[2026] EWHC 2185 (Ch)Case No BL-2026-000634IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECHANCERY DIVISIONBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESBUSINESS LISTVenue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 17 August 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE RICHARDSB E T W E E N
Between
SECRET MODE LIMITEDClaimantSIX DAYS HOLDINGS LIMITED (JERSEY)ClaimantVICTURA, INCDefendant(BY ORIGINAL ACTION)ClaimantA N D B E T W E E NClaimantVICTURA, INCClaimantSECRET MODE LIMITEDSIX DAYS HOLDINGS LIMITED (JERSEY)EMONA CAPITAL LLPSPLASH DAMAGE LIMITEDPart 20 Defendants(BY PART 20 CLAIM)Madeleine Heal (instructed by Colman Coyle Limited) for Defendant/Part 20 ClaimantTom Cleaver (instructed by Sheridans Solicitors LLP) for Claimants/Part 20 DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 29-30 July 2026 and 5 August 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
PART A - INTRODUCTION
[1]The underlying dispute in these proceedings concerns the development and publishing of a video game called Six Days in Fallujah (the Game). The following persons are relevant to the matters I have to decide: i) The Defendant (Victura) is the Game’s developer. Victura says that it has already spent $52m over 8 years developing the Game by, among other matters, producing the source code for it. ii) The First Claimant (Secret Mode) carries on a business of publishing video games (as distinct from developing those games). iii) The Second Claimant (Six Days) is a special purpose vehicle. Both Secret Mode and Six Days have some connection with Emona Capital LLP (Emona) which is an investment advisor to a private equity fund that has provided some of the funding under the Agreement described below. Unless necessary to distinguish between Secret Mode and Six Days, I will describe them together as the Publisher reflecting their role under that Agreement. iv) Splash Damage Limited (Splash Damage) is under common control with Secret Mode. Splash Damage therefore also has some connection with Emona. Splash Damage, like Victura, has some experience in the development of video games.[2]The Game is partially complete: it has been available for download on an “early access” basis over the important Steam platform that is used to sell PC games since 22 June 2023. Victura says that approximately $23 million in gross revenues have been generated from early access sales. Early access, as the name suggests, enables gamers to pay a reduced sum for access to a game that is not fully complete. Gamers who pay for early access expect regular releases of updates that not only fix bugs and glitches, but also introduce new content as the game progresses to full completion. At times material to present applications, version 0.5.4 of the Game was available on Steam.[3]Victura describes the Game as a “documentary military shooter”. It is based on real-world events that took place during military action in Fallujah in 2004. Victura describes how the Game has been developed with input from Marines and soldiers who fought in Fallujah at that time and also from Iraqi civilians. Its realism is said to be one of its defining characteristics and also one of the reasons it has cost so much to develop.[4]The Game involves the player taking a lead role in a series of missions, based on real-life missions that took place in Fallujah. The player is not the only character in those missions. There are also enemy fighters, members of the player’s own team and civilians whose behaviour is governed by AI systems. Because the Game aims to create an experience like that of a real-world military action, the plausibility or otherwise of those AI characters is important. Sometimes AI characters can behave implausibly, for example if an aspect of the AI system fails causing a particular character to stand motionless and stop moving (stuck AI). It is common ground that stuck AI detracts from the gaming experience. Reducing stuck AI is one of the tasks that must be undertaken before the Game can be completed.[5]The Game has been long in gestation. The original idea was conceived in 2005. Previous attempts to develop the Game by a company called “Atomic Games” failed. At some point subsequently Victura became the developer.
The Agreement
[6]The Agreement The sequence of events with which the court is now concerned began in October 2025 although, as noted, there was a considerable history to the Game and unsuccessful attempts to publish it before then. In October 2025 Secret Mode, Six Days and Victura entered into a publishing agreement (the Agreement). Secret Mode and Six Days were described as the “Publisher” in the Agreement and Victura was described as the “Developer”. By the Agreement: i) Victura granted the Publisher certain publishing rights in relation to the Game. ii) The Publisher agreed to pay costs associated with publishing the Game including the costs of marketing, promotion, server hosting and certain licence fees. The Agreement suggests that the parties were proceeding on the basis that the Publisher would spend around $3m in publishing the Game because, if the Publisher spent less than that, its share of profits from the Game described in paragraph v) below would reduce. iii) The Publisher agreed to provide up to $8m of funding to Victura to enable the Game to be completed. That funding, described in the Agreement as a Development Advance, was to be provided in stages. Successive tranches of funding were to be provided only when certain “milestones” were achieved. iv) Clause 3.04 of the Agreement required Victura to deliver “Milestone builds” embodying the product of its development work on various specified dates (as set out in a “Milestone Schedule”). Since Version 0.5.4 of the Game was available for download over Steam, the next applicable milestones were versions 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9. Version 1.0 would be the completed Game. After Victura submitted a particular Milestone build for review, the Publisher then had a period in which to review it to see if it was satisfactory. If the Publisher considered a particular Milestone build to be satisfactory, then it would notify Victura accordingly and the relevant tranche of the Development Advance would be released. If it did not, it would notify Victura of deficiencies it identified whereupon Victura would have the ability to resubmit. v) Once the Game is completed, both parties are entitled to recoup various amounts spent from revenue generated by exploitation. Once those amounts had been recouped, Victura and the Publisher would share net revenues derived from exploitation on a 50-50 basis. vi) The parties agreed that they were targeting a window of 15 October 2026 to 31 January 2027 for the release of the Game in final form.[7]The Agreement contained provisions that operated if the Publisher decided that a particular Milestone build was unsatisfactory. Very broadly, Victura had 20 business days to resubmit the Milestone build. If deficiencies were not addressed after two such resubmissions, the Agreement entitled the Publisher to exercise the Step In Right to “assume full or partial control of the Game’s continued development”.[8]Clause 4.04 also provided that the Step In Right could be exercised if Victura failed to maintain a minimum cash balance of $1m and did not cure that failure within 15 Business Days.[9]Clause 4.05 provides that a Step In Right cannot be exercised by reference to a trigger that arises solely as a result of the Publisher’s uncured breach of the Agreement.[10]The consequences of invoking the Step In Right are set out in Clauses 4.05 to 4.08 of the Agreement: i) the Publisher would be entitled to “use internal or third-party resources to complete, update, distribute, and commercialise the Game under this Agreement”, with its share of net revenues increasing to 75% (Clause 4.05); ii) Victura was obliged to cooperate with the Claimants by delivering up various specified assets including “the full current and historical source code of the Game, including version history” (Clause 4.06); and iii) the Publisher would have the benefit of a royalty-free, limited, non-exclusive, transferable and sub-licensable […] licence for the sole purpose of continuing to develop, market, publish and sell the Game on the Platforms” (Clause 4.07).[11]Clause 6.03 of the Agreement permitted Victura to terminate the Agreement if the Publisher was in material breach of its obligations or if it failed to pay a Development Advance that was due.[12]Some aspects of the economics of the Agreement are notable: i) At the point of signing the Agreement, Victura had spent some $50m developing the Game. Pursuant to the Agreement, it had the prospect of securing $8m in Development Advances from the Publisher and the Publisher spending around $3m on publishing and marketing the Game which Victura would otherwise have had to spend. Therefore, the Agreement offered Victura the prospect of obtaining some $11m of value from the Publisher. ii) In return for that, Victura had to give up at least 50% of revenues remaining after Victura and the Publisher had recovered certain recoupable amounts. iii) To obtain payment, Victura had to subject its work periodically to the Publisher’s scrutiny. If a particular Milestone build failed then Victura risked not receiving the relevant Milestone payment. If two resubmissions also failed, Victura faced having to allow the Publisher to take over development of the Game and suffering a reduction in revenue share to 25%. iv) Therefore, in return for obtaining up to $11m, Victura had both to give up 50% of revenues in the Game (after recovery of recoupable amounts) and take a good amount of risk. If the Step In Right was exercised, Victura faced losing a good part of the $50m it had already spent on the Game.
