“Were the second stage planet gears of the epicyclic module of the MGB of the H225 type susceptible to fatigue fractures as a result of (a) their design, and/or (b) the serviceable life of second stage planet gears before mandatory replacement being set too high.”
“When designing the MGB of the H225 type and setting the serviceable life of the second stage planetary gears, what assessment did the defendant in fact make of the risk of fatigue fractures?”
“MSN 2207 and all H225 helicopters were defective in their design so as to render them unfit for their intended use, being the long-range transport of passengers in the offshore oil and gas market. The nature of the defect, as found by the AIBN in its report summarised at paragraph 25 above, was as follows: PARTICULARS OF THE DEFECT (1) The second stage planet gears of the epicyclic module of the MGB were susceptible to fatigue fractures, as a result of: PARTICULARS OF THE DEFECT (a) the design of the MGB and second stage planet gears; and (b) the serviceable life of second stage planet gears before mandatory replacement being set too high and at an unsafe level.”
“...the Pilot Scheme for Disclosure was not a re-serving ofCPR Part 31 , exemplified by standard disclosure (equivalent to Model D Extended DisclosureCPR PD 51U ), dressed in another garnish. Rather, the Pilot Scheme represents a ‘culture change’ to the management and disclosure in the Business and Property Courts.”
“Model C in one sense occupies an implicitly preferred position within the choices available amongst the Extended Disclosure models in that the more expansive models of Extended Disclosure, Models D and E, should be selected by the parties and approved by the court where Model C is not appropriate or sufficient (paragraph 6.5 CPRPD 51U ). Indeed, the wider Models D and E are not presumed as the appropriate models for Extended Disclosure (paragraph 8.2 ofCPR PD 51U ).”