Frederick Ali Florian Detley Sachs v Hadyn Ross Snape & Ors [2026] EWHC 1059 (Comm)
[2026] EWHC 1059 (Comm)Case No CC-2024-MAN-000022IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEVenue BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTERCIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)1 Bridge Street WestVenue ManchesterM60 9DJDate Monday, 19 th January 2026
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE HALLIWELL SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT AT MANCHESTERB E T W E E N:FREDERICK ALI FLORIAN DETLEY SACHS(1) HADYN ROSS SNAPE(2) JOSHUA SAMUEL SNAPE (AKA JONATHAN MARK SNAPE)(3) RENAISSANCE DIGITAL HOLDINGS(4) DIG MIAMI LLC(5) PERSONS UNKNOWNMR B POMFRET KC & MR K SHARMA appeared on behalf of the ClaimantNO APPEARANCE by or on behalf of the DefendantsJUDGMENTThis Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.HHJ HALLIWELL:
Between
Frederick Ali Florian Detley SachsClaimantHadyn Ross Snape & OrsDefendant
[1]I shall give judgment now. We can return to the order right at the end.[2]By application notice dated 29 October 2025, the claimant, Mr Frederik Sachs, seeks summary judgment on his claim against Mr Jonathan Snape and four other defendants, including a class of persons unknown. The claim arises from an agreement under which the claimant engaged the first defendant, Mr Snape, to manage cryptocurrency on his behalf, appointing Mr Snape as his attorney and to provide him with investment advice.[3]The second defendant is the first defendant’s brother.[4]The third defendant is a company registered in England and Wales under the first and/or second defendant. As I mentioned earlier, it appears from entries at Companies House that the second defendant was struck off the register of companies on 8 January, and will formally be dissolved tomorrow on 20 January. However, since it has not yet been formally dissolved, it remains a legal entity in relation to which I can give judgment now regardless of whether it will cease in existence shortly afterwards.[5]The fourth defendant is a company registered in the USA. It is also alleged to be under the control of the first and/or second defendants.[6]By contrast, the fifth defendants form a class of persons unknown. They are alleged to have received or otherwise dealt with the claimant’s assets, but they are not defined or denoted as such on the claim form or the particulars of claim.[7]Mr Brad Pomfret KC and Mr Kartik Sharma of counsel appear for the claimant. Although steps have been taken to notify them of the application, the defendants do not attend nor are they represented at the hearing today.[8]It is the claimant’s case - set out in his particulars of claim - that, owing to statements, comments and assertions about the future involving the promise of high returns in investments, characterised as representations, the claimant agreed to provide the first defendant with fiat currency to fund the first defendant’s account with Anchorage digital cryptocurrency, with the Anchorage digital cryptocurrency trading platform, which was then to be managed by the first defendant on the claimant’s behalf.[9]The claimant relies upon a written agreement made on 3 March 2024 between himself and the first defendant, under which he appointed the first defendant as his attorney to engage in cryptocurrency trading activities, denoted in paragraph 24 of the particulars of claim, as the Anchorage Agreement. The Anchorage Agreement was expressly terminable upon written notice.[10]The claimant also relies upon an agreement providing for the first and third defendants to provide consultancy services to the claimant. This is denoted as the Consultancy Agreement.[11]Pursuant to these arrangements and at the first defendant’s direction, it is alleged in paragraph 28 of the Particulars of Claim that the claimant paid US$920,000 to a Portuguese company, A1 Limited, to fund a trading account held by the first defendant, which is denoted in the particulars of claim as the Anchorage account.[12]The claimant’s case is then set out in paragraphs 30 to 36 of the particulars of claim.[13]It is alleged that between April and May 2024, the first defendant transferred the monies in the claimant’s wallet in the form of various cryptocurrencies onwards to various wallets believed to be controlled by the first defendant and/or the second and/or fifth defendant, all held to their directional benefit as follows, and then there is the cryptocurrency equivalent of US$209,000 on 18 April 2024, the cryptocurrency equivalent of US$387,499 between the 18th and 29 April 2024, and the cryptocurrency equivalent of US$332,949 between the 3rd and 15 May 2024.[14]It is also alleged that on or around 27 May 2024, the claimant was informed by a third party, a Mr Mani Boni by WhatsApp message that the first defendant appeared to be engaged in fraudulent activities.[15]On 7 June 2024, the claimant then asked the first defendant, over a telephone call, to liquidate all of the claimant’s cryptocurrency assets into fiat currency. The first defendant confirmed he would do so. However, despite repeated requests by the claimant and the first defendant’s assurances, the claimant has not received any funds whatsoever from the first defendant.