Ziyavudin Magomedov & Ors v TPG Group Holdings (SBS), LP & Ors [2026] EWHC 1051 (Comm)

[2026] EWHC 1051 (Comm)Case No CL-2023-000401
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, WC4A 1NLDate 6 May 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE BRIGHT
Between
( 1) ZIYAVUDIN MAGOMEDOVClaimants(2) SGS UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT HOLDINGS LIMITEDClaimant(3) INTIMERE HOLDINGS LIMITEDClaimant(4) HELLICORP INVESTMENTS LTDClaimant(5) SIAN PARTICIPATION CORP. (IN LIQUIDATION)Claimant(6) MAPLE RIDGE LIMITEDClaimant(7) WIREDFLY INVESTMENTS LIMITEDClaimant(8) SMARTILICIOUS CONSULTING LIMITEDClaimant(9) ENVIARTIA CONSULTING LIMITEDClaimant(10) PORT-PETROVSK LIMITEDClaimant(1) TPG GROUP HOLDINGS (SBS), LPDefendants(2) TPG PARTNERS VI, LPDefendant(3) TPG FOF VI SPV, LPDefendant(4) TPG PARTNERS VI-AIV, LPDefendant(5) TPG VI MANAGEMENT, LLCDefendant(6) TPG ADVISORS VI, INCDefendant(7) TPG ADVISORS VI-AIV, INCDefendant(8) DOMIDIAS LIMITEDDefendant(9) HALIMEDA INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDDefendant(10) LEYLA MAMMAD ZADEDefendant(11) MIKHAIL RABINOVICHDefendant(12) ERMENOSSA INVESTMENTS LIMITEDDefendant(13) KONSTANTIN KUZOVKOVDefendant(14) FELIX LPDefendant(15) ANDREY SEVERILOVDefendant(16) KATINA PAPANIKOLAOUDefendant(17) STATE ATOMIC ENERGY CORPORATION ROSATOMDefendant(18) DP WORLD RUSSIA FZCODefendant(19) PJSC FAR-EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANYDefendant(20) PJSC TRANSNEFTDefendant(21) MARK GARBERDefendant(22) GARBER HANNAM AND PARTNERS HOLDING LIMITEDDefendant
Imran Benson (instructed by Seladore Legal Ltd) for ClaimantsDonald Lilly KC (instructed by Cook, Young and Keidan LLP) for Eighth and Fifteenth DefendantsHearing Hearing date: 27 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 6 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................Table of Contents

A: INTRODUCTION

[1]This judgment is concerned with the application of the Eighth Defendant (“Domidias”) and the Fifteenth Defendant (“Mr Severilov”) for security for costs. The application was issued on 12 February 2026 and was heard on 27 April 2026.[2]These dates are significant because they are both more than a full year after judgment in the Defendants’ favour, on 17 January 2025. For an application for security for costs to be made after judgment is very unusual, but not entirely without precedent. However, I am not aware of any previous case where an application for security for costs has been made so long after judgment, and where the applicant has already received an interim payment on account.

