“DESCRIPTION/ INDONESIAN COKING COAL IN BULK. QUALITY: IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM STANDARDS”
“FLUIDITY (TYPICAL) 500 DDPM MMR (TYPICAL) 1.2%.”
“FLUIDITY REJECTION BELOW 250 MMR REJECTION BELOW 1.05% AND ABOVE 1.3%”
“A1 The seller must provide the goods and the commercial invoice in conformity with the Contract of Sale and any other evidence of conformity that may be required by the Contract.”
“Conclusions as to correspondence with the specification: 198. [The seller] was in breach of both Contracts by failing to supply coal which corresponded with the specification in Clause 2. Such a breach was in respect of [the seller’s] obligation under Clause 3 [sic] and the Inco term “CFR” and, or alternatively, in respect of an implied term under Section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act that the coal should correspond with its description” 199. The difference was a shortfall in Fluidity of 172 ddpm (36% shortfall) and an excess in MMR of 0.05%. 208d. The poor quality of the coke produced using an 80/20 blend of the Coal and Australian coal (and other blends): We consider that the reduced Fluidity recorded by Inspectorate Singapore (36% below the typical quality which the coal should have had with regard to Fluidity) is consistent with the production of a poor quality coke, especially if it were to be used as the sole fuel. 209…….We consider that, in all the circumstances, the deficiency of 36% in the Fluidity alone meant that the coal could probably not be used satisfactorily as a single coking coal and could only be used as a blend stock for producing coke of a quality suitable for use in blast furnaces (as it seems, in fact, to have been largely used by [the buyers] during the remainder of 2011. 210. The terms of section 14(2) and 14(2A) of the Sale of Goods Act are well understood. In such a case as this, whether goods are of "a satisfactory quality" depends on (a) (inter-alia) their description and price and (b) all other circumstances. This includes “in appropriate cases whether the goods are fit for "all the pain for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied. 211. Undoubtedly, one of the purposes for which coking coal is used is to make coke suitable for use in blast furnaces. The description or specification (and not the place of origin) will determine whether the coal which is to be supplied is suitable for use on its own or only in a blend. In the circumstances of this case, we accept the evidence of Dr Hazra that the description of the coal in clause 2 of the Contracts was such as to make the coal fit to be used individually, and not just as part of a blend, even though [the buyers] had begun by saying that they wanted to use the coal as blend material. The price which they agreed to pay was an open market price which represented the price for coking coal which conformed to the specification in Clause 2 and [the buyers] were, in our judgement, entitled to be supplied with coal of that quality and description. It was not a price which depended on a particular way in which such coking coal was going to be used, but upon the agreed specification. 212. We conclude that, because [the seller] supplied coal which was off-specification, in the circumstances of this case they were also in breach of the implied terms under Section 14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act by failing to supply goods of a “satisfactory quality”.” [Emphasis added]
“227. We are satisfied that the Coal as delivered was worth significantly less than the value which it would have had, if the Coal had corresponded with its specification and been of a quality which that involved, but by substantially less than would result from adopting the "damaged arrived market value" for which [the buyers] contend. Doing the best that we can on very limited material and acknowledging that the best we can do is to make an estimate based on such evidence as we do have, we have reached the conclusion that the appropriate reduction in value of the Coal as delivered should be US$ 40.00 per tonne. A higher figure would, we conclude, not be justified by our findings as to the quality and specifications of the Coal delivered, which do not reflect the more serious criticisms of the Coal advanced by [the buyers]. A lower figure, on the other hand, would not recognise that substantial deficiency in quality and specifications which we have found existed in the Coal as delivered.”
