“14. The SGS, Domidias and Zutrek Investment Branches acquired their shareholdings in FESCO at the same time in 2012 by way of a leveraged buy-out of the FESCO Group (the “Acquisition”). 15. For tax, financial and regulatory reasons, the Acquisition was initially structured such that Mr Magomedov and his business associates, Mr Garber and Mr Bazylev (the three together being the “Investors”), would each acquire ultimate beneficial ownership of separate shareholder stakes in FESCO. However, the intention and shared understanding between the Investors (as well as TPG Capital and Felix) at that time was that Mr Magomedov, via the SGS Investment Branch, would subsequently acquire the Domidias and Zutrek Investment Branches’ shareholdings in FESCO, with a view to the SGS Investment Branch eventually acquiring the entirety of the FESCO’s outstanding share capital. 16. This agreement between the three Investors was implemented through a series of option contracts which granted to various SGS Investment Branch entities the right to acquire the Domidias and Zutrek Investment Branches’ shareholdings in FESCO.”
“17. On28 November 2012 , Domidias (as Seller) and Sian (as Buyer) entered into a written “Call and Put Option Agreement” in respect of the entire issued share capital in Merbau (the “2012 Option Agreement”). Through the option to acquire the entire issued share capital of Merbau (the “Merbau Shares”), the 2012 Option Agreement gave Sian the right to acquire the Domidias Investment Branch’s shareholding in FESCO (the “2012 Call Option"). 18. Pursuant to the 2012 Call Option contained within the 2012 Option Agreement, Domidias granted to Sian an irrevocable option to buy the Merbau Shares on the following terms: “2.1 [Domidias] irrevocably grants [Sian] an option to buy, and to require [Domidias] to sell, all or any of the Option Shares. The purchase price of the Call Option for the first year is US$600,000 (six hundred thousand)… (“Call Price”).” 2.2 The purchase price of the Call Option for the second and every subsequent year is US$ 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousands) which amount is payable in full by the Buyer to the Seller within ten (10) Business Days following the beginning of second and every subsequent year unless (i) the Buyer acquired all Option Shares under this Agreement or otherwise, and (ii) the Agreement was terminated. 2.3 The purchase price of the Option Shares is US$ 400,000 (four hundred thousand US dollars) (the “Call Option Share Price”) payable at the time of the exercise of the Call Option as described in this Agreement… […]”
“54. From a date at present unknown to the Claimants but (at the latest) late 2019 onwards, the FESCO Group, and more particularly the SGS Investment Branch’s shareholding therein, has been the subject of a “corporate raid”, namely a co-ordinated attempt at a hostile takeover by various hostile parties acting in concert with individuals appointed as directors within the SGS Investment Branch and FESCO Group Companies. The corporate raid has been and is still being carried out pursuant to an unlawful means conspiracy and a lawful means conspiracy involving at least: FESCO, its subsidiary Halimeda International Limited, Domidias, Ms Leyla Mammad Zade (former Chairman of the board of FESCO), MrMikhail Rabinovich (a Russian businessman who is reported previously to have been involved in ‘corporate raids’) and unknown others (the “Hostile Parties” and the “FESCO Conspiracy” respectively). 55. The primary objective of the FESCO Conspiracy is to interfere with and ultimately wrest control of the SGS Investment Branch’s shareholding in FESCO away from Mr Magomedov for less than its fair value and for the sole benefit of the Hostile Parties and/or those who control them. The various unlawful means through which the Conspiracy has been (and is being) perpetrated include (but are not limited to): the wrongful obtaining of injunctive relief in Cyprus against two companies within the SGS Investment Branch (Smartilicious Consulting Limited and Enviartia Consulting Limited), so as to prevent them voting their shares at the FESCO Annual General Shareholders Meeting; the unlawful pressuring of SGS Investment Branch’s directors to act in the interests of the Hostile Parties; and the unlawful pressuring of the SGS Investment Branch’s nominees to the FESCO board into withdrawing their candidacy. 55A. Further, the interests of Mr Magomedov and his brother (Mr Magomed Magomedov) in PJSC Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port have been subject to a further corporate raid (the “NCSP Conspiracy” and, together with the FESCO Conspiracy, the “Conspiracies”). 