Brampford House Estate Limited & Ors v Marlborough Consultancy Services & Ors [2026] EWHC 1663 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1663 (Comm)Case No CL-2024-000330
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 8 May 2026
Before
THE HON. MR JUSTICE BRYAN
Between
BRAMPFORD HOUSE ESTATE LIMITED & OrsClaimantMARLBOROUGH CONSULTANCY SERVICES & OrsDefendant
MR JEREMY RICHMOND KC and MR ANTHONY PAVLOVICH (instructed by Trowers & Hamlins LLP) for First, Third and Fourth ClaimantsMR KEVIN NEAL appeared in Person for in personHearing Hearing Date: 8 May 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1]By a contempt application (the "Contempt Application"), the First, Third and Fourth Claimants (supported by the Second Claimant, who is now separately represented) seek the committal of the Third Defendant ("Mr Neal"), for contempt of court. The alleged contumelious conduct relates to Mr Neal's responses to various orders obtained by the Claimants to protect their position pending the trial in these proceedings.[2]The Contempt Application has long been fixed for a two-hour hearing today. In the circumstances identified below, the first matter to be determined is an application by the Claimants to adjourn the hearing to a one-day hearing at a future date, with the current hearing to be used to give case management directions in relation thereto. That adjournment application is opposed by Mr Neal.[3]Mr Neal is currently a litigant in person, albeit he has previously been represented by two law firms, and has instructed public access leading counsel to draft his Defence and to represent him at the CCMC. The Claimants have directed Mr Neal to pro bono and other legal resources in keeping with the spirit of section M.1.4 of the Commercial Court Guide.[4]The Contempt Application was issued as long ago as 28 January 2026. Annex 1 to the Contempt Application sets out the 4 Grounds relied upon, each followed by detailed Particulars of Contempt which run to some 8 pages. The Contempt Application is supported by the Fourth Affidavit of Michael Rhode ("Rhode 4"), which is also dated 28 January 2026, and which itself runs to some 22 pages.[5]Pursuant to para.13.1 of the CPR PD58, evidence in answer to the application was to be filed and served within 14 days after the application was served. No evidence was served by Mr Neal within that time or thereafter. In a letter dated 31 March 2026, the Claimants' solicitors reiterated (as had been made clear in previous correspondence) that pursuant to CPR 81.4(2)(n), Mr Neal had a right to remain silent and decline to answer any question the answer to which might incriminate him, which meant that he was not required to produce written evidence in response to the Contempt Application but he might do so if he wished. As the Claimants would shortly be preparing the bundle, he was asked to confirm by return whether he wished to rely on an affidavit or other written evidence in response to the Contempt Application. It was indicated that no objection would be taken if any such evidence was served by no later than 4.00 p.m. on Friday 17 April 2026. In an email response the same day, Mr Neal stated:
"Dear Sir, this is in hand, and I will be responding this week as I am away next week. Evidence will also be filed well before the deadline of the 17th."
