“Clause 20.1 Amicable Settlement Should any dispute arise between the Parties under or out of this Contract, or out of the execution and completion of the Works, or out of the remedying of defects and flaws, including disputes on any certificate, determination, instruction, opinion or valuation of the Employer, each Party shall notify another Party of such dispute, and both Parties shall try to settle such dispute amicably before any arbitration starts. However, unless otherwise agreed between the Parties, the arbitration shall not start before expiration of a 2-month period starting on the day of the notice of a dispute, even though attempts may not be made to settle the dispute amicably. Clause 20.2 Arbitration Provided that the procedure described in Sub-Clause 20.1 of the Contract has been followed, any dispute, disagreement or claim arising under or from this Contract, including disputes on breach, termination and validity of the Contract shall be finally settled by arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.…”
"the trend, both national and international, is to limit reconsideration of the findings of arbitral tribunals, both in fact and in law. It is also true that the Convention introduced a “proenforcement” policy for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The New York Convention took a number of significant steps to promote the enforceability of awards. The Geneva Convention placed upon the party seeking enforcement the burden of proving the conditions necessary for enforcement, one of which was that the award had to have become “final” in the country in which it was made. In practice in some countries it was thought that that could be done only by producing an order for leave to enforce (such as an exequatur) and then seeking a similar order in the country in which enforcement was sought, hence the notion of “double exequatur” (but in England it was decided, as late as 1959, that a foreign order was not required for the enforcement of a Geneva Convention award under theArbitration Act 1950, section 37 : see Union Nationale des Coopératives Agricoles des Céréales v Robert Catterall & Co Ltd[1959] 2 QB 44 ). The New York Convention does not require double exequatur and the burden of proving the grounds for nonenforcement is firmly on the party resisting enforcement. Those grounds are exhaustive."
“The authorities show that in order to establish an issue estoppel four conditions must be satisfied, namely (1) that the judgment must be given by a foreign Court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that the judgment must be final and conclusive and on the merits; (3) that there must be identity of parties; and (4) that there must be identity of subject matter, which means that the issue decided by the foreign court must be the same as that arising in the English proceedings …”
“In international commerce a party who contracts into an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign jurisdiction is bound not only by the local arbitration procedure but also by the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration. If the award is defective or the arbitration is defectively conducted the party who complains of the defect must in the first instance pursue such remedies as exist under that supervisory jurisdiction. That is because by his agreement to the place in question as the seat of the arbitration he has agreed not only to refer all disputes to arbitration but that the conduct of the arbitration should be subject to that particular supervisory jurisdiction. Adherence to that part of the agreement must, in my judgment, be a cardinal policy consideration by an English court considering enforcement of a foreign award. In a case where a remedy for an alleged defect is applied for from the supervisory court, but is refused, leaving a final award undisturbed, it will therefore normally be a very strong policy consideration before the English courts that it has been conclusively determined by the courts of the agreed supervisory jurisdiction that the award should stand. Just as great weight must be attached to the policy of sustaining the finality of international awards so also must great weight be attached to the policy of sustaining the finality of the determination of properly referred procedural issues by the courts of the supervisory jurisdiction. I use the word ‘normally’ because there may be exceptional cases where the powers of the supervisory court are so limited that they cannot intervene even where there has been an obvious and serious disregard for basic principles of justice by the arbitrators or where for unjust reasons, such as corruption, they decline to do so. However, outside such exceptional cases, any suggestion that under the guise of allegations of substantial injustice procedural defects in the conduct of an arbitration which have already been considered by the supervisory court should be reinvestigated by the English courts on an enforcement application is to be most strongly deprecated.”
“Where the additional evidence has already been deployed before the court of supervisory jurisdiction for the purpose of an application for the setting aside or remission of the award but the application has failed, the public policy of finality would normally require that the English courts should not permit that further evidence to be adduced at the stage of enforcement.”
