‘The Claimants recognize the gravity of this allegation, which is effectively one of dishonesty. To be clear, no allegation of dishonest or fraudulent conduct of any form is directed against the legal professionals engaged by OWH in respect of the disclosure process (or indeed in respect of any other conduct in the Arbitration)’
‘RTI is in the invidious position of being unable to evidence the falsity of OWH’s statement to the Tribunal that it had given proper disclosure of documents responsive to the Issue unless and until it has sight of its hitherto-undisclosed documents.’
‘(1) Section 70(3) of the Act requires challenges to an award under sections 67 and 68 to be brought within 28 days. This relatively short period of time reflects the principle of speedy finality which underpins the Act, and which is enshrined in section 1(a). The party seeking an extension must therefore show that the interests of justice require an exceptional departure from the timetable laid down by the Act. Any significant delay beyond 28 days is to be regarded as inimical to the policy of the Act. (2) The relevant factors are: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) whether the party who permitted the time limit to expire and subsequently delayed was acting reasonably in the circumstances in doing so; (iii) whether the respondent to the application or the arbitrator caused or contributed to the delay; (iv) whether the respondent to the application would by reason of the delay suffer irremediable prejudice in addition to the mere loss of time if the application were permitted to proceed; (v) whether the arbitration has continued during the period of delay and, if so, what impact on the progress of the arbitration, or the costs incurred in respect of the arbitration, the determination of the application by the Court might now have; (vi) the strength of the application; (vii) whether in the broadest sense it would be unfair to the applicant for him to be denied the opportunity of having the application determined.’
‘i) The test of serious irregularity was intended to limit intervention to “extreme” cases where it could be said that “the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected” ([30]). ii) Serious irregularity has been recognised as imposing a “high threshold” or as “the hurdle” ([31]). iii) The focus is on due process, not the correctness of the decision reached ([32]). iv) Even if a case is shown to fall within one or more of the kinds of irregularities listed in section 68 this will only amount to a serious irregularity if the court considers that it “has caused or will cause substantial injustice”, which means “more than some injustice” ([33]). v) There will be substantial injustice where it is established that, had the irregularity not occurred, the outcome of the arbitration might well have been different, but it is not necessary to show that the outcome would “necessarily or even probably be different” ([34]). vi) Some irregularities may be so serious that substantial justice is “inherently likely” or “likely in the very nature of things” to result ([35]), including where “on a central matter a finding is made on a basis which does not reflect the case which the party complaining reasonably thought he was meeting, or a finding is ambiguous, or an important issue is not addressed.” vii) In general, there will, however, be no substantial injustice if it can be shown that the outcome of the arbitration would have been the same regardless of the irregularity ([37]).’