Iconic Sports Eagle Investment, LLC v John Textor [2026] EWHC 1498 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1498 (Comm)Case No CL-2025-000308
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate Friday 19 June 2026Ms Lesley Anderson KC(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
ICONIC SPORTS EAGLE INVESTMENT, LLCClaimantJOHN TEXTORDefendant
Ryan Perkins (instructed by Kirkland & Ellis International LLP) for ClaimantDavid Davies KC and Owen Lloyd (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 21 May 2026
Approved Judgment.............................

Ms Lesley Anderson KC :

[1]This is my judgment following the hearing on 21 May 2026. The purpose of the hearing was to determine two issues which had been remitted back to the Commercial Court by the Court of Appeal (the Remitted Issues), which hearing has been adjourned pending that determination.[2]The relevant order of the Court of Appeal dated 30 January 2026 states at [4]:
“Ground 2 of the appeal is adjourned on the following basis: (1) The proceedings are remitted to the Commercial Court. (2) The Commercial Court shall: (a) decide whether the Respondent [Iconic] is now entitled to contend that the correct test is whether it is ready and willing to perform its obligations under the Put Option Agreement solely at the date of the order for specific performance (per Snell’s Equity (35th edition) at [17-038]); (b) if so, decide whether, as a matter of law, that is the correct test, or if not, what is the correct test for determining whether the Respondent is/was ready and willing to perform its obligations under the Put Option Agreement; and (c) determine the further conduct of the proceedings in the light of (a) and (b) above. (3) The Appellant is at liberty to restore its appeal in relation to Ground 2 (if relevant) following the determination by the Commercial Court of the issues set out above.”
[3]The underlying proceedings concern a claim by Iconic Sports Eagle Investment, LLC (Iconic) for an order for specific performance of a Put Option Agreement dated 16 November 2022 (the Put Option Agreement) made between Iconic (as Seller) and John Textor (Mr Textor) (as Buyer) for the sale of a substantial minority shareholding in a company called Eagle Football Holdings Limited (Eagle). Eagle has equity interests in Olympique Lyonnais (the well-known French football club) and Botafogo FR (a highly successful Brazilian football club) and, formerly, in Crystal Palace F.C. Mr Textor is the majority shareholder and CEO of Eagle. The Aggregate Option Price (including interest) under the Put Option Agreement exceeds US$100 million.[4]There has been a number of hearings including, importantly, an expedited two-day trial of preliminary issues before HHJ Pelling KC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) on 29 and 30 September 2025 (the Preliminary Issues Trial). HHJ Pelling KC handed down his reserved judgment on 17 October 2025 ([2025] EWHC 2620 (Comm) (the Preliminary Issues Judgment)) which was reflected in an order dated the same day (the Preliminary Issues Order).[5]The Preliminary Issues Judgment found that: 5.1. On the true construction of the Put Option Agreement, the obligations imposed by Clauses 3.2 and 3.3 are concurrent conditions (such that both parties had to be ready and willing to perform those obligations on 26 July 2024 (the Repayment Date)); 5.2. Iconic was ready and willing to perform its obligations under Clause 3.2 of the Put Option Agreement on the Repayment Date; 5.3. Mr Textor was not ready and willing to perform his obligations under Clause 3.3 of the Put Option Agreement on the Repayment Date.[6]So far as relevant for this hearing, by the end of the Preliminary Issues Trial, the relevant factual position established before HHJ Pelling KC was that: 6.1. Mr Textor had admitted that he was not ready to perform on the Repayment Date; 6.2. It was common ground that Clause 3.2 of the Put Option Agreement provided that Mr Textor’s obligations were “Subject to Iconic complying with its obligations under Clause 3.2”. 6.3. Iconic had not taken steps to prepare for performance on the Repayment Date, for example by preparing the documents required by Clause 3.2(a)(i) to (iv) of the Put Option Agreement (in particular, the share certificate for the Option Shares); 6.4. Although he found that Iconic had possibly never even had a share certificate, HHJ Pelling KC nevertheless accepted Iconic’s argument that its beneficial owners were directors of Eagle and they, and Mr Textor, had a legal right to issue a new share certificate; 6.5. Mr Textor had repudiated the Put Option Agreement a few days before the Repayment Date but Iconic had not accepted the repudiatory breach such that the parties’ obligations remained extant.[7]The Court of Appeal granted Mr Textor permission to appeal on essentially two grounds: first, that the Judge was wrong to conclude that the parties’ obligations under Clause 3.2 and 3.3 were simultaneous and concurrent conditions as a matter of law (Ground 1) and secondly, that the Judge was wrong to conclude that Iconic was ready and willing to perform its obligations under the Put Agreement on the Repayment Date (Ground 2).[8]On 21 January 2026, the hearing of the appeal (the Appeal) took place. Ground 1 of the Appeal was dismissed for the reasons set out in a detailed judgment handed down on 25 March 2026 (CA Judgment). Ground Two was adjourned as I have already set out.[9]In short, the Court of Appeal had identified a potentially decisive passage in Snell’s Equity (35th edition) (Snell) at [17-038] that the Court may exercise its discretion to grant an order for specific performance even if Iconic was not ready and willing to complete on the Repayment Date, provided that Iconic is ready and willing to complete at the date when an order for specific performance is made. The parties have referred to this as the Snell Point and it is convenient for me to adopt that. It is the second of the Remitted Issues before me. The first Remitted Issue is whether Iconic should be permitted at this stage to run the Snell Point at all.[10]I mention a further important development. As I have already said, the share certificate was not before the Court on the Preliminary Issues Trial. On 13 January 2026, one week before the Appeal was scheduled to be heard, Mr Textor disclosed (as an attachment to his Counsels’ Reply Skeleton Argument), a copy of the share certificate (signed by him) which Iconic says had been in his possession all along. The significance of this is that whatever might have been the position as at the Repayment Date (or for that matter at the Preliminary Issues Trial), Iconic’s position is that it is now ready and willing to complete its obligations under the Put Option Agreement. It is important to note that Iconic’s primary argument is still that it was ready and willing to complete as at the Repayment Date even if it was not in possession of the share certificate. As Phillips LJ stated in the CA Judgment, the decision of this Court may render Ground 2 of the Appeal academic or otherwise affect its determination.