56. The corporate raid and the underlying FESCO Conspiracy were the subject of a separate claim brought by the SGS Investment Branch entities (including Sian and Hellicorp) against the Hostile Parties for unlawful means conspiracy in the British Virgin Islands (the “BVI UMC Claim”). On20 July 2023 , the Claimants (amongst others) issued claims in the English High Court relating to the FESCO Conspiracy and the NCSP Conspiracy in the tort of unlawful means conspiracy, further or alternatively the tort of conspiracy to injure, and in the further alternative a claim under Russian law for causing harm unlawfully for which the relevant defendants are alleged to be at fault (the “English Conspiracy Claim”). Domidias is a defendant to the English Conspiracy Claim. The Claimants (including Sian and Hellicorp) in the BVI UMC Claim subsequently filed a notice of discontinuance on24 July 2023 discontinuing the BVI UMC Claim. None of the claims or issues pursued in the English Conspiracy Claim are being put before this Court for determination in these proceedings. However, the Conspiracies, particularly the FESCO Conspiracy, and their underlying factual matrix provide necessary background and context for the present proceedings because the subject matter of these proceedings (Domidias’ breaches of the 2012 and 2019 Option Agreements (detailed below)), forms part of the FESCO Conspiracy and was motivated by the same underlying desire to harm the SGS Investment Branch’s position as shareholder of FESCO, by preventing it from exercising the 2012 and/or 2019 Call Options and thus from increasing its shareholding in, and control and influence over, FESCO.”
“7. Mr Desmond Browne QC, for MGN, submitted that a case should not be allowed to go for trial simply because it is asserted that some further evidence may turn up. In support of this submission he relied on ICI Chemicals v TTE Training[2007] EWCA Civ 725 at paras 12 to 14. He is right that a view to that effect was expressed by Moore-Bick LJ in that case but care must be taken in applying that view to a case such as the present. In that case Moore-Bick LJ was dealing with an argument that further facts might turn up which would affect the construction of a commercial document. He expressed the view that a submission that something might emerge should be treated “with caution”, not that it should be rejected out of hand. Paragraph 14 of his judgment makes it clear that he is seeking to distinguish between real and fanciful prospects of success. That is the real distinction, in my view. He was also not dealing with the familiar case in which a claimant makes an ostensibly sustainable allegation but acknowledges that the process of disclosure is necessary to make the case stronger or to have it investigated properly. It is a familiar state of affairs that a claimant is ultimately reliant on disclosure from the other side in order to bring his case home, particularly in cases where the nature of the wrong is such that the defendant’s activities were covert so that, if the case is good, the defendant is likely to have a substantial amount of material in its hands with no equivalent in the hands of the claimant. Unless the prospects of getting disclosure are “fanciful”, the claimant is generally entitled to maintain its case in those circumstances. That is not to say that claimants are entitled to embark on speculative cases in the hope that disclosure will throw up something useful. The claimant must have more than that to start with, but the inability to make a full case without disclosure is not, in my view, a bar to starting the litigation in the first place. 8. The true position is reflected in Doncaster Pharmaceuticals v The Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd[2007] FSR 63 : “17. It is well settled by the authorities that the court should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in certain kinds of case. The classic instance is where there are conflicts of fact on relevant issues, which have to be resolved before a judgment can be given (see Civil Procedure Vol 1 24.2.5). A mini-trial on the facts conducted under CPR Pt 24 without having gone through normal pre-trial procedures must be avoided, as it runs a real risk of producing summary injustice. 18. In my judgment, the court should also hesitate about making a final decision without a trial where, even though there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case.” 9. The present cases are capable of falling into the category of cases which require full investigation. Provided that there is enough to prevent them falling into the category of the purely speculative, the nature of the wrong or alleged is such that the claimants will or may have little knowledge and evidence of their own at this stage and will need the benefits of pre-trial procedures in order to add to their case. There is nothing wrong with this. It is what disclosure (among other steps) is for. The alleged activities in this case were covert and, of their very nature, would be activities of which the victims would know little or nothing. Better evidence of what happened would lie with the defendant. There is nothing wrong with pleading a starting point, on an appropriate basis, and then expecting the case to become clearer after pleading and disclosure (if not the extraction of further information pursuant to a request).”
