Beech Hill Capital Limited v Lucas Duplan & Ors [2026] EWHC 1390 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1390 (Comm)Case No LM-2025-000011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 10 June 2026
Before
SHARIF SHIVJI KC(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
Between
BEECH HILL CAPITAL LIMITEDClaimantLUCAS DUPLANDefendantSEA MARINE HOLDING LLCDefendantSEA MARINE HOLDING LTDDefendant
Thomas Steward (instructed by Wikborg Rein LLP) for ClaimantSean Middleton (instructed by Joseph Chiffers Barrister At Law Limited t/as JSC Chambers) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 5 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 11.30am on 10 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................SHARIF SHIVJI KC

SHARIF SHIVJI KC:

[1]The present proceedings concern a dispute in relation to certain financing agreements entered between the Claimant and the Second Defendant (as borrower) with the First Defendant alleged to be a personal guarantor. The Claimant also brings a claim for damages / specific performance against the Third Defendant and a claim for conspiracy against all three Defendants.[2]The First Defendant is, according to his Affidavit dated 29 January 2025, the director of the Second and Third Defendants.[3]The following matters came before the court at the present hearing: i) The Defendants’ application of 30 October 2025 seeking(a) permission to amend the Defence;(b) strike out / summary judgment;(c) a declaration that the court lacks jurisdiction and that there is no cause of action against the Third Defendant;(d) variation of the order of HHJ Pelling KC dated 22 January 2025; and(e) a stay of the proceedings. ii) The Claimant’s application dated 13 November 2025 seeking an order debarring the Defendants from advancing applications before the court until they have rectified their breaches of previous court orders.[4]At the start of the hearing, there was a disagreement over whether the Claimant’s application had been properly listed by the court for the hearing before me. I understand that the application had been listed for hearing on 23 January 2026 and the parties had filed skeleton arguments for that hearing but that the hearing was removed from the list shortly before the hearing because of the lack of availability of a Judge.[5]The parties differed over whether it was understood that the Claimant’s application would come before the court at this hearing. Whilst the Defendants initially took the position that the application should be resolved at a separate hearing, the Defendants had addressed the Claimant’s application in their skeleton argument and ultimately accepted that they were prepared to deal with the application at the hearing.[6]The parties also disagreed over which application should come first. The Claimant argued that its application was logically prior to the Defendants’ application because it was intended to prevent the Defendants proceeding with applications until previous court orders have been complied with. The Defendants did not press the argument that their applications should be heard first and accepted that it was open to me to direct that the Claimant’s application was heard first. That is what I ultimately directed.[7]The Claimant’s application is based on the Defendants’ failure to comply with the following orders of the court: i) An order dated 22 January 2025 for costs against the Defendants in the amount of £74,579 made by HHJ Pelling KC; ii) An order of David Quest KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dated 18 June 2025 for payment by the Second Defendant of £2,200,000 plus interest and costs of £65,000. iii) An order for costs dated 17 November 2025 against the Defendants in the amount of £4,167 made by Rosalind Phelps KC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court).[8]It is common ground that these orders have not been paid in whole or in part. Mr Middleton, for the Defendants, did attempt to argue at one point during the hearing that it was unclear whether the Defendants were in breach of the orders because the costs orders did not specify a date for payment. His attention was drawn to CPR r.44.7, as a result of which it is not necessary for a costs order to specify a date for payment in the body of the order. He accepted this point and that, accordingly, the Defendants, having not made any payment in respect of the above orders, are in breach of them.[9]The Claimant’s application dated 13 November 2025 was framed in the following terms in Part A of the Application Notice: “The Claimants (sic) seek an order preventing the Defendants from pursuing any applications unless and until they have purged their ongoing contempt. The Claimant relies on the authority of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] P. 285 at 298, and subsequent case law clarifying the Court's jurisdiction in this regard. The Claimant also seeks an extension of time for responding to the Defendants' application dated 30 October 2025”. “… because: The Defendants remain in continuing contempt of Court by failing to comply with existing Court orders and it would be unjust for the Claimant to be required to incur further costs in responding to applications from the Defendants while the Defendants remain in contempt”.[10]Although the application itself referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hadkinson and “subsequent case law”, in the Claimant’s Skeleton Argument dated 22 January 2026, it explained that there was a “related, but separate, line of authorities addressing the principles applicable when a party fails to pay a prior interim costs order”. The cases cited pursuant to this line of authority included Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd v. Vedatech Corp [2006] EWHC 3500 (Ch); Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v. Sinclair and others [2017] EWHC 2424 (Comm) (“Michael Wilson v Sinclair”); Aramco Trading Fujairah FZE v Gulf Petrochem FZC [2021] EWHC 2650 (Comm).[11]There was some debate at the hearing before me as to(a) the source of the court’s jurisdiction to make orders of the nature sought and(b) the extent to which there were two different lines of authority or whether these cases were all manifestations of the exercise of the same jurisdiction.