The Scope of this Hearing

[11]Mr Textor’s primary position is that Iconic should not be permitted to advance a new and different case as to the date or dates on which it must be ready and willing to perform. This raises squarely the doctrine of abuse of process (specifically the type of abuse contemplated by Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100). There are two aspects to this:(i) should Iconic be permitted now to run a new case which is inconsistent with its prior case and the basis on which the litigation has been conducted to date, including at the Preliminary Issues Trial and(ii) if Iconic is permitted to change its case, does that cause prejudice to Mr Textor.[12]In any event, Mr Textor submits that, even if Iconic is allowed to advance a new case, paragraph [17-038] of Snell does not state the law correctly. In particular, he contends that Snell is wrong to suggest a special rule exists for cases of unaccepted repudiatory breach.

The Procedural History

[13]The parties have agreed a helpful, detailed chronology.[14]The Claim Form and Particulars of Claim are dated 3 July 2025 and were served on Mr Textor on 11 July 2025. On 29 July 2025, Mr Textor filed:(a) an application seeking interim injunctive relief against Iconic in relation to its purported exercise of its rights under a Share Charge Agreement dated 9 December 2022 in respect of Mr Textor’s shares in Eagle and(b) an application seeking reverse summary judgment dismissing and/or striking out Iconic’s claim for specific performance.[15]Having identified that there should be a trial of the Preliminary Issues, by his order dated 13 August 2025, HHJ Pelling KC ordered the parties to serve discrete pleadings limited to the matters arising out of the Preliminary Issues. He also accepted various undertakings disposing of Mr Textor’s application for an injunction. Mr Textor’s Defence on Preliminary Issues was served on 20 August 2025 and Iconic served its Reply on Preliminary Issues on 27 August 2025. In the Particulars of Claim and the Reply, Iconic did not advance a case that the relevant date for it to show that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations under the Put Option Agreement was anything other than 26 July 2024.[16]As I have set out, the Preliminary Issues Trial took place on 29 and 30 September 2025 and the reserved Preliminary Issues Judgment was handed down on 17 October 2025. As well as his ruling on the Preliminary Issues, HHJ Pelling KC dismissed Mr Textor’s application for summary judgment/strike-out.[17]On 5 December 2025, Mr Textor served his Defence and Counterclaim on matters other than the Preliminary Issues.[18]Iconic served its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim on matters other than the Preliminary Issues on 9 January 2026. At [51], Iconic adopted the contents of the Preliminary Issues Judgment on the preliminary issues but at [52] pleaded that:
“If (which is denied) Iconic was not ready and willing to perform its obligations under Clause 3.2 on 26 July 2024, it is averred that Iconic is nevertheless entitled to specific performance. The Court has an equitable discretion to grant an order for specific performance even if the claimant was not ready and willing to perform at the contractual completion date, provided that the defendant had already repudiated the contract by that date (such that it would have been futile for the claimant to perform). Mr Textor repudiated the Put Option Agreement on 15 July 2024 by informing Mr Knaster that he was neither ready nor willing to pay the Aggregate Option Price (as HHJ Pelling KC found in his judgment), and it would have been futile for Iconic to perform on 26 July 2024
.

The Evidence

[19]The parties filed evidence in connection with the hearing of the Remitted Issues: 19.1. The sixth witness statement of Jonathan Anthony Lucius Cary (Mr Cary), a partner in Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP (RPC), the solicitors for Mr Textor, dated 2 April 2026 (Clary (6)); 19.2. The fifth witness statement of Richard Boynton (Mr Boynton), a partner in Kirkland & Ellis International LLP (K&E), the solicitors for Iconic, dated 17 April 2026 (Boynton (5)); 19.3. The seventh witness statement of Mr Cary dated 1 May 2026 (Cary (7)).[20]Much of this evidence simply repeated and commented on the relevant chronology and added little to it or was in the form of barely disguised submissions.[21]As Mr Cary fairly acknowledged in Cary 6 at [7], his evidence was primarily directed to the abuse of process argument and in particular, in Section B, to the prejudice that Mr Textor would suffer if Iconic is now permitted to run the Snell Point. He makes three main points: 21.1. The relevant issue for disclosure in the DRD, and so the parties’ disclosure, reflected the fact that the only relevant date for assessing Iconic’s readiness and willingness was the Repayment Date; 21.2. Mr Textor would have asked for a different date range for documents and, in particular, documents directed at the relevant regulatory approvals which might have been required and Iconic’s later conduct when it attempted to sell its shares in Eagle; 21.3. Mr Textor and his team might have taken different case management and strategic decisions.[22]Boynton (5) addresses this from [34] to [47]. He makes essentially five points: 22.1. He stresses the circumstances in which the formulation of the Preliminary Issues came about, that they were suggested by the Judge and drafted and agreed between Counsel during a short adjournment of the hearing, and that the Preliminary Issues Trial was never intended to be the final hearing in this dispute; 22.2. He then emphasises that an alternative position on the date on which Iconic had to show it was ready and willing to perform was raised in its Reply dated 9 January 2025 and the circumstances in which the Snell Point arose in the Court of Appeal; 22.3. He says that Mr Textor is overstating the alleged prejudice arising from needing to conduct further disclosure because the Snell Point is principally a matter of law; 22.4. He rejects any suggestion that Iconic has acted improperly or tactically in relation to the raising of the Snell Point and that it was “held back” for tactical reasons. He confirms that Iconic’s legal team identified the Snell Point when preparing for the hearing of the Appeal and brought to the hearing a copy of the relevant passage from Snell and handed it to Mr Textor’s legal team after the short adjournment, which was, coincidentally, when the Court of Appeal also raised the point; 22.5. Any financial prejudice suffered by Mr Textor can be dealt with by an order for costs.

