“1.1 Whether the English court is the appropriate forum to hear the claims against AFL and Mr Ruimy in connection with each of the First and Second Claims. For the avoidance of doubt, this issue will not include consideration or determination of any disputed issue: (i) as to the validity of service of the First Claim on Mr. Ruimy; (ii) arising out of the Claimant’s application to serve the First Claim on Mr. Ruimy out of the jurisdiction or its application to extend time for service of the First Claim. 1.2 Whether the First Claim should be stayed on the basis of Art. 34 Brussels Recast Regulation (“Brussels Recast”).”
“Compensation resulting from the debtor’s involvement in complex, hidden structures put in place in order to channel towards Fahad Al-Rajaan, the former Director General of the creditor, and to his wife certain undue benefits granted in exchange for investments between 1994 and 2015 having a countervalue of CHF 228 million originating in particular from the Mirabaud Group.”
“Art. 78 Objection to the payment order Effects The objection to the payment order will lead to the suspension of the debt enforcement proceedings. If the debtor only objects to part of the claim, the debt enforcement may be continued for the undisputed amount. Art. 79 Setting aside of the objection to the payment order In civil or administrative proceedings A creditor against whose debt enforcement an objection to the payment order has been made, must assert their claim in civil or administrative proceedings. They may only obtain the continuation of debt enforcement on the basis of an enforceable decision which expressly sets aside the objection to the payment order.”
“28. I do not accept that the second proposition can be taken as a rule. It fails to distinguish the case in which the anchor defendant is the chief protagonist from the case where he is a minor player. A decision that permission should be granted to serve the protagonist out of the jurisdiction because the minor player is domiciled within the jurisdiction would indeed allow the tail to wag the dog. But if the anchor defendant is the protagonist a decision to allow a minor player to be served outside the jurisdiction may be entirely appropriate. That would be, to continue the metaphor, to allow the dog to wag the tail. Just as it may make little sense to have the venue determined by where the claim against the most insignificant player will be heard, so it may make little sense to have the venue where the most significant will be sued passed over in favour of another jurisdiction to whose jurisdiction a lesser player is subject. I do not mean thereby to suggest that whether or not jurisdiction should be exercised against a foreign defendant is necessarily determined by whether the anchor defendant, or the defendant sought to be joined, fits into some particular descriptive category (“major/minor”; “principal/secondary”); only that a decision as to appropriate forum must necessarily take account of the relative importance in the case of different defendants and particularly those against whom proceedings in England are practically bound to continue.”
“In what circumstances, for what reason or purpose, pursuant to what communications, arrangements or agreements (and with whose knowledge, approval, instructions or advice) were payments made by Aerium/Mr Ruimy (or at his / their direction) to Mr Al Rajaan or companies or accounts nominated by him or on his behalf?”
“1. Where jurisdiction is based on Article 4 or on Articles 7, 8 or 9 and an action is pending before a court of a third State at the time when a court in a Member State is seised of an action which is related to the action in the court of the third State, the court of the Member State may stay the proceedings if: (a) it is expedient to hear and determine the related actions together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings; (b) it is expected that the court of the third State will give a judgment capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State; and (c) the court of the Member State is satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice. 2. The court of the Member State may continue the proceedings at any time if: (a) it appears to the court of the Member State that there is no longer a risk of irreconcilable judgments; (b) the proceedings in the court of the third State are themselves stayed or discontinued; (c) it appears to the court of the Member State that the proceedings in the court of the third State are unlikely to be concluded within a reasonable time; or (d) the continuation of the proceedings is required for the proper administration of justice.” (a) it is expedient to hear and determine the related actions together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings; (b) it is expected that the court of the third State will give a judgment capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State; and (c) the court of the Member State is satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice. (a) it appears to the court of the Member State that there is no longer a risk of irreconcilable judgments; (b) the proceedings in the court of the third State are themselves stayed or discontinued; (c) it appears to the court of the Member State that the proceedings in the court of the third State are unlikely to be concluded within a reasonable time; or (d) the continuation of the proceedings is required for the proper administration of justice.”