issue does not depend on what any particular individual thought about the Alleged MABIL Overpayment or how they envisaged it might be treated or dealt with, rather it depends on the proper construction of the SCFA, whether there was any other relevant contractual agreement between the parties, and whether any claim in restitution arises.[1209]So far as the SCFA is concerned, it is common ground that repayment cannot be justified on the terms of the SCFA (indeed the Defendants go out of the way to say the debt does not arise under the SCFA – see para 697 of the Defendants’ Closing Submissions). The reason for this is because the sums that were over paid became part of the capital of the company. In such circumstances the sums were not repayable as they were not treated as a debt, and MABIL are not entitled to demand repayment.[1210]Thus, the SCFA provided, amongst other matters, as follows:
“5. Neither the principal nor the interest on the Subordinated Amounts may be (re)paid if such (re)payment would mean that the Company may become insolvent, over indebted or ceases to be a going concern. The Company shall notify the Central Bank without delay of all repayments of any part of the Subordinated Amounts. 6. The Subordinated Amounts/shareholders' loans are in substance an integral part of the capital of the Fund/Company. 7. The Lender shall not demand, sue for, or receive payment of the whole or any part of the Subordinated Amounts or claim any set-off which would result in the principal amount of the Subordinated Amounts for the time being outstanding being reduced. 8. The Lender's claims on the Company in respect of the Subordinated Amounts are wholly subordinated to the claims of all other non-subordinated creditors of the Company. It is agreed that the Subordinated Amounts will rank paripassu with all other debt which is subordinated to the other creditors of the Company unless the Lender has first given its consent in writing to any such other subordinated debt of the Company having any priority, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”
[1211]The question that therefore arises is whether there was some other agreement by which the parties agreed that the Alleged Overpayment should be repaid. The short answer is that no such agreement has been pleaded or proved.[1212]What happened in relation to the overpayment in relation to the Second Capital Call is that it was dealt with as a related party transaction under Article 158. It was recorded as a related party transaction in Cedar Mundi’s 2017 financial statements (as signed off by the full board) and Cedar Mundi complied with the requirements of Article 158, with the preparation of an auditor’s report and seeking general assembly approval.[1213]None of that happened in relation to the overpayment to the Third Capital Call, and indeed Mr Attieh, when cross-examined, denied that MABIL’s demands for repayment should have been put to the board. When it was put to Mr Attieh that MABIL was not entitled to repayment under the terms of the SCFAs Mr Attieh contended that, in the circumstances, he was entitled to override those terms (see Day 6 page 65 line 2 to Day 6 page 66 line 1). There is no basis for that assertion.[1214]What Mr Attieh did (as addressed above in Section B3.7) and for which there was no basis in law for so doing (unless there was some agreement between the parties for repayment of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment, which there was not) was that he drafted a letter for MABIL demanding repayment of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment, which he then had sent to himself in his Cedar Mundi capacity. He then purported to instruct SGBL on behalf of Cedar Mundi on 12 February 2020 to repay MABIL to an account in Zurich (knowing full well that SGBL was not able to make such an international dollar transfer in light of the de facto capital controls in place as a result of the financial crisis).[1215]This was, as it was put to Mr Attieh, but wrongly denied by him in cross-examination, all “un artifice, un stratagème” to “set up the MABIL overpayment as if it were a crystallised debt that had been demanded but had remained unpaid”.[1216]The only basis on which the Alleged MABIL Overpayment would be repayable as a debt would be if there was some other contractually binding agreement in which it was agreed that it was to be repaid as such, but as already noted no such agreement has ever been identified or proved. Whilst Mr Montagu-Smith asserted in his oral closing that “it was clearly treated … as a debt repayable on demand” no contractually binding agreement was either identified or proved. Instead the Defendants simply reference how it was referred to in the accounts (no doubt on Mr Attieh’s instructions), as well as the alleged contemplation of the BdL, and what they say Mr El Azar’s evidence was, but none of these matters are in point or demonstrate that there was any contractually binding agreement that the Alleged MABIL Overpayment was a debt repayable on demand. How anyone regarded the payment does not suffice (and indeed is not the relevant question) as to whether it was a debt. For it to be a debt there would need to be a contractual agreement to that effect, and no such agreement has been identified or proved.