B: BACKGROUND

[3]My judgment in favour of the Defendants (including Domidias and Mr Severilov) followed a lengthy hearing in respect of challenges to the court’s jurisdiction (“the Jurisdiction Challenge”). I dismissed the Claimants’ claims against Domidias on the basis that there was no serious issue to be tried. I found that there was a serious issue to be tried against Mr Severilov, but I dismissed the claims against him as well, on the ground that England was not the proper forum.[4]Domidias and Mr Severilov were both awarded their costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge: Domidias, 100% on the indemnity basis; Mr Severilov, 95% on the standard basis.[5]The consequentials hearing that followed the judgment was heard on 17 January 2025. The successful Defendants all applied for relief including interim payments on account of their costs. Following some additional post-hearing written submissions, my judgment on interim payments on account of costs was handed down on 14 February 2025. The interim payments on account that I ordered in favour of Domidias and Mr Severilov were £508,454 and £620,848.[6]I had previously ordered security for costs in favour of the Defendants, in respect of their costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge, on 3 May 2024. The sums ordered in favour of Domidias and Mr Severilov were £420,000 and £665,000 (respectively). Thus, the interim payment on account in favour of Domidias was greater than the security which had been provided and so was not fully secured; by contrast, the payment on account in favour of Mr Severilov was less than the security, and thus was fully secured. Nevertheless, even though it was not fully secured, the interim payment on account in favour of Domidias was duly paid by the Claimants.[7]As well as the costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge, there were other relevant costs orders made in relation to applications on which Domidias and/or Mr Severilov succeeded earlier stages of the proceedings:(1) Long before the hearing of the Jurisdiction Challenge, there was a hearing before HHJ Pelling KC in September 2023, and a further hearing before Butcher J in November 2023, both relating to a freezing order which the Claimants sought against various Defendants including Mr Severilov (“the 2023 Freezing Order”). These hearings resulted in an order of Butcher J of 7 November 2023, which ordered costs in favour of Mr Severilov, with payments on account of £336,432.98 and £63,201.91.(2) After the hearing of the challenges to jurisdiction, various Defendants including Domidias and Mr Severilov applied for a freezing order against the Claimants (“the Post Judgment Freezing Order”). They then applied for an order for disclosure by the Claimants of their funding arrangements (“the Funding Disclosure Order”). Both applications succeeded, and Domidias and Mr Severilov were awarded their costs. By an order of Bryan J of 3 July 2025, interim payments on account were ordered of £21,053.33 and £32,346.33 in favour of Domidias and £28,305.53 and £33,856.02 in favour of Mr Severilov.[8]On 12 February 2026, Cooke, Young & Keidan LLP (“CYK”), the solicitors acting for Domidias and Mr Severilov, wrote to Seladore Legal Limited (“Seladore”), the solicitors acting for the Claimants, commencing proceedings for the detailed assessment of costs (“the Assessment Proceedings”). It is not clear to me precisely what work has yet been undertaken in relation to the Assessment Proceedings, but I am told that substantial costs have been incurred already, and considerably more will be incurred in due course.[9]The Claimants sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in relation to the judgment of 17 January 2025. I did not give permission, which was then refused by Males LJ as single LJ on documents, on 3 June 2025. The Claimants applied for the application to be re-opened, pursuant to CPR 52.30. Following an oral hearing on 27 March 2026, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment on 30 April 2026, dismissing the application: [2026] EWCA Civ 516. It follows that my judgment on the Jurisdiction Challenge will stand; as, too, will the rulings in relation to all consequential matters, including my decisions on costs and on my decisions on the interim payments to be made on account of such costs.

C: THE APPLICATION

[10]Against this background, the security for costs applied for is as follows.[11]First, Domidias seeks additional security for its costs in respect of its successful Jurisdiction Challenge, on the basis that its total costs were in fact £784,619.34, which substantially exceeds both the security for costs of £420,000 and the interim payment on account of £508,454.[12]Next, both Domidias and Mr Severilov seek security for their costs of and occasioned by the various other applications I have mentioned above, on the basis that(i) no security for these costs has been ordered previously and(ii) the costs incurred were greater than the interim payments ordered to be made on account. For Domidias, the relevant costs were said to total £105,943.50; for Mr Severilov, £993,518.15.[13]They both also seek security in respect of other work done in the proceedings, i.e. work said not to be related to the Jurisdiction Challenge or to the 2023 Freezing Order, the Post Judgment Freezing Application or the Funding Disclosure Order. For Domidias, the relevant costs were said to total £51,032.18; for Mr Severilov, £38,705.[14]Finally, both Domidias and Mr Severilov seek security for the costs of the Assessment Proceedings.

D: LEGAL PRINCIPLES

[15]The jurisdiction to order security for costs is regulated by CPR 25.26 and CPR 25.27. These provisions do not expressly limit the jurisdiction to the period before trial. It is not common for an application for security for costs to be made after trial, but such applications have been allowed on a number of occasions, as recognised in the White Book at CPR 25.26.32. The cases cited there include the main cases cited to me, from which a number of features emerge.[16]The court can order further security for costs in favour of a Defendant who has already obtained security for costs, if there has been a material change of circumstances; e.g., if security was previously assessed on the standard basis but costs are now awarded on the indemnity basis, with interest thereon: Excalibur Ventures v Gulf Keystone [2013] EWHC 4278 (Comm), per Clarke LJ at [77]-[79].[17]The court can order security for the successful Defendant’s likely future costs of the detailed assessment of costs: MANNutzfahrzeuge AG v Freightliner [2007] EWHC 247 (QB), per Moore-Bick LJ at [5]; followed in Excalibur at [85].[18]The court can also order security for other post-trial costs that will be incurred in the future, such as an inquiry into the damages caused by a freezing injunction: Alta Trading UK Limited v Bosworth [2025] EWHC 1987 (Comm), per Henshaw J at [92].[19]Such applications are usually made at the consequentials hearing after trial, in conjunction with arguments about the basis of assessment (i.e., standard basis or indemnity basis) and the quantum of any interim payment on account: cf. Excalibur and Republic of Djibouti v Boreh [2016] EWHC 1035 (Comm). However, in principle such applications may properly be made much later: cf. MANNutzfahrzeuge.[20]The application in Alta Trading was heard a few months after the consequentials hearing (suggesting that it was issued within weeks). Henshaw J noted at [78] that any application for security for costs must be made “promptly, as soon as the facts justifying the order are known”. On the facts of that case, he considered at [92] that it would have been premature for the application to have been made earlier.[21]In his judgment at [76], Henshaw J referred to the note in the White Book (then §25.12.20, now §25.26.32) which states that, instead of ordering further security, the court may deal with matters by an order for an interim payment on account.[22]However, the court is cautious about ordering additional security if there can be no effective sanction: Dar International FEF Co v Aon Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1833, per Mance LJ at [16]-[19]. In Excalibur, Clarke LJ’s order was to the effect that, in default of payment, the Defendants would have leave to join the persons who had funded the Claimants’ litigation. In Republic of Djibouti, the sanction was that the Claimant would not be able to participate in the inquiry into damages, or in any appeal: per Flaux J at [19]-[20].