The underlying dispute
[13]The underlying dispute arose after the Publisher rejected Milestone 0.6 and two resubmissions between 31 January 2026 and April 2026. Splash Damage assisted the Publisher with that review. The Publisher’s stated reasons for rejecting Milestone 0.6 included ongoing problems with stuck AI and also concerns about loading times.[14]The Publisher asserts that, following the two failed resubmissions, it thereby became entitled to exercise the Step In Right with exercise of that Step In Right due to take effect on 1 May 2026.[15]However, Victura’s position is that the Step In Right never became effective because, on 29 April 2026, Victura terminated the Agreement on grounds of an alleged repudiatory breach or because Victura was entitled to terminate the Agreement in accordance with its terms.[16]That has resulted in the following claims: i) By a claim form issued on 22 May 2026 and associated Particulars of Claim, the Publisher seeks, among other matters, a declaration that it has validly exercised its Step In Right and orders requiring Victura to perform its obligations under Clause 4.06 of the Agreement. The Publisher seeks no monetary remedy. ii) By a Part 20 Claim Form issued on 29 May 2026 and its Defence and Counterclaim, Victura defends the Publisher’s claim. It seeks a declaration that the Agreement has been terminated. It denies that the Step In Right was validly exercised and so denies that it has any obligations under Clause 4.06. It asserts that the Publisher had pre-determined that Milestone 0.6 would be rejected in breach of a Braganza implied term. It asserts that the Publisher was in breach of its own publishing obligations. It also asserts, among other matters, that the Publisher, Emona and Splash Damage were party to an unlawful means conspiracy that included a pre-determined rejection of Milestone 0.6 with a view to acquiring access to Victura’s intellectual property.[17]On 3 June 2026, there was a hearing before Fancourt J. Fancourt J expedited the hearings of the two applications described below and made interim orders holding the ring in the meantime.[18]Fancourt J also ordered the Publisher to provide statements of revenue generated from sales of the Game in early access. The first statement was to cover the period from 29 April to 7 June 2026 with weekly statements to be provided thereafter.
The applications that are now before the court
[19]The applications that are now before the court The following matters were before me at the hearing on 29 and 30 July: i) There was a preliminary issue as to whether certain evidence is admissible in support of the applications described below. The evidence in question consisted of an account of a video call that took place on 9 April 2026 between Mr Tamte of Victura and Mr Blincoe of Secret Mode. Secret Mode argued that the conversation attracted the privilege that attaches to without prejudice communications. Victura disputed that and sought to adduce a Third Witness Statement of Mr Tamte (Tamte 3, with a similar naming convention being applied to other witness statements) to put the account of the conversation in context. Secret Mode objected to the admission of that witness statement on the basis that it trespassed on “without prejudice” privilege. ii) The Publisher’s application dated 21 May 2026 (the Publisher’s Application) for an interim injunction requiring Victura to provide certain material to it including source code so that the Publisher could exercise its Step In Right in the period up to trial of the claims. iii) Victura’s application dated 29 May 2026 for an injunction restraining the Publisher from any misuse of Victura’s confidential information and requiring the Publisher to give publishing control of the Game to Victura in the period between now and trial. Victura also seeks an injunction prohibiting the Publisher from taking any further step in exercise or purported exercise of Step In Rights, requiring the Publisher not to dissipate revenues received from sales of the Game and to hold those in a separate account. iv) Victura’s application of 17 July 2026 (the Console Application and together with the application described in paragraph iii) above, Victura’s Applications) for an injunction requiring the Publisher to restore to it publishing control of the Game on the Sony PlayStation developer portal and the Microsoft Xbox developer portal including by granting Victura full administrative and development access to the Game’s title information on both portals.[20]During the hearing on 29 to 30 July 2026, having reviewed Tamte 3 on a de bene esse basis, I gave an oral judgment concluding that the video call on 9 April 2026 attracted without prejudice privilege and therefore(i) Tamte 3 should not be admitted and(ii) other evidence of the video call on 9 April 2026 should similarly not be admitted.[21]In her oral submissions, Ms Heal aptly used the expression “the keys to the kingdom” to describe the essence of both the Publisher’s Application and Victura’s Applications. By its application, the Publisher seeks the “keys to the kingdom” in the sense that, until trial, it will have the right both to the develop the Game and to publish it without any input from Victura. That approach is consistent with the Publisher’s case that the Agreement continues (so that it retains publishing control pursuant to the Agreement) and it has exercised the Step In Right pursuant to the Agreement. By contrast, Victura’s Applications seek to give it the keys to the kingdom consisting of full development and publishing control over the Game, consistent with Victura’s case that the Agreement has been terminated.[22]Both Victura and the Publisher accept that they would need to offer a cross-undertaking in damages to obtain the relief that they seek.