[1217]The position therefore is that MABIL is in the position of a shareholder who has made a capital contribution under the SCFA, and this is not affected by the 2021 Transaction being found to be invalid, given that MABIL is still a shareholder of Cedar Mundi and still has its interest in that form.[1218]In any event, had there been any agreement to repay the Alleged MABIL Overpayment (contrary to my finding) that would have been a related party transaction for the purposes of Article 158, as was recognised in relation to the (discharged) Alleged MABIL Overpayment arising from the Second Capital Call, and so would have needed to be ratified by a general assembly to be effective, which has not occurred (and which is itself unsurprising given that there never was any agreement to repay). This is, in of itself, fatal to MABIL’s claim in debt.[1219]The Defendants’ suggestion that any such agreement would not be subject to Article 158 and general assembly ratification is unsubstantiated as a matter of Lebanese law. The Defendants’ further suggestion that, “The approval procedure in Article 158 is not intended to provide Lebanese companies with defences to proper claims brought against them”, begs the question as to what a proper claim is. In any event the Article 158 related party regime does apply, and as such if there had been any agreement, the requirements of Article 158 would have had to be complied with.[1220]Accordingly, the Alleged MABIL Overpayment is not repayable as a debt, and Cedar Mundi is not, in any event, obliged to repay the Alleged MABIL Overpayment at this time. Accordingly, MABIL’s associated counterclaim in respect of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment in debt fails and is dismissed.[1221]If, as I have found, there was no debt, MABIL submits that there would be a good claim in restitution under Lebanese law, in circumstances in which it is said that the principles are not materially different from English law (by reference to the Agreed Statement of Lebanese Law, para 21(b)). It is submitted that Cedar Mundi was enriched at MABIL’s expense, because the PPM contemplated equal commitments from shareholders and it is said that there was no justifying basis, because MABIL paid in the belief (which transpired to be mistaken) that the other C-331 Shareholders would contribute to Cedar Mundi in proportion to their shareholding.[1222]I am satisfied that such claim does not bear examination, and that MABIL is not entitled to succeed in a claim by way of restitution.[1223]The applicable principles in relation to restitution in Lebanese law are agreed between the experts as recorded at para 21(b) of the Agreed Statement Of Lebanese Law:
“By Articles 140, 141 and 233 CoC the claimant is also entitled to the restitution or disgorgement of profits obtained by the transferee without cause. In particular, pursuant to Article 141 CoC, the obligation to provide restitution under Article 140 CoC arises where: (i) there has been a direct or indirect, pecuniary or moral, enrichment of the defendant; (ii) a correlative impoverishment of the claimant due to the transfer of an asset or value made by or a service rendered by the claimant; (iii) the enrichment and correlative impoverishment must be devoid of a justifying cause; and (iv) there are no other legal grounds available to obtain such restitution.”
(emphasis added)[1224]Thus, in relation to restitution, as in the English law of unjust enrichment, in Lebanese law (amongst other matters), “(iii) the enrichment and correlative impoverishment must be devoid of a justifying cause”. However, I am satisfied that there was a justifying cause here, as the payment was made under a contract, the SCFA pursuant to the Third Capital Call, and treated as such.[1225]At the time of payment by MABIL of the Third Capital Call there was a contractual obligation to make that payment. That contractual obligation would not be negated if MABIL paid in the belief that, in relation to the Third Capital Call, the other C-331 Shareholders would contribute to Cedar Mundi in proportion to their shareholding, and that belief was subsequently proved to be mistaken. There would still have been a legal basis for MABIL’s performance not least in circumstances where the SCFA is not impugned and has not been brought to an end. There is no evidence that in Lebanese law there would be a restitutionary claim in such circumstances.[1226]Nor is it right to say that on the Claimant’s case the Alleged MABIL Overpayment is “in the ether”. As already noted, the position is that MABIL is in the position of a shareholder who has made a capital contribution under the SCFA, and this is not affected by the 2021 Transaction being found to be invalid, given that MABIL is still a shareholder of Cedar Mundi and still has its interest in that form.[1227]Accordingly, MABIL’s associated counterclaim in respect of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment in restitution also fails, and is dismissed.[1228]Finally, I would only add that even had the Alleged MABIL Overpayment been due and payable, the Defendants have not demonstrated (the burden being upon them) that it would have been payable to an account outside Lebanon in fresh dollars, not least given that the payment was from an account in Lebanon, and in such circumstances Cedar Mundi could discharge any such debt by paying the face value of the dollars (which are subject to capital controls) into another bank account in Lebanon, such as the one from which MABIL made the payment in the first place.

