“7.4 As of the date of this Agreement it is MI’s intention to have a phased approach to sales of the Products which would commence with sales of the Product linked to sales of new Elekta Linacs and Elekta Linac installed base and then progress to sales to the installed base of MOSAIQ and LANTIS customers. Moving to the next phase would depend on several factors including but not limited to customer demand, customer satisfaction with the Product, humediQ ability to produce the Product in the numbers and timescales required and combined Elekta and humediQ servicing and post sales capabilities … 7.8 Subject to (i) humediQ complying in full with its obligations in this Agreement for each phase (including but not limited to meeting clauses 2. 7, 3.2, 5 of this Agreement); and (ii) MI having accepted the Product in accordance with clause 2.8(i) on or before the Final Product Notice Date for each phase MI shall commit to purchase the following minimum volumes (although any acceptance of the Products in Phase 1 shall not in any way commit MI to acceptance of the Products in Phase 2, with the latter Products requiring a separate and additional acceptance process in accordance with clause 2.8): Phase 1 (i) By31 December 2011 - 20 Products (ordered, for delivery before1st May 2012 ) for which the CE Mark has been obtained by humediQ in accordance with this Agreement and for which humediQ shall attempt to obtain the 51 O(k) Approval before1st May 2012 ); Phase 2 (ii) By31 December 2012 - 100 Products (purchased, delivered and invoiced), subject to humediQ obtaining 510(k) Approval for the Product before1st May 2012 ; (iii) By31 December 2013 - 175 Products (purchased, delivered and invoiced), subject to humediQ obtaining 51 O(k) Approval for the Product before1 May 2012 . In the event that humediQ is unable to obtain 51 O(k) Approval as required above following acceptance by MI of the Products in Phase 1 and/or Phase 2, the parties shall ·discuss in good faith how to proceed further, although such discussions may include an extension of the applicable date for obtaining the 51 O(k) Approval. Following such discussions, and solely at Ml's option, MI may notify humediQ in writing in accordance with this Agreement of any such extension that may be granted. However, for the avoidance of doubt, MI shall not be bound by the minimum volumes in Phase 2 unless humediQ obtains the 51 O(k) Approval in accordance with this clause (including any extension that MI may serve notice of).”
“This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Germany and any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration which rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this section and the decision of such arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties. The place of arbitration shall be London. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the English language.”
“2.2.16 It was and is Claimant's case that pursuant to Sec. 7.4 PLDA, Elekta was obliged to bundle the sale of Identify to the sale of a new LINAC, particularly in deals comprising more complex systems like Versa HD and Synergy. Here, according to Experts heard and Elekta's own conviction, Identify could have served as a "key differentiator" and a "lock-out specification". This is confirmed by extensive testimony of Tim Prosser, who emphasises that bundling is useful, necessary and typically envisaged for Western markets, but less so for emerging markets to which cheaper, more basic LINAC solutions may be sold as a consequence of tighter customer budgets. The scheme also constitutes a breach of Section 7.8. PLDA. Elekta's conduct with regard to humediQ and its product Identify is irreconcilable with the marketing and promotion obligation contained therein.”
“Elekta downgraded and excluded Identify even from the base package of their core systems. It was therefore henceforth only optional, if available at all. This shows that they were separating and disintegrating Identify. It is a paradigm shift, in contrast to bundling. This is a clear change in sales strategy and a strident disregard of what the Parties could expect from their relationship. 8.3.2. Therefore, at least since September 2013, Respondents did not link sales of its LINACs and Identify, although it is stipulated in the PLDA”
“THE PRESIDENT: A question with regard to bundling and I will take you again to this exchange of emails we looked at earlier, and the question is whether it had been envisaged or planned to bundle Identify with the sale of every new LINAC by Elekta, but if I look at this exchange of emails, you wrote in your email of 9 June under paragraph 1: "We expect Identify when released to be configured with >50% of the LINAC production in Identify's first year. "(a) in bundled deals with average discounts it should deliver an additional€50K -75K to each LINAC room configured in material margin." So the idea was not to bundle Identify with every LINAC of Elekta? A. It wasn't -- the assumptions I made in the forecast were based on approximately 50%. I assume that 50% of the Elekta LINACs sold would go with an Identify, of one device or another. … ?”
“THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And you told us earlier that one of your assumptions as regards the issue of bundling was that not all of the LINACs would be bundled with the new Identify model or programme, but only up to 50%, you said; did I understand this correctly? A. What I would say, to clarify that, is my assumption is that slightly more than 50% of new sales -- PROF DR SACHS: Of new sales, right. A. -- would be bundled with Identify. PROF DR SACHS: And when you make these assumptions and in preparing this business plan, did you discuss those assumptions with Mr Hieronimi? A. Yes. PROF DR SACHS: Including the issue of bundling, your assumptions that around 50% for the new LINACs would be bundled? A. Yes.”
“Relying on Clause 7.8 of the PLDA, the Claimant argues that the Respondents were solely responsible for the promotion of the Product within the Elekta Field of Use.127 The Claimant contends that in view of Clause 7.4 of the PLDA, this meant that promotion and sale of Identify products were to be bundled to the sales of all new Elekta LINACs.128 Claimant’s claim that “during the first month after the entry of Identify in the price book and alleged beginning of sales, Elekta struck it from its basic standard configuration”.”
