Niranjali Manek v Sintl Ventures Ltd & Anor [2026] EWHC 600 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 600 (Ch)

Case No BL-2025-000983

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

BUSINESS LIST (ChD)

Venue 7 Rolls Building, Fetter Lane

Date 15 January 2026

London

EC4A 1NL

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE HODGE KC

Sitting as a Judge of the Chancery Division

Between

NIRANJALI MANEKClaimant

(1) SINTL VENTURES LTDDefendants

(2) MUHAMMAD HAROON SAEEDDefendant

MS FRANCESCA MITCHELL (instructed by ARMA Litigation Ltd, Leeds) for Claimant

for The Defendants did not attend and were not represented

APPROVED JUDGMENT

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.

2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.

Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE

Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com

Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com

[1]This is my extemporary judgment on a claim proceeding in the Business List of the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales under claim number BL-2025-000983. On its face, this claim might more appropriately have been issued in the Property, Trusts and Probate List. During the course of this hearing, an interesting procedural question has arisen as to what the court should do in a case where summary judgment is sought on only part of a claim and no defence has yet been filed. I will deal with that aspect during the course of this extemporary judgment.

[2]The claim concerns a property at 227 Western Road, London, SW19 2QD. That property is owned by the claimant, Mrs Niranjali Manek. On 3 March 2025, she entered into a contract to sell that property to the first defendant, SINTL Ventures Limited. That company is a special purpose vehicle owned and controlled by the second defendant, Muhammad Haroon Saeed. The claim form was issued on 18 August 2025. It is deemed to have been served on the defendants on 27 August 2025; and they filed an acknowledgment of service stating an intention to defend the claim on the following day, 28 August 2025.

[3]There are two applications before the court. The first in point of time is an application by the claimant, dated 21 August 2025, for summary judgment on part of its claim requiring the first defendant to withdraw two extant applications to enter unilateral notices against the title to the property at HM Land Registry, and also an interim injunction restraining the defendants from further interfering with the claimant’s onward sale of the property following her alleged rescission of the contract for sale with the first defendant.

[4]That application was issued before the acknowledgment of service was filed by the defendants. Normally an acknowledgment of service is required before an application for summary judgment can be issued. The reason for that is that if no acknowledgment of service is filed, then judgment in default can often be entered. There is, however, a carve-out from that general rule in the case of claims for the specific performance or, as in this case, the rescission of a contract for the sale of land. In such cases, an application for summary judgment can be issued at any time after the claim form has been served on the defendant. However, there must have been service of the claim form on the defendant; and, in the present case, the application for summary judgment was made before the date of service of the claim form.

[5]However, it seems to me that any objection to this application on the grounds of prematurity can be met by two answers; and this may be the reason why no objection on that ground has been raised by or on behalf of the defendants. The first answer to any objection, as it seems to me, is that by a consent order made by Richards J on 28 August 2025, provision was made for the listing of this summary judgment application. It therefore seems to me that the defendants have waived any objection to the procedural irregularity of this summary judgment application on the grounds of prematurity.

[6]The second answer to any objection is that under CPR 3.10, any error of procedure does not invalidate a step in proceedings unless the court makes an order to that effect; and the court also has the necessary power to remedy any error of procedure. Given the defendants’ consent to the listing of this application, as expressed in the consent order approved by Richards J on 28 August, I have no doubt that if there has been no waiver of any irregularity, then the court should order that the error of procedure is remedied. I have indicated to counsel appearing for the claimant, Ms Francesca Mitchell, that the order should include a recital giving effect to those two answers to any objection to the procedural irregularity of this summary judgment application.

[7]The second application before the court is one issued by the defendants, on 3 October 2025, for a further extension of time, until 22 October 2025, for the service of their defence. As a matter of history, no defence has been filed or served, whether before or after 3 October 2025. It seems to me that that application was entirely unnecessary.

