V Ships Limited v Luna Management Corporation & Ors [2025] EWHC 3329 (Comm)

[2025] EWHC 3329 (Comm)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND & WALES
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Claim No. CL-2025-000019
Venue 7 Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 17 December 2025
Before
Mr Justice Andrew Baker
Between
V SHIPS LIMITEDClaimant(a company incorporated under the laws of Cyprus)Claimant-v-
Between
LUNA MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONDefendant(a company incorporated under the laws of Liberia)DefendantLAMBROS STRAVELAKISDefendantSTEFANOS STRAVELAKISDefendant_______________________________Michael Ryan and Rebecca Jacobs (instructed by Reed Smith LLP) appeared for ClaimantTim Grey (instructed by Janes Solicitors LLP) appeared for Defendant
JUDGMENT(Approved Transcript)
Digital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground 46 Chancery Lane WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.
[1]Mr Justice Andrew Baker: This judgment follows the final hearing last week, for which I read on Monday and sat on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, of contempt applications dated 22 July 2025 against the first defendant, Luna Management Corp (“Luna”), a Liberian company, and the second defendant, Lambros Stravelakis (“Lambros”), an individual ordinarily resident in Greece. The late Stefanos Stravelakis (“Stefanos”) was the defendant and a contempt application dated 22 July 2025 was also pursued against him.[2]Stefanos was Lambros’s father. Since they both feature in the case they were generally referred to at the hearing by their first names and I am following suit. Stefanos died, on 11 November 2025, at the age of 93. He was born on 7 June 1932. The contempt application against him has been discontinued.[3]The contempt claim charges Luna with disobedience to an anti-suit injunction granted by Calver J, on 17 January 2025, by way of enforcement pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996 of an award of arbitrators dated 23 December 2024. By that award, Luna was required forthwith and in any event within four days of that date(1) to take all necessary steps to discontinue and terminate certain civil proceedings brought by Luna in Greece (“the Greek Proceedings”) and(2) to take all necessary steps to discharge any and all court orders made in any of those proceedings.[4]The award and the injunction granted by Calver J also restrained Luna from taking any steps to commence or continue any other civil claims in respect of matters arising out of or in connection with a ship management agreement between Luna and the claimant (“V-Ships”) dated 30 March 2022, by which V-Ships agreed to provide ship management services for the m.t. Priority, a crude oil tanker owned by Luna between 19 May 2022 and 27 September 2022.[5]The Greek Proceedings are the following:(a) a civil claim before the Multimember Court of First Instance of Piraeus, with general filing number 6359/2024 and special filing number 3255/2024;(b) a civil claim commenced by a writ with general filing number 12172/2024;(c) a civil claim before the Single Member Court of First Instance of Piraeus with general filing number 12173/2024 and special filing number 2030/2024.[6]Luna participated fully in the arbitration, but has not participated in the proceedings in this court, except for one episode of unsatisfactory and cynical conduct (as it was judged to have been by Foxton J). Luna resisted, and insisted upon an oral hearing of, an application by V-Ships to serve the anti-suit injunction on Lambros and Stefanos outside the jurisdiction with a revised penal notice naming them, so as to make against them a personalised threat of contempt proceedings should Luna continue to disobey the injunction. Having thus forced delay and increased cost, Luna then failed to engage with or instruct anyone to appear for it at the hearing upon which it had insisted.[7]Apart from that episode, as I say, Luna has not participated in the proceedings in this court. I have no doubt at all, and find, that it has chosen not to do so, just as it has, I am sure, chosen to persist with the Greek Proceedings in defiance of the anti-suit injunction after due service upon it. That persistence has continued following issue and due service of the contempt application against Luna. It has continued up to and including participation at a final hearing in Greece, on 14 October 2025, such that judgment is now awaited in the Greek Proceedings.[8]The potential imminence of a final judgment in Greece was the ground upon which Henshaw J, as judge in charge of the Commercial Court, directed at the request of V-Ships, resisted by Lambros, that the final hearing of the contempt applications be expedited such that in the event I heard them last week.