An order under Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] P. 285

[12]In the family courts, these types of order appear to be referred to simply as a “Hadkinson order”. Although in general terms, the Hadkinson line of authorities and the Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of cases are illustrations of the court’s power to impose conditions or sanctions in the event that a party fails to comply with the court’s prior orders, in my view they ought to be viewed distinctly.[13]This is apparent from both the principles applicable as to when an order should be made (which are considered below) and also from the derivation of each line of authority. The exercise of the power in Michael Wilson v Sinclair derives from the court’s case management powers, including its powers under the CPR. In contrast, the Hadkinson jurisdiction is of much greater antiquity, being originally a rule of the canon law, which was adopted by the ecclesiastical courts and the Chancery court; see Denning LJ in Hadkinson at p295.[14]In L v O (Stay of order; Hadkinson order; Security for costs) [2024] EWFC 6, Cobb J (as he then was) provided a brief summary of the Hadkinson jurisdiction explaining that “the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it, unless and until that order is discharged” and that “[w]here a party has not obeyed an order, then they may face a restriction on their access to the court…” [21].[15]The courts have described a Hadkinson order as “draconian”, see L v O at [21], C v C (Appeal: Hadkinson Order) [2010] EWHC 1656 (Fam), [2011] 1 FLR 434, and Assoun v Assoun (No 1) [2017] EWCA Civ 21, [2017] 2 FLR 1137 at [3]. In C v C, Eleanor King J (as she then was) said that the jurisdiction should be exercised “judicially, sparingly and proportionately”. In both Assoun and L v O, it was said that it was an order of “last resort”.[16]In terms of when the jurisdiction should be exercised, in L v O, Cobb J said at [22] that:
“It seems reasonably clear that a Hadkinson order will only be made if the following conditions are satisfied: i) The respondent is in contempt; ii) The contempt is deliberate and continuing; iii) As a result, there is an impediment to the course of justice; iv) There is no other realistic and effective remedy; v) The order is proportionate to the problem and goes no further than necessary to remedy it. See Peter Jackson LJ in De Gafforj v De Gafforj [2018] EWCA Civ 2070, at [11]”
[17]Although the jurisdiction was once thought to be a rule, with certain defined exceptions, that a person in contempt would not be heard, in Hadkinson itself, Denning LJ said at p298:
“It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance . . . I am of [the] opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed.”
[18]This more flexible approach was recognised by the House of Lords in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1, 46G as being in accord with contemporary judicial attitudes to the importance of ensuring procedural justice, per Lord Bridge of Harwich.