“31. … the court's approach to the strength of the challenge application will depend upon the procedural circumstances in which the issue arises. … 32. … where, as has happened in the current case, the application for an extension of time has been listed for hearing at the same time as the challenge application itself, and the court has heard full argument on the merits of the challenge application. In such circumstances the court is in a position to decide not merely whether the case is "weak" or "strong", but whether it will or will not succeed if an extension of time were granted. The court is in a position to decide whether the challenge is a good or a bad one. 33. … where the court can determine that the challenge will succeed, if allowed to proceed by the grant of an extension of time, that may be a powerful factor in favour of the grant of an extension, at least in cases of a challenge pursuant to section 68. In such cases the court will be satisfied that there has been a serious irregularity giving rise to substantial injustice in relation to the dispute adjudicated upon in the award. Given the high threshold which this involves, the other factors which fall to be weighed in the balance must be seen in the context of the applicant suffering substantial injustice in respect of the underlying dispute by being deprived of the opportunity to make his challenge if an extension of time is refused. Where the delay is due to incompetence, laxity or mistake and measured in weeks or a few months, rather than years, the fact that the court has concluded that the section 68 challenge will succeed may well be sufficient to justify an extension of time. The position may be otherwise, however, if the delay is the result of a deliberate decision made because of some perceived advantage.”
“It is not open to a party to argue, as have the charterers here, that they were waiting for the other party to take up the award; that they did not know that there was any point they wanted to raise on the award. They have to take that decision for themselves. The position is, in a sense, a stark one: a party who wishes to reserve his right to take the matter to the Court either by way of appeal or under s. 22 of the 1950 Act must ensure that the award is taken up in time to enable the application to be made.”
“(2) Serious irregularity means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant – (a) failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of the tribunal)… ….. (c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties..”
“(1)The tribunal shall— (a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. (2) The tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it.”
“(i) In order to make out a case for the court's intervention under section 68(2)(a), the applicant must show: (a) a breach of section 33 of the Act; ie that the tribunal has failed to act fairly and impartially between the parties, giving each a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, adopting procedures so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined; (b) amounting to a serious irregularity; (c) giving rise to substantial injustice. (ii) The test of a serious irregularity giving rise to substantial injustice involves a high threshold. The threshold is deliberately high because a major purpose of the 1996 Act was to reduce drastically the extent of intervention by the courts in the arbitral process. (iii) A balance has to be drawn between the need for finality of the award and the need to protect parties against the unfair conduct of the arbitration. In striking this balance, only an extreme case will justify the court's intervention. Relief under section 68 will only be appropriate where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration, and where its conduct is so far removed from what could be reasonably be expected from the arbitral process, that justice calls out for it to be corrected. (iv) There will generally be a breach of section 33 where a tribunal decides the case on the basis of a point which one party has not had a fair opportunity to deal with. If the tribunal thinks that the parties have missed the real point, which has not been raised as an issue, it must warn the parties and give them an opportunity to address the point. (v) There is, however, an important distinction between, on the one hand, a party having no opportunity to address a point, or his opponent's case, and, on the other hand, a party failing to recognise or take the opportunity which exists. The latter will not involve a breach of section 33 or a serious irregularity. (vi) The requirement of substantial injustice is additional to that of a serious irregularity, and the applicant must establish both. (vii) In determining whether there has been substantial injustice, the court is not required to decide for itself what would have happened in the arbitration had there been no irregularity. The applicant does not need to show that the result would necessarily or even probably have been different. What the applicant is required to show is that had he had an opportunity to address the point, the tribunal might well have reached a different view and produced a significantly different outcome.”
“3.2 [The seller] was therefore obliged to provide goods that conformed to the description/quality set out in clause 2 and in particular goods with Fluidity 500 DDPM and MMR 1.2%. 3.3 [The seller] was under an obligation not only to provide goods which complied with the above criteria, but was also under an obligation to provide documentary evidence that the goods conformed to these criteria.”
“The parties are required to disclose their entire case in their skeleton arguments, as it is known, at the time of opening. The parties are not keep any points “up their sleeves” for deployment at the hearing. Any point they wish to make or take should be covered in the skeletons.”
