“2 Compensation to persons for damage by riot (1) Where a house, shop, or building in a police area has been injured or destroyed, or the property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, such compensation as hereinafter mentioned shall be paid out of the police fund of the area to any person who has sustained loss by such injury, stealing, or destruction; but in fixing the amount of such compensation regard shall be had to the conduct of the said person, whether as respects the precautions taken by him or as respects his being a party or accessory to such riotous or tumultuous assembly, or as regards any provocation offered to the persons assembled or otherwise. (2)Where any person having sustained such loss as aforesaid has received, by way of insurance or otherwise, any sum to recoup him, in whole or in part, for such loss, the compensation otherwise payable to him under this Act shall, if exceeding such sum, be reduced by the amount thereof, and in any other case shall not be paid to him, and the payer of such sum shall be entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of the sum so paid in like manner as if he had sustained the said loss, and any policy of insurance given by such payer shall continue in force as if he had made no such payment, and where such person was recouped as aforesaid otherwise than by payment of a sum, this enactment shall apply as if the value of such recoupment were a sum paid. 3 Mode of awarding compensation (1) Claims for compensation under this Act shall be made to the compensation authority of the police area where the injury, stealing or destruction took place, and such compensation authority shall inquire into the truth thereof, and shall, if satisfied, fix such compensation as appears to them to be just. (2) A Secretary of State may from time to time make, and when made, revoke and vary regulations respecting the time, manner, and conditions within, in, and under which claims for compensation under this Act are to be made, and all such claims not made in accordance with such regulations may be excluded. Such regulations may also provide for the particulars to be stated in any claim, and for the verification of any claim, and of any facts incidental thereto, by statutory declarations, production of books, vouchers, and documents, entry of premises, and otherwise, and may also provide for any matter which under this act can be prescribed, and for the compensation authority obtaining information and assistance for determining the said claims. 4 Right of action to person aggrieved (1) Where a claim to compensation has been made in accordance with the regulations, and the claimant is aggrieved by the refusal or failure of the compensation authority to fix compensation upon such claim, or by the amount of compensation fixed, he may bring an action against the compensation authority to recover compensation in respect of all or any of the matters mentioned in such claim and to an amount not exceeding that mentioned therein, but if in such action he fails to recover any compensation or an amount exceeding that fixed by the compensation authority, he shall pay the costs of the compensation authority as between solicitor and client… 7 As to claimants in the case of churches, public institutions & c. For the purposes of this Act— (a) where a church or chapel has been injured or destroyed, or any property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, the churchwardens or chapelwardens, if any, or, if there are none, the persons having the management of such church or chapel, or chapel, or the persons in whom the legal estate in the same is vested; and (b) Where a school, hospital, public institution, or public building, has been injured or destroyed, or any property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, the persons having the control of such school, hospital, institution, or building, or the persons in whom the legal estate in the same is vested; shall be deemed to be the persons who have sustained loss from such injury, stealing, or destruction, and claims may be made by any one or more of such persons in relation both to the building and to the property therein, and payment to any such claimant shall discharge the liability of the compensation authority to pay compensation, but shall be without prejudice to the right of any person to recover the compensation from such payee.”
“To encourage people to resist persons thus riotously assembled, and to reward those, who, by doing their duty, shall have incurred their resentment, the same law has made a further provision, that as the trespassers are to be hanged, the country shall pay the damages; and this, by way of inducement to the inhabitants to be active in suppressing such riots, which it is their duty to do; and which being made their interest too, they are more likely to execute. This is the great principle of the law, that the inhabitants shall be in the nature of sureties for one another. It is a very ancient principle; as old as the decennaries by Alfred…”
“I would not attempt to give a full definition of any of those words, but it seems to me that all of them bring a certain impression to one’s mind. When those words are applied to an assembly of persons, the impression is that the assembly should be of considerable size; that it should be an assembly in which the persons taking part are indulging in agitated movement; an excited, emotionally aroused assembly; excitement or emotion common to the members of the assembly; and generally, though not necessarily, accompanied by noise. I agree with the submissions which have been made, that it is a question of degree whether any assembly of people can properly be said to be acting tumultuously.”