The Court’s Case Management Powers

[19]Aside from the court’s power to make a Hadkinson order, a separate line of authority has emerged where the court has imposed conditions on a party where they have failed to comply with a prior costs order of the court in the same proceedings.[20]These cases involve the exercise of the court’s case management powers under its inherent jurisdiction and also specific provisions of the CPR including r.3.1(3)(b) (“(3) When the court makes an order, it may …(b) specify the consequence of failure to comply with the order or a condition”) and r.3.4(2)(c) (“(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court … (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order”).[21]Cases considering the exercise of that power include Crystal Decisions (HC, Patten J)and Michael Wilson v Sinclair (Sir Richard Field).[22]In Crystal Decisions (HC), Patten J said: “[9]. ... The rules of court under the CPR do not prescribe any particular procedure or conditions which have to be satisfied on an application of this kind. The consequences of a failure to comply with an order for costs made during the course of the action in relation to the future conduct of the action is therefore a matter to be dealt with as part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. [10]. It is perfectly true, of course, that parties in the position of the claimants would, in these circumstances, have other remedies available to them. Those might include proceedings for contempt, but equally they might involve a more routine enforcement of the judgment for costs by for example, seeking an order for payment and a charging order against any known assets. In the present circumstances, however, where they are faced with defendants who are not resident within the jurisdiction and have no assets here, those remedies are likely to be of limited value”.[23]At [16], he said: "In any event I take the view that the orders of the court, even in relation to interim costs, require to be complied with and that, unless there is some overwhelming consideration falling within Article 6 [ECHR] that compels the court to take a different view, the normal consequence of a failure to comply with such an order, is that the court, in order to protect its own procedure, should make compliance with that order a condition of the party in question being able to continue with the litigation".[24]The matter subsequently went to the Court of Appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 848 where Vedatech's application for permission to appeal was dismissed. Sir John Chadwick, with whom Laws LJ agreed, said as follows at [17]: "But thirdly – and, to my mind, most importantly - the court's ability to make interlocutory costs orders following, in particular, the Access to Justice reforms in 1998, is a sanction which is available to it in order to encourage responsible litigation. The court marks what it regards as an irresponsible application by an immediate order for the payment of costs. That is intended to bring home to a party - when considering whether to make an application - that an unsuccessful application may carry a price which will have to be paid at once. If the court is not in a position to enforce immediate interlocutory orders for the payment of costs which it was thought right to make, then the force of that sanction is seriously undermined. It is important that, in cases where the court thinks it right to make an order for immediate payment on an interlocutory application, that it does have the power - and can exercise the power - to ensure that order is met. For the reasons which Patten J explained, the only effective sanction in a case of this nature is to require payment of interlocutory costs as the price of being allowed to continue to contest the proceedings. Unless the party against whom an order for costs is made is prepared to, or can be compelled to, comply with, that order, the order might just as well not be made".[25]In respect of paragraph 16 of Patten J's judgment quoted above, Chadwick LJ said at [18]: "For my part, I would hold that - whether or not a statement in such general terms can be supported – the proposition can be supported in a case (such as the present) where there is no other effective way of ensuring that the interim costs order is satisfied. That, of course, is always subject to what the judge referred to as the overwhelming consideration falling within Article 6: that orders requiring payment of costs as a condition of proceeding with litigation are not made in circumstances where to enforce such an order would drive a party from access to justice. But, for the reasons that the judge explained and to which I have already referred, this was not such a case".[26]In Musion Systems v Activ8-3D [2012] EWPCC 5 (cited subsequently in Michael Wilson v Sinclair at [26]), HHJ Birss QC (as he then was) cited Chadwick LJ's judgment in Crystal Decisions (CA) set out above and went on to say at [24]:
“I derive the following principles as being applicable to the case before me: i) The matter is always one for the court's discretion and all relevant circumstances fall to be considered; ii) If the court is not in a position to enforce interlocutory costs orders the force of the sanction is seriously undermined; iii) Other options apart from the order sought must be considered iv) It is always important to have regard to Art 6 ECHR. Orders requiring payment of costs as a condition of proceeding with litigation are not made in circumstances where to enforce such an order would drive a party from access to justice.”
