“There is no evidence, that I am able to see, that this would be the case since there is nothing in the vessel description which suggests any liquid cargo tank capability.”
“70. [The charterer] raised an issue as to whether the vessel was in class to carry MGO. This issue had not been clearly raised prior to the hearing. A vessel’s class for specific operations is a technical question with serious consequences. It was not a matter within the expertise of the market experts and their opinion on it was of limited relevance. 71. [JR] accepted that the vessel had an unusually high fuel oil carrying capacity (around 720mt) for her size. In early February 2009 she had just come out of dry dock and the ABC report issued in May 2009 made clear that her fuel tanks were now suitable for carrying marine gas oil. AV gave evidence that she had been used to carry parcels of around 600mt of MGO bunkers in West Africa for ENI under the 2009 Charter and such business was very profitable in West Africa where logistical difficulties meant it was useful. It was not alleged that this trade was illegal. 72. I take into account that the Bayside valuations did not treat the vessel as a tanker or having fuel carrying capacity, and this was surprising since Bayside would have ordinarily noted this feature. I also note that the SeaWeb data did not mention her as an oil carrier and she did not have an oil carrier class notation. However, the Bayside valuation involved a relatively cursory investigation and the information relied upon did not rebut the evidence that she had actually been offered and used for carrying MGO parcels in 2009. The absence of a class notation as an oil carrier was unsurprising and a neutral factor since on the class information available the oil carrier notation would only be available for a vessel designed primarily to carry oil. Accordingly, I accept that the vessel could have been marketed and used to carry parcels of MGO and this would have been a valuable feature for operators in the West African market. [The charterer] failed to show that the vessel was not in class for the carriage of MGO that took place.”
“75. ML was frank in accepting that the vessel’s market rate was as high as US$6,500 because of her ability to carry parcels of MGO. I accept that this feature would have made her significantly more valuable for chartering. This meant that her market rate was substantially higher than [two comparable vessels]. This supported the conclusion that US$3,250 per day did not reflect what she could achieve on the market. 76. The attempt to fix a single figure as representing the market rate for this vessel cannot be treated as a precise science…I note that [the charterer’s] pleaded case was that the market rate was no more than US$3,250 and it was part of [its] case that there will be a market range since they put this case to [ML]. 77. I am asked to identify a precise market rate and I accept ML’s assessment of the relevant market conditions and find that the market rate for this vessel at1 February 2009 was US$6,500 per day.”
“147. Significant criticism was placed on AV having lied in evidence about a shareholders’ loan of US$1.2m to cover the cost of the dry docking in 2008/2009 and that this was inconsistent with his statement that [the charterer] had paid for the dry dock works through the hire increases since otherwise [it] or its shareholders would have had to pay for them separately in cash. I do not accept that this evidence regarding these costs showed dishonesty. [AV]’s evidence of a shareholders’ loan reflected the commercial reality even if there was no loan documentation (a) There was limited evidence to show the precise source of payments for the dry dock repairs. However, it was clear that the dry dock’s charges had been paid for (in whole or part) in order for the Vessel to leave dry dock and re-start trading (this is invariable practice and reflected [AV]’s evidence and also correspondence of18 March 2009 showing that US$ 738,994 had been paid by [the owner] by that stage). (b) There was no contemporaneous evidence to support [the charterer’s] case that it provided the funds at the time. The main evidence [the charterer] put forward were some [owner] accounts produced by auditors in around November 2012. (c) The contemporaneous documents suggested that the funds used to pay for the dry dock in 2008/2009 had been advanced by way of loan from funds that [AV] and [RT] controlled. This was consistent with the 2012 accounts and also the contemporaneous documents from 2009, including [RT]’s expression of anger at the cost of the dry dock, and the fact that ‘the loss regularisation project’ proposed on27 July 2009 gave credit to various… agencies…that were controlled by [RT] and [AV]. (d) The funds used to pay for the dry dock had been made available as a loan, not a gift (whether under [the charterer’s] or [AV]’s explanation). From [RT] and [AV]’s point of view it may not have made much difference whether the funds were treated as coming from [the charterer] or its shareholders as they were [the charterer]’s owners.” (a) There was limited evidence to show the precise source of payments for the dry dock repairs. However, it was clear that the dry dock’s charges had been paid for (in whole or part) in order for the Vessel to leave dry dock and re-start trading (this is invariable practice and reflected [AV]’s evidence and also correspondence of18 March 2009 showing that US$ 738,994 had been paid by [the owner] by that stage). (b) There was no contemporaneous evidence to support [the charterer’s] case that it provided the funds at the time. The main evidence [the charterer] put forward were some [owner] accounts produced by auditors in around November 2012. (c) The contemporaneous documents suggested that the funds used to pay for the dry dock in 2008/2009 had been advanced by way of loan from funds that [AV] and [RT] controlled. This was consistent with the 2012 accounts and also the contemporaneous documents from 2009, including [RT]’s expression of anger at the cost of the dry dock, and the fact that ‘the loss regularisation project’ proposed on27 July 2009 gave credit to various… agencies…that were controlled by [RT] and [AV]. (d) The funds used to pay for the dry dock had been made available as a loan, not a gift (whether under [the charterer’s] or [AV]’s explanation). From [RT] and [AV]’s point of view it may not have made much difference whether the funds were treated as coming from [the charterer] or its shareholders as they were [the charterer]’s owners.”