“43. The Inspectorate Certificate purported to certify the fluidity of the cargo as 322 ddpm (well below the “typical” 500 ddpm described in the Contracts, but above the rejection threshold of 250 ddpm), and the MMR as 1.25% (within the 1.05-1.3% bracket).”
“48. As the buyers started to put the coking coal to use it transpired to be off-spec in terms of fluidity and MMR and unsuitable for the purpose of producing coke unless mixed with considerable quantities of high quality blendstock….”
“66. In this case, the [buyers] assert that the following were conditions of the Contracts and each of them.”
“68. As regards the goods: a) The goods were to correspond with the contractual specification/description as set out in cl.2 of the Contracts (s.13 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SOGA”)). b) In any event the fluidity would be above 250 ddpm and the MMR between 1.05 – 1.30%. c) The goods were to be of satisfactory quality (s.14(2) SOGA ), including in this regard fitness for all purposes for which hard coking coal are commonly supplied (s.14(2B) SOGA). 69. There can be no dispute that the matters in (b) above went to the root of the Contracts as regards the goods because the parties expressly stipulated in the Contracts that the goods could be rejected outside of those parameters.”
“Upon taking delivery it was discovered that the hard coking coal was unfit for its purpose of producing coke - at least not without using considerable quantities of high quality blendstock…”
“As against all this, the only evidence which tends to suggest the cargo was on-spec at the loadport is the Inspectorate Certificate…..”
“Properly analysed, the question of liability for [the buyers’] remaining claims boils down to a narrow dispute as to whether or not [the buyers] can prove the coking coal was off – specification as to MMR and fluidity – all their various claims for breach of contract stand or fall by that threshold issue.”
“The contractual specifications for MMR were typical 1.2% with rejection below 1.05% and above 1.30%. For fluidity the specifications were typical 500 ddpm and rejection below 250 ddpm.”
“My learned friend is correct to say and to observe in his skeleton argument that the central question is therefore whether this cargo was off-specification at the loadport. And we say there is abundant evidence that it was.”
“…this document stands on its own, it is the only piece of evidence which begins to suggest that this – taken at face value that this shipment might have been on spec at the loadport, and we will be inviting you to reject that in the face of all the other evidence.”
“Q. I suggest to you that you were under considerable pressure to get hold of a certificate from somewhere which showed this cargo to be on spec for fluidity and MMR and what you did is this: you received Mr Sharma’s chaser on the 7th and you contacted inspectorate and asked them to send you a certificate. That’s what happened.”
“….Accordingly, unless the Tribunal finds that Mr Shah and Inspectorate (Singapore) Ltd did dishonestly conspire for Inspectorate (Singapore) Ltd deliberately to misstate figures in their report, there is no basis for finding that the coal was off-specification at the loadport in the face of the Inspectorate (Singapore) report..”
“If, which is denied, the coal had fluidity of 322 ddpm and MMR of 1.25%, nonetheless it was in breach of contract as off-specification”, it is fair to say that they certainly came very close to that in para 75 of their first round closing submissions when they referred to the figures in the Singapore Inspectorate Certificate as being “..well below the “typical” 500 ddpm described in the Contracts…”
“a. The goods were to correspond with the contractual specification/description as set out in cl. 2 of the Contracts (s. 13 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (“SOGA”)). b. In any event the fluidity would be above 250 ddpm and the MMR between 1.05 – 1.30%. c. The goods were to be of satisfactory quality (s. 14(2) SOGA ), including in this regard fitness for all purposes for which hard coking coal are commonly supplied (S. 14(2B) SOGA).”
“[49] The Claimants’ first alternative allegation is that the goods were not of satisfactory quality and were not fit for all purposes for which coking coal is commonly supplied, contrary to the implied terms in s. 14(2) and 14(2B) of SOGA respectively.”
“[134] The Buyers say that, in addition to being off-spec. for MMR and fluidity, the Cargo was of unsatisfactory quality, being oxidised and weathered and unfit for the purposes for which such cargoes are commonly supplied – namely the production of blast furnace grade coke either individually or as the predominant component of the blend.”