“We would … kindly ask Owners cancel the message withdrawing the vessel from service. Indeed we would like to meet with you at your convenience to confirm our wish to build good working relations for the future between our companies”
“The present position is that the vessel has been withdrawn and Charterers must decide if they wish to reinstate the time charter or continue with the voyage instructions on a voyage charter basis. If they do wish to continue on one of these bases then they must do so at the current market rates which Owners have indicated to Charterers. If Charterers consider the market rate to be different then please advise so Owners can consider. Alternatively if Charterers do not wish to reinstate the time charter or continue on a voyage basis then they must make prompt arrangements for receipt back of their cargo. While Charterers are deciding how they wish to proceed or (if that is what they decide to do) making arrangements for off-loading of their cargo, Owners will proceed on the basis that Charterers have requested that Owners store Charterers’ cargo on board and reserve the right to claim remuneration at current market rates for such storage.”
“… Charterers once again expect Owners to reconsider latest decision and keep vessel on service and the [charterparty] in force. Charterers look forward to hearing asap from Owners in order to decide next steps, considering we have cargo on board, to decide if we authorize terminal to receive it back or proceed loading operation”
“In the present case, if one asks the question (eliminating the possibility of fault on the part of the shipowner) “Why was there an explosion?”, the answer is – “Because there was methane in the hold”
“The question of implication arises when the instrument does not expressly provide for what is to happen when some event occurs. The most usual inference in such a case is that nothing is to happen. If the parties had intended something to happen, the instrument would have said so. Otherwise, the express provisions of the instrument are to continue to operate undisturbed. If the event has caused loss to one or other of the parties, the loss lies where it falls.”
“… the first question to be asked is whether the services were rendered at the request (express or implied) of the charterers, in which event the charterers will ordinarily be liable to pay a reasonable remuneration for the services rendered, a liability which can probably be categorized as contractual. If however there was no such request, then there can be no contractual liability on the charterers; and their liability (if any) to pay remuneration for the services so rendered can only derive from the principles of restitution”
“Even if the notice of withdrawal were effective …, I cannot see any basis on which the shipowners could recover any sum from the charterers. The charterer who is a few minutes late or pays a few dollars too little is not thereby guilty of a repudiation of the charter. The damages for such a breach would be trifling. If there is cargo on board at the time of the notice of withdrawal – and the shipowner carries it to its destination – he does so by way of fulfilling the original charter or bill of lading – and not by way of any new request by the charterer. So he cannot recover the market rate either on a quantum meruit or otherwise”
“For any breach of [his duty to take proper steps to preserve bailed goods] the bailee is liable to the bailor in damages for any diminution in value of the goods consequent upon his failure to take such measures; and if he fulfils that duty he has, in my view, a correlative right to charge the owner of the goods with the expenses reasonably incurred in doing so”
“No one is bound, save by contract, to take a chattel to the owner of it; his only obligation is not to prevent the owner from getting it when he comes for it”
“(1) the contract of bailment was a commercial one; (2) it came to an end when the salved goods were brought to a place of safety, which, it has been the common assumption, was the entry into the port of Manila …; (3) the bailee then continued in possession as a gratuitous bailee; (4) he incurred reasonable expenses in safeguarding and preserving the goods to the benefit of the bailor; (5) the bailor stood by, knowing that the bailee was so acting to his (the bailor’s) benefit”
“The Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs of (i) the Application, (ii) the Claimant’s claim for a declaration, and (iii) the Defendant’s counterclaim. The basis of assessment shall be determined following trial of the remaining issues in the action.”
“I think that was the rule established long before 1885, because it is in accordance with my earliest experience of shipping law that the expense of procuring a bail bond, being in the interest of the person who made the application for the release of the vessel, fell to be borne by himself. The pursuer in the action was entirely indifferent as to whether he had the ship secured for his debt or money deposited in lieu of it. But it was to the interest of the defender, who desired the release of his vessel for its profitable employment, to obtain its release on such terms as the Court would sanction. Now that having been the practice in Scotland so far back as I can recollect, I see no warrant for changing that rule in the fact that the English Courts have now, in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon them by Parliament, issued a rule that in England such expense shall be treated as part of the expenses of process. These rules are not binding upon us, and we have no equivalent rule in Scotland.”
“This is a pure question of practice. As regards the Scots practice I entertain no doubt. When expenses generally are allowed only those expenses are to be included in the account which are expenses necessitated by the steps of process in the cause. I cannot understand how procuring a bail bond in order to liberate a ship which had been arrested can be regarded as in any sense a step of process. It is a step which the owners of the ship take for their own convenience, because they think it is better for them to have their ship at their disposal, and to pay the expenses necessary to procure a fund which may remain as a surrogatum, rather than let the ship remain under arrest. ”
“Subject to the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts and the rules of Courts made thereunder, and to the express provisions of any Statute, whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the Supreme Court, including the administration of estates and trusts, shall be in the discretion of the Court or Judge, and the Court or Judge shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent such costs are to be paid.”
“A practice previously unknown in the court of Admiralty has sprung up of recent years, whereby a commission, usually of 1l. per cent., is paid by the party giving bail to each of the sureties to the bail bond. This commission was formerly held to be no part of the costs of the action as between party and party (The Numida, The Collingrove, 10 P.D. 158), but might perhaps have been recovered as damages where the arrest had been improperly made. But it is now provided by R., S. C. Nov. 1900 (Order XII., rule 21a) that a commission or fee paid to a person becoming surety to a bail bond, or otherwise giving security, may be recovered on taxation, provided that the amount of such compensation or fee shall not in the aggregate exceed 1l. per cent, on the amount in which bail is given.”
“This note does not appear in the 1982 edition of the White Book …. From discussion with Admiralty Solicitors and with Admiralty Registrar it is clear that two views could be put forward. The one view is that there is now no longer any limit to the amount of the bail fee which would be awarded on a taxation of costs. The other view is that by long established custom practice the bail fee allowable on taxation is 1%. The purpose of this note is not to advocate any increase in bail fees but to suggest that any doubt which might exist should be clarified one way or the other.”
“The secretary reported that on a recent application before the Admiralty Registrar on a matter concerning bail fees. It was, perhaps somewhat tongue in cheek, put to the Registrar that there were no longer any rules governing the allowance of bail fees. He replied to the effect that it was deliberately left out of the new rules so that proper allowances could be made in respect of the actual costs providing security. In other words whilst bail fees will still be allowed, the Registrar’s discretion as to quantum is no longer fettered.”
“There must be many similar cases coming before the Commercial or Admiralty Courts where a vessel has been arrested in a foreign port and, pursuant to an agreement made either before or after the arrest, proceedings are subsequently brought before those Courts. It would be highly unsatisfactory if the costs incurred in arresting a vessel to secure a Plaintiff’s claim, even if the arrest took place abroad, could not be recovered as reasonable costs in the English courts now that the wording of the Rules has changed and a more general form of words is used in the current Rule, being Order 62, Rule 12”
“So far as the defendant’s claim in respect of fees for the report which he obtained from his expert is concerned, it seems to me quite clear that that report was obtained with a view to a dispute which has arisen and with a view to being used in evidence if proceedings did become necessary, and in the hope that it would assist in the settlement of the dispute without proceedings being started. In those circumstances, I think that the judge was right in reaching the conclusion that that report was something the fees for which, if recoverable at all, would be recoverable only under an order for costs. ”