[9]V-Ships has participated in the Greek Proceedings under protest as to jurisdiction, given that the claims brought by Luna are claims that it was obliged, if it wished to pursue them, to pursue in arbitration and not in the Greek (or any) courts. A judgment of the Greek court might yet vindicate V-Ships’ position as to jurisdiction, just as it has already been vindicated in this jurisdiction by both the arbitrators and by this court. But V-Ships should not have been put in the position of having to defend itself before the Greek court in the first place.[10]The contentious issue in the contempt applications was, in effect, by whom Luna has so conducted itself. At all times material to the underlying disputes between Luna and V-Ships, including the filing in Greece of criminal complaints by Luna against certain V-Ships personnel and the first of the Greek Proceedings, Luna was Lambros’s company, as equal co-owner with his brother Nikolaos, sole director and de facto person in charge.[11]That is subject to this wrinkle, namely that in September 2022, when the Priority was sold by Luna for, on the face of things, a profit of about US$4 million on its purchase price just a few months earlier of US$9.2 million, the shareholding in Luna appears to have been placed with Branzino Trading Corporation, a Marshall Islands company. The shareholding was back with Lambros and Nikolaos by July 2023, however, and as from exactly when prior to that I am unable to say on the evidence.[12]According to Lambros, although he chose not to attend trial so that his evidence could be tested by cross-examination, the sale proceeds were directed to be paid to Branzino rather than to Luna, in September 2022. I consider there can be no doubt that Branzino’s temporary ownership of the shares in Luna, in September 2022, was merely an adjunct to that desire on Lambros’s part as to the destination for the sale proceeds.[13]Also according to Lambros, in evidence corroborated by a certificate from the Liberian company registry dated 31 October 2024, (1) the shareholding in Luna was, again, in Branzino’s sole hands from 29 October 2024, and (2), prior to that, as from 10 June 2024, Lambros was replaced by Stefanos as sole director of Luna.[14]V-Ships claims, however, that Lambros has throughout remained the true person in charge of Luna. The allegation is that he is, and has been throughout, the de facto directing mind and thus de facto director of Luna. The litigation is his; the litigation strategy is his; the defiance of the English court’s anti-suit injunction is his; he, therefore, is rightly is to be adjudged guilty of contempt of court as is Luna, all according to that allegation.[15]Two matters arose for decision at the hearing. The first was whether to adjourn, Lambros having sought an adjournment by an application notice dated 3 December 2025. The reason given for that application was that Stefanos, sole director of Luna, had died. It was said to be inappropriate for the contempt application against Lambros to proceed to determination during a four-month period provided for under Greek law for Stefanos’s heirs, including Lambros, to disown their inheritance, if they or any of them wish to do so, Stefanos having died intestate.[16]So far as material, once the contempt application against Stefanos personally fell away, the application notice claimed that:(1) there was nobody able to give instructions on behalf of Luna, which had a right to be heard, whether Luna wished to participate had nothing to do with Lambros, and if Luna wished to engage, its participation and any evidence it might wish to adduce might support or prejudice Lambros’s case;(2) no steps could be taken in the Greek Proceedings since there was nobody who could give instructions on Luna’s behalf and, therefore, “the reasons for the urgent nature of this Application [i.e. the contempt application] may be thought to be less pressing”;(3) although not a reason in itself for adjourning, Lambros was currently dealing with the death of his father and was “therefore not in a position to come to the UK and attend the trial at present.”[17]Save to agree that, without failing to have every sympathy for the loss of his father, Lambros’s need to deal with his passing was not a reason in itself to adjourn, it was, with respect, simply untrue that Lambros was unable to attend trial, if he wished to do so. That was rightly acknowledged by Mr Grey in argument.[18]As regards the asserted absence of anyone capable of acting for Luna, firstly, even if that were true, it was only through deliberate inaction on the part of those capable of securing the contrary. On V-Ships’ case that would be Lambros himself as he is, on that case, the true directing mind and beneficial owner of Luna in a position as such to procure his own or some nominee’s appointment as de jure director, if required. On Lambros’s case that would be Branzino, on his case Luna’s shareholder entitled and capable of acting independently of him, by its director. In September 2022, Branzino’s sole director was someone called Aigli Solomontos.