[27]In Michael Wilson v Sinclair, Sir Richard Field distilled the relevant principles from the authorities at [29] as follows: "(1) The imposition of a sanction for non-payment of a costs order involves the exercise of a discretion pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction. (2) The Court should keep carefully in mind the policy behind the imposition of costs orders made payable within a specified period of time before the end of the litigation, namely, that they serve to discourage irresponsible interlocutory applications or resistance to successful interlocutory applications. (3) Consideration must be given to all the relevant circumstances including:(a) the potential applicability of Article 6 ECHR;(b) the availability of alternative means of enforcing the costs order through the different mechanisms of execution;(c) whether the court making the costs order did so notwithstanding a submission that it was inappropriate to make a costs order payable before the conclusion of the proceedings in question; and where no such submission was made whether it ought to have been made or there is no good reason for it not having been made. (4) A submission by the party in default that he lacks the means to pay and that therefore a debarring order would be a denial of justice and/or in breach of Article 6 of ECHR should be supported by detailed, cogent and proper evidence which gives full and frank disclosure of the witness's financial position including his or her prospects of raising the necessary funds where his or her cash resources are insufficient to meet the liability. (5) Where the defaulting party appears to have no or markedly insufficient assets in the jurisdiction and has not adduced proper and sufficient evidence of impecuniosity, the court ought generally to require payment of the costs order as the price for being allowed to continue to contest the proceedings unless there are strong reasons for not so ordering. (6) If the court decides that a debarring order should be made, the order ought to be an unless order except where there are strong reasons for imposing an immediate order".[28]This passage from Michael Wilson v Sinclair has been relied on in a number of subsequent authorities including Aramco Trading Fujairah FZE v. Gulf Petrochem FZC [2021] EWHC 2650 (Comm) at [18], Khokan v. Nirjhor [2024] EWHC 1872 (KB) at [23], SFO and others v. Litigation Capital Limited [2025] EWHC 2876 (Comm) at [62], Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Brittain [2025] EWHC 3115 (Ch) at [6] and Dowding v. Character Group plc [2025] EWHC 1755 (KB) at [50].[29]In Siddiqi v. Aidiniantz [2020] EWHC 699 (QB), Saini J summarised the principles as follows at [30]: “Accordingly, when considering whether to stay a claim until an existing costs order is paid, I would summarise the correct general approach of the court position as follows:(i) The ultimate aim of the Court is to identify the just order from a case management perspective, bearing in mind the overriding objective.(ii) In approaching that task, the “working” or “default rule” is that a litigant should not be able to continue with his or her claim without satisfying an existing and non- appealed final costs order, and the court should impose a condition requiring compliance.(iii) However, if a claimant can show his or her Article 6 rights will be interfered with by such a condition (because they cannot pay, and a genuine claim will therefore be stifled) that is a material, but not conclusive, consideration pointing against such a condition.(iv) Finally, the Court must take into account all other circumstances of the case, including the procedural behaviour of the defaulting party in deciding on the just order to make”.[30]The Crystal Decisions / Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of authorities was carefully analysed by Paul Stanley KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) in J Robbins Capital Partners Limited v Zamsort Limited, Ortac Resources (UK) Limited, Arc Minerals Limited [2024] EWHC 1990 (Comm).[31]In that judgment, Paul Stanley KC explained both the policy rationale behind the current costs regime in the High Court and also the reasons why a court may exercise its case management powers in relation to a party who fails to discharge costs orders made against it. I note the following points of interest from that decision: i) Prior to the introduction of the CPR, the usual practice in the High Court was to make orders determining the incidence of costs but not immediate orders for assessment or payment. The civil justice reforms marked a move to a “pay as you go” regime [6]. ii) The court has a broad jurisdiction to order costs. In the High Court, in general the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs (CPR 44.2(2)). That may be the case even where the unsuccessful party acted entirely reasonably and properly. Noting that important context, it would be an error to infer from a party being liable in costs that the party has been sanctioned by the court for “irresponsible” conduct (using the language of Chadwick LJ in Crystal Decisions (CA)). In short, simply because a costs order has been made does not mean that the paying party is to be regarded as a “bad actor” [8]-[9]. iii) The costs regime serves two important functions. First, by placing parties at risk of paying costs when they lose (normally promptly after the application is decided), they concentrate the mind. Second, the rules reflect a policy that since applications involve cost, it is on balance fairer that the reasonable and proportionate costs of an application should be met by whoever turns out to have been wrong [10]. iv) These functions are supported by the modern practice of requiring costs to be paid soon after they have been incurred. People will think harder about their position if they feel the impact in their pocket quickly rather than years later [11]. v) The court will use its inherent jurisdiction, including its case management powers, to prevent a party simply ignoring the court’s costs orders. Crystal Decisions (HC) and Michael Wilson v Sinclair are examples of such cases [12]. vi) In considering whether to exercise its powers, the court should consider the full range of possible options. This includes options for enforcement outside the action such as the usual procedures for enforcement of judgment debts. Options within the action include striking out a claim or defence, debarring a defendant from defending, staying a claim until costs are paid [13]. vii) Although in many first instance decisions, it