Abuse of process – the law

[23]Unsurprisingly there was a high degree of common ground as to the relevant law on abuse of process.[24]The leading modern authority is the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, where Lord Bingham emphasised that the doctrine requires a “broad merits-based judgment” [at 31B-E]:
“It is … wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.”
[25]This paragraph was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2022] AC 1 at [72]. Lord Reed and Lord Hodge said at [76]:
“From these authorities it is clear that for the court to uphold a plea of abuse of process as a bar to a claim or a defence it must be satisfied that the party in question is misusing or abusing the process of the court by oppressing the other party by repeated challenges relating to the same subject matter. It is not sufficient to establish abuse of process for a party to show that a challenge could have been raised in a prior litigation or at an earlier stage in the same proceedings. It must be shown both that the challenge should have been raised on that earlier occasion and that the later raising of the challenge is abusive.”
[26]It is common ground and I accept that, in principle, the abuse of process doctrine can apply to phased litigation or separate stages of the same litigation: it is not confined to a situation where a fresh claim has been issued after the determination of a prior claim. I was referred by both Counsel to Tannu v Moosajee [2003] EWCA Civ 815, where the claimant initially argued that she had paid £110,000 to the defendant as a loan (and sought a money judgment for that amount). The judge held that the payment was not a loan and that there was in fact a partnership between the parties which had been dissolved. The claimant then raised a new argument that the payment was a capital contribution that should be returned in the winding-up of the partnership. The Court of Appeal held that, although the new argument could (and perhaps should) have been raised earlier, this did not amount to an abuse of process.[27]Nevertheless, Tannu makes it clear that it is unusual for the Court to conclude that a litigant is prevented from raising a point merely because it was not raised at an earlier stage in the same proceedings. At [31], Dyson LJ noted that it was “unusual” for the abuse of process doctrine to be applied to separate stages of the same litigation.[28]At [34], Dyson LJ having referred to Johnson v Gore Wood, stated:
“In my view, the judge applied the rule too rigidly. He failed to adopt the “broad merits-based judgment” to which Lord Bingham refers, and failed to ask the question whether in all the circumstances the claimant was misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise the issue as to the basis on which the £100,000 was paid on the footing that there was a partnership. It is not enough simply to say that the issue could have been raised at the earlier stage, and that there are no special circumstances which justify permitting the issue (exceptionally) to be raised at the later stage.”
[29]Arden LJ agreed. She commented at [40] that “[w]hile it may be unusual to apply the principle in Henderson v Henderson in relation to separate stages of the same litigation, it is not conceptually impossible”.[30]Both parties also referred me to the decision of Coulson J (as he then was) in Seele Austria GmbH Co v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Ltd [2009] EWHC 255 (TCC), where the claimant attempted to introduce an entirely new cause of action (requiring new evidence, disclosure and so forth) several years into the proceedings.[31]Discussing Tannu at [27],

the Judge said:

“…the Court of Appeal expressly recognised that Henderson abuse could apply to later stages of the same litigation, although they expressed the view that such a situation was “unusual”
. It seems to me that there is no reason in principle why Henderson abuse should not be applicable, just like issue estoppel, to the later stages of the same action. It is however no more than common sense to observe that it might be significantly easier for a party facing a Henderson abuse allegation to defeat it if the point arose for decision in the same proceedings, rather than in a subsequent action, for the reasons explained by the Court of Appeal in Tannu.”[32]Later in the judgment, Coulson J. said at [107]:
“… I accept that, where certain issues are dealt with by the court in advance of others, genuine mistakes may occur, where it would be unfair and unreasonable to prevent one party from raising an issue on the merits which, for whatever reason, has not been the subject of a clear determination before. Tannu and Aldi Stores are good recent examples of such a case. But at the same time, the court should be astute to prevent a claiming party from putting its case one way, thereby causing the other side to incur considerable expense, only for the claiming party to lose and then come up with a different way of putting the same case, so as to begin the process all over again . … I have no doubt that, on the basis of the facts as I have summarised them in Section D above, it would be wrong and unfair to allow the claimant in these proceedings to go back to square one and attempt to run a case which could and should have been raised years ago.”
[33]Mr Perkins, Counsel for Iconic, also referred me to the cases on the circumstances in which an appellate court will permit a party to raise a new point on appeal (helpfully summarised in the judgment of Snowden LJ in Notting Hill Finance Ltd v Sheikh [2019] 4 WLR 146 especially at [26]-[28]) and to the relevant principles which apply when a party is seeking to withdraw a concession and argue a new point of law (see Heis v MF Global UK Services Ltd [2016] Pens LR 225 especially at [23]-[28]). These are of some assistance to me but the procedural context in those circumstances is generally different from the present case, where the relevant matter has been remitted back to the Commercial Court.