[6]No evidence was served by Mr Neal by 17 April 2026. On 16 April 2026 (in response to a separate letter from the Claimants' solicitors on other matters) Mr Neal sent an email response which included a statement he would, "... respond on all the other baseless nonsense next week by the 24th." The Claimants' solicitors wrote in response, noting that Mr Neal had still not provided any evidence in answer to the Contempt Application, and stating that they assumed that Mr Neal did not intend to rely on any written evidence in answer to the Contempt Application. A draft bundle index was provided, and Mr Neal was asked whether he had instructed a legal representative, and he was asked to comment by 4.00 p.m. on Friday 1 May 2026. He was further reminded of the potentially serious consequences of the Contempt Application. He was strongly recommended to seek legal advice, and his attention was drawn again to sections M.1.4 and M.1.5 of the Commercial Court Guide should he require assistance in seeking legal advice/representation.[7]Mr Neal has not filed any evidence responding to Rhode 4 by the requisite deadline or at all. At 10.32 and 10.34 a.m. yesterday Mr Neal served his Skeleton Argument (the "Neal Skeleton") for the hearing (in advance of the 12.00 p.m. deadline) and a supplemental hearing bundle respectively. Whilst Mr Neal appears before me today as a litigant in person, it is clear that the Neal Skeleton has benefited from some pro bono input - a matter which Mr Neal confirmed to me orally today during the course of his submissions. The Neal Skeleton runs to some 21 pages (6 pages in excess of the maximum allowed without permission, in respect of which no permission has been sought). The Neal Skeleton introduces evidence not only in the body of the skeleton but also in the supplemental bundle (which is effectively an exhibit).[8]The Claimants consider that the evidence requires due consideration by them and also case management by the Court. Inevitably, the Claimants' Skeleton Argument does not address the matters raised in the Neal Skeleton, and clearly a responsive skeleton would be required. The Claimants' counsel identified that there is not sufficient time to take instructions on what further responsive evidence will be required and by when it can be provided.[9]Upon receipt of the Neal Skeleton and consideration of the same, the Claimants' counsel properly wrote to the Court, in accordance with para.F.5.6(b) of the Commercial Court Guide, notifying the Court that, in light of the Neal Skeleton and the consequence of the same, the two-hour estimate was no longer considered adequate, and seeking an adjourned hearing with a one-day estimate, and inviting the Court to use the present hearing for case management under CPR 81.7, and generally. Mr Neal responded by return, opposing the adjournment application.[10]In order to place the adjournment application in context, which I address in section (E) below, it is necessary to place such application and what is involved in the Contempt Application in context.

BACKGROUND – THE CURRENT ACTION

[11]The background to the current litigation between the Claimants and the various Defendants (including Mr Neal, who is the Third Defendant) is set out in the agreed Case Memorandum (approved pursuant to para.1.1 of the order of Dias J, dated 17 October 2025). In summary:(1) The Claimants are investors who invested £7,600,000 in Marlborough Opportunities Ltd. ("MOL") (D1). They say that the money has not been invested as represented to them, and has been misappropriated. In particular, they have allegedly received no sums in return for their investments, nor have they received quarterly updates and a secured asset-backed investment, as was represented.(2) Mr Turner (D2) was a director and shareholder of MOL. He was also a director and shareholder of Versa, an accountancy and tax advisory business. The Claimants say that he acted in effect as administrator providing accountancy and company and secretarial support to Mr Neal, who is said to be driving force behind MOL. Mr Turner says that he acted properly as a director of MOL.(3) Mr Neal (D3) is alleged to have been an investment adviser (albeit not authorised by the FCA) who was involved in the Claimants' investment in MOL. The Claimants say that he provided documents making Representations about the investments, and that he must have produced those documents (bar one). They also say that he advised them on the investments. He denies this and says that he only introduced the investments without providing advice. He says that he made an investment in MOL via a Delaware company FPP. FPP obtained a compulsory winding up of MOL on that basis (to which the claimants unsuccessfully objected).(4) Although a BVI company, FIF has also claimed that investment. It did not appear on the hearing of FPP's Petition, and D1's liquidators have told D3 that it has not submitted any proof of debt in the liquidation. FIF has since filed an application in the insolvency proceedings in which it says that FPP is not a creditor of MOL, the winding up order was obtained by fraud, and FPP was unlawfully reinstated by Mr Neal for that purpose. That application is yet to be determined, as I understand it.(5) Mr Green (D4) is a property investor and developer. He was a director and shareholder of GBLL which allegedly received most of the Claimants' funds. Some of those funds were then invested in property developments, including Cheval and Leasingham, via other companies of which Mr Green is a director and shareholder (KMK, GEL and LHL). Cheval was sold by receivers leaving no funds for MOL or the Claimants. Leasingham is subject to enforcement by a lender. Mr Green and companies associated with him allegedly received in total more than £6 million of the funds from MOL. The Claimants say that he knew that their funds were being misapplied, which he denies. Mr. Green says that the funds were used for their purpose of purchasing and developing Leasingham Hall and Cheval Place.