[19]Secondly, as I have noted and found already, whoever was directing Luna’s conduct in this matter had plainly decided, well before the death of Stefanos a month ago that it would not make any appearance or provide any evidence to defend itself on the charge of contempt. The same was also true of Stefanos, personally. On Lambros’s case, Stefanos was, until very shortly before his death, in good physical and mental health, directing Luna and its multi-jurisdictional litigation. That either is not credible, as V-Ships says, in which case Stefanos’s position is irrelevant, or, if true, as Lambros says, then it warrants the sure inference and finding that Stefanos, like Luna, had made a deliberate decision to ignore the proceedings here as much after as before they escalated into contempt proceedings. Either way, Stefanos was never going to participate or provide evidence.[20]Thirdly, therefore, with respect, Stefanos’s death was irrelevant to the fairness or appropriateness of the hearing going ahead. The hearing against Lambros in Stefanos’s absence and with Luna not appearing or being represented was exactly the hearing Lambros would have faced if his father was still alive.[21]Fourthly, the urgency of this matter being resolved was also unaffected by Stefanos’s passing. That pressing urgency was created by Luna’s carrying on with the Greek Proceedings in defiance of the anti-suit injunction to the point where indeed no positive step is now required of it to bring those proceedings to a conclusion. In that circumstance, this court should not assume that a finding of contempt, if otherwise justified, with the reality of a sentencing hearing to follow, will not finally induce action to end the Greek Proceedings before the Greek court delivers any judgment.[22]Mr Grey, in argument, sought to finesse the application because of a claim by Lambros in his witness evidence that he wishes the Greek Proceedings to terminated, but is powerless to bring that about. The suggestion was that he should be given the chance, by adjourning, to prove himself true to that word. That was not any part of the grounds put forward by the application notice, which was reason enough to reject it. The insuperable difficulty with it in any event was that, if V-Ships’ contempt allegation against Lambros was otherwise well-founded, then it would follow that Lambros was not telling truth about wanting to end the Greek Proceedings, and it would be a substantial injustice to V-Ships to deprive it of its scheduled, urgent day in court to prove its allegation, if it can, on the evidence as it stands.[23]On the other hand, it was not at all unfair to Lambros to proceed. The allegation concerned, necessarily, the past conduct of Luna. If V-Ships could not show to the criminal standard, i.e. so as to make me sure of it, that Lambros had been in charge throughout, directing Luna’s actions, then the contempt application against Lambros would fail. If it could show that, then the final opportunity to bring about compliance that would be afforded to Lambros, between the finding of contempt that would then be made against him and a sentencing hearing, represented a sufficient fair chance for him to do the right thing after all.[24]The real risk of serious injustice to V-Ships, if the essentially speculative possibility that the Greek Proceedings might be terminated irrespective of the outcome of the contempt application against Lambros were allowed to delay matters, rendered it inappropriate to adjourn.[25]The second matter for immediate decision was whether to proceed in the absence of Luna. Counsel (for V-Ships and Lambros) were agreed that Sanchez v Oboz, [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) per Cobb J, as he was then, at [4]-[5], provides a useful and accurate summary of the principles, for a contempt hearing. At [5(ix)], Cobb J referred to the overriding objective before him in that case as formulated in rule 1.1 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, but nothing turns on that. The overriding objective for these proceedings under CPR 1.1 is materially the same.[26]Luna was duly served with every aspect of these proceedings up to and including the anti-suit injunction itself and the contempt application. It was given more than ample opportunity and notice to prepare and present a defence, if it had one. There was no reason for Luna’s non-appearance, except in the sense that it was plain, as I have found, that whoever was directing its affairs had made a deliberate decision to ignore and not engage with these proceedings.[27]The only credible conclusion was, and is, that Luna had waived any right to be present, i.e. since it is a corporate body to be represented at the hearing. There was no more than a speculative possibility that adjourning would create a prospect of Luna being represented at some restored hearing. But, on the other hand, there was a real risk of serious injustice to V-Ships in not proceeding as scheduled. There was no material disadvantage to Luna in being unable to present any account of events, firstly, because it had evidently chosen not to engage and, secondly, because, with respect, it, the company, evidently had no credible defence to the charge of contempt.