“I now turn to consider both the meaning of the words and the question as to whether the words "riotously and tumultuously" from their history are to be read as cumulative requirements, differing in character. Until very recently the victims of crime had, in general, no claim to be compensated for the injury they suffered as a consequence of the crime. Compensation for loss caused by a riot was a special case. This raises the question: Why was it made a special case? If a crowd of people collect in angry and threatening fashion this should become obvious to the local forces of order, and it would then become their duty to prevent the crowd from becoming a riot. This is a duty which has been recognised for centuries, and which until the 19th century was put upon the local administrative area, the hundred or wapentake, or whatever name it might be called; and there was a duty upon them to compensate for damage which was done by persons assembled riotously and tumultuously. The Act of 1886, in fact, did no more than modernise the mode of obtaining compensation and transferred the burden from the inhabitants of the hundred or wapentake to the local police authority. There is nothing secret or furtive about a crowd of people who are acting riotously and tumultuously. It seems to me that the right to compensation from public funds was given because public authority had failed to protect the public who were menaced by a threat which was, or ought to have been, obvious to the forces of law and order as they existed from time to time. In my judgment, the word "tumultuously" was added to "riotously" for the specific reason that it was intended to limit the liability of compensation to cases where the rioters were in such numbers and in such state of agitated commotion, and were generally so acting, that the forces of law and order should have been well aware of the threat which existed, and, if they had done their duty, should have taken steps to prevent the rioters from causing damage.”
“One can see how the scene began and what it involved until the men ran away. It obviously began with the men stealthily driving up in a van and getting out. From that moment onwards they were undoubtedly shouting; there was a reference to war-cries and noise intended to frighten the bystanders. There was then more noise when they used the sledge-hammers on the window. But the main noise undoubtedly came from the terrified spectators. So it was, the judge said, a scene of great commotion; I think he used the word ‘chaos’.”
“It is interesting, contrary to what I had thought, that the derivation of ‘tumult’ … is evidently unconnected with ‘multitude’. The word comes from ‘tumulus’ a mound in one sense, or a swelling in another sense and in the etymological dictionary it is defined as ‘excitement, uproar, agitation’. But when one comes to the Oxford English Dictionary one finds that ‘tumultuous’ is defined as ‘Full of tumult or commotion; marked by confusion and uproar; disorderly and noisy; violent and clamorous; turbulent’. If one then goes to the definition of the word ‘tumult’… one finds the first definition… is… ‘Commotion of a multitude, usually with confused speech or uproar; public disturbance; disorderly or riotous proceeding.’ Rightly or wrongly-apparently etymologically wrongly, but I would say rightly as a matter of common usage nowadays-the connotation of ‘multitude’ or ‘crowd’ or ‘mob’ or of a large number of people, has been introduced into the meaning of ‘tumultuous’ and ‘tumult’. That is certainly how I would construe it as a matter of first impression.”
“‘tumultuously’ added something more than mere noise to the minimum assembly of three people required [at common law] to constitute a riot”
“After all, this was not a case of a crowd which had assembled and which should have attracted the attention of the police by its very presence. On the contrary. These robbers drew up in a van quietly and then stormed out, no doubt making a good deal of noise, but in the minimum time possible; and they then vanished as quickly as they could. The whole nature of the raid was one of furtiveness at the beginning, and then surprise and speed of departure thereafter. In my view that is far from a ‘riotous and tumultuous assembly’.”
“(1) Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot. (2) It is immaterial whether or not the 12 or more use or threaten unlawful violence simultaneously. (3) The common purpose may be inferred from conduct. (4) No person of reasonable firmness need actually be, or be likely to be, present at the scene. (5) Riot may be committed in private as well as in public places. (6) A person guilty of riot is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine or both.”