G. OTHER CLAIMS (ISSUES 11 to 15)

[1229]The other claims are breach of fiduciary duty (Issue 11), dishonest assistance (Issue 12), knowing receipt (Issue 13), unlawful means conspiracy (Issue 14) and loss (Issue 15). Save in relation to the claim in respect of breach of fiduciary duty (Issue 11), it has been agreed that all these issues would be deferred and that these are best addressed subsequent to Judgment being handed down. G1. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (ISSUE 11)

G1.1 Introduction

[1230]Issue 11 is “Did Mr Attieh act in breach of fiduciary duty and what law governs that claim?”[1231]The Claimant submits that Mr Attieh breached his fiduciary duties owed to Cedar Mundi in numerous respects including in relation to both the 2020 Transaction and the 2021 Transaction. For their part, and certainly by the time of Mr Montagu-Smith’s oral closing submissions (by which time, of course, the Defendants had accepted, amongst other matters, that the 2020 Transaction, orchestrated by Mr Attieh, was unauthorised), the Defendants’ stance was that they “did not accept there was” any breach of fiduciary duty (Day 17 page 222 line 18 to page 223 line 8). It might be thought that the Defendants (realistically) felt unable to stretch to an outright denial, although that remained, of course, their pleaded position, and I will address matters on the basis of such denial.

G1.2 Applicable law

[1232]I am satisfied that the issue of whether Mr Attieh owed fiduciary duties, and the scope of the same is governed by Lebanese law. As a matter of English conflicts of law, a director’s duty to his company is governed by the law of the place of incorporation – see Base Metal Trading v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157 at [56] per Tuckey LJ, stating that a director’s duty:
“… arises from and only from the director’s relationship with the company. If it does not relate to the constitution of the company, it must I think relate to its internal management. A director’s duties to his company are inextricably bound up with these matters and must therefore be governed by the place of the company’s incorporation”
See, also, to the same effect Arden LJ at [69]: “the law of the place of incorporation applies to the duties inherent in the office of director”.[1233]Mr Attieh’s duties as a director of Cedar Mundi are therefore governed by Lebanese law.[1234]Cedar Mundi pleaded (under the heading “Relevant Principles of Lebanese Law”) that directors of Lebanese joint stock companies owe their companies a duty of loyalty and good faith, pursuant to various provisions of the Lebanese Code of Commerce and Lebanese Code of Obligations and Contracts (APoC, para 88). That plea was admitted by the Defendants (see Amended Defence Counterclaim, para 189). There was a dispute on the pleadings as to whether Article 158 LCC and Article 124 CoC were sources of the duty of loyalty and good faith (due to Mr Sakr’s written expressed views), but the Defendants accepted (and accept) a duty of loyalty and good faith.[1235]As to its fiduciary duty claim, Cedar Mundi’s pleaded case (referring back to the paragraphs that pleaded relevant principles of Lebanese law) was that Mr Attieh owed the Lebanese law duty of loyalty and good faith to Cedar Mundi and that such duty was to be “characterised as fiduciary”. It was then alleged that Mr Attieh breached that duty in various ways as set out in paragraphs 139 to 140 of the APoC.[1236]However, in the Claimant’s written opening (at para 118), Cedar Mundi asserted that “since neither [party] positively contends that Lebanese law” applies, the Court should apply English law as the “default rule” identified in Brownlie. However, this assertion was not pursued in the Claimant’s Written Closing Submissions (Section G1.1). It suffices to say that in circumstances in which the Claimant pleads a case on Lebanese law and adduced expert evidence in that regard I do not consider that there is any scope for the default rule, nor do I consider that there is any scope for the operation of the presumption of similarity in terms of what the scope of the duties are. I refer to the question of the consequences of any breach of duty (including remedies) separately in due course below.