is suggested that in the case of an unexcused failure to pay, the normal or default approach will be to make an order (Crystal Decisions (HC) at [16] and Siddiqi v Aidiniantz [2020] EWHC 699 (QB) at [30(ii)]), the court always exercises a discretion [15]. viii) The court will consider a party’s rights under Article 6 of the ECHR and the right of access to civil justice. In deciding whether to enforce a costs order by restricting a party’s ability to prosecute or defend a claim, the court must consider whether that is proportionate in all the circumstances [17]. ix) The court will consider issues of stifling. In doing so, its approach is analogous to that taken in the security for costs context [19] – [23]. x) The point that Sir Richard Field highlighted at [29(3)(c)] of Michael Wilson v Sinclair, that the court should have regard to whether the same arguments were raised when the costs order was made and if not whether they could or should have been made, is unlikely to be a point of significance. Stifling issues will rarely, if ever, be considered by the court when the original costs order is made [34].[32]I note that across the authorities summarised above, there have been various statements of the relevant principles, including the oft-cited passage from Sir Richard Field’s judgment in Michael Wilson v Sinclair. Noting the observations of Paul Stanley KC in J Robbins Capital on the principles identified by Sir Richard Field, it is useful in my view to provide a summary of the current state of the law.[33]Taking these cases together, I summarise the applicable principles as follows: i) The court can impose conditions on a party for failing to pay one or more prior costs orders in the same proceedings. ii) This is a case management power which derives from the court’s inherent jurisdiction (Crystal Decisions [2006] EWHC 3500 (Ch) (HC) at [9], Michael Wilson v Sinclair [2017] EWHC 2424 (Comm) at [29(1)]) and its powers under CPR r.3.1(3)(b) and r.3.4(2)(c). iii) This is the exercise of a judicial discretion and the court must consider all of the circumstances (Michael Wilson at [29(3)]). iv) In particular, the court will have regard to: a) the policy behind the imposition of costs orders made payable within a specified period of time before the end of the litigation, namely that(i) it applies discipline to the parties in terms of which issues they decide to contest before the court if they have to bear to cost consequences of unsuccessfully doing so,(ii) it is on balance fairer that the reasonable and proportionate costs of an application should be met by whoever turns out to have been wrong (J Robbins Capital [2024] EWHC 1990 (Comm) at [10]); b) the importance of ensuring that court orders are complied with and that it diminishes the court’s authority and standing if the court then overlooks non-compliance by a party in the same proceedings (J Robbins Capital at [12]); c) all of the available options including other enforcement mechanisms outside the proceedings (including the usual procedures for enforcement of judgment debts) and the full range of possible orders within the proceedings designed to secure compliance with the court’s previous order(s) – as to which see [33(v)] below (J Robbins Capital at [29]); d) the procedural behaviour of the defaulting party (Siddiqi at [30(iv)]. It is not to be assumed, however, that the mere existence of an adverse costs order accompanied by an obligation of immediate payment is itself indicative of any misconduct on the paying party (J Robbins Capital at [32]); e) the potential interference with a party’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to access civil justice (J Robbins Capital at [16]). This will usually arise where a party contends that they lack the means to pay and that therefore the application of conditions would be a denial of justice and/or in breach of Article 6; in short, a claim of stifling. Such a claim should be supported by detailed, cogent and proper evidence which gives full and frank disclosure of the party's financial position including his or her prospects of raising the necessary funds where his or her cash resources are insufficient to meet the liability (Michael Wilson v Sinclair at [29(4)]). The approach taken in this regard is analogous to that taken in relation to security for costs (J Robbins Capital at [19] to [24]); f) the degree of connection between the unpaid costs in question and the claim or application in which the respondent wishes to participate: see Tonstate Group Ltd v Wojakovski [2020] EWHC 1004 (Ch) at [42]-[47]) (Zacaroli J), as cited in SFO v Litigation Capital at [63]. v) If the court decides to exercise its discretion, there are a range of options for orders within the proceedings. The court will be careful to ensure that its proposed order is proportionate (J Robbins Capital at [18]). The options include: a) striking out a claim or defence (as was sought in Peak Hotels and Resorts Ltd v Tarek Investments Ltd [2016] EWHC 690 (Ch) and Musion Systems [2012] EWPCC 5 at [26]); b) debarring a defendant from defending (as in Crystal Decisions (HC) and Michael Wilson v Sinclair); c) staying a claim until costs are paid (Siddiqi). vi) There is no rigid rule that the court will necessarily impose conditions simply because there has been a non-payment of a costs order. This is because the court has a discretion which requires it to take into account all of the relevant circumstances. However, it can ordinarily be expected the balance will weigh in favour of imposing conditions where a party has failed to comply with a costs order and has no satisfactory reason for failing to do so (e.g. an inability to pay / stifling) such that the reasonable inference is that the failure to pay represents wilful disobedience of the court’s order (J RobbinsCapital at [15], Khokan at [82], Siddiqi at [30(ii)]). vii) The court will usually make an order on an unless basis rather than simply ordering the immediate imposition of a sanction. Application to the circumstances of this case The appropriate jurisdictional basis for an order