[8]That is because CPR 24.4(4) provides that if a party applies for summary judgment before a defendant has filed a defence, the defendant by or against whom the application is made need not file any defence before the hearing of that application. Thus, since the claimant had issued her summary judgment application before any defence had been filed, and before the time for filing any defence had arrived, it was unnecessary for the defendant to seek an extension of time for service because CPR 24.4(4) provides that the defendant need not file any defence before the hearing of the summary judgment application.

[9]That point gave rise to an interesting dialogue between the court and counsel at this hearing as to what, if anything, the court should do about the filing of a defence. This is a case in which the claimant is seeking summary judgment on only part of its claim and therefore a defence should be filed to the remainder of the claim. Ms Mitchell, for the claimant and applicant, sought to contend that even though the defendants do not need to file a defence before this hearing, if they do not then do so, then the claimant can immediately enter judgment in default on the balance of the claim, in this case, no doubt, for damages to be assessed.

[10]I do not think that that can be right. Clearly the Civil Procedure Rules Committee cannot have thought that once the hearing has taken place, a defendant is immediately in default of defence. That would rather defeat the provision that the defendant need not file any defence before the summary judgment application is heard.

[11]In my judgment, the answer is to be found in CPR 24.6(a), which provides that when the court determines a summary judgment application, it may give directions as to the filing and service of a defence. Ms Mitchell rightly emphases the permissive nature of that provision: the court ‘may’ give directions; it is not required to do so. However, the commentary at paragraph 24.6.9 of the White Book, under the heading ‘Case management’, reads:

“Where the court dismisses the application or [as in this case] makes an order that does not completely dispose of the claim, the court will give case management directions as to the future conduct of the case.”

[12]It seems to me that in furtherance of the overriding objective, the court should give directions as to the filing of a defence in any case where the application for summary judgment does not completely dispose of the claim. Otherwise it seems to me that the claim is left in limbo: there is no time by which any defence is to be filed. It seems to me that it cannot be right in those circumstances that a claimant can, at any time, enter judgment in default because there is no default as to the service of any defence within any time prescribed by the rules of court. So, I am satisfied that the court should give case management directions for the filing and service of any defence. If either defendant does so, then it will not be open to the claimant to seek judgment in default against that defendant.

[13]I have indicated that what I propose to do is to direct the filing and service of any defence by 4pm on Friday 30 January 2026; in other words, two weeks from tomorrow. The defendants have had ample time to prepare for the service of any defence. They asked until 22 October of last year to do so, and they cannot therefore complain if they are given the normal period of 14 days, plus an additional day to assimilate the court’s order. So that disposes of the defendants’ application. Since, however, the application was, on my view, unnecessary; and, in any event, it was seeking an indulgence of the court, it is only right that the defendants, as applicants, should pay the claimant’s costs of the extension application.

[14]The evidence in support of the application now comprises no less than four witness statements. There is a witness statement from the claimant herself, Mrs Niranjali Manek. That statement is really formal in nature because the substantive evidence comes from her husband, Mr Neil Manek, who was the person who had the overall conduct of the contract of sale with the first defendant. There is also a witness statement from Rajat Sharma, who is a partner in the claimant’s litigation solicitors’ practice, ARMA Litigation. All of those statements are dated 20 August 2025. There is a further statement, filed and served more recently, dated 9 January 2026 from Ailsa Selman. She is a solicitor and partner in ARMA Litigation Limited; and she addresses post-summary judgment application events.

[15]I have already referred to the appearance of Ms Francesca Mitchell as counsel for the claimant and applicant. There is no one here on behalf of either of the two defendants and respondents. The explanation for that is to be found in a letter that was sent by the defendants’ solicitors, Fladgate, to Chancery Judges’ Listing on Monday of this week, 12 January 2026. That letter informs the court that the defendants do not intend to attend or be represented at this hearing; nor do Fladgate, as their solicitors, have any instructions to file or serve any substantive submissions in relation to the two applications that are before the court beyond those included in the evidence already filed in support.