[16]At the end of July 2024, the first defendant and his in-house counsel, Mr Nuno Rodriguez, assured the claimant that he would receive the monies. This never happened.[17]Despite assurances that he would do so too numerous to particularise, the first defendant has failed and/or refused to pay to the claimant the proceeds of the cryptocurrencies acquired with the monies paid by the claimant to A1 Limited or their ultimate proceeds.[18]The claimant’s case against the first defendant is reasonably straightforward. It is set out in paragraphs 38 to 43 of the particulars of claim, the essential elements of which are as follows. In breach of the Anchorage agreement and/or his duties as the claimant’s agent, the first defendant failed or refused to repay to the claimant the cryptocurrencies held in the claimant’s wallet, despite the claimant demanding the same.[19]The first defendant held the cryptocurrencies on trust for the claimant absolutely and continues to hold such cryptocurrencies and/or proceeds or equivalent on trust for the claimant absolutely.[20]The claimant has called, in the first event, to deliver up the proceeds of the trust, but the first defendant has failed or refused to do so.[21]Monies paid to the benefit of the first defendant via the fourth defendant for investment into the supposed RICH, Hyperdex and Quoto projects were held on trust for the claimant absolutely for use in respect of these projects, and the said money was not actually used for those projects, but to repay other investors.[22]It is then alleged that the first defendant holds on trust for the claimant all of the claimant’s Mintlayer tokens were previously held in the claimant’s Metamask wallet and/or the proceeds of the same or their equivalent.[23]On this factual basis, the claimant seeks accounts and enquiries to enable him to follow and trace his property, its proceeds or equivalent, and in the alternative, equitable compensation and/or damages for breach of trust. Then, there is the claim I mentioned a little while ago for misrepresentation, together with a claim based on unjust enrichment.[24]Subject to this, the claimant’s claim against the first defendant is primarily founded on breach of contract and breach of trust. The essence of his case is that, having engaged the first defendant to manage funds on his behalf, the funds and, in due course, the proceeds of the funds were placed under the first defendant’s control but, once the claimant terminated their agreement and demanded repayment of the proceeds of these investments, the first defendant failed to repay or remit them to him or procure that they were repaid. The claimant is thus entitled to bring claims against the first defendant for breach of contract and breach of trust.[25]Among the investments managed on the claimant’s behalf by the first defendant were assets denoted in paragraphs 15 to 21 of the Particulars of Claim, as the Mintlayer tokens. It is alleged, in paragraph 19 of the particulars of claim, that in or around February 2004, the first defendant claimed to have sold the Mintlayer tokens for some US$60,000 and transferred part of the fund, that is US$16,338 to the first defendant. It is then claimed, in paragraph 19B, that the claimant received payments of US$14,866 and US$11,144 from the second defendant in respect of the proceeds of the Mintlayer tokens.[26]The claim against the second defendant is set out in paragraphs 46 to 51 of the particulars of claim. It is claimed that the second defendant acted in concert with the first defendant, in relation, at least, to the Mintlayer tokens. It is also averred that the second defendant received monies of the claimant and/or their followable or traceable proceeds with knowledge of the first defendant’s aforementioned breach of trust, and is liable to account to the claimant as constructive trustee.[27]It is also alleged that the second defendant assisted the first defendant to commit breaches of the aforementioned trust by handling the claimant’s monies or their proceeds, either personally and/or as director of the third and the fourth defendant.[28]In doing so, it is alleged the second defendant acted dishonestly since, by reason of his attendance at meetings with the claimant and his close family when the working relationship with the first defendant, the second defendant was aware that the first defendant was using the claimant’s monies other than in accordance with the purposes for which they were paid over to the first defendant.[29]The claimant seeks an account and enquiries into his monies received by the second defendant, as a constructive trustee of the claimant.[30]The claim against the third defendant is set out in paragraphs 52 to 54. It is said that the third defendant assisted the first defendant to breach the trust by entering into and purporting to act pursuant to the Consultancy Agreement. In doing so, the third defendant acted dishonestly because it knew the first defendant did not intend to use the claimant’s monies for investment purposes.[31]It is alleged the third defendant manifestly adopted and approved of the first defendant’s misrepresentations and is accordingly liable for damages for deceit.