E: COSTS OF JURISDICTION CHALLENGE

[23]In relation to the application for additional security for the costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge, the submissions made by Mr Lilly KC, on behalf of Domidias and Mr Severilov (but, on this point, only on behalf of Domidias), largely concerned whether there had been a material change in circumstances since the previous order for security for costs, on 3 May 2024. I accept that there have been material changes: notably,(i) that Domidias’s challenge to jurisdiction has succeeded and(ii) that Domidias was awarded its costs on the indemnity basis, with interest. When I awarded Domidias security for its costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge on 3 May 2024, I did so on the footing that Domidias might get costs on the standard basis. The figure awarded – £420,000 – therefore did not reflect the basis of assessment ultimately adopted following my judgment on the point.[24]However, the fact that Domidias was awarded security for costs on 3 May 2024 is not the real problem that Domidias faces on this part of the application. Its real problem is that, at the consequentials hearing on 17 January 2025, Domidias asked for and was then awarded an interim payment on account, which exceeded the existing security. The sum asked for was £726,364 (out of costs actually incurred, said to total just over £800,000). The payment on account ordered in favour of Domidias was £508,454.[25]Domidias now says that the total costs incurred and claimed in respect of the Jurisdiction Challenge were £784,619.34. Its application proceeds by(i) applying 85% (this being a standard percentage to apply to total incurred costs, when ordering security for costs on the indemnity basis), then(ii) netting off the payment on account already received of £508,454; which results in a figure now sought, as additional security, of £158,472.44. Domidias also seeks security in respect of each of the interest on the various elements of its costs on the Jurisdiction Challenge, in a total amount of approximately £40,000.[26]It is not obvious to me why the total sum claimed by Domidias in respect of the incurred costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge has increased from £726,364 to £784,619.34. Be that as it may, I have noted above that, in Alta Trading, Henshaw J at [76] referred to the note in the White Book, now §25.26.32.[27]That note says:
“Application for additional security after trial … Another possibility is that, instead of ordering further security, the court may order the claimant to pay the appropriate increase as an interim payment of costs, such payment to be made in addition to the sums already paid or secured in the proceedings.”
[28]Henshaw J’s own observation was:
“An alternative to ordering additional security post-judgment is to award a payment on account of costs which reflects any increase in the defendant’s costs compared with those previously estimated (for example because they are awarded their costs on an indemnity basis): CPR25.12.20”
[29]The comment made by the editors of the White Book and the additional comment made by Henshaw J are consistent with each other and with my own experience. The key words, for present purposes, are “… instead of ordering further security…” and “An alternative to ordering additional security post-judgment…” I do not recall any positive statement being made to me in submissions at the consequentials hearing to this effect. Nevertheless, I am sure that my understanding at the time, based on the established practice, was that Domidias’s application for an interim payment on account was instead of, i.e., an alternative to, an application for additional security for costs.[30]I cannot now say what, precisely, I would have done in January/February 2025, if I had been told either(i) that Domidias wanted both an interim payment on account and additional security for costs, or(ii) that Domidias’s only application on that date was for an interim payment on account, but it reserved the right to apply at some time in the future for additional security for costs. However, I am sure that, at the very least, I would have approached the assessment of the appropriate amount for an interim payment on account differently, and more conservatively. It is likely that I would have gone further and indicated to Domidias that the two forms of relief are normally treated as alternatives, ergo it must decide which it wanted to ask for – it not normally being possible to ask for both.[31]Mr Lilly KC made the point that the difference in the test for quantifying a payment on account and that for quantifying security means that, other things being equal, the quantum of the latter may be higher. I accept this in principle, and I therefore do not rule out the possibility that there may be cases where it is appropriate for a defendant who has succeeded after trial to ask both for an interim payment on account of costs, and for security for costs in relation to any perceived gap between the amount likely to be recovered following assessment and the amount of the interim payment on account. However, I would expect such cases to be exceedingly rare. Above all, if a successful defendant wishes to ask for both forms of relief, or at least to reserve the right to do so, it should raise this at the consequentials hearing, when applying for an interim payment on account.[32]If a successful defendant merely asks for an interim payment on account of costs, without indicating that it also seeks or may seek additional security for costs, the court is entitled to interpret the defendant’s silence on this point as meaning that it has elected only to seek an interim payment on account. Therefore, any subsequent and belated application for additional security for costs will be refused, on Henderson v Henderson grounds.[33]A further problem that arises on the specific facts of this case is that the sum sought has been calculated by applying a percentage of 85%. At the consequentials hearing on 17 January 2025, and in the post-hearing submissions, there was some debate about the appropriate percentages that should be applied to each Defendant’s figure for the total costs it had incurred in relation to the Jurisdiction Challenge. Domidias contended, and I accepted, that the appropriate percentage in all the circumstances was 70%, in order to reflect the “general, inchoate possibility of the fees being reduced on assessment for some presently unidentified reason”: Domidias’s written submissions of 10 February 2025, at §5. This was suggested in the knowledge that Domidias’s costs were to be assessed on the indemnity basis, i.e., the burden would fall on the Claimants to show that Domidias’s costs were unreasonable. Against this background, I do not see why I should now accept the application of the higher percentage of 85%, in the context of security for costs.[34]Mr Lilly KC submitted that there has been a further material change since 14 February 2025, namely that the First Claimant (“Mr Magomedov”) has been declared bankrupt. For present purposes, this is of no materiality. There was never any realistic prospect that Domidias or any other Defendant would be able to enforce any costs order against Mr Magomedov, who has throughout been in prison in Russia. They have known from the outset that the Claimants’ legal costs were being funded. They must always have expected to recover costs from the funders, alternatively from those of the Claimants which are solvent and in jurisdictions where the enforcement of English costs orders is readily achievable.[35]Although the reasons above focus on the application for additional security in respect of the costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge, the same points apply to the claim for security in respect of interest on such costs.