[28]The only issue in the case worthy of any argument at all was whether Lambros had so directed Luna’s conduct as to be guilty alongside it or whether, as Lambros claimed, Luna’s actions had been driven by Stefanos until he died, and not by Lambros at all after 10 June 2024. There will be no prejudice to the forensic process in proceeding in Luna’s absence, again because it had evidently chosen to allow the case to proceed without its involvement and in particular, therefore, without evidence on its side.[29]A third matter might have required decision at the hearing, but in the event did not arise. Having ruled against the adjournment application prior to the short adjournment on Day 1, with reasons to follow as they have now in my judgment at the end of the matter, Mr Grey was instructed to say, when the hearing resumed for the afternoon, that Lambros wished to give evidence remotely in his defence on the merits, if the court would permit that. I made no decision on that, but indicated that a proper application would need to be made which could be considered on Day 2. I also indicated that, if need be, I would make arrangements to prolong the listing to include last Friday, if that might be required, and that, if an application were to be made, I would obviously need to be satisfied not only in general terms that there was some good reason for its being made and only being made during the hearing, but also as to why Lambros was not willing to attend in person, if he truly wished now to give oral evidence.[30]In the event, no application was made and Lambros did not travel to London so as to attend any part of the hearing.[31]In those circumstances I proceeded and proceed now on the basis that Lambros was able but unwilling to attend the hearing of the contempt charge against him. He was willing to submit an account in writing, which he did, and which on his instructions was deployed as evidence in his defence, meaning that he did not rest on his right not to give evidence, but he was not willing to have that account tested cross-examination. That is so even though, as I am sure Lambros well understands, there are at least substantial grounds for proposing that his account might not be the truth. If V-Ships’ affirmative case against Lambros, upon the evidence it put forward, was strong enough to call for an answer, then Lambros’s unwillingness to submit to cross-examination may lend additional support to that case against him.[32]A clear and helpful modern statement of that principle, which is also usefully concise, appears in Therium (UK) Holdings Limited v Brooke et al [2016] EWHC 2421 (Comm) per Popplewell J, as he was then, at [29]:
“A person accused of contempt, like a defendant in a criminal trial, has a right to decline to give oral evidence: Comet Products (UK) Limited v Hawkex Plastics Limited [1971] 2 QB 67. However, where he chooses to do so, the court may draw an adverse inference just as it can from a defendant’s silence in criminal proceedings: Inplayer Limited v Thorogood [2014] EWCA Civ 1511 at paragraph [40]. As is the case in criminal proceedings, and by analogy with s.35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the Court may draw the inference that a deliberate decision not to give evidence by a person charged with contempt in relation to matters within his own knowledge has been made because he does not believe his case will withstand scrutiny when tested by cross-examination, provided the case against him is such that it calls for an answer. …”
[33]That statement of the principle in relation to drawing adverse inferences was not contentious in the present case. In particular Mr Grey accepted, in my view rightly, that the principle applies – and it is then a matter for judgment in each case whether it is right to draw the inference and, if so, how weighty it is – where, as here, the defendant has provided an account by a witness statement, but chooses not to give oral evidence so as to be cross-examined on it.[34]More generally, also, the principles applicable to judging allegations of contempt were not materially in issue. They were set out helpfully in both skeleton arguments. I shall not repeat them in this oral judgment.[35]Mr Grey submitted, as his only minor quibbles with Mr Ryan’s submissions as to the law, firstly, that a posited reasonable inference consistent with innocence does not have to be separately evidenced, as in principle it may be just a plausible explanation, contrary to a claimant’s asserted explanation, of the very evidence upon which the claimant relies, and, secondly, that any factual circumstances necessary to an inferential finding that an element of the contempt charge is made out must themselves be proved to the criminal standard.