G1.3 The scope of the duties

[1237]The parties agree that the following duties in Lebanese law fall to be characterised as fiduciary in nature (see APoC, paras 88-89 and 139 and Amended Defence and Counterclaim, paras 189-190 and 249):(1) The duty of loyalty and good faith owed by directors to their companies pursuant to Articles 158-160, 187 and 253 (bis) of the LCC and Articles 124 and 221 of the CoC (although the Defendants deny that this duty “arises from Article 158 LCC or Article 124 CoC”); and(2) The duty of due diligence of a prudent person owed by directors (as deemed agents) to their companies pursuant to Articles 769-822 of the CoC.[1238]The experts on Lebanese law have agreed the following statement as to the law in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo at para 6:
“The duty of loyalty and good faith of directors and general managers is (i) enshrined in Article 221 CoC where it is associated with the principle of performance of contractual obligations, and (ii) inferred from various provisions of the LCC that set forth specific obligations and prohibitions with which the directors and general managers of Lebanese companies must comply. In summary, the duty of loyalty and good faith requires that directors and managers act in the company’s best interests (which includes the best interests of its shareholders), and that they refrain from taking advantage of their position to obtain benefits for themselves to the company’s and its shareholders’ detriment.”
(emphasis added)[1239]Professor Soumrani explains that the duty of good faith and loyalty “does not stem under the Lebanese law from one particular article of law, but rather from general principles” enshrined in the above provisions of the LCC and CoC (Soumrani 2 at para 40).[1240]Lebanese law (like other civil systems) links the duty of loyalty to the doctrine of abuse of rights, i.e., where “(i) an act is committed in bad faith, or (ii) the exercise of the right exceeds the purpose for which such right was granted” (Soumrani 2 at para 46). This principle is embodied in Article 124 of the CoC (addressed further below).[1241]Another aspect of the duty is that directors and managers are required to avoid conflicts of interest (Soumrani 2 para 54) and Professor Soumrani’s evidence (which I accept) is that “Article 158 can in my opinion be considered as a source of the duty to act loyally because it provides for rules preventing the conflict of interest” (Soumrani 2 para 57).[1242]This duty of loyalty, together with the duty of diligence, is owed by directors both to the company and its shareholders (Soumrani 2 para 49). To the extent that it may be of any relevance, the Defendants highlight that the duty is owed to the shareholders as a whole, by reference to what is said by Fabia & Safa in the context of directors’ liabilities under Article 167 LCC to wrongs, “committed by the director [that] would cause prejudice to the company i.e. to the universality of the shareholders” (cited in Soumrani 3 at para 134).[1243]In his written evidence Mr Sakr agreed with Professor Soumrani as to the duties, subject to two caveats: that(1) Article 124 of the CoC (abuse of rights) is “concerned solely with tortious and not contractual liability”; and(2) Article 158 of the LCC “has its source in the protection of the shareholders’ general interests and national economy, rather than the duty to act loyally or in good faith” (see Sakr 1 paras 16 to 18).[1244]However, I am satisfied that neither caveat is well founded. Article 124 is the embodiment in Lebanese law of the well-known civilian doctrine of ‘abuse of rights (as Mr Sakr accepted in cross-examination – Day 11 page 153 lines 3 to 5). It provides:
“Whoever, in exercising a right, exceeds the bounds of good faith or the purpose for which the right was granted, thereby causing prejudice to another, shall also be liable in damages”
. As the Claimant rightly submitted, in his reports, Mr Sakr confused two different concepts: (1) the type of rights to which Article 124 applies; and (2) the nature of the liability that results from an abuse of a right. Mr Sakr’s original position was that Article 124 was only concerned with tortious rights and hence had no application. This is recorded in the Lebanese Law Joint Memo at para 8, “For MS, Article 124 CoC falls within the section of the CoC on torts; this Article is thus solely concerned with tortious liability and not with contractual liability”.[1245]However, in cross-examination, Mr Sakr accepted that Article 124 applies to any type of rights (not just tortious rights) but the resulting liability is tortious in nature (see Day 11 page 152 line 16 to page 154 line 10). That accords with Professor Soumrani’s evidence (Soumrani 3 paras 12 to 19), and Professor Soumrani was not cross-examined on this point. Accordingly, the duty of loyalty and the doctrine of abuse of rights as interlinked concepts - if a director abuses the rights afforded to him in that capacity, that can be regarded as a breach of the duty of loyalty (that, of course, is also the position in English law).[1246]As for Article 158 Mr Sakr had stated (in Sakr 1 para 18) that: “I disagree with Mr Soumrani’s opinion regarding Article 158 LCC. He says ‘[a]lthough it is not cited by scholars as a source of the duty to act in good faith and with loyalty, Article 158 can in my opinion be considered as a source of the duty to act loyally’. I do not agree. Article 158 LCC has its source in the protection of the shareholders’ general interests and national economy, rather than the duty to act loyally or in good faith”.[1247]However, as the Claimant rightly points out, this obviously elides two different concepts:(1) whether Article 158 can be considered as a source of the duty of loyalty; and(2) the source of Article 158 itself. Mr Sakr’s reasoning addresses the latter point. Mr Sakr’s position is also contradicted by Saba Zreik, Les Conventions Moyens de Corruption Sociale (2018), n.815:
“The Lebanese Code of Commerce does not state any general principle regarding the duty of loyalty of commercial companies’ managers. Article 158 of the Lebanese Code of Commerce, which is the subject of my thesis, is nevertheless one of the manifestations of the raison d’être of the loyalty obligation. The latter aiming primarily to avoid that managers act in a manner that could create a conflict between their personal interests and the company’s interest, against the company and its shareholders, is truly and indeed, albeit implicitly, incorporated in the said Article the purpose of which is to prevent directors to contract with the company without having received the prior authorisation of the general assembly.”
(emphasis added)[1248]Whilst Mr Sakr said in cross-examination that he did not agree with this and that it represented only the author’s personal opinion, it is consistent with Professor Soumrani’s evidence (and Professor Soumrani was not cross-examined on this point). I prefer the evidence of Professor Soumrani on this, and I am satisfied that the requirement to avoid conflicts of interest is an aspect of the duty of loyalty (as again would be the position under English law).[1249]Mr Attieh, if nothing else, is an experienced Lebanese company director, and as such would be, and clearly was, aware of the duties of Lebanese company directors, as would be the position in English law. In this regard Mr Attieh, in cross-examination, agreed with the following summary of principles taken from the (voluntary) Lebanese Code of Corporate Governance, and said that these were principles to which he adhered as a director (Day 5 page 132 line 20 to Day 133 line 5):
“Q. ... ‘The Company’s board members owe the Company and its shareholders the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and, compliance with corporate authority. In the discharge of their fiduciary duties the Board Members must at all time act in good faith, with candour, avoiding all potential or actual conflicts of interest, and in the best interests of the Company’ Do you agree with all of that? A. I agree. Q. Are those principles that you adhere to as a director? A. Yes, absolutely.”
Q. Are those principles that you adhere to as a director? A. Yes, absolutely.”