The applicable test
[23]The applicable test Both parties agree that I should approach the injunction applications that are before me on familiar American Cyanamid principles. I should not, therefore, engage in a “mini-trial” with a view to deciding the merits of the underlying claims.[24]In his written skeleton argument on behalf of the Publisher, Mr Cleaver referred me to paragraphs [16] to [21] of judgment of Lord Hoffmann in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corporation Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1405 as setting out the correct approach in a case such as this. Subject to the point made in paragraph 25 below, Victura did not suggest that any different approach should be followed. I will, therefore, adopt the approach set out in Olint. In summary that approach distils to the following given the position of the parties in this case: i) Both the Publisher and Victura deny each other’s claims. However, neither side sought to persuade me, for the purposes of the present applications, that their opponents’ claims fail to raise a “serious issue to be tried”. I will, therefore, proceed on the basis that both the Publisher’s and Victura’s claims do give rise to a “serious issue to be tried”. ii) As I have explained, both sides are seeking interlocutory injunctions that give them the “keys to the kingdom” pending trial. Sometimes the grant of substantial interlocutory relief can render the outcome of a trial academic. For example, a target company that is the subject of a hostile takeover bid might claim that a particular solicitor cannot act for the bidder because of a conflict of interest. If interlocutory relief is granted restraining the solicitor from acting pending trial, there might be little point in the trial taking place because by the time it does take place, the takeover bid will either have succeeded or failed rendering the outcome of trial academic. In such cases, the court typically requires a “high degree of assurance” before granting interlocutory relief. However, both sides agree that this higher threshold does not apply in this case. While both sides seek substantial relief, they agree that, even if one side obtains relief, there will still be utility in the trial of the various claims. I therefore proceed on the relevant basis that(a) the relevant threshold that each party’s claims must surmount is that of “serious issue to be tried” and(b) because of the parties’ positions outlined in paragraph i) above, both parties’ claims get over that threshold. iii) The Publisher did argue, in its written skeleton argument, that damages under its cross-undertaking would be an appropriate remedy if the Publisher’s requested interlocutory injunctions were granted but subsequently set aside following trial. However, Mr Cleaver did not make much, if anything, of that point in oral submissions and in paragraph 92 below, I explain why I do not accept the point in any event. For its part, Victura did not suggest that damages under its cross-undertaking would be an adequate remedy if it obtained its interlocutory injunctions but they were set aside at trial. I therefore proceed on the basis that both sides’ applications must be determined by reference to the “balance of convenience” (i.e. whether granting or withholding the injunctions requested is more likely to produce a just result). Almost all of the parties’ oral submissions were directed at that issue. iv) Both the Publisher and Victura are seeking what can be described as mandatory injunctions as they seek to require the other party to take positive steps. On neither side’s formulation of the relief sought could the other party comply simply by doing nothing. I should refrain from adopting a “box-ticking exercise” that consists of classifying the relief sought as involving a mandatory injunction and then insisting that both sides satisfy me that the court can have a “high degree of assurance” that their claims should succeed. Rather, my task remains to consider which course will cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other. That invites a consideration of the practical consequences of granting or withholding the relief sought. Accordingly, I should certainly take into account the possibility that requiring a party to take action may well be more likely to cause irremediable prejudice. However, my task remains to consider risks of irremediable prejudice rather than simply to classify the injunctions sought as “mandatory” or “prohibitory”.[25]Victura also argues, by reference to the judgment of Laddie J in Series 5 Software Ltd v Clarke [1996] All ER 853, that it is permissible for the court to take into account any clear disparity between the strength of the parties’ cases when deciding what, if any, relief to order. The Publisher does not argue against that proposition, but makes the more limited point that it is not possible for the court to decide at this stage whether one party’s case is stronger than that of the other.
PART B - CONCLUSIONS ON PARTICULAR ISSUES
[26]PART B - CONCLUSIONS ON PARTICULAR ISSUES Before considering the applications that are before me, I start by reaching conclusions on various issues that will inform the exercise of my discretion.
Is Version 0.8 ready?
[27]Is Version 0.8 ready? Victura’s position as set out in paragraph 4 of Ross 2 is: The v0.8 build of the Game is complete. I describe below the specific features and improvements that it contains, each of which corresponds to contractual deliverables under the Agreement’s milestone schedule. The only reason the v.0.8 update has not been released is that Secret Mode holds Publishing Control of the Game’s Steam account.[28]It was accepted during the hearing that paragraph 4 of Ross 2 was not entirely accurate. To meet the v0.8 milestone, the Game must be “PlayStation Networking and Xbox First Playable”. That, in turn, requires that “Co-op mode is playable on PS5”. However, the premise behind Victura’s Console Application is that it lacks development access to the PlayStation portal that would be necessary for these requirements to be met. Victura’s position is that Ross 2 is true in relation to the Game as sold over the Steam platform (i.e. a version of the Game that can be played on PCs rather than gaming consoles such as PS5 or Xbox). Mr Tamte also says in Tamte 6 that Victura has rearranged the order of tasks so that work that does not involve PlayStation networking (that would otherwise form part of the v0.9 milestone) has been accelerated so that overall no time has been lost.[29]Mr Ross’s position in Ross 2 is that Victura remains on track to deliver the Release Candidate by 31 December 2026. The “Release Candidate” is defined in the Agreement as a “final shippable build ready for certification on all platforms”. It is a version of the Game that “runs at 100% of target performance on all platforms”.