“13. TERM AND TERMINATION 13.1 This Agreement shall (unless terminated at an earlier date or extended pursuant to the terms of this Agreement) continue in force for a term of one (1) year from the date hereof. If the Agreement is terminated by means of the Termination Notice (according to clause 14) the Agreement shall be deemed terminated at the latest of the following dates: (i) at the last date of the period when the Termination Notice is received or (ii) after five (5) days after the Termination Notice was received by the Seller. 13.2 This Agreement shall terminate upon the Completion unless agreed otherwise by the Parties.” […] 15 EXTENSION This Agreement shall be automatically extended for a term of one (1) year provided that the Buyer does not send to the Seller a written objection to such extension (the “Termination Notice”) not later than thirty (30) Business Days before expiration of the term of this Agreement. After the seventh anniversary from the date hereof the Agreement shall not be extended automatically. Any further extension of this Agreement shall be made if the parties agree accordingly in writing.”
“4. EXERCISE OF CALL AND PUT OPTION 4.1 The Call Option may be exercised only: 4.1.1 by the delivery by the Buyer to the Seller of the Call Option Notice at any time after the date hereof. The Call Option Notice must specify the date of Completion and the Option Shares to which the Call Option Notice relates. 4.2 The Put Option may be exercised: 4.2.1 by the delivery by the Seller to the Buyer of the Put Option Notice after (i) seven (7) calendar years minus five (5) business days following the date hereof; or (ii) the receipt by the Seller of the Termination Notice (as defined in clause 15); 4.2.2 by the delivery by the Seller to the Buyer of the Put Option Notice at any time after the date hereof as may be separately agreed by the Parties.”
“8. There is an abundance of recent high authority on the principles applicable to the construction of commercial documents, including Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society[1998] 1 WLR 896 ; Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd[2009] 1 AC 1101 ; Re Sigma Finance Corp[2010] 1 All ER 571 ; Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank[2011] 1 WLR 2900 ; Arnold v Britton[2015] AC 1619 ; and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd[2017] AC 1173 . The court's task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen in which to express their agreement. The court must consider the language used and ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to have meant. The court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to the objective meaning of the language used. If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other. Interpretation is a unitary exercise; in striking a balance between the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions, the court must consider the quality of drafting of the clause and it must also be alive to the possibility that one side may have agreed to something which with hindsight did not serve his interest; similarly, the court must not lose sight of the possibility that a provision may be a negotiated compromise or that the negotiators were not able to agree more precise terms. This unitary exercise involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated. It does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each.”
“What I do say is that, in that unitary exercise, textualism and contextualism −− in that unitary exercise , the text is important, and … my learned friend’s submission departs too far from the language.”
“…pending disclosure, it is Sian’s case that Mr Economou (either himself or in conjunction with others) took steps to protect the position of Sian by agreeing a legally binding commitment with Domidias that the 2012 Option Agreement would not expire in November 2019.”
“Dear Konstantin, Indeed, the option expires on28 November 2019 . We believe we should extend the option so that it continues to31 December 2025 (as we did with Noubelius option) and also clean up the overdue IGLs between Hellicorp and Merbau so that they are also moved to be due on31 December 2025 . We will draft the documents to implement such in due course.”
“I agree to proceed with a new option with Hellicorp. Please send me draft and if possible highlight any deviations from the Domidias Sian one for cross referencing purposes. Once I receive I will review and revert.”
