"Cases are reported when lab tests are completed. This may be a few days after initial testing. Testing capacity is increasing, which is resulting in a greater number of observed cases. (Confidence: testing capacity constraints mean there are likely many more cases than currently recorded here)"
“And so following agreement between all the four nations of the United Kingdom, all the devolved administrations, we are collectively telling, telling cafes, pubs, bars, restaurants to close tonight as soon as they reasonably can, and not to open tomorrow. Though to be clear, they can continue to provide take-out services. We’re also telling nightclubs, theatres, cinemas, gyms and leisure centres to close on the same timescale.”
"1. Restaurants, including restaurants and dining rooms in hotels or members clubs. 2. Cafes, including workplace canteens, but not including— (a) cafes or canteens at a hospital, care home or school; (b) canteens at a prison or an establishment intended for use for naval, military or air force purposes or for the purposes of the Department of the Secretary of State responsible for defence; (c) services providing food or drink to the homeless. 3. Bars, including bars in hotels or members’ clubs. 4. Public houses."
“The right hon. Gentleman asked about insurance for the leisure sector. I can confirm that, after extensive meetings today between my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury and the insurance industry, the insurance industry will honour insurance contracts that would have been triggered if the advice had been to ban certain things, rather than it being advisory not to do them. That has been agreed and negotiated by my hon. Friend. I thank him for those efforts, and I thank the insurance industry for doing the right thing.”
"The Chancellor's statement today is consistent with our statement this morning where we said in the event businesses have the right cover, this type of notification could help make a claim. But, as the Chancellor acknowledged, the vast majority won’t have purchased extended cover and this remains unchanged"
“If the only barrier to your business making an insurance claim was a lack of clarity on whether the government advising people to stay away from businesses, rather than ordering businesses to shut down, was sufficient to make a claim on business interruption insurance: (1) The government’s medical advice of 16 March is sufficient to enable those businesses which have an insurance policy that covers both pandemics and government ordered closure to make a claim - provided all other terms and conditions in their policy are met. Businesses should check the terms and conditions of their specific policy and contact their providers if in doubt. (2) However, most businesses have not purchased insurance that covers pandemic related losses. As such, any affected businesses should note the government’s full package of support, including the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme and business rates holiday.” (1) The government’s medical advice of 16 March is sufficient to enable those businesses which have an insurance policy that covers both pandemics and government ordered closure to make a claim - provided all other terms and conditions in their policy are met. Businesses should check the terms and conditions of their specific policy and contact their providers if in doubt. (2) However, most businesses have not purchased insurance that covers pandemic related losses. As such, any affected businesses should note the government’s full package of support, including the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme and business rates holiday.”
“To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he will publish any correspondence he has had with insurance companies on covering the contingent liability of losses suffered by pubs and restaurants between 16 and20 March 2020 due to the covid-19 outbreak." Answer (from John Glen, Economic Secretary to the Treasury): “The Government is in continual dialogue with the insurance sector given the significant role it has in supporting businesses in the current situation. However, on 17 March, following a roundtable with the insurance industry, the Chancellor made it clear that the Government’s social distancing instructions of 16 March would be treated the same as government-ordered closure for insurance purposes (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-of-the-exchequerrishi-sunak-on-covid19-response). As long as all other terms of the policies are met, pubs and restaurants should therefore be able to make a claim for the period between 16 and 20 March.”
“To treat customers fairly and act in their best interests, insurers should not include the period between17 June 2020 and the date of issue of the Supreme Court’s declarations when relying on any time limits within which policyholders must make potentially affected claims or take any other step under the terms of their policies, such as notifying circumstances in relation to a claim. Insurers should not limit any payment that may be due to a policyholder because of the time period that has elapsed before the potentially affected claim was made. … Where any further judicial decisions may have a wider impact for the interpretation of similar policies, then firms should take them into account in their claims and complaints handling.”