“156. [RT] and [AV]’s decision to raise charter rates in 2009 enabled the owner to cover the cost of the dry dock over the following couple of years, and [the charterer] to continue using the vessel for [its] business in West Africa. It was made believing it was in the commercial interests of both companies. The managers’ dominant purpose for concluding the 2009 Charter at the rate of US$6,500 per month was not to enrich themselves or to reverse [the owner]’s losses. I do not find that these actions were dishonest by decent and ordinary standards.”
“45. Determining whether or not the duty of fairness has been breached will always be a question of fact and sometimes degree. However, the relevant broad legal principles are uncontroversial and can be summarised for present purposes as follows: (i) There will generally be a breach of section 33 of the Act where a tribunal decides the case on the basis of a point which one party has not had a fair opportunity to deal with. It is not right that a decision should be based on specific matters which the parties have never had the chance to deal with, nor is it right that a party should first learn of adverse points in the decision against him. (ii) If a tribunal considers that the parties have missed the point and/or contemplates a completely different basis for a decision, the parties need to be given notice and a proper opportunity to consider the position and respond. This does not mean that every nuance or inference which the tribunal wishes to draw needs to be put to the parties if it differs from that which has been precisely contended for in the arbitration. … (v) In determining whether there has been substantial injustice, the applicant does not need to show that the result would necessarily or even probably have been different. He simply has to show that the tribunal might well have reached a different view and produced a significantly different outcome. It is enough for the applicant to show that the arbitrator reached a conclusion unfavourable to him which, but for the irregularity, he might well never have reached, provided always that the opposite conclusion is reasonably arguable.” (i) There will generally be a breach of section 33 of the Act where a tribunal decides the case on the basis of a point which one party has not had a fair opportunity to deal with. It is not right that a decision should be based on specific matters which the parties have never had the chance to deal with, nor is it right that a party should first learn of adverse points in the decision against him. (ii) If a tribunal considers that the parties have missed the point and/or contemplates a completely different basis for a decision, the parties need to be given notice and a proper opportunity to consider the position and respond. This does not mean that every nuance or inference which the tribunal wishes to draw needs to be put to the parties if it differs from that which has been precisely contended for in the arbitration. … (v) In determining whether there has been substantial injustice, the applicant does not need to show that the result would necessarily or even probably have been different. He simply has to show that the tribunal might well have reached a different view and produced a significantly different outcome. It is enough for the applicant to show that the arbitrator reached a conclusion unfavourable to him which, but for the irregularity, he might well never have reached, provided always that the opposite conclusion is reasonably arguable.”
“What was the market rate of hire for the [the vessel] as at1 February 2009 ?”
“So I think in fact we are agreed that [the vessel] did do so and therefore she could do so, but query whether she should do so.”
“I have seen nothing to say that she was classed to carry hazardous oil cargo. Later JR summed up her evidence this way: “[The vessel] is described as a general purpose landing craft and in none of the documents is she described with the capability to act as a short sea tanker, neither is she classed to act as a short sea tanker…At the point where the markets, all the markets were declined, my best approach to the valuation of what this ship could earn does not include a capability to carry oil cargoes where she would not have been in compliance in any event with local regulations.”
“I can’t believe for one second that ENI with some vetting process would receive cargoes, whatever it is, would even deal with a ship which is not in class. So where is this information that she is not in class, she is not compliant? I don’t know where it is coming from.”
“That isn’t what I see in the remarks of the class, I would say, yes.”
“Do you know whether these notations are decisive as to the vessel’s actual class?”
“I am convinced she is trading in line with the law, absolutely convinced.”
“Was the vessel in class to carry MGO?”
“Arbitrator: You say it is a critical issue whether [the] vessel was in class and that wasn’t an issue either of these experts were really qualified to form a conclusion on, or asked to, for that matter. [Counsel]: Well, it may in that case be that the Tribunal simply doesn’t need to decide that issue. The way it actually arose, obviously, for the first time, was in the course of [JR] being cross-examined and so it may be that my written closing overstates that position [that it was a critical issue].”