Abuse of process- the application to the facts

[34]This is a case of phased litigation and so it would be “unusual”, on the basis of the current state of the authorities, to bar Iconic from pursuing the new Snell Point.[35]It is clear from the relevant procedural chronology that Iconic chose to plead its case on the relevant Repayment Date in its Particulars of Claim and was under no particular time pressure to do so at that time. For good reason, HHJ Pelling KC identified that the case was appropriate for a separate trial of the Preliminary Issues and there was then a trial of the Preliminary Issues as formulated (fairly speedily) by the Judge and the parties. However, between the case management order made by HHJ Pelling KC on 13 August 2025 and the Preliminary Issues Trial itself (a matter of mere weeks) there was a significant need to expedite matters and it seems to me this creates the precise conditions whereby material points can be missed.[36]Although Mr Davies KC submits that Iconic is running a case which is inconsistent with the case advanced at the Preliminary Issues Trial, it seems to me that this is overstating the point. Iconic’s primary argument remains that it was ready and willing, as a matter of fact and law, to complete at the Repayment Date and the Snell Point is being relied on as an alternative position, if Iconic is not successful in the Court of Appeal. It was not suggested to me that Iconic could not, at the outset, have pleaded these as alternative cases and so there is no material difference between this point being decided now or in September/October 2025. In any event, I accept that until Iconic had the actual share certificate in January 2026, the Snell Point was somewhat academic.[37]Mr Davies KC also submits that Mr Textor has not had a proper opportunity to respond to the new case that Iconic seeks to raise. Mr Textor was alerted in January 2026 to the fact that Iconic would argue that it was entitled to specific performance even if Iconic was not ready and willing to perform at the contractual completion date if Mr Textor had already repudiated. Although this did not expressly refer to Snell or plead the point out fully, Mr Textor was on notice of a change of case, and had at least the opportunity to have researched the position. Mr Textor has never purported to terminate the Put Option Agreement and the suggestion on his behalf that he has been prejudiced by not having that opportunity is at odds with the facts established at the Preliminary Issues Trial.[38]Although Mr Cary is right to say that the formulation of issues in the DRD and the parties’ disclosure was given by reference to the pleaded case that performance was required as at the Repayment Date, I am not persuaded that the parties would have identified a different date range or that it would have required investigation into the regulatory position at a different date.[39]I agree with Mr Perkins that the facts of the present case are a very long way from the facts of Seele: Iconic is not seeking to introduce a new cause of action (but simply a new legal argument) and the point is a short one, which does not turn on disputed facts or require a lengthy hearing. Iconic is certainly not seeking “to go back to square one and attempt to run a case which could and should have been raised years ago”.[40]Moreover, whilst the abuse of process argument cannot turn solely on the strength or merits of the underlying case now sought to be advanced, it is common ground that Iconic may well lose a US$100 million claim that it might otherwise win if it is not entitled to advance the Snell Point now. That is a significant degree of prejudice.[41]Although an abuse of process can arise without any deliberate or improper tactical conduct, I am satisfied in any event that this is not such a case. I accept that Mr Boynton has fairly set out the circumstances in which the Snell Point arose and that there is no question here of tactical advantage or bad faith.[42]I am entirely satisfied that, adopting that broad merits-based judgment, Iconic should be permitted to advance the Snell Point and that it is not an abuse of process for it to do so now. Indeed, the point having now been raised, it would be wholly artificial and contrary to the proper administration of justice for the Court of Appeal to conduct the Ground 2 Appeal without having regard to it. I am not satisfied that Mr Textor has demonstrated that he has suffered any real prejudice as a result of the point being raised now, or at least, not prejudice that is not capable of being dealt with by an appropriate order for costs.

