“42.1 … a provisional order that: 42.1.1 the operation of the Demand be suspended until the Emergency Arbitrator has issued his or her final order on the emergency measures sought; and 42.1.2 the Project Company refrain from calling the Bond until the Emergency Arbitrator has issued his or her final order on the emergency measures sought.”
“… due to the following reasons: (a) Failure by [SPC] to meet the Date for Taking Over as defined in the Contract and consequential liability to pay Delay Liquidated Damages as required under the Contract; and (b) Failure by [SPC] to provide the Top-Up Performance Bond within six months of the expected Date of Taking Over, as agreed by the parties.”
“... we consider your purported invocation of the Bond Amount to be baseless, and the reasons for your demand to be fabricated.”
“Both reasons are entirely without basis and cannot give rise to inference that there was an honest belief on the part of Yumn in making the call on the Bond”
“… because any such failure was a direct result of its dishonest and bad faith tactics in deliberately not engaging with Shapoorji’s extension of time requests – all of which in the four years of the life of the Project have been rejected.”
“It must be positively established that [the beneficiary] was not entitled to draw down under the underlying contract” – see paragraph 34. As Popplewell J (as he then was) emphasised in Ouais GroupEngineering and Contracting v Saipem SpA[2013] EWHC 990 (Comm) at paragraph 45, a case concerning an application against a beneficiary: “In my view the court must have a high degree of assurance that the beneficiary is not entitled to call on an on demand bond before it will, at an interlocutory stage, restrain payment of the bond.”
“The nature of an on demand bond is that it is payable merely upon an assertion by the beneficiary of his entitlement to payment, without inquiry into the validity of the grounds asserted by the beneficiary as giving rise to that entitlement. The court should be reluctant to interfere unless confident that the grounds asserted do not give rise to the entitlement to payment. For this reason what is usually required at the interlocutory stage is, at the least, a strong case that there is no such entitlement.”
“In my view there is a very powerful case that an anti-beneficiary injunction should have to meet the same enhanced merits test as an injunction against the credit-provider. As I have noted, the enhanced merits requirement is a concomitant of the decision to treat irrevocable credits and similar instruments as equivalent to cash, a consideration which weighs as much in favour of its application to injunctions against the beneficiary which (if granted) would make the instrument very inferior to cash, as to injunctions against the credit provider preventing payment. For that reason, the enhanced merits test is not limited to cases in which the fraud exception is relied upon, but also extends to applications to injunct payment on the basis that the pre-conditions to a call on the instrument have not been satisfied.”
“The Commencement Date of the Contract was on or around23 February 2017 and it was agreed that the Date for Taking Over of the Works would be 36 months from the Commencement Date of the Contract. This was therefore on23 February 2020 . 2.19 Clause 8.7 is materially the same under both the Supply Contract and Construction Contract … (a) Under 8.7.1 of the Supply Contract, Shapoorji Limited is liable to pay (or allow at the Employer’s discretion) Delay Liquidated Damages to the Employer in the event and to the extent that Shapoorji Limited is in breach of its Clause 8.2 obligations under the Supply Contract … (b) Under 8.7.1 of the Construction Contract, Shapoorji Rwanda is liable to pay (or allow at the Employer’s discretion) Delay Liquidated Damages to the Employer if the Contractor fails to comply with the Time for Completion under Clause 8.2 … 2.20 Under Clause 8.7.2 and under Schedule 5, Delay Liquidated Damages are calculated in accordance with pre-defined rates for each day of the period commencing on the day after the applicable Date for Taking Over and expiring on the Date of Taking Over of the Works. 2.21 Under Clause 8.7.3, if Yumn requires payment or a deduction in respect of Delay Liquidated Damages, it must first serve notice to that effect on the Contractor. Provided a notice has been served, Yumn is not obliged to serve further notices where the period for which Delay Liquidated Damages were payable is ongoing. As I explain below, Yumn did serve the relevant notice of its intention to levy Delay Liquidated Damages and furthermore the issue of Shapoorji delay has been the subject of much discussion for more than a year and a half. Yumn continued to reserve its rights in this regard up to the date of the demand being made on the Bond. 2.22 If the Contractor considers itself entitled to any extension of time … and/or additional payment the Contractor must comply with the strict Construction Contract … Completion under Clause 8.2 … 38. for these proceedings but I note that Yumn’s position is that the Contractor’s request for extensions of time are time-barred for lack of timely notice under Clause 20.1 (and have been rejected by Yumn accordingly), and/or that the Contractor’s EOT claims (to the extent any could be regarded as extant) have not been the subject of a final claim notice capable of determination by [the] Employer. As things stand today – and having done due diligence with the benefit of external legal and delay expert advice – Yumn considers that there is no EOT entitlement that would reduce the Employer’s entitlement to Delay Liquidated Damages below the maximum cap explained below. That was also the position that pertained at the date when Yumn made its demand on the Bond ... 2.26. With respect to Delay Liquidated Damages, Clause 10.3 of the Umbrella Agreement provides that notwithstanding the cap on delay liquidated damages … the liability of each Contractor shall not exceed the Aggregate DLD Cap overall. The Aggregate DLD Cap is defined in the Umbrella Agreement as 10% of the Aggregate Contract Price as adjusted from time to time. Clause 17 of the Umbrella Agreement provides that if there is any difference or conflict between its terms and either the Supply or Construction Contract the terms of the Umbrella Agreement prevail …”