(6) MOL also purchased an investment development in another property where this was later transferred to MCS (D7) in return for a debt owed to MOL. The shareholders of MCS are Mr Neal and Mrs Neal (D5). Mrs Neal was a director, and now Mr Neal is a director of MCS. Previously Mr Turner was a director and shareholder of MCS. The Claimants say that this change of control put Ware entirely in the control of Mr Neal. For his part, Mr Neal denies any impropriety and says he managed the development of that property, which is near his home. This property remains unencumbered, and Mr Neal/MCS are content to deal with it as agreed or ordered by the Court.(7) MOL invested in the Ware Flat, which was later transferred to MREP (D8) in return for a debt owed to MOL. Mr Turner is a director and shareholder of MREP. The Claimants say that this transfer was also improper.(8) MOL made various payments to the benefit of Mr Neal and his family, including his daughter, Ms Neal, (D6). She was a director and shareholder of MOL and had access to its bank account (she was also a director of MCS). Mr and Mrs Neal say those payments were limited respectively to: (i) sums such as commissions that were contractually due, loans that had been discharged and expenses relating to the Ware development; and (ii) work expenses, gifts and some sums paid in error. The Claimants say that the payments were improper and that no specific commissions were notified to them, and that no loans were properly given or discharged. Mr Neal says that he told the Second Claimant and the Third Claimant's director the commissions to which he was entitled, and that out of these he paid commissions to the Second Claimant (and another intermediary). The Claimants dispute this.(9) Mr and Mrs Neal were disqualified as directors for six and four years (respectively) from 31 May 2018, as a result of misconduct in the management of a financial advisory business. The Claimants say that Mr Neal was a shadow director of MOL, MCS and MREP, and that Mr Turner, Mrs Neal and Ms Neal acted on his instructions or were willing so to act where they were directors of those companies.(10) The Claimants rely on a range of causes of action. MOL is sued in misrepresentation, deceit, alternatively negligence, breach of contract, unlawful means conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of FISMA. It is currently in liquidation on the petition of FPP, although proceedings against it are automatically stayed for now. Mr Turner and Mr Neal are also sued in deceit, alternatively negligence and conspiracy, and for inducing MOL to breach of contract. In addition, Mr Neal is sued for breach of fiduciary duty, receipt of secret commissions and breach of FISMA. MCS and MREP are sued for inducing breaches of contract relating to Ware and the Ware Flat respectively, and for conspiracy. Finally, Mr Turner, Mr Neal, Mr Green, MCS and MREP are sued for knowing receipt and dishonest assistance.(11) The Claimants also make proprietary claims for traceable proceeds of the funds they say were misappropriated. They rely on a variety of legal bases to establish the necessary trust, including a Quistclose trust and a constructive trust resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty, a total absence of consideration, rescission under FSMA, the use of pure vehicles for fraud, and secret commissions.(12) The remedies sought include damages (on the tortious and contractual basis), alternatively rescission, equitable compensation, an account of profits and/or disgorgement; relief under FSMA and declaratory relief (with orders to vindicate the Claimants' proprietary claims).(13) The Defendants that have filed Defences deny the claims against them and deny that the Claimants are entitled to any of the remedies against them, save as noted above in respect of Ware.[12]In addition to such summary of the litigation, it is convenient to set out what the Claimants characterise as the "alleged fraud" in paras.3 and 4 of the Claimants' Skeleton Argument in support of the Contempt Application. I bear well in mind that the same is contentious and disputed by the Defendants, including Mr Neal. I have set it out merely to place in context the Claimants' submissions on the Contempt Application:
"Mr Neal was instrumental in an investment fraud by which the Claimants' funds were misappropriated. The Claimants invested a total of £7,540,000 in the First Defendant, Marlborough Opportunities Ltd ('MOL'). MOL should have invested those monies in bridging loans secured on UK properties and other assets. Instead, most of the monies were used in projects overseen by Mr Neal and the Fourth Defendant ('Mr Green'). Mr Neal introduced this investment opportunity to the Claimants. The Claimants have received no return on their investment and have sought to establish precisely what has happened to their monies. A substantial part perhaps, including £2 million, was paid to Mr Neal and his family. MOL also invested in a development property at 59 High Street, Ware, SG12 NAB ('Ware'). On 16 February 2023 MOL transferred that property to the Seventh Defendant, Marlborough Consulting services Ltd ('MCS'). Before that date all shares in MCS were owned by MOL's director, the Second Defendant ('Mr Turner') but in the following weeks all shares in MCS were transferred to Mr Neal and his wife giving them 100% effective ownership of Ware."