The Snell Point - the law and analysis

[43]The relevant passage to which the Court of Appeal referred at the hearing of the Appeal is in Snell at [17-038]:
“A claimant who seeks [specific performance] must show (i) that he has performed, or has been ready and willing to perform, all terms and conditions (apart from trivial ones) then to be performed by him; (ii) that he is ready and willing to perform all terms and conditions thereafter to be performed by him; and (iii) that he has not acted in contravention of the essential terms of the contract. But where the defendant has repudiated and the claimant has elected to keep the contract alive and enforce it, it is not incumbent on a claimant to show that he was in a position to complete (e.g. if he is the purchaser, by having the price available) during the period from repudiation by the defendant to the date of the order for specific performance, as long as he was in such a position at the date of the order.”
(emphasis added).[44]I was told that the same passage has appeared in Snell for over 40 years. The authority cited in the relevant footnote to that sentence is Davis v Spalding (1974] 231 E.G. 373 which is said to have been cited and applied (along with the passage from Snell) in Aymes International Ltd v Nutrition 4U BV [2023] EWHC 1452 (Ch). I will return to these and the other relevant legal authorities (in England and abroad) below. It is convenient first to consider what, if any, support can be derived from the academic literature.[45]Although Mr Davies KC for Mr Textor argued to the contrary, the analysis undertaken by Mr Perkins suggests that it would be wrong to consider the proposition in this passage in Snell to be an outlier so far as the relevant academic textbooks is concerned.[46]In Jones and Goodhart on Specific Performance (2nd edition, page 68), the law is stated as follows:
“A party which has previously been in default of its obligations under the contract may enforce it, even if the default involved an essential term, provided that the other party did not exercise its right to terminate the contract while the contract subsisted and that the party previously in default is now ready and willing to complete it.”
[47]In Virgo et. al. Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies (4th edition) at [27-055]-[27-056]:
“Whether or not the parties’ mutual obligations under a contract are strictly interdependent at law, it is clear that a claimant will not get an order of specific performance unless he alleges and is prepared to prove that he is himself ready and willing to perform his own essential obligations. But the word “essential” is important: as Barwick CJ said in the High Court of Australia: “The question as to whether or not the plaintiff has been and is ready and willing to perform the contract is one of substance not to be resolved in any technical or narrow sense. It is important to bear in mind what is the substantial thing for which the parties contract and what on the part of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance are his essential obligations.”
So a buyer who, having had doubts about his ability to provide the price of land, convinces the court that he can provide it, albeit later than the contract demands, may be entitled to an order notwithstanding. And conversely, a property developer is not barred from obtaining specific relief against a buyer merely because of small matters remaining uncompleted.”[48]I was also referred to Atkin’s Court Forms (Vol. 33(2), 19, [319]) (footnote references removed) dealing with defences to claims for specific performance:
“A claimant must, in general, plead and prove that they are, and at all material times, (namely the time when the notice is served, the time when it expires, if applicable and the time when the court’s order is made) have been ready, willing and able to perform their obligations. But this is not an absolute rule. For example, there is no need to prove ability to complete, once the contract has been repudiated and the repudiation is still running, provided that such ability could be proven to exist at the time when the order was made.”
[49]Mr Perkins for Iconic stresses that the starting point is that an order for specific performance is an equitable, discretionary remedy which is flexible and adaptable to achieve the ends of equity. He submits that there are few hard and fast “rules”. The passage from Snell cannot be read in isolation: it needs to be seen as a facet of the flexible, equitable and discretionary nature of the remedy of specific performance. Indeed, he points to the fact that the other textbooks quoted above (Jones and Goodhart and Virgo) go further and do not suggest that there is any requirement to show that the defendant was in repudiatory breach.[50]As Lord Hoffmann said in Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1 at 9[F]:
“A decree of specific performance is of course a discretionary remedy and the question for your Lordships is whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to set aside the exercise of the judge's discretion. There are well-established principles which govern the exercise of the discretion but these, like all equitable principles, are flexible and adaptable to achieve the ends of equity, which is, as Lord Selborne L.C. once remarked, to ‘do more perfect and complete justice’ than would be the result of leaving the parties to their remedies at common law: Wilson v. Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co. (1874) L.R. 9 Ch.App. 279, 284. Much therefore depends upon the facts of the particular case …”
[51]For example, he submits that it is not correct that a party cannot obtain an order for specific performance if that party is itself in breach of contract. The true test was explained by the Court of Appeal in National and Provincial Bank Society v British Waterways Board (unreported, 26 November 1992), where the following passage from Jones and Goodhart was quoted:
“… the question is whether the obligation which the plaintiff has failed to perform is sufficiently important (having regard to its connection with the obligation which the plaintiff is seeking to enforce) to make it inequitable to grant specific performance.”
[52]The Court of Appeal commented:
“We are in complete agreement with the last sentence quoted: it seems to us to embody both good law and good sense. We turn, therefore, to consider the authorities to see if they require us to reach a conclusion contrary to what we believe equity in its broadest sense requires in the present case.”
[53]This principle was applied in Redrow Homes Ltd v Martin Dawn (Leckhampton) Ltd [2016] EWHC 934 (Ch) at [68] per HHJ Hodge KC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court).[54]Mr Textor’s position is that there is no such special rule or principle applicable to repudiatory breach and that paragraph [17-038] of Snell is wrong for the following reasons: 54.1. The proposition in Snell is inconsistent with the modern law on repudiatory breach as established by cases in the Court of Appeal (Hitex v Uniserve Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 122, the House of Lords (The Simona [1989] 1 AC 788) and as accepted in the Supreme Court; 54.2. The proposition in Snellis not, in fact, supported by Davis which, properly understood, supports Mr Textor’s position. If Davis does support Snell, then it was decided per incuriam; 54.3. Subsequent first instance decisions considering or applying Davis do not support the proposition in Snell. If they do, they too are decided per incuriam.[55]The starting point for Mr Davies KC’s submissions is the general law on repudiatory breach as summarised and stated in the recent decision in Hitex at [64] to [66]. The seller under a supply contract had problems meeting the agreed delivery schedule which led to the buyer purporting to terminate the contract. The seller contended that the buyer’s termination was unlawful and that the supply contract remained alive for performance. The seller claimed damages for the buyer’s failure to accept and pay for the goods as and when deliveries fell due. The buyer defended the claim on the basis that it was entitled to rescind the contract for misrepresentation; and that in any event the seller was not in a position to perform the contract and therefore not entitled to damages. The Court of Appeal concluded that the buyer’s appeal under the supply contract must be allowed and that the seller’s claim must be dismissed because the seller was not in a position to perform and so the buyer was entitled to terminate the contract.