Golda Ajayi v Ebury Partners Limited [2026] EWHC 1118 (Comm)
[1]The Claimant (“Ms Ajayi”) has made three applications for permission to appeal from my Judgment in this matter and also from the judgment that I gave on consequentials. The Defendant (“Ebury”) says first, that I do not have jurisdiction to determine these applications, and secondly that each of these applications should in any event be dismissed. Jurisdiction[2]Ebury submits that I have no jurisdiction to determine Ms Ajayi’s applications, in circumstances where, as none of the Claimants applications for permission were made at the hearing at which the decisions the Claimant seeks permission to appeal were made, nor was that hearing adjourned, any application for permission to appeal which must now be made to the Court of Appeal by way of an Appellants Notice. Ebury relies on CPR r.52.3(2)(b) and my Order dated 16 December 2025.[3]Ms Ajayi says that she does not dispute that CPR r.52.3(2)(b) is the applicable route for seeking permission to appeal, as expressly stated in the Order and that the Defendant’s submission goes further than the Order permits by asserting that this Court has “no jurisdiction” in consequence. She says that the Court did not entertain a retrospective application for permission; it entertained and granted an application for an extension of time, recognising that Ms Ajayi was absent due to sickness. Although the reference in the Order to CPR r.52.3(2)(b) identifies the correct procedural route, it does not invalidate Ms Ajayi’s application or preclude the Court from giving effect to its own Order. The extension of time under CPR r.52.12 confirms that the Court contemplated a properly constituted appeal process following the Claimant’s absence. Ebury’s preliminary objection therefore overstates the effect of CPR r.52.3 and should be rejected.[4]Although I do not accept that I granted an extension of time because of Ms Ajayi’s alleged sickness, I did initially grant her an extension of time in which to make an application to me for permission to appeal. This was later modified to grant an extension of time in which to apply to the Court of Appeal.[5]I think that there is much force in Ebury’s submission, although I accept that the position may have been confusing for Ms Ajayi. She will in any event have to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal in circumstances where I reject, or would have rejected, her applications in any event. The applications for permission to appeal[6]In my judgment each of the three applications is totally without merit and, to the extent that I have jurisdiction to do, I have no hesitation in rejecting them.[7]Trial appeal: In respect of the Trial Judgment, Ms Ajayi’s application raises an issue as to whether I adjudicated her pleaded and admitted case at all, given that she submits that the Judgment proceeded on an assumed agreement to reformulate the case which did not exist. I do not agree. I dealt with all of those issues that needed to be dealt with. In particular, at Judgment [87-105] I rejected Ms Ajayi’s case that Ebury were consciously and deliberately dishonest in making the representations that Ms Ajayi asserts that they did make. That was and is a complete answer to her claim. Her application for permission to appeal does not seek to challenge these findings. It has no prospect of success.[8]Recusal appeal. I dealt with Ms Ajayi’s Recusal Application at some length in my Judgment on Consequentials. I rejected her application as being totally without merit and I consider that her application for permission to appeal is equally without merit for the reasons already given by me in that Judgment. I note that Ms Ajayi did not appeal my decision at the outset of the trial that I would consider the summary judgment application at the same time as hearing the trial: Judgment [12]. In light of my findings on the facts, all of which were in play, Ms Ajayi’s claim failed on the merits.[9]Indemnity costs appeal. I dealt with Ebury’s application for indemnity costs in my Judgment on Consequentials. Ms Ajayi was given every opportunity to attend the hearing and to deal with the application but did not do so. Although it was alleged that she was unwell, I found that no evidence to this effect was adduced to the Court. This case was eminently one for the award of indemnity costs, for the reasons given by me in my Judgment on Consequentials. I have no doubt that had Ms Ajayi attended the consequentials hearing the result would have been exactly the same.