[13]The trial of the action is listed to begin on 9 November 2026 with an estimated length of trial of 16 days (see the CCMC order, para.4.1).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE

[14]The Claimants issued their claim against Mr Neal (and others0 on 10 June 2024.[15]On 11 June 2024, they obtained an injunction order which comprised a Worldwide Freezing Order, and at para.7 a proprietary injunction over certain "trust assets", including Ware (the "Injunction Order").[16]The Injunction Order contained at paragraph 20 an exception allowing expenditure on legal advice and representation (varied non-materially on the return date by the Calver Order and by consent through the Dias Order). Both variations contain a "Source Proviso" notification, both "in writing at least 3 clear working days prior to it being sent".[17]The Injunction Order also contained ancillary provisions to assist the Claimants in identifying what had become of their monies. Thus, it provided by para.17 that Mr Neal (amongst others) must provide unredacted copies of all his banks accounts showing transactions from 8 November 2019 to the date of the order.[18]The Injunction Order also provided by para.18 that Mr Neal (amongst others) must swear and serve an affidavit:
"(ii) to the best of ... his ability, setting out the full details of [his] dealings in the Trust assets ... including without limitation: (1) full details of the acquisition of the trust assets as well as any sale, mortgage or other disposal of the trust assets or any interest in them; ... and (iii) exhibiting any available documentary evidence such as contracts to support the information given about the Trust Assets ..." (1) full details of the acquisition of the trust assets as well as any sale, mortgage or other disposal of the trust assets or any interest in them; ... and (iii) exhibiting any available documentary evidence such as contracts to support the information given about the Trust Assets ..."
[19]Mr Neal purported to comply with para.18 of the Injunction Order by NealAff2 and Neal Aff3.[20]The Claimants considered that he had not complied, and obtained the Foxton Order which provided at para.2:
"In relation to 'dealing with the Trust Assets ...' within 14 days: (1) a responsible officer of MCS must provide the full details of the circumstances in which the Ware property was transferred to MCS on 16 February 2023, providing the material referred to at paragraph 18 of the [Injunction Order] ("
Full Details") ... (iii) Mr Neal must set out Full Details of the transaction whereby shares in MCS were transferred to Mr Neal on 27 February 2023 and to Mrs Neal on 5 April 2023." (1) a responsible officer of MCS must provide the full details of the circumstances in which the Ware property was transferred to MCS on 16 February 2023, providing the material referred to at paragraph 18 of the [Injunction Order] ("Full Details") ... (iii) Mr Neal must set out Full Details of the transaction whereby shares in MCS were transferred to Mr Neal on 27 February 2023 and to Mrs Neal on 5 April 2023."[21]The upshot of this was:(1) the Neal letter from Healys LLP (Mr Neal's then solicitors) in which Mr Neal set out his version of events, provided some documents, and signed a statement of truth; and(2) NealAff4, which confirmed the contents of that letter on oath.[22]The Claimants were again dissatisfied and obtained the Henshaw Order which provided at para.1:
"[Mr Neal] and [MCS] shall explain in affidavit evidence ... the matters set out below and where [Mr Neal] and [MCS] do not address such matters, they shall provide a full explanation for why they have not done so: a. Full Details (as defined in the Foxton Order) of [Mr Neal's] involvement in the transfer of the Ware properties [MCS], including the explanation of (i) the reasons for the transfer; (ii) the execution of form TR1; (iii) any other contract or arrangement relating to the transfer (and providing a copy of such documents where available) and (iv) the full terms of the order; b. Full Details (as defined in the Foxton Order) of [Mr Neal's] involvement in the transfer of the shares in [MCS] to himself and his wife, including an explanation of (i) the reasons for the transfer; (ii) the completion and execution of the stock transfer form (providing copies of the forms if available); (iii) any other contract or arrangement relating to the transfers (providing a copy of such documents where available), and (iv) consideration for and other terms of the transfer."