Q. Are those principles that you adhere to as a director?

[1250]The parties are not in agreement as to the remedies for breach of duty, and in particular as to whether Mr Attieh is liable to account to Cedar Mundi for all or part of his bonus. In their Closing Submissions at para 712, the Defendants assert that “Importantly, unlike English law there is no evidence that Lebanese law requires a director to disgorge profits made by him in breach of fiduciary duty” and they go on to submit that a director’s liability is to compensate the company for losses caused by the director’s breach of duty.[1251]There is no doubt that this is a pleaded issue, such an account being sought at para 141 of the APoC. In the Defence, at para 251 of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim, the plea is, “Paragraph 141 is denied. If, which is denied, Mr Attieh is liable to account for his bonus payment, it is averred his liability should extend only to that part referable to the Cedar Mundi/Cedar II transaction”. The underlined plea was added by amendment (by consent) on 27 November 2025. The Defendants accordingly did not plead a positive case that under Lebanese law a director is not liable to account for benefits obtained for themselves in breach of duty. In such circumstances the Lebanese experts have not expressly addressed the point.[1252]For its part, I understand the Claimant to submit that it is a breach of duty as a matter of Lebanese law for a director to obtain a benefit for themselves (which I believe may be common ground given the terms of the Lebanese Law Joint Memorandum) and that the same is recoverable whether as a matter of Lebanese law or English law (the former at least being challenged by the Defendants). Mr Wilson submitted in closing that remedies are a matter for the lex fori – and so English law applies (it being well-established in English law that a fiduciary must disgorge profits made by him in breach of duty). The issue as to whether remedies are a matter for the lex fori was not argued out before me and will have to be addressed following Judgment at the consequentials stage (remedies being a matter that it was agreed would be deferred to that stage).[1253]However, the parties do not even seem to be ad idem as to what the experts have themselves agreed at paragraph 6 of the Lebanese Law Joint Memo in relation to duties, the relevant part I will repeat for ease of reference: In summary, “[t]he duty of loyalty and good faith requires that directors and managers act in the company’s best interests (which includes the best interests of its shareholders), and that they refrain from taking advantage of their position to obtain benefits for themselves to the company’s and its shareholders’ detriment.” (emphasis added)[1254]It is clear from the highlighted words that part of the director’s duty is to “refrain from taking advantage of their position to obtain benefits for themselves” (which is what the Claimant says Mr Attieh did in obtaining bonuses). I am satisfied that that does reflect the position in Lebanese law (not least given that both experts agree that). That, of course, is also the position in English law. I address in due course below whether Mr Attieh was in breach of his duty of loyalty and good faith in the context of obtaining a benefit for himself.[1255]In their written closing (at para 712) the Defendants then suggest that, at the remedy stage, nothing is recoverable unless it is “to the company’s and its shareholders’ detriment” and, implicitly, they must therefore also be saying that it is not to the company’s and its shareholders’ detriment for Mr Attieh to receive a benefit for himself in the form of a bonus from a third party (in acting in the interests of that third party as opposed to in the interests of the company and its shareholders). I confess to having some difficulty with that submission as, at first blush, paying Mr Attieh a bonus to act in the best interests of the third party is not only a benefit obtained by Mr Attieh for himself but a detriment to the company and its shareholders. I accept, however, that the issue of whether the bonus is recoverable may be a separate issue that remains for determination.[1256]I have not heard full argument on the issues arising, and as I foreshadowed during the close of oral closings (Day 16 page 11 lines 1 to 11), I will defer all issues concerning Mr Attieh’s bonus (other than a consideration of whether Mr Attieh was in breach of duty as a matter of Lebanese law) until the consequentials hearing, at which hearing the parties will also have to address the Court as to applicable law(s) and the lex fori issue.

