“Was St. Petersburg covered by the express warranty of safety in clause 67?”
“…it was not part of the Owners’ case that St. Petersburg was permanently unsafe. Nor did they allege that it was known to be unsafe at the time the charter was concluded. Nor was there any evidence in relation to either point.”
“12. Turning now to the construction of this contract, the Charterers argued that it was to be inferred by (i) naming St. Petersburg as a load port (ii) expressly deleting the safe port warranty contained in lines 24-31 of the standard form charter and (iii) including it instead in clause 67 (which dealt primarily with trading exclusions) that the safe port warranty only applied to the unnamed load port(s) and the discharge ports – which were not named. They argued that any other construction would give no effect to the express deletion of lines 26-31 and the insertion of the safe port provision in the Trading Exclusions clause at Rider Clause 67. 13. The Owners denied that any such inference could be made. As a matter of construction, they submitted, the charterparty provided for a time charter trip via St. Petersburg/Baltic/Continent to the Far East with an intended cargo of steel products “within below mentioned trading limits”
“22. It was the Owners’ case that the nature of the damage as described in the report of Captain Bogachev of Sea Wolf Ltd. was entirely consistent with the Master’s explanation in his two statements. The voyage through the ice took 6 days rather than the usual period of 1 day. Throughout that period the “LIVANITA” was having to deal with broken ice of up to 60cm left in the wake of the ice breaker. Although the ice was broken by the ice breaker, it did not disappear and over the period of 6 days the ice blocks created by the breaker were likely to have caused damage to both sides of the “LIVANITA’s” hull. The Master candidly admitted that on occasions he did not maintain the convoy speed. He said that, had he done so, the damage to his vessel would have been substantially greater, as the unbroken ice would have hit the “LIVANITA” with greater force. “25. The central difficulty with the Charterers’ case was that they had to demonstrate that the Master’s decision marginally to reduce the speed ordered by the convoy leader caused the damage and that none would have occurred had the Master complied strictly with the convoy’s instructions. As the Owners argued, the Master was “on the spot” (in any event, he was “on the horns of a dilemma”). His prime concern was the safety of the vessel and the crew and to minimise damage to the vessel. The primary concern of the convoy was to get as many ships safely through the ice as possible – even at the expense of minor damage to individual ships. Furthermore, we agreed with the Owners that the distinction that the Charterers sought to draw between the Master “forcing ice” as opposed to “following ice breakers” was somewhat artificial. We did not accept that marginally dropping speed from 0.3nm/h to 0.6nm/h as described by the Master to lessen the impact of the ice on the vessel constituted “forcing ice”
“Where a charterparty expressly names a loading port and also contains, in a different section of the charterparty, a safe port warranty, does that safe port warranty apply to the named loading port? If the answer to the above question is “yes”, is the owner still entitled to rely upon the safe port warranty in circumstances where the owner knew or should reasonably have known that the named port was unsafe at the time the charterparty was entered into?”
“1. I grant leave to appeal pursuant tosection 69(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 because there arises out of the award a question of law which is of general public importance, in the sense of being of general importance to the relevant commercial community, as to which the decision of the tribunal is in my judgment at least open to serious doubt. 2. I am not sure that the charterers’ formulation necessarily states precisely the question of law which in fact arises in this case. To my mind the critical question in this case arises out of the fact that the named port was, by the time the vessel came to use it, “unsafe” in an entirely predictable and indeed entirely to be expected respect, i.e., the approaches were affected by ice. The charterparty expressly stipulates that the vessel may be required to follow icebreakers. This feature alone renders it arguable that the decisions in “The Helen Miller” … and “The Mary Lou” … are not of direct application. 3. Furthermore in “The Mary Lou”
“Further and alternatively, does the charterer act in breach [of] the safe port warranty in circumstances where the nominated port is, at the time the vessel uses it, “unsafe” in a reasonably predictable and expected way.”
“Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied – (a) … , (b) That the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine. …” (a) … , (b) That the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine. …”
“ whether the wording in the Charterparty referring to the sole loadport as ‘I safe port Ventspils’, constituted a warranty by the Charterer of the safety of the port, as opposed to an agreement by both parties that the port was safe.”
“Charterers further submit that although the ice may have become thicker, the port was being kept open by ice breakers and, although ingress and egress from it may have become more difficult, the safety of the port was not affected.”
“Charterers’ case is that the port of St Petersburg was safe at all material times. The provision of ice breakers kept the port open and safe despite ice conditions.”