“2. Compulsory closure (a) Interruption of or interference with the Business in consequence of compulsory closure by a public body authorised to prevent or restrict access to the Premises arising from (a) discovery of a notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the Premises [or] On the proper construction of Extension 2(a), and to make sense of it, an “or” needs to be added between “notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the Premises” and “foreign or deleterious matter in food or drink sold, supplied or provided at the Premises”, such that that extension responds to a discovery of either, if the other requirements of Extension 2 are met. As I understood it, this was not controversial. foreign or deleterious matter in food or drink sold, supplied or provided at the Premises (b) the occurrence at the Premises of murder, manslaughter, suicide or rape (c) defective sanitation or the presence of vermin or pests. (a) discovery of a notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the Premises [or] On the proper construction of Extension 2(a), and to make sense of it, an “or” needs to be added between “notifiable human infectious or contagious disease at the Premises” and “foreign or deleterious matter in food or drink sold, supplied or provided at the Premises”, such that that extension responds to a discovery of either, if the other requirements of Extension 2 are met. As I understood it, this was not controversial. foreign or deleterious matter in food or drink sold, supplied or provided at the Premises (b) the occurrence at the Premises of murder, manslaughter, suicide or rape (c) defective sanitation or the presence of vermin or pests. For the purpose of this cover the maximum indemnity period is restated as 3 months.”
“The cautionary words of Lord Mustill in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan[1997] AC 313 , 388 are apt, [namely that] there comes a point at which the court should remind itself that … to force upon the words a meaning which they cannot fairly bear is to substitute for the bargain actually made one which the court believes could better have been made. This is an illegitimate role for a court.” (2) While the unitary exercise of contractual construction can require a court to give weight to the implications of rival constructions by reaching a view as to which construction is more consistent with commercial common sense, See Wood v Capita (SC) at [11]-[12] (Lord Hodge). commercial common sense should not be invoked retrospectively, or to rewrite a contract, in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party. See Arnold v Britton (SC) at [17], [19]-[20] (Lord Neuberger). (3) Second, the Defendant pointed out that the Claimants sought in their pleaded case to rely on contra proferentem, in relation to the late notification issue. However, said the Defendant, to the extent that the principle has any validity at all in the construction of commercial contracts, it “can only apply if there is genuine ambiguity, which cannot otherwise be resolved by applying the ordinary principles of construction.”
“47. … The core principle is that an insurance policy, like any other contract, must be interpreted objectively by asking what a reasonable person, with all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered into the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean. Evidence about what the parties subjectively intended or understood the contract to mean is not relevant to the court’s task.”
“the overriding question is how the words of the contract would be understood by a reasonable person. In the case of an insurance policy of the present kind, sold principally to SMEs, the person to whom the document should be taken to be addressed is not a pedantic lawyer who will subject the entire policy wording to a minute textual analysis. It is an ordinary policyholder who, on entering into the contract, is taken to have read through the policy conscientiously in order to understand what cover they were getting.”
“351 Accordingly, the wider language is “sustained” or “occurred”: this captures all people who had the disease, whether or not they were symptomatic or it was diagnosed. Those where the disease is “manifested” is a subset of that wider group, and there the display of symptoms or diagnosis is required.”
“It is unquestionably a common usage of the word “suffer” to mean that a person is undergoing a degree (including a very considerable degree) of discomfort as a result of a disease or injury. However, this is by no means the only usage of the word, including in the context of disease”
“355…Whilst the argument of the insurers is certainly grammatically possible on the basis of the word “suffer”, I think that it makes far more commercial sense to interpret it as being synonymous with “sustain”
“[63] Accordingly, if the parties had applied their minds to the circumstances in which the insured premises were likely to be closed by a relevant authority as a result of an occurrence of disease at the premises, they would have contemplated that closures or restrictions imposed by the authority in such cases would be unlikely to be a response only to the occurrence of the disease at the insured premises. Rather they would be imposed in response to the outbreak as a whole over the relevant area, whether local or national. Indeed, the worse and more widespread the outbreak of the disease, the more likely it would be that such restrictions would be imposed. If the disease clauses were to have meaningful content, therefore, the parties must have intended that there would be cover in such circumstances. [64] These considerations demonstrate, in our judgment, that the parties cannot have intended a conventional ‘but for’ approach to causation to apply. In the circumstances in which the insured peril was likely to arise, and cover under the disease clause would be most needed, it would in general be difficult or impossible for the policyholder to prove that the restrictions would not have been imposed ‘but for’ the occurrence of the disease at the insured premises. Accordingly the parties must have intended that the causation requirement would be satisfied if the occurrence at the premises was one of a number of causes of the closure (or, in the case of a ‘pure’ disease clause, of the BI losses suffered as a result of the disease). Moreover, it would not have mattered to the parties whether the number of other causes was large or small. Indeed, the larger the number, the more likely it was that restrictions would be imposed and the cover would be needed.”