G1.4 Breach of fiduciary duty

[1257]I am satisfied that Mr Attieh was in breach of fiduciary duty as a director of Cedar Mundi in the respects set out below.

G1.4.1 In relation to the 2020 Transaction

[1258]The 2020 Transaction involved multiple breaches of the duty of loyalty and good faith on the part of Mr Attieh. It was an unauthorised transaction that Mr Attieh neither raised with the directors or put before the board (which he should have done) which divested Cedar Mundi of a large part of its assets (which should not have occurred) and which was in the interests of the Al Bahar Group and not Cedar Mundi or its shareholders (a fundamental failure to act in the best interests of Cedar Mundi and its shareholders). Yet further (and in further breach of duty) Mr Attieh concealed the very existence of the 2020 Transaction over an extended period of time, including at the time of the 13 April 2021 board meeting (and thereafter) from both the board (which included SGBL) and the shareholders (specifically the C-331 Shareholders) and when a time came when they had to know something, he engaged in the backdating of the “Trust Undertaking” to conceal that Cedar Mundi had indeed been divested of its assets over an extended period of time.[1259]In an unguarded moment in the course of his cross-examination, Mr Attieh confirmed that the “purpose and intent” of the PPC Agreement was to cancel the Alleged MABIL Overpayment (Day 6 page 102 lines 11 to 18). It is obvious from the form and content of the PPC Agreement that its true, or predominant, purpose was to protect the Al Bahar Group’s interest in that it provided the functional equivalent of repayment of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment or security for the same (the effect of the terms being to give MABCO (as assignee of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment) an indirect ownership interest in assets corresponding to the value of the Alleged MABIL Overpayment, and thus give priority to it, since no other creditor received such treatment).[1260]Yet further, Mr Attieh’s attempted justifications do not bear examination. The IFAC structure was unnecessary to serve its alleged purpose. If the fund needed further hard currency there was nothing to prevent MABIL from independently investing or providing loans, and the structure put in place was not even used for the alleged purpose, with only a relatively modest loan to Quiqup which, on Mr El Koussa’s evidence, did not necessitate the 2020 Transaction in any event – see Day 7 page 51 line 6 to page 52 line 9. The structure was also notably not used to invest in Proximie when its fundraising round closed in March 2021.[1261]Additionally, there was the “Trust Undertaking” which was backdated to 1 June 2020, to give the false impression that Cedar Mundi had always had 100% ownership of IFAC, when it had not. The reality was that Mr Attieh divested Cedar Mundi of assets, and he then had to invent the “Trust Undertaking” when a time came when Cedar Mundi would need to know something about what had occurred.[1262]It is notable that despite conceding in opening that the 2020 Transaction was unauthorised (and repeating the same in oral closing) the same is not addressed in the Defendants’ Closing Submissions. The reason is not hard to discern. Once the 2020 Transaction is acknowledged to be an unauthorised transaction undertaken by Mr Attieh, this inevitably involved Mr Attieh in multiple breaches of fiduciary duty.

G1.4.2 In relation to the 2021 Transaction

[1263]The 2021 Transaction involved multiple breaches of the duty of loyalty and good faith on the part of Mr Attieh. Its very premise, as carried through into the terms of the SPA, was to protect and benefit Al Bahar group interests rather than acting in the interests of Cedar Mundi and its shareholders as a whole – the very definition of a breach of the duty of loyalty and good faith.[1264]Following the Lebanese financial crisis, and as Mr El Azar said (El Azar 1 para 62):
“Cedar Mundi could have stopped actively investing and entered the divestment period where it would have held its then existing portfolio assets until a divestment opportunity presented itself. This is the approach that other 331 funds with which SGBL has been involved took following the onset of the Lebanese financial crisis.”
[1265]Mr Attieh, however, did not consider that such a course was in the best interest of MABIL and the Al Bahar Group in whose interests he was clearly acting (rather than in the interests of Cedar Mundi and its shareholders for whom he should have been acting, and with undivided loyalty). This is well illustrated by this telling passage from Mr Attieh’s cross-examination (Day 6 page 59 line 14 to page 60 line 8): “… it is wrong to assume that Cedar Mundi was like the other funds basically that were established indirectly under Circular 331. It is a unique fund because it's the only fund basically that availed and had a private investor as an LP. All the others have no other investor, except basically the Lebanese commercial banks, and they were content to sit on their hands because they don't have any problem. They were not investment managers. As I said, my Lord, for context again, sitting on our hands was not a option because our group, the group I worked for, and that entrusted me with this is investment, is an investment management group and for investment managers it is extremely important to have track record. Track record means, my Lord that when you actually are investing , you make sure that basically you have returns for your LPs, not that you are content with losses because somebody, like the collusion of the BdL and the Lebanese commercial banks, ask you basically to just take the losses”. (emphasis added)[1266]It could not be plainer that all Mr Attieh did in relation to the 2021 Transaction, as addressed in Section B5-B8 above, including how he went about it, the valuation and price arrived at, the 13 April 2021 board minutes, and his (concealed) entering into the SPA without a general assembly, and without general assembly approval, was done in what Mr Attieh considered to be in the best interests of “our group” that is the Al Bahar Group and MABIL (a minority shareholder in Cedar Mundi) rather than in the best interests of Cedar Mundi (of whom he was a director) and its majority shareholders, a classic breach of the duty of loyalty and good faith. It is clear that throughout Mr Al Bahar aligned himself with the Al Bahar group and MABIL (hence sitting on “our hands” was not an option because “our group”, “the group I worked for” had “entrusted” him with this).[1267]This involved Mr Attieh doing all that was necessary to further the interests of the Al Bahar Group and MABIL and get the 2021 Transaction across the line. It involved clear and obvious breaches of his fiduciary duty owed to Cedar Mundi and its shareholders, including in relation to the valuation evidence which knowingly undervalued the fund (as addressed in Section C3 above) deliberately concealing matters from Cedar Mundi (the 2020 Transaction being a case in point, as well as not updating the shareholders as to the Proximie funding), back-dating of documents (the “Trust Undertaking” being a case in point), the obtaining of self-serving legal opinions, and the deliberate entering into of the SPA when knowing full well that general assembly ratification was required and concealing that it had been entered into, whilst steps were taken to effect the transfer and receive payments, itself in an underhand manner, with the same only being discovered by accident after the event, and no thanks to Mr Attieh.[1268]I reject the suggestion that he was acting in the best interest of Cedar Mundi and the shareholders in relation to the 2021 Transaction (or any aspect thereof). That is rebutted by the matters identified above, and a consideration of all that occurred, as I have addressed at length in Section B above. Far from having undivided loyalty to Cedar Mundi and its shareholders, or even having divided loyalty (which would itself be contrary to the duty of loyalty and good faith), his loyalty lay, and lay alone, with the Al Bahar Group and MABIL. Indeed, Mr Attieh has remained loyal to them to the end, including when giving evidence, even being willing to invent evidence “on the hoof” of which the most egregious example is Mr Attieh’s invented factual narrative that Mr Dahdah and El Azar agreed that all the decisions would be made at the board and that there was no need basically to wait for a general assembly meeting. A new, and invented, untruth, that was not put to the Claimant’s witnesses and, unsurprisingly, was not referred to, still less adopted, by the Defendants in closing.[1269]One might also ask, why all the subterfuge on Mr Attieh’s part? The answer is obvious. Because Mr Attieh knew perfectly well that he was breaching his duties to Cedar Mundi and the shareholders, and that he would not achieve what he wanted for his masters, the Al Bahar Group and MABIL without concealing from the company of which he was a director, and its shareholders, what was actually going on in order to persuade them to authorise the 2021 Transaction. Still further, once he realised that they would not agree to the SPA being entered into until after general assembly deliberation and possible ratification (and no doubt recognising that they might not in fact ratify), he went behind the back of Cedar Mundi and the C-331 shareholders by entering into the SPA anyway and deliberately concealing from them that he had done so, all in further breach of fiduciary duty.