“According to the Claimant, to meet its marketing, promotion and sales obligations under the PLDA, the Respondents were required to bundle the Product with all new Elekta LINAC sales. For the Claimant, Identify should have been integrated in all VersaHD and Synergy LINAC systems (types of LINACs sold by Elekta) without the option to opt out of the additional safety feature.”
“191 The Arbitral Tribunal does not accept the Claimant’s argument that to meet their marketing, promotion, and sales obligations under the PLDA and DA, the Respondents were obliged to bundle the Product with all of their new LINAC sales. The so-called “bundling requirement” is not reflected in the language of the PLDA or DA. Clause 7.4 of the PLDA does not express an obligation to bundle the sales of the Product with the sales of all new Elekta LINACs. Said provision describes a phased approach to sales of the Products “which would commence with sales of the Product linked to sales of new Elekta Linacs and Elekta Linac installed base”
“I agree we’ll sell one with every machine.”
“(1) The tribunal shall— (a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. (2) The tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it.”
“(1) In order to make out a case for the court’s intervention under section 68(2)(a), the applicant must show: (a) a breach of section 33 of the Act; ie that the tribunal has failed to act fairly and impartially between the parties, giving each a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, adopting procedures so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined; (b) amounting to a serious irregularity; (c) giving rise to substantial injustice. (2) The test of a serious irregularity giving rise to substantial injustice involves a high threshold. The threshold is deliberately high because a major purpose of the 1996 Act was to reduce drastically the extent of intervention by the courts in the arbitral process. (3) A balance has to be drawn between the need for finality of the award and the need to protect parties against the unfair conduct of the arbitration. In striking this balance, only an extreme case will justify the court’s intervention. Relief under section 68 will only be appropriate where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration, and where its conduct is so far removed from what could be reasonably be expected from the arbitral process, that justice calls out for it to be corrected. (4) There will generally be a breach of section 33 where a tribunal decides the case on the basis of a point which one party has not had a fair opportunity to deal with. If the tribunal thinks that the parties have missed the real point, which has not been raised as an issue, it must warn the parties and give them an opportunity to address the point. (5) There is, however, an important distinction between, on the one hand, a party having no opportunity to address a point, or his opponent’s case, and, on the other hand, a party failing to recognise or take the opportunity which exists. The latter will not involve a breach of section 33 or a serious irregularity. (6) The requirement of substantial injustice is additional to that of a serious irregularity, and the applicant must establish both. (7) In determining whether there has been substantial injustice, the court is not required to decide for itself what would have happened in the arbitration had there been no irregularity. The applicant does not need to show that the result would necessarily or even probably have been different. What the applicant is required to show is that had he had an opportunity to address the point, the tribunal might well have reached a different view and produced a significantly different outcome.” (a) a breach of section 33 of the Act; ie that the tribunal has failed to act fairly and impartially between the parties, giving each a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, adopting procedures so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined; (b) amounting to a serious irregularity; (c) giving rise to substantial injustice. As Carr J, as she then was, emphasised in Obrascon Huarte Lain SA (t/a OHL International) v Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development[2019] EWHC 2539 ; [2019] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 559 at paragraph 44 “S. 68 imposes a high threshold for a successful challenge… It is not to be used simply because one of the parties is dissatisfied with the result, but rather as a longstop in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice "calls out for it to be corrected".”
“As a matter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold arbitration awards. They do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye endeavouring to pick holes, inconsistencies and faults. The approach is to read an award in a reasonable and commercial way, expecting, as is usually the case, that there will be no substantial fault”
“Having considered these authorities my understanding of the law regarding allegations that an arbitral tribunal has overlooked evidence is as follows. A contention that the tribunal has ignored or failed to have regard to evidence relied upon by one of the parties cannot be the subject matter of an allegation of a serious irregularity within section 68(2)(a) or (d), for several reasons. First, the tribunal’s duty is to decide the essential issues put to it for decision and to give its reasons for doing so. It does not have to deal in its reasons with each point made by a party in relation to those essential issues or refer to all the relevant evidence. Second, the assessment and evaluation of such evidence is a matter exclusively for the tribunal. The court has no role in that regard. Third, where a tribunal in its reasons has not referred to a piece of evidence which one party says is crucial the tribunal may have (i) considered it, but regarded it as not determinative, (ii) considered it, but assessed it as coming from an unreliable source, (iii) considered it, but misunderstood it or (iv) overlooked it. There may be other possibilities. Were the court to seek to determine why the tribunal had not referred to certain evidence it would have to consider the entirety of the evidence which was before the tribunal and which was relevant to the decision under challenge. Such evidence would include not only documentary evidence but also the transcripts of factual and expert evidence. Such an enquiry (in addition to being lengthy, as it certainly would be in the present case) would be an impermissible exercise for the court to undertake because it is the tribunal, not the court, that assesses the evidence adduced by the parties. Further, for the court to decide that the tribunal had overlooked certain evidence the court would have to conclude that the only inference to be drawn from the tribunal’s failure to mention such evidence was that the tribunal had overlooked it. But the tribunal may have had a different view of the importance, relevance or reliability of the evidence from that of the court and so the required inference cannot be drawn. Fourth, section 68 is concerned with due process. Section 68 is not concerned with whether the tribunal has made the "right" finding of fact, any more than it is concerned with whether the tribunal has made the "right" decision in law. The suggestion that it is a serious irregularity to fail to deal with certain evidence ignores that principle. By choosing to resolve disputes by arbitration the parties clothe the tribunal with jurisdiction to make a "wrong" finding of fact.”