Application to the circumstances of this case

[34]Although the Claimant’s application was framed around the Hadkinson jurisdiction, it was clear from both the application and the Claimant’s skeleton argument of 22 January 2026 that it was also relying on the court’s case management powers as set out in Michael Wilson v Sinclair. The Defendants were given proper notice of the bases on which the Claimant contended that an order should be made and there is no unfairness to the Defendant in considering the application under both the Hadkinson jurisdiction and the court’s case management jurisdiction.[35]For my part, I consider that the relief sought is better characterised as arising under the court’s case management jurisdiction rather than the Hadkinson jurisdiction. The latter arises where there is “an impediment to the course of justice” and, although there is some flexibility in that jurisdiction, it may result in the court completely refusing to hear a party. The facts of the leading cases on the Hadkinson jurisdiction (Hadkinson, which concerned a child who had been removed from the jurisdiction in breach of a court order, and X Ltd which concerned the disclosure of a journalistic source) are different in nature to the present case. In contrast, the case management jurisdiction as per the Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of cases are much closer to the factual circumstances of the present case and so I consider this application on that basis.

The issues arising in relation to a case management order

[36]There was little dispute between the parties as to the relevant circumstances arising on the Claimant’s application. The Claimant filed a Fourth Witness Statement of Shawn David Kirby dated 13 November 2025 in support of the application. The Defendants did not file any evidence in answer or raise any serious dispute to the matters raised.[37]A number of important areas were undisputed: i) As noted at the start of this Judgment, once the Defendants recognised that the court’s previous costs orders carried with them a date for payment, they also accepted that they were in breach of the court’s previous orders. There was no suggestion from the Defendants that they would be taking any steps to pay the outstanding orders. ii) Mr Middleton accepted for the Defendants that the Second Defendant was in contempt of the court’s order. He did not resist an order debarring the Second Defendant in the terms sought. iii) Mr Middleton also made it clear that the Defendants did not take any argument on the grounds of impecuniosity or stifling. iv) No point was taken that an order would impede the Defendants’ right to a fair trial under Article 6 or on the basis of access to civil justice.