[16]Fladgate state that the defendants are content for the court to scrutinise the material already before it and to hear the claimant’s counsel, if appropriate, and to determine both applications in the defendants’ absence in accordance with CPR 23.11(1). I have no doubt that that is the appropriate course to take. The defendants have had every opportunity to attend this hearing, and they have elected not to do so. Fladgate state that their clients’ decision not to attend this hearing has been based on procedural, financial, and wider commercial considerations. In a responsive letter to Fladgate’s letter, dated 13 January 2026, from the claimant’s solicitors, ARMA Litigation Limited, they point out that there is no explanation of what any of those procedural, financial, or wider commercial considerations might be.

[17]Fladgate state that the defendants would, however, like them to make clear that the position being taken in relation to this hearing should not be treated, or constituted, or construed as any admission regarding any matters in dispute on the claimant’s application, or the claim more widely. The defendants’ position on all substantive points not disposed of by the court’s decision on this application will, Fladgate say, be fully pleaded in a defence in due course. Fladgate state that they wish to stress that the defendants intend to defend the wider claim, the substance of which, so they say, remains heavily disputed. The defendants also are said to reserve their right to prosecute any relevant counterclaims.

[18]Fladgate confirm that the defence and counterclaim will be filed and served in accordance with the court’s directions, which they anticipate being made at this hearing. To that end, and pursuant to the court’s power to make directions for the filing and service of any defence upon determining a summary judgment application, they invite the court to make an order that such defence and counterclaim should be filed and served not less than 21 days from the date of service of any order for directions, broadly in line with the period sought by way of the defendants’ application. As I have already indicated, I see no reason why, given the time that has already elapsed since 22 October, which was the date by reference to which the defendants had been proposing to file and serve their defence, any extension beyond 14 days can in any way be justified.

[19]Fladgate conclude again by reiterating that the position being taken in relation to this application by the defendants should not be treated or construed as any admission regarding any matters in dispute on either the application, or the claim more widely. Fladgate state that their clients’ position on all substantive points not disposed of by the court’s decision on this application will be fully pleaded in a defence in due course.

[20]I have read all of the evidence in support of the application. By way of summary, the claimant served a valid notice to complete on the first defendant. The first defendant failed to complete the contract for the purchase of the property when time was of the essence, apparently because it had insufficient funds to enable it to do so. That was a fundamental breach of contract which entitled the claimant to treat the contract as repudiated, which she did by accepting the repudiation and rescinding the contract, and by retaining the deposit, in accordance with condition 10.5 of the standard commercial property conditions which had been incorporated into the sale contract.

[21]Despite that, the first defendant has applied for no less than three unilateral notices to be placed on the title of the property. The first, which protected the contract for sale itself, was withdrawn belatedly by the first defendant following the consent order approved by Richards J on 28 August 2025, although the first defendant clearly was in breach of contract by failing to withdraw it earlier. There are, however, still extant two further applications for unilateral notices which are preventing the claimant from selling her property, and causing her significant prejudice.

[22]The claimant has already lost one sale, and the opportunity that this would have given her to invest in a valuable investment opportunity. That is all the result of the defendants’ conduct. She has now contracted to sell the property to a third party, SK Hub Limited, with a longstop completion date of 19 May this year. The claimant cannot complete on that sale if the applications for unilateral notices, or any resulting notices, remain on the title. It is in those circumstances that the claimant seeks summary judgment, first of all confirming that the first defendant breached condition 10.2 of the standard conditions of the sale contract by failing to withdraw its first unilateral notice application before the application for summary judgment, and Richards J’s decision thereon; and, secondly, by requiring the defendant to withdraw the two extant further applications for unilateral notices.