[56]At [64] Males LJ referred to the speech of Lord Ackner in The Simona at 799: “When one party wrongly refuses to perform obligations, this will not automatically bring the contract to an end. The innocent party has an option. He may either accept the wrongful repudiation as determining the contract and sue for damages, or he may ignore or reject the attempt to determine he contract and affirm its existence”.[57]At [65], Males LJ explains, by reference to Lord Ackner’s citation of Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111 that: “… if the contract is kept alive, it is kept alive for all purposes. This means that the innocent party ‘remains subject to his own obligations and liabilities under it, and enables the other party not only to complete the contract, if so advised, notwithstanding his previous repudiation of it, but also to take advantage of any supervening circumstance which would justify him in declining to complete it’. It follows that, if the contract is kept alive, but the innocent party then fails to perform its obligations, the party which was in wrongful repudiation may have another opportunity to terminate the contract”.[58]At [66], Males LJ observes that the particular importance of the The Simona was the rejection of any theory “whereby the innocent party faced with a repudiation is absolved from continuing to perform the contract unless and until the repudiating party gives notice that it is once again able and willing to perform”.[59]Thus, Mr Davies KC submits, applying these principles to this case: 59.1. If, as HHJ Pelling KC found, Mr Textor was in repudiatory breach of contract from 15 July 2024, it is nevertheless common ground that Iconic did not accept that breach and, to the contrary, has affirmed the contract by calling for it to be enforced. 59.2. If the repudiatory breach was of no effect, it is a “thing writ in water”, the contract remained in force and both parties remained subject to their obligations. 59.3. HHJ Pelling KC held, and the Court of Appeal upheld, that the parties’ obligations are concurrent conditions which meant that there ought to have been an exchange of money for the shares on the Repayment Date. 59.4. Mr Textor was not ready and willing to make payment on that date and so Iconic was not in breach of contract in failing to provide the documents but if Iconic was not also ready and willing to perform on the Repayment Date, Mr Textor was not obliged to make payment. 59.5. Because Iconic had not been excused from performing or getting ready to perform by the unaccepted repudiatory breach, the date of contractual performance remains the logical date to assess its readiness to perform. 59.6. Mr Textor would only be in breach of contract himself if Iconic was willing to go ahead and exchange money for shares on the Repayment Date.[60]The difficulty for Mr Davies KC is that there is nothing in either of the passages in Hitex or The Simonato indicate that there was any consideration given to the remedy of specific performance far less any consideration of the jurisprudence which underpins the relevant passage from Snell. Although he points (correctly) to the fact that the proposition in Snell does not appear to be reflected in Chitty on Contracts or Treitel, the relevant chapter of Chitty (chapter 31) does not address the principle of readiness and willingness to perform at all. The point can equally be made, that there is apparently nothing in any of the leading texts to which I have been referred to support his analysis.[61]I turn then to consider the relevant authorities (including Davis itself).[62]I was referred first to Ellis v Rogers (1885) 29 Ch D 661 (cited in Atkin’s Court Forms), where a vendor was ready and willing to complete until the purchaser repudiated the contract. From the time of the purchaser’s repudiation, the vendor did not perform the contract (e.g. by delivering copies of a notice to assign). The judge (Kay J) held that the vendor was not entitled to specific performance, but the Court of Appeal unanimously held that Kay J’s analysis was wrong. The relevant parts of the judgments in the Court of Appeal are obiter (since the appeal was decided on a different basis).[63]Cotton LJ said at 671:
“… it [is] unnecessary to decide the point on which Mr. Justice Kay’s decision mainly proceeded, but it must not be considered that I agree with him. The vendor up to the time when the purchaser refused to go on, had been ready and willing to do all that was required to be done by him up to that time, and the proceedings had not reached the stage when it was necessary for him to be furnished with a license to assign. It seems to me, therefore, that if there had been no other objection to the Plaintiff’s title he would have been entitled to relief, but I do not decide the point.”
[64]Bowen LJ agreed: “As at present advised I dissent from the conclusion of Mr. Justice Kay as to the result of the vendor’s not having procured a license to assign”.[65]Fry LJ stated at 671-672:
“The contract was entered into on the 5th of December, 1881, and on the 1st of April, 1882, the Defendant refused to go on with the bargain. The question is whether he was justified in doing so. He relies on two grounds, and first on the want of a license to assign. Without giving a concluded opinion on the point, I may state my present view to be that this defence would not avail him, the time not having arrived when a license was wanted, as the title had not been accepted nor a conveyance tendered.”
[66]In Berners v Fleming [1925] Ch 264, the vendor refused to complete because he had a mistaken understanding of what was required under the contract of sale. To that extent, he was not ready and willing to perform on the contractual completion day. After the construction of the contract was clarified by the Court, the vendor applied for (and obtained) specific performance. The purchaser argued that the vendor was not ready and willing to complete on the contractual completion date: see the argument of Mr Bennett KC at 269.[67]Lord Pollock MR held that, although the vendor failed to do what the contract required, the vendor was nevertheless entitled to specific performance in the exercise of the Court’s discretion (at 270):
“No case has been cited to the Court where it has been decided that where the plaintiff put a wrong interpretation upon the contract he thereby forfeits his claim to specific performance of the contract as rightly interpreted, if he is willing so to modify it. There are, however, a number of cases which point in the opposite direction … The question is one of degree and discretion.”
[68]Sargant LJ said at 273:
“… though the plaintiff has unfortunately put a construction on the contract which was a mistaken one and has failed, I cannot see that he has thereby disentitled himself to enforce the contract on that construction of it which the Court has determined to be the right one. No doubt he has insisted on his mistaken view down to and at the hearing; but that was the first time at which the true construction of the contract was or could be ascertained by the Court in these proceedings. And when there is, as here, a perfectly bona fide dispute as to the interpretation of conditions of sale by auction, it is I think an unduly strict view to take of the position of a vendor, that he cannot seek to enforce his view of the written contract without losing his right of enforcing it at all, should his interpretation prove to be incorrect.”
[69]Berners v Fleming was cited with approval by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Gold v Penney [1960] NZLR 1032 at 1051. There, Mr Penney had agreed at the request of Mr Gold to take up some shares in a company subject to various conditions, including restrictions contained in the company’s articles of association. Mr Penny sued for specific performance prior to having complied with the terms of the articles. Mr Penny obtained an order for specific performance despite not having been ready and willing to perform on the contractual completion date. The facts in Berners v Fleming did not involve a repudiation – rather, that was simply a case in which it was fair and just to grant an order for specific performance.[70]I was also referred to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Mehmet v Benson (1965) 113 CLR 295. In that case, Windeyer J. stated:
“It is necessary that the plaintiff in an action for specific performance should allege in his pleading and prove at the hearing his readiness and willingness to perform the contract on his part: and readiness involves an ability to perform it … And he must show too that he has performed or been ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract on his part: see Fry on Specific Performance, 6th ed (1921) p 435. But if, notwithstanding earlier breaches, the contract remained on foot, then it seems to me a plaintiff is not necessarily barred from having a decree for specific performance if those breaches, not having resulted in a valid rescission, can be made good by the payment of interest.”