“[66] The question then arises whether the causation requirement would only be satisfied if the relevant authority actually knew of (or as Mr Kealey submitted, had a reasonable belief as to) the occurrence of the disease at the insured premises. Again it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which closure or other restrictions would be likely to be imposed in response to occurrences of a notifiable disease. It is unrealistic to think that the authority would apply its mind to identifying the particular premises at which there had been such occurrences. It would know in the case of a serious outbreak that there had been a number of occurrences of the disease in its area (or perhaps in particular kinds of premises in its area, such as restaurants, schools or other places where people gather) and would react to those occurrences by imposing restrictions accordingly. Identification of the particular premises at which there had been such occurrences would be an irrelevant consideration.”
“[72] It follows that the government’s order or advice to close the ExCeL Centre was caused by what is agreed to have been an occurrence of Covid-19 at the Centre, operating in combination with all other cases of Covid-19 in the country which had occurred. The same analysis applies to the other policies. On the assumption that there were occurrences of Covid-19 at each of the policyholders’ premises, those occurrences together with all other cases of Covid-19 in the country were a cause of the closure of those premises. In ordering the national lockdown, therefore, the government was responding to the fact of disease having occurred at each of these premises. This is an approach which is clear and simple to apply, in contrast with an interpretation which would require the policyholder to establish precisely what knowledge (or belief) the relevant authority had as to the existence of a disease at any given location. In our judgment it reflects the way in which the words of the contract would be understood by a reasonable person and in particular the ordinary policyholder taking out this kind of policy. [73] Accordingly, although we have preferred to base our conclusion on the language and context of the ‘at the premises’ clauses in issue and the presumed common intentions of the parties, rather than on how the Supreme Court interpreted the radius clauses, we agree with the conclusion and much of the reasoning of the judge on the common causation issues. Although there are differences between radius and ‘at the premises’ clauses, those differences do not materially affect the nature of the causal link which must be proved, save that in the case of ‘at the premises’ clauses the occurrence of disease must be at the premises themselves and not within a specified distance from them.”
“We shall indemnify You in respect of interruption or interference with the Business during the Indemnity Period following: (a) any (i) occurrence of a Notifiable Disease (as defined below) at the Premises or attributable to food or drink supplied from the Premises; (ii) discovery of an organism at the Premises likely to result in the occurrence of a Notifiable Disease; (iii) occurrence of a Notifiable Disease within a radius of 25 miles of the Premise; (b) the discovery of vermin or pests at the Premises which causes restrictions on the use of the Premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority; (c) any accident causing defects in the drains or other sanitary arrangements at the Premises which causes restrictions on the use of the Premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority; or (d) any occurrence of murder or suicide at the Premises.”
“As a matter of plain language, the clause covers only cases of illness resulting from Covid-19 that occur within the 25-mile radius specified in the clause. That is consistent with the other sub-clauses of the extension. In each case they cover events (or the discovery of events) that occur at the premises, that is to say at a particular time and place.”
“Loss resulting from interruption of or interference with the business in consequence of any of the following events: (a) any occurrence of a notifiable disease at the premises or attributable to food or drink supplied from the premises; (b) any discovery of any organism at the premises likely to result in the occurrence of a notifiable disease; (c) any occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 25 miles of the premises; (d) the discovery of vermin or pests at the premises which cause restrictions on the use of the premises on the order or advice of the competent local authority; (e) any accident causing defects in the drains or other sanitary arrangements at the premises which causes restrictions on the use of the premises on the order of or advice of the competent local authority; (f) any occurrence of murder or suicide at the premises; provided that the . . . (h) insurer shall only be liable for loss arising at those premises which are directly subject to the incident; (i) insurer’s maximum liability under this cover extension clause in respect of any one incident shall not exceed£100,000 or 15% of the total sum insured (or limit of liability) for this insured section B, whichever is the lesser, any one claim and£250,000 any one period of insurance.”