[23]I am satisfied that, as the claimant asserts, the first defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim in relation to these unilateral notices. I am satisfied that there is no other reason, still less any compelling reason, why that aspect of the case needs to be disposed of at a trial. It is quite clear on the evidence that the first defendant caused the contract to go off. That was down to the first defendant, rather than to any conduct on the part of the claimant. The first defendant has no entitlement to the deposit that was paid over to the claimant’s conveyancing solicitors as stakeholder; nor can the first defendant assert any interest in the property capable of being protected by a unilateral notice. In those circumstances, the first defendant cannot be permitted to retain its two extant applications for unilateral notices over the title to the property.

[24]Ms Mitchell sets out the history of the contract at paragraphs 9 through to 26 of her written skeleton argument. I am entirely satisfied that her recital of the facts in those paragraphs is amply borne out by the uncontradicted evidence in the witness statements filed in support of the summary judgment application, and the underlying documents exhibited to such evidence. Ms Mitchell also sets out the history relating to the three applications for unilateral notices to be entered against the title to the property at paragraph 27 of her skeleton argument. Again, her recital of the facts is amply supported by the underlying evidence.

[25]In addition, at paragraph 28, Ms Mitchell emphasises that on 14 August 2025, and following the valid rescission of the contract, the claimant had offered to place the deposit that had been paid to her solicitors as stakeholders into an escrow account pending the resolution of this dispute, provided the defendants withdrew their applications for unilateral notices. That offer was rejected on the same day; and, indeed, it was four days later that the first defendant applied, on 18 August, to register the third unilateral notice.

[26]Ms Mitchell points to the fact that there was absolutely no justification for that because the interest sought to be protected was already the subject matter of the second unilateral notice application in so far as it sought to protect a buyer’s lien arising from the unlawful release of the stakeholder deposit, and because the other basis for the third unilateral notice, a pending land action, was advanced on the basis that the defendants intended to file a defence and counterclaim when, in fact, no such statement of case has been filed by either defendant, whether within the time prescribed by the rules or at all.

[27]It is the defendants’ case that it was the claimant who repudiated the sale contract, thereby entitling the first defendant to the return of the deposit paid in two tranches following exchange of contracts. Ms Mitchell correctly submits that neither argument as to any equitable charge for the deposit has any prospect of success.

[28]The first contention advanced by the defendants is that prior to the notice of rescission, the claimant had already repudiated the contract by placing it into auction. Ms Mitchell submits, correctly, that there is no merit in that argument at all. That is for two reasons: First, when, on 15 May 2025, the second defendant informed the claimant, through her husband and agent, that the first defendant was unlikely to be able to complete on the agreed contractual completion date of 23 May 2025, Mr Manek made it clear that whilst the intention was to place the property into an auction, “in the event you complete the property could be withdrawn from that auction”. In the event, the claimant entered the property into an auction that was only going to be held on 17 June, which was after the notice to complete would have already expired.

[29]Ms Mitchell submits that, looking at all the circumstances objectively, the claimant failed to evince any intention to abandon, and altogether refuse to perform, the contract when the claimant’s husband indicated that she proposed to enter the property into an auction in the future solely as a precaution in the event that the first defendant did not complete. In that regard, reliance is placed upon the test stated by Etherton LJ in Eminence Property Developments Ltd v Heaney

[2010] EWCA Civ 1168

at [61].

[30]There, Etherton LJ made it clear that the legal test for repudiatory conduct is whether, looking at all the circumstances objectively, that is from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the innocent party, the contract breaker has clearly shown an intention to abandon and altogether refuse to perform the contract. That is not satisfied by indicating an intention to place a property into auction when one simultaneously makes it clear that, in the event that the contracting purchaser completes, the vendor can withdraw the property from that auction. In any event, Ms Mitchell points out that once it knew about the proposed entry into the auction, the defendants did not accept that entry as any repudiation. Instead, the defendants sought to keep the contract alive, and to negotiate a further extension of time for completion.