[71]Mehmet v Benson has been cited with approval in England: see Vision Express (UK) Ltd v Wilson [1998] BCC 173 at 182-183 per HHJ Levy QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court).[72]Mr Perkins points to the fact that Berners v Fleming and Mehmet v Benson are not cases of repudiatory breach but he submits that, the present case (which does involve a repudiatory breach by Mr Textor) falls squarely within the proposition in Snell at [17-038].[73]The next authority is Davis v Spalding, one of the cases cited in the footnote to the relevant passage in Snell.[74]Davis v Spalding concerned a contract for the sale of a residential property. Walton J found that on the day before completion, Mr Spalding, the seller, had visited the purchasers and explained that he had not been able to raise all of the funds necessary to fund his own purchase. Walton J granted an order for specific performance in favour of the purchasers (despite them having ceased to prepare for completion after the vendor’s repudiation).[75]Although Mr Davies KC sought to argue to the contrary, it is clear from the report of the judgment that Walton J did not consider that the plaintiffs needed to show that they were in a position to perform on the contractual completion date. True it is, the Judge first considered that the first material time “must be the date agreed for completion”. But he went on to consider the effect of the repudiation and it is in that context, that he held that “the next material time” was the date when the decree of specific performance was made.[76]Walton J said: “so long as that repudiation was running the plaintiffs need not show either they had, or that they were in a position to [perform] … To suggest otherwise would … place a totally unnecessary burden upon them. Why should they prepare for an event which was not, or not yet, going to take place?”.[77]It seems to me that Mr Perkins is right to submit that the underlying principle is one of essential fairness.[78]Although Mr Davies KC submitted that Davis v Spalding is poorly reported (because the only report is in the Estates Gazette) and that the report itself was ambiguous and unclear, I am unable to accept that. It seems to me that Davis v Spalding is authority for the proposition in Snell.[79]Davis v Spalding has been followed in other cases on specific performance: see Grant v Lapid Developments Ltd [1996] BCC 410 at 417 per Judge Weeks QC; Aymes International Ltd v Nutrition 4U BV [2023] EWHC 1452 (Ch) at [138] per HHJ Hodge KC; and Wheatland v CL SPV 1 Ltd [2025] EWHC 3092 (Ch) at [38] per Master Brightwell.[80]Mr Perkins submitted that the decision in Grant v Lapid Developments Ltd is particularly close to the facts of the present case. I agree. In that case, the claimant agreed to sell shares to the defendant issued by a private company of which the claimant and the defendant were the sole directors. The claimant applied for specific performance of the contract, and the defendant sought to resist the action on the basis that the claimant was not ready and willing to complete on the contractual completion date. Amongst other things, the defendant argued that the claimant was not in possession of the relevant share certificates – the same argument that is advanced by Mr Textor in the present case.[81]This argument was rejected by HHJ Weeks QC (sitting as a High Court Judge), who stated at 417:
“… the short answer to the point is Walton J’s answer in Davis v Spalding. Mr Grant does not have to show himself ready, willing and able to complete while Mr Cigman is refusing to perform his obligations. He does have to prove that readiness, willingness and ability at the date of the order for specific performance only.”
[82]I am unable to accept the submissions made on behalf of Mr Textor that the reasoning of HHJ Weeks QC is unclear or runs contrary to the orthodox principles of contract law.[83]The decision in Aymes International Ltd v Nutrition 4U BV concerned the admitted exercise by Aymes of a call option agreement for the purchase from Nutrition 4U B.V of the entire share capital of NutriMedical B.V, a Dutch company specialising in the development and marketing of nutritional products. The option was exercised on 1 April 2020 and was due to complete by 29 May 2020 but prior to that date, a dispute had emerged as to the correct valuation of the company and the calculation of the price payable. Completion did not take place on the due date and Aymes sued for specific performance.[84]At [137] HHJ Hodge KC referred to paragraph [17-038] of Snell and to the material parts of the footnote referring to Davis v Spalding. Then at, [138] he states:
“In the present case, the defendants, through their solicitors, Freeths, had made it clear to the claimant that they were not going to complete their option contract: see their letters of 24 September and 10 November 2020. In such circumstances, I hold that it is sufficient for the claimant to demonstrate that it is ready, willing and able to complete the option contract at the date of the order for specific performance. Indeed, in my judgment that is so in any case where completion is delayed because of genuine dispute over the meaning and effect of an option contract which has the effect of preventing completion taking place before the resolution of that dispute.”
[85]Although Mr Davies KC argued that it was unclear what point HHJ Hodge KC was deciding in this case or how the passage in Snell was being deployed I am unable to accept that. The Judge expressly finds that it was sufficient for the claimant to demonstrate that it was ready, willing and able to complete at the date of the order for specific performance and he does so expressly by reference to the relevant passage in Snell and the decision in Davis v Spalding. Nor was he confining that finding to the specific context where the reason for the delay in completion was owing to a dispute over its meaning and effect.[86]So far as the decision in Wheatland v CL SPV 1 Ltd is concerned, Master Brightwell at [38] specifically referred to and applied Aymes and its citation of Snell at [17-038] stating that it was established that a claimant seeking specific performance must be ready and willing to complete at the date of the order for specific performance.[87]In my judgment, there is ample authority to support the proposition that Snell at [17-038] is correct. I was not taken to any authority in which Davis v Spalding has been doubted.[88]In addition, Davis v Spalding has been cited with approval at appellate level in Australia and Hong Kong. I was referred to the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sommers v Pearse [1993] NSWCA 249 at 12-13 per Powell JA and the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Peggy v Lam [2010] 4 HKC 215 at 231 per Lord Millett (sitting as a Non-Permanent Judge).[89]In the latter case, Lord Millett stated (citing Davis v Spalding): “I should add, though the matter does not arise in the present case, that had she been obliged to complete on some earlier date, the Vendors’ refusal to complete dispensed with any need on her part either to tender the purchase price or to continue with her efforts to raise the money. The letter of the Vendors’ solicitors of 15 October 2004 was the clearest possible intimation that it would be pointless for the plaintiff to tender the money or, for that matter, to continue in her efforts to seek finance. So long as that remained the position, the plaintiff was not required to show ‘that she had, or was in a position to get, the money needed at completion’[90]Peggy v Lam is not binding on me. However, it is a very persuasive authority from an impeccable source.[91]Mr Perkins also submitted that the proposition stated in Snell’s Equity must be right as a matter of common sense. He posed, by way of illustration, the proposition that a vendor repudiates a contract for the sale of a house which the purchaser had intended to buy with a mortgage from a bank, and the purchaser applies for specific performance. He submitted that it cannot seriously be suggested that, even if the contract was repudiated by the vendor a month ahead of completion, the purchaser must nevertheless raise funds to buy the house on the completion day as if the contract had not been repudiated. In practice, he submitted, it is very unlikely that bank would agree to lend money to the buyer under a contract of sale which is known to have already been repudiated. In light of the vendor’s repudiation, the purchaser will never realistically be ready to disburse the purchase price to the vendor on completion day but that cannot mean that the purchaser is forever barred from obtaining an order for specific performance.