“11. In the course of his judgment, the judge concluded that the obligation of the police authority to pay compensation under the 1886 Act stemmed from the idea that the local police were responsible for failing to control riots within their area. Although the obligation to pay compensation was a strict liability (in the sense that it did not matter whether or not the police had neglected their duty or that, however diligent they may have been, the riot could not have been prevented and damage would inevitably have occurred) the reason why that strict liability was imposed on the police authority rather than on the community at large, whether the local authority or central government, was due to the notional responsibility of the police who had the duty of preserving law and order. The judge buttressed this conclusion by reference to the original liability of the hundredors for preserving law and order pursuant to the Statute of Winchester of 1285 and subsequent statutes, but for present purposes it is only necessary to note that one of the main purposes (if not the main purpose) of the 1886 Act was to transfer the obligation to pay compensation from the hundred to what was then called the "police rate" of the "police district" in which the relevant property had been damaged. Since the Police Acts 1994 and 1996 these phrases have become the "police fund" and the "police area" respectively. 12. Happily for non-historians the notional responsibility of the police has been repeated in modern authority and it is sufficient to refer to [Dwyer]…”
“Once one appreciates that the reason for the 1886 Act placing the burden of paying compensation to the victims of riot damage on the police authority is that the police are responsible for law and order and that they are (notionally) in breach of that responsibility, it seems to me, as an English lawyer, that compensation payable is a sum which the police authority is "liable to pay as damages". The fact that the application is first made to the police authority and that the right to make a claim only arises after rejection (or receipt of a suggested amount which is alleged to be too low) does not make any difference to this conclusion. The situation is not dissimilar to that of an insurer who first has to consider a claim; he is still liable to damages (for breach of contract) if he wrongly rejects a claim or offers too low a sum.”
“In my judgment, however, the distinction which has been argued, and the stress which has been placed by the parties' submissions on the choice between the rationalisations, are not particularly helpful to the process of statutory interpretation which has to be undertaken. I can see no useful distinction for present purposes whether the 1886 Act is described as providing for no-fault compensation or as providing for liability premised on the notional responsibility of the police to maintain law and order. The police undoubtedly have a real and not merely notional responsibility for law and order (and within that responsibility a duty to deal with and if they can prevent riot) and there is no need for the 1886 Act to acknowledge that. What it seems to me is more significant for present purposes is that such a responsibility in terms of the 1886 Act is a strict one, however that is described: strict, notional, or not dependent on fault, blame or breach. What is the rationalisation of such a liability, obligation or duty? It seems to me that what Lord Mansfield had to say about that question, so much closer to the origin of the firstRiot Act 1714 , still retains pertinence, expressing as it does the common sense of the matter. It is for the sake of the party whose property has been damaged, it is to encourage the inhabitants (now the police force) of the locality, but including the party injured himself, all to assist in the preservation of the peace, it is to share the burden both of keeping the peace and of the misfortune of loss or injury. Moreover, as is so often the case with strict liability, it is because those who are liable to compensate are also regarded by the law as standing in the shoes of the wrongdoers themselves (as, for instance, in the case of the vicariously liable), in part because their obligation, their strict obligation, is to prevent what has happened happening.”
“word on the grapevine is it’s gonna happen in Enfield again tonight as the job was not done properly”
“What the fuck are you looking at?”
“27. It may be objected that the concept of responsibility in the previous paragraph is different from and an extension to the concept of "some breach of duty or obligation" as used by Sir Wilfrid Greene MR in Hall v Young. But it is not. Torts of strict liability are based on the concept of responsibility. As a matter of language it is somewhat unnatural to say that the land owner in Rylands v Fletcher, the common carrier or the innkeeper are in breach of duty when their obligation is to be strictly answerable because of the responsibility inherent in their respective positions. But it cannot be doubted that their liability is a liability in damages and that sums paid by them are sums which they are "legally liable to pay as damages". The same applies to statutes which give rise to strict liability such as theAir Navigation Act 1920 and theAnimals Act 1971 . The Riot (Damages) Act is no different.”