[31]Ms Mitchell places reliance upon observations of Barling J in the case of Cantt Pak Ltd v Pak Southern China Property Investment Ltd

[2018] EWHC 2564 (Ch)

at [127]. There, Barling J said:

“The defendant did not accept the claimant’s repudiation and terminate the contract. Rather, the defendant wished to keep it alive. In those circumstances, the contract was alive for both parties, and the defendant was obliged to complete (claiming damages if so advised), unless it immediately sought specific performance (again, with a claim for damages if so advised). The defendant did not complete. Nor did it claim specific performance until it counterclaimed many months later in these proceedings on the basis of its own notice to complete.”

Barling J went on to state that it might reasonably be inferred that the delay was because the defendant had earlier not been in any financial position to complete and to establish grounds for specific performance. In failing to complete by the deadline, the defendant was itself in repudiatory breach of the contract; and the claimant was entitled to accept this repudiation, notwithstanding its own previous breach.

[32]It seems to me that that is entirely analogous with the position here if, contrary to my earlier conclusion, there had been any repudiatory breach on the part of the claimant by intimating an intention to place the property into auction, even whilst making it clear that if the first defendant should complete, the claimant could withdraw the property from auction.

[33]The second argument raised by the defendants as to why there was a repudiation of the contract by the claimant which entitles the first defendant to the return of its deposit is that the claimant had served its own notice of rescission prematurely, and, in doing so, the claimant acted in repudiatory breach of contract. Again, that is entirely incorrect. Ms Mitchell analyses the dates of the notice to complete and the notice of rescission in a table set out at paragraph 29.2 of her skeleton argument. Essentially, what is being said is that the defendants say that the notice to rescind was served early only by cherry-picking dates. The defendants take the postal deemed date of service for the notice to complete of 28 May 2025, yet they take the fax/email deemed date of service for the notice to rescind of 10 June.

[34]I am entirely satisfied that Ms Mitchell is correct in her contention that the defendants cannot have it both ways. Either service by fax or email is not permitted, in which case it is the date of postal service which should be adopted. Alternatively, if service by fax or email is permitted, then it is the date on which the notice to rescind was served in that way which prevails. On any analysis, I am satisfied that the claimant’s notice to complete, and then notice of rescission, were correctly served on the dates prescribed by the special conditions of sale. I am satisfied, as a result, that the claimant has validly rescinded the contract of sale.

[35]In any event, Ms Mitchell is correct in her further submission that there is no purchaser’s equitable lien for its deposit where such deposit is paid not to the seller, or an agent for the seller, but, rather, to a stakeholder. That was the position here. The deposit was paid to the claimant’s conveyancing lawyers, Hanney, Dawkins and Jones, expressly as stakeholder, and on terms that, on completion, the deposit would be paid to the claimant with accrued interest. That is the effect of standard condition 3.2.2.

[36]There is clear authority, in the form of the decision of Wynn-Parry J in the case of Combe v Lord Swaythling

[1947] Ch 625

, to the effect that where a deposit is paid to a stakeholder, the purchaser has no lien over the property. That is the established position, as acknowledged both in Megarry and Wade, at paragraph 14-106 and footnote 426 to paragraph 14-055, where the case of Combe v Lord Swaythling is cited as authority for the statements, and also paragraph 44-014 of the current edition of Snell’s Equity.

[37]As the deposit was paid to the claimant’s conveyancing solicitors as stakeholder, the first defendant was never entitled to any equitable lien over the property. That is the case even if, contrary to my earlier holding, it was the claimant’s conduct that caused the contract to go off. The first defendant might have a claim in damages for breach of contract; but that would not give rise to any proprietary interest sufficient to give rise to any entitlement to apply for a unilateral notice in relation to the property.