[36]I agree with both of those quibbles. As to the latter, statements in the case law about every point raised or piece of evidence relied on not having to be proved to the criminal standard do not mean, in my view, that if guilt can only be inferred beyond doubt if facts X, Y and Z are all true, then guilt can be found even if one or more of X, Y and Z is no more than probably true, or less.[37]Having carefully considered the evidence and the submissions of counsel at the hearing last week, I find myself sure of the following matters.[38]First, Luna was Lambros and Nikolaos’s company in which Stefanos had no involvement prior, if at all, to June 2024. The brothers, but even more so Lambros than Nikolaos, were in human terms the shipowner of the m.t. Priority. Through their vehicle, Merman Maritime Company, they raised ship purchase finance from Chenavari Credit Partners LLP, including US$5 million for the Priority, on the basis that they would be, and that they undertook to remain at all times, the beneficial owners of the ship once acquired. Merman, acting by Lambros, concluded the credit facility on 24 March 2022, which was also signed separately by Lambros and Nikolaos as personal guarantors. Merman, again acting by Lambros, had concluded the Saleform 2012 MoA to acquire the Priority on the basis that it or its guaranteed nominee, in the event Luna, would be the buyer.[39]Second, Branzino was temporarily used as shareholder of Luna in order to fulfil Lambros’s wish for the sale proceeds to paid not to Luna but to the Marshall Islands. That had nothing to do with Stefanos, who was not involved. Whatever the precise holding arrangements may be, of which I do not have evidence and the absence of public records in the Marshall Islands prevented V-Ships from investigating the specifics, I consider Lambros’s suggestion that Branzino was not his vehicle but Stefanos’s as fanciful.[40]Third, having sold the ship in September 2022, Luna’s only purpose in business has been, and is today, to pursue what Lambros has conceived as serious complaints about V-Ships’ conduct arising out of the ship management relationship created by its contract with Luna, which he negotiated and concluded on behalf of Luna, his company, for the management of the Priority, his ship.[41]I make clear that nothing in this judgment is any observation of any kind about the possible merit, or lack of merit, as the case may be, of those serious complaints. On any view, those merits will not be for this court to judge. What matters for my purpose is that it is entirely plain on the evidence that Lambros was in charge of Luna, for his own ultimate benefit, it may be jointly with Nikolaos, and that the identification, formulation and pursuit of Luna’s claims against V-Ships, including in particular the decision to defy from the outset its plain obligation to the arbitrate, if it wished to pursue civil claims against V-Ships arising out of its contractual relationship, was Lambros’s and not Stefanos’s, or even Nikolaos’s.[42]The account given by Lambros suggesting that Stefanos, his then 90-year old father, was out of retirement in March 2022 and in ultimate control of the relevant business and subsequent litigation throughout until his death is not credible. It is inherently very unlikely. It involves the proposition that Lambros and Nikolaos misled their financiers and V-Ships as to their status as the relevant UBOs. As regards V-Ships, I accept its evidence, albeit noting that it came as hearsay from Ms Panayides of Reed Smith, rather than directly, that there was no appearance or mention of Stefanos in V-Ships’ dealings with Merman, Luna and Lambros. That was not only in terms of who was dealing with V-Ships, but concerned also the onboarding processes for taking on Merman and Luna as clients. I think it is right to draw the inference that Lambros’s choice not to give oral evidence was a deliberate decision to avoid being tested on his account because, so he thought, it would not stand up to scrutiny.[43]I have not overlooked the fact that in one email within the initial dispute correspondence, on 29 July 2022, Lambros invoked his ship owning family’s 60 years of experience in order to emphasise, as he wished to assert, the unique and extraordinary nature of V-Ships’ alleged misconduct. That is no evidence at all that Stefanos was then involved. Lambros’s reimagination of that passing comment as some corroboration of his story that he was only ever acting on behalf of his father I regard as risible. Whether or not, as to which I am not sure, Stefanos’s insertion as de jure director, if it did occur in June 2024, was from the outset with a view to pretence, I have no doubt that Lambros, from late October 2024, took advantage of no longer being in office de jure to pretend that he was not the driving force and relevant true directing mind of Luna.