[32]The claim against the fourth defendant arises from the factual allegation, in paragraph 14(b) of the Particulars of Claim, that, relying on the First Defendant’s advice on or around 1 December 2024, the claimant rolled over one of his investments and transferred US$40,000 into the fourth defendant’s bank account to invest in a venture called Hyperdex Token.[33]It is alleged, in paragraph 56, that, in breach of trust, the fourth defendant allowed the investment to be used for unauthorised purposes other than for the claimant’s benefit, so as to furnish the claimant with a claim for equitable compensation and damages for breach of trust in an alternative claim, based on unjust enrichment. This claim is set out in paragraphs 56 to 58.[34]The claim described in paragraphs 59 to 61 is against persons unknown. It is contended that they received monies that were held on trust for the claimant, knew that they were being placed in breach of trust, and are liable to an account and/or equitable compensation for doing so.[35]A question initially arises as to whether I should entertain the application for summary judgment given that the defendants have neither filed an acknowledgement of service nor a defence.[36]Whilst the first defendant has filed, at Court in these proceedings, a document under the heading, “Defence,” this document was filed prior to the service of the particulars of claim and before the first defendant could have seen it. It follows that this document cannot amount to a defence to the particulars of claim, in the formal sense for which the Civil Procedure Rules provide.[37]However, it does informally disclose an intention to defend the proceedings and, in vague terms, an indication of the basis for doing so. This is so notwithstanding that there is a latent ambiguity, in the document itself, as to the parties on whose behalf it was intended to be filed and served. It was filed by the first defendant and contains a statement of truth on his behalf. However, it commences with a statement on behalf of the defendants in the plural, without distinction. This is significant because the first defendant has a clear connection with the second, third and fourth defendants. The second defendant is his brother. They are both directors of the third and fourth defendants. In paragraph 1, it is stated, again in the plural, that the defendants dispute the claim and, in paragraphs 4 and 5, there is a defence on behalf of the second and fourth defendants. In all likelihood, it was intended as a defence for the first defendant and each of the second to fourth defendants but it is unclear to what extent the first defendant was authorised to file a defence on behalf, at least, of the second and fifth defendants. In the claim form, the fifth defendants were not identified by name and, objectively construed, the document could not obviously be taken to set out their case and defence. This is quite apart from the issue of authority.[38]In these circumstances, I shall give the claimant permission to apply for summary judgment against all five defendants, and I shall do so for two reasons.[39]Firstly, I shall do so for the reasons canvassed by Mr Promfret in his submissions before me this morning and in paragraphs 14 to 16 of his skeleton argument. This includes, in particular, the cross-border nature of the digital assets, the likelihood of enforcement in multiple jurisdictions and the expectation that, in some jurisdictions, summary judgment might carry more weight or recognition than a default judgment.[40]There is a second reason. Whilst no formal acknowledgement of service or defence has been filed, the defendants have generally been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. This is certainly so in the case of the first to fourth Defendants. Indeed, the first defendant has purported to file a defence, conceivably as I mentioned before, on their joint behalf, to challenge the claimant’s case.[41]There is guidance in relation to the principles governing applications for summary judgment in the judgment of Lewison J, as he was, in Easyair. This was approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Son v Catlin (Five) Ltd & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1098. Whilst given in relation to an application for reverse summary judgment, there is no reason why the principles should not apply in the same way to a claim for summary judgment as sought by the claimant today.[42]This guidance includes the following propositions. “(i) The Court must consider whether the claimant has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success...” that is Swain v Hillman & Anor [2001] 1 All ER 91; “(ii) A realistic claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable.” ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 oat paragraph 8. iii) In reaching its conclusion, the Court must not conduct a mini trial…” Swain v Hillman & Anor; iv) This does not mean that the Court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statement before the Court. In some cases, it may be clear that there is no real substance and factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents.” ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel at paragraph 10; v) However, in reaching its conclusion, the Court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial; Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus, the Court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the applications, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial Judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100. Ltd [2007] FSR 3. vii) On the other hand, it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction, and if the Court is satisfied that he has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question, that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple. If the respondent’s case is bad in law, he will, in truth, have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant’s case is bad in law, the sooner that it is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that, although materially in the form of the documents or oral evidence that will put the documents in another light is not currently before the Court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, then in those circumstances, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fancible prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would otherwise have a bearing on the question of construction, and that is ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.”[43]Bearing in mind this guidance, I shall now turn to the present case with respect to each defendant. In doing so, I shall start with the first defendant.[44]I am persuaded that the claimant is entitled to summary judgment against the first defendant in its case against him for breach of contract and breach of trust, namely that(1) the first defendant was engaged to manage the relevant funds or assets on behalf of the claimant, as his agent,(2) having done so, the claimant placed such funds or assets under the first defendant’s management or control:(3) the funds or assets and the proceeds of such assets were always the claimant’s property; and(4) the first defendant was under a continuing duty to manage the assets on the claimant’s behalf, in the claimant’s proper interests, and with reasonable skill and care. Once the claimant terminated their agreement and demanded the proceeds of his investments, he was entitled to payment. In these circumstances, the first defendant’s continuing failure to pay or remit the proceeds to the claimant is a breach of trust. If and to the extent that the first defendant has depleted the trust funds or allowed them to be depleted without proper explanation or cause, he is liable to the claimant for breach of contract and breach of trust.[45]Cryptocurrency is legally recognised as a species of personal property. The claimant is also entitled to the proceeds of the assets, which the first defendant holds, subject to an act or tracing claimant of the relevant assets.[46]In my judgment, the claimant is thus entitled to an order for delivery up of such of those assets as are of the proprietary nature, and they are held for or in interest for him. There is a list of the relevant assets at pages 199 to £200 of the bundle. At the end of the hearing, I shall hear further from Mr Pomfret about this aspect of the case. However, the first defendant will be required to deliver such of the relevant assets as are in his position or under his control.[47]The claimant has also submitted his claim for pecuniary relief against the first defendant for, amongst other things, breach of contract and breach of trust. Since the point has been reached for me to give judgment, I advised Mr Pomfret this morning that the time had come for his client to make an election as to whether to seek an account of the damages.[48]In the case of the first defendant and, as it happens, the fourth defendant - with whom I shall deal later - he has elected to seek damages and/or an equitable compensation rather than an account of profits. This is for reasons that are understandable.[49]It is plain that the claimant is thus entitled to damages to be assessed for the losses that he has incurred owing to the first defendant’s breaches of contract and breaches of trust. I shall make an order for damages to be assessed on this basis.[50]Having done so, I am invited to make an order for an interim payment of damages under Rule 25 of the CPR. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to do so on the basis that, in the event the case goes to trial, the claimant will be entitled to judgment for a substantial amount. On his pleaded case, which the defendants are deemed to admit having failed to file a formal defence, supported as it is by the evidence filed on the claimant’s behalf, I am persuaded the claimant should be awarded an interim payment in the sum of US$920,000. This is, of course, based on the amount paid by the claimant at the first defendant’s request to A1 Limited to fund the Anchorage trading account.[51]For the avoidance of doubt, although I shall hear further from Mr Pomfret if necessary, I am minded to direct that the first defendant shall be entitled to credit against this amount for the value of any of his proprietary assets that might be delivered up to the claimant under the other provisions of this order. In saying so, I appreciate that US$920,000 has been assessed as a minimum amount to which the claimant is likely to be entitled.