[23]Mr Neal then swore NealAff5 in purported compliance, with which the Claimants were again dissatisfied. In the course of NealAff5, Mr Neal made a number of admissions which are relied upon on the Contempt Application.

THE CONTEMPT APPLICATION

[24]Following pre-issue correspondence, the Claimants issued the Contempt Application on 28 January 2026, with four grounds being set out in the Particulars of Contempt at Appendix 1 to the Contempt Application. In summary:(1) GROUND 1: FALSE STATEMENTS AND AFFIDAVITS AND STATEMENTS OF TRUTH. Mr Neal has made knowingly false statements in NealAff3, the Neal Letter, and NealAff4, endorsed by Statements of Truth.(2) GROUND 2: BREACH OF THE HENSHAW ORDER. Mr Neal has knowingly failed to provide in NealAff5 "Full Details" of his involvement in the transfer of Ware to MCS and the transfer of shares in MCS to Mr Neal and Mrs Neal.(3) GROUND 3: BREACHES OF INJUNCTION ORDER, CALVER ORDER AND DIAS ORDER. Mr Neal repeatedly failed to disclose bank statements (in breach of the Injunction Order). He only sought to rectify this after investigations by the Claimants revealed the existence of undisclosed bank accounts, which accounts and statements were subsequently provided.(4) GROUND 4: FAILURE TO DISCLOSE SOURCE OF FUNDS. Mr Neal failed on an ongoing basis to disclose the source of funds used to pay his legal expenses (in breach of the Injunction Order as varied by the Calver and Dias Orders).[25]The Claimants require permission to rely upon Ground 1: see CPR 81.3(5)(b). The other grounds do not require permission. The Court is asked to deal with both permission for Ground 1 and the substantive grounds at the same hearing.[26]Mr Neal's permission in respect of the Contempt Application is set out in the Neal Skeleton. In summary (and as set out in para.61 of the Neal Skeleton), he invites the Court to:(1) Refuse permission for Ground 1; in the alternative adjourn Ground 1 to be determined if necessary after the trial in November/December 2026;(2) Dismiss Ground 2;(3) Dismiss Grounds 3 and 4;(4) In the alternative if any contempt is found on any ground, to impose only such financial penalty as the Court considers proportionate, and decline to impose any custodial sentence (whether immediate or suspended);(5) Make no order as to costs against Mr Neal, Mr Neal being a litigant in person opposing an application brought by well-resourced represented parties in proceedings whose substance falls to be determined at a trial in November 2026; and(6) Grant such further or other relief as the Court thinks fit.

THE ADJOURNMENT APPLICATION

[27]The Claimants submit that in light of the contents and timing of the Neal Skeleton, the current hearing with its two-hour listing cannot be effective and the adjournment application should be acceded to, with directions to be given today as to an adjourned one-day hearing with associated case management directions.[28]It is pointed out (rightly), pursuant to para.13.1 of CPR Practice Direction 58, that evidence in answer to the application must be filed and served within 14 days after the application was served, and no such evidence was served. The Claimants' solicitors, it is said, have acted reasonably throughout in the context of the fact that Mr Neal is a litigant in person, and have been prepared to give extensions of time for service of responsive evidence. Indeed, Mr Neal indicated he would file evidence by 17 April 2026 (and thereafter by 24 April 2026) but he never did so. On the day before the hearing, Mr Neal has served a 21-page skeleton (in excess of the length permitted and without permission) which introduces evidence not only in the body of the skeleton but also in the supplemental bundle (which is effectively an exhibit).[29]In this regard, in oral submissions before me today, a number of paragraphs of the Neal Skeleton were identified which raised matters of evidence, including the following: 3(ii), 3(iii), 4(iv), 18(ii), 22, 23, 31, 35, 44, 50(i), 50(ii) and 53(i). In addition, at para.58 of the Neal Skeleton, it is stated, amongst other matters:
"It is for the Claimants to prove their case to the criminal standard. Mr Neal's sworn evidence, KN Aff 1 to 5 is on record and the court has it."
And then:
"He responds further through this skeleton argument and through his oral submissions today." [Emphasis added]
[30]The Claimants consider that that evidence that they identify in Mr Neal's Skeleton requires due consideration by them and also case management by the Court. In particular in that regard, and although some of the matters identified by way of evidence are matters within the knowledge of Mr Neal and potentially Mr Neal alone, the Claimants identified there are matters that they will wish to consider as to whether evidence is required. That relates, amongst other matters, to allegations which are made for the first time that Mr Neal relied on legal advice from his then solicitors, which may raise issues of waiver of privilege, and also requests for provision of documentation under Practice Direction 57AD para.21.1 (documents referred to in evidence). They also refer to the evidence that is given in relation to the £690,000, and that raises matters on which further evidence may be required as well, certainly investigated, in relation to the Ware property transfer and what is stated at para.31 of the Neal Skeleton.[31]Thirdly, in relation to the Kingsley Napley position - that is the position of one of the solicitors of Mr Neal, and what Mr Neal says about where monies lie, which has yet to be investigated. They also say, rightly, that a responsive skeleton will be needed to the Neal Skeleton. The Claimants' counsel also identifies that there has been insufficient time to take instructions on the detail of what further responsive evidence will be provided and by when it can be provided, albeit in oral submissions I have been assisted by counsel as to the areas that that evidence may be involved in.[32]Attention is also drawn to the seriousness of the allegations made against Mr Neal and the need for the Court to have assistance on the matters now raised by Mr Neal in terms of a responsive skeleton and further evidence as necessary. There also needs to be sufficient time for the Court to deal with the Contempt Application and to provide its judgment. None of that has been possible in advance of the hearing, and it is submitted that the two-hour listing would be quite inadequate even if those matters had been capable of being undertaken overnight, which they clearly were not. All this, it is said, will require time for preparation and lodging of such submissions and evidence and a one-day hearing to determine. The remainder of this hearing, it is said, can be constructively used to deal with case management and particular matters proposed by the Claimants in that regard, as addressed in a draft order that has been provided to the Court. That order also seeks the costs of the hearing against Mr Neal.[33]For his part, Mr Neal opposes the adjournment application. He submits as follows:(1) Firstly, the application has been live since 28 January 2026, and the Claimants have had over three months to prepare. Their skeleton was filed on 5 May 2026, three days before the hearing. Mr Neal's Skeleton was filed yesterday. Mr Neal is a litigant in person, and he served his Skeleton Argument as quickly as possible following reviewing the skeleton served upon him. In his oral submissions before me today, when asked about why he indicated that he would serve evidence by 17th and then by 24th April, he indicated that, as a litigant in person, he has been very busy dealing with matters in relation to the action itself, including in relation to disclosure, which is no easy matter for a litigant in person. Essentially, that is why he says he has not served evidence before: essentially the overwhelming weight of other matters that he had to deal with. So far as the evidence is concerned, he says that actually none of this evidence should really take the Claimants by surprise, and much of it has already been foreshadowed or dealt with in previous affidavits, including his Aff 5.