[44]At that time Stefanos was suffering serious health problems rendering him unfit even to attend a mediation meeting in the Greek Proceedings. Accepting Mr Grey’s submission that, even knowing, as we do now, that Stefanos died a year later, I cannot be sure that his serious ill health was a constant in the meantime, nonetheless I am sure that Lambros, and not Stefanos, was running the show in late 2024, as he been doing throughout. I think I can also be sure, and I am sure, that likewise there is no truth in the thought that just weeks before his death, at 93, Stefanos was driving and directing the Greek Proceedings for the final hearing in October of this year. The Greek Proceedings are, I am sure, and have been throughout, Lambros’s litigation for Lambros’s benefit, should they succeed, serving Lambros’s agenda.[45]Fourth, Lambros has, when it suits him, including in formal documents before the Greek court, repeatedly and credibly claimed to be responsible for or in charge of Luna and the litigation.[46]Fifth, Lambros introduced himself to Ms Panayides on the telephone, in July 2024, as the director of Merman and Luna and the person in charge. That telephone call was prompted by Reed Smith, acting for V-Ships, commencing the arbitration to seek anti-suit relief and damages from the arbitrators for breach of the arbitration agreement, when the Greek Proceedings had come to the attention of V-Ships in late June 2024. The arbitration was commenced on 18 July 2024 and Lambros telephoned to speak to Ms Panayides on 23 July. That came up for her as a missed call from a number she did not know. When she called the number back, Lambros answered and introduced himself in the manner I have just stated.[47]I accept, without reservation or hesitation, Ms Panayides’s evidence about that telephone call. In my view, she plainly has an honest and clear recollection of the main elements, including specifically the way Lambros introduced himself and conducted the call. Her recollection is directly corroborated by her own contemporaneous sketched notes, jotted down during the call, and those of her then trainee, taken in shorthand following his background in journalism and typed up at the time. Her trainee was in the room with Ms Panayides and she put the call on speaker so that he could listen and take a note.[48]Sixth, and, therefore, though it seems that Lambros may have caused Stefanos to be appointed in his place as de jure director in mid-June 2024, that did not change the reality that the litigation, being Luna’s only continued raison d’être, was Lambros’s creature being conducted at his direction.[49]I agree with Mr Grey’s submission that it would be wrong to say, just because Luna was Lambros’s vehicle in 2022 at the time of the primary events, or for a given period after them, that it must still have been his vehicle in 2025, when it was disobeying the anti-suit injunction. V-Ships’ case, and my finding, does not leap to a conclusion in that way, however. It relies on the lack of credible reason for Lambros to gift his very elderly father the burden of his, Lambros’s, fight with V-Ships, and on Lambros’s communications and conduct after, for whatever reason he chose to do this, he resigned from his de jure directorship of Luna and installed Stefanos in his place.[50]Seventh, it is no coincidence that it was first suggested to V-Ships or Reed Smith that Lambros might not be in charge, but rather Stefanos might be running the show, only when, in late October 2024, Lambros was threatened with being joined to the proceedings here, together with Merman, at that stage on the basis that V-Ships might wish to proceed against him and/or Merman for costs pursuant to s.51 Senior Courts Act 1981, putting in other words some initial flesh on the bones of any possibility that these proceedings might engage personal liabilities for Lambros and not only liabilities for Luna, the company.[51]Thereafter, although not with complete consistency, Lambros has asserted that he was or came to be only acting on behalf of his father, and ensured that his father, whilst still alive, put his signature to some documents in the case. I do not consider that creates any doubt about the reality of the situation.[52]In those cumulative circumstances, I am satisfied to the point of being sure of it that Lambros is still today, and has been at all material times, the true directing mind and will of Luna, which is his vehicle. The decisions that Luna would commence and pursue the Greek Proceedings, in breach of the arbitration agreement in the ship management contract with V-Ships, were, I am sure, Lambros’s decisions. The decision that Luna would continue to prosecute those proceedings after being ordered by this court to stop, initially in October 2024 when interim anti-suit relief was granted pending a decision on final relief by the arbitrators, was also Lambros’s decision. Likewise the decision by Luna to dishonour the arbitrator’s award and then to defy and disobey the final anti-suit injunction granted by way of enforcement of that award, in January 2025.