Objections taken by the Defendants to making an order

[38]In its written skeleton argument, the Defendants contended that the Hadkinson jurisdiction was engaged only where there is a deliberate and continuing contempt which materially impedes the administration of justice, such that no other effective remedy is available and the making of the order sought is proportionate. They contended that this was not such a case.[39]I agree with the above summary of the circumstances where the Hadkinson jurisdiction is invoked but, as noted above, this case is better characterised as arising under the Michael Wilson v Sinclair case management line of cases. In these cases, the applicant is not required to show specifically that the respondent’s conduct materially impedes the administration of justice but simply that the respondent has failed to pay one or more orders. It may be that, on the facts of some cases, a continuing failure to pay outstanding orders can be analysed as a matter that impedes the administration of justice but I do not need to decide that question here; in any event, whether the administration of justice has been impeded is not a specific consideration for an order pursuant to the court’s case management powers.[40]The Defendants also argue that the “Hadkinson jurisdiction should not operate so as to bar an application already properly before the Court at the time the Hadkinson application was made”. I have considered this question on the premise that the application is for a case management order. I see no objection in principle to the court making a case management order (where it is appropriate in all the circumstances to do so) which debars a party from making future applications and also pursuing existing applications.[41]The Defendants also argue that since the court’s previous freezing injunction in this matter contained an express liberty to apply to discharge or vary, it would be contrary to principle to bar a party subject to that order from applying to exercise that right. Again, I see no issue in principle with the court barring applications if it is just in all the circumstances to do so under the Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of cases.

The Defendants’ procedural behaviour

[42]As regards the procedural behaviour of the Defendants, I note that the Claimant says in its evidence that the Defendants have made the following applications which, as at the date of the hearing before me, they had not materially progressed: i) 21 May 2025: an application for specific disclosure. ii) 6 June 2025: an application to relist the application for specific disclosure. iii) 11 June 2025: an application to relist the application for specific disclosure. iv) 11 June 2025: an application for summary judgment. v) 7 July 2025: an application for permission to appeal the order of David Quest KC.[43]A further application was issued on 30 October 2025 which I have referred to at paragraph 1(i) above. As noted in the summary of the law above, as with the approach in cases in relation to security for costs, in considering whether to make a case management order of the type sought here, the court does not usually conduct an evaluation of the merits of the Defendants’ position in the action or indeed in its various applications. However, in relation to the application of 30 October 2025, I noted that it contained a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction on the part of the Third Defendant. Noting that the Defendants filed a defence in the proceedings on 3 March 2025 (over a year prior to the hearing before me) and had been active in this litigation for some considerable time, it was not clear to me how a jurisdiction challenge could be made at this late stage. I drew the Defendant’s counsel’s attention to CPR r.11 which, in material parts, says:(1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) dispute the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim; or (b) argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction may apply to the court for an order declaring that it has no such jurisdiction or should not exercise any jurisdiction which it may have.(2) A defendant who wishes to make such an application must first file an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Part 10.(3) A defendant who files an acknowledgment of service does not, by doing so, lose any right that he may have to dispute the court’s jurisdiction.(4) An application under this rule must – (a) be made within 14 days after filing an acknowledgment of service; and (b) be supported by evidence.(5) If the defendant – (a) files an acknowledgment of service; and (b) does not make such an application within the period specified in paragraph (4), he is to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try the claim. (a) dispute the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim; or (b) argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction (a) be made within 14 days after filing an acknowledgment of service; and (b) be supported by evidence. (a) files an acknowledgment of service; and (b) does not make such an application within the period specified in paragraph (4),[44]The Third Defendant had filed an acknowledgment of service dated 6 January 2025 but had made no application disputing the court’s jurisdiction within the period under the rules. Noting the terms of CPR r.11(5), I enquired of Mr Middleton how the Third Defendant said that it could make an application challenging the court’s jurisdiction at this late stage.[45]Mr Middleton could offer no answer on this point and the Defendant’s application and supporting evidence did not illuminate the position either. Given that the Defendants had come to the hearing before me on 5 March 2026 prepared to argue the Defendants’ application (which included this jurisdiction challenge) that indicated to me that the jurisdiction challenge was, prima facie, unsustainable.

Whether other options are available in terms of enforcement of the court’s orders

[46]I have considered whether there are alternative routes available to the Claimant in enforcing the outstanding court orders outside of these proceedings. I note that the First Defendant has provided a list of assets for the Defendants attached to his Affidavit dated 29 January 2025 which was provided pursuant to the order of HHJ Pelling KC of 17 January 2025. There are no assets listed in relation to any of the Defendants which are in this jurisdiction.