"Although Adams was concerned with public policy in relation to the enforcement of foreign judgments, it illustrates the principle that in the sphere of enforcement considerations of public policy involve investigation not only of the core procedural defect relied upon by way of objection to enforcement, but of all those other surrounding circumstances which are material to the English court's decision whether, as a matter of policy, enforcement should be refused. Such circumstances may give rise to policy considerations which so strongly favour enforcement as to outweigh policy considerations to the contrary."
“that … the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, with the law of the country in which the arbitration took place.”
“There is obvious commercial sense in such a dispute resolution clause. Arbitration can be expensive and time consuming. It is far better if it can be avoided by friendly discussions to resolve a claim. Thus the clause obliges the parties to seek to resolve a claim by friendly discussions before a claim can be referred to arbitration. The reference to a period of four continuous weeks ensures both that a defaulting party cannot postpone the commencement of arbitration indefinitely by continuing to discuss the claim and that a claimant who is eager to commence arbitration must have the opportunity to consider such proposals as might emerge from a discussion of his claim for a period of at least four continuous weeks before he may commence arbitration.”
“In the context of a positive obligation to attempt to resolve a dispute or difference amicably before referring a matter to arbitration or bringing proceedings the test is whether the provision prescribes, without the need for further agreement, (a) a sufficiently certain and unequivocal commitment to commence a process (b) from which may be discerned what steps each party is required to take to put the process in place and which is (c) sufficiently clearly defined to enable the court to determine objectively (i) what under that process is the minimum required of the parties to the dispute in terms of their participation in it and (ii) when or how the process will be exhausted or properly terminable without breach.”
“56…the language of the arbitration agreement in Clause 20.1 makes it sufficiently clear that no attempts to settle the dispute amicably are required prior to commencing arbitration. The second paragraph of Clause 20.1 states that “arbitration shall not start before expiration of a 2-month period starting on the day of the notice of a dispute, even though attempts may not be made to settle the dispute amicably.”
“32. It is not in dispute that in applying these principles the enforcing court must apply its own concept of natural justice. …. It is contrary to public policy in England to enforce a foreign arbitral award where the foreign proceedings violated English principles of natural justice: see e.g. Adams v Cape Industries[1990] Ch 433 . ... 33. … if a particular breach of natural justice does not fall within section [103] because it was not one which meant that the party could not present its case, it is in principle open to the court to refuse to enforce the award on the ground of public policy. However, it follows from the above that the question … is whether [the applicant] was unable to present its case for reasons which were beyond its control. …. As Sir John Donaldson MR observed in Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Ra's al-Khaimah National Oil Co[1990] 1 AC 295 , 316 considerations of public policy can never be exhaustively defined, but they should be approached with extreme caution. 34. The general approach to enforcement of an award should be pro-enforcement …”
“In my judgment, the inability to present a case to arbitrators within s. 103(2)(c) contemplates at least that the enforce has been prevented from presenting his case by matters outside his control. This will normally cover the case where the procedure adopted has been operated in a manner contrary to the rules of natural justice. Where, however, the enforce has, due to matters within his control, not provided himself with the means of taking advantage of an opportunity given to him to present his case, he does not in my judgment, bring himself within that exception to enforcement under the convention. In the present case that is what has happened.”
“Recognition or enforcement of the award may also be refused … if it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award.”
“Considerations of public policy can never be exhaustively defined, but they should be approached with extreme caution. As Burrough J. remarked in Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252, "It is never argued at all, but when other points fail." It has to be shown that there is some element of illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be clearly injurious to the public good or, possibly, that enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the state are exercised.”
“…normally the conditions to be fulfilled will be (a) that the evidence to establish the fraud was not available to the party alleging the fraud at the time of the hearing before the arbitrators; and (b) where perjury is the fraud alleged, i.e., where the very issue before the arbitrators was whether the witness or witnesses were lying, the evidence must be so strong that it would reasonably be expected to be decisive at a hearing, and if unanswered must have that result.”