[53]In my judgment, Lambros has tried to play a game with this court, deciding that Luna should not engage but that he would, hiding behind the change in de jure control of Luna and its lack of participation to put forward a denial of responsibility that was not credible and that he knew would not stand up to scrutiny. Hence his decision not to attend the hearing last week to allow his account to be tested in court. The measured submissions of Mr Grey on his behalf amounted in substance to the plea that the court could not, or at any rate should not, say it was sure on the evidence that V-Ships’ case was made out. I have reflected anxiously on that submission and on the individual points made by Mr Grey in support of it. However, I am left without doubt about the correctness of V-Ships’ case as the only credible explanation of all the circumstances, supported additionally by the adverse inference I do think it right to draw against Lambros that he was unwilling to swear to his witness statement and be challenged on it in court, because he appreciated that it would not withstand that test.[54]It is clear beyond peradventure that the anti-suit injunction was duly served on both Luna and Lambros by alternative methods ordered by Calver J when granting it that were effective to bring the injunction to their intention such that they had full actual knowledge of its terms. V-Ships also took substantial reasonable steps to try to achieve personal service without success. The absence of personal service is therefore not for want of effort and did not have any impact on the fairness of trying Luna and Lambros on the charge of contempt. I agree with Mr Ryan, who presented the case for V-Ships with consummate skill, care and balance, that it is therefore appropriate to dispense with personal service, and I so order. In Lambros’s case, I should add, Mr Grey did not argue against such an order, and accepted in terms that service had been effective and that there was no issue but that Lambros was well aware of what this court had ordered Luna to do and not to do.[55]The contempt application was also, I am satisfied, and again in Lambros’s case there was no issue about this, served on both Luna and Lambros by methods authorised by prior orders. An order of Jacobs J dated 15 July 2025 dispensed with personal service of the application.[56]Luna, without any doubt whatever, has taken no step since service of the anti-suit injunction upon it to discontinue or terminate the Greek Proceedings, but rather has continued to prosecute those proceedings up to and including its participation in the final hearing, in October 2025, pressing for substantive judgments to be entered in its favour by the Greek court. It did all that well knowing that the anti-suit injunction required it to take all necessary steps to end the Greek Proceedings and not to prosecute them any further. Luna is guilty of contempt of court as charged against it by the application notice.[57]On my findings concerning Lambros’s position, all those actions and failures on Luna’s parts are Lambros’s and he has all that same knowledge. Indeed, it is his knowledge that constitutes for these purposes Luna’s knowledge. Lambros is and has been, at all times since the anti-suit injunction was granted, and for some time before that also since he stepped down as de jure director, Luna’s de facto and real controller and director with sole true responsibility for its affairs, decisions and conduct. Lambros is also guilty of contempt of court as charged against him by the application notice.[58]Luna made no appearance at all. Lambros appeared only by counsel, unwilling as he was to attend because that would have required him to submit to cross-examination on his factual account. Further, I consider it appropriate to adhere for the moment to the hope that the prospect of obtaining substantial mitigation of sentence might now finally induce compliance.[59]I therefore propose to adjourn the matter for sentence, for a hearing to be listed with a time estimate of two hours in the second half of next term. As I adjourn, I indicate that as things stand, in keeping with the normal approach to sentence in a matter of this degree of seriousness, the court must inevitably consider the very real possibility of an immediate custodial sentence in Lambros’s case. However, steps taken now to purge the contempt by ending the Greek Proceedings would amount to very substantial mitigation indeed, as it presently seems to me. All sentencing options therefore remain open and I urge both defendants, but especially Lambros, whose liberty is at stake, now finally to do the right thing.[60]I close by repeating and emphasising that nothing this court has done at any stage in these proceedings has been intended to or has had any effect to curb Luna’s ability, if so advised, to pursue the civil claims it wishes to make and has been making against V-Ships to a fair and proper determination. The entire point of these proceedings has been, and remains, to enforce the entirely plain obligation upon Luna, if it does wish to make and pursue such claims, to do so by arbitration. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk

Cited in 1 later judgment