F: COSTS OF PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS

[36]In relation to the application for security for the costs of(i) Mr Severilov’s success at the hearings before HHJ Pelling KC and Butcher J in relation to the 2023 Freezing Order,(ii) Domidias’s and Mr Severilov’s successful application for the Post Judgment Freezing Order and(iii) their successful application for the Funding Disclosure Order, Domidias and Mr Severilov face the same problem as in relation to the application for additional security for the costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge. When these applications were disposed of, Domidias and Mr Severilov (as relevant) not only applied for and were ordered their costs; they also applied for and were ordered interim payments on account. They did not indicate that they would or might return to court to seek security for costs, over and above the sums ordered as interim payments on account of costs. It is too late for them to do so now.

G: OTHER WORK DONE

[37]In relation to the application for security for the costs of other work said to have been done in the proceedings, there was no evidence before me to explain what these costs were or how they were incurred, save that they were described as relating to the Defence and to amendments to the statements of case. I do not understand how costs so described could truly be separate from the costs of the Jurisdiction Challenge. Nor do I understand why work that was genuinely separate from the Jurisdiction Challenge was being undertaken at all, pending the outcome of that matter. This part of the application therefore must fail in any event.

H: ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS

[38]In relation to the application for security for the costs of the Assessment Proceedings, the position is different. No previous security for costs has been sought, ordered or provided, and there has been no interim payment on account.[39]I have already noted that several authorities confirm that the court can order security for the costs of a detailed assessment. In theory this possibly could have been done at an earlier stage – say, the consequentials hearing on 17 January 2025. However, no-one at that point was able to say whether detailed assessment would be necessary; it was at least possible that the total costs recoverable by Domidias and Mr Severilov might be agreed. Accordingly, they were entitled to wait and see.[40]The Assessment Proceedings were commenced on 12 February 2026. This was also the date when the application now before me was issued. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Domidias and Mr Severilov did not act promptly in making their application.[41]The estimated total costs of Domidias and of Mr Severilov for the Assessment Proceedings are £116,926 and £159,977.90 (respectively), on the basis of hearings of 3 days and 5 days (respectively).[42]Mr Benson, on behalf of the Claimants, suggested that these figures are excessive. They do not seem especially excessive in the context of the general costs of the proceedings, nor by comparison with the scale of the security ordered in MANNutzfahrzeuge AG v Freightliner and in Excalibur. Furthermore, I note that the estimates given to me previously on behalf of Domidias and Mr Severilov (i.e., for the hearing on 3 May 2024) turned out to be reasonably accurate.[43]Nevertheless, some discount is appropriate. Accordingly I grant security for costs under this heading, to Domidias in the sum of £80,000 and to Mr Severilov in the sum of £110,000.[44]The Claimants suggested that any security ordered should be divided into tranches. I do not consider this convenient.[45]The order will give Domidias and Mr Severilov liberty to apply, in the event of any failure to comply. I anticipate that, if this arises, Domidias and Mr Severilov may then wish to be permitted to proceed against the funders, as was the case in Excalibur. However, that will be for them to decide, if the need arises.

Cited in 1 later judgment