G1.4.3 Mr Attieh’s remuneration

[1270]As is clear from para 6 of the Lebanese Law Joint Memo (as quoted above), the duty of loyalty and good faith of directors in Lebanese law includes that they, “refrain from taking advantage of their position to obtain benefits for themselves to the company’s and its shareholders’ detriment”.[1271]I have no doubt that all the aforesaid breaches of duty also involved Mr Attieh taking advantage of his position to obtain benefits for himself, not only in ingratiating himself with the Al Bahar Group with whom he associated (“our group”) but in the expectation (as occurred) that he would be personally rewarded by Mr Al Bahar for bringing about the Transactions (as occurred, with Mr Al Bahar paying Mr Attieh a US$1.634 million bonus). This is the very antithesis of the duty of loyalty and good faith that he owed to Cedar Mundi and the shareholders in Lebanese law.[1272]I do not consider that para 6 of the Lebanese Law Joint Memo is to be understood that there is no breach of the duty of loyalty and good faith unless the company and the shareholders have suffered detriment. I am satisfied, and find, based on such Lebanese law evidence, that there is a breach of duty in Lebanese law if the director takes advantage of their position to obtain benefits for themselves – clearly that is not something that a director should obtain out of their position as a director – and this is recognised in Lebanese law.[1273]As already foreshadowed, I would also have thought, at least at first blush, that the very fact of the director obtaining a benefit from a third party (either to ingratiate the third party with the director, or as a reward for services rendered, and whenever paid) also carries with it a detriment to the company and its shareholders (not least because in such circumstances the director no longer has an undivided loyalty to them). However, as it appears any findings in this regard may impact upon remedy and the issue of whether the remuneration has to be accounted for (on which I have yet to hear full argument), I defer any further findings on this aspect until I have heard further submissions at the consequentials hearing.[1274]What I am satisfied of is that Mr Attieh was rewarded with a very large (US$1.634 million) bonus, and that bonus, in whole or in part, was in respect of pursuing the Al Bahar Group’s interests in respect of the 2020 and 2021 Transactions. Whilst Mr Attieh initially claimed that the bonus was in respect of the “harrowing and independent exercise” of raising funds for Cedar II (Day 5 page 159 lines 10 to 11), he eventually conceded what was obvious, namely that the Transactions represented (at least) “part of [his] bonus”, though he maintained that this was “nowhere basically the main part of my bonus” (Day 5 page 170 lines 11 to 12), which lacks credibility. It lacks credibility in circumstances where Mr Al Bahar’s sole stated reason in writing for conferring the bonus was “the great effort and achievement by closing Cedar 1 and starting Cedar 2 while continuing developing your portfolio companies” (Mr Al Bahar’s email to Mr Attieh dated 22 November 2021).[1275]There also can be no suggestion that the remuneration was an “after-thought” “after the event” (albeit I consider that a payment after the event for service rendered can still amount to a breach of duty). It was clearly contemplated at the time of the Transactions by both Mr Attieh and Mr Al Bahar, that Mr Attieh would be remunerated for what he was doing in relation to the Transactions. Indeed, in a rare moment of candour, Mr Attieh admitted as much, accepting that he “knew that basically I would ask for compensation” during the course of pursuing the Transactions (Day 5 page 160 line 21).[1276]Mr Al Bahar’s evidence was that the bonus was paid because Mr Attieh was “the one who managed to think outside the box and find a solution” (Day 9 page 14039 line 6). That solution (or those solutions) was/were the 2020 Transaction and the 2021 Transaction – each obtained (for the Al Bahar Group) in breach of Mr Attieh’s duties.[1277]However, in circumstances in which I did not receive full submissions on the point, I will defer making further findings in relation to the bonus, and whether or not all, or some lesser part, is attributable to the breach of duty and/or accountable for, until the consequentials hearing. Quite apart from the issue as to the part of the bonus that relates to the breach of duty, there may be an issue as to whether all the bonus stands to be accounted for due to the duty of (undivided) loyalty, even if part might be for other services. There is also the (deferred) issue as to whether the bonus is recoverable at all.

H. REMEDIES (ISSUE 16)

[1278]Issue 16 encompasses:(1) whether the Court should give declarations claimed by either side;(2) whether the Court should give orders requiring IFAC and/or Cedar II to return the investment portfolio to Cedar Mundi;(3) the quantification of any money judgment (damages and account of profits); and(4) interest.[1279]I do not understand either of(1) or(2) to be controversial and they will follow based on the Court’s conclusions on the issues addressed in this Judgment. In particular where the Court has held that the 2021 Transaction is invalid (as I have) the Defendants accept that the 2020 Transaction is necessarily invalid and that Cedar Mundi is entitled to the return of the assets. However, I consider that the declarations to be made, and their terms, are best addressed at the consequentials hearing following the handing down of Judgment, not least given that the terms of such declarations ought to be capable of agreement between the parties, but if that should not prove to be possible then the Court can determine the same. Equally, the parties were in agreement that(3) and(4) should also be held over until the consequentials hearing. ANNEX A – DECISION TREE