Conclusion

[47]As explained above, I consider that the court has the case management power under the Michael Wilson v Sinclair line of cases to make an order in the form sought.[48]In considering whether to make such an order, I have taken into account all of the relevant circumstances of the case outlined above: i) The Defendants are in breach of prior orders of the court which have been outstanding for some considerable time. ii) The orders were all made at a time when the Defendants were legally represented, with solicitors on the record, and with submissions made by counsel or leading counsel on their behalf. iii) No explanation has been offered for the Defendants’ failure to comply with those orders. iv) The Defendants do not allege that they are impecunious and they do not allege that paying the orders would stifle their defence of the proceedings. They do not allege that the proposed order raised any concerns in relation to Article 6 or their access to civil justice. v) I note that the Defendants have not even sought to make a part payment of the sums due. Nothing has been paid at all. vi) The Claimant has faced a series of applications from the Defendants which have not been pursued. vii) As to the Defendants’ latest application of 30 October 2025, I note that the Third Defendant’s application to challenge the court’s jurisdiction appears unmeritorious. viii) The Defendants have not identified any assets in the jurisdiction against which the Claimant could enforce. I have considered whether there are alternative routes available to the Claimant in enforcing the outstanding orders outside of these proceedings but no viable options have been raised before me. ix) It would be unfair to expect the Claimant to incur expenses dealing with the Defendants’ applications in circumstances where the Defendants have apparently deliberately chosen not to discharge costs orders payable to the Claimant. x) Noting paragraph 33(iv)(f) above, there is a significant connection between the unpaid orders, which were made in the circumstances set out in Mr Shawn David Kirby’s evidence in relation to the worldwide freezing order, summary judgment and the application to adjourn the CMC, and the pending applications. The pending applications relate to the same substantive subject-matter and are part of the continuum of this litigation. xi) The Defendants have been on notice since November 2025 that the Claimant was seeking an order in this form. They have had ample time to discharge the outstanding orders.[49]I consider a limited form of debarring relief, preventing the progress of any applications, is reasonable and proportionate, considering the circumstances of the case, and is consistent with Article 6, ECHR. In support of my view that the order is reasonable and proportionate, I take into account the Defendants’ conduct set out above and I note that the proposed order does not prevent the Defendants participating in the litigation but merely prevents them from issuing or pursuing any applications. The Defendants would still be able to defend the claim substantively. Instead, the effect of the order would be that the Claimant would not face any applications issued by the Defendants unless the Defendants discharged the outstanding court orders.[50]An issue arose in the process of drawing up the order as to whether the court should prohibit each Defendant from making an application unless they paid the the orders applicable to them or whether all the Defendants should be prohibited from making an application unless and until all Defendants have discharged all orders. This was not a point that was taken by the Defendants at the hearing (at least not in the way that it has since been articulated). It is one that the Defendants have raised after the event. The Claimant contends that it seeks a formulation of the order that prevents any applications by the Defendants until all Defendants have discharged all orders against them.[51]For present purposes, I am content to make an order of the former nature; that the prohibition operates against each Defendant individually unless and until that Defendant has discharged the orders made against it.[52]I am prepared to hear argument from the parties on whether the order should be extended so as to apply in the way that the Claimant contends, and if so persuaded, I can make a further order to that effect.[53]I had considered whether the order also ought to contain a liberty to apply in the event that there was a material change in circumstances. I asked the parties, when circulating this judgment in draft, to agree a suitable provision on that front, noting of course that it should not be a route by which the Claimant should be vexed by unmeritorious applications. The parties agreed the following text: The Defendants shall have liberty to apply in the event of a material change of circumstances, but(i) such circumstances must be directly relevant to the Defendants’ ability to comply with the outstanding orders,(ii) the Defendants must give no less than 14 days’ written notice to the Claimant before making such application, and(iii) the Defendants are not permitted to advance, under the guise of this liberty to apply, any application that is or was the subject of the debarring order made herein.