“Please see attached the put call option agreement with our comments/amendments highlighted in green for your review and comments if any.”
“Dear Dmitry, To follow up on our conversation regarding Domidias option, Mr. Economou has sent updated Agreement, attached to his email below. We are kindly asking you to review. In short, the changes are as follows: 1. In case there is an amicable change of control over F. before Sept 1st 2020, option price increases to USD 5m. 2. “Standard price” of the call option is increased to USD 700k as a compensation of additional costs (given current circumstances) and as a mechanism of a repayment of accumulated fees. 3. There is also a change of pledge (given the change of the Buyer) and some other minor technical changes. Please note that all these changes have been discussed and agreed with Mr. Garber and his legal team. In case you agree with the proposed changes we are ready to proceed with execution asap. Accordingly we are asking for your formal consent to proceed.”
“Please see below (hopefully) final draft of Domidias option. Colleagues from GHP (cc’cd) [i.e. Domidias] made some changes, I believe they are more of a technical nature. Please have a look and if you / TPG arc OK, we are ready to proceed with execution.”
“Dear Anastasia, Could you please reply to Scott? From my side, I’m fine with his comments and would appreciate if you could accept them, so we could proceed with execution soon.”
“…On the below, the wording on Sian Pledge is accepted. On the second item (increased Call Option Share Price) we would suggest that the Call Option Share Price is automatically increased in case of a New Acquisition before1 September 2020 safe for a Resolution of the Board of the Buyer that such New Acquisition was made against the interests of the current shareholders/UBOs of the group (i.e. shareholders as of the date of the Call Option Agreement).In case of such Board resolution, the Seller shall have the right to contest it in the court, and before the court decision is made the call option cannot be exercised. This seems to be the balanced way to reflect the agreement of the parties.”
“Dear colleagues, Just wanted to check whether we agreed on anything. As for suggestion that Denis [Sukhanov from GHP Group represented Domidias] mentioned, my understanding is as follows. There is a$5m payment in case: ( 1 ) option is executed before September 1st, 2020, AND (2) Directors or Hellicorp didn’t object the 5m payment (I suppose there should be 1-2 business days for such a notice; in case there is no objection within the timeframe, 5m is approved). Directors can object, however, on the ground that “change of control” deal (effectively, sale of control in FESCO) is hostile. In case they do object, there should be a rationale, specified in the resolution of Hellicorp (blocking$5m ). And this resolution/ objection could be disputed by Domidias in court. This is a guarantee for Domidias that decision of Hellicorp wouldn’t be arbitrary.”
“1 the current put/call is with Sian. Sian continues to be in bad standing. Given that efforts have been ongoing since June (if not earlier) to restore Sian to good standing, I am not confident that it will be in good standing by 28 NOV expires. Sian cannot sign an extension until it is in good standing. 2 we should not allow the current option to expire without a new option in place. if Sian is not in good health soon, I suggest we plan to have a new option in place between Domidias and Hellicorp (rather than Sian)…”
“I agree to proceed with a new option with Hellicorp. Please send me draft and if possible highlight any deviations from the Domidias Sian one for cross referencing purposes. Once I receive I will review and revert.”
“Dear Elias: pursuant to below, please find attached drafts of the replacement option agreement + share pledge, so that Hellicorp effectively replaces Sian under the existing arrangement. Blacklines are against the original option/share pledge. As you will see, we have respected the original docs, but as noted below, we did strike out the annual fee (which, as far as I know, has not been paid in practice). we did keep the$400,000 payment to made option exercise. We specified a simple termination date of the new option to be12/31/2025 . Please note that in the share pledge we need to insert existing debt of Merbau per cl 3.1(n). Please let us know if you have any questions/comments. As you know, we should get this signed up before 28 NOV, and I’d hope we could get signed up this week.”
“Please see below (hopefully) final draft of Domidias option. Colleagues from GHP (cc’cd) made some changes, I believe they are more of a technical nature. Please have a look and if you / TPG arc OK, we are ready to proceed with execution.”