[30]The Publisher is not prepared to accept that upbeat assessment of the readiness of v0.8 and progress towards the Release Candidate. It observes that it has, through its solicitors, asked Victura on 24 June 2026 to provide it with v0.8 saying that, if it is as good as Victura claims it to be, the Publisher will make it available for download over the Steam platform. The Publisher says that Victura’s failure to respond to that offer by providing it with sight of v0.8 speaks volumes and it invites me to draw the inference that v0.8 is not ready. For its part, Victura stresses that, on its view, the Agreement is at an end and so it has no obligation to provide anything to the Publisher and, in any event, there is no point in making v0.8 available for download over Steam since the Publisher shows no sign of complying with its obligations to market the update so as to create the necessary excitement in the market necessary for the update to be well-received.[31]I cannot determine this factual dispute on the papers, not least since I must not perform a mini-trial. I regard it as unfortunate indeed that Victura has not provided the Publisher with the v0.8 that it says it has developed. It does seem to me that provision of this version, if necessary without prejudice to Victura’s contention that the Agreement is terminated, could have gone a long way to restoring some trust between the parties. If that v0.8 is as good as Victura says, it could have paved the way for the parties to agree some co-operation until trial, rather than both sides seeking interim relief that gives them the keys to the kingdom to the entire exclusion of the other.[32]I regard Victura’s approach in refusing to provide the Publisher with v0.8 as unhelpful and probably counter-productive. However, an explanation has been given as to why Victura takes this stance which is consistent with its stance in the litigation to date. I accept that Mr Ross believes v0.8 is substantially complete, hence his evidence set out in paragraph 27 above.[33]However, insofar as Victura asks me to proceed on the basis that v0.8 is complete (at least as regards the PC version of the Game) and that it is on course to deliver a Release Candidate by 31 December 2026, I do not see how I can securely do so. I am certainly not disbelieving Mr Ross, or Mr Tamte. I am quite prepared to accept that they genuinely believe that v.0.8 is complete (as regards the PC version of the Game) and that a Release Candidate by December 2026 is achievable. However, the fact that they believe those statements cannot be determinative of the actual position. After all, the parties have diametrically opposite views on whether v0.6 was ever completed satisfactorily. In addition, when he provided Ross 2, Mr Ross evidently overlooked the fact that to meet fully the requirements of the Agreement, v0.8 had to be “PlayStation Networking and Xbox First playable”. It may be that this is a point of detail. However, with a project as complicated as this, details matter and this oversight is a further reason why I will not accept uncritically Mr Ross’s opinions about v0.8.[34]Without some evidence as to the Publisher’s perspectives on v0.8 I do not consider I can make secure findings on whether v0.8 is complete or when Victura can produce a Release Candidate. Victura’s actions in declining to make v0.8 available mean that I can have no evidence of the Publisher’s assessment on this issue.
Proprietary elements of the source code
[35]Proprietary elements of the source code A central allegation underpinning Victura’s claims is that the Publisher engineered a pre-ordained failure of the v0.6 milestone so that it could purport to exercise the Step In Right and thereby obtain access to Victura’s source code that contains proprietary and secret techniques.[36]Of course I will not attempt to decide that allegation but it is appropriate for me to explain what, if any, proprietary and secret techniques the source code contains as that will be a guide to the evaluation of the balance of convenience.[37]Tamte 1 and Tamte 2 explain a proprietary aspect of Victura’s source code, namely its procedural architecture system. That enables the generation of a physical layout of buildings that is different each time the game is played. That in turn ensures that when gamers play the game, no two sessions are identical. Mr Tamte also explains a further consequential aspect of that proprietary technology, namely that AI generated agents and controllable AI team-mates then interact with the procedurally generated architecture in a believable way rather than operating from fixed scripts. So, for example, once the proprietary techniques have generated a particular building, AI team-mates determine for themselves which parts of that building provide cover from enemy fire rather than being told which parts provide cover and which do not.[38]The Publisher accepts that some of the procedural architecture system may be proprietary. It seeks to downplay the significance of this, however, arguing that the system simply generates authentic-looking buildings in Fallujah which would be of little transferable value in other games. It also submits that the significance of the proprietary techniques is limited since this whole dispute has arisen because the AI is not interacting satisfactorily with the environment.[39]I cannot determine this difference of opinion at the interlocutory stage. I proceed on the basis that Victura’s source code does indeed contain proprietary and secret techniques. I am simply unable to assess the significance and values of those techniques and therefore proceed on the basis that they could be significant and valuable or they could not.
Does Victura have the expertise to complete development of the Game?
[40]Does Victura have the expertise to complete development of the Game? It is quite clear that Victura has the necessary expertise. While the Publisher has been critical of some of Victura’s work to date on v0.6, it does not suggest that Victura lacks expertise.
Does Victura have the expertise to publish the Game?
[41]Does Victura have the expertise to publish the Game? “Publishing” a game used to involve distributing physical media such as CD-ROMS to bricks and mortar stores that would sell them. However, these days many games are simply downloaded (over Steam for example). A game can be made available for download over Steam at the touch of a button. In the present world “publishing” a game is predominantly about marketing and ensuring that demand for the Game is stimulated both through traditional advertising and engagement with influencers and fanbase over social media.[42]To read Mr Tamte’s witness statements is to see both his and Victura’s passion for the Game. Moreover, Mr Tamte stresses, and I accept, that the Game is not appropriately characterised simply as a “first-person shooter” but is intended to have a specialist niche appeal as a realistic “military shooter” that relies heavily on its authentic use of military tactics and its replication of the look and feel of military engagements in Fallujah in 2004. I accept that Mr Tamte in particular, and Victura more generally, has a particular expertise in marketing a game such as this with that expertise drawing on its significant engagement with the experiences of military personnel and Iraqi civilians drawn from the period in question. Mr Tamte is not the only person at Victura with this kind of expertise. Victura also has the services of Mr Ross who was formerly associate project director for the successful Call of Duty franchise.[43]Victura has the expertise to publish the Game.
Does the Publisher have the expertise to complete development of the Game?
[44]Does the Publisher have the expertise to complete development of the Game? The Publisher does not suggest that it has, itself, the expertise to develop the Game. However, Mr Blincoe says in Blincoe 2 that it has access to such expertise in two respects. First, Splash Damage is a company affiliated with Secret Mode and Secret Mode will, therefore, be able to draw on Splash Damage’s expertise. Second, Secret Mode as an experienced publisher of games has a network of developers who it knows and who it could involve in development of the Game.[45]Victura argues that Splash Damage lacks the expertise necessary to develop the Game. It argues that Splash Damage is a failed business that has not released a game in the “first person shooter” genre for 6 years and has no experience whatsoever of military shooters. Victura characterises Splash Damage as a failed business because of public commentary in November 2025 to the effect that it had placed its entire workforce on redundancy consultation.[46]I cannot perform a mini-trial as to the relative competence of, on the one hand, Victura and Splash Damage on the other. However, I am quite satisfied on the evidence that, if required to complete development of the Game, the Publisher could do so. To the extent that there are problems with the Game, those problems relate largely to AI. In Blincoe 1, Mr Blincoe gives evidence specifically on Splash Damage’s AI engineering capability. Moreover, I accept Mr Blincoe’s evidence that the Publisher has a sufficiently large network of contacts among software developers to be able to enlist someone other than Splash Damage to assist as necessary.[47]A good part of Victura’s case about the Publisher’s asserted lack of development expertise was impressionistic and advanced by way of submission rather than concrete evidence. So, for example, Ms Heal made much in her submissions of Splash Damage’s lack of expertise of “telling stories”, which she said was at the heart of the Game. She also made the submission, not supported by evidence, that while Splash Damage had been involved in Halo: the Master Chief Collection (a very successful first person shooter), all it had done was assemble content that was otherwise available into a single “collection”, an assertion that the Publisher denies.[48]Ultimately, I am not prepared to accept Victura’s assertion that the Publisher could not obtain access to the resource necessary to complete the Game since there was ample evidence that the Publisher could do so. Recognising the constraints associated with my inability to perform a mini-trial, I am prepared to accept that Victura may have greater expertise than Splash Damage or anyone else that the Publisher could involve in developing the Game. I cannot decide that one way or the other.[49]I do, however, accept that there is a real prospect that, if the Publisher took over development of the Game, the Game would be completed later, and perhaps much later, than it would be if Victura continued to develop it. No particular evidence is needed for that conclusion which is simply a matter of common sense. If the Publisher obtained a transfer of Victura’s source code to enable it to complete development, there would necessarily be a period during which it would have to familiarise itself with that code and the problems to which it gives rise before it could even think about progressing the Game towards a Release Candidate. By definition, that would be work that Victura would not need to perform. Mr Seghers makes this point clearly in Seghers 1.[50]I simply cannot estimate how long any such additional delay might be. Mr Seghers thought it could be more than six months. Mr Blincoe thought it could be three to six months but could be less if an incoming developer found efficiency savings that had eluded Victura. The best I can do is proceed on the basis that there is a real risk of a material additional delay if the Publisher took over development of the Game.
Does the Publisher have the expertise to publish the Game?
[51]Does the Publisher have the expertise to publish the Game? It is quite clear to me that the Publisher has at least the bare minimum of expertise to publish the Game. Blincoe 2 sets out details of the Publisher’s publishing credentials that included successful titles such as Star Wars: Galactic Racer and Escape the Backrooms.[52]In submissions, Victura sought to characterise the Publisher’s expertise as being in publishing more budget games. It submitted that, because of the military component to the Game, and the need to interact with the specialist military gaming community, Secret Mode is “institutionally incapable” of publishing the Game. Victura stresses that Escape the Backrooms, which it accepts has enjoyed considerable commercial success, was a budget game that retailed for less than $10. By contrast, the Game in early access retails for $40 and when complete can be expected to cost much more.[53]I am prepared to accept, without deciding (since I cannot do so without performing a mini-trial) that Victura may have more expertise than Secret Mode in publishing a game such as the Game. However, the proposition that Secret Mode is “institutionally incapable” of publishing the Game strikes me as considerably overstated and perhaps a reflection on the deteriorating relationship between Secret Mode and Victura rather than on Secret Mode’s own publishing acumen. Moreover, when it signed the Agreement, Victura cannot have believed that Secret Mode was “institutionally incapable” of publishing the Game since Victura gave up 50% of its rights to share in profits generated from sales of the Game in consideration for a package that included Secret Mode’s agreement to publish the Game. I was also told that the Agreement contains no restrictions on Secret Mode’s ability to, for example, determine the retail price of the Game. To give that level of power to Secret Mode over the publishing of the Game, Victura must have thought that, in October 2025, Secret Mode was well capable of publishing the Game. I am not prepared to accept that Secret Mode lost all that expertise in just a few months.[54]Victura also points to what it asserts to be Secret Mode’s breach of its obligations to market the Game. Again, I cannot perform a mini-trial on the extent or otherwise of any such breaches. However, even if Secret Mode has breached the Agreement in the past, it would conceptually be open to the court to insist that any interim relief granted to Secret Mode requires Secret Mode to undertake to use reasonable or best endeavours to adhere to its contractual obligations.[55]Finally, Victura points to the fact that(i) in the 12-month period when Victura was publishing the Game itself (i.e. prior to Secret Mode assuming publishing control in November 2025), revenues from the Game were $3.826m, but(ii) in the 10-week period from 29 April 2026 to 7 July 2026 (after the Publisher says it exercised its Step In Right), revenues from the Game were just $73,254. After adjusting the 12-month figure so that it referenced a notional 10-week period, Victura invites me to conclude that it oversaw 10 times as much revenue from the Game as did the Publisher. I accept the arithmetic, but the conclusion is flawed. While both sides blame the other for this state of affairs, there have been no updates to the Game between 29 April and 7 July. By contrast, the 12 months in which Victura had publishing control coincided with the Game first becoming available for download over Steam and the inevitable stimulation to sales that arose as a result.
How much is it likely to cost to complete development and publishing of the Game?
[56]How much is it likely to cost to complete development and publishing of the Game? I have some evidence on this matter in Tamte 6. Mr Tamte estimates that it will cost $3.8m to complete development of the Game. I accept that this is Mr Tamte’s genuine view of the likely cost. I cannot, of course, determine what the actual cost will be. Mr Tamte’s estimate necessarily proceeds on the basis that v0.8 of the Game has been completed. That assumption may, or may not, be correct (see paragraph 33 above).[57]Mr Tamte estimates that it will cost some $3m to complete the publication of the Game. The costs factored into that estimate are largely marketing costs and do not include internal staff salaries. The estimate also ignores any revenues generated from sales of the Game.[58]In submissions, Mr Cleaver did not dissent significantly from the $3m estimate for publication. He submitted that the development costs could be estimated by using the $8m of funding to be provided under the Agreement as a proxy. $2.6m of that sum has been paid. There is a dispute about whether $1.3m should be paid for v0.6. Therefore, he submitted that development costs were likely to be between $4.1m and $5.4m. Of course, the difficulty with that approach is that it assumes that Victura has to date made no progress at all towards v0.8. That seems unduly pessimistic since, while I am not prepared to find that v0.8 is, or is not, complete there is a good quantity of evidence that suggests that at least some meaningful progress has been made towards completion of v0.8.[59]Ultimately, the only estimates that are evidenced are those given in Tamte 6. While I acknowledge that the development estimate could be somewhat too low, I consider it appropriate to use Mr Tamte’s estimates as a starting point when evaluating the balance of convenience.
The nature of potential claims under the cross-undertaking in damages
[60]The nature of potential claims under the cross-undertaking in damages Mr Tamte’s witness evidence paints a vivid picture of the importance of momentum to sales of the Game. I accept that timely and frequent release of high-quality updates to the Game can, with appropriate marketing, drive a virtuous circle. The updates and marketing stimulate gamers’ interest, more people play and write about the Game on social media, more gamers are waiting in lobbies to play and a “buzz” is generated that drives increased sales. By contrast, infrequent updates, or updates of poor quality that do not take the Game forward are capable of having the opposite effect. In that case, the Game can be perceived as stagnant, gamer interest declines and there is no buzz to drive sales.[61]It follows that if either the Publisher or Victura is given the “keys to the kingdom” (to use Ms Heal’s phrase), I consider there to be real scope for the other to complain that either delay, or poor quality work, has had an impact on sales, leading to claims under the cross-undertaking in damages if any interim injunction is set aside at trial.[62]The risk is more acute if the Publisher takes over development of the Game. As I have noted, in that case, the Publisher (or the developer it engages) would need to become familiar with Victura’s source code. That gives rise to the real risk of a material additional delay that I identify in paragraph 50 above. If the Publisher obtains interim relief which is set aside at trial, it is quite possible to envisage Victura arguing that the delay has had a significant and adverse effect on the Game’s commercial viability. Such a claim would be complicated. It would involve a difficult analysis of counterfactuals such as how Victura could have been expected to perform if it had been allowed to continue to develop the Game. Moreover, it could be a large claim. Victura has already alluded to what it sees as the lack of knowledge of both the Publisher and Splash Damage of the aspects of the Game that make it so distinctive. It is quite possible to foresee Victura arguing that the combination of delay and lack of expertise on the part of the Publisher has contributed to an unsatisfactory release of the Game and a corresponding loss to Victura of a good part of its investment of over $50m. Of course I cannot tell whether any such claim would succeed, but I consider that the cross-undertaking could expose the Publisher to the risk of a large claim being made if interim relief granted to the Publisher is set aside at trial.[63]A similar risk exists in relation to any cross-undertaking that Victura offers. The Publisher is already alleging that Victura has done an unsatisfactory job on the v0.6 milestone. I am not prepared to proceed on the basis that all of these problems have been fixed in a v0.8 milestone that Victura says it has ready (see paragraph 33 above). It is therefore quite possible that the Publisher will make similar arguments in support of a claim under Victura’s cross-undertaking. However, in my judgment, Victura is taking somewhat less risk under its cross-undertaking than is the Publisher. That is because there would be no delay inbuilt into Victura’s continued development of the Game. Moreover, while there is certainly a dispute as to whether Victura did a good job on v0.6, its expertise to develop a game such as the Game is less in question.
Victura’s financial condition
[64]Victura’s financial condition I was shown Victura’s balance sheet as at 30 April 2026. I agree with the Publisher that it is weak. Liabilities of $12.03m significantly exceed assets of $4.7m. Moreover, those assets appear to include $1.3m in respect of the disputed Development Advance relating to v0.6.[65]Victura does not suggest that its balance sheet as at 30 April 2026 provides much reassurance about its ability to complete development and/or publishing of the Game. Rather, it suggests that reassurance on this matter can come from recent significant and successful fund-raising efforts. In summary: i) Victura has raised around $4.9m at a 0% interest rate and with repayment due only after the Game has been commercially released in full. ii) Lenders are to be rewarded with participating preferred stock in Victura intended to have a face value of four times the amount invested plus further rights of participation. iii) Lenders have already advanced the amount of this financing. iv) As at 30 June 2026 nearly $4m stood to the credit of Victura’s bank accounts.[66]The difficulty with that is that, even on Mr Tamte’s evidence, Victura does not have the liquid resources necessary to fund both the development and the publication of the Game. Mr Tamte realistically accepts that there is a shortfall of about $3m. He addresses that shortfall as follows: i) He points out the Game can be expected to earn revenue. After the last major update, the Game generated nearly $2.6m in sales in the 5 months after that update was released. ii) Mr Tamte expresses confidence that he would be able to approach distributors and co-publishers to provide marketing funding in exchange for distribution rights. iii) Alternatively, the same funders who provided the funding described in paragraph 65 could be expected to provide funding to cover publishing as well. Alternatively, Victura has already had conversations with private credit firms who are now providing funding to video game developers.[67]It is quite clear that Mr Tamte has put in a significant effort to raise money. However, I am unable to accept that Victura has a clear path towards raising all the sums necessary to fund both development and publication of the Game. Overall, I conclude that the proposals for funding the shortfall are lacking specifics and based on hope rather than the presence of existing liquid facilities.[68]I acknowledge the possibility that revenues from the Game could help to fill the funding gap. However, those revenues are inherently uncertain given the issues associated with the Game to date. Moreover, Victura offered through counsel to pay 25% of those game revenues into an escrow account to deal with potential concerns about its ability to meet claims under its cross-undertaking. Sums paid into escrow would not be available to fund marketing costs.[69]Victura’s scope to raise still further finance to fund the $3m shortfall must, in my judgment, be constrained by the terms of the finance it has just raised. Although carrying a 0% interest rate, that remains expensive finance if the Game is successful as investors are to obtain a return equal to four times their original investment together also with some share in the equity of Victura.[70]Even if it could complete development and publication of the Game, it would have nothing left with which to satisfy any claims made under the cross-undertaking in damages. I do not accept that Victura’s offer to pay 25% of (uncertain) revenues from the Game provides sufficient comfort that claims under the cross-undertaking could be met.[71]A still further problem with Victura’s financial situation is that it envisages any claims under the cross-undertaking in damages being significantly funded out of the proceeds of borrowed money. Borrowed money does not offer full reassurance that a cross-undertaking in damages can be met as a simplistic example demonstrates. If a person borrows 100 and has a liability under a cross-undertaking of 100, that person has liabilities of 200 and cash of 100. If the borrowings and liabilities under the cross-undertaking rank pari passu, the borrowed money can only pay half of the liability arising under the cross-undertaking.[72]Overall, I am unable to conclude that Victura has sufficient funds to complete both development and publication of the Game. Moreover, while I consider that Victura is taking less risk on its cross-undertaking than is the Publisher (see paragraph 63) it is still taking some risk. I am not satisfied that Victura has sufficient financial resources to offer realistic assurance that it could meet claims under its cross-undertaking. In submissions, Ms Heal argued that anticipated revenues from the Game would be adequate security for Victura’s cross-undertaking. I am unable to accept that. Revenues from the Game are too uncertain for that to be a secure conclusion.
The Publisher’s financial condition
[73]The Publisher’s financial condition Ms Heal’s written skeleton argument suggested that the Publisher’s financial situation was weak. Submissions were made by reference to a report of Kevin Foster FCA of RPG Crouch Chapman who had considered, among other documents, Secret Mode’s most recent published accounts (drawn up to 31 December 2024).[74]However, Secret Mode has recently been the subject of a takeover that led to it becoming affiliated with Splash Damage. In his oral submissions, Mr Cleaver made submissions on Secret Mode’s financial condition by reference to much more recent management accounts. In her oral submissions, Ms Heal said little if anything about the Publisher’s financial situation.[75]Six Days and Secret Mode between them have access to the following cash resources: i) In order to commit to providing up to $8m pursuant to the Agreement, Six Days had to have facilities that provided it access to those sums. It has drawn down $2.6m on those sources of funding. Blincoe 1 confirms that Six Days remains entitled to draw down the remaining $5.4m and use that sum both to develop and publish the Game. ii) As at 30 April 2026, Secret Mode had a cash balance of approximately $4.25m. iii) Secret Mode has enjoyed commercial success from games such as Escape the Backrooms and Star Wars: Galactic Racer. It is therefore cash-generative. Blincoe 3 confirms that, on the basis of the current sales trajectory, Secret Mode expects to have a cash balance of over $24m at the end of December 2026. This is a cash balance estimated on the basis of sales that are already being made. It is different from Victura’s estimate of sales of the Game which rely on future contingent events to stimulate those sales.[76]I consider that the Publisher has sufficient liquid cash resources to fund the entirety of Mr Tamte’s estimate of future development and publishing costs set out in paragraphs 56 to 59 above.[77]I also consider Secret Mode’s cash balance to be sufficient to offer appropriate backing for a cross-undertaking in damages. Of course, even on its own projections, it does not hold enough cash to pay a claim of above $24m. I have acknowledged that claims against the Publisher under the cross-undertaking could be large indeed. However, it does not follow from that that claims would necessarily be in excess of this level.
Whether Victura’s claim is materially stronger than that of the Publisher
[78]Whether Victura’s claim is materially stronger than that of the Publisher Victura invites me to conclude that its claim is materially stronger than that of the Publisher and that this should affect my assessment of the balance of convenience in line with Series 5 Software. I am unable to accept that submission. There is simply no prospect of me forming an even preliminary view on the merits of the claims in a technical dispute such as this on the basis of what I can be shown in a hearing lasting a day and a half.[79]Central to Victura’s assertion was the proposition that there was a smoking gun at the heart of the Publisher’s case, namely that in its comparative testing of the v0.6 milestone against v0.5.4, the Publisher found no instances of permanently stuck AI in v0.5.4. but seven instances in its testing of the second resubmission of v0.6. Victura argues that this simply beggars belief given the known issues with stuck AI in v0.5.4 that is documented in Victura’s own contemporaneous reports that suggest on average 23.76 instances of stuck AI per session as well as comments from gamers complaining about stuck AI in v0.5.4. Victura therefore suggests that the Publisher’s own testing notes themselves provide evidence that the testing process was rigged and pre-determined to result in a v0.6 being rejected.[80]I cannot make that finding on the limited evidence I have seen, none of which has been tested in cross-examination. In an email of 13 March 2026, Mr Tamte expressed understanding of Mr Blincoe’s “frustration about our AI issues”. Mr Tamte described a resolution of AI issues as being of “mission-critical importance”. Only trial will show whether the Publisher’s testing process was rigged as Victura suggests. However, at this early stage it strikes me as plausible that significant AI problems remained in the v0.6 milestones.
PART C – VICTURA’S APPLICATION
[81]PART C – VICTURA’S APPLICATION Serious issue to be tried and adequacy of damages The Publisher does not seek to persuade me that Victura’s claims fail to give rise to a serious issue to be tried. Nor does it suggest that damages would be an adequate remedy for those claims. For its part, Victura does not suggest that damages under its cross-undertaking in damages would be adequate remedy if it obtains interim relief that is set aside at trial. Victura’s application therefore involves purely an analysis of the balance of convenience.
The balance of convenience
[82]The balance of convenience In support of its submissions on balance of convenience, Victura points to damage that it has suffered from what it describes as “continued exclusion” from the development and publication of the Game. It says that it has been carrying alone the cost of a 43-strong development team. It notes that the Game’s review scores, and so its perception, are declining and that every day without meaningful updates hurts reviews and impacts on possibility of a successful v.1.0 launch. It suggests that Victura’s failure to market the Game, and spend money to do so, are having a serious effect on the Game.[83]I understand those as articulations of grievance and loss said to have been suffered by the Publisher’s breach of the Agreement. However, on their own they say relatively little about where the balance of convenience falls. To support a claim for interim relief, Victura must show that the balance comes down in favour of giving it publishing and development control in the period up to trial recognising that this might be shown to be wrong at trial. Central to that is the ability or otherwise of Victura to make meaningful strides towards completing the Game while also having resources sufficient to meet claims under its cross-undertaking.[84]I recognise that an attraction of Victura’s proposal is that Victura continues to develop the Game with its undoubted ability to do so. No time would be lost in a potentially difficult handover to the Publisher.[85]I am also prepared to accept that Victura has a distinctive expertise that it could bring to bear when publishing a military shooter. Victura’s formulation of the relief would allow that expertise to be leveraged.[86]However a fundamental problem with Victura’s proposal is that I am not satisfied that Victura has sufficiently certain financial resources available to it to complete marketing and publication. A world in which Victura takes over development of the Game but runs out of money before the Game is complete represents the worst of all possible worlds.[87]Nor do I consider that Victura has sufficient financial resources to meet claims under its cross-undertaking.[88]I consider those indications to weigh forcefully and conclusively against the grant of interim relief to Victura.