“It can be seen that this wording is virtually identical to the corresponding provisions of RSA 3, save in two respects. First, the list of insured perils in the clause is not preceded by the word “following” but by the words “in consequence of any of the following events” (and the word “event” is also used in the definition of the “indemnity period”). Second, the term “incident” is used in several places, apparently as a synonym for the term “event”.”
“We agree with these observations but cannot accept that the terms event and incident are necessary to make it clear that what is covered by the clause is any occurrence(s) of a notifiable disease within the 25 miles. That is already plain from the description of the insured peril as any occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 25 miles of the premises. We do not perceive any difference in meaning between the terms “occurrence” and “event”, and nothing significant is added by the use of the word “incident” as a compendious term instead of the phrase “occurrence, discovery or accident” used, for example, in the definition of the indemnity period in RSA 3. Furthermore the other matters referred to in (a) [which required an occurrence], (b) [which required “any discovery”] and (d) to (f) [and which required, respectively a discovery, accident and occurrence] in clause 3.2.4 of QBE 2 are exactly the same as those referred to in the corresponding sub-clauses in RSA 3, and the nature of those matters confirms equally in both cases that the clause is concerned with the consequences of particular events occurring at a particular time and place.”
“Discovery” as equivalent to a “manifestation.”
“'I have expressed my reluctance to add to the many pronouncements on the subject of what “discovery” [as required bys 125 of the Income Tax Act 1918 (repealed; see supra)] is. To say that it means to “find out” does not seem to me to help very much. Is there perhaps, a distinction to be drawn between “finding” and “finding out”? Does a man discover a diamond by finding it in the ground believing it to be a piece of glass, that is, not finding out that what he has found is a diamond? … It seems to me that this is a true analogy:—A man finds or discovers in his land a diamond. He thinks it is only a piece of glass, but, though he did not at first find out it was a diamond, he had in the true sense discovered it on the day that he found it…. I think that the discovery need not be a complete and detailed or accurate discovery and that when the commissioners find out, or think that they have found out, the existence of an omission or other error it is not necessary for them to have probed the matter to its depths or to define precisely the ground on which they have made the assessments. Here the relevant facts were all known to them. What was lacking was a comprehension of those facts. The facts were there, the commissioners, to revert for a moment to my analogy, thought that the diamond which they had found was only a piece of glass, but it was none the less a discovery.”
“Furthermore, in a case (favoured by the insurers [including the Defendant in this case] in the context of their causation arguments) where a serious and highly infectious disease had been diagnosed in an individual on the day after he or she had been at the premises, and where the authorities had decided that closure was required because of that very illness, there is no reason why a claim for BI losses should depend upon whether the individual happened to be feeling perfectly well (and was therefore asymptomatic) on the day of the visit to the premises, or happened to be feeling unwell to a degree.”
“Whilst the word ‘manifesting’ is narrower than ‘occurring’, it does not follow from the fact that a person at the premises must be displaying symptoms of Covid-19 or be diagnosed with it that the Medical Officer of Health must be aware of that specific manifested incidence of Covid-19 and be responding to it at the time when they issue the operative advice.”
“Although what is required to show causation is an independent matter from the identification of the insured peril, it follows inexorably from the resolution of the causation issue that the ‘Medical Officer of Health’ whose advice leads to the closure of or imposition of restrictions on the premises does not have to know about the manifestation (or occurrence) of the notifiable disease at those specific premises. In those circumstances it is impossible to introduce a requirement of knowledge by implication. Indeed, once it is appreciated that the phrase ‘the Medical Officer of Health of the Public Authority’ is not restricted to local authority officers, as both these insurers unsuccessfully contended that it was, the argument becomes unsustainable.”