[38]So for those reasons, I am satisfied that the claimant is entitled to a declaration that the first defendant had no reasonable cause to make any of the unilateral notice applications, whether in respect of the deposit, or any threatened defence or counterclaim operating by way of a pending land action. I am also satisfied that the claimant is entitled to a declaration that the first defendant had no reasonable cause to maintain any unilateral notice in relation to the contract of sale once this had been validly rescinded; and that clause 10.2(b) of the standard conditions of the contract of sale required the first defendant to cancel the unilateral notice that had been entered in order to protect the now rescinded sale contract.

[39]It follows that the claimant is entitled to summary judgment on the claims particularised at paragraphs 26 to 31 of the particulars of claim. The first defendant should, by 4pm next Friday, 23 January, withdraw the two extant unilateral notice applications. The first defendant has already withdrawn the first application. There must also be an injunction restraining the first defendant from applying to register any further notices against the title to the property arising out of the now rescinded contract of sale.

[40]In addition, the claimant seeks an interim injunction restraining any further interference on the part of either defendant with the property or its sale. Ms Mitchell submits, in my judgment correctly, that in light of my earlier holdings, the first defendant has no continuing interest in the property and yet the defendants have unlawfully interfered in the claimant’s attempts to sell it without any valid basis for doing so. The matters of which complaint is made are summarised at paragraphs 33 and 34 of Ms Mitchell’s skeleton argument.

[41]Again, I am satisfied that those matters are made out on the unchallenged, supporting evidence. As a result, I am satisfied that the claimant has, at the very least, raised serious questions to be tried as to the existence of claims against both defendants for procuring the breach of the contract for sale that the claimant has entered into with SK Hub Limited, and also in the torts of malicious falsehood or slander of title for the statements they have been making about the property.

[42]Applying the well known American Cyanamid guidelines, I am satisfied: first, that the claims against the defendants raise a number of serious questions to be tried. Despite ample opportunity to do so, the defendants have failed and neglected to provide any arguable defence to those claims.

[43]Secondly, it is clear that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the claimant. She is unable to sell a valuable property, and, as a result, has been unable to utilise the sale proceeds in further investment opportunities. Nor is there any reason to think that the defendants would be able to satisfy any order for damages. The first defendant is a single, or special, purpose vehicle, incorporated for the purposes of this purchase, which has now proved abortive because of the first defendant’s inability to raise the necessary funding. The second defendant is an individual whose assets are unknown.

[44]Third, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours the claimant. The defendants have no rights in the property and no proper basis for interfering in its sale. There is the risk of severe prejudice to the claimant if the defendants continue to interfere. Conversely, there is no risk to the defendants if they are prevented from doing so. The defendants have had ample opportunity to justify their conduct, but they have elected not to do so. Moreover, the claimant will provide a cross-undertaking in damages, and there is evidence of her ability to satisfy any award of damages that might be made in the defendants’ favour if the defendants, or either of them, were able to establish any claim to recover such damages.

[45]Finally, there is the fact that the claimant invited the defendants to give voluntary undertakings not to contact prospective purchasers of the property for the purpose of interfering with, frustrating, preventing, or delaying any sale of it, or publishing material which would have the same effect, but the defendants have declined to do so. In short, the defendants have interfered with the claimant’s attempts to sell her property; and they must be prevented from continuing to do so. I am satisfied, therefore, that until further order or final judgment, the defendants must not publish or communicate, orally or in writing, directly or indirectly, any statements concerning the property to any person who has made an offer to purchase it from the claimant, or has expressed an interest in doing so, or any person conducting or attending an auction of the property.

[46]There will be provision for the defendants to apply at any time to vary or discharge the order; but if they wish to do so they must first inform the claimant’s legal representatives in writing at least two clear days beforehand. That right to apply or vary should be expressly limited to the injunctive relief in paragraph 5 of the court’s order. I see no reason why it should extend to the orders in relation to the withdrawal of the applications for unilateral notices.