PART D – THE PUBLISHER’S APPLICATION
[89]PART D – THE PUBLISHER’S APPLICATION Serious issue to be tried Victura does not seek to persuade me that the Publisher’s claim fails to raise a serious issue to be tried. It clearly does raise a serious issue to be tried with the Publisher’s claims being appropriately supported by evidence.
Whether damages are an adequate remedy
[90]Whether damages are an adequate remedy Victura does not seek to persuade me that damages would be an adequate remedy for the Publisher’s claims.[91]The Publisher’s skeleton argument sought (albeit briefly) to assert that, if it obtains its interim relief, then damages under the cross-undertaking would be an adequate remedy for Victura if the Publisher’s claim fails at trial. In essence, the Publisher argued that in such a case Victura’s claim would simply be for the additional 25% of revenue (after recovery of recoupable expenses) to which it would be entitled under the Agreement if the Publisher’s claim fails.[92]I do not accept that analysis. If the Publisher’s claim fails and Victura’s claim succeeds then the Agreement will have been shown to have been terminated in April 2026. In that situation, the Publisher should not have been exercising any publishing or developmental control over the Game after that point. Victura could in that situation have suffered loss if the Publisher’s actions in relation to the Game caused revenues from it to suffer. Any such claim would be complicated, dependent on counterfactuals and difficult to quantify as discussed in paragraphs 60 to 63 above. I do not consider that damages for such a claim would be an adequate remedy in circumstances in which ex hypothesi, Victura should, with hindsight, have been free to develop and publish the Game as it saw fit.
Balance of convenience
[93]Balance of convenience Therefore, the question whether to grant the Publisher its relief comes down to the balance of convenience. Factors that weigh in favour of granting the Publisher the relief it claims are as follows: i) The Publisher has, or has access to, sufficient expertise to complete development of the Game and to publish it. ii) The Publisher has sufficient financial resources available to it to complete development of the Game and to publish it. Even after funding development and publication of the Game, it would have adequate financial resources to meet reasonably likely claims under its cross-undertaking. iii) Granting the Publisher relief at least opens the prospect of some progress being made on the Game in the period before trial.[94]Factors that weigh against granting the Publisher its relief are as follows: i) There is a serious issue to be tried to the effect that the Publisher has engineered the obtaining of Victura’s source code that could well contain valuable proprietary elements by a pre-determined and illegitimate refusal to accept the v0.6 milestone. There is a serious issue to be tried to the effect that the Publisher has combined with Splash Damage and Emona to perpetrate an economic tort against Victura. The Publisher’s relief therefore risks giving the Publisher the very thing it was (on Victura’s case) seeking to obtain by illegitimate means at an interlocutory stage and without a trial. ii) Relatedly, granting the Publisher its relief gives it, following an investment of some $2.6m, source code that Victura has spent over $50m in developing. I do not need to go as far as accepting Victura’s argument that the Publisher’s relief is akin to asking a drug company to hand over a secret formula to a rival. The sheer disparity between the investments to date of Victura and the Publisher give rise to a real risk of irremediable damage to Victura in those circumstances. That real risk arises, as the judgment of the Privy Council in Olint notes, precisely because of the mandatory nature of the injunction that the Publisher seeks. iii) The benefits of allowing the Publisher to take over development of the Game could be illusory. If it takes a long time for the Publisher to understand the source code following a handover, the Game could, in the interim become stale and the prospects of a commercially successful launch be significantly impaired by the delay. That strikes me as a real risk that significantly detracts from the attractiveness of the Publisher’s approach. iv) Granting the Publisher interim relief could open a new front in hostilities between the Publisher and Victura with Victura looking for ways to assert that the Publisher’s development and/or publication of the Game has been defective so as to claim under the Publisher’s cross-undertaking. That might reduce the possibility of the Publisher and Victura reaching an accommodation under which they work together to bring the Game to a successful release.[95]The impact of some of the factors pointing against the grant of relief could be mitigated in any order the court makes. For example, Clause 4.07 of the Agreement contemplates that, if the Step In Right is exercised, the Publisher obtains a licence only to use the source code for the sole purpose of developing, marketing and selling the Game. Relief could be granted that is conditional on the Publisher giving an undertaking not to use the source code for any other purposes with any breach of that undertaking potentially punishable as a contempt of court. That is not a complete answer, however. The court should not be naïve. If, as is alleged, the Publisher has perpetrated an economic tort with a view to accessing source code that contains proprietary elements and trade secrets, it may not comply with court orders.[96]I also regard the risk that the Publisher’s relief is worse than a negotiated accommodation as a real one. There is clearly currently ill-feeling between the parties. Victura feels that it has been commercially wronged. The Publisher resents Victura’s allegations of improper business practices. However, if the parties can put aside those feelings, it seems to me that reasonable negotiations ought to be able to reach some kind of accommodation: i) If, as Victura says, there is a substantially complete version 0.8 and Victura is on course to produce a Release Candidate by 31 December 2026 there is an obvious attraction in seeking to preserve the collaboration at least until trial. ii) That attraction is only the more obvious in circumstances where the Publisher has sufficient funds to complete development and marketing whereas Victura does not. iii) Perhaps a means of focusing attention on this matter would be for Victura to make available its v0.8 to the Publisher for evaluation. If it is as good as Victura says both sides might be able to reflect on their common interest in having the Game completed rather than dwelling on present ill-feeling between them. A formal mediation could help with this.[97]Victura has expressed scepticism about the prospect of a successful mediation citing what it sees as the Publisher’s perpetrating of an economic tort against it. That position may have been sustainable when Victura thought that it might obtain the keys to the kingdom by way of its own claim for interim relief. However, now that Victura’s claim for interim relief has failed, it may have to recalibrate its expectations.[98]I have not found the question at all straightforward. I regard the Publisher’s application for interim relief as having more going for it than Victura’s application. However, on balance, I have concluded that the factors pointing against allowing the Publisher’s Application are more weighty than those pointing in favour of allowing it.
The Console Application
[99]The Console Application Making no order on the two applications means that I am not proposing to disturb the status quo under the Agreement to the effect that Victura is the developer and the Publisher is the publisher.[100]I do not understand the Publisher to resist an order that it provides Victura with developer access to the PlayStation developer portal and the Microsoft Xbox developer portal.[101]However, I will not make an order requiring the Publisher to give up access to its own publisher access to those portals.