“knowledge is not to be equated with absolute certainty… knowledge pre-supposes the truth of the matters known, and a firm belief in their truth, as well as sufficient justification for that belief in terms of experience, information and/or reasoning.” of that thing, place or happening. (2) Mere suspicion or speculation or even reasonable belief that there was a hitherto undetected thing, place or happening would not be described, in common parlance, as the “discovery” of that thing, place or happening. (3) By the same token, an undetectable happening is not a “discovery” and cannot be the subject matter of a “discovery”
“The action of finding out or becoming aware of something for the first time; the action of being the first to find (a place); the action of bringing to light something (as a substance, scientific phenomenon, etc.) which was previously unknown.” (b) Cambridge Dictionary: “the process of finding information, a place, or an object, especially for the first time, or the thing that is found.” (c) Merriam-Webster Dictionary: “the act or process of discovering” or “something discovered” where “discover” is defined as “to make known or visible” or “to obtain sight or knowledge of for the first time” or to “find out”. (2) All the dictionaries speak with one voice. (3) ARO policy wording. There are three other uses of “discovery” in the Policies (in addition to that in Extension 2(a)). All are telling: See General Condition 12: “This Policy and its terms… shall be read together as one contract. Any word or expression to which a specific meaning has been attached in any part of this Policy shall bear that meaning wherever it may appear unless such meaning is stated only to apply to a specific part of the Policy.”; see also Barnardo’s v Buckinghamshire[2019] 2 All ER 175 (SC) at [23] (Lord Hodge): “it is trite both that a provision in a… formal document should be considered in the context of the document as a whole and that one would in principle expect words and phrases to be used consistently in a carefully drafted document, absent a reason for giving them different meanings”. (a) On page 10, General Condition 15 (Reasonable care) states, in part: “It is a condition precedent to the liability of [the Insurer] that the Insured shall at his own expense… (d) as soon as possible after discovery, cause any defect or danger to be made good or remedied and in the meantime shall cause… such additional precautions to be effected as the circumstances may require”
“The [Insurer] shall not be liable under this Sub-Section for… 3. any loss due to the fraud or dishonesty of any director, partner or employee unless the loss is discovered within seven working days of the date of its occurrence.”
“We consider that there will have been an “occurrence” of COVID-19 within an area when at least one person who was infected with COVID-19 was in the relevant area. We do not consider that it is necessary for there to have been an “occurrence” of the disease that the case should have been diagnosed. The definition of Notifiable Disease is in relevant part “illness sustained by any person resulting from … any human infectious or human contagious disease…”
“It is a fundamental tenet of insurance law that cover responds to insured perils and there is no cover unless an insured peril has been made out.”
“11. In this connection it is frequently pointed out that in relation to clauses of this kind, if the contract states that the condition is a 'condition precedent' or a 'condition of liability', that is influential but not decisive as to its status, especially when the label condition precedent is attached on an indiscriminate basis for a number of terms of different nature and varying importance in the policy.”
“29. Mr Moxon Browne submitted as follows. In Layher the condition required " immediate" notice. That is markedly different to the present condition which requires notice " as soon as possible ", in contrast to the reference to " immediately " in the following sentence. In Layher the judge found that no claim was likely at the date of event. The Court did not, therefore, have to grapple with what the position would be if such a claim was likely but the insured was not aware that that was so; or with what he submitted would be the absurdity of an insured being required to give notice of an event of which he was not aware. In Jacobs , the assumption that the court was prepared to make – that the clause must be construed and applied objectively, but taking account of such knowledge as the insured had – provided a means of avoiding that absurdity. In the present case, where immediate notice is not required, it would be almost equally absurd if the insured did not have to give notification as soon as he became (or should have become) aware of an event that was likely to give rise to a claim. The true meaning of the clause must be that, if the insured did not know of the event when it occurred he must nevertheless give notice of it to the insurers when he becomes aware of the event, and that it was likely to give rise to a claim, or when he ought to have become so aware. The effect of the phrase " as soon as possible " was not limited to specifying a period after the event within which notice must be given. It also meant that the obligation to notify arose when the state of knowledge of the insured was such that it was, or should have been, possible to do so. The obligation was to give full particulars. That itself is consistent with a duty on the part of the insured to be pro-active in making inquiries and signifies that the notice might fall to be given some considerable time after the event when such particulars are available.” “32. I do not accept Zurich's construction of the condition. This is a condition introduced by Zurich into its policy which has the potential effect of completely excluding liability in respect of an otherwise valid claim for indemnity. If Zurich wished to exclude liability it was for it to ensure that clear wording was used to secure that result. It has not done so. It is possible to construe the use of the phrase " as soon as possible " as meaning that even if, when the event occurred, it was not likely to give rise to a claim, the obligation to notify would arise whenever thereafter the insured knew or should have known that an event which had occurred in the past was likely to give rise to a claim. But I regard this as a strained interpretation and erroneous. 33. It is, in any event, far from clear that that is the right interpretation and given the nature of the clause the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of Maccaferri. Clauses such as these need to be clear if they are to have effect: Royal and Sun Alliance v Dornoch[2005] EWCA Civ 238 . That is particularly so in circumstances where the context in which the clause was agreed was that Layher and Jacobs had been decided as they had. Although the wording in the present case is not identical to the wording in those cases, the two cases indicate that prima facie whether there is an obligation to notify an occurrence as one likely to give rise to a claim is to be determined by reference to the position immediately after it occurs. Further, Zurich's construction imposes an obligation to carry out something of a rolling assessment as to whether a past event is likely to give rise to a claim (and possibly as to whether an event has happened at all) as circumstances develop. There are clauses which have that effect, particularly in claims made policies insuring against professional liability, but they are not in this form. If that was what was intended, the insurers could be expected to have spelt it out.”