[52]At this stage, I am not persuaded the claimant has demonstrated he has a good claim against the first defendant for misrepresentation. This may ultimately be academic. Promises or comments about the future are not actionable as misrepresentations. I appreciate, as Mr Pomfret submitted, that false statements of knowledge or intention can, in appropriate circumstances, furnish a party with a claim for misrepresentation, but I am not persuaded we are unarguably in this territory here.[53]This brings me to the claims against the second, third and fifth defendants. These claims are less straightforward than the claim against the first and fourth defendants albeit for different reasons. The claim against the second defendant is primarily based on the fact that, no doubt at the first defendant’s direction, the second defendant made two repayments to the claimant in relation to the Mintlayer token. He can thus be seen to have cooperated closely with the first defendant, and in doing so made a payment out of funds to which the claimant was entitled. However, at present, the claimant’s factual case goes no further than this.[54]As to the claim against the third defendant, it is alleged it assisted the first defendant by entering into the consultancy agreement. However, subject to this, it is not specifically alleged, in the particulars of claim itself, that the third defendant knowingly received or dishonestly in the misapplication of trust property. In its original form, the fifth defendant was named in the claim form as persons unknown only but this was refined so as to mean the owners and/or holders of the following blockchain wallets. These are the wallets defined at the bottom of the order, at page 197 of the bundle. I shall not set out the lengthy set of initials and numbers appearing after each wallet in the order of Judge Pearce on 4 April 2025. However, there are five names,(a) wallet Oxe, and(b) Binance wallet, Ox2c,(c) Binance wallet, Eto,(d) Binance wallet, D7kj,(e) MEXC wallet, Ox43, and those are set out in full at page 197 of the bundle.[55]If the persons unknown are defined with such particularity so as to encompass persons who have held and misapplied assets, it is clear against whom the order is directed. They are liable on the basis they have misapplied the blockchain wallets defined at page 197.[56]In these circumstances, the claimant invites me to make an order for delivery up against the second to fifth defendants in the same form as the first defendant, but he seeks to adjourn his case for damages or account for further consideration later. That is in relation to the second, third and fifth defendants, once additional evidence has become available, and until this happens, he reserves his election, albeit he recognises to the extent that his pecuniary claim, that is his claim other than his claim for delivery up, overlaps, he will be precluded from exercising it inconsistently from his election against the first, or indeed, the fourth defendant, to which I shall come now.[57]As I have mentioned, the claim against the fourth defendant arises in part from the factual allegation in paragraph 14B of the particulars of claim that, relying on the first defendant’s advice on or around 1 December 2024, the claimant rolled over one of his investments and transferred US$40,000 into the fourth defendant’s bank account to invest in a venture called Hyperdex Token. It is alleged, in paragraph 56, that, in breach of trust, the fourth defendant allowed the investment to be used for unauthorised purposes. Otherwise, and for the claimant’s benefit, the possibility is left open that the fourth defendant has received other amounts and assets on an analogous basis.[58]On this basis, I am persuaded that the claimant has a good claim against the fourth defendant for knowing receipt, and he is entitled to summary judgment, and on the same basis as the claim against the first defendant, he is entitled to an interim payment from the fourth defendant in the sum of US$40,000 as the minimum amount likely to be recoverable.[59]I am also invited to deal with the issue of costs. I shall deal with this now. Mr Pomfret seeks an order for the payment of his costs of the proceedings to date subject to detailed assessment, on the standard basis, with a payment on account of costs in the sum of £115,000, amounting to 70% of the costs itemised on his costs schedule.[60]As Mr Pomfret submits, the claimant is plainly the successful party. He is entitled to his costs. No case has been advanced to the contrary. I am also persuaded it is appropriate for me to make an interim payment on account of costs and that it is reasonable for this to be assessed at £115,000 on the basis for which Mr Pomfret contends. The order shall be on this basis.[61]The order is at page 13 of the bundle. The reference to persons unknown is properly defined in your order. There is thus no need for amendment to the heading. The recitals are apposite. There shall be summary judgment for delivery limited of course to the assets in their possession or control. For the reasons outlined in your submissions, it is unnecessary to limit the order for delivery up further so as to require best endeavours only if the order is limited to the assets in their possession and control. End of Judgment. Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 legal@ubiqus.com Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof