“a. …it is evident from the Company’s latest audited accounts that the Company is balance sheet insolvent. The Company has no realistic prospect of meeting its liabilities in full, and there is an obvious and pressing need for an office‑holder to take control in order to protect the interests of creditors as a whole. b. The Applicants have very substantial claims against the Company. The significant size of these claims, relative to the Company’s asset base, means that every day of delay increases the risk of value being lost to the general body of creditors, whether through dissipation of assets, incurring further liabilities, or transactions entered into without proper regard to creditors’ interests. An administrator is needed urgently to stabilise the position and prevent further prejudice. c. I am aware that several other key creditors have material exposures to the Company and are themselves becoming increasingly concerned about the deterioration in the Company’s financial position. d. All of this is set against a background of serious and unresolved questions regarding the management and governance of the Company and the wider MFS Group. There are credible concerns about mismanagement and the way in which key decisions of the Company and/or the MFS Group have been taken. Creditors require access to information and documents in order to understand their position, but that information has not been provided to date. An administrator is urgently required to secure and review those materials, investigate the conduct of management, and take steps to recover any assets or unwind any transactions which may be challengeable. e. Further, the Applicants concerns have been heightened by observations by the English Court in previous (unrelated) proceedings concerning Mr. Raja’s conduct and character acting in his capacity as the sole director and CEO of the Company. f. The above developments underline the immediacy of the crisis and the need for a prompt, court‑sanctioned appointment. There is a clear risk that Mr. Raja may seek to shape the process to his own advantage, including by selecting office‑holders who he has sought to form relationships with. It is therefore essential that administrators are appointed by the Court now, to ensure that the administration is conducted independently, transparently, and in the best interests of the general body of creditors.”
“On19 February 2026 , Mr Raja filed an application, on behalf of the Company, seeking to appoint Mr Patel and I as its joint administrators under Paragraph 12(1)(b) of Schedule B1, which was originally listed to be heard on6 March 2026 . Owing to the urgency of the matter and concerns expressed by a number of stakeholders, with whom we had engaged at short notice, and to avoid a potentially protracted period of uncertainty, this application was withdrawn and it was proposed that the Company would instead immediately pursue the out-of-court appointment of Mr Patel and I, for expedience…it came to my attention that the Applicants had filed the instant Application, purporting to be creditors of the Company, in order to, essentially, block the proposed out-of-court appointment and have managed to secure an immediate hearing…”
“Each of ABL and ZBL appointed MFS as its servicer pursuant to the ABL Servicing Agreement and ZBL Servicing Agreement (respectively) in respect of the mortgage loans ABL and ZBL provided to underlying customers. MFS’ obligations as servicer include collecting the income on the mortgage loans (whether principal, interest or otherwise) from underlying customers and ensuring that income is promptly deposited into nominated bank accounts of ABL or ZBL (as the case may be). Since at least December 2025, MFS has not been acting in compliance with the Servicing Agreements and the Administrators understand that, since at least that date, most of the income on the mortgage loans has not been paid into the nominated bank accounts as required. It is unclear where the missing income is, especially as MFS has not provided this information, despite such information having been requested and despite the fact that MFS is in breach of contract and subject to extensive contractual obligations to provide information relating to the servicing activities and the underlying portfolio. However, at present, the Administrators have reason to believe, pursuant to discussions had between the Administrators and Stephen Katz of BTG Begbies Traynor (London) LLP, that ABL and ZBL are the largest creditors of the broader network of companies owned by, among others, Paresh Raja (including MFS), and have amounts due to them of approximately£1 billion . A significant part of these creditor claims will be due to income on the mortgage loans not being paid into the nominated bank accounts of ABL and ZBL (as applicable), and applied as required, in clear and flagrant breach of MFS’ obligations under the Servicing Agreements. Given the ongoing administrations across the group (both prospective and actual) and the lack of transparency as to what has happened to these monies, it appears inevitable that these breaches will entitle ABL and ZBL to further claims and damages against MFS. Our concerns in this regard were only exacerbated by the fact that it appears from the claim brought against Barclays by MFS and others that these breaches have been ongoing since (at the latest) November 2025 which was never communicated to ABL and ZBL’s lenders. Separately to missing income payments, due to the lack of information and cooperation mentioned above, it remains unclear whether mortgage loans with perfected priority mortgages over the underlying properties, which were funded by and therefore ought to have been held by ABL or ZBL have been improperly dissipated. To the extent that has occurred, ABL and/or ZBL will have further grounds for damages claims against MFS. Based on the information from Stephen Katz of BTG Begbies Traynor (London) LLP referenced in paragraph 2.4, it is evident that the majority of the mortgages that should have been held by ABL or ZBL have been dissipated and these damages claims will be very extensive.”
“There is a public interest in office holders charged with the administration of an insolvent estate not only acting but being seen to be acting in the best interest of the creditors generally; and ensuring that all legitimate claims that the company may have are thoroughly investigated. This is a reflection of a more general principle that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. The importance of the principle is reflected, amongst other ways, in the fact that applications for recusal are almost always made not on the ground of actual bias but on the ground of appearance of bias.”
“I was also informed by Begbies that (i) with respect to ZBL, which has lent£520 million of debt, there is only£110 million of ‘true value’ available in its collateral account (an unaccounted for deficiency of£410 million ); and (ii) with respect to ABL, which has lent£640m of debt, there is only£120m of ‘true value’ available in its collateral account (an unaccounted for deficiency of£520 million ).”
“The court may make an administration order in relation to a company only if satisfied— (a) that the company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts, and (b) that the administration order is reasonably likely to achieve the purpose of administration.”