[47]Finally, I have to address the costs of both applications, including the costs expressly reserved by Richards J’s approval of the consent order. I have already indicated that the claimant is entitled to the costs of the extension application. So far as the summary judgment application is concerned, I am satisfied that that has been entirely successful. There has been no admissible offer on the part of the defendants to compromise that application. Even when indicating that they were not proposing to attend to defend or resist the summary judgment application, no offer was made in relation to that. It follows that costs should follow the event, and be paid by the defendants to the claimant.

[48]Since this hearing has taken less than a day, it is appropriate that I should undertake a summary assessment. Ms Mitchell invites the court to do so on the indemnity, rather than the usual, standard basis. The consequences of an indemnity basis of assessment are: first, that issues of proportionality do not fall to be considered on the assessment; and, secondly, that in the event of any doubt as to the entitlement to any element of the claim for costs, such doubt, on an indemnity basis assessment, would fall to be resolved in favour of the claimant, as the receiving party, rather than the defendants, as the paying parties, which would be the case on a standard basis assessment.

[49]I am satisfied that this is a proper case to order assessment of costs on the indemnity, rather than the standard, basis. The defendants have demonstrated unreasonable conduct of this litigation to a high degree, falling outside the norm for commercial litigation of the present character. This is a case where the defendants have effectively spun out the hearing of this summary judgment application from 21 August 2025 until today, 15 January 2026.

[50]In addition, the defendants, through their solicitors, have made serious allegations against the propriety of the conduct of both the claimant’s conveyancing and their litigation solicitors. They have contacted the Solicitors Regulation Authority in relation to aspects of that conduct relating to the release of the deposit held as stakeholder. Even when the claimant offered to pay the amount of the deposit into an escrow account, to be held against the outcome of this litigation, that offer was refused, and the first defendant proceeded to apply for a third unilateral notice.

[51]I am satisfied, by reference to the email and other correspondence to which I have been taken, that the defendants, through their solicitors, have done all that they could to delay the hearing of this summary judgment application until the middle of January 2026. Having achieved that degree of delay, they then waited until the Monday before this hearing today before indicating that they were not proposing to attend, or to make any representations to the court. Even then, they did not concede the application. I am satisfied, as I say, that that was conduct that was unreasonable to a high degree, and which falls outside the norm for commercial litigation of this kind.

[52]So, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis. I have been provided with two costs statements. One relates only to the extension application. It amounts to £4,525.50 (exclusive of VAT). The other, relating to the summary judgment application, comes to £106,751.50, again exclusive of VAT. Although on an indemnity basis assessment, issues of proportionality are not engaged, nevertheless the court must be satisfied that costs have been reasonably incurred, and are also reasonable in amount.

[53]I note that the hourly rates charged are in excess of even the recently uplifted guideline hourly rates for solicitors within the National 1 scale, as the claimant’s solicitors based in Leeds are; but those guideline hourly rates are exactly that: they are a guideline. Sitting, as I do, mainly in Manchester, which also attracts National 1 rate, the hourly rates claimed are not unusual for hard-fought commercial litigation of the present kind. The guideline hourly rates cover a wide range of litigation; and I am satisfied that, for litigation of the present kind, where the claimant’s solicitors are pitched against London-based solicitors charging at a far higher rate, the rates being sought are reasonable.

[54]I acknowledge that a considerable number of hours’ work have been expended in relation to this litigation. The statement of costs is signed by a partner in the claimant’s solicitors’ practice, and I must therefore proceed on the footing that those are the hours that were actually incurred. Were those hours reasonable in amount? When one looks at the total amount of time spent on attendance on opponents, with over 19 hours at grade A rate, 33 hours at grade C rate, and over 25 hours at grade D rate, it is quite clear that because of the way in which the defendants have elected to conduct this litigation, including lengthy correspondence addressing serious professional allegations of breach of the Solicitors Code of Conduct, and involving alleged ethical violations, the number of hours spent overall is a reasonable response to that.

