“Section 3(3) deals with statutory obligations of secrecy but not, in my judgment, the heads of public policy which may justify non-disclosure. When one considers the various heads of policy, such as national security, diplomatic relations and the administration of central government, which have been held to justify non-disclosure even for the purposes of justice, I find it impossible to suppose that the only public interest which Parliament thought capable of taking precedence over the investigation of fraud was the efficient collection of the revenue. The reason, in my judgment, why section 3(3) overrides most statutory obligations of secrecy is that these are expressed in absolute terms, or at any rate in terms which permit no exception for the needs of the S.F.O. But the doctrine of public policy, which may well underlie some of the statutory provisions, permits a balance to be struck between the public interest in preserving secrecy and the public interest in the investigation of fraud. There was no reason why these heads of public policy should have to be excluded from the concept of "reasonable excuse" and in my judgment section 3(3) does not have this effect.”
“. . . . . . . . an order for production of documents to a solicitor on behalf of a party to civil litigation is made upon the implied undertaking given by the solicitor personally to the court (of which he is an officer) that he himself will not use or allow the documents or copies of them to be used for any collateral or ulterior purpose of his own, his client or anyone else; and any breach of that implied undertaking is a contempt of court by the solicitor himself. Save as respects the gravity of the contempt no distinction is to be drawn between those documents which have and those which have not been admitted in evidence; to make use for some collateral or ulterior purpose of the special advantage obtained by having possession of copies of any of an adverse party's documents obtained upon discovery is, in my view, a contempt of court.”