“The law never compels a person to do that which is useless and unnecessary.”
“In order to give a valid notice, the insured must be aware of the circumstances in question. You cannot notify something of which you are not aware.”
“Where the policy wording demonstrates a clear intention to give a clause the status of a condition precedent, the clause will be recognised as such”; Colinvaux & Merkin’s Insurance Contract Law, paras B-0102: “The labelling of a specific clause as a condition precedent is conclusive”; and C-0251: “It has indeed been pointed out that there is no case in which a term individually referred to as a condition precedent has been construed in any other way.”
“The clause is emphatic in stating that “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Reinsurance Agreement and/or Policy working to the contrary, it is a condition precedent to any liability under this Policy that…”
“Contractual provisions in an insurance contract imposing an obligation on the insured to give notification of circumstances that might give rise to a claim to the insurer are frequently held to be conditions precedent to the insurer’s liability. There are good policy reasons why an insurer should wish such notification to be a condition precedent to its liability. As well as the potential benefits that may come from dealing with a claim that is notified as soon as possible, there is a practical benefit to an insurer in avoiding the kind of arguments that were ventilated in this case as to whether late notification has in fact prejudiced the insurer. It may be difficult in any particular case to show prejudice, even if an insurer is able to show a commercial landscape in which early notification may have advantages to its business. Nevertheless, the desirability to an insurer of a notification clause being construed as a condition precedent is of course balanced by a potential prejudice to an insured or a third party such as the Claimant in this case if it enables the insurer to take notification points which are either unmeritorious or which relate to matters outside the control of the person who is harmed by the failure of notification. Sympathy for these competing positions cannot however alter the fundament of the argument which is whether on their true construction the clauses here are to be treated as conditions precedent to the insurer's liability under the policy.”
“In condition 4 there is the provision that “the insured shall give all such information as shall reasonably be required.”
“It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word “immediately” in all cases. The words “forthwith” and “immediately” have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression “within a reasonable time,” and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether, there has been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case.”
“It may happen that a waiver of a breach of the condition in the policy was not actually intended; but if the conduct and declaration of the insurer are of such a character as to justify the belief that waiver was intended and, acting upon this belief, the insured is induced to incur trouble and expense and is subjected to delay to his injury and prejudice, the insurer may be prohibited from claiming a forfeiture for such a breach upon the principle of equitable estoppel.”
“A party can represent that he will not enforce a specific legal right by words or conduct. He can say so expressly—this of course he can only do if he is aware of the right. Alternatively he can adopt a course of conduct which is inconsistent with the exercise of that right. Such a course of conduct will only constitute a representation that he will not exercise the right if the circumstances are such as to suggest either that he was aware of the right when he embarked on the course of conduct inconsistent with it or that he was content to abandon any rights that he might enjoy which were inconsistent with that course of conduct.”
“Based upon the specific circumstances surrounding this matter and having considered the wording of your Policy, LMIE has asked us to communicate to you that, unfortunately, there is no cover for any losses arising out of this event and explain the basis of that decision.”
“We appreciate that this is not the response you would have hoped for but trust the explanation above clearly sets out the reason for this decision.”
“What a reservation of rights does is expressly to preserve a situation where otherwise it might be held that something unequivocal had occurred.”