[55]I am satisfied that although on the face of it they are large, the costs that have been incurred are reasonable in amount, and that they have been reasonably incurred. I make one exception to that, and that is as regards the attendances at this hearing. The claimant has instructed experienced specialist counsel. In those circumstances, I do not consider that it was appropriate to have two fee earners, even at grade D level, attending this hearing. One alone would have been sufficient. That means that there should fall to be a small deduction from the total figure of £1,700, representing half the costs of attendance at the hearing and half the costs of travel.

[56]Making that deduction produces a figure of £105,051.50. Subject to that small deduction, I would summarily assess the costs at the amount claimed, less £1,700 producing a figure of £105,051.50. That, I am told, includes the reserved costs of the consent order. In addition, I would allow in full the figure claimed in relation to the extension application, which is £4,525.50. I make that £109,576. In addition to that, I will say ‘plus VAT if applicable’ because it is not presently clear to me why VAT should not be chargeable given that neither the property nor the claimant is registered for VAT purposes. So that is the figure that should be included in paragraph 8 of the order.

[57]I bear in mind also two matters in relation to costs: first, that I have received no representations concerning costs from the defendants’ solicitors even though the statement of costs was— MS MITCHELL: My Lord, I am reluctant to rise. A letter was sent yesterday on costs. Forgive me. JUDGE HODGE: Ah! Sorry, I have not seen that on CE-file. MS MITCHELL: I believe it was CE-filed. I have a copy, if I may hand that up, my Lord? JUDGE HODGE: Right, well then I had better look at that. MS MITCHELL: Yes, forgive me. JUDGE HODGE: Thank you. MS MITCHELL: It was sent yesterday in the latter part of the day, I believe. (Short pause) JUDGE HODGE: Yes.

[58]I must correct what I had just said about having received no representations as to costs. Ms Mitchell has handed me a letter that was sent to the court yesterday on 14 January. For some reason that letter – oh, no, it does appear on CE-file. I had overlooked it. No, it does appear on CE-file at case event 38. What the letter says is that:

“At 10.28 this morning Fladgate received from the claimant’s solicitors two statements of costs in respect of the two applications to be heard imminently. Whilst our client accepts the decision not to contest the hearing was its own, we consider that the very significant levels of costs detailed in the statements filed by the claimant would justify an order reserving costs to the determination of the substantive claim. Our clients consider that the extraordinary level of costs merit close scrutiny particularly in circumstances where the claimant will have known at the time of preparing the statements that they would be unchallenged at the forthcoming hearing.”

[59]I note that that letter does not raise any detailed criticism of the level of costs beyond stating that they are very significant and represent extraordinary levels of costs. However, no specific criticisms are directed to the figures in question. Fladgate could, had they wished, have drawn the court’s attention to particular matters.

[60]The other matter which I was going to mention was that I have no indication whatsoever by way of comparison of the level of costs incurred by Fladgate in this matter. The clear impression that I have is, as I have already stated, that this is a case where the defendant has spun the proceedings out, and, at the eleventh hour, indicated an intention not to appear and take issue with any aspect of the application. It would be entirely wrong in those circumstances for the court to defer any assessment of costs to a future occasion or hearing. Had they wished to attend, even for the purpose of challenging costs, the defendants could have done so.

[61]The philosophy of the Civil Procedure Rules, so far as interim applications are concerned, is one of ‘Pay as you Go’. This is a case where the time allocated to this hearing is one where a summary assessment of costs is generally appropriate, and undertaken; and I see no reason why I should not do so in this case. I see no reason to depart from the figure at which I have already arrived for both applications of £109,576 – sorry, £109,577 I think it is. So that is the figure at which I propose to assess the costs. As with the defence, I will provide for those costs to be payable by 4pm on Friday, 30 January 2026. So that concludes this extemporary judgment. (For proceedings after judgment see separate transcript) -------------------------- (This Judgment has been approved by HHJ Hodge KC.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com