(2) So far as the supplemental bundle is concerned, Mr Neal submits that that does not introduce surprising material. It contains: (i) the ACCA Disciplinary Committee's published decision on 5 January 2026 in respect of the Second Defendant, which is a public document referenced in his Defence and addressed in the Claimants' own evidence; (ii) Companies House records for MCS, which are on the public register and pre-date the Injunction Order; (iii) invoices for maintenance works at Ware paid for by Mr Neal personally, which are referenced in his skeleton; (iv) any confirmation Kingsley Napley LLP is willing to provide.(3) The next point Mr Neal makes is that he did not propose to give oral evidence and proposed only to make submissions on the basis of the evidence already filed (in KGN Aff 5 and Rhode F4, and the documents in the supplemental bundle).(4) He submitted that an adjournment now would be procedurally one-sided. The Claimants seek time to respond to the Neal Skeleton, but Mr Neal has only had three days to respond to theirs, and he has done so. Adjourning the hearing to permit the Claimants to file further evidence and to cross-examine would convert a Contempt Application in which the burden of proof lies on the Claimants and the standard is the criminal standard, into what he characterises as a fishing expedition directed against him as a litigant in person, and it is submitted that that is not a proper use of the contempt jurisdiction. For his part, if the hearing is adjourned, Mr Neal too asks for his costs of and occasioned by the vacation.

DISCUSSION

[34]I am in no doubt that the overriding objective is best served by acceding to the adjournment application, and utilising what is left of today's hearing to give case management directions. In this regard:(1) Mr Neal has known of the contempt allegations against him since the date of issue on 28 January 2026, and has known of the evidence in support of the Contempt Application since that time, as set out in Rhode 4 and the exhibit thereto;(2) The Claimants have properly made Mr Neal aware that if he wished to serve evidence in response to Rhode 4 (and in opposition to the Contempt Application) then pursuant to para.13.1 of CPR PD58, evidence was to be filed and served within 14 days after the application was served, and no such evidence was served. Thereafter, I am satisfied that the Claimants' solicitors have acted reasonably throughout in the context of the fact that Mr Neal is a litigant in person, and have been prepared to give extensions of time for service of responsive evidence.(3) Mr Neal indicated he would file evidence by 17 April (and thereafter by 24 April 2026), but he never did so. I bear well in mind that Mr Neal is a litigant in person and I accept his explanation as to why he did not do so, but the fact remains that he did not do so, which is why the Court and the parties are in the position that they now are in. It is clear, I am satisfied, from a consideration of the Neal Skeleton, that it does contain much evidence on which Mr Neal wishes to rely, including those matters identified during the course of the Claimants' oral submissions before me this morning, which I have identified by paragraph number above. The time for that was not in a Skeleton Argument the day before the hearing, and in a skeleton of the length beyond that permitted without permission.(4) As I understand it, and realistically, if I might say so, the Claimants are not inviting the Court to ignore the Neal Skeleton or its contents (given that Mr Neal is a litigant in person) but they clearly need time to consider whether responsive evidence is required and to prepare responsive submissions in any event to the matters raised. On no view was any of that possible overnight.(5) In any event, and as the Claimants' counsel has drawn to the attention of the Court, in accordance with F.5.6(b) of the Commercial Court Guide, not only was there a material risk that the two-hour listing would be exceeded, but it was rightly considered that the hearing could not possibly be effective in advance of responsive submissions and possible responsive evidence, and a revised time estimate of the hearing thereafter was one day.(6) I consider it is also important to bear in mind the nature of the application to commit Mr Neal for alleged contempt of court in circumstances where it is suggested that an immediate custodial sentence of between 12 and 24 months would be appropriate if the contempts are proved. It is important to ensure that the Court has all material assistance from the parties on such an application, and that proper time is allowed for such a hearing. On any view, that could not be done within the existing hearing.