“Dear Anastasia Could you please reply to Scott? From my side, I’m fine with his comments and would appreciate if you could accept them, so we could proceed with execution soon.”
“26. On or around27 August 2020 , Mr Shagav Gadzhiev, a director of both Claimant, received an email from Ms Ekaterina Vlasova, head of the “family office” (i.e. the entity managing the personal assets and enterprises of Mr Magomedov), attached to which was a document entitled “Call and Put Option Agreement re Shares of Merbau Synergy Limited Between Domidias Limited and Hellicorp Investments Ltd” (“2019 Option Agreement”). The document was signed by Mr Elias Economou who was at the time a director of Hellicorp, and had been found amongst the documents of Mr Economou. 27. It is unclear to the Claimants how the 2019 Option Agreement came to be agreed. Neither Mr Shagav Gadzhiev (a director of Hellicorp), nor Mr Magomedov, had any knowledge of the 2019 Option Agreement prior to Ms Vlasova’s email.”
“A reminder that we have yet to receive the requisite Merbau information to complete the pledge (and as such Hellicorp has not yet executed the put/call).”
“Merbau address is: Akara Bldg, 24 De Castro Street, Wickhams Cay 1, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands And as per auditors confirmation: 3.1(n) as of the date hereof, Merbau has no outstanding financial liabilities save for the following amounts: USD 197, 903.560 Hope this concludes the matter.”
“Much appreciated, Elias. We have updated the pledge accordingly, as well as implementing anastasia's comment below re the notice provision in the pledge, and corrected a typo in clause 4.2.1 of the put/call Clean and blacklines attached. Anastasia, if this looks good for you, could you please then arrange executed of both documents by Domidias (but do not date) and then we will procure execution by Hellicorp.”
“On06 December 2019 , we sent to you Call and Put Option Agreement re shares of Merbau Synergy Limited between Domidias Limited (“Domidias”) and Hellicorp Investments Ltd (the “Option Agreement”) signed on behalf of Domidias. As by the current date we did not receive countersigned Option Agreement from your side we recall the Option Agreement and kindly ask you to note that Domidias has to think over again its position regarding entering into the proposed Option Agreement.”
“A reminder that we have yet to receive the requisite Merbau information to complete the pledge (and as such Hellicorp has not yet executed the put/call).”
“For Merbau you already have the registered address. As for the financial liabilities amount I have referred the question to the auditors to give us the exact figure (there is a relevant figure in the 2017 FS and there has been no activity ever since but we want to get the correct figure if there have been any adjustments etc.”
“Merbau address is: Akara Bldg, 24 De Castro Street, Wickhams Cay 1, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands And as per auditors confirmation:3.1(n) as of the date hereof, Merbau has no outstanding financial liabilities save for the following amounts: USD 197, 903.560 Hope this concludes the matter.”
“It is a familiar state of affairs that a claimant is ultimately reliant on disclosure from the other side in order to bring his case home, particularly in cases where the nature of the wrong is such that the defendant's activities were covert so that, if the case is good, the defendant is likely to have a substantial amount of material in its hands with no equivalent in the hands of the claimant. Unless the prospects of getting disclosure are “fanciful”, the claimant is generally entitled to maintain its case in those circumstances. That is not to say that claimants are entitled to embark on speculative cases in the hope that disclosure will throw up something useful. The claimant must have more than that to start with, but the inability to make a full case without disclosure is not, in my view, a bar to starting the litigation in the first place.”
“As a consequence of the alleged FESCO Conspiracy, the Claimants say that they have not yet been able to obtain all of the relevant evidence because this has either been concealed from them or has otherwise not been forthcoming, particularly in relation to the 2019 Option Agreement.”
“The primary objective of the Conspiracy is to interfere with and ultimately wrest control of the SGS Investment Branch’s shareholding in FESCO away from Mr Magomedov for less than its fair value and for the sole benefit of the Hostile Parties and/or those who control them.”