“51. Bedfordshire Police Authority v. Constable (arising out of the riot at Yarl's Wood) continues the modern authorities. There the issue was whether the Authority's obligation under the 1886 Act to compensate property owners for riot damage was covered by its liability insurance policy which insured it in respect of sums which it "may become legally liable to pay as damages for accidental damage to property" (emphasis added). The decision at first instance by Walker J to the effect that cover existed was considered by Beatson J, but this court's decision upholding Walker J had not yet then occurred. This court referred (at paras 11/14) to the concept of the "notional responsibility of the police to preserve law and order in their locality", as stated in Dwyer and approved in Edmonds and as agreed by the defendant insurers, and then proceeded to what was in essence a matter of construction of the contractual words "legally liable to pay as damages". This court concluded that the statute's strict notional responsibility could be regarded as a liability to pay damages, by analogy with either the obligation of insurers to indemnify, which lies for breach of contract, or with torts of strict liability (at paras 24/27). 52. In my judgment, the decision of this court is not in the least surprising, indeed it is not altogether easy to understand the insurers' contrary argument (advanced as it happens by reference to an English authority as to the effect of a French law: see at paras 21/24). It appears to be based on the concept that the proper analogy for the liability to compensate under the 1886 Act is that it is in the nature of an expense or dues.”
“This statute, though penal in a great part of its provisions, and though, perhaps, there is something of a penal nature in transferring the action from the party committing the felony to the hundred, yet, with respect to the party injured, must be considered as remedial. Antecedent to this statute, and till the trespass was turned into a felony, there is no doubt that, against the actors and their abettors, the party injured would have been entitled to recover damages for all his loss. In lieu of that remedy, which can no longer be had, it was thought better to substitute an action against the hundred, in analogy to the ancient policy of the kingdom, by which the men of each district were bound to maintain peace and order, and to answer for the violation of them within that district. The Act does not say that damages shall be yielded for the injury done to the fabric of the house, but, by the demolishing or pulling down of the house; and it seemed to be admitted in the argument that, if the destruction of the furniture in the house were the necessary consequence of the demolition of the house itself, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the full amount of his loss. …But will not the principle extend likewise to those damages which, though not the necessary consequence of the felony committed, yet are clearly the immediate effect of that cause? If, in order to destroy the walls, the mob break down the wainscoting and the glasses, or if by driving a beam or joist against the wall to throw that down, they break a glass fixed against the wainscot, it would be strange to argue that such destruction, not being a necessary, but only an immediate consequence of demolishing the house, should not be repaired by this action. The case might be different as to consequences that are neither necessary nor immediate: if, for instance, one set of rioters had broken in on the 7th of June and destroyed the house, leaving the goods in it, and the next day, another party had come to the house so left, and robbed it of the furniture.”
“The starting point on this issue must again be the words of the statute. Before any claim can be made there must be "...damage or injury...to any ...building...".The person who may claim is "the party injured or damnified thereby.".The entitlement is to "...full compensation for the loss or injury...".The key issue is whether the use of the definite article "the" means that the loss or injury must relate back to the description of damage or injury done to the building. In my view the argument that claims for loss or injury under section 10 are limited to physical damage is a sound one for the following reasons. First, the language of the provision can be contrasted with statutes allowing for compensation for "any damage done" or "any loss or damage". The loss that can be claimed is limited, it is not any loss arising from damage caused by riotous assembly.”