(7) Whilst sympathetic to the position of Mr Neal as a litigant in person, I do not consider the points made by Mr Neal opposing the adjournment to be meritorious. Mr Neal's Skeleton is not simply responding to the Claimants' Skeleton Argument. It is responding to the Contempt Application and Rhode 4, of which he has been aware since January 2026. He had indicated that he would file evidence by 17 April 2026 and then by 24 April 2026. I should add that as recently as Wednesday 6 May this week, in an email to Mr Neal, timed at 0959 hours, attaching the Skeleton Argument of the Claimants and the bundle, the Claimants stated, "We would be grateful for confirmation if you propose to serve an affidavit in response."(8) Accordingly, even as late as the 6th, the Claimants were keen to know as soon as possible whether or not there would be any more evidence served in relation to the application. In the event, they only received notice of that very shortly before the hearing yesterday, and at a time when it was not possible to consider responsive evidence and not possible to produce a responsive skeleton argument, which of course at least in part would have to take into account any such further evidence.(9) The reality - and this is not intended by way of criticism but by way of recognition of the reality - is that the Defendant stored up his points until the day before the hearing. I have taken the view that this is not a reason why he should not be entitled to make the points he makes, although another Court might have taken a less sympathetic view. Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is that it is only fair that the Claimants should have a fair opportunity to respond, and there must also be adequate time allowed for a hearing after they have done so.[35]For those reasons, I will adjourn the Contempt Application and give further case management directions following this judgment.[36]I would only add that last-minute engagement by a respondent on a contempt application (with or without instruction of counsel) is not uncommon, and it is often tactical with a view to deferring the determination of the application. In such cases this Court will always act robustly to ensure that committal hearings go ahead whenever the Claimant considers that is possible and the Court is satisfied that the hearing can proceed justly. However, that is not this case. I am satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate for the hearing to be adjourned and suitable case management directions given to ensure a realistic and effective hearing hereafter.

COSTS

[37]The final matter that arises is in relation to the costs. The Claimants ask for their costs of and occasioned by the adjournment. They say the adjournment is caused by the late service of evidence. For his part, Mr Neal submits that he should have the costs thrown away in circumstances where he says he complied with the timescale for putting in his Skeleton Argument, and if the Claimants need more time to provide responsive submissions to that, or indeed any further evidence (although he does not accept that further evidence will be necessary), then the price to pay for the adjournment which, after all, the Claimants ask for, should be that they pay their costs.[38]I consider that the costs are best reserved to the judge hearing the adjourned Contempt Application, who will be best placed to judge responsibility for such costs and what the overall incidence of costs should be. I would not wish to prejudge the views of the judge on that occasion but I would simply note the fact that the two-hour listing of this Contempt Application was an ambitious one, even prior to service of the Neal Skeleton, having regard to the fact that, being an ordinary application in the Commercial Court, that two-hour estimate includes the time for the judgment which, in the nature of a serious matter such as a committal order, would itself be a substantial judgment.[39]I would also note that this hearing has not been wasted because it has been possible to identify that considerably more than two hours in fact will be needed, and that need for considerably more than two hours is not simply as a result of Mr Neal's Skeleton but a degree of realism and court-led assessment as to how long the contempt hearing will actually take. It is also right to say that this hearing has been useful because it has been possible to give case management directions, including in relation to matters which have the potential to be adversarial between the parties, including, for example, the fact that Mr Neal had not been personally served in relation to two of the orders. Whilst the point is made, well, it could be possible that those could be sorted out in agreed directions had the Neal Skeleton or the Neal evidence been earlier, the reality is that it is with the assistance of the Court that it is often possible to achieve matters by way of case management which are not possible in correspondence between parties, which, in the context of committal, is quasi-criminal and to an extent therefore adversarial.[40]Those observations that I have just made are in no way, shape or form binding on the judge who hears the committal hearing, but I do consider they are matters which that judge on that occasion may wish to bear in mind when considering what to do with the costs of this hearing. Accordingly, in those circumstances, I decline to rule on the application on costs, and simply reserve it to the committal hearing.