The Snell Point: Conclusion

[92]In my judgment, Iconic is correct to submit that: 92.1. The Snell Point is a principle of equity, not a principle of contract law. 92.2. It is an elementary rule of contract law that a claimant is contractually bound to perform his obligations if he does not accept the defendant’s repudiation and if the contract is not terminated, then it remains alive for all purposes and the innocent party remains subject to all of his own obligations and liabilities under it. 92.3. However, this has nothing to do with the equitable doctrine of specific performance. Lord Millett expressly referred to the applicable rules of contract law in Peggy v Lam at 228, and was undoubtedly aware of them. 92.4. Specific performance is a flexible, discretionary and equitable remedy which can be granted even if the claimant has failed to perform a contract which the defendant has repudiated (in circumstances where the claimant has not accepted the repudiation). 92.5. It does not follow that the claimant will be deprived of the equitable remedy of specific performance if the claimant did not perform all of his own obligations under the contract. 92.6. The question of whether to grant specific performance is simply a different question from asking whether the claimant was in breach of contract by failing to perform after the defendant repudiated.[93]Mr Textor has not satisfied me that the proposition stated in Snell’s Equity is somehow inconsistent with fundamental principles of contract law. Mr Textor has come nowhere near showing that the authorities relied on by Iconic are “clearly wrong”.[94]I am satisfied that the authorities establish that there is no absolute rule that a claimant must be “ready and willing” to perform on the contractual completion date. The cases demonstrate that there are circumstances where the Court will grant an order for specific performance even if the claimant was not ready and willing to perform on the contractual completion date.[95]Turning to the Remitted Issues I am satisfied, based on my analysis of these authorities and the textbooks to which I have referred, that as a matter of law, the proposition in Snell at [17-038] sets out the correct test for determining whether Iconic is/was ready and willing to perform its obligations under the Put Option Agreement. Given the facts of this case, it is not necessary for me to determine whether that principle applies more widely to the situation where the defendant has not repudiated the relevant contract which has been kept alive by the claimant.[96]In his Skeleton Argument for this hearing, Mr Perkins at [52] to [57] invited this Court to go further and to decide whether the Court should now exercise its discretion to make an order for specific performance (subject to the resolution of Mr Textor’s other defences as pleaded in his Defence and Counterclaim).[97]HHJ Pelling KC found that Mr Textor repudiated the Put Option Agreement at a meeting on 15 July 2024: see the Preliminary Issues Judgment at [10], [50]-[57] and [66]. It is not necessary for me to set out the background to those findings which appear clearly from that judgment. It is common ground that Iconic did not accept the repudiation.[98]The findings of fact made in the Preliminary Issues Judgment were not challenged by Mr Textor on appeal. On the face of it, the Snell Point (i.e. the principle established in Davis v Spalding) is therefore engaged. The Court can exercise its discretion to make an order for specific performance even if it was not ready and willing to complete on the Repayment Date, provided that Iconic is now ready and willing to complete.[99]Whilst it may be that this is the inevitable consequence of this judgment, there has been some discussion as to whether further directions are required in order to determine whether Iconic is presently ready and willing to perform its obligations.[100]As I noted at the outset of this judgment the order of the Court of Appeal contemplates that this court will “determine the further conduct of the proceedings in the light of (a) and (b) above”. Accordingly, I will hear further submissions from the parties on the future conduct of the proceedings when dealing with matters consequential on this judgment.[101]Finally, I should record my thanks to Counsel for both parties for their careful and helpful written and oral submissions and to their respective instructing solicitors for assisting me in relation to the bundles.