“If this element of value be admitted, a restitutio in integrum might, no doubt, by this process be effected”
“There is, I think, no inconsistency between the rule that statutory language retains the meaning it had when Parliament used it and the rule that a statute is always speaking. If Parliament, however long ago, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to apply to animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was passed but are so regarded now... More pertinent is the guidance given by the late Lord Wilberforce in his dissenting opinion in Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security[1981] AC 800 . The case concerned theAbortion Act 1967 and the issue which divided the House was whether nurses could lawfully take part in a termination procedure not known when the Act was passed. Lord Wilberforce said, at p.822 ;- ‘....when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the parliamentary intention. They may be held to do so, if they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy has been formulated. They may also be held to do so if there can be detected a clear purpose in the legislation which can only be fulfilled if the extension is made. How liberally these principles may be applied must depend upon the nature of the enactment, and the strictness or otherwise of the words in which it has been expressed. The courts should be less willing to extend expressed meanings if it is clear that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive’.” ‘....when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the parliamentary intention. They may be held to do so, if they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy has been formulated. They may also be held to do so if there can be detected a clear purpose in the legislation which can only be fulfilled if the extension is made. How liberally these principles may be applied must depend upon the nature of the enactment, and the strictness or otherwise of the words in which it has been expressed. The courts should be less willing to extend expressed meanings if it is clear that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive’.”
“Whereas by law the inhabitants of the hundred or other area in which property is damaged by persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together are liable in certain cases to pay compensation for such damage, and it is expedient to make other provision respecting such compensation and the mode of recovering the same…”
“A study of the cases and of the leading textbooks…appears to me to warrant the formulation of the following propositions: (1) Subordinate legislation may be used in order to construe the parent Act, but only where power is given to amend the Act by regulations or where the meaning of the Act is ambiguous. (2) Regulations made under the Act provide a Parliamentary or administrative contemporanea expositio of the Act but do not decide or control its meaning: to allow this would be to substitute the rule-making authority for the judges as interpreter and would disregard the possibility that the regulation relied upon was misconceived or ultra vires. (3) Regulations which are consistent with a certain interpretation of the Act tend to confirm that interpretation. (4) Where the Act provides a framework built on by contemporaneously prepared regulations, the latter may be a reliable guide to the meaning of the former….”
“[Counsel for the applicant] does not dissent from the proposition that if the time for Parliamentary disapproval had passed, I could have regard to the paragraph: and this is surely right. In my judgment, the fact that that time has not yet passed goes perhaps to the weight I should attach to the paragraph, but cannot constitute an absolute bar against my taking it into account. At present the paragraph has legal effect for the administration of immigration control, and does so in the context of the Act of 1993. There is manifestly no kind of presumption that Parliament will strike it down. Its position is analogous to, though not identical with, that of a statutory instrument which may be prayed in aid to construe main legislation, where it is clear that the two are intended to form an overall code; I do not think that in such a case the court would have to disregard entirely the statutory instrument on the ground only that it still remained open to Parliament to strike it down by negative resolution.”
“The compensation to be fixed is such as "appears" to the authority to be "just". The authority (and presumably the court too, but we are not concerned with that wrinkle) is therefore entitled to take a broad view of what the claimant is entitled to. That is emphasised by the proviso to section 2(1) which requires that regard shall be had to the conduct of the claimant, of which examples such as (lack of) precautions, complicity, and provocation are given, but the statute ends generally with "or otherwise". Therefore, the assessment of quantum is not a mere matter of valuation of the lost or damaged property. It is a global assessment which takes account of the claimant's conduct in the broadest sense.”
“To my mind, that provision [the second half of section 2(1)] makes it clear that, when compensation is claimed against the police authority, then it is entitled to take into account that the "person" claiming it was a public authority and had responsibility (whether sole or shared) for law and order in the public building or public institution where the riotous assembly occurred and which resulted in injury, destruction or damage to the building or property within it. This view is reinforced by the terms of section 3(1), because that provides that when a claim is made to the compensation authority, it has to inquire into the truth of the injury, stealing or destruction. The compensation authority has, if satisfied, to "…fix such compensation as appears to them to be just". That gives a broad discretion, although it must doubtless be exercised in a quasi – judicial manner. But the "just" result may be that the compensation is reduced to nil, because the "person" claiming is a public authority with responsibility for law and order in the public building or public institution where the injury, stealing, or destruction took place.”